XXVI.--They [his officers], exerting boldness and courage, aided by the

instructions of Marcus Antonius, and Fufius Kalenus, and animated by the

soldiers strongly encouraging them, and declining no danger for Caesar's

safety, having got a southerly wind, weighed anchor, and the next day

were carried past Apollonia and Dyrrachium, and being seen from the

continent, Quintus Coponius, who commanded the Rhodian fleet at

Dyrrachium, put out of the port with his ships; and when they had almost

come up with us, in consequence of the breeze dying away, the south wind

sprang up afresh, and rescued us. However, he did not desist from his

attempt, but hoped by the labour and perseverance of his seamen to be

able to bear up against the violence of the storm; and although we were

carried beyond Dyrrachium, by the violence of the wind, he nevertheless

continued to chase us. Our men, taking advantage of fortune's kindness,

for they were still afraid of being attacked by the enemy's fleet, if

the wind abated, having come near a port, called Nymphaeum, about three

miles beyond Lissus, put into it (this port is protected from a

south-west wind, but is not secure against a south wind); and thought less

danger was to be apprehended from the storm than from the enemy. But as

soon as they were within the port, the south wind, which had blown for

two days, by extraordinary good luck veered round to the south-west.

XXVII.--Here one might observe the sudden turns of fortune. We who, a

moment before, were alarmed for ourselves, were safely lodged in a very

secure harbour: and they who had threatened ruin to our fleet, were

forced to be uneasy on their own account: and thus, by a change of

circumstances, the storm protected our ships, and damaged the Rhodian

fleet to such a degree, that all their decked ships, sixteen in number,

foundered, without exception, and were wrecked: and of the prodigious

number of seamen and soldiers, some lost their lives by being dashed

against the rocks, others were taken by our men: but Caesar sent them

all safe home.

XXVIII.--Two of our ships, that had not kept up with the rest, being

overtaken by the night, and not knowing what port the rest had made to,

came to an anchor opposite Lissus. Otacilius Crassus, who commanded

Pompey's fleet, detached after them several barges and small craft, and

attempted to take them. At the same time, he treated with them about

capitulating, and promised them their lives if they would surrender. One

of them carried two hundred and twenty recruits, the other was manned

with somewhat less than two hundred veterans. Here it might be seen what

security men derive from a resolute spirit. For the recruits, frightened

at the number of vessels, and fatigued with the rolling of the sea; and

with sea-sickness, surrendered to Otacilius, after having first received

his oath, that the enemy would not injure them; but as soon as they were

brought before him, contrary to the obligation of his oath, they were

inhumanly put to death in his presence. But the soldiers of the veteran

legion, who had also struggled, not only with the inclemency of the

weather, but by labouring at the pump, thought it their duty to remit

nothing of their former valour: and having protracted the beginning of

the night in settling the terms, under pretence of surrendering, they

obliged the pilot to run the ship aground: and having got a convenient

place on the shore, they spent the rest of the night there, and at

daybreak, when Otacilius had sent against them a party of the horse, who

guarded that part of the coast, to the number of four hundred, besides

some armed men, who had followed them from the garrison, they made a

brave defence, and having killed some of them, retreated in safety to

our army.

XXIX.--After this action, the Roman citizens, who resided at Lissus, a

town which Caesar had before assigned them, and had carefully fortified,

received Antony into their town, and gave him every assistance.

Otacilius, apprehensive for his own safety, escaped out of the town, and

went to Pompey. All his forces, whose number amounted to three veteran

legions, and one of recruits, and about eight hundred horse, being

landed, Antony sent most of his ships back to Italy, to transport the

remainder of the soldiers and horse. The pontons, which are a sort of

Gallic ships, he left at Lissus with this object, that if Pompey,

imagining Italy defenceless, should transport his army thither (and this

notion was spread among the common people), Caesar might have some means

of pursuing him; and he sent messengers to him with great despatch, to

inform him in what part of the country he had landed his army, and what

number of troops he had brought over with him.

XXX.--Caesar and Pompey received this intelligence almost at the same

time; for they had seen the ships sail past Apollonia and Dyrrachium.

They directed their march after them by land; but at first they were

ignorant to what part they had been carried; but when they were informed

of it, they each adopted a different plan; Caesar, to form a junction

with Antonius as soon as possible, Pompey, to oppose Antonius's forces

on their march to Caesar, and, if possible, to fall upon them

unexpectedly from ambush. And the same day they both led out their

armies from their winter encampment along the river Apsus; Pompey,

privately by night; Caesar, openly by day. But Caesar had to march a

longer circuit up the river to find a ford. Pompey's route being easy,

because he was not obliged to cross the river, he advanced rapidly and

by forced marches against Antonius, and being informed of his approach,

chose a convenient situation, where he posted his forces; and kept his

men close within camp, and forbade fires to be kindled, that his arrival

might be the more secret. An account of this was immediately carried to

Antonius by the Greeks. He despatched messengers to Caesar, and confined

himself in his camp for one day. The next day Caesar came up with him.

On learning his arrival, Pompey, to prevent his being hemmed in between

two armies, quitted his position, and went with all his forces to

Asparagium, in the territory of Dyrrachium, and there encamped in a

convenient situation.

XXXI.--During these times, Scipio, though he had sustained some losses

near mount Amanus, had assumed to himself the title of imperator, after

which he demanded large sums of money from the states and princes. He

had also exacted from the tax-gatherers two years' rents that they owed;

and enjoined them to lend him the amount of the next year, and demanded

a supply of horse from the whole province. When they were collected,

leaving behind him his neighbouring enemies, the Parthians (who shortly

before had killed Marcus Crassus, the imperator, and had kept Marcus

Bibulus besieged), he drew his legions and cavalry out of Syria; and

when he came into the province, which was under great anxiety and fear

of the Parthian war, and heard some declarations of the soldiers, "That

they would march against an enemy, if he would lead them on; but would

never bear arms against a countryman and consul"; he drew off his

legions to winter quarters to Pergamus, and the most wealthy cities, and

made them rich presents: and in order to attach them more firmly to his

interest, permitted them to plunder the cities.

XXXII.--In the meantime, the money which had been demanded from the

province at large, was most rigorously exacted. Besides, many new

imposts of different kinds were devised to gratify his avarice. A tax of

so much a head was laid on every slave and child. Columns, doors, corn,

soldiers, sailors, arms, engines, and carriages, were made subject to a

duty. Wherever a name could be found for anything, it was deemed a

sufficient reason for levying money on it. Officers were appointed to

collect it, not only in the cities, but in almost every village and

fort: and whosoever of them acted with the greatest rigour and

inhumanity, was esteemed the best man, and best citizen. The province

was overrun with bailiffs and officers, and crowded with overseers and

tax-gatherers; who, besides the duties imposed, exacted a gratuity for

themselves; for they asserted, that being expelled from their own homes

and countries, they stood in need of every necessary; endeavouring by a

plausible pretence to colour the most infamous conduct. To this was

added the most exorbitant interest, as usually happens in times of war;

the whole sums being called in, on which occasion they alleged that the

delay of a single day was a donation. Therefore, in those two years, the

debt of the province was doubled: but notwithstanding, taxes were

exacted, not only from the Roman citizens, but from every corporation

and every state. And they said that these were loans, exacted by the

senate's decree. The taxes of the ensuing year were demanded beforehand

as a loan from the collectors, as on their first appointment.

XXXIII.--Moreover, Scipio ordered the money formerly lodged in the

temple of Diana at Ephesus, to be taken out with the statues of that

goddess which remained there. When Scipio came to the temple, letters

were delivered to him from Pompey, in the presence of several senators,

whom he had called upon to attend him; [informing him] that Caesar had

crossed the sea with his legions; that Scipio should hasten to him with

his army, and postpone all other business. As soon as he received the

letter, he dismissed his attendants, and began to prepare for his

journey to Macedonia; and a few days after set out. This circumstance

saved the money at Ephesus.

XXXIV.--Caesar, having effected a junction with Antonius's army, and

having drawn his legion out of Oricum, which he had left there to guard

the coast, thought he ought to sound the inclination of the provinces,

and march farther into the country; and when ambassadors came to him

from Thessaly and Aetolia, to engage that the states in those countries

would obey his orders, if he sent a garrison to protect them, he

despatched Lucius Cassius Longinus, with the twenty-seventh, a legion

composed of young soldiers, and two hundred horse, to Thessaly: and

Caius Calvisius Sabinus, with five cohorts, and a small party of horse,

into Aetolia. He recommended them to be especially careful to provide

corn, because those regions were nearest to him. He ordered Cneius

Domitius Calvinus to march into Macedonia with two legions, the eleventh

and twelfth, and five hundred horse; from which province, Menedemus, the

principal man of those regions, on that side which is called the Free,

having come as ambassador, assured him of the most devoted affection of

all his subjects.

XXXV.--Of these Calvisius, on his first arrival in Aetolia, being very

kindly received, dislodged the enemy's garrisons in Calydon and

Naupactus, and made himself master of the whole country. Cassius went to

Thessaly with his legion. As there were two factions there, he found the

citizens divided in their inclinations. Hegasaretus, a man of

established power, favoured Pompey's interest. Petreius, a young man of

a most noble family, warmly supported Caesar with his own and his

friends' influence.

XXXVI.--At the same time, Domitius arrived in Macedonia: and when

numerous embassies had begun to wait on him from many of the states,

news was brought that Scipio was approaching with his legions, which

occasioned various opinions and reports; for in strange events, rumour

generally goes before. Without making any delay in any part of

Macedonia, he marched with great haste against Domitius; and when he was

come within about twenty miles of him, wheeled on a sudden towards

Cassius Longinus in Thessaly. He effected this with such celerity, that

news of his march and arrival came together; for to render his march

expeditious, he left the baggage of his legions behind him at the river

Haliacmon, which divides Macedonia from Thessaly, under the care of

Marcus Favonius, with a guard of eight cohorts, and ordered him to build

a strong fort there. At the same time, Cotus's cavalry, which used to

infest the neighbourhood of Macedonia, flew to attack Cassius's camp, at

which Cassius being alarmed, and having received information of Scipio's

approach, and seen the horse, which he imagined to be Scipio's, he

betook himself to the mountains that environ Thessaly, and thence began

to make his route towards Ambracia. But when Scipio was hastening to

pursue him, despatches overtook him from Favonius, that Domitius was

marching against him with his legions, and that he could not maintain

the garrison over which he was appointed, without Scipio's assistance.

On receipt of these despatches, Scipio changed his designs and his

route, desisted from his pursuit of Cassius, and hastened to relieve

Favonius. Accordingly, continuing his march day and night, he came to

him so opportunely, that the dust raised by Domitius's army, and

Scipio's advanced guard, were observed at the same instant. Thus, the

vigilance of Domitius saved Cassius, and the expedition of Scipio,

Favonius.

XXXVII--Scipio, having stayed for two days in his camp, along the river

Haliacmon, which ran between him and Domitius's camp, on the third day,

at dawn, led his army across a ford, and having made a regular

encampment the day following, drew up his forces in front of his camp.

Domitius thought he ought not to show any reluctance, but should draw

out his forces and hazard a battle. But as there was a plain six miles

in breadth between the two camps, he posted his army before Scipio's

camp; while the latter persevered in not quitting his entrenchment.

However, Domitius with difficulty restrained his men, and prevented

their beginning a battle; the more so as a rivulet with steep banks,

joining Scipio's camp, retarded the progress of our men. When Scipio

perceived the eagerness and alacrity of our troops to engage, suspecting

that he should be obliged the next day, either to fight, against his

inclination, or to incur great disgrace by keeping within his camp,

though he had come with high expectation, yet by advancing rashly, made

a shameful end; and at night crossed the river, without even giving the

signal for breaking up the camp, and returned to the ground from which

he came, and there encamped near the river, on an elevated situation.

After a few days, he placed a party of horse in ambush in the night,

where our men had usually gone to forage for several days before. And

when Quintus Varus, commander of Domitius's horse, came there as usual,

they suddenly rushed from their ambush. But our men bravely supported

their charge, and returned quickly every man to his own rank, and in

their turn, made a general charge on the enemy: and having killed about

eighty of them, and put the rest to flight, retreated to their camp with

the loss of only two men.

XXXVIII.--After these transactions, Domitius, hoping to allure Scipio to

a battle, pretended to be obliged to change his position through want of

corn, and having given the signal for decamping, advanced about three

miles, and posted his army and cavalry in a convenient place, concealed

from the enemy's view. Scipio being in readiness to pursue him, detached

his cavalry and a considerable number of light infantry to explore

Domitius's route. When they had marched a short way, and their foremost

troops were within reach of our ambush, their suspicions being raised by

the neighing of the horses, they began to retreat: and the rest who

followed them, observing with what speed they retreated, made a halt.

Our men, perceiving that the enemy had discovered their plot, and

thinking it in vain to wait for any more, having got two troops in their

power, intercepted them. Among them was Marcus Opimius, general of the

horse, but he made his escape: they either killed or took prisoners all

the rest of these two troops, and brought them to Domitius.

XXXIX.--Caesar, having drawn his garrisons out of the sea-ports, as

before mentioned, left three cohorts at Oricum to protect the town, and

committed to them the charge of his ships of war, which he had

transported from Italy. Acilius, as lieutenant-general, had the charge

of this duty and the command of the town; he drew the ships into the

inner part of the harbour, behind the town, and fastened them to the

shore, and sank a merchant-ship in the mouth of the harbour to block it

up; and near it he fixed another at anchor, on which he raised a turret,

and faced it to the entrance of the port, and filled it with soldiers,

and ordered them to keep guard against any sudden attack.

XL.--Cneius, Pompey's son, who commanded the Egyptian fleet, having got

intelligence of these things, came to Oricum, and weighed up the ship,

that had been sunk, with a windlass, and by straining at it with several

ropes, and attacked the other which had been placed by Acilius to watch

the port with several ships, on which he had raised very high turrets,

so that fighting as it were from an eminence, and sending fresh men

constantly to relieve the fatigued, and at the same time attempting the

town on all sides by land, with ladders and his fleet, in order to

divide the force of his enemies, he overpowered our men by fatigue, and

the immense number of darts, and took the ship, having beat off the men

who were put on board to defend it, who, however, made their escape in

small boats; and at the same time he seized a natural mole on the

opposite side, which almost formed an island over against the town. He

carried over land, into the inner part of the harbour, four galleys, by

putting rollers under them, and driving them on with levers. Then

attacking on both sides the ships of war which were moored to the shore,

and were not manned, he carried off four of them, and set the rest on

fire. After despatching this business, he left Decimus Laelius, whom he

had taken away from the command of the Asiatic fleet, to hinder

provisions from being brought into the town from Biblis and Amantia, and

went himself to Lissus, where he attacked thirty merchantmen, left

within the port by Antonius, and set them on fire. He attempted to storm

Lissus, but being delayed three days by the vigorous defence of the

Roman citizens who belonged to that district, and of the soldiers which

Caesar had sent to keep garrison there, and having lost a few men in the

assault, he returned without effecting his object.

XLI.--As soon as Caesar heard that Pompey was at Asparagium, he set out

for that place with his army, and having taken the capital of the

Parthinians on his march, where there was a garrison of Pompey's, he

reached Pompey in Macedonia, on the third day, and encamped beside him;

and the day following, having drawn out all his forces before his camp,

he offered Pompey battle. But perceiving that he kept within his

trenches, he led his army back to his camp, and thought of pursuing some

other plan. Accordingly, the day following, he set out with all his

forces by a long circuit, through a difficult and narrow road to

Dyrrachium; hoping, either that Pompey would be compelled to follow him

to Dyrrachium, or that his communication with it might be cut off,

because he had deposited there all his provisions and mat['e]riel of

war. And so it happened; for Pompey, at first not knowing his design,

because he imagined he had taken a route in a different direction from

that country, thought that the scarcity of provisions had obliged him to

shift his quarters; but having afterwards got true intelligence from his

scouts, he decamped the day following, hoping to prevent him by taking a

shorter road; which Caesar suspecting might happen, encouraged his

troops to submit cheerfully to the fatigue, and having halted a very

small part of the night, he arrived early in the morning at Dyrrachium,

when the van of Pompey's army was visible at a distance, and there he

encamped.

XLII.--Pompey, being cut off from Dyrrachium, as he was unable to effect

his purpose, took a new resolution, and entrenched himself strongly on a

rising ground, which is called Petra, where ships of a small size can

come in, and be sheltered from some winds. Here he ordered a part of his

men-of-war to attend him, and corn and provisions to be brought from

Asia, and from all the countries of which he kept possession. Caesar,

imagining that the war would be protracted to too great a length, and

despairing of his convoys from Italy, because all the coasts were

guarded with great diligence by Pompey's adherents; and because his own

fleets, which he had built during the winter, in Sicily, Gaul, and

Italy, were detained; sent Lucius Canuleius into Epirus to procure corn;

and because these countries were too remote, he fixed granaries in

certain places, and regulated the carriage of the corn for the

neighbouring states. He likewise gave directions that search should be

made for whatever corn was in Lissus, the country of the Parthini, and

all the places of strength. The quantity was very small, both from the

nature of the land (for the country is rough and mountainous, and the

people commonly import what grain they use); and because Pompey had

foreseen what would happen, and some days before had plundered the

Parthini, and having ravaged and dug up their houses, carried off all

the corn, which he collected by means of his horse.

XLIII.--Caesar, on being informed of these transactions, pursued

measures suggested by the nature of the country. For round Pompey's

camps there were several high and rough hills. These he first of all

occupied with guards, and raised strong forts on them. Then drawing a

fortification from one fort to another, as the nature of each position

allowed, he began to draw a line of circumvallation round Pompey; with

these views; as he had but a small quantity of corn, and Pompey was

strong in cavalry, that he might furnish his army with corn and other

necessaries from all sides with less danger: secondly, to prevent Pompey

from foraging, and thereby render his horse ineffectual in the

operations of the war; and thirdly, to lessen his reputation, on which

he saw he depended greatly, among foreign nations, when a report should

have spread throughout the world that he was blockaded by Caesar, and

dare not hazard a battle.

XLIV.--Neither was Pompey willing to leave the sea and Dyrrachium,

because he had lodged his mat['e]riel there, his weapons, arms, and

engines; and supplied his army with corn from it by his ships: nor was

he able to put a stop to Caesar's works without hazarding a battle,

which at that time he had determined not to do. Nothing was left but to

adopt the last resource, namely, to possess himself of as many hills as

he could, and cover as great an extent of country as possible with his

troops, and divide Caesar's forces as much as possible; and so it

happened: for having raised twenty-four forts, and taken in a compass of

fifteen miles, he got forage in this space, and within this circuit

there were several fields lately sown, in which the cattle might feed in

the meantime. And as our men, who had completed their works by drawing

lines of communication from one fort to another, were afraid that

Pompey's men would sally out from some part, and attack us in the rear;

so the enemy were making a continued fortification in a circuit within

ours to prevent us from breaking in on any side, or surrounding them on

the rear. But they completed their works first; both because they had a

greater number of men, and because they had a smaller compass to

enclose. When Caesar attempted to gain any place, though Pompey had

resolved not to oppose him with his whole force or to come to a general

engagement; yet he detached to particular places slingers and archers,

with which his army abounded, and several of our men were wounded, and

filled with great dread of the arrows; and almost all the soldiers made

coats or coverings for themselves of hair cloths, tarpaulins, or raw

hides to defend them against the weapons.

XLV.--In seizing the posts, each exerted his utmost power: Caesar, to

confine Pompey within as narrow a compass as possible; Pompey, to occupy

as many hills as he could in as large a circuit as possible, and several

skirmishes were fought in consequence of it. In one of these, when

Caesar's ninth legion had gained a certain post, and had begun to

fortify it; Pompey possessed himself of a hill near to and opposite the

same place, and endeavoured to annoy the men while at work; and as the

approach on one side was almost level, he first surrounded it with

archers and slingers, and afterwards by detaching a strong party of

light infantry, and using his engines, he stopped our works: and it was

no easy matter for our men at once to defend themselves, and to proceed

with their fortifications. When Caesar perceived that his troops were

wounded from all sides, he determined to retreat and give up the post;

his retreat was down a precipice, on which account they pushed on with

more spirit, and would not allow us to retire, because they imagined

that we resigned the place through fear. It is reported that Pompey said

that day in triumph to his friends about him, "That he would consent to

be accounted a general of no experience, if Caesar's legions effected a

retreat without considerable loss from that ground into which they had

rashly advanced."

XLVI.--Caesar, being uneasy about the retreat of his soldiers, ordered

hurdles to be carried to the further side of the hill, and to be placed

opposite to the enemy, and behind them a trench of a moderate breadth to

be sunk by his soldiers under shelter of the hurdles: and the ground to

be made as difficult as possible. He himself disposed slingers in

convenient places to cover our men in their retreat. These things being

completed, he ordered his legions to file off. Pompey's men insultingly

and boldly pursued and chased us, levelling the hurdles that were thrown

up in the front of our works, in order to pass over the trench. Which as

soon as Caesar perceived, being afraid that his men would appear not to

retreat, but to be repulsed, and that greater loss might be sustained,

when his men were almost half way down the hill, he encouraged them by

Antonius, who commanded that legion, ordered the signal of battle to be

sounded, and a charge to be made on the enemy. The soldiers of the ninth

legion suddenly closing their files threw their javelins, and advancing

impetuously from the low ground up the steep, drove Pompey's men

precipitately before them, and obliged them to turn their backs; but

their retreat was greatly impeded by the hurdles that lay in a long line

before them, and the pallisadoes which were in their way, and the

trenches that were sunk. But our men being contented to retreat without

injury, having killed several of the enemy, and lost but five of their

own, very quietly retired, and having seized some other hills somewhat

on this side of that place, completed their fortifications.

XLVII.--This method of conducting a war was new and unusual, as well on

account of the number of forts, the extent and greatness of the works,

and the manner of attack and defence, as on account of other

circumstances. For all who have attempted to besiege any person, have

attacked the enemy when they were frightened or weak, or after a defeat;

or have been kept in fear of some attack, when they themselves have had

a superior force both of foot and horse. Besides, the usual design of a

siege is to cut off the enemy's supplies. On the contrary, Caesar, with

an inferior force, was enclosing troops sound and unhurt, and who had

abundance of all things. For there arrived every day a prodigious number

of ships, which brought them provisions: nor could the wind blow from

any point that would not be favourable to some of them. Whereas, Caesar,

having consumed all the corn far and near, was in very great distress,

but his soldiers bore all with uncommon patience. For they remembered

that they lay under the same difficulties last year in Spain, and yet by

labour and patience had concluded a dangerous war. They recollected too

that they had suffered an alarming scarcity at Alesia, and a much

greater at Avaricum, and yet had returned victorious over mighty

nations. They refused neither barley nor pulse when offered them, and

they held in great esteem cattle, of which they got great quantities

from Epirus.

XLVIII.--There was a sort of root, called chara, discovered by the

troops which served under Valerius. This they mixed up with milk, and it

greatly contributed to relieve their want. They made it into a sort of

bread. They had great plenty of it: loaves made of this, when Pompey's

men upbraided ours with want, they frequently threw among them to damp

their hopes.

XLIX.--The corn was now beginning to ripen, and their hope supported

their want, as they were confident of having abundance in a short time.

And there were frequently heard declarations of the soldiers on guard,

in discourse with each other, that they would rather live on the bark of

the trees, than let Pompey escape from their hands. For they were often

told by deserters, that they could scarcely maintain their horses, and

that their other cattle was dead: that they themselves were not in good

health from their confinement within so narrow a compass, from the

noisome smell, the number of carcasses, and the constant fatigue to

them, being men unaccustomed to work, and labouring under a great want

of water. For Caesar had either turned the course of all the rivers and

streams which ran to the sea, or had dammed them up with strong works.

And as the country was mountainous, and the valleys narrow at the

bottom, he enclosed them with piles sunk in the ground, and heaped up

mould against them to keep in the water. They were therefore obliged to

search for low and marshy grounds, and to sink wells, and they had this

labour in addition to their daily works. And even these springs were at

a considerable distance from some of their posts, and soon dried up with

the heat. But Caesar's army enjoyed perfect health and abundance of

water, and had plenty of all sorts of provisions except corn; and they

had a prospect of better times approaching, and saw greater hopes laid

before them by the ripening of the grain.

L.--In this new kind of war, new methods of managing it were invented by

both generals. Pompey's men, perceiving by our fires at night, at what

part of the works our cohorts were on guard, coming silently upon them

discharged their arrows at random among the whole multitude, and

instantly retired to their camp: as a remedy against which our men were

taught by experience to light their fires in one place, and keep guard

in another.

* * * * *

LI.--In the meantime, Publius Sylla, whom Caesar at his departure had

left governor of his camp, came up with two legions to assist the

cohort; upon whose arrival Pompey's forces were easily repulsed. Nor did

they stand the sight and charge of our men, and the foremost falling,

the rest turned their backs and quitted the field. But Sylla called our

men in from the pursuit, lest their ardour should carry them too far,

but most people imagine, that if he had consented to a vigorous pursuit,

the war might have been ended that day. His conduct however does not

appear to deserve censure; for the duties of a lieutenant-general and of

a commander-in-chief are very different; the one is bound to act

entirely according to his instructions, the other to regulate his

conduct without control, as occasion requires. Sylla, being deputed by

Caesar to take care of the camp, and having rescued his men, was

satisfied with that, and did not desire to hazard a battle (although

this circumstance might probably have had a successful issue), that he

might not be thought to have assumed the part of the general. One

circumstance laid the Pompeians under great difficulty in making good a

retreat: for they had advanced from disadvantageous ground, and were

posted on the top of a hill. If they attempted to retire down the steep,

they dreaded the pursuit of our men from the rising ground, and there

was but a short time till sunset: for in hopes of completing the

business, they had protracted the battle almost till night. Taking

therefore measures suited to their exigency, and to the shortness of the

time, Pompey possessed himself of an eminence, at such a distance from

our fort, that no weapon discharged from an engine could reach him. Here

he took up a position, and fortified it, and kept all his forces there.

LII.--At the same time, there were engagements in two other places; for

Pompey had attacked several forts at once, in order to divide our

forces; that no relief might be sent from the neighbouring posts. In one

place, Volcatius Tullus sustained the charge of a legion with three

cohorts, and beat them off the field. In another, the Germans, having

sallied over our fortifications, slew several of the enemy, and

retreated safe to our camp.

LIII.--Thus six engagements having happened in one day, three at

Dyrrachium, and three at the fortifications, when a computation was made

of the number of slain, we found that about two thousand fell on

Pompey's side, several of them volunteer veterans and centurions. Among

them was Valerius, the son of Lucius Flaccus, who as praetor had

formerly had the government of Asia, and six military standards were

taken. Of our men, not more than twenty were missing in all the action.

But in the fort, not a single soldier escaped without a wound; and in

one cohort, four centurions lost their eyes. And being desirous to

produce testimony of the fatigue they underwent, and the danger they

sustained, they counted to Caesar about thirty thousand arrows which had

been thrown into the fort; and in the shield of the centurion Scaeva,

which was brought to him, were found two hundred and thirty holes. In

reward for this man's services both to himself and the republic, Caesar

presented to him two hundred thousand pieces of copper money, and

declared him promoted from the eighth to the first centurion. For it

appeared that the fort had been in a great measure saved by his

exertions; and he afterwards very amply rewarded the cohorts with double

pay, corn, clothing, and other military honours.

LIV.--Pompey, having made great additions to his works in the night, the

following days built turrets, and having carried his works fifteen feet

high, faced that part of his camp with mantlets; and after an interval

of five days, taking advantage of a second cloudy night, he barricaded

all the gates of his camp to hinder a pursuit, and about midnight

quietly marched off his army, and retreated to his old fortifications.

LV.--Aetolia, Acarnania, and Amphilochis, being reduced, as we have

related, by Cassius Longinus, and Calvisius Sabinus, Caesar thought he

ought to attempt the conquest of Achaia, and to advance farther into the

country. Accordingly, he detached Fufius thither, and ordered Quintus

Sabinus and Cassius to join him with their cohorts. Upon notice of their

approach, Rutilius Lupus, who commanded in Achaia, under Pompey, began

to fortify the Isthmus, to prevent Fufius from coming into Achaia.

Kalenus recovered Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus, by a voluntary

submission of those states. Some he subdued by force, the rest he

endeavoured to win over to Caesar's interest, by sending deputies round

to them. In these things, principally, Fufius was employed.

LVI.--Every day afterwards, Caesar drew up his army on a level ground,

and offered Pompey battle, and led his legions almost close to Pompey's

camp; and his front line was at no greater distance from the rampart

than that no weapons from their engines could reach it. But Pompey, to

save his credit and reputation with the world, drew out his legions, but

so close to his camp that his rear lines might touch the rampart, and

that his whole army, when drawn up, might be protected by the darts

discharged from it.

LVII.--Whilst these things were going forward in Achaia and at

Dyrrachium, and when it was certainly known that Scipio was arrived in

Macedonia, Caesar, never losing sight of his first intention, sends

Clodius to him, an intimate friend to both, whom Caesar, on the

introduction and recommendation of Pompey, had admitted into the number

of his acquaintance. To this man he gave letters and instructions to

Pompey, the substance of which was as follows: "That he had made every

effort towards peace, and imputed the ill success of those efforts to

the fault of those whom he had employed to conduct those negotiations:

because they were afraid to carry his proposals to Pompey at an improper

time. That Scipio had such authority, that he could not only freely

explain what conduct met his approbation, but even in some degree

enforce his advice, and govern him [Pompey] if he persisted in error;

that he commanded an army independent of Pompey, so that besides his

authority, he had strength to compel; and if he did so, all men would be

indebted to him for the quiet of Italy, the peace of the provinces, and

the preservation of the empire." These proposals Clodius made to him,

and for some days at the first appeared to have met with a favourable

reception, but afterwards was not admitted to an audience; for Scipio

being reprimanded by Favonius, as we found afterwards when the war was

ended, and the negotiation having miscarried, Clodius returned to

Caesar.

LVIII.--Caesar, that he might the more easily keep Pompey's horse

enclosed within Dyrrachium, and prevent them from foraging, fortified

the two narrow passes already mentioned with strong works, and erected

forts at them. Pompey perceiving that he derived no advantage from his

cavalry, after a few days had them conveyed back to his camp by sea.

Fodder was so exceedingly scarce that he was obliged to feed his horses

upon leaves stripped off the trees, or the tender roots of reeds

pounded. For the corn which had been sown within the lines was already

consumed, and they would be obliged to supply themselves with fodder

from Corcyra and Acarnania, over a long tract of sea; and as the

quantity of that fell short, to increase it by mixing barley with it,

and by these methods support their cavalry. But when not only the barley

and fodder in these parts were consumed, and the herbs cut away, when

the leaves too were not to be found on the trees, the horses being

almost starved, Pompey thought he ought to make some attempt by a sally.

LIX.--In the number of Caesar's cavalry were two Allobrogians, brothers,

named Roscillus and Aegus, the sons of Abducillus, who for several years

possessed the chief power in his own state; men of singular valour,

whose gallant services Caesar had found very useful in all his wars in

Gaul. To them, for these reasons, he had committed the offices of

greatest honour in their own country, and took care to have them chosen

into the senate at an unusual age, and had bestowed on them lands taken

from the enemy, and large pecuniary rewards, and from being needy had

made them affluent. Their valour had not only procured them Caesar's

esteem, but they were beloved by the whole army. But presuming on

Caesar's friendship, and elated with the arrogance natural to a foolish

and barbarous people, they despised their countrymen, defrauded their

cavalry of their pay, and applied all the plunder to their own use.

Displeased at this conduct, their soldiers went in a body to Caesar, and

openly complained of their ill usage; and to their other charges added,

that false musters were given in to Caesar, and the surcharged pay

applied to their own use.

LX.--Caesar, not thinking it a proper time to call them to account, and

willing to pardon many faults, on account of their valour, deferred the

whole matter, and gave them a private rebuke, for having made a traffic

of their troops, and advised them to expect everything from his

friendship, and by his past favours to measure their future hopes. This,

however, gave them great offence, and made them contemptible in the eyes

of the whole army. Of this they became sensible, as well from the

reproaches of others, as from the judgment of their own minds, and a

consciousness of guilt. Prompted then by shame, and perhaps imagining

that they were not liberated from trial, but reserved to a future day,

they resolved to break off from us, to put their fortune to a new

hazard, and to make trial of new connections. And having conferred with

a few of their clients, to whom they could venture to entrust so base an

action, they first attempted to assassinate Caius Volusenus, general of

the horse (as was discovered at the end of the war), that they might

appear to have fled to Pompey after conferring an important service on

him. But when that appeared too difficult to put in execution, and no

opportunity offered to accomplish it, they borrowed all the money they

could, as if they designed to make satisfaction and restitution for what

they had defrauded: and having purchased a great number of horses, they

deserted to Pompey along with those whom they had engaged in their plot.

LXI.--As they were persons nobly descended and of liberal education, and

had come with a great retinue, and several cattle, and were reckoned men

of courage, and had been in great esteem with Caesar, and as it was a

new and uncommon event, Pompey carried them round all his works, and

made an ostentatious show of them, for till that day, not a soldier,

either horse or foot, had deserted from Caesar to Pompey, though there

were desertions almost every day from Pompey to Caesar: but more

commonly among the soldiers levied in Epirus and Aetolia, and in those

countries which were in Caesar's possession. But the brothers, having

been acquainted with all things, either what was incomplete in our

works, or what appeared to the best judges of military matters to be

deficient, the particular times, the distance of places, and the various

attention of the guards, according to the different temper and character

of the officer who commanded the different posts, gave an exact account

of all to Pompey.

LXII.--Upon receiving this intelligence, Pompey, who had already formed

the design of attempting a sally, as before mentioned, ordered the

soldiers to make ozier coverings for their helmets, and to provide

fascines. These things being prepared, he embarked on board small boats

and row galleys by night, a considerable number of light infantry and

archers, with all their fascines, and immediately after midnight, he

marched sixty cohorts drafted from the greater camp and the outposts, to

that part of our works which extended towards the sea, and were at the

farthest distance from Caesar's greater camp. To the same place he sent

the ships, which he had freighted with the fascines and light-armed

troops; and all the ships of war that lay at Dyrrachium; and to each he

gave particular instructions: at this part of the lines Caesar had

posted Lentulus Marcellinus, the quaestor, with the ninth legion, and as

he was not in a good state of health, Fulvius Costhumus was sent to

assist him in the command.

LXIII.--At this place, fronting the enemy, there was a ditch fifteen

feet wide, and a rampart ten feet high, and the top of the rampart was

ten feet in breadth. At an interval of six hundred feet from that there

was another rampart turned the contrary way, with the works lower. For

some days before, Caesar, apprehending that our men might be surrounded

by sea, had made a double rampart there, that if he should be attacked

on both sides, he might have the means in defending himself. But the

extent of the lines, and the incessant labour for so many days, because

he had enclosed a circuit of seventeen miles with his works, did not

allow time to finish them. Therefore the transverse rampart which should

make a communication between the other two, was not yet completed. This

circumstance was known to Pompey, being told to him by the Allobrogian

deserters, and proved of great disadvantage to us. For when our cohorts

of the ninth legion were on guard by the sea-side, Pompey's army arrived

suddenly by break of day, and their approach was a surprise to our men,

and at the same time, the soldiers that came by sea cast their darts on

the front rampart; and the ditches were filled with fascines: and the

legionary soldiers terrified those that defended the inner rampart, by

applying the scaling ladders, and by engines and weapons of all sorts,

and a vast multitude of archers poured round upon them from every side.

Besides, the coverings of oziers, which they had laid over their

helmets, were a great security to them against the blows of stones which

were the only weapons that our soldiers had. And therefore, when our men

were oppressed in every manner, and were scarcely able to make

resistance, the defect in our works was observed, and Pompey's soldiers,

landing between the two ramparts, where the work was unfinished,

attacked our men in the rear, and having beat them from both sides of

the fortification, obliged them to flee.

LXIV.--Marcellinus, being informed of this disorder, detached some

cohorts to the relief of our men, who seeing them flee from the camp,

were neither able to persuade them to rally at their approach, nor

themselves to sustain the enemy's charge. And in like manner, whatever

additional assistance was sent, was infected by the fears of the

defeated, and increased the terror and danger. For retreat was prevented

by the multitude of the fugitives. In that battle, when the eagle-bearer

was dangerously wounded, and began to grow weak, having got sight of our

horse, he said to them, "This eagle have I defended with the greatest

care for many years, at the hazard of my life, and now in my last

moments restore it to Caesar with the same fidelity. Do not, I conjure

you, suffer a dishonour to be sustained in the field, which never before

happened to Caesar's army, but deliver it safe into his hands." By this

accident the eagle was preserved, but all the centurions of the first

cohorts were killed, except the principal.

LXV.--And now the Pompeians, after great havoc of our troops, were

approaching Marcellinus's camp, and had struck no small terror into the

rest of the cohorts, when Marcus Antonius, who commanded the nearest

fort, being informed of what had happened, was observed descending from

the rising ground with twelve cohorts. His arrival checked the

Pompeians, and encouraged our men to recover from their extreme

affright. And shortly after, Caesar having got notice by the smoke from

all the forts, which was the usual signal on such occasions, drafted off

some cohorts from the outposts, and went to the scene of action. And

having there learnt the loss he had sustained, and perceiving that

Pompey had forced our works, and had encamped along the coast, so that

he was at liberty to forage, and had a communication with his shipping,

he altered his plan for conducting the war, as his design had not

succeeded, and ordered a strong encampment to be made near Pompey.

LXVI.--When this work was finished, Caesar's scouts observed that some

cohorts, which to them appeared like a legion, were retired behind the

wood, and were on their march to the old camp. The situation of the two

camps was as follows: a few days before, when Caesar's ninth legion had

opposed a party of Pompey's troops, and were endeavouring to enclose

them, Caesar's troops formed a camp in that place. This camp joined a

certain wood, and was not above four hundred paces distant from the sea.

Afterwards, changing his design for certain reasons, Caesar removed his

camp to a small distance beyond that place; and after a few days, Pompey

took possession of it, and added more extensive works, leaving the inner

rampart standing, as he intended to keep several legions there. By this

means, the lesser camp included within the greater, answered the purpose

of a fort and citadel. He had also carried an entrenchment from the left

angle of the camp to the river, about four hundred paces, that his

soldiers might have more liberty and less danger in fetching water. But

he too, changing his design for reasons not necessary to be mentioned,

abandoned the place. In this condition the camp remained for several

days, the works being all entire.

LXVII.--Caesar's scouts brought him word that the standard of a legion

was carried to this place. That the same thing was seen he was assured

by those in the higher forts. This place was half a mile distant from

Pompey's new camp. Caesar, hoping to surprise this legion, and anxious

to repair the loss sustained that day, left two cohorts employed in the

works to make an appearance of entrenching himself, and by a different

route, as privately as he could, with his other cohorts amounting to

thirty-three, among which was the ninth legion, which had lost so many

centurions, and whose privates were greatly reduced in number, he

marched in two lines against Pompey's legion and his lesser camp. Nor

did this first opinion deceive him. For he reached the place before

Pompey could have notice of it; and though the works were strong, yet

having made the attack with the left wing, which he commanded in person,

he obliged the Pompeians to quit the rampart in disorder. A barricade

had been raised before the gates, at which a short contest was

maintained, our men endeavouring to force their way in, and the enemy to

defend the camp; Titus Pulcio, by whose means we have related that Caius

Antonius's army was betrayed, defending them with singular courage. But

the valour of our men prevailed, and having cut down the barricade, they

first forced the greater camp, and after that the fort which was

enclosed within it: and as the legion on its repulse had retired to

this, they slew several defending themselves there.

LXVIII.--But Fortune, who exerts a powerful influence as well in other

matters, as especially in war, effects great changes from trifling

causes, as happened at this time. For the cohorts on Caesar's right

wing, through ignorance of the place, followed the direction of that

rampart, which ran along from the camp to the river, whilst they were in

search of a gate, and imagined that it belonged to the camp. But when

they found that it led to the river, and that nobody opposed them, they

immediately climbed over the rampart, and were followed by all our

cavalry.

LXIX.--In the meantime Pompey, by the great delay which this occasioned,

being informed of what had happened, marched with the fifth legion,

which he called away from their work to support his party; and at the

same time his cavalry were advancing up to ours, and an army in order of

battle was seen at a distance by our men who had taken possession of the

camp, and the face of affairs was suddenly changed. For Pompey's legion,

encouraged by the hope of speedy support, attempted to make a stand at

the Decuman gate, and made a bold charge on our men. Caesar's cavalry,

who had mounted the rampart by a narrow breach, being apprehensive of

their retreat, were the first to flee. The right wing, which had been

separated from the left, observing the terror of the cavalry, to prevent

their being overpowered within the lines, were endeavouring to retreat

by the same way as they burst in; and most of them, lest they should be

engaged in the narrow passes, threw themselves down a rampart ten feet

high into the trenches; and the first being trodden to death, the rest

procured their safety and escaped over their bodies. The soldiers of the

left wing, perceiving from the rampart that Pompey was advancing, and

their own friends fleeing, being afraid that they should be enclosed

between the two ramparts, as they had an enemy both within and without,

strove to secure their retreat the same way they came. All was disorder,

consternation, and flight; insomuch that, when Caesar laid hold of the

colours of those who were running away, and desired them to stand, some

left their horses behind, and continued to run in the same manner;

others through fear even threw away their colours, nor did a single man

face about.

LXX.--In this calamity, the following favourable circumstance occurred

to prevent the ruin of our whole army, viz., that Pompey suspecting an

ambuscade (because, as I suppose, the success had far exceeded his

hopes, as he had seen his men a moment before fleeing from the camp),

durst not for some time approach the fortification; and that his horse

were retarded from pursuing, because the passes and gates were in

possession of Caesar's soldiers. Thus a trifling circumstance proved of

great importance to each party; for the rampart drawn from the camp to

the river, interrupted the progress and certainty of Caesar's victory,

after he had forced Pompey's camp. The same thing, by retarding the

rapidity of the enemy's pursuit, preserved our army.

LXXI.--In the two actions of this day, Caesar lost nine hundred and

sixty rank and file, several Roman knights of distinction, Felginas

Tuticanus Gallus, a senator's son; Caius Felginas from Placentia; Aulus

Gravius from Puteoli; Marcus Sacrativir from Capua; and thirty-two

military tribunes and centurions. But the greatest part of all these

perished without a wound, being trodden to death in the trenches, on the

ramparts and banks of the river by reason of the terror and flight of

their own men. Pompey, after this battle, was saluted Imperator; this

title he retained, and allowed himself to be addressed by it afterwards.

But neither in his letters to the senate, nor in the fasces, did he use

the laurel as a mark of honour. But Labienus, having obtained his

consent that the prisoners should be delivered up to him, had them all

brought out, as it appeared, to make a show of them, and that Pompey

might place a greater confidence in him who was a deserter; and calling

them fellow soldiers, and asking them in the most insulting manner

whether it was usual with veterans to flee, ordered them to be put to

death in the sight of the whole army.

LXXII.-Pompey's party were so elated with confidence and spirit at this

success, that they thought no more of the method of conducting the war,

but thought that they were already conquerors. They did not consider

that the smallness of our numbers, and the disadvantage of the place and

the confined nature of the ground occasioned by their having first

possessed themselves of the camp, and the double danger both from within

and without the fortifications, and the separation of the army into two

parts, so that the one could not give relief to the other, were the

cause of our defeat. They did not consider, in addition, that the

contest was not decided by a vigorous attack, nor a regular battle; and

that our men had suffered greater loss from their numbers and want of

room, than they had sustained from the enemy. In fine, they did not

reflect on the common casualties of war; how trifling causes, either

from groundless suspicions, sudden affright, or religious scruples, have

oftentimes been productive of considerable losses; how often an army has

been unsuccessful either by the misconduct of the general, or the

oversight of a tribune; but as if they had proved victorious by their

valour, and as if no change could ever take place, they published the

success of the day throughout the world by reports and letters.

LXXIII.--Caesar, disappointed in his first intentions, resolved to

change the whole plan of his operations. Accordingly, he at once called

in all out-posts, gave over the siege, and collecting his army into one

place, addressed his soldiers and encouraged them "not to be troubled at

what had happened, nor to be dismayed at it, but to weigh their many

successful engagements against one disappointment, and that, too, a

trifling one. That they ought to be grateful to Fortune, through whose

favour they had recovered Italy without the effusion of blood; through

whose favour they had subdued the two Spains, though protected by a most

warlike people under the command of the most skilful and experienced

generals: through whose favour they had reduced to submission the

neighbouring states that abounded with corn: in fine, that they ought to

remember with what success they had been all transported safe through

blockading fleets of the enemy, which possessed not only the ports, but

even the coasts: that if all their attempts were not crowned with

success, the defects of Fortune must be supplied by industry; and

whatever loss had been sustained, ought to be attributed rather to her

caprices than to any faults in him: that he had chosen a safe ground for

the engagement, that he had possessed himself of the enemy's camp; that

he had beaten them out, and overcome them when they offered resistance;

but whether their own terror or some mistake, or whether Fortune herself

had interrupted a victory almost secured and certain, they ought all now

to use their utmost efforts to repair by their valour the loss which had

been incurred; if they did so, their misfortunes would turn to their

advantage, as it happened at Gergovia, and those who feared to face the

enemy would be the first to offer themselves to battle.

LXXIV.--Having concluded his speech, he disgraced some standard-bearers,

and reduced them to the ranks; for the whole army was seized with such

grief at their loss, and with such an ardent desire of repairing their

disgrace, that not a man required the command of his tribune or

centurion, but they imposed each on himself severer labours than usual

as a punishment, and at the same time were so inflamed with eagerness to

meet the enemy, that the officers of the first rank, sensibly affected

at their entreaties, were of opinion that they ought to continue in

their present posts, and commit their fate to the hazard of a battle.

But, on the other hand, Caesar could not place sufficient confidence in

men so lately thrown into consternation, and thought he ought to allow

them time to recover their dejected spirits; and having abandoned his

works, he was apprehensive of being distressed for want of corn.

LXXV.--Accordingly, suffering no time to intervene but what was

necessary for a proper attention to be paid to the sick and wounded, he

sent on all his baggage privately in the beginning of the night from his

camp to Apollonia, and ordered them not to halt till they had performed

their journey; and he detached one legion with them as a convoy. This

affair being concluded, having retained only two legions in his camp; he

marched the rest of his army out at three o'clock in the morning by

several gates, and sent them forward by the same route; and in a short

space after, that the military practice might be preserved, and his

march known as late as possible, he ordered the signal for decamping to

be given; and setting out immediately, and following the rear of his own

army, he was soon out of sight of the camp. Nor did Pompey, as soon as

he had notice of his design, make any delay to pursue him; but with a

view to surprise them whilst encumbered with baggage on their march, and

not yet recovered from their fright, he led his army out of his camp,

and sent his cavalry on to retard our rear; but was not able to come up

with them, because Caesar had got far before him, and marched without

baggage. But when we reached the river Genusus, the banks being steep,

their horse overtook our rear, and detained them by bringing them to

action. To oppose whom, Caesar sent his horse, and intermixed with them

about four hundred of his advanced light troops, who attacked their

horse with such success, that having routed them all, and killed

several, they returned without any loss to the main body.

LXXVI.--Having performed the exact march which he had proposed that day,

and having led his army over the river Genusus, Caesar posted himself in

his old camp opposite Asparagium; and kept his soldiers close within the

entrenchments; and ordered the horse, who had been sent out under

pretence of foraging, to retire immediately into the camp, through the

Decuman gate. Pompey, in like manner, having completed the same day's

march, took post in his old camp at Asparagium; and his soldiers, as

they had no work (the fortifications being entire), made long

excursions, some to collect wood and forage; others, invited by the

nearness of the former camp, laid up their arms in their tents, and

quitted the entrenchments in order to bring what they had left behind

them, because the design of marching being adopted in a hurry, they had

left a considerable part of their waggons and luggage behind. Being thus

incapable of pursuing, as Caesar had foreseen, about noon he gave the

signal for marching, led out his army, and doubling that day's march, he

advanced eight miles beyond Pompey's camp; who could not pursue him,

because his troops were dispersed.

LXXVII.--The next day Caesar sent his baggage forward early in the

night, and marched off himself immediately after the fourth watch: that

if he should be under the necessity of risking an engagement, he might

meet a sudden attack with an army free from incumbrance. He did so for

several days successively, by which means he was enabled to effect his

march over the deepest rivers, and through the most intricate roads

without any loss. For Pompey, after the first day's delay, and the

fatigue which he endured for some days in vain, though he exerted

himself by forced marches, and was anxious to overtake us, who had got

the start of him, on the fourth day desisted from the pursuit, and

determined to follow other measures.

LXXVIII.--Caesar was obliged to go to Apollonia, to lodge his wounded,

pay his army, confirm his friends, and leave garrisons in the towns. But

for these matters, he allowed no more time than was necessary for a

person in haste. And being apprehensive for Domitius, lest he should be

surprised by Pompey's arrival, he hastened with all speed and

earnestness to join him; for he planned the operations of the whole

campaign on these principles: that if Pompey should march after him, he

would be drawn off from the sea, and from those forces which he had

provided in Dyrrachium, and separated from his corn and magazines, and

be obliged to carry on the war on equal terms; but if he crossed over

into Italy, Caesar, having effected a junction with Domitius, would

march through Illyricum to the relief of Italy; but if he endeavoured to

storm Apollonia and Oricum, and exclude him from the whole coast, he

hoped, by besieging Scipio, to oblige him, of necessity, to come to his

assistance. Accordingly, Caesar despatching couriers, writes to

Domitius, and acquaints him with his wishes on the subject: and having

stationed a garrison of four cohorts at Apollonia, one at Lissus, and

three at Oricum, besides those who were sick of their wounds, he set

forward on his march through Epirus and Acarnania. Pompey, also,

guessing at Caesar's design, determined to hasten to Scipio, that if

Caesar should march in that direction, he might be ready to relieve him;

but that if Caesar should be unwilling to quit the sea-coast and

Corcyra, because he expected legions and cavalry from Italy, he himself

might fall on Domitius with all his forces.

LXXIX.--For these reasons, each of them studied despatch, that he might

succour his friends, and not miss an opportunity of surprising his

enemies. But Caesar's engagements at Apolloma had carried him aside from

the direct road. Pompey had taken the short road to Macedonia, through

Candavia. To this was added another unexpected disadvantage, that

Domitius, who for several days had been encamped opposite Scipio, had

quitted that post for the sake of provisions, and had marched to

Heraclea Sentica, a city subject to Candavia; so that fortune herself

seemed to throw him in Pompey's way. Of this, Caesar was ignorant up to

this time. Letters likewise being sent by Pompey through all the

provinces and states, with an account of the action at Dyrrachium, very

much enlarged and exaggerated beyond the real facts, a rumour had been

circulated, that Caesar had been defeated and forced to flee, and had

lost almost all his forces. These reports had made the roads dangerous,

and drawn off some states from his alliance: whence it happened, that

the messengers despatched by Caesar, by several different roads to

Domitius, and by Domitius to Caesar, were not able by any means to

accomplish their journey. But the Allobroges, who were in the retinue of

Aegus and Roscillus, and who had deserted to Pompey, having met on the

road a scouting party of Domitius; either from old acquaintance, because

they had served together in Gaul, or elated with vain glory, gave them

an account of all that had happened, and informed them of Caesar's

departure, and Pompey's arrival. Domitius, who was scarce four hours'

march distant, having got intelligence from these, by the courtesy of

the enemy, avoided the danger, and met Caesar coming to join him at

Aeginium, a town on the confines of and opposite to Thessaly.

LXXX.--The two armies being united, Caesar marched to Gomphi, which is

the first town of Thessaly on the road from Epirus. Now, the

Thessalians, a few months before, had of themselves sent ambassadors to

Caesar, offering him the free use of everything in their power, and

requesting a garrison for their protection. But the report, already

spoken of, of the battle at Dyrrachium, which it had exaggerated in many

particulars, had arrived before him. In consequence of which,

Androsthenes, the praetor of Thessaly, as he preferred to be the

companion of Pompey's victory, rather than Caesar's associate in his

misfortunes, collected all the people, both slaves and freemen, from the

country into the town and shut the gates, and despatched messengers to

Scipio and Pompey "to come to his relief, that he could depend on the

strength of the town, if succour was speedily sent; but that it could

not withstand a long siege." Scipio, as soon as he received advice of

the departure of the armies from Dyrrachium, had marched with his

legions to Larissa: Pompey was not yet arrived near Thessaly. Caesar

having fortified his camp, ordered scaling ladders and pent-houses to be

made for a sudden assault, and hurdles to be provided. As soon as they

were ready, he exhorted his soldiers, and told them of what advantage it

would be to assist them with all sorts of necessaries if they made

themselves masters of a rich and plentiful town: and, at the same time,

to strike terror into other states by the example of this, and to effect

this with speed, before auxiliaries could arrive. Accordingly, taking

advantage of the unusual ardour of the soldiers, he began his assault on

the town at a little after three o'clock on the very day on which he

arrived, and took it, though defended with very high walls, before

sunset, and gave it up to his army to plunder, and immediately decamped

from before it, and marched to Metropolis, with such rapidity as to

outstrip any messenger or rumour of the taking of Gomphi.

LXXXI.--The inhabitants of Metropolis, at first influenced by the same

rumours, followed the same measures, shut the gates and manned their

walls. But when they were made acquainted with the fate of the city of

Gomphi by some prisoners, whom Caesar had ordered to be brought up to

the walls, they threw open their gates. As he preserved them with the

greatest care, there was not a state in Thessaly (except Larissa, which

was awed by a strong army of Scipio's), but on comparing the fate of the

inhabitants of Metropolis with the severe treatment of Gomphi, gave

admission to Caesar, and obeyed his orders. Having chosen a position

convenient for procuring corn, which was now almost ripe on the ground,

he determined there to wait Pompey's arrival, and to make it the centre

of all his warlike operations.

LXXXII.--Pompey arrived in Thessaly a few days after, and having

harangued the combined army, returned thanks to his own men, and

exhorted Scipio's soldiers, that as the victory was now secured, they

should endeavour to merit a part of the rewards and booty. And receiving

all the legions into one camp, he shared his honours with Scipio,

ordered the trumpet to be sounded at his tent, and a pavilion to be

erected for him. The forces of Pompey being thus augmented, and two such

powerful armies united, their former expectations were confirmed, and

their hopes of victory so much increased, that whatever time intervened

was considered as so much delay to their return into Italy: and whenever

Pompey acted with slowness and caution, they used to exclaim, that it

was the business only of a single day, but that he had a passion for

power, and was delighted in having persons of consular and praetorian

rank in the number of his slaves. And they now began to dispute openly

about rewards and priesthoods, and disposed of the consulate for several

years to come. Others put in their claims for the houses and properties

of all who were in Caesar's camp, and in that council there was a warm

debate, whether Lucius Hirrus, who had been sent by Pompey against the

Parthians, should be admitted a candidate for the praetorship in his

absence at the next election; his friends imploring Pompey's honour to

fulfil the engagements which he had made to him at his departure, that

he might not seem deceived through his authority: whilst others,

embarked in equal labour and danger, pleaded that no individual ought to

have a preference before all the rest.

LXXXIII.--Already Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinthur, in their

daily quarrels about Caesar's priesthood, openly abused each other in

the most scurrilous language. Lentulus urging the respect due to his

age, Domitius boasting his interest in the city and his dignity, and

Scipio presuming on his alliance with Pompey. Attius Rufus charged

Lucius Afranius before Pompey with betraying the army in the action that

happened in Spain, and Lucius Domitius declared in the council that it

was his wish that, when the war should be ended, three billets should be

given to all the senators who had taken part with them in the war, and

that they should pass sentence on every single person who had stayed

behind at Rome, or who had been within Pompey's garrisons and had not

contributed their assistance in the military operations; that by the

first billet they should-have power to acquit, by the second to pass

sentence of death, and by the third to impose a pecuniary fine. In

short, Pompey's whole army talked of nothing but the honours or sums of

money which were to be their rewards, or of vengeance on their enemies;

and never considered how they were to defeat their enemies, but in what

manner they should use their victory.

LXXXIV.--Corn being provided, and his soldiers refreshed, and a

sufficient time having elapsed since the engagement at Dyrrachium, when

Caesar thought he had sufficiently sounded the disposition of his

troops, he thought that he ought to try whether Pompey had any intention

or inclination to come to a battle. Accordingly he led his troops out of

the camp, and ranged them in order of battle, at first on their own

ground, and at a small distance from Pompey's camp: but afterwards for

several days in succession he advanced from his own camp, and led them

up to the hills on which Pompey's troops were posted, which conduct

inspired his army every day with fresh courage. However he adhered to

his former purpose respecting his cavalry, for as he was by many degrees

inferior in number, he selected the youngest and most active of the

advanced guard, and desired them to fight intermixed with the horse, and

they by constant practice acquired experience in this kind of battle. By

these means it was brought to pass that a thousand of his horse would

dare, even on open ground, to stand against seven thousand of Pompey's,

if occasion required, and would not be much terrified by their number.

For even on one of those days he was successful in a cavalry action, and

killed one of the two Allobrogians who had deserted to Pompey, as we

before observed, and several others.

LXXXV.--Pompey, because he was encamped on a hill, drew up his army at

the very foot of it, ever in expectation, as may be conjectured, that

Caesar would expose himself to this disadvantageous situation. Caesar,

seeing no likelihood of being able to bring Pompey to an action, judged

it the most expedient method of conducting the war, to decamp from that

post, and to be always in motion: with this hope, that by shifting his

camp and removing from place to place, he might be more conveniently

supplied with corn, and also, that by being in motion he might get some

opportunity of forcing them to battle, and might by constant marches

harass Pompey's army, which was not accustomed to fatigue. These matters

being settled, when the signal for marching was given, and the tents

struck, it was observed that shortly before, contrary to his daily

practice, Pompey's army had advanced farther than usual from his

entrenchments, so that it appeared possible to come to an action on

equal ground. Then Caesar addressed himself to his soldiers, when they

were at the gates of the camp, ready to march out. "We must defer," says

he, "our march at present, and set our thoughts on battle, which has

been our constant wish; let us then meet the foe with resolute souls. We

shall not hereafter easily find such an opportunity." He immediately

marched out at the head of his troops.

LXXXVI.--Pompey also, as was afterward known, at the unanimous

solicitation of his friends, had determined to try the fate of a battle.

For he had even declared in council a few days before that, before the

battalions came to battle, Caesar's army would be put to the rout. When

most people expressed their surprise at it, "I know," says he, "that I

promise a thing almost incredible; but hear the plan on which I proceed,

that you may march to battle with more confidence and resolution. I have

persuaded our cavalry, and they have engaged to execute it, as soon as

the two armies have met, to attack Caesar's right wing on the flank, and

enclosing their army on the rear, throw them into disorder, and put them

to the rout, before we shall throw a weapon against the enemy. By this

means we shall put an end to the war, without endangering the legions,

and almost without a blow. Nor is this a difficult matter, as we far

outnumber them in cavalry." At the same time he gave them notice to be

ready for battle on the day following, and since the opportunity which

they had so often wished for was now arrived, not to disappoint the

opinion generally entertained of their experience and valour.

LXXXVII.--After him Labienus spoke, as well to express his contempt of

Caesar's forces, as to extol Pompey's scheme with the highest encomiums.

"Think not, Pompey," says he, "that this is the army which conquered

Gaul and Germany; I was present at all those battles and do not speak at

random on a subject to which I am a stranger: a very small part of that

army now remains, great numbers lost their lives, as must necessarily

happen in so many battles, many fell victims to the autumnal pestilence

in Italy, many returned home, and many were left behind on the

continent. Have you not heard that the cohorts at Brundisium are

composed of invalids? The forces which you now behold, have been

recruited by levies lately made in Hither Spain, and the greater part

from the colonies beyond the Po; moreover, the flower of the forces

perished in the two engagements at Dyrrachium." Having so said, he took

an oath, never to return to his camp unless victorious; and he

encouraged the rest to do the like. Pompey applauded his proposal, and

took the same oath; nor did any person present hesitate to take it.

After this had passed in the council they broke up full of hopes and

joy, and in imagination anticipated victory; because they thought that

in a matter of such importance, no groundless assertion could be made by

a general of such experience.

LXXXVIII.--When Caesar had approached near Pompey's camp, he observed

that his army was drawn up in the following manner:--On the left wing

were the two legions delivered over by Caesar at the beginning of the

disputes in compliance with the senate's decree, one of which was called

the first, the other the third. Here Pompey commanded in person. Scipio

with the Syrian legions commanded the centre. The Cilician legion in

conjunction with the Spanish cohorts, which we said were brought over by

Afranius, were disposed on the right wing. These Pompey considered his

steadiest troops. The rest he had interspersed between the centre and

the wing, and he had a hundred and ten complete cohorts; these amounted

to forty-five thousand men. He had besides two cohorts of volunteers,

who having received favours from him in former wars, flocked to his

standard: these were dispersed through his whole army. The seven

remaining cohorts he had disposed to protect his camp, and the

neighbouring forts. His right wing was secured by a river with steep

banks; for which reason he placed all his cavalry, archers, and

slingers, on his left wing.

LXXXIX.--Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth

legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much

weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so

close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them

to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a

total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp.

He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P.

Sulla, and of the centre to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post

opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the

enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be

surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort

from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a

fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them

with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended

on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the

entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the

signal whenever he wished them to do so.

XC.--When he was exhorting his army to battle, according to the military

custom, and spoke to them of the favours that they had constantly

received from him, he took especial care to remind them "that he could

call his soldiers to witness the earnestness with which he had sought

peace, the efforts that he had made by Vatinius to gain a conference

[with Labienus], and likewise by Claudius to treat with Scipio, in what

manner he had exerted himself at Oricum, to gain permission from Libo to

send ambassadors; that he had been always reluctant to shed the blood of

his soldiers, and did not wish to deprive the republic of one or other

of her armies." After delivering this speech, he gave by a trumpet the

signal to his soldiers, who were eagerly demanding it, and were very

impatient for the onset.

XCI.--There was in Caesar's army a volunteer of the name of Crastinus,

who the year before had been first centurion of the tenth legion, a man

of pre-eminent bravery. He, when the signal was given, says, "Follow me,

my old comrades, and display such exertions in behalf of your general as

you have determined to do: this is our last battle, and when it shall be

won, he will recover his dignity, and we our liberty." At the same time

he looked back to Caesar, and said, "General, I will act in such a

manner to-day, that you will feel grateful to me living or dead." After

uttering these words he charged first on the right wing, and about one

hundred and twenty chosen volunteers of the same century followed.

XCII.--There was so much space left between the two lines, as sufficed

for the onset of the hostile armies: but Pompey had ordered his soldiers

to await Caesar's attack, and not to advance from their position, or

suffer their line to be put into disorder. And he is said to have done

this by the advice of Caius Triarius, that the impetuosity of the charge

of Caesar's soldiers might be checked, and their line broken, and that

Pompey's troops remaining in their ranks, might attack them while in

disorder; and he thought that the javelins would fall with less force if

the soldiers were kept in their ground, than if they met them in their

course; at the same time he trusted that Caesar's soldiers, after

running over double the usual ground, would become weary and exhausted

by the fatigue. But to me Pompey seems to have acted without sufficient

reason: for there is a certain impetuosity of spirit and an alacrity

implanted by nature in the hearts of all men, which is inflamed by a

desire to meet the foe. This a general should endeavour not to repress,

but to increase; nor was it a vain institution of our ancestors, that

the trumpets should sound on all sides, and a general shout be raised;

by which they imagined that the enemy were struck with terror, and their

own army inspired with courage.

XCIII.--But our men, when the signal was given, rushed forward with

their javelins ready to be launched, but perceiving that Pompey's men

did not run to meet their charge, having acquired experience by custom,

and being practised in former battles, they of their own accord

repressed their speed, and halted almost midway, that they might not

come up with the enemy when their strength was exhausted, and after a

short respite they again renewed their course, and threw their javelins,

and instantly drew their swords, as Caesar had ordered them. Nor did

Pompey's men fail in this crisis, for they received our javelins, stood

our charge, and maintained their ranks: and having launched their

javelins, had recourse to their swords. At the same time Pompey's horse,

according to their orders, rushed out at once from his left wing, and

his whole host of archers poured after them. Our cavalry did not

withstand their charge: but gave ground a little, upon which Pompey's

horse pressed them more vigorously, and began to file off in troops, and

flank our army. When Caesar perceived this, he gave the signal to his

fourth line, which he had formed of the six cohorts. They instantly

rushed forward and charged Pompey's horse with such fury, that not a man

of them stood; but all wheeling about, not only quitted their post, but

galloped forward to seek a refuge in the highest mountains. By their

retreat the archers and slingers, being left destitute and defenceless,

were all cut to pieces. The cohorts, pursuing their success, wheeled

about upon Pompey's left wing, whilst his infantry still continued to

make battle, and attacked them in the rear.

XCIV.--At the same time Caesar ordered his third line to advance, which

till then had not been engaged, but had kept their post. Thus, new and

fresh troops having come to the assistance of the fatigued, and others

having made an attack on their rear, Pompey's men were not able to

maintain their ground, but all fled, nor was Caesar deceived in his

opinion that the victory, as he had declared in his speech to his

soldiers, must have its beginning from those six cohorts which he had

placed as a fourth line to oppose the horse. For by them the cavalry

were routed; by them the archers and slingers were cut to pieces; by

them the left wing of Pompey's army was surrounded, and obliged to be

the first to flee. But when Pompey saw his cavalry routed, and that part

of his army on which he reposed his greatest hopes thrown into

confusion, despairing of the rest, he quitted the field, and retreated

straightway on horseback to his camp, and calling to the centurions,

whom he had placed to guard the praetorian gate, with a loud voice, that

the soldiers might hear: "Secure the camp," says he, "defend it with

diligence, if any danger should threaten it; I will visit the other

gates, and encourage the guards of the camp." Having thus said, he

retired into his tent in utter despair, yet anxiously waiting the issue.

XCV.--Caesar having forced the Pompeians to flee into their

entrenchment, and thinking that he ought not to allow them any respite

to recover from their fright, exhorted his soldiers to take advantage of

fortune's kindness, and to attack the camp. Though they were fatigued by

the intense heat, for the battle had continued till mid-day, yet, being

prepared to undergo any labour, they cheerfully obeyed his command. The

camp was bravely defended by the cohorts which had been left to guard

it, but with much more spirit by the Thracians and foreign auxiliaries.

For the soldiers who had fled for refuge to it from the field of battle,

affrighted and exhausted by fatigue, having thrown away their arms and

military standards, had their thoughts more engaged on their further

escape than on the defence of the camp. Nor could the troops who were

posted on the battlements long withstand the immense number of our

darts, but fainting under their wounds, quitted the place, and under the

conduct of their centurions and tribunes, fled, without stopping, to the

high mountains which joined the camp.

XCVI.--In Pompey's camp you might see arbours in which tables were laid,

a large quantity of plate set out, the floors of the tents covered with

fresh sods, the tents of Lucius Lentulus and others shaded with ivy, and

many other things which were proofs of excessive luxury, and a

confidence of victory, so that it might readily be inferred that they

had no apprehensions of the issue of the day, as they indulged

themselves in unnecessary pleasures, and yet upbraided with luxury

Caesar's army, distressed and suffering troops, who had always been in

want of common necessaries. Pompey, as soon as our men had forced the

trenches, mounting his horse, and stripping off his general's habit,

went hastily out of the back gate of the camp, and galloped with all

speed to Larissa. Nor did he stop there, but with the same despatch

collecting a few of his flying troops, and halting neither day nor

night, he arrived at the sea-side, attended by only thirty horse, and

went on board a victualling barque, often complaining, as we have been

told, that he had been so deceived in his expectation, that he was

almost persuaded that he had been betrayed by those from whom he had

expected victory, as they began the flight.

XCVII.--Caesar having possessed himself of Pompey's camp, urged his

soldiers not to be too intent on plunder, and lose the opportunity of

completing their conquest. Having obtained their consent, he began to

draw lines round the mountain. The Pompeians distrusting the position,

as there was no water on the mountain, abandoned it, and all began to

retreat towards Larissa; which Caesar perceiving, divided his troops,

and ordering part of his legions to remain in Pompey's camp, sent back a

part to his own camp, and taking four legions with him, went by a

shorter road to intercept the enemy: and having marched six miles, drew

up his army. But the Pompeians observing this, took post on a mountain

whose foot was washed by a river. Caesar having encouraged his troops,

though they were greatly exhausted by incessant labour the whole day,

and night was now approaching, by throwing up works cut off the

communication between the river and the mountain, that the enemy might

not get water in the night. As soon as the work was finished, they sent

ambassadors to treat about a capitulation. A few senators who had

espoused that party, made their escape by night.

XCVIII.--At break of day, Caesar ordered all those who had taken post on

the mountain, to come down from the higher grounds into the plain, and

pile their arms. When they did this without refusal, and with

outstretched arms, prostrating themselves on the ground, with tears,

implored his mercy: he comforted them and bade them rise, and having

spoken a few words of his own clemency to alleviate their fears, he

pardoned them all, and gave orders to his soldiers that no injury should

be done to them, and nothing taken from them. Having used this

diligence, he ordered the legions in his camp to come and meet him, and

those which were, with him to take their turn of rest, and go back to

the camp; and the same day went to Larissa.

XCIX.--In that battle, no more than two hundred privates were missing,

but Caesar lost about thirty centurions, valiant officers. Crastinus,

also, of whom mention was made before, fighting most courageously, lost

his life by the wound of a sword in the mouth; nor was that false which

he declared when marching to battle: for Caesar entertained the highest

opinion of his behaviour in that battle, and thought him highly

deserving of his approbation. Of Pompey's army, there fell about fifteen

thousand; but upwards of twenty-four thousand were made prisoners: for

even the cohorts which were stationed in the forts, surrendered to

Sylla. Several others took shelter in the neighbouring states. One

hundred and eighty stands of colours, and nine eagles, were brought to

Caesar. Lucius Domitius, fleeing from the camp to the mountains, his

strength being exhausted by fatigue, was killed by the horse.

C.--About this time, Decimus Laelius arrived with his fleet at

Brundisium and in the same manner as Libo had done before, possessed

himself of an island opposite the harbour of Brundisium. In like manner,

Valimus, who was then governor of Brundisium, with a few decked barques,

endeavoured to entice Laelius's fleet, and took one five-benched galley

and two smaller vessels that had ventured farther than the rest into a

narrow part of the harbour: and likewise disposing the horse along the

shore, strove to prevent the enemy from procuring fresh water. But

Laelius having chosen a more convenient season of the year for his

expedition, supplied himself with water brought in transports from

Corcyra and Dyrrachium, and was not deterred from his purpose; and till

he had received advice of the battle in Thessaly, he could not be forced

either by the disgrace of losing his ships, or by the want of

necessaries, to quit the port and islands.

CI.--Much about the same time, Cassius arrived in Sicily with a fleet of

Syrians, Phoenicians, and Cilicians: and as Caesar's fleet was divided

into two parts, Publius Sulpicius the praetor commanding one division at

Vibo near the straits, Pomponius the other at Messana, Cassius got into

Messana with his fleet before Pomponius had notice of his arrival, and

having found him in disorder, without guards or discipline, and the wind

being high and favourable, he filled several transports with fir, pitch,

and tow, and other combustibles, and sent them against Pomponius's

fleet, and set fire to all his ships, thirty-five in number, twenty of

which were armed with beaks: and this action struck such terror, that

though there was a legion in garrison at Messana, the town with

difficulty held out, and had not the news of Caesar's victory been

brought at that instant by the horse stationed along the coast, it was

generally imagined that it would have been lost, but the town was

maintained till the news arrived very opportunely; and Cassius set sail

from thence to attack Sulpicius's fleet at Vibo, and our ships being

moored to the land, to strike the same terror, he acted in the same

manner as before. The wind being favourable, he sent into the port about

forty ships provided with combustibles, and the flame catching on both

sides, five ships were burnt to ashes. And when the fire began to spread

wider by the violence of the wind, the soldiers of the veteran legions,

who had been left to guard the fleet, being considered as invalids,

could not endure the disgrace, but of themselves went on board the ships

and weighed anchor, and having attacked Cassius's fleet, captured two

five-banked galleys, in one of which was Cassius himself; but he made

his escape by taking to a boat. Two three-banked galleys were taken

besides. Intelligence was shortly after received of the action in

Thessaly, so well authenticated, that the Pompeians themselves gave

credit to it; for they had hitherto believed it a fiction of Caesar's

lieutenants and friends. Upon which intelligence Cassius departed with

his fleet from that coast.

CII.--Caesar thought he ought to postpone all business and pursue

Pompey, whithersoever he should retreat; that he might not be able to

provide fresh forces, and renew the war; he therefore marched on every

day, as far as his cavalry were able to advance, and ordered one legion

to follow him by shorter journeys. A proclamation was issued by Pompey

at Amphipolis, that all the young men of that province, Grecians and

Roman citizens, should take the military oath; but whether he issued it

with an intention of preventing suspicion, and to conceal as long as

possible his design of fleeing farther, or to endeavour to keep

possession of Macedonia by new levies, if nobody pursued him, it is

impossible to judge. He lay at anchor one night, and calling together

his friends in Amphipolis, and collecting a sum of money for his

necessary expenses, upon advice of Caesar's approach, set sail from that

place, and arrived in a few days at Mitylene. Here he was detained two

days, and having added a few galleys to his fleet he went to Cilicia,

and thence to Cyprus. There he is informed that, by the consent of all

the inhabitants of Antioch and Roman citizens who traded there, the

castle had been seized to shut him out of the town; and that messengers

had been despatched to all those who were reported to have taken refuge

in the neighbouring states, that they should not come to Antioch; that

if they did that, it would be attended with imminent danger to their

lives. The same thing had happened to Lucius Lentulus, who had been

consul the year before, and to Publius Lentulus a consular senator, and

to several others at Rhodes, who having followed Pompey in his flight,

and arrived at the island, were not admitted into the town or port; and

having received a message to leave that neighbourhood, set sail much

against their will; for the rumour of Caesar's approach had now reached

those states.

CIII.--Pompey, being informed of these proceedings, laid aside his

design of going to Syria, and having taken the public money from the

farmers of the revenue, and borrowed more from some private friends, and

having put on board his ships a large quantity of brass for military

purposes, and two thousand armed men, whom he partly selected from the

slaves of the tax farmers, and partly collected from the merchants, and

such persons as each of his friends thought fit on this occasion, he

sailed for Pelusium. It happened that king Ptolemy, a minor, was there

with a considerable army, engaged in war with his sister Cleopatra, whom

a few months before, by the assistance of his relations and friends, he

had expelled from the kingdom; and her camp lay at a small distance from

his. To him Pompey applied to be permitted to take refuge in Alexandria,

and to be protected in his calamity by his powerful assistance, in

consideration of the friendship and amity which had subsisted between

his father and him. But Pompey's deputies having executed their

commission, began to converse with less restraint with the king's

troops, and to advise them to act with friendship to Pompey, and not to

think meanly of his bad fortune. In Ptolemy's army were several of

Pompey's soldiers, of whom Gabinius had received the command in Syria,

and had brought them over to Alexandria, and at the conclusion of the

war had left with Ptolemy the father of the young king.

CIV.--The king's friends, who were regents of the kingdom during the

minority, being informed of these things, either induced by fear, as

they afterwards declared, lest Pompey should corrupt the king's army,

and seize on Alexandria and Egypt; or despising his bad fortune, as in

adversity friends commonly change to enemies, in public gave a

favourable answer to his deputies, and desired him to come to the king;

but secretly laid a plot against him, and despatched Achillas, captain

of the king's guards, a man of singular boldness, and Lucius Septimius a

military tribune to assassinate him. Being kindly addressed by them, and

deluded by an acquaintance with Septimius, because in the war with the

pirates the latter had commanded a company under him, he embarked in a

small boat with a few attendants, and was there murdered by Achillas and

Septimius. In like manner, Lucius Lentulus was seized by the king's

order, and put to death in prison.

CV.--When Caesar arrived in Asia, he found that Titus Ampius had

attempted to remove the money from the temple of Diana at Ephesus; and

for this purpose had convened all the senators in the province that he

might have them to attest the sum, but was interrupted by Caesar's

arrival, and had made his escape. Thus, on two occasions, Caesar saved

the money of Ephesus. It was also remarked at Elis, in the temple of

Minerva, upon calculating and enumerating the days, that on the very day

on which Caesar had gained his battle, the image of Victory which was

placed before Minerva, and faced her statue, turned about towards the

portal and entrance of the temple; and the same day, at Antioch in

Syria, such a shout of an army and sound of trumpets was twice heard,

that the citizens ran in arms to the walls. The same thing happened at

Ptolemais; a sound of drums too was heard at Pergamus, in the private

and retired parts of the temple, into which none but the priests are

allowed admission, and which the Greeks call Adyta (the inaccessible),

and likewise at Tralles, in the temple of Victory, in which there stood

a statue consecrated to Caesar; a palm-tree at that time was shown that

had sprouted up from the pavement, through the joints of the stones, and

shot up above the roof.

CVI.--After a few days' delay in Asia, Caesar, having heard that Pompey

had been seen in Cyprus, and conjecturing that he had directed his

course into Egypt, on account of his connection with that kingdom, set

out for Alexandria with two legions (one of which he ordered to follow

him from Thessaly, the other he called in from Achaia, from Fufius, the

lieutenant-general) and with eight hundred horse, ten ships of war from

Rhodes, and a few from Asia. These legions amounted but to three

thousand two hundred men; the rest, disabled by wounds received in

various battles, by fatigue and the length of their march, could not

follow him. But Caesar, relying on the fame of his exploits; did not

hesitate to set forward with a feeble force, and thought that he would

be secure in any place. At Alexandria he was informed of the death of

Pompey: and at his landing there, heard a cry among the soldiers whom

the king had left to garrison the town, and saw a crowd gathering

towards him, because the fasces were carried before him; for this the

whole multitude thought an infringement of the king's dignity. Though

this tumult was appeased, frequent disturbances were raised for several

days successively, by crowds of the populace, and a great many of his

soldiers were killed in all parts of the city.

CVIL--Having observed this, he ordered other legions to be brought to

him from Asia, which he had made up out of Pompey's soldiers; for he was

himself detained against his will, by the etesian winds, which are

totally unfavourable to persons on a voyage from Alexandria. In the

meantime, considering that the disputes of the princes belonged to the

jurisdiction of the Roman people, and of him as consul, and that it was

a duty more incumbent on him, as in his former consulate a league had

been made with Ptolemy the late king, under sanction both of a law, and

a decree of the senate, he signified that it was his pleasure, that king

Ptolemy, and his sister Cleopatra, should disband their armies, and

decide their disputes in his presence by justice, rather than by the

sword.

CVIII.--A eunuch named Pothinus, the boy's tutor, was regent of the

kingdom on account of his youthfulness. He at first began to complain

amongst his friends, and to express his indignation, that the king

should be summoned to plead his cause: but afterwards, having prevailed

on some of those whom he had made acquainted with his views to join him,

he secretly called the army away from Pelusium to Alexandria, and

appointed Achillas, already spoken of, commander-in-chief of the forces.

Him he encouraged and animated by promises both in his own and the

king's name, and instructed him both by letters and messages how he

should act. By the will of Ptolemy the father, the elder of his two sons

and the more advanced in years of his two daughters were declared his

heirs, and for the more effectual performance of his intention, in the

same will he conjured the Roman people by all the gods, and by the

league which he had entered into at Rome, to see his will executed. One

of the copies of his will was conveyed to Rome by his ambassadors to be

deposited in the treasury, but the public troubles preventing it, it was

lodged with Pompey: another was left sealed up, and kept at Alexandria.

CIX.--Whilst these things were debated before Caesar, and he was very

anxious to settle the royal disputes as a common friend and arbitrator;

news was brought on a sudden that the king's army and all his cavalry

were on their march to Alexandria. Caesar's forces were by no means so

strong that he could trust to them, if he had occasion to hazard a

battle without the town. His only resource was to keep within the town

in the most convenient places, and get information of Achillas's

designs. However he ordered his soldiers to repair to their arms; and

advised the king to send some of his friends, who had the greatest

influence, as deputies to Achillas and to signify his royal pleasure.

Dioscorides and Serapion, the persons sent by him, who had both been

ambassadors at Rome, and had been in great esteem with Ptolemy the

father, went to Achillas. But as soon as they appeared in his presence,

without hearing them, or learning the occasion of their coming, he

ordered them to be seized and put to death. One of them, after receiving

a wound, was taken up and carried off by his attendants as dead: the

other was killed on the spot. Upon this, Caesar took care to secure the

king's person, both supposing that the king's name would have great

influence with his subjects, and to give the war the appearance of the

scheme of a few desperate men, rather than of having been begun by the

king's consent.

CX.--The forces under Achillas did not seem despicable, either for

number, spirit, or military experience; for he had twenty thousand men

under arms. They consisted partly of Gabinius's soldiers, who were now

become habituated to the licentious mode of living at Alexandria, and

had forgotten the name and discipline of the Roman people, and had

married wives there, by whom the greatest part of them had children. To

these was added a collection of highwaymen and free-booters, from Syria,

and the province of Cilicia, and the adjacent countries. Besides several

convicts and transports had been collected: for at Alexandria all our

runaway slaves were sure of finding protection for their persons on the

condition that they should give in their names, and enlist as soldiers:

and if any of them was apprehended by his master, he was rescued by a

crowd of his fellow soldiers, who being involved in the same guilt,

repelled, at the hazard of their lives, every violence offered to any of

their body. These by a prescriptive privilege of the Alexandrian army,

used to demand the king's favourites to be put to death, pillage the

properties of the rich to increase their pay, invest the king's palace,

banish some from the kingdom, and recall others from exile. Besides

these, there were two thousand horse, who had acquired the skill of

veterans by being in several wars in Alexandria. These had restored

Ptolemy the father to his kingdom, had killed Bibulus's two sons; and

had been engaged in war with the Egyptians; such was their experience in

military affairs.

CXI.--Full of confidence in his troops, and despising the small number

of Caesar's soldiers, Achillas seized Alexandria, except that part of

the town which Caesar occupied with his troops. At first he attempted to

force the palace; but Caesar had disposed his cohorts through the

streets, and repelled his attack. At the same time there was an action

at the port: where the contest was maintained with the greatest

obstinacy. For the forces were divided, and the fight maintained in

several streets at once, and the enemy endeavoured to seize with a

strong party the ships of war; of which fifty had been sent to Pompey's

assistance, but after the battle in Thessaly had returned home. They

were all of either three or five banks of oars, well equipped and

appointed with every necessary for a voyage. Besides these, there were

twenty-two vessels with decks, which were usually kept at Alexandria, to

guard the port. If they made themselves masters of these, Caesar being

deprived of his fleet, they would have the command of the port and whole

sea, and could prevent him from procuring provisions and auxiliaries.

Accordingly that spirit was displayed, which ought to be displayed when

the one party saw that a speedy victory depended on the issue, and the

other their safety. But Caesar gained the day, and set fire to all those

ships, and to others which were in the docks, because he could not guard

so many places with so small a force; and immediately he conveyed some

troops to the Pharos by his ships.

CXIL--The Pharos is a tower on an island, of prodigious height, built

with amazing works, and takes its name from the island. This island

lying over against Alexandria forms a harbour; but on the upper side it

is connected with the town by a narrow way eight hundred paces in

length, made by piles sunk in the sea, and by a bridge. In this island

some of the Egyptians have houses, and a village as large as a town; and

whatever ships from any quarter, either through mistaking the channel,

or by the storm, have been driven from their course upon the coast, they

constantly plunder like pirates. And without the consent of those who

are masters of the Pharos, no vessels can enter the harbour, on account

of its narrowness. Caesar being greatly alarmed on this account, whilst

the enemy were engaged in battle, landed his soldiers, seized the

Pharos, and placed a garrison in it. By this means he gained this point,

that he could be supplied without danger with corn and auxiliaries: for

he sent to all the neighbouring countries, to demand supplies. In other

parts of the town, they fought so obstinately, that they quitted the

field with equal advantage, and neither were beaten (in consequence of

the narrowness of the passes); and a few being killed on both sides,

Caesar secured the most necessary posts, and fortified them in the

night. In this quarter of the town was a wing of the king's palace, in

which Caesar was lodged on his first arrival, and a theatre adjoining

the house which served as for citadel, and commanded an avenue to the

port and other docks. These fortifications he increased during the

succeeding days, that he might have them before him as a rampart, and

not be obliged to fight against his will. In the meantime Ptolemy's

younger daughter, hoping the throne would become vacant, made her escape

from the palace to Achillas, and assisted him in prosecuting the war.

But they soon quarrelled about the command, which circumstance enlarged

the presents to the soldiers, for each endeavoured by great sacrifices

to secure their affection. Whilst the enemy was thus employed, Pothinus,

tutor to the young king, and regent of the kingdom, who was in Caesar's

part of the town, sent messengers to Achillas, and encouraged him not to

desist from his enterprise, nor to despair of success; but his

messengers being discovered and apprehended, he was put to death by

Caesar. Such was the commencement of the Alexandrian war.

* * * * *

INDEX

N.B. The numerals refer to the book, the figures to the chapter. G.

stands for the Gallic War, C. for the Civil.

Acarn[=a]n[)i]a, a region of Greece, _Carnia_

Acco, prince of the Sen[)o]nes, his conduct on Caesar's approach, G. vi.

4; condemned in a council of the Gauls, vi. 44

Achaia, sometimes taken for all Greece, but most commonly for a part of

it only; in Peloponnesus, _Romania alta_

Achillas, captain of Ptolemy's guards, sent to kill Pompey, C. iii. 104;

appointed by Pothinus commander of all the Egyptian forces, _ibid_. 108;

heads an army of twenty thousand veteran troops, _ibid_. 110

Acilla, or Achilla, or Acholla. There were two cities in Africa of this

name, one inland, the other on the coast. The modern name of the latter

is _Elalia_

Acilius, Caesar's lieutenant, C. iii. 15

Act[)i]um, a promontory of Epirus, now called the _Cape of Tigalo_,

famous for a naval victory gained near it, by Augustus, over M. Antony

Act[)i]us, a Pelignian, one of Pompey's followers, taken by Caesar, and

dismissed in safety, C. i. 18

Act[)i]us Rufus accuses L. Apanius of treachery, C. iii. 83

Act[)i]us Varus prevents Tubero from landing in Africa, C. i. 31; his

forces, C. ii. 23; his camp, _ibid_. 25; engages Curio, _ibid_. 34; his

danger, defeat, and stratagem, _ibid_. 35

Adcant[)u]annus sallies upon Crassus at the head of a chosen body of

troops, G. iii. 22

Add[)u]a, the _Adda_, a river that rises in the Alps, and, separating

the duchy of Milan from the state of Venice, falls into the Po above

Cremona

Adriatic Sea, the _Gulf of Venice_, at the extremity of which that city

is situated

Adrum[=e]tum, a town in Africa, _Mahometta_; held by Considius Longus

with a garrison of one legion, C. ii. 23

Aduat[)u]uci (in some editions Atuatici), descendants of the Teutones

and Cimbri, G. ii. 29; they furnish twenty-nine thousand men to the

general confederacy of Gaul, _ibid_. 4; Caesar obliges them to submit,

_ibid_. 29

Aed[)u]i, the _Autunois_, a people of Gaul, near _Autun_, in the country

now called _Lower Burgundy_; they complain to Caesar of the ravages

committed in their territories by the Helvetii, G. i. 11; join in a

petition against Ariovistus, _ibid_. 33; at the head of one of the two

leading factions of Gaul, G. vi. 12; Caesar quiets an intestine

commotion among them, C. vii. 33; they revolt from the Romans, G. vii.

54; their law concerning magistrates, _ibid_. 33; their clients, i. 31;

vii. 75

Aeg[=e]an Sea, the _Archipelago_, a part of the Mediterranean which lies

between Greece, Asia Minor, and the Isle of Crete

Aeg[=i]n[)i]um, a town of Thessaly; Domitius joins Caesar near that

place, C. iii. 79

Aegus and Roscillus, their perfidious behaviour towards Caesar, C. iii.

59, 60

Aegyptus, _Egypt,_ an extensive country of Africa, bounded on the west

by part of Marmarica and the deserts of Lybia, on the north by the

Mediterranean, on the east by the Sinus Arabicus, and a line drawn from

Arsino[)e] to Rhinocolura, and on the south by Aethiopia. Egypt,

properly so called, may be described as consisting of the long and

narrow valley which follows the course of the Nile from Syene

(_Assooan_) to _Cairo,_ near the site of the ancient Memphis. The name

by which this country is known to Europeans comes from the Greeks, some

of whose writers inform us that it received this appellation from

Aegyptus, son of Belus, it having been previously called Aeria. In the

Hebrew scriptures it is called Mitsraim, and also Matsor and Harets

Cham; of these names, however, the first is the one most commonly

employed

Aemilia Via, a Roman road in Italy, from Rimini to Aquileia, and from

Pisa to Dertona

Aet[=o]lia, a country of Greece, _Despotato;_ recovered from Pompey by

the partisans of Caesar, C. iii. 35

Afr[=a]nius, Pompey's lieutenant, his exploits in conjunction with

Petreius, C. i. 38; resolves to carry the war into Celtiberia, _ibid_.

61; surrenders to Caesar, _ibid_. 84

Afr[)i]ca, one of the four great continents into which the earth is

divided; the name seems to have been originally applied by the Romans to

the country around Carthage, the first part of the continent with which

they became acquainted, and is said to have been derived from a small

Carthaginian district on the northern coast, called _Frigi._ Hence, even

when the name had become applied to the whole continent, there still

remained in Roman geography the district of Africa Proper, on the

Mediterranean coast, corresponding to the modem kingdom of _Tunis,_ with

part of that of _Tripoli_

Agend[)i]cum, a city of the Senones, _Sens_; Caesar quarters four

legions there, G. vi. 44; Labienus leaves his baggage in it under a

guard of new levies, and sets out for Lutetia, G. vii. 57

Alba, a town of Latium, in Italy, _Albano_; Domitius levies troops in

that neighbourhood, C. i. 15

Alb[=i]ci, a people of Gaul, unknown; some make them the same with the

_Vivarois_; taken into the service of the Marseillians, C. i. 34

Albis, the _Elbe,_ a large and noble river in Germany, which has its

source in the Giant's Mountains in Silesia, on the confines of Bohemia,

and passing through Bohemia, Upper and Lower Saxony, falls into the

North Sea at Ritzbuttel, about sixty miles below Hamburg

Alces, a species of animals somewhat resembling an elk, to be found in

the Hercynian forests, C. vi. 27

Alemanni, or Alamanni, a name assumed by a confederacy of German tribes,

situated between the Neckar and the Upper Rhine, who united to resist

the encroachments of the Roman power. According to Mannert, they derived

their origin from the shattered remains of the army of Ariovistus

retired, after the defeat and death of their leader, to the mountainous

country of the Upper Rhine. After their overthrow by Clovis, king of the

Salian Franks, they ceased to exist as one nation, and were dispersed

over Gaul, Switzerland, and Nether Italy. From them L'Allemagne, the

French name for Germany, is derived

Alemannia, the country inhabited by the Alemanni

Alesia, or Alexia, a town of the Mandubians, _Alise_; Caesar shuts up

Vercingetorix there, C. vii. 68; surrounds it with lines of

circumvallation and contravallation, _ibid_. 69, 72; obliges it to

surrender, _ibid_. 89

Alexandr[=i]a, a city of Egypt, _Scanderia_. It was built by Alexander

the Great, 330 years before Christ; Caesar pursues Pompey thither, C.

iii. 106

Aliso, by some supposed to be the town now called _Iselburg_; or,

according to Junius, _Wesel_, in the duchy of Cleves, but more probably

_Elsen_

Allier (El[=a]ver), Caesar eludes the vigilance of Vercingetorix, and by

an artifice passes that river, G. vii. 35

All[)o]br[)o]ges, an ancient people of Gallia Transalp[=i]na, who

inhabited the country which is now called _Dauphiny, Savoy,_ and

_Piedmont_. The name, Allobroges, means highlanders, and is derived from

Al, "high," and Broga, "land." They are supposed to be disaffected to

the Romans, G. i. 6; complain to Caesar of the ravages of the

Helvetians, _ibid_. 11

Alps, a ridge of high mountains, which separates France and Germany from

Italy. That part of them which separates Dauphiny from Piedmont was

called the Cottian Alps. Their name is derived from their height, Alp

being an old Celtic appellation for "a lofty mountain"; Caesar crosses

them with five legions, G. i. 10; sends Galba to open a free passage

over them to the Roman merchants, G. iii. 1

Alsati[)a], a province of Germany, in the upper circle of the Rhine,

_Alsace_

Amagetobr[)i]a, a city of Gaul, unknown; famous for a defeat of the

Gauls there by Ariovistus, G. i. 31

Amant[)i]a, a town in Macedonia, _Porto Raguseo_; it submits to Caesar,

and sends ambassadors to know his pleasure, C. iii. 12

Am[=a]nus, a mountain of Syria, _Alma Daghy,_ near which Scipio sustains

some losses, C. iii. 31

Am[=a]ni Pylae, or Am[=a]nicae Portae, _Straits of Scanderona_

Ambarri, a people of Gaul, uncertain; they complain to Caesar of the

ravages committed in their territories by the Helvetii, G. i. 11

Ambialites, a people of Gaul, of _Lamballe in Bretagne_. Others take the

word to be only a different name for the Ambiani; they join in a

confederacy with the Veneti against Caesar, G. iii. 9

Ambi[=a]ni, or Ambianenses, the people of _Amiens;_ they furnish ten

thousand men to the general confederacy of the Belgians against Caesar,

G. ii. 4; sue for peace, and submit themselves to Caesar's pleasure, G.

ii. 15

Ambi[=a]num, a city of Belgium, _Amiens_

Amb[)i]b[)a]ri, a people of Gaul, inhabiting _Ambie_, in Normandy

Amb[)i][)o]rix, his artful speech to Sabinus and Cotta, G. v. 27; Caesar

marches against him, G. vi. 249. Ravages and lays waste his territories,

_ibid_. 34; endeavours in vain to get him into his hands, _ibid_. 43

Ambivar[)e]ti, a people of Gaul, the _Vivarais_. They are ordered to

furnish their contingent for raising the siege of Alesia, G. vii. 75

Ambivar[=i]ti, an ancient people of _Brabant_, between the Rhine and the

Maese; the German cavalry sent to forage among them, G. iv. 9

Ambr[)a]c[)i]a, a city of Epirus, _Arta_; Cassius directs his march

thither, C. iii. 36

Ambrones, an ancient people, who lived in the country which is now

called the _Canton of Bern_, in Switzerland

Amph[)i]l[)o]chia, a region of Epirus, _Anfilocha_. Its inhabitants

reduced by Cassius Longinus, C. iii. 55

Amph[)i]p[)o]lis, a city of Macedonia, _Cristopoli_, or _Emboli_. An

edict in Pompey's name published there, C. iii. 102

Anartes, a people of Germany, _Walachians_, _Servians_, or _Bulgarians_,

bordering upon the Hercynian Forest, G. vi. 25

Anas, a river of Spain, the _Guadiana_, or _Rio Roydera_, bounding that

part of Spain under the government of Petreius, C. i. 38

Anc[)a]l[=i]tes, a people of Britain, of the hundred of _Henley_, in

Oxfordshire; they send ambassadors to Caesar with an offer of

submission, G. v. 21

Anch[)i][)a]los, a city of Thrace, near the Euxine Sea, now called

_Kenkis_

Ancibarii, or Ansivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, of and

about the town of _Ansestaet_, or _Amslim_

Anc[=o]na, _Ancona_, a city of Italy, on the coast of Pisenum. It is

supposed to derive its name from the Greek word [Greek: agkon], an angle

or elbow, on account of the angular form of the promontory on which it

is built. The foundation of Ancona is ascribed by Strabo to some

Syracusans, who were fleeing from the tyranny of Dionysius. Livy speaks

of it as a naval station of great importance in the wars of Rome with

the Illyrians. We find it occupied by Caesar (C. i. 2) shortly after

crossing the Rubicon; Caesar takes possession of it with a garrison of

one cohort, C. i. 11

Andes, _Angers_, in France, the capital of the duchy of Anjou

Andes, a people of Gaul, the ancient inhabitants of the duchy of Anjou;

Caesar puts his troops into winter quarters among them, G. ii. 35

Andomad[=u]num Ling[)o]num, a large and ancient city of Champagne, at

the source of the river Marne, _Langres_

Anglesey (Mona), an island situated between Britain and Ireland, where

the night, during the winter, is said to be a month long, G. v. 13

Angrivarii, an ancient people of Lower Germany, who dwelt between the

Ems and the Weser, below the Lippe

Ansivarii, see _Ancibarii_

Antioch[=i]a, _Antachia_, an ancient and famous city, once the capital

of Syria, or rather of the East. It is situate on two rivers, the

Orontes and the Phaspar, not far from the Mediterranean; refuses to

admit the fugitives after the battle of Pharsalia, C. iii. 102

Ant[=o]nius (Mark Antony), Caesar's lieutenant, G. vii. i i; quaestor,

G. viii. 2; governor of Brundusium, C. iii. 24; his standing for that

priesthood, G. vii. 50; obliges Libo to raise the siege of Brundusium,

C. iii. 24; and in conjunction with Kalenus transports Caesar's troops

to Greece, _ibid_. 26

Apam[=e]a, _Apami_, a city of Bithynia, built by Nicomedes, the son of

Prusias

Apennine Mountains, a large chain of mountains, branching off from the

Maritime Alps, in the neighbourhood of Genoa, running diagonally from

the Ligurian Gulf to the Adriatic, in the vicinity of Ancona; from which

it continues nearly parallel with the latter gulf, as far as the

promontory of Garg[=a]nus, and again inclines to Mare Inf[)e]rum, till

it finally terminates in the promontory of Leucopetra, near Rhegium. The

etymology of the name given to these mountains must be traced to the

Celtic, and appears to combine two terms of that language nearly

synonymous, Alp, or Ap, "a high mountain," and Penn, "a summit"

Apoll[=o]n[)i]a, a city of Macedonia, _Piergo_. Pompey resolves to

winter there, C. iii. 5; Caesar makes himself master of it, _ibid_. iii.

12

Appia Via, the Appian road which led from Rome to Campania, and from the

sea to Brundusium. It was made, as Livy informs us, by the censor,

Appius Caecus, A.U.C. 442, and was, in the first instance, only laid

down as far as Capua, a distance of about 125 miles. It was subsequently

carried on to Beneventum, and finally to Brundusium. According to

Eustace (_Classical Tour_, vol. iii.), such parts of the Appian Way as

have escaped destruction, as at _Fondi_ and _Mola_, show few traces of

wear and decay after a duration of two thousand years

Apsus, a river of Macedonia, the _Aspro_. Caesar and Pompey encamp over

against each other on the banks of that river, C. iii. 13

Apulia, a region of Italy, _la Puglia_. Pompey quarters there the

legions sent by Caesar, C. i. 14

Aquil[=a]ria, a town of Africa, near Clupea. Pompey quarters there the

legions sent by Caesar, C. i. 14; Curio arrives there with the troops

designed against Africa. C. ii. 23

Aquileia, formerly a famous and considerable city of Italy, not far from

the Adriatic, now little more than a heap of ruins, _Aquilegia_. Caesar

draws together the troops quartered there, G. i. 10

Aquitania, a third part of ancient Gaul, now containing _Guienne_,

_Gascony_, etc.

Aquit[=a]ni, the Aquitanians reduced under the power of the Romans by

Crassus, G. iii. 20-22; very expert in the art of mining, _ibid_. 21

Arar, or Araris, a river of Gaul, the Sa[^o]ne; the Helvetians receive a

considerable check in passing this river, G. i. 12

Arduenna Silva, the forest of _Ardenne_, in France, reaching from the

Rhine to the city of Tournay, in the low countries; Indutiom[)a]rus

conceals in it the infirm and aged, G. v. 3; Caesar crosses it in quest

of Ambiorix, G. vi. 29

Arecomici Volcae, Caesar plants garrisons among them, G. vii. 7

Arel[=a]te, or Arel[=a]tum, or Arelas, a city of Gaul, _Arles_. Caesar

orders twelve galleys to be built there, C. i. 36

Ar[)i]m[)i]num, a city of Italy, _Rimini_; Caesar having sounded the

disposition of his troops, marches thither, C. i. 8