Greene joins Morgan on the Catawba.—Adopts the Fabian Policy.—Movement
of Cornwallis to cross the Catawba.—Affair at McGowan’s
Ford.—Militia surprised by Tarleton at Tarrant’s Tavern.—Cornwallis
checked by the Rising of the Yadkin.—Contest of Skill and Speed of
the Two Armies in a March to the Banks of the Dan.
General Greene was gladdened by a letter from Morgan, written shortly
after his defeat of Tarleton, and transmitted the news to Washington
with his own generous comments. “The victory was complete,” writes he,
“and the action glorious. The brilliancy and success with which it was
fought, does the highest honor to the American arms, and adds splendor
to the character of the general and his officers. I must beg leave to
recommend them to your Excellency’s notice, and doubt not but from your
representation, Congress will receive pleasure from testifying their
approbation of their conduct.”
Another letter from Morgan, written on the 25th, spoke of the approach
of Cornwallis and his forces. “My numbers,” writes he, “are at this time
too weak to fight them. I intend to move towards Salisbury, to get near
the main army. I think it would be advisable to join our forces, and
fight them before they join Phillips, which they certainly will do if
they are not stopped.”
Greene had recently received intelligence of the landing of troops at
Wilmington, from a British squadron, supposed to be a force under
Arnold, destined to push up Cape Fear River, and coöperate with
Cornwallis; he had to prepare, therefore, not only to succor Morgan, but
to prevent this coöperation. He accordingly detached General Stevens
with his Virginia militia (whose term of service was nearly expired) to
take charge of Morgan’s prisoners, and conduct them to Charlottesville
in Virginia. At the same time he wrote to the governors of North
Carolina and Virginia, for all the aid they could furnish; to Steuben,
to hasten forward his recruits, and to Shelby, Campbell, and others, to
take arms once more, and rival their achievements at King’s Mountain.
This done, he left General Huger in command of the division on the
Pedee, with orders to hasten on by forced marches to Salisbury, to join
the other division: in the mean time he set off on horseback for
Morgan’s camp, attended merely by a guide, an aide-de-camp, and a
sergeant’s guard of dragoons. His object was to aid Morgan in assembling
militia and checking the enemy until the junction of his forces could be
effected. It was a hard ride of upwards of a hundred miles through a
rough country. On the last day of January he reached Morgan’s camp at
Sherrard’s Ford on the east side of the Catawba. The British army lay on
the opposite side of the river, but a few miles distant from it, and
appeared to be making preparations to force a passage across, as it was
subsiding, and would soon be fordable. Greene supposed Cornwallis had in
view a junction with Arnold at Cape Fear; he wrote, therefore, to
General Huger to hurry on, so that with their united forces they could
give his lordship a defeat before he could effect the junction. “_I am
not without hopes_,” writes he, “_of ruining Lord Cornwallis if he
persists in his mad scheme of pushing through the country_; and it is my
earnest desire to form a junction as early for this purpose as possible.
Desire Colonel Lee to force a march to join us. _Here is a fine field,
and great glory ahead._”
More correct information relieved him from the apprehension of a
coöperation of Arnold and Cornwallis. The British troops which landed at
Wilmington, were merely a small detachment sent from Charleston to
establish a military depot for the use of Cornwallis in his Southern
campaign. They had taken possession of Wilmington without opposition.
Greene now changed his plans. He was aware of the ill-provided state of
the British army, from the voluntary destruction of their wagons, tents,
and baggage. Indeed, when he first heard of this measure, on his
arriving at Sherrard’s Ford, he had exclaimed, “Then Cornwallis is
ours.” His plan now was to tempt the enemy continually with the prospect
of a battle, but continually to elude one; to harass them by a long
pursuit, draw them higher into the country, and gain time for the
division advancing under Huger to join him. It was the Fabian policy
that he had learnt under Washington, of whom he prided himself on being
a disciple.
As the subsiding of the Catawba would enable Cornwallis to cross, Greene
ordered Morgan to move off silently with his division, on the evening of
the 31st, and to press his march all night, so as to gain a good start
in advance, while he (Greene) would remain to bring on the militia, who
were employed to check the enemy. These militia, assembled from the
neighboring counties, did not exceed five hundred. Two hundred of them
were distributed at different fords; the remaining three hundred,
forming a corps of mounted riflemen under General Davidson, were to
watch the movements of the enemy, and attack him wherever he should make
his main attempt to cross. When the enemy should have actually crossed,
the different bodies of militia were to make the best of their way to a
rendezvous, sixteen miles distant, on the road to Salisbury, where
Greene would be waiting to receive them, and conduct their further
movements.
While these dispositions were being made by the American commander,
Cornwallis was preparing to cross the river. The night of the 31st was
chosen for the attempt. To divert the attention of the Americans, he
detached Colonels Webster and Tarleton with a part of the army to a
public ford called Beattie’s Ford, where he supposed Davidson to be
stationed. There they were to open a cannonade, and make a feint of
forcing a passage. The main attempt, however, was to be made six miles
lower down, at McGowan’s, a private and unfrequented ford, where little,
if any, opposition was anticipated.
Cornwallis set out for that ford, with the main body of his army, at one
o’clock in the morning. The night was dark and rainy. He had to make his
way through a wood and swamp where there was no road. His artillery
stuck fast. The line passed on without them. It was near daybreak by the
time the head of the column reached the ford. To their surprise, they
beheld numerous camp fires on the opposite bank. Word was hastily
carried to Cornwallis that the ford was guarded. It was so indeed:
Davidson was there with his riflemen.
His lordship would have waited for his artillery, but the rain was still
falling, and might render the river unfordable. At that place the
Catawba was nearly five hundred yards wide, about three feet deep, very
rapid, and full of large stones. The troops entered the river in
platoons, to support each other against the current, and were ordered
not to fire until they should gain the opposite bank. Colonel Hall, of
the light infantry of the guards, led the way; the grenadiers followed.
The noise of the water and the darkness covered their movements until
they were nearly half-way across, when they were descried by an American
sentinel. He challenged them three times, and receiving no answer,
fired. Terrified by the report, the man who was guiding the British
turned and fled. Colonel Hall, thus abandoned, led the way directly
across the river; whereas the true ford inclined diagonally further
down. Hall had to pass through deeper water, but he reached a part of
the bank where it was unguarded. The American pickets, too, which had
turned out at the alarm given by the sentinel, had to deliver a distant
and slanting fire. Still it had its effect. Three of the British were
killed, and thirty-six wounded. Colonel Hall pushed on gallantly, but
was shot down as he ascended the bank. The horse on which Cornwallis
rode was wounded, but the brave animal carried his lordship to the
shore, where he sank under him. The steed of Brigadier-general O’Hara
rolled over with him into the water, and General Leslie’s horse was
borne away by the tumultuous current and with difficulty recovered.
General Davidson hastened with his men towards the place where the
British were landing. The latter formed as soon as they found themselves
on firm ground, charged Davidson’s men before he had time to get them in
order, killed and wounded about forty, and put the rest to flight.
General Davidson was the last to leave the ground, and was killed just
as he was mounting his horse. When the enemy had effected the passage,
Tarleton was detached with his cavalry in pursuit of the militia, most
of whom dispersed to their homes. Eager to avenge his late disgrace, he
scoured the country, and made for Tarrant’s tavern, about ten miles
distant, where about a hundred of them had assembled from different
fords, on their way to the rendezvous, and were refreshing themselves.
As Tarleton came clattering upon them with his legion, they ran to their
horses, delivered a hasty fire, which emptied some of his saddles, and
then made for the woods; a few of the worst mounted were overtaken and
slain. Tarleton, in his account of his campaigns, made the number nearly
fifty; but the report of a British officer, who rode over the ground
shortly afterwards, reduced it to ten. The truth probably lay between.
The survivors were dispersed beyond rallying. Tarleton, satisfied with
his achievement, rejoined the main body. Had he scoured the country a
few miles further, General Greene and his suite might have fallen into
his hands.
The general, informed that the enemy had crossed the Catawba at
daybreak, awaited anxiously at the rendezvous the arrival of the
militia. It was not until after midnight that he heard of their utter
dispersion, and of the death of Davidson. Apprehending the rapid advance
of Cornwallis, he hastened to rejoin Morgan, who with his division was
pushing forward for the Yadkin, first sending orders to General Huger to
conduct the other division by the most direct route to Guilford
Court-house, where the forces were to be united. Greene spurred forward
through heavy rain and deep miry roads. It was a dreary ride and a
lonely one, for he had detached his aides-de-camp in different
directions, to collect the scattered militia. At mid-day he alighted,
weary and travel-stained, at the inn at Salisbury, where the army
physician who had charge of the sick and wounded prisoners received him
at the door, and inquired after his well-being. “Fatigued, hungry,
alone, and penniless,” was Greene’s heavy-hearted reply. The landlady,
Mrs. Elizabeth Steele, overheard his desponding words. While he was
seated at table, she entered the room, closed the door, and drawing from
under her apron two bags of money, which she had carefully hoarded in
those precarious times, “Take these,” said the noble hearted woman; “you
will want them, and I can do without them.” This is one of the
numberless instances of the devoted patriotism of our women during the
Revolution. Their patriotism was apt to be purer and more disinterested
than that of the men.
Cornwallis did not advance so rapidly as had been apprehended. After
crossing the Catawba, he had to wait for his wagons and artillery, which
had remained on the other side in the woods; so that by nightfall of the
1st of February he was not more than five miles on the road to
Salisbury. Eager to come up with the Americans, he mounted some of the
infantry upon the baggage horses, joined them to the cavalry, and sent
the whole forward under General O’Hara. They arrived on the banks of the
Yadkin at night, between the 2d and 3d of February, just in time to
capture a few wagons lingering in the rear of the American army, which
had passed. The riflemen who guarded them retreated after a short
skirmish There were no boats with which to cross; the Americans had
secured them on the other side. The rain which had fallen throughout the
day had overflooded the ford by which the American cavalry had passed.
The pursuers were again brought to a stand. After some doubt and delay,
Cornwalllis took his course up the south side of the Yadkin, and crossed
by what is still called the Shallow Ford, while Greene continued on
unmolested to Guilford Court-house, where he was joined by General Huger
and his division on the 9th.
Cornwallis was now encamped about twenty-five miles above them, at the
old Moravian town of Salem. Greene summoned a council of war (almost the
only time he was known to do so), and submitted the question whether or
not to offer battle. There was a unanimous vote in the negative. A
fourth part of the force was on the sick list, from nakedness and
exposure. The official returns gave but two thousand and thirty-six,
rank and file, fit for duty. Of these upwards of six hundred were
militia.
Cornwallis had from twenty-five hundred to three thousand men, including
three hundred cavalry, all thoroughly disciplined and well equipped. It
was determined to continue the retreat.
The great object of Greene now was to get across the river Dan and throw
himself into Virginia. With the reinforcements and assistance he might
there expect to find, he hoped to effect the salvation of the South, and
prevent the dismemberment of the Union. The object of Cornwallis was to
get between him and Virginia, force him to a combat before he could
receive those reinforcements, or enclose him in between the great rivers
on the west, the sea on the east, and the two divisions of the British
army under himself and Lord Rawdon on the north and south. His lordship
had been informed that the lower part of the Dan, at present, could only
be crossed in boats, and that the country could not afford a sufficient
number for the passage of Greene’s army; he trusted, therefore, to cut
him off from the upper part of the river, where alone it was fordable.
Greene, however, had provided against such a contingency. Boats had been
secured at various places by his agents, and could be collected at a few
hours’ notice at the lower ferries. Instead, therefore, of striving with
his lordship for the upper fords, Greene shaped his course for Boyd’s
and Irwin’s fords, just above the confluence of the Dan and Staunton
rivers which forms the Roanoke, and about seventy miles from Guilford
Court-house. This would give him twenty-five miles advantage of Lord
Cornwallis at the outset. General Kosciuszko was sent with a party in
advance to collect the boats and throw up breastworks at the ferries.
In ordering his march, General Greene took the lead with the main body,
the baggage, and stores. General Morgan would have had the command of
the rear-guard, composed of seven hundred of the most alert and active
troops, cavalry and light infantry; but, being disabled by a violent
attack of ague and rheumatism, it was given to Colonel Otho H. Williams
(formerly adjutant-general), who had with him Colonels Howard,
Washington, and Lee.
This corps, detached some distance in the rear, did infinite service.
Being lightly equipped, it could maneuver in front of the British line
of march, break down bridges, sweep off provisions, and impede its
progress in a variety of ways, while the main body moved forward
unmolested. It was now that Cornwallis most felt the severity of the
blow he had received at the battle of the Cowpens in the loss of his
light troops, having so few to cope with the élite corps under Williams.
Great abilities were shown by the commanders on either side in this
momentous trial of activity and skill. It was a long and severe march
for both armies, through a wild and rough country, thinly peopled, cut
up by streams, partly covered by forests, along deep and frozen roads,
under drenching rains, without tents at night, and with scanty supplies
of provisions. The British suffered the least, for they were well
equipped and comfortably clad; whereas the poor Americans were badly off
for clothing, and many of them without shoes. The patriot armies of the
Revolution, however, were accustomed in their winter marches to leave
evidences of their hardships in bloody footprints.
We forbear to enter into the details of this masterly retreat, the many
stratagems and maneuvers of the covering party to delay and hoodwink the
enemy. Tarleton himself bears witness in his narrative, that every
measure of the Americans was judiciously designed and vigorously
executed. So much had Cornwallis been misinformed at the outset as to
the means below of passing the river, and so difficult was, it from want
of light troops, to gain information while on the march, that he pushed
on in the firm conviction that he was driving the American army into a
trap and would give it a signal blow before it could cross the Dan.
In the mean time, Greene, with the main body, reached the banks of the
river, and succeeded in crossing over with ease in the course of a
single day at Boyd’s and Irwin’s ferries, sending back word to Williams,
who with his covering party was far in the rear. That intelligent
officer encamped, as usual, in the evening, at a wary distance in front
of the enemy, but stole a march upon them after dark, leaving his camp
fires burning. He pushed on all night, arrived at the ferry in the
morning of the 15th, having marched forty miles within the last four and
twenty hours; and made such dispatch in crossing, that his last troops
had landed on the Virginia shore by the time the astonished enemy
arrived on the opposite bank. Nothing, according to their own avowal,
could surpass the grief and vexation of the British at discovering, on
their arrival at Boyd’s Ferry, “that all their toils and exertions had
been vain, and that all their hopes were frustrated.”[63]
[Illustration]