LIV.--When Caesar's affairs were in this unfavourable position, and all

the passes were guarded by the soldiers and horse of Afranius, and the

bridges could not be prepared, Caesar ordered his soldiers to make ships

of the kind that his knowledge of Britain a few years before had taught

him. First, the keels and ribs were made of light timber, then, the rest

of the hulk of the ships was wrought with wicker-work, and covered over

with hides. When these were finished, he drew them down to the river in

waggons in one night, a distance of twenty-two miles from his camp, and

transported in them some soldiers across the river, and on a sudden took

possession of a hill adjoining the bank. This he immediately fortified,

before he was perceived by the enemy. To this he afterwards transported

a legion: and having begun a bridge on both sides, he finished it in two

days. By this means, he brought safe to his camp the convoys, and those

who had gone out to forage; and began to prepare a conveyance for the

provisions.

LV.--The same day he made a great part of his horse pass the river, who,

falling on the foragers by surprise as they were dispersed without any

suspicions, intercepted an incredible number of cattle and people; and

when some Spanish light-armed cohorts were sent to reinforce the enemy,

our men judiciously divided themselves into two parts, the one to

protect the spoil, the other to resist the advancing foe, and to beat

them back, and they cut off from the rest and surrounded one cohort,

which had rashly ventured out of the line before the others, and after

putting it to the sword, returned safe with considerable booty to the

camp over the same bridge.

LVI.--Whilst these affairs are going forward at Ilerda, the Massilians,

adopting the advice of Domitius, prepared seventeen ships of war, of

which eleven were decked. To these they add several smaller vessels,

that our fleet might be terrified by numbers: they man them with a great

number of archers and of the Albici, of whom mention has been already

made, and these they incited by rewards and promises. Domitius required

certain ships for his own use, which he manned with colonists and

shepherds, whom he had brought along with him. A fleet being thus

furnished with every necessary, he advanced with great confidence

against our ships, commanded by Decimus Brutus. It was stationed at an

island opposite to Massilia.

LVII.--Brutus was much inferior in number of ships; but Caesar had

appointed to that fleet the bravest men selected from all his legions,

antesignani and centurions, who had requested to be employed in that

service. They had provided iron hooks and harpoons, and had furnished

themselves with a vast number of javelins, darts, and missiles. Thus

prepared, and being apprised of the enemy's approach, they put out from

the harbour, and engaged the Massilians. Both sides fought with great

courage and resolution; nor did the Albici, a hardy people, bred on the

highlands and inured to arms, fall much short of our men in valour: and

being lately come from the Massilians, they retained in their minds

their recent promises: and the wild shepherds, encouraged by the hope of

liberty, were eager to prove their zeal in the presence of their

masters.

LVIII.--The Massilians themselves, confiding in the quickness of their

ships, and the skill of their pilots, eluded ours, and evaded the shock,

and as long as they were permitted by clear space, lengthening their

line they endeavoured to surround us, or to attack single ships with

several of theirs, or to run across our ships, and carry away our oars,

if possible; but when necessity obliged them to come nearer, they had

recourse, from the skill and art of the pilots, to the valour of the

mountaineers. But our men, not having such expert seamen, or skilful

pilots, for they had been hastily drafted from the merchant ships, and

were not yet acquainted even with the names of the rigging, were

moreover impeded by the heaviness and slowness of our vessels, which

having been built in a hurry and of green timber, were not so easily

manoeuvred. Therefore, when Caesar's men had an opportunity of a close

engagement, they cheerfully opposed two of the enemy's ships with one of

theirs. And throwing in the grappling irons, and holding both ships

fast, they fought on both sides of the deck, and boarded the enemy's;

and having killed numbers of the Albici and shepherds, they sank some of

their ships, took others with the men on board, and drove the rest into

the harbour. That day the Massilians lost nine ships, including those

that were taken.

LIX.--When news of this battle was brought to Caesar at Ilerda, the

bridge being completed at the same time, fortune soon took a turn. The

enemy, daunted by the courage of our horse, did not scour the country as

freely or as boldly as before: but sometimes advancing a small distance

from the camp, that they might have a ready retreat, they foraged within

narrower bounds: at other times, they took a longer circuit to avoid our

outposts and parties of horse; or having sustained some loss, or

descried our horse at a distance, they fled in the midst of their

expedition, leaving their baggage behind them; at length they resolved

to leave off foraging for several days, and, contrary to the practice of

all nations, to go out at night.

LX.--In the meantime the Oscenses and the Calagurritani, who were under

the government of the Oscenses, send ambassadors to Caesar, and offer to

submit to his orders. They are followed by the Tarraconenses, Jacetani,

and Ausetani, and in a few days more by the Illurgavonenses, who dwell

near the river Ebro. He requires of them all to assist him with corn, to

which they agreed, and having collected all the cattle in the country,

they convey them into his camp. One entire cohort of the

Illurgavonenses, knowing the design of their state, came over to Caesar,

from the place where they were stationed, and carried their colours with

them. A great change is shortly made in the face of affairs. The bridge

being finished, five powerful states being joined to Caesar, a way

opened for the receiving of corn, and the rumours of the assistance of

legions which were said to be on their march, with Pompey at their head,

through Mauritania, having died away, several of the more distant states

revolt from Afranius, and enter into league with Caesar.

LXI.--Whilst the spirits of the enemy were dismayed at these things,

Caesar, that he might not be always obliged to send his horse a long

circuit round by the bridge, having found a convenient place, began to

sink several drains, thirty feet deep, by which he might draw off a part

of the river Segre, and make a ford over it. When these were almost

finished, Afranius and Petreius began to be greatly alarmed, lest they

should be altogether cut off from corn and forage, because Caesar was

very strong in cavalry. They therefore resolved to quit their posts, and

to transfer the war to Celtiberia. There was, moreover, a circumstance

that confirmed them in this resolution: for of the two adverse parties,

that which had stood by Sertorius in the late war, being conquered by

Pompey, still trembled at his name and sway, though absent: the other

which had remained firm in Pompey's interest, loved him for the favours

which they had received: but Caesar's name was not known to the

barbarians. From these they expected considerable aid, both of horse and

foot, and hoped to protract the war till winter, in a friendly country.

Having come to this resolution, they gave orders to collect all the

ships in the river Ebro, and to bring them to Octogesa, a town situated

on the river Ebro, about twenty miles distant from their camp. At this

part of the river, they ordered a bridge to be made of boats fastened

together, and transported two legions over the river Segre, and

fortified their camp with a rampart, twelve feet high.

LXII.--Notice of this being given by the scouts, Caesar continued his

work day and night, with very great fatigue to the soldiers, to drain

the river, and so far effected his purpose, that the horse were both

able and bold enough, though with some difficulty and danger, to pass

the river; but the foot had only their shoulders and upper part of their

breast above the water, so that their fording it was retarded, not only

by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of the current.

However, almost at the same instant, news was received of the bridge

being nearly completed over the Ebro, and a ford was found in the Segre.

LXIII.--Now indeed the enemy began to think that they ought to hasten

their march. Accordingly, leaving two auxiliary cohorts in the garrison

at Ilerda, they crossed the Segre with their whole force, and formed one

camp with the two legions which they had led across a few days before.

Caesar had no resource, but to annoy and cut down their rear; since with

his cavalry to go by the bridge, required him to take a long circuit; so

that they would arrive at the Ebro by a much shorter route. The horse,

which he had detached, crossed the ford, and when Afranius and Petreius

had broken up their camp about the third watch, they suddenly appeared

on their rear, and spreading round them in great numbers, began to

retard and impede their march.

LXIV.--At break of day, it was perceived from the rising grounds which

joined Caesar's camp, that their rear was vigorously pressed by our

horse; that the last line sometimes halted and was broken; at other

times, that they joined battle and that our men were beaten back by a

general charge of their cohorts, and, in their turn, pursued them when

they wheeled about: but through the whole camp the soldiers gathered in

parties, and declared their chagrin that the enemy had been suffered to

escape from their hands and that the war had been unnecessarily

protracted. They applied to their tribunes and centurions, and entreated

them to inform Caesar that he need not spare their labour or consider

their danger; that they were ready and able, and would venture to ford

the river where the horse had crossed. Caesar, encouraged by their zeal

and importunity, though he felt reluctant to expose his army to a river

so exceedingly large, yet judged it prudent to attempt it and make a

trial. Accordingly, he ordered all the weaker soldiers, whose spirit or

strength seemed unequal to the fatigue, to be selected from each

century, and left them, with one legion besides, to guard the camp: the

rest of the legions he drew out without any baggage, and, having

disposed a great number of horses in the river, above and below the

ford, he led his army over. A few of his soldiers being carried away by

the force of the current, were stopped by the horse and taken up, and

not a man perished. His army being safe on the opposite bank, he drew

out his forces and resolved to lead them forward in three battalions:

and so great was the ardour of the soldiers that, notwithstanding the

addition of a circuit of six miles and a considerable delay in fording

the river, before the ninth hour of the day they came up with those who

had set out at the third watch.

LXV.--When Afranius, who was in company with Petreius, saw them at a

distance, being affrighted at so unexpected a sight, he halted on a

rising ground and drew up his army. Caesar refreshed his army on the

plain that he might not expose them to battle whilst fatigued; and when

the enemy attempted to renew their march, he pursued and stopped them.

They were obliged to pitch their camp sooner than they had intended, for

there were mountains at a small distance; and difficult and narrow roads

awaited them about five miles off. They retired behind these mountains

that they might avoid Caesar's cavalry, and, placing parties in the

narrow roads, stop the progress of his army and lead their own forces

across the Ebro without danger or apprehension. This it was their

interest to attempt and to effect by any means possible; but, fatigued

by the skirmishes all day, and by the labour of their march, they

deferred it till the following day: Caesar likewise encamped on the next

hill.

LXVI.--About midnight a few of their men who had gone some distance from

the camp to fetch water, being taken by our horse, Caesar is informed by

them that the generals of the enemy were drawing their troops out of the

camp without noise. Upon this information Caesar ordered the signal to

be given and the military shout to be raised for packing up the baggage.

When they heard the shout, being afraid lest they should be stopped in

the night and obliged to engage under their baggage, or lest they should

be confined in the narrow roads by Caesar's horse, they put a stop to

their march and kept their forces in their camp. The next day Petreius

went out privately with a few horse to reconnoitre the country. A

similar movement was made from Caesar's camp. Lucius Decidius Saxa was

detached with a small party to explore the nature of the country. Each

returned with the same account to his camp, that there was a level road

for the next five miles, that there then succeeded a rough and

mountainous country. Whichever should first obtain possession of the

defiles would have no trouble in preventing the other's progress.

LXVII.--There was a debate in the council between Afranius and Petreius,

and the time of marching was the subject. The majority were of opinion

that they should begin their march at night, "for they might reach the

defiles before they should be discovered." Others, because a shout had

been raised the night before in Caesar's camp, used this as an argument

that they could not leave the camp unnoticed: "that Caesar's cavalry

were patrolling the whole night, and that all the ways and roads were

beset; that battles at night ought to be avoided, because in civil

dissension, a soldier once daunted is more apt to consult his fears than

his oath; that the daylight raised a strong sense of shame in the eyes

of all, and that the presence of the tribunes and centurions had the

same effect: by these things the soldiers would be re strained and awed

to their duty. Wherefore they should, by all means, attempt to force

their way by day; for, though a trifling loss might be sustained, yet

the post which they desired might be secured with safety to the main

body of the army." This opinion prevailed in the council, and the next

day, at the dawn, they resolved to set forward.

LXVIII.--Caesar, having taken a view of the country, the moment the sky

began to grow white, led his forces from the camp and marched at the

head of his army by a long circuit, keeping to no regular road; for the

road which led to the Ebro and Octogesa was occupied by the enemy's

camp, which lay in Caesar's way. His soldiers were obliged to cross

extensive and difficult valleys. Craggy cliffs, in several places,

interrupted their march, insomuch that their arms had to be handed to

one another, and the soldiers were forced to perform a great part of

their march unarmed, and were lifted up the rocks by each other. But not

a man murmured at the fatigue, because they imagined that there would be

a period to all their toils if they could cut off the enemy from the

Ebro and intercept their convoys.

LXIX.--At first, Afranius's soldiers ran in high spirits from their camp

to look at us, and in contumelious language upbraided us, "that we were

forced, for want of necessary subsistence, to run away, and return to

Ilerda." For our route was different from what we proposed, and we

appeared to be going a contrary way. But their generals applauded their

own prudence in keeping within their camp, and it was a strong

confirmation of their opinion, that they saw we marched without waggons

or baggage, which made them confident that we could not long endure

want. But when they saw our army gradually wheel to the right, and

observed our van was already passing the line of their camp, there was

nobody so stupid, or averse to fatigue, as not to think it necessary to

march from the camp immediately, and oppose us. The cry to arms was

raised, and all the army, except a few which were left to guard the

camp, set out and marched the direct road to the Ebro.

LXX.--The contest depended entirely on despatch, which should first get

possession of the defile and the mountain. The difficulty of the roads

delayed Caesar's army, but his cavalry pursuing Afranius's forces,

retarded their march. However, the affair was necessarily reduced to

this point, with respect to Afranius's men, that if they first gained

the mountains, which they desired, they would themselves avoid all

danger, but could not save the baggage of their whole army, nor the

cohorts which they had left behind in the camps, to which, being

intercepted by Caesar's army, by no means could assistance be given.

Caesar first accomplished the march, and having found a plain behind

large rocks, drew up his army there in order of battle and facing the

enemy. Afranius, perceiving that his rear was galled by our cavalry, and

seeing the enemy before him, having come to a hill, made a halt on it.

Thence he detached four cohorts of Spanish light infantry to the highest

mountain which was in view: to this he ordered them to hasten with all

expedition, and to take possession of it, with the intention of going to

the same place with all his forces, then altering his route, and

crossing the hills to Octogesa. As the Spaniards were making towards it

in an oblique direction, Caesar's horse espied them and attacked them,

nor were they able to withstand the charge of the cavalry even for a

moment, but were all surrounded and cut to pieces in the sight of the

two armies.

LXXI.--There was now an opportunity for managing affairs successfully,

nor did it escape Caesar, that an army daunted at suffering such a loss

before their eyes, could not stand, especially as they were surrounded

by our horse, and the engagement would take place on even and open

ground. To this he was importuned on all sides. The lieutenants,

centurions, and tribunes, gathered round him, and begged "that he would

not hesitate to begin the battle: that the hearts of all the soldiers

were very anxious for it: that Afranius's men had by several

circumstances betrayed signs of fear; in that they had not assisted

their party; in that they had not quitted the hill; in that they did not

sustain the charge of our cavalry, but crowding their standards into one

place, did not observe either rank or order. But if he had any

apprehensions from the disadvantage of the ground, that an opportunity

would be given him of coming to battle in some other place: for that

Afranius must certainly come down, and would not be able to remain there

for want of water."

LXXII.--Caesar had conceived hopes of ending the affair without an

engagement, or without striking a blow, because he had cut off the

enemy's supplies. Why should he hazard the loss of any of his men, even

in a successful battle? Why should he expose soldiers to be wounded; who

had deserved so well of him? Why, in short, should he tempt fortune?

especially when it was as much a general's duty to conquer by tactics,

as by the sword. Besides, he was moved with compassion for those

citizens, who, he foresaw, must fall: and he had rather gain his object

without any loss or injury to them. This resolution of Caesar was not

generally approved of; but the soldiers openly declared to each other,

that since such an opportunity of victory was let pass, they would not

come to an engagement, even when Caesar should wish it. He persevered

however in his resolution, and retired a little from that place to abate

the enemy's fears. Petreius and Afranius, having got this opportunity,

retired to their camp. Caesar, having disposed parties on the mountains,

and cut off all access to the Ebro, fortified his camp as close to the

enemy as he could.

LXXIII.--The day following, the generals of his opponents, being alarmed

that they had lost all prospect of supplies, and of access to the Ebro,

consulted as to what other course they should take. There were two

roads, one to Ilerda, if they chose to return, the other to Tarraco, if

they should march to it. Whilst they were deliberating on these matters,

intelligence was brought them that their watering parties were attacked

by our horse: upon which information, they dispose several parties of

horse and auxiliary foot along the road, and intermix some legionary

cohorts, and begin to throw up a rampart from the camp to the water,

that they might be able to procure water within their lines, both

without fear, and without a guard. Petreius and Afranius divided this

task between themselves, and went in person to some distance from their

camp for the purpose of seeing it accomplished.

LXXIV.--The soldiers having obtained by their absence a free opportunity

of conversing with each other, came out in great numbers, and inquired

each for whatever acquaintance or fellow citizen he had in our camp, and

invited him to him. First they returned them general thanks for sparing

them the day before, when they were greatly terrified, and acknowledged

that they were alive through their kindness; then they inquired about

the honour of our general, and whether they could with safety entrust

themselves to him; and declared their sorrow that they had not done so

in the beginning, and that they had taken up arms against their

relations and kinsmen. Encouraged by these conferences, they desired the

general's parole for the lives of Petreius and Afranius, that they might

not appear guilty of a crime, in having betrayed their generals. When

they were assured of obtaining their demands, they promised that they

would immediately remove their standards, and sent centurions of the

first rank as deputies to treat with Caesar about a peace. In the

meantime some of them invite their acquaintances, and bring them to

their camp, others are brought away by their friends, so that the two

camps seemed to be united into one, and several of the tribunes and

centurions came to Caesar, and paid their respects to him. The same was

done by some of the nobility of Spain, whom they summoned to their

assistance, and kept in their camp as hostages. They inquired after

their acquaintance and friends, by whom each might have the means of

being recommended to Caesar. Even Afranius's son, a young man,

endeavoured by means of Sulpitius the lieutenant, to make terms for his

own and his father's life. Every place was filled with mirth and

congratulations; in the one army, because they thought they had escaped

so impending danger; in the other, because they thought they had

completed so important a matter without blows; and Caesar, in every

man's judgment, reaped the advantage of his former lenity, and his

conduct was applauded by all.

LXXV.--When these circumstances were announced to Afranius, he left the

work which he had begun, and returned to his camp determined, as it

appeared, whatever should be the event to bear it with an even and

steady mind. Petreius did not neglect himself; he armed his domestics;

with them and the praetorian cohort of Spaniards, and a few foreign

horse, his dependants, whom he commonly kept near him to guard his

person, he suddenly flew to the rampart, interrupted the conferences of

the soldiers, drove our men from the camp, and put to death as many as

he caught. The rest formed into a body, and, being alarmed by the

unexpected danger, wrapped their left arms in their cloaks, and drew

their swords, and in this manner, depending on the nearness of their

camp, defended themselves against the Spaniards, and the horse, and made

good their retreat to the camp, where they were protected by the

cohorts, which were on guard.

LXXVI.--Petreius, after accomplishing this, went round every maniple,

calling the soldiers by their names and entreating with tears, that they

would not give up him and their absent general Pompey, as a sacrifice to

the vengeance of their enemies. Immediately they ran in crowds to the

general's pavilion, when he required them all to take an oath that they

would not desert nor betray the army nor the generals, nor form any

design distinct from the general interest. He himself swore first to the

tenor of those words, and obliged Afranius to take the same oath. The

tribunes and centurions followed their example; the soldiers were

brought out by centuries, and took the same oath. They gave orders, that

whoever had any of Caesar's soldiers should produce them; as soon as

they were produced, they put them to death publicly in the praetorium,

but most of them concealed those that they had entertained, and let them

out at night over the rampart. Thus the terror raised by the generals,

the cruelty of the punishments, the new obligation of an oath, removed

all hopes of surrender for the present, changed the soldiers' minds, and

reduced matters to the former state of war.

LXXVII.--Caesar ordered the enemy's soldiers, who had come into his camp

to hold a conference, to be searched for with the strictest diligence,

and sent back. But of the tribunes and centurions, several voluntarily

remained with him, and he afterwards treated them with great respect.

The centurions he promoted to higher ranks, and conferred on the Roman

knights the honour of tribunes.

LXXVIII.--Afranius's men were distressed in foraging, and procured water

with difficulty. The legionary soldiers had a tolerable supply of corn,

because they had been ordered to bring from Ilerda sufficient to last

twenty-two days; the Spanish and auxiliary forces had none, for they had

but few opportunities of procuring any, and their bodies were not

accustomed to bear burdens; and therefore a great number of them came

over to Caesar every day. Their affairs were under these difficulties;

but of the two schemes proposed, the most expedient seemed to be to

return to Ilerda, because they had left some corn there; and there they

hoped to decide on a plan for their future conduct. Tarraco lay at a

greater distance; and in such a space they knew affairs might admit of

many changes. Their design having met with approbation, they set out

from their camp. Caesar having sent forward his cavalry, to annoy and

retard their rear, followed close after with his legions. Not a moment

passed in which their rear was not engaged with our horse.

LXXIX.--Their manner of fighting was this: the light cohorts closed

their rear, and frequently made a stand on the level grounds. If they

had a mountain to ascend, the very nature of the place readily secured

them from any danger; for the advanced guards, from the rising grounds,

protected the rest in their ascent. When they approached a valley or

declivity, and the advanced men could not impart assistance to the

tardy, our horse threw their darts at them from the rising grounds with

advantage; then their affairs were in a perilous situation; the only

plan left was, that whenever they came near such places, they should

give orders to the legions to halt, and by a violent effort repulse our

horse; and these being forced to give way, they should suddenly, with

the utmost speed, run all together down to the valley, and having passed

it, should face about again on the next hill. For so far were they from

deriving any assistance from their horse (of which they had a large

number), that they were obliged to receive them into the centre of their

army, and themselves protect them, as they were daunted by former

battles. And on their march no one could quit the line without being

taken by Caesar's horse.

LXXX.--Whilst skirmishes were fought in this manner, they advanced but

slowly and gradually, and frequently halted to help their rear, as then

happened. For having advanced four miles, and being very much harassed

by our horse, they took post on a high mountain, and there entrenched

themselves on the front only, facing the enemy; and did not take their

baggage off their cattle. When they perceived that Caesar's camp was

pitched, and the tents fixed up, and his horse sent out to forage, they

suddenly rushed out about twelve o'clock the same day, and, having hopes

that we should be delayed by the absence of our horse, they began to

march, which Caesar perceiving, followed them with the legions that

remained. He left a few cohorts to guard his baggage, and ordered the

foragers to be called home at the tenth hour, and the horse to follow

him. The horse shortly returned to their daily duty on march, and

charged the rear so vigorously, that they almost forced them to fly; and

several privates and some centurions were killed. The main body of

Caesar's army was at hand, and universal ruin threatened them.

LXXXI.--Then indeed, not having opportunity either to choose a

convenient position for their camp, or to march forward, they were

obliged to halt, and to encamp at a distance from water, and on ground

naturally unfavourable. But for the reasons already given, Caesar did

not attack them, nor suffer a tent to be pitched that day, that his men

might be the readier to pursue them whether they attempted to run off by

night or by day. Observing the defect in their position, they spent the

whole night in extending their works, and turn their camp to ours. The

next day, at dawn, they do the same, and spend the whole day in that

manner, but in proportion as they advanced their works, and extended

their camp, they were farther distant from the water; and one evil was

remedied by another. The first night, no one went out for water. The

next day, they left a guard in the camp, and led out all their forces to

water: but not a person was sent to look for forage. Caesar was more

desirous that they should be humbled by these means, and forced to come

to terms, than decide the contest by battle. Yet he endeavoured to

surround them with a wall and trench, that he might be able to check

their most sudden sally, to which he imagined that they must have

recourse. Hereupon, urged by want of fodder, that they might be the

readier for a march, they killed all their baggage cattle.

LXXXII.--In this work, and the deliberations on it, two days were spent.

By the third day a considerable part of Caesar's works was finished. To

interrupt his progress, they drew out their legions about the eighth

hour, by a certain signal, and placed them in order of battle before

their camp. Caesar calling his legions off from their work, and ordering

the horse to hold themselves in readiness, marshalled his army: for to

appear to decline an engagement contrary to the opinion of the soldiers

and the general voice, would have been attended with great disadvantage.

But for the reasons already known, he was dissuaded from wishing to

engage, and the more especially, because the short space between the

camps, even if the enemy were put to flight, would not contribute much

to a decisive victory; for the two camps were not distant from each

other above two thousand feet. Two parts of this were occupied by the

armies, and one third left for the soldiers to charge and make their

attack. If a battle should be begun, the nearness of the camps would

afford a ready retreat to the conquered party in the flight. For this

reason Caesar had resolved to make resistance, if they attacked him, but

not to be the first to provoke the battle.

LXXXIII.--Afranius's five legions were drawn up in two lines, the

auxiliary cohorts formed the third line, and acted as reserves. Caesar

had three lines, four cohorts out of each of the five legions formed the

first line. Three more from each legion followed them, as reserves: and

three others were behind these. The slingers and archers were stationed

in the centre of the line; the cavalry closed the flanks. The hostile

armies being arranged in this manner, each seemed determined to adhere

to his first intention: Caesar not to hazard a battle, unless forced to

it; Afranius to interrupt Caesar's works. However, the matter was

deferred, and both armies kept under arms till sunset; when they both

returned to their camp. The next day Caesar prepared to finish the works

which he had begun. The enemy attempted to pass the river Segre by a

ford. Caesar, having perceived this, sent some light-armed Germans and a

party of horse across the river, and disposed several parties along the

banks to guard them.

LXXXIV.--At length, beset on all sides, their cattle having been four

days without fodder, and having no water, wood, or corn, they beg a

conference; and that, if possible, in a place remote from the soldiers.

When this was refused by Caesar, but a public interview offered if they

chose it, Afranius's son was given as a hostage to Caesar. They met in

the place appointed by Caesar. In the hearing of both armies, Afranius

spoke thus: "That Caesar ought not to be displeased either with him or

his soldiers, for wishing to preserve their attachment to their general,

Cneius Pompey. That they had now sufficiently discharged their duty to

him, and had suffered punishment enough, in having endured the want of

every necessary: but now, pent up almost like wild beasts, they were

prevented from procuring water, and prevented from walking abroad; and

were not able to bear the bodily pain or the mental disgrace: but

confessed themselves vanquished: and begged and entreated, if there was

any room left for mercy, that they should not be necessitated to suffer

the most severe penalties." These sentiments were delivered in the most

submissive and humble language.

LXXXV.--Caesar replied, "That either to complain or sue for mercy became

no man less than him: for that every other person had done their duty:

himself, in having declined to engage on favourable terms, in an

advantageous situation and time, that all things tending to a peace

might be totally unembarrassed: his army, in having preserved and

protected the men whom they had in their power, notwithstanding the

injuries which they had received, and the murder of their comrades; and

even Afranius's soldiers, who of themselves treated about concluding a

peace, by which they thought that they would secure the lives of all.

Thus, that the parties on both sides inclined to mercy: that the

generals only were averse to peace: that they paid no regard to the laws

either of conference or truce; and had most inhumanly put to death

ignorant persons, who were deceived by a conference: that therefore,

they had met that fate which usually befalls men from excessive

obstinacy and arrogance; and were obliged to have recourse, and most

earnestly desire that which they had shortly before disdained. That for

his part, he would not avail himself of their present humiliation, or

his present advantage, to require terms by which his power might be

increased, but only that those armies, which they had maintained for so

many years to oppose him, should be disbanded: for six legions had been

sent into Spain, and a seventh raised there, and many and powerful

fleets provided, and generals of great military experience sent to

command them, for no other purpose than to oppose him; that none of

these measures were adopted to keep the Spains in peace, or for the use

of the province, which, from the length of the peace, stood in need of

no such aid; that all these things were long since designed against him:

that against him a new sort of government was established, that the same

person should be at the gates of Rome, to direct the affairs of the

city; and though absent, have the government of two most warlike

provinces for so many years: that against him the laws of the

magistrates had been altered; that the late praetors and consuls should

not be sent to govern the provinces as had been the constant custom, but

persons approved of and chosen by a faction. That against him the excuse

of age was not admitted: but persons of tried experience in former wars

were called up to take the command of the armies, that with respect to

him only, the routine was not observed which had been allowed to all

generals, that, after a successful war, they should return home and

disband their armies, if not with some mark of honour, at least without

disgrace: that he had submitted to all these things patiently, and would

still submit to them: nor did he now desire to take their army from them

and keep it to himself (which, however, would not be a difficult

matter), but only that they should not have it to employ against him:

and therefore, as he said before, let them quit the provinces, and

disband their army. If this was complied with, he would injure no

person; that these were the last and only conditions of peace."

LXXXVI.--It was very acceptable and agreeable to Afranius's soldiers, as

might be easily known from their signs of joy, that they who expected

some injury after this defeat, should obtain without solicitation the

reward of a dismissal. For when a debate was introduced about the place

and time of their dismissal, they all began to express, both by words

and signs, from the rampart where they stood, that they should be

discharged immediately: for although every security might be given that

they would be disbanded, still the matter would be uncertain, if it was

deferred to a future day. After a short debate on either side, it was

brought to this issue: that those who had any settlement or possession

in Spain, should be immediately discharged: the rest at the river Var.

Caesar gave security that they should receive no damage, and that no

person should be obliged against his inclination to take the military

oath under him.

LXXXVII.--Caesar promised to supply them with corn from the present

time, till they arrived at the river Var. He further adds, that whatever

any of them lost in the war, which was in the possession of his

soldiers, should be restored to those that lost them. To his soldiers he

made a recompense in money for those things, a just valuation being

made. Whatever disputes Afranius's soldiers had afterwards amongst

themselves, they voluntarily submitted to Caesar's decision. Afranius

and Petreius, when pay was demanded by the legions, a sedition almost

breaking out, asserted that the time had not yet come, and required that

Caesar should take cognizance of it: and both parties were content with

his decision. About a third part of their army being dismissed in two

days, Caesar ordered two of his legions to go before, the rest to follow

the vanquished enemy: that they should encamp at a small distance from

each other. The execution of this business he gave in charge to Quintus

Fufius Kalenus, one of his lieutenants. According to his directions,

they marched from Spain to the river Var, and there the rest of the army

was disbanded.

BOOK II

I.--Whilst these things were going forward in Spain, Caius Trebonius,

Caesar's lieutenant, who had been left to conduct the assault of

Massilia, began to raise a mound, vineae, and turrets against the town,

on two sides: one of which was next the harbour and docks, the other on

that part where there is a passage from Gaul and Spain to that sea which

forces itself up the mouth of the Rhone. For Massilia is washed almost

on three sides by the sea, the remaining fourth part is the only side

which has access by land. A part even of this space, which reaches to

the fortress, being fortified by the nature of the country, and a very

deep valley, required a long and difficult siege. To accomplish these

works, Caius Trebonius sends for a great quantity of carriages and men

from the whole Province, and orders hurdles and materials to be

furnished. These things being provided, he raised a mound eighty feet in

height.

II.--But so great a store of everything necessary for a war had been a

long time before laid up in the town, and so great a number of engines,

that no vineae made of hurdles could withstand their force. For poles

twelve feet in length, pointed with iron, and these too shot from very

large engines, sank into the ground through four rows of hurdles.

Therefore the arches of the vineae were covered over with beams a foot

thick, fastened together, and under this the materials of the agger were

handed from one to another. Before this was carried a testudo sixty feet

long, for levelling the ground, made also of very strong timber, and

covered over with every thing that was capable of protecting it against

the fire and stones thrown by the enemy. But the greatness of the works,

the height of the wall and towers, and the multitude of engines retarded

the progress of our works. Besides, frequent sallies were made from the

town by the Albici, and fire was thrown on our mound and turrets. These

our men easily repulsed, and, doing considerable damage to those who

sallied, beat them back into the town.

III.--In the meantime, Lucius Nasidius, being sent by Cneius Pompey with

a fleet of sixteen sail, a few of which had beaks of brass, to the

assistance of Lucius Domitius and the Massilians, passed the straits of

Sicily without the knowledge or expectation of Curio, and, putting with

his fleet into Messana, and making the nobles and senate take flight

with the sudden terror, carried off one of their ships out of dock.

Having joined this to his other ships, he made good his voyage to

Massilia, and, having sent in a galley privately, acquaints Domitius and

the Massilians of his arrival, and earnestly encourages them to hazard

another battle with Brutus's fleet with the addition of his aid.

IV.--The Massilians, since their former loss, had brought the same

number of old ships from the docks, and had repaired and fitted them out

with great industry: they had a large supply of seamen and pilots. They

had got several fishing-smacks, and covered them over, that the seamen

might be secure against darts: these they filled with archers and

engines. With a fleet thus appointed, encouraged by the entreaties and

tears of all the old men, matrons, and virgins to succour the state in

this hour of distress, they went on board with no less spirit and

confidence than they had fought before. For it happens, from a common

infirmity of human nature, that we are more flushed with confidence, or

more vehemently alarmed at things unseen, concealed, and unknown, as was

the case then. For the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had filled the state

with the most sanguine hopes and wishes. Having got a fair wind, they

sailed out of port and went to Nasidius to Taurois, which is a fort

belonging to the Massilians, and there ranged their fleet and again

encouraged each other to engage, and communicated their plan of

operation. The command of the right division was given to the

Massilians, that of the left to Nasidius.

V.--Brutus sailed to the same place with an augmented fleet: for to

those made by Caesar at Arelas were added six ships taken from the

Massilians, which he had refitted since the last battle and had

furnished with every necessary. Accordingly, having encouraged his men

to despise a vanquished people whom they had conquered when yet

unbroken, he advanced against them full of confidence and spirit. From

Trebonius's camp and all the higher grounds it was easy to see into the

town--how all the youth which remained in it, and all persons of more

advanced years, with their wives and children, and the public guards,

were either extending their hands from the wall to the heavens, or were

repairing to the temples of the immortal gods, and, prostrating

themselves before their images, were entreating them to grant them

victory. Nor was there a single person who did not imagine that his

future fortune depended on the issue of that day; for the choice of

their youth and the most respectable of every age, being expressly

invited and solicited, had gone on board the fleet, that if any adverse

fate should befall them they might see that nothing was left for them to

attempt, and, if they proved victorious, they might have hopes of

preserving the city, either by their internal resources or by foreign

assistance.

VI-.-When the battle was begun, no effort of valour was wanting to the

Massilians, but, mindful of the instructions which they had a little

before received from their friends, they fought with such spirit as if

they supposed that they would never have another opportunity to attempt

a defence, and as if they believed that those whose lives should be

endangered in the battle would not long precede the fate of the rest of

the citizens, who, if the city was taken, must undergo the same fortune

of war. Our ships being at some distance from each other, room was

allowed both for the skill of their pilots and the manoeuvring of their

ships; and if at any time ours, gaining an advantage by casting the iron

hooks on board their ships, grappled with them, from all parts they

assisted those who were distressed. Nor, after being joined by the

Albici, did they decline coming to close engagement, nor were they much

inferior to our men in valour. At the same time, showers of darts,

thrown from a distance from the lesser ships, suddenly inflicted several

wounds on our men when off their guard and otherwise engaged; and two of

their three-decked galleys, having descried the ship of Decimus Brutus,

which could be easily distinguished by its flag, rowed up against him

with great violence from opposite sides: but Brutus, seeing into their

designs, by the swiftness of his ship extricated himself with such

address as to get clear, though only by a moment. From the velocity of

their motion they struck against each other with such violence that they

were both excessively injured by the shock; the beak, indeed, of one of

them being broken off, the whole ship was ready to founder, which

circumstance being observed, the ships of Brutus's fleet, which were

nearest that station, attack them when in this disorder and sink them

both.

VII.--But Nasidius's ships were of no use, and soon left the fight; for

the sight of their country, or the entreaties of their relations, did

not urge them to run a desperate risk of their lives. Therefore, of the

number of the ships not one was lost: of the fleet of the Massilians

five were sunk, four taken, and one ran off with Nasidius: all that

escaped made the best of their way to Hither Spain, but one of the rest

was sent forward to Massilia for the purpose of bearing this

intelligence, and when it came near the city, the whole people crowded

out to hear the tidings, and on being informed of the event, were so

oppressed with grief, that one would have imagined that the city had

been taken by an enemy at the same moment. The Massilians, however,

began to make the necessary preparations for the defence of their city

with unwearied energy.

VIII.--The legionary soldiers who had the management of the works on the

right side observed, from the frequent sallies of the enemy, that it

might prove a great protection to them to build a turret of brick under

the wall for a fort and place of refuge, which they at first built low

and small, [to guard them] against sudden attacks. To it they retreated,

and from it they made defence if any superior force attacked them; and

from it they sallied out either to repel or pursue the enemy. It

extended thirty feet on every side, and the thickness of the walls was

five feet. But afterwards, as experience is the best master in

everything on which the wit of man is employed, it was found that it

might be of considerable service if it was raised to the usual height of

turrets, which was effected in the following manner.

IX.-When the turret was raised to the height for flooring, they laid it

on the walls in such a manner that the ends of the joists were covered

by the outer face of the wall, that nothing should project to which the

enemy's fire might adhere. They, moreover, built over the joists with

small bricks as high as the protection of the plutei and vineae

permitted them; and on that place they laid two beams across, angle-ways,

at a small distance from the outer walls, to support the rafters

which were to cover the turret, and on the beams they laid joists across

in a direct line, and on these they fastened down planks. These joists

they made somewhat longer, to project beyond the outside of the wall,

that they might serve to hang a curtain on them to defend and repel all

blows whilst they were building the walls between that and the next

floor, and the floor of this story they faced with bricks and mortar,

that the enemy's fire might do them no damage; and on this they spread

mattresses, lest the weapons thrown from engines should break through

the flooring, or stones from catapults should batter the brickwork.

They, moreover, made three mats of cable ropes, each of them the length

of the turret walls, and four feet broad, and, hanging them round the

turret on the three sides which faced the enemy, fastened them to the

projecting joists. For this was the only sort of defence which, they had

learned by experience in other places, could not be pierced by darts or

engines. But when that part of the turret which was completed was

protected and secured against every attempt of the enemy, they removed

the plutei to other works. They began to suspend gradually, and raise by

screws from the first-floor, the entire roof of the turret, and then

they elevated it as high as the length of the mats allowed. Hid and

secured within these coverings, they built up the walls with bricks, and

again, by another turn of the screw, cleared a place for themselves to

proceed with the building; and, when they thought it time to lay another

floor, they laid the ends of the beams, covered in by the outer bricks

in like manner as in the first story, and from that story they again

raised the uppermost floor and the mat-work. In this manner, securely

and without a blow or danger, they raised it six stories high, and in

laying the materials left loop-holes in such places as they thought

proper for working their engines.

X.--When they were confident that they could protect the works which lay

around from this turret, they resolved to build a musculus, sixty feet

long, of timber, two feet square, and to extend it from the brick tower

to the enemy's tower and wall. This was the form of it: two beams of

equal length were laid on the ground, at the distance of four feet from

each other; and in them were fastened small pillars, five feet high,

which were joined together by braces, with a gentle slope, on which the

timber which they must place to support the roof of the musculus should

be laid: upon this were laid beams, two feet square, bound with iron

plates and nails. To the upper covering of the musculus and the upper

beams, they fastened laths, four fingers square, to support the tiles

which were to cover the musculus. The roof being thus sloped and laid

over in rows in the same manner as the joists were laid on the braces,

the musculus was covered with tiles and mortar, to secure it against

fire, which might be thrown from the wall. Over the tiles hides are

spread, to prevent the water let in on them by spouts from dissolving

the cement of the bricks. Again, the hides were covered over with

mattresses, that they might not be destroyed by fire or stones. The

soldiers under the protection of the vineae, finish this whole work to

the very tower, and suddenly, before the enemy were aware of it, moved

it forward by naval machinery, by putting rollers under it, close up to

the enemy's turret, so that it even touched the building.

XI.--The townsmen, affrighted at this unexpected stroke, bring forward

with levers the largest stones they can procure; and pitching them from

the wall, roll them down on the musculus. The strength of the timber

withstood the shock; and whatever fell on it slid off, on account of the

sloping roof. When they perceived this, they altered their plan and set

fire to barrels, filled with resin and tar, and rolled them down from

the wall on the musculus. As soon as they fell on it, they slid off

again, and were removed from its side by long poles and forks. In the

meantime, the soldiers, under cover of the musculus, were looting out

with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's turret, with which the

foundation was laid. The musculus was defended by darts, thrown from

engines by our men from the brick tower, and the enemy were beaten off

from the wall and turrets; nor was a fair opportunity of defending the

walls given them. At length several stones being picked away from the

foundation of that turret next the musculus, part of it fell down

suddenly, and the rest, as if following it, leaned forward.

XII.--Hereupon, the enemy, distressed at the sudden fall of the turret,

surprised at the unforeseen calamity, awed by the wrath of the gods, and

dreading the pillage of their city, rush all together out of the gate

unarmed, with their temples bound with fillets, and suppliantly stretch

out their hands to the officers and the army. At this uncommon

occurrence, the whole progress of the war was stopped, and the soldiers,

turning away from the battle, ran eagerly to hear and listen to them.

When the enemy came up to the commanders and the army, they all fell

down at their feet, and besought them "to wait till Caesar's arrival;

they saw that their city was taken, our works completed, and their tower

undermined, therefore they desisted from a defence; that no obstacle

could arise, to prevent their being instantly plundered at a beck, as

soon as he arrived, if they refused to submit to his orders." They

inform them that, "if the turret had entirely fallen down, the soldiers

could not be withheld from forcing into the town and sacking it, in

hopes of getting spoil." These and several other arguments to the same

effect were delivered, as they were a people of great learning, with

great pathos and lamentations.

XIII.--The lieutenants, moved with compassion, draw off the soldiers

from the work, desist from the assault, and leave sentinels on the

works. A sort of a truce having been made through compassion for the

besieged, the arrival of Caesar is anxiously awaited; not a dart was

thrown from the walls or by our men, but all remit their care and

diligence, as if the business was at an end. For Caesar had given

Trebonius strict charge not to suffer the town to be taken by storm,

lest the soldiers, too much irritated both by abhorrence of their

revolt, by the contempt shown to them, and by their long labour, should

put to the sword all the grown-up inhabitants, as they threatened to do.

And it was with difficulty that they were then restrained from breaking

into the town, and they were much displeased, because they imagined that

they were prevented by Trebonius from taking possession of it.

XIV.--But the enemy, destitute of all honour, only waited a time and

opportunity for fraud and treachery. And after an interval of some days,

when our men were careless and negligent, on a sudden, at noon, when

some were dispersed, and others indulging themselves in rest on the very

works, after the fatigue of the day, and their arms were all laid by and

covered up, they sallied out from the gates, and, the wind being high

and favourable to them, they set fire to our works; and the wind spread

it in such a manner that, in the same instant, the agger, plutei,

testudo, tower, and engines all caught the flames and were consumed

before we could conceive how it had occurred. Our men, alarmed at such

an unexpected turn of fortune, lay hold on such arms as they could find.

Some rush from the camp; an attack is made on the enemy: but they were

prevented, by arrows and engines from the walls, from pursuing them when

they fled. They retired to their walls, and there, without fear, set the

musculus and brick tower on fire. Thus, by the perfidy of the enemy and

the violence of the storm, the labour of many months was destroyed in a

moment. The Massilians made the same attempt the next day, having got

such another storm. They sallied out against the other tower and agger,

and fought with more confidence. But as our men had on the former

occasion given up all thoughts of a contest, so, warned by the event of

the preceding day, they had made every preparation for a defence.

Accordingly, they slew several, and forced the rest to retreat into the

town without effecting their design.

XV.--Trebonius began to provide and repair what had been destroyed, with

much greater zeal on the part of the soldiers; for when they saw that

their extraordinary pains and preparations had an unfortunate issue,

they were fired with indignation that, in consequence of the impious

violation of the truce, their valour should be held in derision. There

was no place left them from which the materials for their mound could be

fetched, in consequence of all the timber, far and wide, in the

territories of the Massilians, having been cut down and carried away;

they began therefore to make an agger of a new construction, never heard

of before, of two walls of brick, each six feet thick, and to lay floors

over them of almost the same breadth with the agger, made of timber. But

wherever the space between the walls, or the weakness of the timber,

seemed to require it, pillars were placed underneath and traversed beams

laid on to strengthen the work, and the space which was floored was

covered over with hurdles, and the hurdles plastered over with mortar.

The soldiers, covered overhead by the floor, on the right and left by

the wall, and in the front by the mantlets, carried whatever materials

were necessary for the building without danger: the business was soon

finished--the loss of their laborious work was soon repaired by the

dexterity and fortitude of the soldiers. Gates for making sallies were

left in the wall in such places as they thought proper.

XVI.--But when the enemy perceived that those works, which they had

hoped could not be replaced without a great length of time, were put

into so thorough repair by a few days' labour and diligence, that there

was no room for perfidy or sallies, and that no means were left them by

which they could either hurt the men by resistance or the works by fire,

and when they found by former examples that their town could be

surrounded with a wall and turrets on every part by which it was

accessible by land, in such a manner that they could not have room to

stand on their own fortifications, because our works were built almost

on the top of their walls by our army, and darts could be thrown from

our hands, and when they perceived that all advantage arising from their

engines, on which they had built great hopes, was totally lost, and that

though they had an opportunity of fighting with us on equal terms from

walls and turrets, they could perceive that they were not equal to our

men in bravery, they had recourse to the same proposals of surrender as

before.

XVII.--In Further Spain, Marcus Varro, in the beginning of the

disturbances, when he heard of the circumstances which took place in

Italy, being diffident of Pompey's success, used to speak in a very

friendly manner of Caesar. That though, being pre-engaged to Cneius

Pompey in quality of lieutenant, he was bound in honour to him, that,

nevertheless, there existed a very intimate tie between him and Caesar;

that he was not ignorant of what was the duty of a lieutenant, who bore

an office of trust; nor of his own strength, nor of the disposition of

the whole province to Caesar. These sentiments he constantly expressed

in his ordinary conversation, and did not attach himself to either

party. But afterwards, when he found that Caesar was detained before

Massilia, that the forces of Petreius had effected a junction with the

army of Afranius, that considerable reinforcements had come to their

assistance, that there were great hopes and expectations, and heard that

the whole Hither province had entered into a confederacy, and of the

difficulties to which Caesar was reduced afterwards at Ilerda for want

of provisions, and Afranius wrote to him a fuller and more exaggerated

account of these matters, he began to regulate his movements by those of

fortune.

XVIII.--He made levies throughout the province; and, having completed

his two legions, he added to them about thirty auxiliary cohorts: he

collected a large quantity of corn to send partly to the Massilians,

partly to Afranius and Petreius. He commanded the inhabitants of Gades

to build ten ships of war; besides, he took care that several others

should be built in Spain. He removed all the money and ornaments from

the temple of Hercules to the town of Gades, and sent six cohorts

thither from the province to guard them, and gave the command of the

town of Gades to Caius Gallonius, a Roman knight, and friend of

Domitius, who had come thither sent by Domitius to recover an estate for

him; and he deposited all the arms, both public and private, in

Gallonius's house. He himself [Varro] made severe harangues against

Caesar. He often pronounced from his tribunal that Caesar had fought

several unsuccessful battles, and that a great number of his men had

deserted to Afranius. That he had these accounts from undoubted

messengers, and authority on which he could rely. By these means he

terrified the Roman citizens of that province, and obliged them to

promise him for the service of the state one hundred and ninety thousand

sesterces, twenty thousand pounds weight of silver, and a hundred and

twenty thousand bushels of wheat. He laid heavier burdens on those

states which he thought were friendly disposed to Caesar, and billeted

troops on them; he passed judgment against some private persons, and

condemned to confiscation the properties of those who had spoken or made

orations against the republic, and forced the whole province to take an

oath of allegiance to him and Pompey. Being informed of all that

happened in Hither Spain, he prepared for war. This was his plan of

operations. He was to retire with his two legions to Gades, and to lay

up all the shipping and provisions there. For he had been informed that

the whole province was inclined to favour Caesar's party. He thought

that the war might be easily protracted in an island, if he was provided

with corn and shipping. Caesar, although called back to Italy by many

and important matters, yet had determined to leave no dregs of war

behind him in Spain, because he knew that Pompey had many dependants and

clients in the Hither province.

XIX.--Having therefore sent two legions into Further Spain under the

command of Quintus Cassius, tribune of the people; he himself advances

with six hundred horse by forced marches, and issues a proclamation,

appointing a day on which the magistrates and nobility of all the states

should attend him at Corduba. This proclamation being published through

the whole province, there was not a state that did not send a part of

their senate to Corduba, at the appointed time; and not a Roman citizen

of any note but appeared that day. At the same time the senate at

Corduba shut the gates of their own accord against Varro, and posted

guards and sentinels on the wall and in the turrets, and detained two

cohorts (called Colonicae, which had come there accidentally), for the

defence of the town. About the same time the people of Carmona, which is

by far the strongest state in the whole province, of themselves drove

out of the town the cohorts, and shut the gates against them, although

three cohorts had been detached by Varro to garrison the citadel.

XX.--But Varro was in greater haste on this account to reach Gades with

his legion as soon as possible, lest he should be stopped either on his

march or on crossing over to the island. The affection of the province

to Caesar proved so great and so favourable, that he received a letter

from Gades, before he was far advanced on his march: that as soon as the

nobility of Gades heard of Caesar's proclamation, they had combined with

the tribune of the cohorts, which were in garrison there, to drive

Gallonius out of the town, and to secure the city and island for Caesar.

That having agreed on the design they had sent notice to Gallonius, to

quit Gades of his own accord whilst he could do it with safety; if he

did not, they would take measures for themselves; that for fear of this

Gallonius had been induced to quit the town. When this was known, one of

Varro's two legions, which was called Vernacula, carried off the colours

from Varro's camp, he himself standing by and looking on, and retired to

Hispalis, and took post in the market and public places without doing

any injury, and the Roman citizens residing there approved so highly of

this act, that every one most earnestly offered to entertain them in

their houses. When Varro, terrified at these things, having altered his

route, proposed going to Italica, he was informed by his friends that

the gates were shut against him. Then indeed, when intercepted from

every road, he sends word to Caesar that he was ready to deliver up the

legion which he commanded. He sends to him Sextus Caesar, and orders him

to deliver it up to him. Varro, having delivered up the legion, went to

Caesar to Corduba, and having laid before him the public accounts,

handed over to him most faithfully whatever money he had, and told him

what quantity of corn and shipping he had, and where.

XXI.--Caesar made a public oration at Corduba, in which he returned

thanks to all severally: to the Roman citizens, because they had been

zealous to keep the town in their own power; to the Spaniards, for

having driven out the garrison; to the Gaditani, for having defeated the

attempts of his enemies, and asserted their own liberty; to the Tribunes

and Centurions who had gone there as a guard, for having by their valour

confirmed them in their purpose. He remitted the tax which the Roman

citizens had promised to Varro for the public use: he restored their

goods to those who he was informed had incurred that penalty by speaking

too freely, having given public and private rewards to some: he filled

the rest with flattering hopes of his future intentions; and having

stayed two days at Corduba, he set out for Gades: he ordered the money

and ornaments which had been carried away from the temple of Hercules,

and lodged in the houses of private persons, to be replaced in the

temple. He made Quintus Cassius governor of the province, and assigned

him four legions. He himself, with those ships which Marcus Varro had

built, and others which the Gaditani had built by Varro's orders,

arrived in a few days at Tarraco, where ambassadors from the greatest

part of the nearer province waited his arrival. Having in the same

manner conferred marks of honour both publicly and privately on some

states, he left Tarraco, and went thence by land to Narbo, and thence to

Massilia. There he was informed that a law was passed for creating a

dictator, and that he had been nominated dictator by Marcus Lepidus the

praetor.

XXII.--The Massilians, wearied out by misfortunes of every sort, reduced

to the lowest ebb for want of corn, conquered in two engagements at sea,

defeated in their frequent sallies, and struggling moreover with a fatal

pestilence, from their long confinement and change of victuals (for they

all subsisted on old millet and damaged barley, which they had formerly

provided and laid up in the public stores against an emergency of this

kind), their turret being demolished, a great part of their wall having

given way, and despairing of any aid, either from the provinces or their

armies, for these they had heard had fallen into Caesar's power,

resolved to surrender now without dissimulation. But a few days before,

Lucius Domitius, having discovered the intention of the Massilians, and

having procured three ships, two of which he gave up to his friends,

went on board the third himself, having got a brisk wind, put out to

sea. Some ships, which by Brutus's orders were constantly cruising near

the port, having espied him, weighed anchor, and pursued him. But of

these, the ship on board of which he was, persevered itself, and

continuing its flight, and by the aid of the wind got out of sight: the

other two, affrighted by the approach of our galleys, put back again

into the harbour. The Massilians conveyed their arms and engines out of

the town, as they were ordered: brought their ships out of the port and

docks, and delivered up the money in their treasury. When these affairs

were despatched, Caesar, sparing the town more out of regard to their

renown and antiquity than to any claim they could lay to his favour,

left two legions in garrison there, sent the rest to Italy, and set out

himself for Rome.

XXIII.--About the same time Caius Curio, having sailed from Sicily to

Africa, and from the first despising the forces of Publius Attius Varus,

transported only two of the four legions which he had received from

Caesar, and five hundred horse, and having spent two days and three

nights on the voyage, arrived at a place called Aquilaria, which is

about twenty-two miles distant from Clupea, and in the summer season has

a convenient harbour, and is enclosed by two projecting promontories.

Lucius Caesar, the son, who was waiting his arrival near Clupea with ten

ships which had been taken near Utica in a war with the pirates, and

which Publius Attius had had repaired for this war, frightened at the

number of our ships, fled the sea, and running his three-decked covered

galley on the nearest shore, left her there and made his escape by land

to Adrumetum. Caius Considius Longus, with a garrison of one legion,

guarded this town. The rest of Caesar's fleet, after his flight, retired

to Adrumetum. Marcus Rufus, the quaestor, pursued him with twelve ships,

which Curio had brought from Sicily as convoy to the merchantmen, and

seeing a ship left on the shore, he brought her off by a towing rope,

and returned with his fleet to Curio.

XXIV.--Curio detached Marcus before with the fleet to Utica, and marched

thither with his army. Having advanced two days, he came to the river

Bagrada, and there left Caius Caninius Rebilus, the lieutenant, with the

legions; and went forward himself with the horse to view the Cornelian

camp, because that was reckoned a very eligible position for encamping.

It is a straight ridge, projecting into the sea, steep and rough on both

sides, but the ascent is more gentle on that part which lies opposite

Utica. It is not more than a mile distant from Utica in a direct line.

But on this road there is a spring, to which the sea comes up, and

overflows; an extensive morass is thereby formed; and if a person would

avoid it, he must make a circuit of six miles to reach the town.

XXV.--Having examined this place, Curio got a view of Varus's camp,

joining the wall and town, at the gate called Bellica, well fortified by

its natural situation, on one side by the town itself, on the other by a

theatre which is before the town, the approaches to the town being

rendered difficult and narrow by the very extensive out-buildings of

that structure. At the same time he observed the roads very full of

carriages and cattle which they were conveying from the country into the

town on the sudden alarm. He sent his cavalry after them to plunder them

and get the spoil. And at the same time Varus had detached as a guard

for them six hundred Numidian horse, and four hundred foot, which king

Juba had sent to Utica as auxiliaries a few days before. There was a

friendship subsisting between his [Juba's] father and Pompey, and a feud

between him and Curio, because he, when a tribune of the people, had

proposed a law, in which he endeavoured to make public property of the

kingdom of Juba. The horse engaged; but the Numidians were not able to

stand our first charge; but a hundred and twenty being killed, the rest

retreated into their camp near the town. In the meantime, on the arrival

of his men-of-war, Curio ordered proclamation to be made to the merchant

ships, which lay at anchor before Utica, in number about two hundred,

that he would treat as enemies all that did not set sail immediately for

the Cornelian camp. As soon as the proclamation was made, in an instant

they all weighed anchor and left Utica, and repaired to the place

commanded them. This circumstance furnished the army with plenty of

everything.

XXVI.--After these transactions, Curio returned to his camp at Bagrada;

and by a general shout of the whole army was saluted imperator. The next

day he led his army to Utica, and encamped near the town. Before the

works of the camp were finished, the horse upon guard brought him word

that a large supply of horse and foot sent by king Juba were on their

march to Utica, and at the same time a cloud of dust was observed, and

in a moment the front of the line was in sight. Curio, surprised at the

suddenness of the affair, sent on the horse to receive their first

charge, and detain them. He immediately called off his legions from the

work, and put them in battle array. The horse began the battle: and

before the legions could be completely marshalled and take their ground,

the king's entire forces being thrown into disorder and confusion,

because they had marched without any order, and were under no

apprehensions, betake themselves to flight: almost all the enemy's horse

being safe, because they made a speedy retreat into the town along the

shore, Caesar's soldiers slay a great number of their infantry.

XXVII.--The next night two Marsian centurions, with twenty-two men

belonging to the companies, deserted from Curio's camp to Attius Varus.

They, whether they uttered the sentiments which they really entertained,

or wished to gratify Varus (for what we wish we readily give credit to,

and what we think ourselves, we hope is the opinion of other men),

assured him, that the minds of the whole army were disaffected to Curio,

that it was very expedient that the armies should be brought in view of

each other, and an opportunity of a conference be given. Induced by

their opinion, Varus the next day led his troops out of the camp: Curio

did so in like manner, and with only one small valley between them, each

drew up his forces.

XXVIII.--In Varus's army there was one Sextus Quintilius Varus who, as

we have mentioned before, was at Corfinium. When Caesar gave him his

liberty, he went over to Africa; now, Curio had transported to Africa

those legions which Caesar had received under his command a short time

before at Corfinium: so that the officers and companies were still the

same, excepting the change of a few centurions. Quintilius, making this

a pretext for addressing them, began to go round Curio's lines, and to

entreat the soldiers "not to lose all recollection of the oath which

they took first to Domitius and to him their quaestor, nor bear arms

against those who had shared the same fortune, and endured the same

hardships in a siege, nor fight for those by whom they had been

opprobriously called deserters." To this he added a few words by way of

encouragement, what they might expect from his own liberality, if they

should follow him and Attius. On the delivery of this speech, no

intimation of their future conduct is given by Curio's army, and thus

both generals led back their troops to their camp.

XXIX.--However, a great and general fear spread through Curio's camp,

for it is soon increased by the various discourses of men. For every one

formed an opinion of his own; and to what he had heard from others,

added his own apprehensions. When this had spread from a single author

to several persons, and was handed from one another, there appeared to

be many authors for such sentiments as these: ["That it was a civil war;

that they were men; and therefore that it was lawful for them to act

freely, and follow which party they pleased." These were the legions

which a short time before had belonged to the enemy; for the custom of

offering free towns to those who joined the opposite party had changed

Caesar's kindness. For the harshest expressions of the soldiers in

general did not proceed from the Marsi and Peligni, as those which

passed in the tents the night before; and some of their fellow soldiers

heard them with displeasure. Some additions were also made to them by

those who wished to be thought more zealous in their duty.]

XXX.--For these reasons, having called a council, Curio began to

deliberate on the general welfare. There were some opinions, which

advised by all means an attempt to be made, and an attack on Varus's

camp; for when such sentiments prevailed among the soldiers, they

thought idleness was improper. In short, they said, "that it was better

bravely to try the hazard of war in a battle, than to be deserted and

surrounded by their own troops, and forced to submit to the greatest

cruelties." There were some who gave their opinion, that they ought to

withdraw at the third watch to the Cornelian camp; that by a longer

interval of time the soldiers might be brought to a proper way of

thinking; and also, that if any misfortune should befall them, they

might have a safer and readier retreat to Sicily, from the great number

of their ships.

XXXI.--Curio, censuring both measures, said, "that the one was as

deficient in spirit, as the other exceeded in it: that the latter

advised a shameful flight, and the former recommended us to engage at a

great disadvantage. For on what, says he, can we rely that we can storm

a camp, fortified both by nature and art? Or, indeed, what advantage do

we gain if we give over the assault, after having suffered considerable

loss; as if success did not acquire for a general the affection of his

army, and misfortune their hatred? But what does a change of camp imply

but a shameful flight, and universal despair, and the alienation of the

army? For neither ought the obedient to suspect that they are

distrusted, nor the insolent to know that we fear them; because our

fears augment the licentiousness of the latter, and diminish the zeal of

the former. But if, says he, we were convinced of the truth of the

reports of the disaffection of the army (which I indeed am confident are

either altogether groundless, or at least less than they are supposed to

be), how much better to conceal and hide our suspicions of it, than by

our conduct confirm it? Ought not the defects of an army to be as

carefully concealed as the wounds in our bodies, lest we should increase

the enemy's hopes? but they moreover advise us to set out at midnight,

in order, I suppose, that those who attempt to do wrong may have a

fairer opportunity; for conduct of this kind is restrained either by

shame or fear, to the display of which the night is most adverse.

Wherefore, I am neither so rash as to give my opinion that we ought to

attack their camp without hopes of succeeding; nor so influenced by fear

as to despond: and I imagine that every expedient ought first to be

tried; and I am in a great degree confident that I shall form the same

opinion as yourselves on this matter."

XXXII.--Having broken up the council he called the soldiers together,

and reminded them "what advantage Caesar had derived from their zeal at

Corfinium; how by their good offices and influence he had brought over a

great part of Italy to his interest. For, says he, all the municipal

towns afterwards imitated you and your conduct; nor was it without

reason that Caesar judged so favourably, and the enemy so harshly of

you. For Pompey, though beaten in no engagement, yet was obliged to

shift his ground, and leave Italy, from the precedent established by

your conduct. Caesar committed me, whom he considered his dearest

friend, and the provinces of Sicily and Africa, without which he was not

able to protect Rome or Italy, to your protection. There are some here

present who encourage you to revolt from us; for what can they wish for

more, than at once to ruin us, and to involve you in a heinous crime? or

what baser opinions could they in their resentment entertain of you,

than that you would betray those who acknowledged themselves indebted to

you for everything, and put yourselves in the power of those who think

they have been ruined by you? Have you not heard of Caesar's exploits in

Spain? that he routed two armies, conquered two generals, recovered two

provinces, and effected all this within forty days after he came in

sight of the enemy? Can those who were not able to stand against him

whilst they were uninjured resist him when they are ruined? Will you,

who took part with Caesar whilst victory was uncertain, take part with

the conquered enemy when the fortune of the war is decided, and when you

ought to reap the reward of your services? For they say that they have

been deserted and betrayed by you, and remind you of a former oath. But

did you desert Lucius Domitius, or did Lucius Domitius desert you? Did

he not, when you were ready to submit to the greatest difficulties, cast

you off? Did he not, without your privacy, endeavour to effect his own

escape? When you were betrayed by him, were you not preserved by

Caesar's generosity? And how could he think you bound by your oath to

him, when, after having thrown up the ensigns of power, and abdicated

his government, he became a private person, and a captive in another's

power? A new obligation is left upon you, that you should disregard the

oath, by which you are at present bound; and have respect only to that

which was invalidated by the surrender of your general, and his

diminution of rank. But I suppose, although you are pleased with Caesar,

you are offended with me; however I shall not boast of my services to

you, which still are inferior to my own wishes or your expectations.

But, however, soldiers have ever looked for the rewards of labour at the

conclusion of a war; and what the issue of it is likely to be, not even

you can doubt. But why should I omit to mention my own diligence and

good fortune, and to what a happy crisis affairs are now arrived? Are

you sorry that I transported the army safe and entire, without the loss

of a single ship? That on my arrival, in the very first attack, I routed

the enemy's fleet? That twice in two days I defeated the enemy's horse?

That I carried out of the very harbour and bay, two hundred of the

enemy's victuallers, and reduced them to that situation that they can

receive no supplies either by land or sea? Will you divorce yourselves

from this fortune and these generals; and prefer the disgrace of

Corfinium, the defeat of Italy, the surrender of both Spains, and the

prestige of the African war? I, for my part, wished to be called a

soldier of Caesar's; you honoured me with the title of Imperator. If you

repent your bounty, I give it back to you; restore to me my former name

that you may not appear to have conferred the honour on me as a

reproach."

XXXIII.--The soldiers, being affected by this oration, frequently

attempted to interrupt him whilst he was speaking, so that they appeared

to bear with excessive anguish the suspicion of treachery, and when he

was leaving the assembly they unanimously besought him to be of good

spirits, and not hesitate to engage the enemy and put their fidelity and

courage to a trial. As the wishes and opinions of all were changed by

this act, Curio, with the general consent, determined, whenever

opportunity offered, to hazard a battle. The next day he led out his

forces and ranged them in order of battle on the same ground where they

had been posted the preceding day; nor did Attius Varus hesitate to draw

out his men, that, if any occasion should offer, either to tamper with

our men or to engage on equal terms, he might not miss the opportunity.

XXXIV.-There lay between the two armies a valley, as already mentioned,

not very deep, but of a difficult and steep ascent. Each was waiting

till the enemy's forces should attempt to pass it, that they might

engage with the advantage of the ground. At the same time, on the left

wing, the entire cavalry of Publius Attius, and several light-armed

infantry intermixed with them, were perceived descending into the

valley. Against them Curio detached his cavalry and two cohorts of the

Marrucini, whose first charge the enemy's horse were unable to stand,

but, setting spurs to their horses, fled back to their friends: the

light-infantry being deserted by those who had come out along with them,

were surrounded and cut to pieces by our men. Varus's whole army, facing

that way, saw their men flee and cut down. Upon which Rebilus, one of

Caesar's lieutenants, whom Curio had brought with him from Sicily

knowing that he had great experience in military matters, cried out,

"You see the enemy are daunted, Curio! why do you hesitate to take

advantage of the opportunity?" Curio, having merely "expressed this,

that the soldiers should keep in mind the professions which they had

made to him the day before," then ordered them to follow him, and ran

far before them all. The valley was so difficult of ascent that the

foremost men could not struggle up it unless assisted by those behind.

But the minds of Attius's soldiers being prepossessed with fear and the

flight and slaughter of their men, never thought of opposing us; and

they all imagined that they were already surrounded by our horse, and,

therefore, before a dart could be thrown or our men come near them,

Varus's whole army turned their backs and retreated to their camp.

XXXV.-In this flight one Fabius, a Pelignian and common soldier in

Curio's army, pursuing the enemy's rear, with a loud voice shouted to

Varus by his name, and often called him, so that he seemed to be one of

his soldiers, who wished to speak to him and give him advice. When

Varus, after being repeatedly called, stopped and looked at him, and

inquired who he was and what he wanted, he made a blow with his sword at

his naked shoulder and was very near killing Varus, but he escaped the

danger by raising his shield to ward off the blow. Fabius was surrounded

by the soldiers near him and cut to pieces; and by the multitude and

crowds of those that fled, the gates of the camps were thronged and the

passage stopped, and a greater number perished in that place without a

stroke than in the battle and flight. Nor were we far from driving them

from this camp; and some of them ran straightway to the town without

halting. But both the nature of the ground and the strength of the

fortifications prevented our access to the camp; for Curio's soldiers,

marching out to battle, were without those things which were requisite

for storming a camp. Curio, therefore, led his army back to the camp,

with all his troops safe except Fabius. Of the enemy about six hundred

were killed and a thousand wounded, all of whom, after Curio's return,

and several more under pretext of their wounds, but in fact through

fear, withdrew from the camp into the town, which Varus perceiving and

knowing the terror of his army, leaving a trumpeter in his camp and a

few tents for show, at the third watch led back his army quietly into

the town.

XXXVI.--The next day Curio resolved to besiege Utica, and to draw lines

about it. In the town there was a multitude of people, ignorant of war,

owing to the length of the peace; some of them Uticans, very well

inclined to Caesar, for his favours to them; the Roman population was

composed of persons differing widely in their sentiments. The terror

occasioned by former battles was very great; and therefore they openly

talked of surrendering, and argued with Attius that he should not suffer

the fortune of them all to be ruined by his obstinacy. Whilst these

things were in agitation, couriers, who had been sent forward, arrived

from king Juba, with the intelligence that he was on his march, with

considerable forces, and encouraged them to protect and defend their

city, a circumstance which greatly comforted their desponding hearts.

XXXVII.--The same intelligence was brought to Curio; but for some time

he could not give credit to it, because he had so great confidence in

his own good fortune. And at this time Caesar's success in Spain was

announced in Africa by messages and letters. Being elated by all these

things, he imagined that the king would not dare to attempt anything

against him. But when he found out, from undoubted authority, that his

forces were less than twenty miles distant from Utica, abandoning his

works, he retired to the Cornelian camp. Here he began to lay in corn

and wood, and to fortify his camp, and immediately despatched orders to

Sicily, that his two legions and the remainder of his cavalry should be

sent to him. His camp was well adapted for protracting a war, from the

nature and strength of the situation, from its proximity to the sea, and

the abundance of water and salt, of which a great quantity had been

stored up from the neighbouring salt-pits. Timber could not fail him

from the number of trees, nor corn, with which the lands abounded.

Wherefore, with the general consent, Curio determined to wait for the

rest of his forces, and protract the war.

XXXVIII.--This plan being settled, and his conduct approved of, he is

informed by some deserters from the town that Juba had stayed behind in

his own kingdom, being called home by a neighbouring war, and a dispute

with the people of Leptis; and that Sabura, his commander-in-chief, who

had been sent with a small force, was drawing near to Utica. Curio

rashly believing this information, altered his design, and resolved to

hazard a battle. His youth, his spirits, his former good fortune and

confidence of success, contributed much to confirm this resolution.

Induced by these motives, early in the night he sent all his cavalry to

the enemy's camp near the river Bagrada, of which Sabura, of whom we

have already spoken, was the commander. But the king was coming after

them with all his forces, and was posted at a distance of six miles

behind Sabura. The horse that were sent perform their march that night,

and attack the enemy unawares and unexpectedly; for the Numidians, after

the usual barbarous custom, encamped here and there without any

regularity. The cavalry having attacked them, when sunk in sleep and

dispersed, killed a great number of them; many were frightened and ran

away. After which the horse returned to Curio, and brought some

prisoners with them.

XXXIX.--Curio had set out at the fourth watch with all his forces,

except five cohorts which he left to guard the camp. Having advanced six

miles, he met the horse, heard what had happened, and inquired from the

captives who commanded the camp at Bagrada. They replied Sabura. Through

eagerness to perform his journey, he neglected to make further

inquiries, but looking back to the company next him, "Don't you see,

soldiers," says he, "that the answer of the prisoners corresponds with

the account of the deserters, that the king is not with him, and that he

sent only a small force which was not able to withstand a few horse?

Hasten then to spoil, to glory; that we may now begin to think of

rewarding you, and returning you thanks." The achievements of the horse

were great in themselves, especially if their small number be compared

with the vast host of Numidians. However, the account was enlarged by

themselves, as men are naturally inclined to boast of their own merit.

Besides, many spoils were produced; the men and horses that were taken

were brought into their sight, that they might imagine that every moment

of time which intervened was a delay to their conquest. By this means

the hopes of Curio were seconded by the ardour of the soldiers. He

ordered the horse to follow him, and hastened his march, that he might

attack them as soon as possible, while in consternation after their

flight. But the horse, fatigued by the expedition of the preceding

night, were not able to keep up with him, but fell behind in different

places. Even this did not abate Curio's hopes.

XL.--Juba, being informed by Sabura of the battle in the night, sent to

his relief two thousand Spanish and Gallic horse, which he was

accustomed to keep near him to guard his person, and that part of his

infantry on which he had the greatest dependence, and he himself

followed slowly after with the rest of his forces and forty elephants,

suspecting that as Curio had sent his horse before, he himself would

follow them. Sabura drew up his army, both horse and foot, and commanded

them to give way gradually and retreat through the pretence of fear;

that when it was necessary he would give them the signal for battle, and

such orders as he found circumstances required. Curio, as his idea of

their present behaviour was calculated to confirm his former hopes,

imagined that the enemy were running away, and led his army from the

rising grounds down to the plain.

XLI.--And when he had advanced from this place about sixteen miles, his

army being exhausted with the fatigue, he halted. Sabura gave his men

the signal, marshalled his army, and began to go around his ranks and

encourage them. But he made use of the foot only for show; and sent the

horse to the charge: Curio was not deficient in skill, and encouraged

his men to rest all their hopes in their valour. Neither were the

soldiers, though wearied, nor the horse, though few and exhausted with

fatigue, deficient in ardour to engage, and courage: but the latter were

in number but two hundred: the rest had dropped behind on the march.

Wherever they charged they forced the enemy to give ground, but they

were not able to pursue them far when they fled, or to press their

horses too severely. Besides, the enemy's cavalry began to surround us

on both wings and to trample down our rear. When any cohorts ran forward

out of the line, the Numidians, being fresh, by their speed avoided our

charge, and surrounded ours when they attempted to return to their post,

and cut them off from the main body. So that it did not appear safe

either to keep their ground and maintain their ranks, or to issue from

the line, and run the risk. The enemy's troops were frequently

reinforced by assistance sent from Juba; strength began to fail our men

through fatigue; and those who had been wounded could neither quit the

field nor retire to a place of safety, because the whole field was

surrounded by the enemy's cavalry. Therefore, despairing of their own

safety, as men usually do in the last moment of their lives, they either

lamented their unhappy deaths, or recommended their parents to the

survivors, if fortune should save any from the impending danger. All

were full of fear and grief.

XLII.--When Curio perceived that in the general consternation neither

his exhortations nor entreaties were attended to, imagining that the

only hope of escaping in their deplorable situation was to gain the

nearest hills, he ordered the colours to be borne that way. But a party

of horse, that had been sent by Sabura, had already got possession of

them. Now indeed our men were reduced to extreme despair: and some of

them were killed by the cavalry in attempting to escape: some fell to

the ground unhurt. Cneius Domitius, commander of the cavalry, standing

round Curio with a small party of horse, urged Curio to endeavour to

escape by flight, and to hasten to his camp; and assured him that he

would not forsake him. But Curio declared that he would never more

appear in Caesar's sight, after losing the army which had been committed

by Caesar to his charge, and accordingly fought till he was killed. Very

few of the horse escaped from that battle, but those who had stayed

behind to refresh their horses having perceived at a distance the defeat

of the whole army, retired in safety to their camp.

XLIII.--The soldiers were all killed to a man. Marcus Rufus, the

quaestor, who was left behind in the camp by Curio, having got

intelligence of these things, encouraged his men not to be disheartened.

They beg and entreat to be transported to Sicily. He consented, and

ordered the masters of the ships to have all the boats brought close to

the shore early in the evening. But so great was the terror in general

that some said that Juba's forces were marching up, others that Varus

was hastening with his legions, and that they already saw the dust

raised by their coming; of which not one circumstance had happened:

others suspected that the enemy's fleet would immediately be upon them.

Therefore, in the general consternation, every man consulted his own

safety. Those who were on board of the fleet, were in a hurry to set

sail, and their flight hastened the masters of the ships of burden. A

few small fishing boats attended their duty and his orders. But as the

shores were crowded, so great was the struggle to determine who of such

a vast number should first get on board, that some of the vessels sank

with the weight of the multitude, and the fears of the rest delayed them

from coming to the shore.

XLIV.--From which circumstances it happened that a few foot and aged

men, that could prevail either through interest or pity, or who were

able to swim to the ships, were taken on board, and landed safe in

Sicily. The rest of the troops sent their centurions as deputies to

Varus at night, and surrendered themselves to him. But Juba, the next

day having spied their cohorts before the town, claimed them as his

booty, and ordered a great part of them to be put to the sword; a few he

selected and sent home to his own realm. Although Varus complained that

his honour was insulted by Juba, yet he dare not oppose him: Juba rode

on horseback into the town, attended by several senators, amongst whom

were Servius Sulpicius and Licinius Damasippus, and in a few days

arranged and ordered what he would have done in Utica, and in a few days

more returned to his own kingdom, with all his forces.

BOOK III

I.--Julius Caesar, holding the election as dictator, was himself

appointed consul with Publius Servilius; for this was the year in which

it was permitted by the laws that he should be chosen consul. This

business being ended, as credit was beginning to fail in Italy, and the

debts could not be paid, he determined that arbitrators should be

appointed: and that they should make an estimate of the possessions and

properties [of the debtors], how much they were worth before the war,

and that they should be handed over in payment to the creditors. This he

thought the most likely method to remove and abate the apprehension of

an abolition of debt, the usual consequence of civil wars and

dissensions, and to support the credit of the debtors. He likewise

restored to their former condition (the praetors and tribunes first

submitting the question to the people) some persons condemned for

bribery at the elections, by virtue of Pompey's law, at the time when

Pompey kept his legions quartered in the city (these trials were

finished in a single day, one judge hearing the merits, and another

pronouncing the sentences), because they had offered their service to

him in the beginning of the civil war, if he chose to accept them;

setting the same value on them as if he had accepted them, because they

had put themselves in his power. For he had determined that they ought

to be restored, rather by the judgment of the people, than appear

admitted to it by his bounty: that he might neither appear ungrateful in

repaying an obligation, nor arrogant in depriving the people of their

prerogative of exercising this bounty.

II.--In accomplishing these things, and celebrating the Latin festival,

and holding all the elections, he spent eleven days; and having resigned

the dictatorship, set out from the city, and went to Brundisium, where

he had ordered twelve legions and all his cavalry to meet him. But he

scarcely found as many ships as would be sufficient to transport fifteen

thousand legionary soldiers and five hundred horse. This [the scarcity

of shipping] was the only thing that prevented Caesar from putting a

speedy conclusion to the war. And even these troops embarked very short

of their number, because several had fallen in so many wars in Gaul, and

the long march from Spain had lessened their number very much, and a

severe autumn in Apulia and the district about Brundisium, after the

very wholesome countries of Spain and Gaul, had impaired the health of

the whole army.

III.--Pompey having got a year's respite to provide forces, during which

he was not engaged in war, nor employed by an enemy, had collected a

numerous fleet from Asia, and the Cyclades, from Corcyra, Athens,

Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had given

directions that a great number should be built in every other place. He

had exacted a large sum of money from Asia, Syria, and all the kings,

dynasts, tetrarchs, and free states of Achaia; and had obliged the

corporations of those provinces, of which he himself had the government,

to count down to him a large sum.

IV.--He had made up nine legions of Roman citizens; five from Italy,

which he had brought with him; one veteran legion from Sicily, which

being composed of two, he called the Gemella; one from Crete and

Macedonia, of veterans who had been discharged by their former generals,

and had settled in those provinces; two from Asia, which had been levied

by the activity of Lentulus. Besides he had distributed among his

legions a considerable number, by way of recruits, from Thessaly,

Boeotia, Achaia, and Epirus: with his legions he also intermixed the

soldiers taken from Caius Antonius. Besides these, he expected two

legions from Syria, with Scipio; from Crete, Lacedaemon, Pontus, Syria,

and other states, he got about three thousand archers, six cohorts of

slingers, two thousand mercenary soldiers, and seven thousand horse; six

hundred of which, Deiotarus had brought from Gaul; Ariobarzanes, five

hundred from Cappadocia. Cotus had given him about the same number from

Thrace, and had sent his son Sadalis with them. From Macedonia there

were two hundred, of extraordinary valour, commanded by Rascipolis; five

hundred Gauls and Germans; Gabinius's troops from Alexandria, whom Aulus

Gabinius had left with king Ptolemy, to guard his person. Pompey, the

son, had brought in his fleet eight hundred, whom he had raised among

his own and his shepherds' slaves. Tarcundarius, Castor and Donilaus had

given three hundred from Gallograecia: one of these came himself, the

other sent his son. Two hundred were sent from Syria by Comagenus

Antiochus, whom Pompey rewarded amply. The most of them were archers. To

these were added Dardanians, and Bessians, some of them mercenaries;

others procured by power and influence: also, Macedonians, Thessalians,

and troops from other nations and states, which completed the number

which we mentioned before.

V.--He had laid in vast quantities of corn from Thessaly, Asia, Egypt,

Crete, Cyrene, and other countries. He had resolved to fix his winter

quarters at Dyrrachium, Apollonia, and the other sea-ports, to hinder

Caesar from passing the sea: and for this purpose had stationed his

fleet along the sea-coast. The Egyptian fleet was commanded by Pompey,

the son: the Asiatic, by Decimus Laelius, and Caius Triarius: the

Syrian, by Caius Cassius: the Rhodian, by Caius Marcellus, in

conjunction with Caius Coponius; and the Liburnian, and Achaian, by

Scribonius Libo, and Marcus Octavius. But Marcus Bibulus was appointed

commander-in-chief of the whole maritime department, and regulated every

matter. The chief direction rested upon him.

VI.--When Caesar came to Brundisium, he made a speech to the soldiers:

"That since they were now almost arrived at the termination of their

toils and dangers, they should patiently submit to leave their slaves

and baggage in Italy, and to embark without luggage, that a greater

number of men might be put on board: that they might expect everything

from victory and his liberality." They cried out with one voice, "he

might give what orders he pleased, that they would cheerfully fulfil

them." He accordingly set sail the fourth day of January, with seven

legions on board, as already remarked. The next day he reached land,

between the Ceraunian rocks and other dangerous places; meeting with a

safe road for his shipping to ride in, and dreading all other ports

which he imagined were in possession of the enemy, he landed his men at

a place called Pharsalus, without the loss of a single vessel.

VII.--Lucretius Vespillo and Minutius Rufus were at Oricum, with

eighteen Asiatic ships, which were given into their charge by the orders

of Decimus Laelius: Marcus Bibulus at Corcyra, with a hundred and ten

ships. But they had not the confidence to dare to move out of the

harbour; though Caesar had brought only twelve ships as a convoy, only

four of which had decks; nor did Bibulus, his fleet being disordered and

his seamen dispersed, come up in time: for Caesar was seen at the

continent before any account whatsoever of his approach had reached

those regions.

VIII.--Caesar, having landed his soldiers, sent back his ships the same

night to Brundisium, to transport the rest of his legions and cavalry.

The charge of this business was committed to lieutenant Fufius Kalenus,

with orders to be expeditious in transporting the legions. But the ships

having put to sea too late, and not having taken advantage of the night

breeze, fell a sacrifice on their return. For Bibulus, at Corcyra, being

informed of Caesar's approach, hoped to fall in with some part of our

ships, with their cargoes, but found them empty; and having taken about

thirty, vented on them his rage at his own remissness, and set them all

on fire: and, with the same flames, he destroyed the mariners and

masters of the vessels, hoping by the severity of the punishment to

deter the rest. Having accomplished this affair, he filled all the

harbours and shores from Salona to Oricum with his fleets. Having

disposed his guard with great care, he lay on board himself in the depth

of winter, declining no fatigue or duty, and not waiting for

reinforcements, in hopes that he might come within Caesar's reach.

IX.--But after the departure of the Liburnian fleet, Marcus Octavius

sailed from Illyricum with what ships he had to Salona; and having

spirited up the Dalmatians, and other barbarous nations, he drew Issa

off from its connection with Caesar; but not being able to prevail with

the council of Salona, either by promises or menaces, he resolved to

storm the town. But it was well fortified by its natural situation, and

a hill. The Roman citizens built wooden towers, the better to secure it;

but when they were unable to resist, on account of the smallness of

their numbers, being weakened by several wounds, they stooped to the

last resource, and set at liberty all the slaves old enough to bear

arms; and cutting the hair off the women's heads, made ropes for their

engines. Octavius, being informed of their determination, surrounded the

town with five encampments, and began to press them at once with a siege

and storm. They were determined to endure every hardship, and their

greatest distress was the want of corn. They, therefore, sent deputies

to Caesar, and begged a supply from him; all other inconveniences they

bore by their own resources, as well as they could: and after a long

interval, when the length of the siege had made Octavius's troops more

remiss than usual, having got an opportunity at noon, when the enemy

were dispersed, they disposed their wives and children on the walls, to

keep up the appearance of their usual attention; and forming themselves

into one body, with the slaves whom they had lately enfranchised, they

made an attack on Octavius's nearest camp, and having forced that,

attacked the second with the same fury; and then the third and the

fourth, and then the other, and beat them from them all: and having

killed a great number, obliged the rest and Octavius himself to fly for

refuge to their ships. This put an end to the blockade. Winter was now

approaching, and Octavius, despairing of capturing the town, after

sustaining such considerable losses, withdrew to Pompey, to Dyrrachium.

X.--We have mentioned that Vibullius Rufus, an officer of Pompey's, had

fallen twice into Caesar's power; first at Corfinium, and afterwards in

Spain. Caesar thought him a proper person, on account of his favours

conferred on him, to send with proposals to Pompey: and he knew that he

had an influence over Pompey. This was the substance of his proposals:

"That it was the duty of both, to put an end to their obstinacy, and

forbear hostilities, and not tempt fortune any further; that sufficient

loss had been suffered on both sides, to serve as a lesson and

instruction to them, to render them apprehensive of future calamities,

by Pompey, in having been driven out of Italy, and having lost Sicily,

Sardinia, and the two Spains, and one hundred and thirty cohorts of

Roman citizens, in Italy and Spain: by himself, in the death of Curio,

and the loss of so great an army in Africa, and the surrender of his

soldiers in Corcyra. Wherefore, they should have pity on themselves, and

the republic: for, from their own misfortunes, they had sufficient

experience of what fortune can effect in war. That this was the only

time to treat of peace; when each had confidence in his own strength,

and both seemed on an equal footing. Since, if fortune showed ever so

little favour to either, he who thought himself superior, would not

submit to terms of accommodation; nor would he be content with an equal

division, when he might expect to obtain the whole. That, as they could

not agree before, the terms of peace ought to be submitted to the senate

and people in Rome. That in the meantime, it ought to content the

republic and themselves, if they both immediately took oath in a public

assembly, that they would disband their forces within the three

following days. That having divested themselves of the arms and

auxiliaries, on which they placed their present confidence, they must

both of necessity acquiesce in the decision of the people and senate. To

give Pompey the fuller assurance of his intentions, he would dismiss all

his forces on land, even his garrisons.

XI.--Vibullius, having received this commission from Caesar, thought it

no less necessary to give Pompey notice of Caesar's sudden approach,

that he might adopt such plans as the circumstance required, than to

inform him of Caesar's message; and therefore continuing his journey by

night as well as by day, and taking fresh horses for despatch, he posted

away to Pompey, to inform him that Caesar was marching towards him with

all his forces. Pompey was at this time in Candavia, and was on his

march from Macedonia to his winter quarters in Apollonia and Dyrrachium;

but surprised at the unexpected news, he determined to go to Apollonia

by speedy marches, to prevent Caesar from becoming master of all the

maritime states. But as soon as Caesar had landed his troops, he set off

the same day for Oricum: when he arrived there, Lucius Torquatus, who

was governor of the town by Pompey's appointment, and had a garrison of

Parthinians in it, endeavoured to shut the gates and defend the town,

and ordered the Greeks to man the walls, and to take arms. But as they

refused to fight against the power of the Roman people, and as the

citizens made a spontaneous attempt to admit Caesar, despairing of any

assistance, he threw open the gates, and surrendered himself and the

town to Caesar, and was preserved safe from injury by him.

XII.--Having taken Oricum, Caesar marched without making any delay to

Apollonia. Staberius the governor, hearing of his approach, began to

bring water into the citadel, and to fortify it, and to demand hostages

of the town's people. But they refuse to give any, or to shut their

gates against the consul, or to take upon them to judge contrary to what

all Italy and the Roman people had judged. As soon as he knew their

inclinations, he made his escape privately. The inhabitants of Apollonia

sent ambassadors to Caesar, and gave him admission into their town.

Their example was followed by the inhabitants of Bullis, Amantia, and

the other neighbouring states, and all Epirus: and they sent ambassadors

to Caesar, and promised to obey his commands.

XIII.--But Pompey having received information of the transactions at

Oricum and Apollonia, began to be alarmed for Dyrrachium, and

endeavoured to reach it, marching day and night. As soon as it was said

that Caesar was approaching, such a panic fell upon Pompey's army,

because in his haste he had made no distinction between night and day,

and had marched without intermission, that they almost every man

deserted their colours in Epirus and the neighbouring countries; several

threw down their arms, and their march had the appearance of a flight.

But when Pompey had halted near Dyrrachium, and had given orders for

measuring out the ground for his camp, his army even yet continuing in

their fright, Labienus first stepped forward and swore that he would

never desert him, and would share whatever fate fortune should assign to

him. The other lieutenants took the same oath, and the tribunes and

centurions followed their example: and the whole army swore in like

manner. Caesar, finding the road to Dyrrachium already in the possession

of Pompey, was in no great haste, but encamped by the river Apsus, in

the territory of Apollonia, that the states which had deserved his

support might be certain of protection from his out-guards and forts;

and there he resolved to wait the arrival of his other legions from

Italy, and to winter in tents. Pompey did the same; and pitching his

camp on the other side of the river Apsus, collected there all his

troops and auxiliaries.

XIV.--Kalenus, having put the legions and cavalry on board at

Brundisium, as Caesar had directed him, as far as the number of his

ships allowed, weighed anchor: and having sailed a little distance from

port, received a letter from Caesar, in which he was informed, that all

the ports and the whole shore was occupied by the enemy's fleet: on

receiving this information he returned into the harbour, and recalled

all the vessels. One of them, which continued the voyage and did not

obey Kalenus's command, because it carried no troops, but was private

property, bore away for Oricum, and was taken by Bibulus, who spared

neither slaves nor free men, nor even children; but put all to the

sword. Thus the safety of the whole army depended on a very short space

of time and a great casualty.

XV.--Bibulus, as has been observed before, lay with his fleet near

Oricum, and as he debarred Caesar of the liberty of the sea and

harbours, so he was deprived of all intercourse with the country by

land; for the whole shore was occupied by parties disposed in different

places by Caesar. And he was not allowed to get either wood or water, or

even anchor near the land. He was reduced to great difficulties, and

distressed with extreme scarcity of every necessary; insomuch that he

was obliged to bring, in transports from Corcyra, not only provisions,

but even wood and water; and it once happened that, meeting with violent

storms, they were forced to catch the dew by night which fell on the

hides that covered their decks; yet all these difficulties they bore

patiently and without repining, and thought they ought not to leave the

shores and harbours free from blockade. But when they were suffering

under the distress which I have mentioned, and Libo had joined Bibulus,

they both called from on ship-board to Marcus Acilius and Statius

Marcus, the lieutenants, one of whom commanded the town, the other the

guards on the coast, that they wished to speak to Caesar on affairs of

importance, if permission should be granted them. They add something

further to strengthen the impression that they intended to treat about

an accommodation. In the meantime they requested a truce, and obtained

it from them; for what they proposed seemed to be of importance, and it

was well known that Caesar desired it above all things, and it was

imagined that some advantage would be derived from Bibulus's proposals.

XVI.--Caesar having set out with one legion to gain possession of the

more remote states, and to provide corn, of which he had but a small

quantity, was at this time at Buthrotum, opposite to Corcyra. There

receiving Acilius and Marcus's letters, informing him of Libo's and

Bibulus's demands, he left his legion behind him, and returned himself

to Oricum. When he arrived, they were invited to a conference. Libo came

and made an apology for Bibulus, "that he was a man of strong passion,

and had a private quarrel against Caesar, contracted when he was aedile

and praetor; that for this reason he had avoided the conference, lest

affairs of the utmost importance and advantage might be impeded by the

warmth of his temper. That it now was and ever had been Pompey's most

earnest wish, that they should be reconciled, and lay down their arms;

but they were not authorized to treat on that subject, because they

resigned the whole management of the war, and all other matters, to

Pompey, by order of the council. But when they were acquainted with

Caesar's demands, they would transmit them to Pompey, who would conclude

all of himself by their persuasions. In the meantime, let the truce be

continued till the messengers could return from him; and let no injury

be done on either side." To this he added a few words of the cause for

which they fought, and of his own forces and resources.

XVII.--To this, Caesar did not then think proper to make any reply, nor

do we now think it worth recording. But Caesar required "that he should

be allowed to send commissioners to Pompey, who should suffer no

personal injury; and that either they should grant it, or should take

his commissioners in charge, and convey them to Pompey. That as to the

truce, the war in its present state was so divided, that they by their

fleet deprived him of his shipping and auxiliaries; while he prevented

them from the use of the land and fresh water; and if they wished that

this restraint should be removed from them, they should relinquish their

blockade of the seas, but if they retained the one, he in like manner

would retain the other; that nevertheless, the treaty of accommodation

might still be carried on, though these points were not conceded, and

that they need not be an impediment to it." They would neither receive

Caesar's commissioners, nor guarantee their safety, but referred the

whole to Pompey. They urged and struggled eagerly to gain the one point

respecting a truce. But when Caesar perceived that they had proposed the

conference merely to avoid present danger and distress, but that they

offered no hopes or terms of peace, he applied his thoughts to the

prosecution of the war.

XVIII.--Bibulus, being prevented from landing for several days, and

being seized with a violent distemper from the cold and fatigue, as he

could neither be cured on board, nor was willing to desert the charge

which he had taken upon him, was unable to bear up against the violence

of the disease. On his death, the sole command devolved on no single

individual, but each admiral managed his own division separately, and at

his own discretion. Vibullius, as soon as the alarm, which Caesar's

unexpected arrival had raised, was over, began again to deliver Caesar's

message in the presence of Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theophanes, to

whom Pompey used to communicate his most confidential secrets. He had

scarcely entered on the subject when Pompey interrupted him, and forbade

him to proceed. "What need," says he, "have I of life or Rome, if the

world shall think I enjoy them by the bounty of Caesar; an opinion which

can never be removed whilst it shall be thought that I have been brought

back by him to Italy, from which I set out." After the conclusion of the

war, Caesar was informed of these expressions by some persons who were

present at the conversation. He attempted, however, by other means to

bring about a negotiation of peace.

XIX.--Between Pompey's and Caesar's camp there was only the river Apsus,

and the soldiers frequently conversed with each other; and by a private

arrangement among themselves, no weapons were thrown during their

conferences. Caesar sent Publius Vatinius, one of his lieutenants, to

the bank of the river, to make such proposals as should appear most

conducive to peace; and to cry out frequently with a loud voice

[asking], "Are citizens permitted to send deputies to citizens to treat

of peace? a concession which had been made even to fugitives on the

Pyrenean mountains, and to robbers, especially when by so doing they

would prevent citizens from fighting against citizens." Having spoken

much in humble language, as became a man pleading for his own and the

general safety, and being listened to with silence by the soldiers of

both armies, he received an answer from the enemy's party that Aulus

Varro proposed coming the next day to a conference, and that deputies

from both sides might come without danger, and explain their wishes, and

accordingly a fixed time was appointed for the interview. When the

deputies met the next day, a great multitude from both sides assembled,

and the expectations of every person concerning this subject were raised

very high, and their minds seemed to be eagerly disposed for peace.

Titus Labienus walked forward from the crowd, and in submissive terms

began to speak of peace, and to argue with Vatinius. But their

conversation was suddenly interrupted by darts thrown from all sides,

from which Vatinius escaped by being protected by the arms of the

soldiers. However, several were wounded; and among them Cornelius

Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Lucius Tiburtius, centurions, and some

privates; hereupon Labienus exclaimed, "Forbear, then, to speak any more

about an accommodation, for we can have no peace unless we carry

Caesar's head back with us."

XX.--At the same time in Rome, Marcus Caelius Rufus, one of the

praetors, having undertaken the cause of the debtors, on entering into

his office, fixed his tribunal near the bench of Caius Trebonius, the

city praetor, and promised if any person appealed to him in regard to

the valuation and payment of debts made by arbitration, as appointed by

Caesar when in Rome, that he would relieve them. But it happened, from

the justice of Trebonius's decrees and his humanity (for he thought that

in such dangerous times justice should be administered with moderation

and compassion), that not one could be found who would offer himself the

first to lodge an appeal. For to plead poverty, to complain of his own

private calamities, or the general distresses of the times, or to assert

the difficulty of setting the goods to sale, is the behaviour of a man

even of a moderate temper; but to retain their possessions entire, and

at the same time acknowledge themselves in debt, what sort of spirit,

and what impudence would it not have argued! Therefore nobody was found

so unreasonable as to make such demands. But Caelius proved more severe

to those very persons for whose advantage it had been designed; and

starting from this beginning, in order that he might not appear to have

engaged in so dishonourable an affair without effecting something, he

promulgated a law, that all debts should be discharged in six equal

payments, of six months each, without interest.

XXI.--When Servilius, the consul, and the other magistrates opposed him,

and he himself effected less than he expected, in order to raise the

passions of the people, he dropped it, and promulgated two others; one,

by which he remitted the annual rents of the houses to the tenants, the

other, an act of insolvency: upon which the mob made an assault on Caius

Trebonius, and having wounded several persons, drove him from his

tribunal. The consul Servilius informed the senate of his proceedings,

who passed a decree that Caelius should be removed from the management

of the republic. Upon this decree, the consul forbade him the senate;

and when he was attempting to harangue the people, turned him out of the

rostrum. Stung with the ignominy and with resentment, he pretended in

public that he would go to Caesar, but privately sent messengers to

Milo, who had murdered Clodius, and had been condemned for it; and

having invited him into Italy, because he had engaged the remains of the

gladiators to his interest, by making them supple presents, he joined

him, and sent him to Thurinum to tamper with the shepherds. When he

himself was on his road to Casilinum, at the same time that his military

standards and arms were seized at Capua, his slaves seen at Naples, and

the design of betraying the town discovered: his plots being revealed,

and Capua shut against him, being apprehensive of danger, because the

Roman citizens residing there had armed themselves, and thought he ought

to be treated as an enemy to the state, he abandoned his first design,

and changed his route.

XXII.--Milo in the meantime despatched letters to the free towns,

purporting that he acted as he did by the orders and commands of Pompey,

conveyed to him by Bibulus: and he endeavoured to engage in his interest

all persons whom he imagined were under difficulties by reason of their

debts. But not being able to prevail with them, he set at liberty some

slaves from the work-houses, and began to assault Cosa in the district

of Thurinum. There having received a blow of a stone thrown from the

wall of the town which was commanded by Quintus Pedius with one legion,

he died of it; and Caelius having set out, as he pretended for Caesar,

went to Thurii, where he was put to death as he was tampering with some

of the freemen of the town, and was offering money to Caesar's Gallic

and Spanish horse, which he had sent there to strengthen the garrison.

And thus these mighty beginnings, which had embroiled Italy, and kept

the magistrates employed, found a speedy and happy issue.

XXIII.--Libo having sailed from Oricum, with a fleet of fifty ships,

which he commanded, came to Brundisium, and seized an island, which lies

opposite to the harbour; judging it better to guard that place, which

was our only pass to sea, than to keep all the shores and ports blocked

up by a fleet. By his sudden arrival, he fell in with some of our

transports, and set them on fire, and carried off one laden with corn;

he struck great terror into our men, and having in the night landed a

party of soldiers and archers, he beat our guard of horse from their

station, and gained so much by the advantage of situation, that he

despatched letters to Pompey, that if he pleased he might order the rest

of the ships to be hauled upon shore and repaired; for that with his own

fleet he could prevent Caesar from receiving his auxiliaries.

XXIV.--Antonius was at this time at Brundisium, and relying on the

valour of his troops, covered about sixty of the long-boats belonging to

the men-of-war with penthouses and bulwarks of hurdles, and put on board

them select soldiers; and disposed them separately along the shore: and

under the pretext of keeping the seamen in exercise, he ordered two

three-banked galleys, which he had built at Brundisium, to row to the

mouth of the port. When Libo saw them advancing boldly towards him, he

sent five four-banked galleys against them, in hopes of intercepting

them. When these came near our ships, our veteran soldiers retreated

within the harbour. The enemy, urged by their eagerness to capture them,

pursued them unguardedly; for instantly the boats of Antonius, on a

certain signal, rowed with great violence from all parts against the

enemy; and at the first charge took one of the four-banked galleys, with

the seamen and marines, and forced the rest to flee disgracefully. In

addition to this loss, they were prevented from getting water by the

horse which Antonius had disposed along the sea-coast. Libo, vexed at

the distress and disgrace, departed from Brundisium, and abandoned the

blockade.

XXV.--Several months had now elapsed, and winter was almost gone, and

Caesar's legions and shipping were not coming to him from Brundisium,

and he imagined that some opportunities had been neglected, for the

winds had at least been often favourable, and he thought that he must

trust to them at last. And the longer it was deferred, the more eager

were those who commanded Pompey's fleet to guard the coast, and were

more confident of preventing our getting assistance: they receive

frequent reproofs from Pompey by letter, that as they had not prevented

Caesar's arrival at the first, they should at least stop the remainder

of his army: and they were expecting that the season for transporting

troops would become more unfavourable every day, as the winds grew

calmer. Caesar, feeling some trouble on this account, wrote in severe

terms to his officers at Brundisium, [and gave them orders] that as soon

as they found the wind to answer, they should not let the opportunity of

setting sail pass by, if they were even to steer their course to the

shore of Apollonia: because there they might run their ships on ground.

That these parts principally were left unguarded by the enemy's fleet,

because they dare not venture too far from the harbour.