Arnold at Portsmouth in Virginia.—Expedition sent against
him.—Instructions to Lafayette.—Washington at Newport.—Consultations
with De Rochambeau.—Sailing of the French Fleet.—Pursued by the
English.—Expedition of Lafayette to Virginia.—Engagement between the
English and French Fleets.—Failure of the Expedition against
Arnold.—Letter of Washington to Colonel Laurens.—Measures to
reinforce Greene.—General Phillips in Command at Portsmouth.—Marauds
the Country.—Checked by Lafayette.—Mount Vernon menaced.—Death of
Phillips.
In a former chapter we left Benedict Arnold fortifying himself at
Portsmouth, after his ravaging incursion. At the solicitation of
Governor Jefferson, backed by Congress, the Chevalier de la Luzerne had
requested the French commander at the eastward to send a ship of the
line and some frigates to Chesapeake Bay to oppose the traitor.
Fortunately, at this juncture a severe snow-storm (Jan. 22d) scattered
Arbuthnot’s blockading squadron, wrecking one ship of the line and
dismasting others, and enabled the French fleet at Newport to look
abroad; and Rochambeau wrote to Washington that the Chevalier
Destouches, who commanded the fleet, proposed to send three or four
ships to the Chesapeake.
Washington feared the position of Arnold, and his well-known address,
might enable him to withstand a mere attack by sea; anxious to insure
his capture, he advised that Destouches should send his whole fleet; and
that De Rochambeau should embark about a thousand men on board of it,
with artillery and apparatus for a siege; engaging, on his own part, to
send off immediately a detachment of twelve hundred men to coöperate.
“The destruction of the corps under the command of Arnold,” writes he,
“is of such immense importance to the welfare of the Southern States,
that I have resolved to attempt it with the detachment I now send in
conjunction with the militia, even if it should not be convenient for
your Excellency to detach a part of your force; provided M. Destouches
is able to protect our operations by such a disposition of his fleet as
will give us the command of the bay, and prevent succors from being sent
from New York.”
Before the receipt of this letter, the French commanders, acting on
their first impulse, had, about the 9th of February, detached M. de
Tilly, with a sixty-gun ship and two frigates, to make a dash into the
Chesapeake. Washington was apprised of their sailing just as he was
preparing to send off the twelve hundred men spoken of in his letter to
De Rochambeau. He gave the command of this detachment to Lafayette,
instructing him to act in conjunction with the militia and the ships
sent by Destouches, against the enemy’s corps actually in Virginia. As
the case was urgent, he was to suffer no delay, when on the march, for
want either of provisions, forage, or wagons, but where ordinary means
did not suffice, he was to resort to military impress. “You are to do no
act whatever with Arnold,” said the letter of instruction, “that
directly or by implication may screen him from the punishment due to his
treason and desertion, which, if he should fall into your hands, you
will execute in the most summary manner.”
Washington wrote at the same time to the Baron Steuben, informing him of
the arrangements, and requesting him to be on the alert. “If the fleet
should have arrived before this gets to hand,” said he, “secrecy will be
out of the question; if not, you will conceal your expectations, and
only seem to be preparing for defense. Arnold, on the appearance of the
fleet, may endeavor to retreat through North Carolina. If you take any
measure to obviate this, the precaution will be advisable. Should you be
able to capture this detachment with its chief, it will be an event as
pleasing as it will be useful.”
Lafayette set out on his march on the 22d of February, and Washington
was indulging the hope that, scanty as was the naval force sent to the
Chesapeake, the combined enterprise might be successful, when on the
27th, he received a letter from the Count de Rochambeau announcing its
failure. De Tilly had made his dash into Chesapeake Bay, but Arnold had
been apprised by the British Admiral Arbuthnot of his approach, and had
drawn his ships high up Elizabeth River. The water was too shallow for
the largest French ships to get within four leagues of him. One of De
Tilly’s frigates ran aground, and was got off with difficulty, and that
commander, seeing that Arnold was out of his reach, and fearing to be
himself blockaded should he linger, put to sea and returned to Newport;
having captured during his cruise a British frigate of forty-four guns,
and two privateers with their prizes.
The French commanders now determined to follow the plan suggested by
Washington, and operate in the Chesapeake with their whole fleet and a
detachment of land troops, being, as they said, disposed to risk
everything to hinder Arnold from establishing himself at Portsmouth.
Washington set out for Newport to concert operations with the French
commanders. Before his departure, he wrote to Lafayette, on the 1st of
March, giving him intelligence of these intentions, and desiring him to
transmit it to the Baron Steuben. “I have received a letter,” adds he,
“from General Greene, by which it appears that Cornwallis, with
twenty-five hundred men, was penetrating the country with very great
rapidity, and Greene with a much inferior force retiring before him,
having determined to pass the Roanoke.” This intelligence and an
apprehension that Arnold may make his escape before the fleet can arrive
in the bay, induces me to give you greater latitude than you had in your
original instructions. You are at liberty to concert a plan with the
French general and naval commander for a descent into North Carolina, to
cut off the detachment of the enemy which had ascended Cape Fear River,
intercept, if possible, Cornwallis, and relieve General Greene and the
Southern States. This, however, ought to be a secondary object,
attempted in case of Arnold’s retreat to New York; or in case his
reduction should be attended with too much delay. There should be strong
reasons to induce a change of our first plan against Arnold if he is
still in Virginia.
Washington arrived at Newport on the 6th of March, and found the French
fleet ready for sea, the troops, eleven hundred strong, commanded by
General the Baron de Viomenil, being already embarked.
Washington went immediately on board of the admiral’s ship, where he had
an interview with the Count de Rochambeau, and arranged the plan of the
campaign. Returning on shore he was received by the inhabitants with
enthusiastic demonstrations of affection; and was gratified to perceive
the harmony and good-will between them and the French army and fleet.
Much of this he attributed to the wisdom of the commanders, and the
discipline of the troops, but more to magnanimity on the one part, and
gratitude on the other; and he hailed it as a happy presage of lasting
friendship between the two nations.
On the 8th of March, at ten o’clock at night, he writes to Lafayette: “I
have the pleasure to inform you that the whole fleet went out with a
fair wind this evening about sunset. We have not heard of any move of
the British in Gardiner’s Bay. Should we luckily meet with no
interruption from them, and Arnold should continue in Virginia, until
the arrival of M. Destouches, I flatter myself you will meet with that
success which I most ardently wish, not only on the public, but your own
account.”
The British fleet made sail in pursuit, on the morning of the 10th; as
the French had so much the start, it was hoped they would reach
Chesapeake Bay before them. Washington felt the present to be a most
important moment. “The success of the expedition now in agitation,” said
he, “seems to depend upon a naval superiority, and the force of the two
fleets is so equal, that we must rather hope for, than entertain an
assurance of victory. The attempt, however, made by our allies to
dislodge the enemy, in Virginia, is a bold one, and should it fail, will
nevertheless entitle them to the thanks of the public.”
On returning to his head-quarters at New Windsor, Washington on the 20th
of March found letters from General Greene, informing him that he had
saved all his baggage, artillery, and stores, notwithstanding the hot
pursuit of the enemy, and was now in his turn following them, but that
he was greatly in need of reinforcements.
“My regard for the public good, and my inclination to promote your
success,” writes Washington in reply, “will prompt me to give every
assistance, and to make every diversion in your favor. But what can I do
if I am not furnished with the means? From what I saw and learned while
at the eastward, I am convinced the levies will be late in the field,
and I fear far short of the requisition. I most anxiously wait the event
of the present operation in Virginia. If attended with success, it may
have the happiest influence on our Southern affairs, by leaving the
forces of Virginia free to act. For while there is an enemy in the heart
of a country, you can expect neither men nor supplies from it, in that
full and regular manner in which they ought to be given.”
In the mean time Lafayette with his detachment was pressing forward by
forced marches for Virginia. Arriving at the Head of Elk on the 3d of
March, he halted until he should receive tidings respecting the French
fleet. A letter from the Baron Steuben spoke of the preparations he was
making, and the facility of taking the fortifications at Portsmouth,
“sword in hand.” The youthful marquis was not so sanguine as the veteran
baron. “Arnold,” said he, “has had so much time to prepare, and plays so
deep a game; nature has made the position so respectable, and some of
the troops under his orders have been in so many actions, that I do not
flatter myself to succeed so easily.” On the 7th he received
Washington’s letter of the 1st, apprising him of the approaching
departure of the whole fleet with land forces. Lafayette now conducted
his troops by water to Annapolis, and concluding, from the time the
ships were to sail, and the winds which had since prevailed, the French
fleet must be already in the Chesapeake, he crossed the bay in an open
boat to Virginia, and pushed on to confer with the American and French
commanders, get a convoy for his troops, and concert matters for a
vigorous coöperation. Arriving at York on the 14th, he found the Baron
Steuben in the bustle of military preparations, and confident of having
five thousand militia ready to coöperate. These, with Lafayette’s
detachment, would be sufficient for the attack by land: nothing was
wanting but a coöperation by sea; and the French fleet had not yet
appeared, though double the time necessary for the voyage had elapsed.
The marquis repaired to General Muhlenburg’s camp near Suffolk, and
reconnoitered with him the enemy’s works at Portsmouth; this brought on
a trifling skirmish, but everything appeared satisfactory; everything
promised complete success.
On the 20th, word was brought that a fleet had come to anchor within the
capes. It was supposed of course to be the French, and now the capture
of the traitor was certain. He himself, from certain signs appeared to
be in great confusion: none of his ships ventured down the bay. An
officer of the French navy bore down to visit the fleet, but returned
with the astounding intelligence that it was British!
Admiral Arbuthnot had in fact overtaken Destouches on the 16th of March,
off the capes of Virginia. Their forces were nearly equal; eight ships
of the line, and four frigates on each side, the French having more men,
the English more guns. An engagement took place which lasted about an
hour. The British van at first took the brunt of the action, and was
severely handled; the centre came up to its relief. The French line was
broken and gave way, but rallied, and formed again at some distance. The
crippled state of some of his ships prevented the British admiral from
bringing on a second encounter; nor did the French seek one, but shaped
their course the next day back to Newport. Both sides claimed a victory.
The British certainly effected the main objects they had in view; the
French were cut off from the Chesapeake; the combined enterprise against
Portsmouth was disconcerted, and Arnold was saved. Great must have been
the apprehensions of the traitor, while that enterprise threatened to
entrap him. He knew the peculiar peril impending over him; it had been
announced in the sturdy reply of an American prisoner, to his inquiry
what his countrymen would do to him if he were captured. “They would cut
off the leg wounded in the service of your country and bury it with the
honors of war; the rest of you they would hang!”
The feelings of Washington, on hearing of the result of the enterprise,
may be judged from the following passage of a letter to Colonel John
Laurens, then minister at Paris. “The failure of this expedition, which
was most flattering in the commencement, is much to be regretted;
because a successful blow in that quarter would, in all probability,
have given a decisive turn to our affairs in all the Southern States;
because it has been attended with considerable expense on our part, and
much inconvenience to the State of Virginia, by the assembling of our
militia, because the world is disappointed at not seeing Arnold in
gibbets; and above all, because we stood in need of something to keep us
afloat till the result of your mission is known; for be assured, my dear
Laurens, day does not follow night more certainly, than it brings with
it some additional proof of the impracticability of carrying on the war,
without the aids you were directed to solicit. As an honest and candid
man, as a man whose all depends on the final and happy termination of
the present contest, I assert this, while I give it decisively as my
opinion, that, without a foreign loan, our present force, which is but
the remnant of an army, cannot be kept together this campaign, much less
will it be increased, and in readiness for another.... If France delays
a timely and powerful aid in the critical posture of our affairs, it
will avail us nothing should she attempt it hereafter. We are at this
hour suspended in the balance; not from choice, but from hard and
absolute necessity; and you may rely on it as a fact, that we cannot
transport the provisions from the States in which they are assessed, to
the army, because we cannot pay the teamsters, who will no longer work
for certificates.... In a word, we are at the end of our tether, and now
or never our deliverance must come.... How easy would it be to retort
the enemy’s own game upon them; if it could be made to comport with the
general plan of the war to keep a superior fleet always in these seas,
and France would put us in condition to be active, by advancing us
money. The ruin of the enemy’s schemes would then be certain; the bold
game they are now playing would be the means of effecting it; for they
would be reduced to the necessity of concentrating their force at
capital points; thereby giving up all the advantages they have gained in
the Southern States, or be vulnerable everywhere.”
Washington’s anxiety was now awakened for the safety of General Greene.
Two thousand troops had sailed from New York under General Phillips,
probably to join with the force under Arnold, and proceed to reinforce
Cornwallis. Should they form a junction, Greene would be unable to
withstand them. With these considerations Washington wrote to Lafayette,
urging him, since he was already three hundred miles, which was half the
distance, on the way, to push on with all possible speed to join the
Southern army, sending expresses ahead to inform Greene of his approach.
The letter found Lafayette on the 8th of April, at the Head of Elk,
preparing to march back with his troops to the banks of the Hudson. On
his return through Virginia, he had gone out of his way, and travelled
all night for the purpose of seeing Washington’s mother at
Fredericksburg, and paying a visit to Mount Vernon. He now stood ready
to obey Washington’s orders, and march to reinforce General Greene; but
his troops, who were chiefly from the Eastern States, murmured at the
prospect of a campaign in a southern climate, and desertions began to
occur. Upon this he announced in general orders, that he was about to
enter on an enterprise of great difficulty and danger, in which he
trusted his soldiers would not abandon him. Any, however, who were
unwilling, should receive permits to return home.
As he had anticipated, their pride was roused by this appeal. All
engaged to continue forward. So great was the fear of appearing a
laggard, or a craven, that a sergeant, too lame to march, hired a place
in a cart to keep up with the army. In the zeal of the moment, Lafayette
borrowed money on his own credit from the Baltimore merchants, to
purchase summer clothing for his troops, in which he was aided, too, by
the ladies of the city, with whom he was deservedly popular.
The detachment from New York, under General Phillips, arrived at
Portsmouth on the 26th of March. That officer immediately took command,
greatly to the satisfaction of the British officers, who had been acting
under Arnold. The force now collected there amounted to three thousand
five hundred men. The garrison of New York had been greatly weakened in
furnishing this detachment, but Cornwallis had urged the policy of
transferring the seat of war to Virginia, even at the expense of
abandoning New York; declaring that until that State was subdued, the
British hold upon the Carolinas must be difficult, if not precarious.
The disparity in force was now so great, that the Baron Steuben had to
withdraw his troops, and remove the military stores into the interior.
Many of the militia, too, their term of three months being expired,
stacked their arms and set off for their homes, and most of the residue
had to be discharged.
General Phillips had hitherto remained quiet in Portsmouth, completing
the fortifications, but evidently making preparations for an expedition.
On the 16th of April, he left one thousand men in garrison, and,
embarking the rest in small vessels of light draught, proceeded up James
River, destroying armed vessels, public magazines, and a ship-yard
belonging to the State.
Landing at City Point, he advanced against Petersburg, a place of
deposit of military stores and tobacco. He was met about a mile below
the town by about one thousand militia, under General Muhlenburg, who,
after disputing the ground inch by inch for nearly two hours, with
considerable loss on both sides, retreated across the Appomattox,
breaking down the bridge behind them.
Phillips entered the town, set fire to the tobacco warehouses, and
destroyed all the vessels lying in the river. Repairing and crossing the
bridge over the Appomattox, he proceeded to Chesterfield Court-house,
where he destroyed barracks and public stores; while Arnold, with a
detachment, laid waste the magazines of tobacco in the direction of
Warwick. A fire was opened by the latter from a few field-pieces on the
river bank, upon a squadron of small armed vessels, which had been
intended to coöperate with the French fleet against Portsmouth. The
crews scuttled or set fire to them, and escaped to the north side of the
river.
This destructive course was pursued until they arrived at Manchester, a
small place opposite Richmond, where the tobacco warehouses were
immediately in a blaze. Richmond was a leading object of this desolating
enterprise, for there a great part of the military stores of the State
had been collected. Fortunately, Lafayette, with his detachment of two
thousand men, had arrived there by forced marches, the evening before,
and being joined by about two thousand militia and sixty dragoons (the
latter principally young Virginians of family), had posted himself
strongly on the high banks on the north side of the river.
There being no bridge across the river at that time, General Phillips
did not think it prudent to attempt a passage in face of such a force so
posted, but was extremely irritated at being thus foiled by the celerity
of his youthful opponent, who now assumed the chief command of the
American forces in Virginia.
Returning down the south bank of the river, to the place where his
vessels awaited him, General Phillips reëmbarked on the 2d of May, and
dropped slowly down the river below the confluence of the Chickahominy.
He was followed cautiously, and his movements watched by Lafayette, who
posted himself behind the last-named river.
Dispatches from Cornwallis now informed Phillips that his lordship was
advancing with all speed from the South to effect a junction with him.
The general immediately made a rapid move to regain possession of
Petersburg, where the junction was to take place. Lafayette attempted by
forced marches to get there before him, but was too late. Falling back,
therefore, he recrossed James River and stationed himself some miles
below Richmond, to be at hand for the protection of the public stores
collected there.
During this main expedition of Phillips, some of his smaller vessels had
carried on the plan of plunder and devastation in other of the rivers
emptying into the Chesapeake Bay; setting fire to the houses where they
met with resistance. One had ascended the Potomac and menaced Mount
Vernon. Lund Washington, who had charge of the estate, met the flag
which the enemy sent on shore, and saved the property from ravage, by
furnishing the vessel with provisions. Lafayette, who heard of the
circumstance, and was sensitive for the honor of Washington, immediately
wrote to him on the subject. “This conduct of the person who represents
you on your estate,” writes he, “must certainly produce a bad effect,
and contrast with the courageous replies of some of your neighbors,
whose houses in consequence have been burnt. You will do what you think
proper, my dear general, but friendship makes it my duty to give you
confidentially the facts.”
Washington, however, had previously received a letter from Lund himself,
stating all the circumstances of the case, and had immediately written
him a reply. He had no doubt that Lund had acted from his best judgment,
and with a view to preserve the property and buildings from impending
danger, but he was stung to the quick by the idea that his agent should
go on board of the enemy’s vessel, carry them refreshments, and “commune
with a parcel of plundering scoundrels,” as he termed them. “It would
have been a less painful circumstance to me to have heard,” writes he,
“that in consequence of your non-compliance with their request, they had
burnt my house and laid my plantation in ruins. You ought to have
considered yourself as my representative, and should have reflected on
the bad example of communicating with the enemy and making a voluntary
offer of refreshments to them, with a view to prevent a conflagration.”
In concluding his letter, he expresses his opinion that it was the
intention of the enemy to prosecute the plundering plan they had begun;
and that it would end in the destruction of his property, but adds, that
he is “prepared for the event.” He advises his agent to deposit the
valuable and least bulky articles in a place of safety. “Such and so
many things as are necessary for common and present use must be
retained, and must run their chance through the fiery trial of this
summer.”
Such were the steadfast purposes of Washington’s mind when war was
brought home to his door, and threatening his earthly paradise of Mount
Vernon.
In the mean time the desolating career of General Phillips was brought
to a close. He had been ill for some days previous to his arrival at
Petersburg, and by the time he reached there, was no longer capable of
giving orders. He died four days afterwards, honored and deeply
regretted by his brothers in arms, as a meritorious and well-tried
soldier. What made his death to be more sensibly felt by them at this
moment, was, that it put the traitor, Arnold, once more in the general
command.
He held it, however, but for a short time, as Lord Cornwallis arrived at
Petersburg on the 20th of May, after nearly a month’s weary marching
from Wilmington. His lordship, on taking command, found his force
augmented by a considerable detachment of Royal Artillery, two
battalions of light infantry, the 76th and 80th British regiments, a
Hessian regiment, Lieutenant-colonel Simcoe’s corps of Queen’s rangers,
cavalry and infantry, one hundred yagers, Arnold’s legion of royalists,
and the garrison of Portsmouth. He was cheered also by intelligence that
Lord Rawdon had obtained an advantage over General Greene before Camden,
and that three British regiments had sailed from Cork for Charleston.
His mind, we are told, was now set at ease with regard to Southern
affairs; his spirits, so long jaded by his harassing tramps about the
Carolinas, were again lifted up by his augmented strength, and Tarleton
assures us, that his lordship indulged in “brilliant hopes of a glorious
campaign in those parts of America where he commanded.”[73] How far
these hopes were realized, we shall show in a future page.
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