BOOK VIII

CONTINUATION OF CAESAR'S GALLIC WAR ASCRIBED TO AULUS HIRTIUS

PREFACE

Prevailed on by your continued solicitations, Balbus, I have engaged in

a most difficult task, as my daily refusals appear to plead not my

inability, but indolence, as an excuse. I have compiled a continuation

of the Commentaries of our Caesar's Wars in Gaul, not indeed to be

compared to his writings, which either precede or follow them; and

recently, I have completed what he left imperfect after the transactions

in Alexandria, to the end, not indeed of the civil broils, to which we

see no issue, but of Caesar's life. I wish that those who may read them

could know how unwillingly I undertook to write them, as then I might

the more readily escape the imputation of folly and arrogance, in

presuming to intrude among Caesar's writings. For it is agreed on all

hands, that no composition was ever executed with so great care, that it

is not exceeded in elegance by these Commentaries, which were published

for the use of historians, that they might not want memoirs of such

achievements; and they stand so high in the esteem of all men, that

historians seem rather deprived of than furnished with materials. At

which we have more reason to be surprised than other men; for they can

only appreciate the elegance and correctness with which he finished

them, while we know with what ease and expedition. Caesar possessed not

only an uncommon flow of language and elegance of style, but also a

thorough knowledge of the method of conveying his ideas. But I had not

even the good fortune to share in the Alexandrian or African war; and

though these were partly communicated to me by Caesar himself, in

conversation, yet we listen with a different degree of attention to

those things which strike us with admiration by their novelty, and those

which we design to attest to posterity. But, in truth, whilst I urge

every apology, that I may not be compared to Caesar, I incur the charge

of vanity, by thinking it possible that I can in the judgment of any one

be put in competition with him. Farewell.

I.--Gaul being entirely reduced, when Caesar having waged war

incessantly during the former summer, wished to recruit his soldiers

after so much fatigue, by repose in winter quarters, news was brought

him that several states were simultaneously renewing their hostile

intentions, and forming combinations. For which a probable reason was

assigned: namely, that the Gauls were convinced that they were not able

to resist the Romans with any force they could collect in one place; and

hoped that if several states made war in different places at the same

time, the Roman army would neither have aid, nor time, nor forces, to

prosecute them all: nor ought any single state to decline any

inconveniences that might befall them, provided that by such delay the

rest should be enabled to assert their liberty.

II.--That this notion might not be confirmed among the Gauls, Caesar

left Marcus Antonius, his quaestor, in charge of his quarters, and set

out himself with a guard of horse, the day before the kalends of

January, from the town Bibracte, to the thirteenth legion, which he had

stationed in the country of the Bituriges, not far from the territories

of the Aedui, and joined to it the eleventh legion which was next it.

Leaving two cohorts to guard the baggage, he leads the rest of his army

into the most plentiful part of the country of the Bituriges; who,

possessing an extensive territory and several towns, were not to be

deterred, by a single legion quartered among them, from making warlike

preparation, and forming combinations.

III.-By Caesar's sudden arrival, it happened, as it necessarily must, to

an unprovided and dispersed people, that they were surprised by our

horse, whilst cultivating the fields without any apprehensions, before

they had time to fly to their towns. For the usual sign of an enemy's

invasion, which is generally intimated by the burning of their towns,

was forbidden by Caesar's orders: lest if he advanced far, forage and

corn should become scarce, or the enemy be warned by the fires to make

their escape. Many thousands being taken, as many of the Bituriges as

were able to escape the first coming of the Romans, fled to the

neighbouring states, relying either on private friendship, or public

alliance. In vain; for Caesar, by hasty marches, anticipated them in

every place, nor did he allow any state leisure to consider the safety

of others, in preference to their own. By this activity, he both

retained his friends in their loyalty, and by fear, obliged the wavering

to accept offers of peace. Such offers being made to the Bituriges, when

they perceived that through Caesar's clemency, an avenue was open to his

friendship, and that the neighbouring states had given hostages, without

incurring any punishment, and had been received under his protection,

they did the same.

IV.-Caesar promises his soldiers, as a reward for their labour and

patience, in cheerfully submitting to hardships from the severity of the

winter, the difficulty of the roads, and the intolerable cold, two

hundred sestertii each, and to every centurian two thousand, to be given

instead of plunder; and sending his legions back to quarters, he himself

returned on the fortieth day to Bibracte. Whilst he was dispensing

justice there, the Bituriges send ambassadors to him, to entreat his aid

against the Carnutes, who they complained had made war against them.

Upon this intelligence, though he had not remained more than eighteen

days in winter quarters, he draws the fourteenth and sixth legion out of

quarters on the Saone, where he had posted them as mentioned in a former

Commentary to procure supplies of corn. With these two legions he

marches in pursuit of the Carnutes.

V.--When the news of the approach of our army reached the enemy, the

Carnutes, terrified by the sufferings of other states, deserted their

villages and towns (which were small buildings, raised in a hurry, to

meet the immediate necessity, in which they lived to shelter themselves

against the winter, for, being lately conquered, they had lost several

towns), and dispersed and fled. Caesar, unwilling to expose his soldiers

to the violent storms that break out, especially at that season, took up

his quarters at Genabum, a town of the Carnutes; and lodged his men in

houses, partly belonging to the Gauls, and partly built to shelter the

tents, and hastily covered with thatch. But the horse and auxiliaries he

sends to all parts to which he was told the enemy had marched; and not

without effect, as our men generally returned loaded with booty. The

Carnutes, overpowered by the severity of the winter, and the fear of

danger, and not daring to continue long in any place, as they were

driven from their houses, and not finding sufficient protection in the

woods, from the violence of the storms, after losing a considerable

number of their men, disperse, and take refuge among the neighbouring

states.

VI.--Caesar, being contented, at so severe a season, to disperse the

gathering foes, and prevent any new war from breaking out, and being

convinced, as far as reason could foresee, that no war of consequence

could be set on foot in the summer campaign, stationed Caius Trebonius,

with the two legions which he had with him, in quarters at Genabum: and

being informed by frequent embassies from the Remi, that the Bellovaci

(who exceed all the Gauls and Belgae in military prowess), and the

neighbouring states, headed by Correus, one of the Bellovaci, and

Comius, the Atrebatian, were raising an army, and assembling at a

general rendezvous, designing with their united forces to invade the

territories of the Suessiones, who were put under the patronage of the

Remi: and moreover, considering that not only his honour, but his

interest was concerned, that such of his allies, as deserved well of the

republic, should suffer no calamity; he again draws the eleventh legion

out of quarters and writes besides to Caius Fabius, to march with his

two legions to the country of the Suessiones; and he sends to Trebonius

for one of his two legions. Thus, as far as the convenience of the

quarters, and the management of the war admitted, he laid the burden of

the expedition on the legions by turns, without any intermission to his

own toils.

VII.--As soon as his troops were collected, he marched against the

Bellovaci: and pitching his camp in their territories, detached troops

of horse all round the country, to take prisoners, from whom he might

learn the enemy's plan. The horse, having executed his orders, bring him

back word that but few were found in the houses: and that even these had

not stayed at home to cultivate their lands (for the emigration was

general from all parts), but had been sent back to watch our motions.

Upon Caesar's inquiring from them, where the main body of the Bellovaci

were posted, and what was their design: they made answer, "that all the

Bellovaci, fit for carrying arms, had assembled in one place, and along

with them the Ambiani, Aulerci, Caletes, Velocasses, and Atrebates, and

that they had chosen for their camp an elevated position, surrounded by

a dangerous morass: that they had conveyed all their baggage into the

most remote woods: that several noblemen were united in the management

of the war; but that the people were most inclined to be governed by

Correus, because they knew that he had the strongest aversion to the

name of the Roman people: that a few days before Comius had left the

camp to engage the Germans to their aid whose nation bordered on theirs,

and whose numbers were countless: that the Bellovaci had come to a

resolution, with the consent of all the generals and the earnest desire

of the people, if Caesar should come with only three legions, as was

reported, to give him battle, that they might not be obliged to

encounter his whole army on a future occasion, when they should be in a

more wretched and distressed condition; but if he brought a stronger

force, they intended to remain in the position they had chosen, and by

ambuscade to prevent the Romans from getting forage (which at that

season was both scarce and much scattered), corn, and other

necessaries."

VIII.--When Caesar was convinced of the truth of this account from the

concurring testimony of several persons, and perceived that the plans

which were proposed were full of prudence, and very unlike the rash

resolves of a barbarous people, he considered it incumbent on him to use

every exertion, in order that the enemy might despise his small force

and come to an action. For he had three veteran legions of distinguished

valour, the seventh, eighth, and ninth. The eleventh consisted of chosen

youth of great hopes, who had served eight campaigns, but who, compared

with the others, had not yet acquired any great reputation for

experience and valour. Calling therefore a council, and laying before it

the intelligence which he had received, he encouraged his soldiers. In

order if possible to entice the enemy to an engagement by the appearance

of only three legions, he ranged his army in the following manner: that

the seventh, eighth, and ninth legions should march before all the

baggage; that then the eleventh should bring up the rear of the whole

train of baggage (which however was but small, as is usual on such

expeditions), so that the enemy could not get a sight of a greater

number than they themselves were willing to encounter. By this

disposition he formed his army almost into a square, and brought them

within sight of the enemy sooner than was anticipated.

IX.--When the Gauls, whose bold resolutions had been reported to Caesar,

saw the legions advance with a regular motion, drawn up in battle array;

either from the danger of an engagement, or our sudden approach, or with

the design of watching our movements, they drew up their forces before

the camp, and did not quit the rising ground. Though Caesar wished to

bring them to battle, yet being surprised to see so vast a host of the

enemy, he encamped opposite to them, with a valley between them, deep

rather than extensive. He ordered his camp to be fortified with a

rampart twelve feet high, with breast-works built on it proportioned to

its height; and two trenches, each fifteen feet broad, with

perpendicular sides to be sunk: likewise several turrets, three stories

high, to be raised, with a communication to each other by galleries laid

across and covered over; which should be guarded in front by small

parapets of osiers; that the enemy might be repulsed by two rows of

soldiers. The one of whom, being more secure from danger by their

height, might throw their darts with more daring and to a greater

distance; the other, which was nearer the enemy, being stationed on the

rampart, would be protected by their galleries from darts falling on

their heads. At the entrance he erected gates and turrets of a

considerable height.

X.-Caesar had a double design in this fortification; for he both hoped

that the strength of his works, and his [apparent] fears would raise

confidence in the barbarians; and when there should be occasion to make

a distant excursion to get forage or corn, he saw that his camp would be

secured by the works with a very small force. In the meantime there were

frequent skirmishes across the marsh, a few on both sides sallying out

between the two camps. Sometimes, however, our Gallic or German

auxiliaries crossed the marsh, and furiously pursued the enemy; or on

the other hand the enemy passed it and beat back our men. Moreover there

happened in the course of our daily foraging, what must of necessity

happen, when corn is to be collected by a few scattered men out of

private houses, that our foragers dispersing in an intricate country

were surrounded by the enemy; by which, though we suffered but an

inconsiderable loss of cattle and servants, yet it raised foolish hopes

in the barbarians; but more especially, because Comius, who I said had

gone to get aid from the Germans, returned with some cavalry, and though

the Germans were only 500, yet the barbarians were elated by their

arrival.

XI.-Caesar, observing that the enemy kept for several days within their

camp, which was well secured by a morass and its natural situation, and

that it could not be assaulted without a dangerous engagement, nor the

place enclosed with lines without an addition to his army, wrote to

Trebonius to send with all despatch for the thirteenth legion which was

in winter-quarters among the Bituriges under Titus Sextius, one of his

lieutenants; and then to come to him by forced marches with the three

legions. He himself sent the cavalry of the Remi, and Lingones, and

other states, from whom he had required a vast number, to guard his

foraging parties, and to support them in case of any sudden attack of

the enemy.

XII.--As this continued for several days, and their vigilance was

relaxed by custom (an effect which is generally produced by time), the

Bellovaci, having made themselves acquainted with the daily stations of

our horse, lie in ambush with a select body of foot in a place covered

with woods; to it they sent their horse the next day, who were first to

decoy our men into the ambuscade, and then when they were surrounded, to

attack them. It was the lot of the Remi to fall into this snare, to whom

that day had been allotted to perform this duty; for, having suddenly

got sight of the enemy's cavalry, and despising their weakness, in

consequence of their superior numbers, they pursued them too eagerly,

and were surrounded on every side by the foot. Being by this means

thrown into disorder they returned with more precipitation than is usual

in cavalry actions, with the loss of Vertiscus, the governor of their

state, and the general of their horse, who, though scarcely able to sit

on horseback through years, neither, in accordance with the custom of

the Gauls, pleaded his age in excuse for not accepting the command, nor

would he suffer them to fight without him. The spirits of the barbarians

were puffed up and inflated at the success of this battle, in killing

the prince and general of the Remi; and our men were taught by this

loss, to examine the country, and post their guards with more caution,

and to be more moderate in pursuing a retreating enemy.

XIII.--In the meantime daily skirmishes take place continually in view

of both camps; these were fought at the ford and pass of the morass. In

one of these contests the Germans, whom Caesar had brought over the

Rhine, to fight intermixed with the horse, having resolutely crossed the

marsh, and slain the few who made resistance, and boldly pursued the

rest, so terrified them, that not only those who were attacked hand to

hand, or wounded at a distance, but even those who were stationed at a

greater distance to support them, fled disgracefully; and being often

beaten from the rising grounds, did not stop till they had retired into

their camp, or some, impelled by fear, had fled farther. Their danger

drew their whole army into such confusion, that it was difficult to

judge whether they were more insolent after a slight advantage, or more

dejected by a trifling calamity.

XIV.--After spending several days in the same camp, the guards of the

Bellovaci, learning that Caius Trebonius was advancing nearer with his

legions, and fearing a siege like that of Alesia, send off by night all

who were disabled by age or infirmity, or unarmed, and along with them

their whole baggage. Whilst they are preparing their disorderly and

confused troop for march (for the Gauls are always attended by a vast

multitude of waggons, even when they have very light baggage), being

overtaken by daylight, they drew their forces out before their camp, to

prevent the Romans attempting a pursuit before the line of their baggage

had advanced to a considerable distance. But Caesar did not think it

prudent to attack them when standing on their defence, with such a steep

hill in their favour, nor keep his legions at such a distance that they

could quit their post without danger: but, perceiving that his camp was

divided from the enemy's by a deep morass, so difficult to cross that he

could not pursue with expedition, and that the hill beyond the morass,

which extended almost to the enemy's camp, was separated from it only by

a small valley, he laid a bridge over the morass and led his army

across, and soon reached the plain on the top of the hill, which was

fortified on either side by a steep ascent. Having there drawn up his

army in order of battle, he marched to the furthest hill, from which he

could, with his engines, shower darts upon the thickest of the enemy.

XV.--The Gauls, confiding in the natural strength of their position,

though they would not decline an engagement if the Romans attempted to

ascend the hill, yet dared not divide their forces into small parties,

lest they should be thrown into disorder by being dispersed, and

therefore remained in order of battle. Caesar, perceiving that they

persisted in their resolution, kept twenty cohorts in battle array, and,

measuring out ground there for a camp, ordered it to be fortified.

Having completed his works, he drew up his legions before the rampart

and stationed the cavalry in certain positions, with their horses

bridled. When the Bellovaci saw the Romans prepared to pursue them, and

that they could not wait the whole night, or continue longer in the same

place without provisions, they formed the following plan to secure a

retreat. They handed to one another the bundles of straw and sticks on

which they sat (for it is the custom of the Gauls to sit when drawn up

in order of battle, as has been asserted in former commentaries), of

which they had great plenty in their camp, and piled them in the front

of their line; and at the close of the day, on a certain signal, set

them all on fire at one and the same time. The continued blaze soon

screened all their forces from the sight of the Romans, which no sooner

happened than the barbarians fled with the greatest precipitation.

XVI.--Though Caesar could not perceive the retreat of the enemy for the

intervention of the fire, yet, suspecting that they had adopted that

method to favour their escape, he made his legions advance, and sent a

party of horse to pursue them; but, apprehensive of an ambuscade, and

that the enemy might remain in the same place and endeavour to draw our

men into a disadvantageous situation, he advances himself but slowly.

The horse, being afraid to venture into the smoke and dense line of

flame, and those who were bold enough to attempt it being scarcely able

to see their horses' heads, gave the enemy free liberty to retreat,

through fear of an ambuscade. Thus, by a flight, full at once of

cowardice and address, they advanced without any loss about ten miles,

and encamped in a very strong position. From which, laying numerous

ambuscades, both of horse and foot, they did considerable damage to the

Roman foragers.

XVII.--After this had happened several times, Caesar discovered, from a

certain prisoner, that Correus, the general of the Bellovaci, had

selected six thousand of his bravest foot and a thousand horse, with

which he designed to lie in ambush in a place to which he suspected the

Romans would send to look for forage, on account of the abundance of

corn and grass. Upon receiving information of their design Caesar drew

out more legions than he usually did, and sent forward his cavalry as

usual, to protect the foragers. With these he intermixed a guard of

light infantry, and himself advanced with the legions as fast as he

could.

XVIII.--The Gauls, placed in ambush, had chosen for the seat of action a

level piece of bound, not more than a mile in extent, enclosed on every

side by a thick wood or a very deep river, as by a toil, and this they

surrounded. Our men, apprised of the enemy's design, marched in good

order to the ground, ready both in heart and hand to give battle, and

willing to hazard any engagement when the legions were at their back. On

their approach, as Correus supposed that he had got an opportunity of

effecting his purpose, he at first shows himself with a small party and

attacks the foremost troops. Our men resolutely stood the charge, and

did not crowd together in one place, as commonly happens from surprise

in engagements between the horse, whose numbers prove injurious to

themselves.

XIX.--When by the judicious arrangement of our forces only a few of our

men fought by turns, and did not suffer themselves to be surrounded, the

rest of the enemy broke out from the woods whilst Correus was engaged.

The battle was maintained in different parts with great vigour, and

continued for a long time undecided, till at length a body of foot

gradually advanced from the woods in order of battle and forced our

horse to give ground: the light infantry, which were sent before the

legions to the assistance of the cavalry, soon came up, and, mixing with

the horse, fought with great courage. The battle was for some time

doubtful, but, as usually happens, our men, who stood the enemy's first

charge, became superior from this very circumstance that, though

suddenly attacked from an ambuscade, they had sustained no loss. In the

meantime the legions were approaching, and several messengers arrived

with notice to our men and the enemy that the [Roman] general was near

at hand, with his forces in battle array. Upon this intelligence, our

men, confiding in the support of the cohorts, fought most resolutely,

fearing, lest if they should be slow in their operations they should let

the legions participate in the glory of the conquest. The enemy lose

courage and attempt to escape by different ways. In vain; for they were

themselves entangled in that labyrinth in which they thought to entrap

the Romans. Being defeated and put to the rout, and having lost the

greater part of their men, they fled in consternation whither-soever

chance carried them; some sought the woods, others the river, but were

vigorously pursued by our men and put to the sword. Yet, in the

meantime, Correus, unconquered by calamity, could not be prevailed on to

quit the field and take refuge in the woods, or accept our offers of

quarter, but, fighting courageously and wounding several, provoked our

men, elated with victory, to discharge their weapons against him.

XX.--After this transaction, Caesar, having come up immediately after

the battle, and imagining that the enemy, upon receiving the news of so

great a defeat, would be so depressed that they would abandon their

camp, which was not above eight miles distant from the scene of action,

though he saw his passage obstructed by the river, yet he marched his

army over and advanced. But the Bellovaci and the other states, being

informed of the loss they had sustained by a few wounded men who having

escaped by the shelter of the woods, had returned to them after the

defeat, and learning that everything had turned out unfavourable, that

Correus was slain, and the horse and most valiant of their foot cut off,

imagined that the Romans were marching against them, and calling a

council in haste by sound of trumpet, unanimously cry out to send

ambassadors and hostages to Caesar.

XXI.--This proposal having met with general approbation, Comius the

Atrebatian fled to those Germans from whom he had borrowed auxiliaries

for that war. The rest instantly send ambassadors to Caesar; and

requested that he would be contented with that punishment of his enemy,

which if he had possessed the power to inflict on them before the

engagement, when they were yet uninjured, they were persuaded from his

usual clemency and mercy, he never would have inflicted; that the power

of the Bellovaci was crushed by the cavalry action; that many thousands

of their choicest foot had fallen, that scarce a man had escaped to

bring the fatal news. That, however, the Bellovaci had derived from the

battle one advantage, of some importance, considering their loss; that

Correus, the author of the rebellion, and agitator of the people, was

slain: for that whilst he lived, the senate had never equal influence in

the state with the giddy populace.

XXII.--Caesar reminded the ambassadors who made these supplications,

that the Bellovaci had at the same season the year before, in

conjunction with other states of Gaul, undertaken a war, and that they

had persevered the most obstinately of all in their purpose, and were

not brought to a proper way of thinking by the submission of the rest;

that he knew and was aware that the guilt of a crime was easily

transferred to the dead; but that no one person could have such

influence, as to be able by the feeble support of the multitude to raise

a war and carry it on without the consent of the nobles, in opposition

to the senate, and in despite of every virtuous man; however he was

satisfied with the punishment which they had drawn upon themselves.

XXIII.--The night following the ambassadors bring back his answer to

their countrymen, and prepare the hostages. Ambassadors flock in from

the other states, which were waiting for the issue of the [war with the]

Bellovaci: they give hostages, and receive his orders; all except

Comius, whose fears restrained him from entrusting his safety to any

person's honour. For the year before, while Caesar was holding the

assizes in Hither Gaul, Titus Labienus, having discovered that Comius

was tampering with the states, and raising a conspiracy against Caesar,

thought he might punish his infidelity without perfidy; but judging that

he would not come to his camp at his invitation, and unwilling to put

him on his guard by the attempt, he sent Caius Volusenus Quadratus, with

orders to have him put to death under pretence of a conference. To

effect his purpose, he sent with him some chosen centurions. When they

came to the conference, and Volusenus, as had been agreed on, had taken

hold of Comius by the hand, and one of the centurions, as if surprised

at so uncommon an incident, attempted to kill him, he was prevented by

the friends of Comius, but wounded him severely in the head by the first

blow. Swords were drawn on both sides, not so much with a design to

fight as to effect an escape, our men believing that Comius had received

a mortal stroke; and the Gauls, from the treachery which they had seen,

dreading that a deeper design lay concealed. Upon this transaction, it

was said that Comius made a resolution never to come within sight of any

Roman.

XXIV.--When Caesar, having completely conquered the most warlike

nations, perceived that there was now no state which could make

preparations for war to oppose him, but that some were removing and

fleeing from their country to avoid present subjection, he resolved to

detach his army into different parts of the country. He kept with

himself Marcus Antonius the quaestor, with the eleventh legion; Caius

Fabius was detached with twenty-five cohorts into the remotest part of

Gaul, because it was rumoured that some states had risen in arms, and he

did not think that Caius Caninius Rebilus, who had the charge of that

country, was strong enough to protect it with two legions. He ordered

Titus Labienus to attend himself, and sent the twelfth legion which had

been under him in winter quarters, to Hither Gaul, to protect the Roman

colonies, and prevent any loss by the inroads of barbarians, similar to

that which had happened the year before to the Tergestines, who were cut

off by a sudden depredation and attack. He himself marched to depopulate

the country of Ambiorix, whom he had terrified and forced to fly, but

despaired of being able to reduce under his power; but he thought it

most consistent with his honour to waste his country both of

inhabitants, cattle, and buildings, so that from the abhorrence of his

countrymen, if fortune suffered any to survive, he might be excluded

from a return to his state for the calamities which he had brought on

it.

XXV.--After he had sent either his legions or auxiliaries through every

part of Ambiorix's dominions, and wasted the whole country by sword,

fire, and rapine, and had killed or taken prodigious numbers, he sent

Labienus with two legions against the Treviri, whose state, from its

vicinity to Germany, being engaged in constant war, differed but little

from the Germans, in civilization and savage barbarity; and never

continued in its allegiance, except when awed by the presence of his

army.

XXVI.--In the meantime Caius Caninius, a lieutenant, having received

information by letters and messages from Duracius, who had always

continued in friendship to the Roman people, though a part of his state

had revolted, that a great multitude of the enemy were in arms in the

country of the Pictones, marched to the town Limonum. When he was

approaching it, he was informed by some prisoners, that Duracius was

shut up by several thousand men, under the command of Dumnacus, general

of the Andes, and that Limonum was besieged, but not daring to face the

enemy with his weak legions, he encamped in a strong position: Dumnacus,

having notice of Caninius's approach, turned his whole force against the

legions, and prepared to assault the Roman camp. But after spending

several days in the attempt, and losing a considerable number of men,

without being able to make a breach in any part of the works, he

returned again to the siege of Limonum.

XXVII.--At the same time, Caius Fabius, a lieutenant, brings back many

states to their allegiance, and confirms their submission by taking

hostages; he was then informed by letters from Caninius, of the

proceedings among the Pictones. Upon which he set off to bring

assistance to Duracius. But Dumnacus hearing of the approach of Fabius,

and despairing of safety, if at the same time he should be forced to

withstand the Roman army without, and observe, and be under apprehension

from the town's people, made a precipitate retreat from that place with

all his forces. Nor did he think that he should be sufficiently secure

from danger, unless he led his army across the Loire, which was too deep

a river to pass except by a bridge. Though Fabius had not yet come

within sight of the enemy, nor joined Caninius; yet being informed of

the nature of the country, by persons acquainted with it, he judged it

most likely that the enemy would take that way, which he found they did

take. He therefore marched to that bridge with his army, and ordered his

cavalry to advance no further before the legions, than that they could

return to the same camp at night, without fatiguing their horses. Our

horse pursued according to orders, and fell upon Dumnacus's rear, and

attacking them on their march, while fleeing, dismayed, and laden with

baggage, they slew a great number, and took a rich booty. Having

executed the affair so successfully, they retired to the camp.

XXVIII.--The night following, Fabius sent his horse before him, with

orders to engage the enemy, and delay their march till he himself should

come up. That his orders might be faithfully performed, Quintus Atius

Varus, general of the horse, a man of uncommon spirit and skill,

encouraged his men, and pursuing the enemy, disposed some of his troops

in convenient places, and with the rest gave battle to the enemy. The

enemy's cavalry made a bold stand, the foot relieving each other, and

making a general halt, to assist their horse against ours. The battle

was warmly contested. For our men, despising the enemy whom they had

conquered the day before, and knowing that the legions were following

them, animated both by the disgrace of retreating, and a desire of

concluding the battle expeditiously by their own courage, fought most

valiantly against the foot: and the enemy, imagining that no more forces

would come against them, as they had experienced the day before, thought

they had got a favourable opportunity of destroying our whole cavalry.

XXIX.-After the conflict had continued for some time with great

violence, Dumnacus drew out his army in such a manner, that the foot

should by turns assist the horse. Then the legions, marching in close

order, came suddenly in sight of the enemy. At this sight, the barbarian

horse were so astonished, and the foot so terrified, that breaking

through the line of baggage, they betook themselves to flight with a

loud shout, and in great disorder. But our horse, who a little before

had vigorously engaged them, whilst they made resistance, being elated

with joy at their victory, raising a shout on every side, poured round

them as they ran, and as long as their horses had strength to pursue, or

their arms to give a blow, so long did they continue the slaughter of

the enemy in that battle, and having killed above twelve thousand men in

arms, or such as threw away their arms through fear, they took their

whole train of baggage.

XXX.--After this defeat, when it was ascertained that Drapes, a Senonian

(who in the beginning of the revolt of Gaul, had collected from all

quarters men of desperate fortunes, invited the slaves to liberty,

called in the exiles of the whole kingdom, given an asylum to robbers,

and intercepted the Roman baggage and provisions), was marching to the

province with five thousand men, being all he could collect after the

defeat, and that Luterius a Cadurcian who, as it has been observed in a

former commentary, had designed to make an attack on the Province in the

first revolt of Gaul, had formed a junction with him, Caius Caninius

went in pursuit of them with two legions, lest great disgrace might be

incurred from the fears or injuries done to the Province by the

depredations of a band of desperate men.

XXXI.--Caius Fabius set off with the rest of the army to the Carnutes

and those other states, whose forces he was informed had served as

auxiliaries in that battle, which he fought against Dumnacus. For he had

no doubt that they would be more submissive after their recent

sufferings, but if respite and time were given them, they might be

easily excited by the earnest solicitations of the same Dumnacus. On

this occasion Fabius was extremely fortunate and expeditious in

recovering the states. For the Carnutes, who, though often harassed had

never mentioned peace, submitted and gave hostages: and the other

states, which lie in the remotest parts of Gaul, adjoining the ocean,

and which are called Armoricae, influenced by the example of the

Carnutes, as soon as Fabius arrived with his legions, without delay

comply with his command. Dumnacus, expelled from his own territories,

wandering and skulking about, was forced to seek refuge by himself in

the most remote parts of Gaul.

XXXII.--But Crapes in conjunction with Literius, knowing that Caninius

was at hand with the legions, and that they themselves could not without

certain destruction enter the boundaries of the province, whilst an army

was in pursuit of them, and being no longer at liberty to roam up and

down and pillage, halt in the country of the Cadurci, as Luterius had

once in his prosperity possessed a powerful influence over the

inhabitants, who were his countrymen, and being always the author of new

projects, had considerable authority among the barbarians; with his own

and Drapes' troops he seized Uxellodunum, a town formerly in vassalage

to him and strongly fortified by its natural situation; and prevailed on

the inhabitants to join him.

XXXIII.--After Caninius had rapidly marched to this place, and perceived

that all parts of the town were secured by very craggy rocks, which it

would be difficult for men in arms to climb even if they met with no

resistance; and, moreover, observing that the town's people were

possessed of effects, to a considerable amount, and that if they

attempted to convey them away in a clandestine manner, they could not

escape our horse, nor even our legions; he divided his forces into three

parts, and pitched three camps on very high ground, with the intention

of drawing lines round the town by degrees, as his forces could bear the

fatigue.

XXXIV.--When the townsmen perceived his design, being terrified by the

recollection of the distress at Alesia, they began to dread similar

consequences from a siege; and above all Luterius, who had experienced

that fatal event, cautioned them to make provision of corn; they

therefore resolve by general consent to leave part of their troops

behind, and set out with their light troops to bring in corn. The scheme

having met with approbation, the following night Drapes and Luterius,

leaving two thousand men in the garrison, marched out of the town with

the rest. After a few days' stay in the country of the Cadurci (some of

whom were disposed to assist them with corn, and others were unable to

prevent their taking it) they collected a great store. Sometimes also

attacks were made on our little forts by sallies at night. For this

reason Caninius deferred drawing his works round the whole town, lest he

should be unable to protect them when completed, or by disposing his

garrisons in several places, should make them too weak.

XXXV.--Drapes and Luterius, having laid in a large supply of corn,

occupy a position at about ten miles distance from the town, intending

from it to convey the corn into the town by degrees. They chose each his

respective department. Drapes stayed behind in the camp with part of the

army to protect it; Luterius conveys the train with provisions into the

town. Accordingly, having disposed guards here and there along the road,

about the tenth hour of the night, he set out by narrow paths through

the woods, to fetch the corn into the town. But their noise being heard

by the sentinels of our camp, and the scouts which we had sent out,

having brought an account of what was going on, Caninius instantly with

the ready-armed cohorts from the nearest turrets made an attack on the

convoy at the break of day. They, alarmed at so unexpected an evil, fled

by different ways to their guard: which as soon as our men perceived,

they fell with great fury on the escort, and did not allow a single man

to be taken alive. Luterius escaped thence with a few followers, but did

not return to the camp.

XXXVI.--After this success, Caninius learnt from some prisoners, that a

part of the forces was encamped with Drapes, not more than ten miles

off; which being confirmed by several, supposing that after the defeat

of one general, the rest would be terrified, and might be easily

conquered, he thought it a most fortunate event that none of the enemy

had fled back from the slaughter to the camp, to give Drapes notice of

the calamity which had befallen him. And as he could see no danger in

making the attempt, he sent forward all his cavalry and the German foot,

men of great activity, to the enemy's camp. He divides one legion among

the three camps, and takes the other without baggage along with him.

When he had advanced near the enemy, he was informed by scouts, which he

had sent before him, that the enemy's camp, as is the custom of

barbarians, was pitched low, near the banks of a river, and that the

higher grounds were unoccupied: but that the German horse had made a

sudden attack on them, and had begun the battle. Upon this intelligence,

he marched up with his legion, armed and in order of battle. Then, on a

signal being suddenly given on every side, our men took possession of

the higher grounds. Upon this, the German horse observing the Roman

colours, fought with great vigour. Immediately all the cohorts attack

them on every side; and having either killed or made prisoners of them

all, gained great booty. In that battle, Drapes himself was taken

prisoner.

XXXVII.--Caninius, having accomplished the business so successfully,

without having scarcely a man wounded, returned to besiege the town;

and, having destroyed the enemy without, for fear of whom he had been

prevented from strengthening his redoubts, and surrounding the enemy

with his lines, he orders the work to be completed on every side. The

next day, Caius Fabius came to join him with his forces, and took upon

him the siege of one side.

XXXVIII.--In the meantime, Caesar left Caius Antonius in the country of

the Bellovaci, with fifteen cohorts, that the Belgae might have no

opportunity of forming new plans in future. He himself visits the other

states, demands a great number of hostages, and by his encouraging

language allays the apprehensions of all. When he came to the Carnutes,

in whose state he has in a former commentary mentioned that the war

first broke out; observing, that from a consciousness of their guilt,

they seemed to be in the greatest terror: to relieve the state the

sooner from its fear, he demanded that Guturvatus, the promoter of that

treason, and the instigator of that rebellion, should be delivered up to

punishment. And though the latter did not dare to trust his life even to

his own countrymen, yet such diligent search was made by them all, that

he was soon brought to our camp. Caesar was forced to punish him, by the

clamours of the soldiers, contrary to his natural humanity, for they

alleged that all the dangers and losses incurred in that war, ought to

be imputed to Guturvatus. Accordingly, he was whipped to death, and his

head cut off.

XXXIX.--Here Caesar was informed by numerous letters from Caninius of

what had happened to Drapes and Luterius, and in what conduct the town's

people persisted: and though he despised the smallness of their numbers,

yet he thought their obstinacy deserving a severe punishment, lest Gaul

in general should adopt an idea that she did not want strength but

perseverance to oppose the Romans; and lest the other states, relying on

the advantage of situation, should follow their example and assert their

liberty; especially as he knew that all the Gauls understood that his

command was to continue but one summer longer, and if they could hold

out for that time, that they would have no further danger to apprehend.

He therefore left Quintus Calenus, one of his lieutenants behind him,

with two legions, and instructions to follow him by regular marches. He

hastened as much as he could with all the cavalry to Caninius.

XL.--Having arrived at Uxellodunum, contrary to the general expectation,

and perceiving that the town was surrounded by the works, and that the

enemy had no possible means of retiring from the assault, and being

likewise informed by the deserters that the townsmen had abundance of

corn; he endeavoured to prevent their getting water. A river divided the

valley below, which almost surrounded the steep craggy mountain on which

Uxellodunum was built. The nature of the ground prevented his turning

the current; for it ran so low down at the foot of the mountain, that no

drains could be sunk deep enough to draw it off in any direction. But

the descent to it was so difficult, that if we made opposition, the

besieged could neither come to the river, nor retire up the precipice

without hazard of their lives. Caesar, perceiving the difficulty,

disposed archers and slingers, and in some places, opposite to the

easiest descents, placed engines, and attempted to hinder the townsmen

from getting water at the river, which obliged them afterwards to go all

to one place to procure water.

XLI.--Close under the walls of the town, a copious spring gushed out on

that part, which for the space of nearly three hundred feet, was not

surrounded by the river. Whilst every other person wished that the

besieged could be debarred from this spring, Caesar alone saw that it

could be effected, though not without great danger. Opposite to it he

began to advance the vineae towards the mountain, and to throw up a

mound, with great labour and continual skirmishing. For the townsmen ran

down from the high ground, and fought without any risk, and wounded

several of our men, yet they obstinately pushed on and were not deterred

from moving forward the vineae, and from surmounting by their assiduity

the difficulties of situation. At the same time they work mines, and

move the crates and vineae to the source of the fountain. This was the

only work which they could do without danger or suspicion. A mound sixty

feet high was raised; on it was erected a turret of ten stories, not

with the intention that it should be on a level with the wall (for that

could not be effected by any works), but to rise above the top of the

spring. When our engines began to play from it upon the paths that led

to the fountain, and the townsmen could not go for water without danger,

not only the cattle designed for food and the working cattle, but a

great number of men also died of thirst.

XLII.--Alarmed at this calamity, the townsmen fill barrels with tallow,

pitch, and dried wood; these they set on fire, and roll down on our

works. At the same time, they fight most furiously, to deter the Romans,

by the engagement and danger, from extinguishing the flames. Instantly a

great blaze arose in the works. For whatever they threw down the

precipice, striking against the vine and agger, communicated the fire to

whatever was in the way. Our soldiers on the other hand, though they

were engaged in a perilous sort of encounter, and labouring under the

disadvantages of position, yet supported all with very great presence of

mind. For the action happened in an elevated situation, and in sight of

our army; and a great shout was raised on both sides; therefore every

man faced the weapons of the enemy and the flames in as conspicuous a

manner as he could, that his valour might be the better known and

attested.

XLIII.--Caesar, observing that several of his men were wounded, ordered

the cohorts to ascend the mountain on all sides, and, under pretence of

assailing the walls, to raise a shout: at which the besieged being

frightened, and not knowing what was going on in other places, call off

their armed troops from attacking our works, and dispose them on the

walls. Thus our men, without hazarding a battle, gained time partly to

extinguish the works which had caught fire, and partly to cut off the

communication. As the townsmen still continued to make an obstinate

resistance, and even, after losing the greatest part of their forces by

drought, persevered in their resolution: At last the veins of the spring

were cut across by our mines, and turned from their course. By this

their constant spring was suddenly dried up, which reduced them to such

despair that they imagined that it was not done by the art of man, but

the will of the gods; forced, therefore, by necessity, they at length

submitted.

XLIV.--Caesar, being convinced that his lenity was known to all men, and

being under no fears of being thought to act severely from a natural

cruelty, and perceiving that there would be no end to his troubles if

several states should attempt to rebel in like manner and in different

places, resolved to deter others by inflicting an exemplary punishment

on these. Accordingly he cut off the hands of those who had borne arms

against him. Their lives he spared, that the punishment of their

rebellion might be the more conspicuous. Drapes, who I have said was

taken by Caninius, either through indignation and grief arising from his

captivity, or through fear of severer punishments, abstained from food

for several days, and thus perished. At the same time, Luterius, who, I

have related, had escaped from the battle, having fallen into the hands

of Epasnactus, an Arvernian (for he frequently changed his quarters, and

threw himself on the honour of several persons, as he saw that he dare

not remain long in one place, and was conscious how great an enemy he

deserved to have in Caesar), was by this Epasnactus, the Arvernian, a

sincere friend of the Roman people, delivered without any hesitation, a

prisoner to Caesar.

XLV.--In the meantime, Labienus engages in a successful cavalry action

among the Treviri; and, having killed several of them and of the

Germans, who never refused their aid to any person against the Romans,

he got their chiefs alive into his power, and, amongst them, Surus, an

Aeduan, who was highly renowned both for his valour and birth, and was

the only Aeduan that had continued in arms till that time. Caesar, being

informed of this, and perceiving that he had met with good success in

all parts of Gaul, and reflecting that, in former campaigns, [Celtic]

Gaul had been conquered and subdued; but that he had never gone in

person to Aquitania, but had made a conquest of it, in some degree, by

Marcus Crassus, set out for it with two legions, designing to spend the

latter part of the summer there. This affair he executed with his usual

despatch and good fortune. For all the states of Aquitania sent

ambassadors to him and delivered hostages. These affairs being

concluded, he marched with a guard of cavalry towards Narbo, and drew

off his army into winter quarters by his lieutenants. He posted four

legions in the country of the Belgae, under Marcus Antonius, Caius

Trebonius, Publius Vatinius, and Quintus Tullius, his lieutenants. Two

he detached to the Aedui, knowing them to have a very powerful influence

throughout all Gaul. Two he placed among the Turoni, near the confines

of the Carnutes, to keep in awe the entire tract of country bordering on

the ocean; the other two he placed in the territories of the Lemovices,

at a small distance from the Arverni, that no part of Gaul might be

without an army. Having spent a few days in the province, he quickly ran

through all the business of the assizes, settled all public disputes,

and distributed rewards to the most deserving; for he had a good

opportunity of learning how every person was disposed towards the

republic during the general revolt of Gaul, which he had withstood by

the fidelity and assistance of the Province.

XLVII.--Having finished these affairs, he returned to his legions among

the Belgae and wintered at Nemetocenna: there he got intelligence that

Comius, the Atrebatian had had an engagement with his cavalry. For when

Antonius had gone into winter quarters, and the state of the Atrebates

continued in their allegiance, Comius, who, after that wound which I

before mentioned, was always ready to join his countrymen upon every

commotion, that they might not want a person to advise and head them in

the management of the war, when his state submitted to the Romans,

supported himself and his adherents on plunder by means of his cavalry,

infested the roads, and intercepted several convoys which were bringing

provisions to the Roman quarters.

XLVIII.--Caius Volusenus Quadratus was appointed commander of the horse

under Antonius, to winter with him: Antonius sent him in pursuit of the

enemy's cavalry; now Volusenus added to that valour which was pre-eminent

in him, a great aversion to Comius, on which account he executed

the more willingly the orders which he received. Having, therefore, laid

ambuscades, he had several encounters with his cavalry and came off

successful. At last, when a violent contest ensued, and Volusenus,

through eagerness to intercept Comius, had obstinately pursued him with

a small party; and Comius had, by the rapidity of his flight, drawn

Volusenus to a considerable distance from his troops, he, on a sudden,

appealed to the honour of all about him for assistance not to suffer the

wound, which he had perfidiously received, to go without vengeance; and,

wheeling his horse about, rode unguardedly before the rest up to the

commander. All his horse following his example, made a few of our men

turn their backs and pursued them. Comius, clapping spurs to his horse,

rode up to Volusenus, and, pointing his lance, pierced him in the thigh

with great force. When their commander was wounded, our men no longer

hesitated to make resistance, and, facing about, beat back the enemy.

When this occurred, several of the enemy, repulsed by the great

impetuosity of our men, were wounded, and some were trampled to death in

striving to escape, and some were made prisoners. Their general escaped

this misfortune by the swiftness of his horse. Our commander, being

severely wounded, so much so that he appeared to run the risk of losing

his life, was carried back to the camp. But Comius, having either

gratified his resentment, or, because he had lost the greatest part of

his followers, sent ambassadors to Antonius, and assured him that he

would give hostages as a security that he would go wherever Antonius

should prescribe, and would comply with his orders, and only entreated

that this concession should be made to his fears, that he should not be

obliged to go into the presence of any Roman. As Antonius judged that

his request originated in a just apprehension, he indulged him in it and

accepted his hostages.

* * * * *

Caesar, I know, has made a separate commentary of each year's

transactions, which I have not thought it necessary for me to do,

because the following year, in which Lucius Paulus and Caius Marcellus

were consuls, produced no remarkable occurrences in Gaul. But that no

person may be left in ignorance of the place where Caesar and his army

were at that time, I have thought proper to write a few words in

addition to this commentary.

* * * * *

XLIX.--Caesar, whilst in winter quarters in the country of the Belgae,

made it his only business to keep the states in amity with him, and to

give none either hopes of, or pretext for, a revolt. For nothing was

further from his wishes than to be under the necessity of engaging in

another war at his departure; lest, when he was drawing his army out of

the country, any war should be left unfinished, which the Gauls would

cheerfully undertake, when there was no immediate danger. Therefore, by

treating the states with respect, making rich presents to the leading

men, imposing no new burdens, and making the terms of their subjection

lighter, he easily kept Gaul (already exhausted by so many unsuccessful

battles) in obedience.

L.--When the winter quarters were broken up, he himself, contrary to his

usual practice, proceeded to Italy, by the longest possible stages, in

order to visit the free towns and colonies, that he might recommend to

them the petition of Marcus Antonius, his treasurer, for the priesthood.

For he exerted his interest both cheerfully in favour of a man strongly

attached to him, whom he had sent home before him to attend the

election, and zealously to oppose the faction and power of a few men,

who, by rejecting Marcus Antonius, wished to undermine Caesar's

influence when going out of office. Though Caesar heard on the road,

before he reached Italy, that he was created augur, yet he thought

himself in honour bound to visit the free town and colonies, to return

them thanks for rendering such service to Antonius by their presence in

such great numbers [at the election], and at the same time to recommend

to them himself, and his honour in his suit for the consulate the

ensuing year. For his adversaries arrogantly boasted that Lucius

Lentulus and Caius Marcellus had been appointed consuls, who would strip

Caesar of all honour and dignity: and that the consulate had been

injuriously taken from Sergius Galba, though he had been much superior

in votes and interest, because he was united to Caesar, both by

friendship, and by serving as lieutenant under him.

LI.--Caesar, on his arrival, was received by the principal towns and

colonies with incredible respect and affection; for this was the first

time he came since the war against united Gaul. Nothing was omitted

which could be thought of for the ornament of the gates, roads, and

every place through which Caesar was to pass. All the people with their

children went out to meet him. Sacrifices were offered up in every

quarter. The market places and temples were laid out with

entertainments, as if anticipating the joy of a most splendid triumph.

So great was the magnificence of the richer and zeal of the poorer ranks

of the people.

LII.--When Caesar had gone through all the states of Cisalpine Gaul, he

returned with the greatest haste to the army at Nemetocenna; and having

ordered all his legions to march from winter quarters to the territories

of the Treviri, he went thither and reviewed them. He made Titus

Labienus governor of Cisalpine Gaul, that he might be the more inclined

to support him in his suit for the consulate. He himself made such

journeys, as he thought would conduce to the health of his men by change

of air; and though he was frequently told that Labienus was solicited by

his enemies, and was assured that a scheme was in agitation by the

contrivance of a few, that the senate should interpose their authority

to deprive him of a part of his army; yet he neither gave credit to any

story concerning Labienus, nor could be prevailed upon to do anything in

opposition to the authority of the senate; for he thought that his cause

would be easily gained by the free voice of the senators. For Caius

Curio, one of the tribunes of the people, having undertaken to defend

Caesar's cause and dignity, had often proposed to the senate, "that if

the dread of Caesar's arms rendered any apprehensive, as Pompey's

authority and arms were no less formidable to the forum, both should

resign their command, and disband their armies. That then the city would

be free, and enjoy its due rights." And he not only proposed this, but

of himself called upon the senate to divide on the question. But the

consuls and Pompey's friends interposed to prevent it; and regulating

matters as they desired, they broke up the meeting.

LIII.--This testimony of the unanimous voice of the senate was very

great, and consistent with their former conduct; for the preceding year,

when Marcellus attacked Caesar's dignity, he proposed to the senate,

contrary to the law of Pompey and Crassus, to dispose of Caesar's

province, before the expiration of his command, and when the votes were

called for, and Marcellus, who endeavoured to advance his own dignity,

by raising envy against Caesar, wanted a division, the full senate went

over to the opposite side. The spirit of Caesar's foes was not broken by

this, but it taught them, that they ought to strengthen their interest

by enlarging their connections, so as to force the senate to comply with

whatever they resolved on.

LIV.--After this a decree was passed by the senate, that one legion

should be sent by Pompey, and another by Caesar, to the Parthian war.

But these two legions were evidently drawn from Caesar alone. For the

first legion which Pompey sent to Caesar, he gave Caesar, as if it

belonged to himself, though it was levied in Caesar's province. Caesar,

however, though no one could doubt the design of his enemies, sent the

legion back to Cneius Pompey, and in compliance with the decree of the

senate, ordered the fifteenth, belonging to himself, and which was

quartered in Cisalpine Gaul, to be delivered up. In its room he sent the

thirteenth into Italy, to protect the garrisons from which he had

drafted the fifteenth. He disposed his army in winter quarters, placed

Caius Trebonius, with four legions among the Belgae, and detached Caius

Fabius, with four more, to the Aedui; for he thought that Gaul would be

most secure if the Belgae, a people of the greatest valour, and the

Aedui, who possessed the most powerful influence, were kept in awe by

his armies.

LV.--He himself set out for Italy; where he was informed on his arrival,

that the two legions sent home by him, and which by the senate's decree,

should have been sent to the Parthian war, had been delivered over to

Pompey, by Caius Marcellus the consul, and were retained in Italy.

Although from this transaction it was evident to every one that war was

designed against Caesar, yet he resolved to submit to any thing, as long

as there were hopes left of deciding the dispute in an equitable manner,

rather than have recourse to arms.

* * * * *

THE CIVIL WAR

BOOK I

I.--When Caesar's letter was delivered to the consuls, they were with

great difficulty, and a hard struggle of the tribunes, prevailed on to

suffer it to be read in the senate; but the tribunes could not prevail,

that any question should be put to the senate on the subject of the

letter. The consuls put the question on the regulation of the state.

Lucius Lentulus the consul promises that he will not fail the senate and

republic, "if they declared their sentiments boldly and resolutely, but

if they turned their regard to Caesar, and courted his favour, as they

did on former occasions, he would adopt a plan for himself, and not

submit to the authority of the senate: that he too had a means of

regaining Caesar's favour and friendship." Scipio spoke to the same

purport, "that it was Pompey's intention not to abandon the republic, if

the senate would support him; but if they should hesitate and act

without energy, they would in vain implore his aid, if they should

require it hereafter."

II.--This speech of Scipio's, as the senate was convened in the city,

and Pompey was near at hand, seemed to have fallen from the lips of

Pompey himself. Some delivered their sentiments with more moderation, as

Marcellus first, who in the beginning of his speech, said, "that the

question ought not to be put to the senate on this matter, till levies

were made throughout all Italy, and armies raised under whose protection

the senate might freely and safely pass such resolutions as they thought

proper": as Marcus Calidius afterwards, who was of opinion, "that Pompey

should set out for his province, that there might be no cause for arms:

that Caesar was naturally apprehensive as two legions were forced from

him, that Pompey was retaining those troops, and keeping them near the

city to do him injury": as Marcus Rufus, who followed Calidius almost

word for word. They were all harshly rebuked by Lentulus, who

peremptorily refused to propose Calidius's motion. Marcellus, overawed

by his reproofs, retracted his opinion. Thus most of the senate,

intimidated by the expressions of the consul, by the fears of a present

army, and the threats of Pompey's friends, unwillingly and reluctantly

adopted Scipio's opinion, that Caesar should disband his army by a

certain day, and should he not do so, he should be considered as acting

against the state. Marcus Antonius, and Quintus Cassius, tribunes of the

people, interposed. The question was immediately put on their

interposition. Violent opinions were expressed: whoever spoke with the

greatest acrimony and cruelty, was most highly commended by Caesar's

enemies.

III.--The senate having broken up in the evening, all who belonged to

that order were summoned by Pompey. He applauded the forward, and

secured their votes for the next day; the more moderate he reproved and

excited against Caesar. Many veterans, from all parts, who had served in

Pompey's armies, were invited to his standard by the hopes of rewards

and promotions. Several officers belonging to the two legions, which had

been delivered up by Caesar, were sent for. The city and the Comitium

were crowded with tribunes, centurions, and veterans. All the consuls'

friends, all Pompey's connections, all those who bore any ancient enmity

to Caesar, were forced into the senate house. By their concourse and

declarations the timid were awed, the irresolute confirmed, and the

greater part deprived of the power of speaking their sentiments with

freedom. Lucius Piso, the censor, offered to go to Caesar: as did

likewise Lucius Roscius, the praetor, to inform him of these affairs,

and require only six days' time to finish the business. Opinions were

expressed by some to the effect that commissioners should be sent to

Caesar to acquaint him with the senate's pleasure.

IV.--All these proposals were rejected, and opposition made to them all,

in the speeches of the consul, Scipio, and Cato. An old grudge against

Caesar and chagrin at a defeat actuated Cato. Lentulus was wrought upon

by the magnitude of his debts, and the hopes of having the government of

an army and provinces, and by the presents which he expected from such

princes as should receive the title of friends of the Roman people, and

boasted amongst his friends, that he would be a second Sylla, to whom

the supreme authority should return. Similar hopes of a province and

armies, which he expected to share with Pompey on account of his

connection with him, urged on Scipio; and moreover, [he was influenced

by] the fear of being called to trial, and the adulation and an

ostentatious display of himself and his friends in power, who at that

time had great influence in the republic, and courts of judicature.

Pompey himself, incited by Caesar's enemies, because he was unwilling

that any person should bear an equal degree of dignity, had wholly

alienated himself from Caesar's friendship, and procured a

reconciliation with their common enemies; the greatest part of whom he

had himself brought upon Caesar during his affinity with him. At the

same time, chagrined at the disgrace which he had incurred by converting

the two legions from their expedition through Asia and Syria, to

[augment] his own power and authority, he was anxious to bring matters

to a war.

V.--For these reasons everything was done in a hasty and disorderly

manner, and neither was time given to Caesar's relations to inform him

[of the state of affairs] nor liberty to the tribunes of the people to

deprecate their own danger, nor even to retain the last privilege, which

Sylla had left them, the interposing their authority; but on the seventh

day they were obliged to think of their own safety, which the most

turbulent tribunes of the people were not accustomed to attend to, nor

to fear being called to an account for their actions, till the eighth

month. Recourse is had to that extreme and final decree of the senate

(which was never resorted to even by daring proposers except when the

city was in danger of being set on fire, or when the public safety was

despaired of). "That the consuls, praetors, tribunes of the people, and

proconsuls in the city should take care that the state received no

injury." These decrees are dated the eighth day before the ides of

January; therefore, in the first five days, on which the senate could

meet, from the day on which Lentulus entered into his consulate, the two

days of election excepted, the severest and most virulent decrees were

passed against Caesar's government, and against those most illustrious

characters, the tribunes of the people. The latter immediately made

their escape from the city, and withdrew to Caesar, who was then at

Ravenna, awaiting an answer to his moderate demands; [to see] if matters

could be brought to a peaceful termination by any equitable act on the

part of the enemies.

VI.--During the succeeding days the senate is convened outside the city.

Pompey repeated the same things which he had declared through Scipio. He

applauded the courage and firmness of the senate, acquainted them with

his force, and told them that he had ten legions ready; that he was

moreover informed and assured that Caesar's soldiers were disaffected,

and that he could not persuade them to defend or even follow him.

Motions were made in the senate concerning other matters; that levies

should be made through all Italy; that Faustus Sylla should be sent as

propraetor into Mauritania; that money should be granted to Pompey from

the public treasury. It was also put to the vote that king Juba should

be [honoured with the title of] friend and ally. But Marcellus said that

he would not allow this motion for the present. Philip, one of the

tribunes, stopped [the appointment of] Sylla; the resolutions respecting

the other matters passed. The provinces, two of which were consular, the

remainder praetorian, were decreed to private persons; Scipio got Syria,

Lucius Domitius Gaul: Philip and Marcellus were omitted, from a private

motive, and their lots were not even admitted. To the other provinces

praetors were sent, nor was time granted as in former years, to refer to

the people on their appointment, nor to make them take the usual oath,

and march out of the city in a public manner, robed in the military

habit, after offering their vows; a circumstance which had never before

happened. Both the consuls leave the city, and private men had lictors

in the city and capital, contrary to all precedents of former times.

Levies were made throughout Italy, arms demanded, and money exacted from

the municipal towns, and violently taken from the temples. All

distinctions between things human and divine are confounded.

VII.--These things being made known to Caesar, he harangued his

soldiers; he reminded them "of the wrongs done to him at all times by

his enemies, and complained that Pompey had been alienated from him and

led astray by them through envy and a malicious opposition to his glory,

though he had always favoured and promoted Pompey's honour and dignity.

He complained that an innovation had been introduced into the republic,

that the intercession of the tribunes, which had been restored a few

years before by Sylla, was branded as a crime, and suppressed by force

of arms; that Sylla, who had stripped the tribunes of every other power,

had, nevertheless, left the privilege of intercession unrestrained; that

Pompey, who pretended to restore what they had lost, had taken away the

privileges which they formerly had; that whenever the senate decreed,

"that the magistrates should take care that the republic sustained no

injury" (by which words and decree the Roman people were obliged to

repair to arms), it was only when pernicious laws were proposed; when

the tribunes attempted violent measures; when the people seceded, and

possessed themselves of the temples and eminences of the city; (and

these instances of former times, he showed them were expiated by the

fate of Saturninus and the Gracchi): that nothing of this kind was

attempted now, nor even thought of: that no law was promulgated, no

intrigue with the people going forward, no secession made; he exhorted

them to defend from the malice of his enemies, the reputation and honour

of that general, under whose command they had for nine years most

successfully supported the state; fought many successful battles, and

subdued all Gaul and Germany." The soldiers of the thirteenth legion,

which was present (for in the beginning of the disturbances he had

called it out, his other legions not having yet arrived), all cry out

that they are ready to defend their general, and the tribunes of the

commons, from all injuries.

VIII.--Having made himself acquainted with the disposition of his

soldiers, Caesar set off with that legion to Ariminum, and there met the

tribunes, who had fled to him for protection; he called his other

legions from winter quarters, and ordered them to follow him. Thither

came Lucius Caesar, a young man, whose father was a lieutenant general

under Caesar. He, after concluding the rest of his speech, and stating

for what purpose he had come, told Caesar that he had commands of a

private nature for him from Pompey; that Pompey wished to clear himself

to Caesar, lest he should impute those actions which he did for the

republic, to a design of affronting him; that he had ever preferred the

interest of the state to his own private connections; that Caesar, too,

for his own honour, ought to sacrifice his desires and resentment to the

public good, and not vent his anger so violently against his enemies,

lest in his hopes of injuring them, he should injure the republic. He

spoke a few words to the same purport from himself, in addition to

Pompey's apology. Roscius, the praetor, conferred with Caesar almost in

the same words, and on the same subject, and declared that Pompey had

empowered him to do so.

IX.--Though these things seemed to have no tendency towards redressing

his injuries, yet having got proper persons by whom he could communicate

his wishes to Pompey; he required of them both, that as they had

conveyed Pompey's demands to him, they should not refuse to convey his

demands to Pompey; if by so little trouble they could terminate a great

dispute, and liberate all Italy from her fears.

"That the honour of the republic had ever been his first object, and

dearer to him than life; that he was chagrined, that the favour of the

Roman people was wrested from him by the injurious reports of his

enemies; that he was deprived of a half-year's command, and dragged back

to the city, though the people had ordered that regard should be paid to

his suit for the consulate at the next election, though he was not

present; that, however, he had patiently submitted to this loss of

honour for the sake of the republic; that when he wrote letters to the

senate, requiring that all persons should resign the command of their

armies, he did not obtain even that request; that levies were made

throughout Italy; that the two legions which had been taken from him,

under the pretence of the Parthian war, were kept at home, and that the

state was in arms. To what did all these things tend, unless to his

ruin? But, nevertheless, he was ready to condescend to any terms, and to

endure everything for the sake of the republic. Let Pompey go to his own

province; let them both disband their armies; let all persons in Italy

lay down their arms; let all fears be removed from the city; let free

elections, and the whole republic be resigned to the direction of the

senate and Roman people. That these things might be the more easily

performed, and conditions secured and confirmed by oath, either let

Pompey come to Caesar, or allow Caesar to go to him; it might be that

all their disputes would be settled by an interview."

X.--Roscius and Lucius Caesar, having received this message, went to

Capua, where they met the consuls and Pompey, and declared to them

Caesar's terms. Having deliberated on the matter, they replied, and sent

written proposals to him by the same persons, the purport of which was,

that Caesar should return into Gaul, leave Ariminum, and disband his

army: if he complied with this, that Pompey would go to Spain. In the

meantime, until security was given that Caesar would perform his

promises, that the consuls and Pompey would not give over their levies.

XI.--It was not an equitable proposal, to require that Caesar should

quit Ariminum and return to his province; but that he [Pompey] should

himself retain his province and the legions that belonged to another,

and desire that Caesar's army should be disbanded, whilst he himself was

making new levies: and that he should merely promise to go to his

province, without naming the day on which he would set out; so that if

he should not set out till after Caesar's consulate expired, yet he

would not appear bound by any religious scruples about asserting a

falsehood. But his not granting time for a conference, nor promising to

set out to meet him, made the expectation of peace appear very hopeless.

Caesar, therefore, sent Marcus Antonius, with five cohorts from Ariminum

to Arretium; he himself stayed at Ariminum with two legions, with the

intention of raising levies there. He secured Pisaurus, Fanum, and

Ancona, with a cohort each.

XII.--In the meantime, being informed that Thermus the praetor was in

possession of Iguvium, with five cohorts, and was fortifying the town,

but that the affections of all the inhabitants were very well inclined

towards himself; he detached Curio with three cohorts, which he had at

Ariminum and Pisaurus. Upon notice of his approach, Thermus, distrusting

the affections of the townsmen, drew his cohorts out of it, and made his

escape; his soldiers deserted him on the road, and returned home. Curio

recovered Iguvium, with the cheerful concurrence of all the inhabitants.

Caesar, having received an account of this, and relying on the

affections of the municipal towns, drafted all the cohorts of the

thirteenth legion from the garrisons, and set out for Auximum, a town

into which Attius had brought his cohorts, and of which he had taken

possession, and from which he had sent senators round about the country

of Picenum, to raise new levies.

XIII.--Upon news of Caesar's approach, the senate of Auximum went in a

body to Attius Varus; and told him that it was not a subject for them to

determine upon: yet neither they, nor the rest of the freemen would

suffer Caius Caesar, a general, who had merited so well of the republic,

after performing such great achievements, to be excluded from their town

and walls; wherefore he ought to pay some regard to the opinion of

posterity, and his own danger. Alarmed at this declaration, Attius Varus

drew out of the town the garrison which he had introduced, and fled. A

few of Caesar's front rank having pursued him, obliged him to halt, and

when the battle began, Varus is deserted by his troops: some of them

disperse to their homes, the rest come over to Caesar; and along with

them, Lucius Pupius, the chief centurion, is taken prisoner and brought

to Caesar. He had held the same rank before in Cneius Pompey's army. But

Caesar applauded the soldiers of Attius, set Pupius at liberty, returned

thanks to the people of Auximum, and promised to be grateful for their

conduct.

XIV.--Intelligence of this being brought to Rome, so great a panic

spread on a sudden that when Lentulus, the consul, came to open the

treasury, to deliver money to Pompey by the senate's decree, immediately

on opening the hallowed door he fled from the city. For it was falsely

rumoured that Caesar was approaching, and that his cavalry were already

at the gates. Marcellus, his colleague, followed him, and so did most of

the magistrates. Cneius Pompey had left the city the day before, and was

on his march to those legions which he had received from Caesar, and had

disposed in winter quarters in Apulia. The levies were stopped within

the city. No place on this side of Capua was thought secure. At Capua

they first began to take courage and to rally, and determined to raise

levies in the colonies, which had been sent thither by the Julian law:

and Lentulus brought into the public market-place the gladiators which

Caesar maintained there for the entertainment of the people, and

confirmed them in their liberty, and gave them horses and ordered them

to attend him; but afterwards, being warned by his friends that this

action was censured by the judgment of all, he distributed them among

the slaves of the districts of Campania, to keep guard there.

XV.--Caesar, having moved forward from Auximum, traversed the whole

country of Picenum. All the governors in these countries most cheerfully

received him, and aided his army with every necessary. Ambassadors came

to him even from Cingulum, a town which Labienus had laid out and built

at his own expense, and offered most earnestly to comply with his

orders. He demanded soldiers: they sent them. In the meantime, the

twelfth legion came to join Caesar; with these two he marched to

Asculum, the chief town of Picenum. Lentulus Spinther occupied that town

with ten cohorts; but, on being informed of Caesar's approach, he fled

from the town, and, in attempting to bring off his cohorts with him, was

deserted by a great part of his men. Being left on the road with a small

number, he fell in with Vibullius Rufus, who was sent by Pompey into

Picenum to confirm the people [in their allegiance]. Vibullius, being

informed by him of the transactions in Picenum, takes his soldiers from

him and dismisses him. He collects, likewise, from the neighbouring

countries, as many cohorts as he can from Pompey's new levies. Amongst

them he meets with Ulcilles Hirrus fleeing from Camerinum, with six

cohorts, which he had in the garrison there; by a junction with which he

made up thirteen cohorts. With them he marched by hasty journeys to

Corfinium, to Domitius Aenobarbus, and informed him that Caesar was

advancing with two legions. Domitius had collected about twenty cohorts

from Alba, and the Marsians, Pelignians, and neighbouring states.

XVI.--Caesar, having recovered Asculum and driven out Lentulus, ordered

the soldiers that had deserted from him to be sought out and a muster to

be made; and, having delayed for one day there to provide corn, he

marched to Corfinium. On his approach, five cohorts, sent by Domitius

from the town, were breaking down a bridge which was over the river, at

three miles' distance from it. An engagement taking place there with

Caesar's advanced-guard, Domitius's men were quickly beaten off from the

bridge and retreated precipitately into the town. Caesar, having marched

his legions over, halted before the town and encamped close by the

walls.

XVII.--Domitius, upon observing this, sent messengers well acquainted

with the country, encouraged by a promise of being amply rewarded, with

despatches to Pompey to Apulia, to beg and entreat him to come to his

assistance. That Caesar could be easily enclosed by the two armies,

through the narrowness of the country, and prevented from obtaining

supplies: unless he did so, that he and upwards of thirty cohorts, and a

great number of senators and Roman knights, would be in extreme danger.

In the meantime he encouraged his troops, disposed engines on the walls,

and assigned to each man a particular part of the city to defend. In a

speech to the soldiers he promised them lands out of his own estate; to

every private soldier four acres, and a corresponding share to the

centurions and veterans.

XVIII.--In the meantime, word was brought to Caesar that the people of

Sulmo, a town about seven miles distant from Corfinium, were ready to

obey his orders, but were prevented by Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and

Attius, a Pelignian, who were in possession of the town with a garrison

of seven cohorts. He sent Marcus Antonius thither, with five cohorts of

the eighth legion. The inhabitants, as soon as they saw our standards,

threw open their gates, and all the people, both citizens and soldiers,

went out to meet and welcome Antonius. Lucretius and Attius leaped off

the walls. Attius, being brought before Antonius, begged that he might

be sent to Caesar. Antonius returned the same day on which he had set

out with the cohorts and Attius. Caesar added these cohorts to his own

army, and sent Attius away in safety. The three first days Caesar

employed in fortifying his camp with strong works, in bringing in corn

from the neighbouring free towns, and waiting for the rest of his

forces. Within the three days the eighth legion came to him, and

twenty-two cohorts of the new levies in Gaul, and about three hundred

horse from the king of Noricum. On their arrival he made a second camp

on another part of the town, and gave the command of it to Curio. He

determined to surround the town with a rampart and turrets during the

remainder of the time. Nearly at the time when the greatest part of the

work was completed, all the messengers sent to Pompey returned.

XIX.--Having read Pompey's letter, Domitius, concealing the truth, gave

out in council that Pompey would speedily come to their assistance; and

encouraged them not to despond, but to provide everything necessary for

the defence of the town. He held private conferences with a few of his

most intimate friends, and determined on the design of fleeing. As

Domitius's countenance did not agree with his words, and he did

everything with more confusion and fear than he had shown on the

preceding days, and as he had several private meetings with his friends,

contrary to his usual practice, in order to take their advice, and as he

avoided all public councils and assemblies of the people, the truth

could be no longer hid nor dissembled; for Pompey had written back in

answer, "That he would not put matters to the last hazard; that Domitius

had retreated into the town of Corfinium, without either his advice or

consent. Therefore, if any opportunity should offer, he [Domitius]

should come to him with the whole force." But the blockade and works

round the town prevented his escape.

XX.--Domitius's design being noised abroad, the soldiers in Confinium

[**error in original: should be CORFINIUM] early in the evening began to

mutiny, and held a conference with each other by their tribunes and

centurions, and the most respectable amongst themselves: "that they were

besieged by Caesar; that his works and fortifications were almost

finished; that their general, Domitius, on whose hopes and expectations

they had confided, had thrown them off, and was meditating his own

escape; that they ought to provide for their own safety." At first the

Marsians differed in opinion, and possessed themselves of that part of

the town which they thought the strongest. And so violent a dispute

arose between them, that they attempted to fight and decide it by arms.

However, in a little time, by messengers sent from one side to the

other, they were informed of Domitius's meditated flight, of which they

were previously ignorant. Therefore they all with one consent brought

Domitius into public view, gathered round him, and guarded him; and sent

deputies out of their number to Caesar, to say that they were ready to

throw open their gates, to do whatever he should order, and to deliver

up Domitius alive into his hands.

XXI.--Upon intelligence of these matters, though Caesar thought it of

great consequence to become master of the town as soon as possible, and

to transfer the cohorts to his own camp, lest any change should be

wrought on their inclinations by bribes, encouragement, or fictitious

messages, because in war great events are often brought about by

trifling circumstances; yet, dreading lest the town should be plundered

by the soldiers entering into it, and taking advantage of the darkness

of the night, he commended the persons who came to him, and sent them

back to the town, and ordered the gates and walls to be secured. He

disposed his soldiers on the works, which he had begun, not at certain

intervals, as was his practice before, but in one continued range of

sentinels and stations, so that they touched each other, and formed a

circle round the whole fortification; he ordered the tribunes and

general officers to ride round; and exhorted them not only to be on

their guard against sallies from the town, but also to watch that no

single person should get out privately. Nor was any man so negligent or

drowsy as to sleep that night. To so great height was their expectation

raised, that they were carried away, heart and soul, each to different

objects, what would become of the Corfinians, what of Domitius, what of

Lentulus, what of the rest; what event would be the consequence of

another.

XXII.--About the fourth watch, Lentulus Spinther said to our sentinels

and guards from the walls, that he desired to have an interview with

Caesar, if permission were given him. Having obtained it, he was

escorted out of town; nor did the soldiers of Domitius leave him till

they brought him into Caesar's presence. He pleaded with Caesar for his

life, and entreated him to spare him, and reminded him of their former

friendship; and acknowledged that Caesar's favours to him were very

great; in that through his interest he had been admitted into the

college of priests; in that after his praetorship he had been appointed

to the government of Spain; in that he had been assisted by him in his

suit for the consulate. Caesar interrupted him in his speech, and told

him, "that he had not left his province to do mischief [to any man], but

to protect himself from the injuries of his enemies; to restore to their

dignity the tribunes of the people who had been driven out of the city

on his account, and to assert his own liberty, and that of the Roman

people, who were oppressed by a few factious men." Encouraged by this

address, Lentulus begged leave to return to the town, that the security

which he had obtained for himself might be an encouragement to the rest

to hope for theirs; saying that some were so terrified that they were

induced to make desperate attempts on their own lives. Leave being

granted him, he departed.

XXIII.--When day appeared Caesar ordered all the senators and their

children, the tribunes of the soldiers, and the Roman knights, to be

brought before him. Among the persons of senatorial rank were Lucius

Domitius, Publius Lentulus Spinther, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, Sextus

Quintilius Varus, the quaestor, and Lucius Rubrius, besides the son of

Domitius, and several other young men, and a great number of Roman

knights and burgesses, whom Domitius had summoned from the municipal

towns. When they were brought before him he protected them from the

insolence and taunts of the soldiers; told them in few words that they

had not made him a grateful return, on their part, for his very

extraordinary kindness to them, and dismissed them all in safety. Sixty

sestertia, which Domitius had brought with him and lodged in the public

treasury, being brought to Caesar by the magistrates of Corfinium, he

gave them back to Domitius, that he might not appear more moderate with

respect to the life of men than in money matters, though he knew that it

was public money, and had been given by Pompey to pay his army. He

ordered Domitius's soldiers to take the oath to himself, and that day

decamped and performed the regular march. He stayed only seven days

before Corfinium, and marched into Apulia through the country of the

Marrucinians, Frentanians, and Larinates.

XXIV.--Pompey, being informed of what had passed at Corfinium, marches

from Luceria to Canusium, and thence to Brundusium. He orders all the

forces raised everywhere by the new levies to repair to him. He gives

arms to the slaves that attended the flocks, and appoints horses for

them. Of these he made up about three hundred horse. Lucius, the

praetor, fled from Alba, with six cohorts: Rutilus Lupus, the praetor,

from Tarracina, with three. These having descried Caesar's cavalry at a

distance, which were commanded by Bivius Curius, and having deserted the

praetor, carried their colours to Curius and went over to him. In like

manner during the rest of his march, several cohorts fell in with the

main body of Caesar's army, others with his horse. Cneius Magius, from

Cremona, engineer-general to Pompey, was taken prisoner on the road and

brought to Caesar, but sent back by him to Pompey with this message: "As

hitherto he had not been allowed an interview, and was now on his march

to him at Brundusium, that it deeply concerned the commonwealth and

general safety that he should have an interview with Pompey; and that

the same advantage could not be gained at a great distance when the

proposals were conveyed to them by others, as if terms were argued by

them both in person."

XXV.--Having delivered this message he marched to Brundusium with six

legions, four of them veterans: the rest those which he had raised in

the late levy and completed on his march, for he had sent all Domitius's

cohorts immediately from Corfinium to Sicily. He discovered that the

consuls were gone to Dyrrachium with a considerable part of the army,

and that Pompey remained at Brundusium with twenty cohorts; but could

not find out, for a certainty, whether Pompey stayed behind to keep

possession of Brundusium, that he might the more easily command the

whole Adriatic sea, with the extremities of Italy and the coast of

Greece, and be able to conduct the war on either side of it, or whether

he remained there for want of shipping; and, being afraid that Pompey

would come to the conclusion that he ought not to relinquish Italy, he

determined to deprive him of the means of communication afforded by the

harbour of Brundusium. The plan of his work was as follows:--Where the

mouth of the port was narrowest he threw up a mole of earth on either

side, because in these places the sea was shallow. Having gone out so

far that the mole could not be continued in the deep water, he fixed

double floats, thirty feet on either side, before the mole. These he

fastened with four anchors at the four corners, that they might not be

carried away by the waves. Having completed and secured them, he then

joined to them other floats of equal size. These he covered over with

earth and mould, that he might not be prevented from access to them to

defend them, and in the front and on both sides he protected them with a

parapet of wicker work; and on every fourth one raised a turret, two

stories high, to secure them the better from being attacked by the

shipping and set on fire.

XXVI.--To counteract this, Pompey fitted out large merchant ships, which

he found in the harbour of Brundusium: on them he erected turrets three

stories high, and, having furnished them with several engines and all

sorts of weapons, drove them amongst Caesar's works, to break through

the floats and interrupt the works; thus there happened skirmishes every

day at a distance with slings, arrows, and other weapons. Caesar

conducted matters as if he thought that the hopes of peace were not yet

to be given up. And though he was very much surprised that Magius, whom

he had sent to Pompey with a message, was not sent back to him; and

though his attempting a reconciliation often retarded the vigorous

prosecution of his plans, yet he thought that he ought by all means to

persevere in the same line of conduct. He therefore sent Caninius

Rebilus to have an interview with Scribonius Libo, his intimate friend

and relation. He charges him to exhort Libo to effect a peace, but,

above all things, requires that he should be admitted to an interview

with Pompey. He declared that he had great hopes, if that were allowed

him, that the consequence would be that both parties would lay down

their arms on equal terms; that a great share of the glory and

reputation of that event would redound to Libo, if, through his advice

and agency, hostilities should be ended. Libo, having parted from the

conference with Caninius, went to Pompey, and, shortly after, returns

with answer that, as the consuls were absent, no treaty of compositions

could be engaged in without them. Caesar therefore thought it time at

length to give over the attempt which he had often made in vain, and act

with energy in the war.

XXVII.--When Caesar's works were nearly half finished, and after nine

days were spent in them, the ships which had conveyed the first division

of the army to Dyrrachium being sent back by the consuls, returned to

Brundusium. Pompey, either frightened at Caesar's works or determined

from the beginning to quit Italy, began to prepare for his departure on

the arrival of the ships; and the more effectually to retard Caesar's

attack, lest his soldiers should force their way into the town at the

moment of his departure, he stopped up the gates, built walls across the

streets and avenues, sunk trenches across the ways, and in them fixed

palisadoes and sharp stakes, which he made level with the ground by

means of hurdles and clay. But he barricaded with large beams fastened

in the ground and sharpened at the ends two passages and roads without

the walls, which led to the port. After making these arrangements, he

ordered his soldiers to go on board without noise, and disposed here and

there, on the wall and turrets, some light-armed veterans, archers and

slingers. These he designed to call off by a certain signal, when all

the soldiers were embarked, and left row-galleys for them in a secure

place.

XXVIII.--The people of Brundusium, irritated by the insolence of

Pompey's soldiers, and the insults received from Pompey himself, were in

favour of Caesar's party. Therefore, as soon as they were aware of

Pompey's departure, whilst his men were running up and down, and busied

about their voyage, they made signs from the tops of the houses: Caesar,

being apprized of the design by them, ordered scaling ladders to be got

ready, and his men to take arms, that he might not lose any opportunity

of coming to an action. Pompey weighed anchor at nightfall. The soldiers

who had been posted on the wall to guard it, were called off by the

signal which had been agreed on, and knowing the roads, ran down to the

ships. Caesar's soldiers fixed their ladders and scaled the walls: but

being cautioned by the people to beware of the hidden stakes and covered

trenches, they halted, and being conducted by the inhabitants by a long

circuit, they reached the port, and captured with their long boats and

small craft two of Pompey's ships, full of soldiers, which had struck

against Caesar's moles.

XXIX.-Though Caesar highly approved of collecting a fleet, and crossing

the sea, and pursuing Pompey before he could strengthen himself with his

transmarine auxiliaries, with the hope of bringing the war to a

conclusion, yet he dreaded the delay and length of time necessary to

effect it: because Pompey, by collecting all his ships, had deprived him

of the means of pursuing him at present. The only resource left to

Caesar, was to wait for a fleet from the distant regions of Gaul,

Picenum, and the straits of Gibraltar. But this, on account of the

season of the year, appeared tedious and troublesome. He was unwilling

that, in the meantime, the veteran army, and the two Spains, one of

which was bound to Pompey by the strongest obligations, should be

confirmed in his interest; that auxiliaries and cavalry should be

provided and Gaul and Italy reduced in his absence.

XXX.--Therefore, for the present, he relinquished all intention of

pursuing Pompey, and resolved to march to Spain, and commanded the

magistrates of the free towns to procure him ships, and to have them

conveyed to Brundusium. He detached Valerius, his lieutenant, with one

legion to Sardinia; Curio, the proprietor, to Sicily with three legions;

and ordered him, when he had recovered Sicily, to immediately transport

his army to Africa. Marcus Cotta was at this time governor of Sardinia:

Marcus Cato, of Sicily: and Tubero, by the lots, should have had the

government of Africa. The Caralitani, as soon as they heard that

Valerius was sent against them, even before he left Italy, of their own

accord drove Cotta out of the town; who, terrified because he understood

that the whole province was combined [against him], fled from Sardinia

to Africa. Cato was in Sicily, repairing the old ships of war, and

demanding new ones from the states, and these things he performed with

great zeal. He was raising levies of Roman citizens, among the Lucani

and Brutii, by his lieutenants, and exacting a certain quota of horse

and foot from the states of Sicily. When these things were nearly

completed, being informed of Curio's approach, he made a complaint that

he was abandoned and betrayed by Pompey, who had undertaken an

unnecessary war, without making any preparation, and when questioned by

him and other members in the senate, had assured them that every thing

was ready and provided for the war. After having made these complaints

in a public assembly, he fled from his province.

XXXI.--Valerius found Sardinia, and Curio, Sicily, deserted by their

governors when they arrived there with their armies. When Tubero arrived

in Africa, he found Attius Varus in the government of the province, who,

having lost his cohorts, as already related, at Auximum, had straightway

fled to Africa, and finding it without a governor, had seized it of his

own accord, and making levies, had raised two legions. From his

acquaintance with the people and country, and his knowledge of that

province, he found the means of effecting this; because a few years

before, at the expiration of his praetorship, he had obtained that

province. He, when Tubero came to Utica with his fleet, prevented his

entering the port or town, and did not suffer his son, though labouring

under sickness, to set foot on shore; but obliged him to weigh anchor

and quit the place.

XXXIL.--When these affairs were despatched, Caesar, that there might be

an intermission from labour for the rest of the season, drew off his

soldiers to the nearest municipal towns, and set off in person for Rome.

Having assembled the senate, he reminded them of the injustice of his

enemies; and told them, "That he aimed at no extraordinary honour, but

had waited for the time appointed by law, for standing candidate for the

consulate, being contented with what was allowed to every citizen. That

a bill had been carried by the ten tribunes of the people

(notwithstanding the resistance of his enemies, and a very violent

opposition from Cato, who in his usual manner, consumed the day by a

tedious harangue) that he should be allowed to stand candidate, though

absent, even in the consulship of Pompey; and if the latter disapproved

of the bill, why did he allow it to pass? if he approved of it, why

should he debar him [Caesar] from the people's favour? He made mention

of his own patience, in that he had freely proposed that all armies

should be disbanded, by which he himself would suffer the loss both of

dignity and honour. He urged the virulence of his enemies, who refused

to comply with what they required from others, and had rather that all

things should be thrown into confusion, than that they should lose their

power and their armies. He expatiated on their injustice, in taking away

his legions: their cruelty and insolence in abridging the privileges of

the tribunes; the proposals he had made, and his entreaties of an

interview, which had been refused him: For which reasons, he begged and

desired that they would undertake the management of the republic, and

unite with him in the administration of it. But if through fear they

declined it, he would not be a burden to them, but take the management

of it on himself. That deputies ought to be sent to Pompey, to propose a

reconciliation; as he did not regard what Pompey had lately asserted in

the senate, that authority was acknowledged to be vested in those

persons to whom ambassadors were sent, and fear implied in those that

sent them. That these were the sentiments of low, weak minds: that for

his part, as he had made it his study to surpass others in glory, so he

was desirous of excelling them in justice and equity."

XXXIII.--The senate approved of sending deputies, but none could be

found fit to execute the commission: for every person, from his own

private fears, declined the office. For Pompey, on leaving the city, had

declared in the open senate, that he would hold in the same degree of

estimation, those who stayed in Rome and those in Caesar's camp. Thus

three days were wasted in disputes and excuses. Besides, Lucius

Metellus, one of the tribunes, was suborned by Caesar's enemies, to

prevent this, and to embarrass everything else which Caesar should

propose. Caesar having discovered his intention, after spending several

days to no purpose, left the city, in order that he might not lose any

more time, and went to Transalpine Gaul, without effecting what he had

intended.

XXXIV.--On his arrival there, he was informed that, Vibullius Rufus,

whom he had taken a few days before at Corfinium, and set at liberty,

was sent by Pompey into Spain; and that Domitius also was gone to seize

Massilia with seven row-galleys, which were fitted up by some private

persons at Igilium and Cosa, and which he had manned with his own

slaves, freedmen, and colonists: and that some young noblemen of

Massilia had been sent before him; whom Pompey, when leaving Rome had

exhorted, that the late services of Caesar should not erase from their

minds the memory of his former favours. On receiving this message, the

Massilians had shut their gates against Caesar, and invited over to them

the Albici, who had formerly been in alliance with them, and who

inhabited the mountains that overhung Massilia: they had likewise

conveyed the corn from the surrounding country, and from all the forts

into the city; had opened armouries in the city: and were repairing the

walls, the fleet, and the gates.

XXXV.--Caesar sent for fifteen of the principal persons of Massilia to

attend him. To prevent the war commencing among them, he remonstrates

[in the following language]; "that they ought to follow the precedent

set by all Italy, rather than submit to the will of any one man." He

made use of such arguments as he thought would tend to bring them to

reason. The deputies reported his speech to their countrymen, and by the

authority of the state bring him back this answer: "That they understood

that the Roman people was divided into two factions: that they had

neither judgment nor abilities to decide which had the juster cause; but

that the heads of these factions were Cneius Pompey and Caius Caesar,

the two patrons of the state: the former of whom had granted to their

state the lands of the Volcae Arecomici, and Helvii; the latter had

assigned them a part of his conquests in Gaul, and had augmented their

revenue. Wherefore, having received equal favours from both, they ought

to show equal affection to both, and assist neither against the other,

nor admit either into their city or harbours."

XXXVI.--Whilst this treaty was going forward, Domitius arrived at

Massilia with his fleet, and was received into the city, and made

governor of it. The chief management of the war was entrusted to him. At

his command they send the fleet to all parts; they seize all the

merchantmen they could meet with, and carry them into the harbour; they

apply the nails, timber, and rigging, with which they were furnished to

rig and refit their other vessels. They lay up in the public stores, all

the corn that was found in the ships, and reserve the rest of their

lading and convoy for the siege of the town, should such an event take

place. Provoked at such ill treatment, Caesar led three legions against

Massilia, and resolved to provide turrets, and vinae to assault the

town, and to build twelve ships at Arelas, which being completed and

rigged in thirty days (from the time the timber was cut down), and being

brought to Massilia, he put under the command of Decimus Brutus; and

left Caius Trebonius his lieutenant, to invest the city.

XXXVII.--Whilst he was preparing and getting these things in readiness,

he sent Caius Fabius one of his lieutenants into Spain with three

legions, which he had disposed in winter quarters in Narbo, and the

neighbouring country; and ordered him immediately to seize the passes of

the Pyrenees, which were at that time occupied by detachments from

Lucius Afranius, one of Pompey's lieutenants. He desired the other

legions, which were passing the winter at a great distance, to follow

close after him. Fabius, according to his orders, by using expedition,

dislodged the party from the hills, and by hasty marches came up with

the army of Afranius.

XXXVIII.--On the arrival of Vibullius Rufus, whom, we have already

mentioned, Pompey had sent into Spain, Afranius, Petreius, and Varro,

his lieutenants (one of whom had the command of Hither Spain, with three

legions; the second of the country from the forest of Castulo to the

river Guadiana with two legions; the third from the river Guadiana to

the country of the Vettones and Lusitania, with the like number of

legions), divided amongst themselves their respective departments.

Petreius was to march from Lusitania through the Vettones, and join

Afranius with all his forces; Varro was to guard all Further Spain with

what legions he had. These matters being settled, reinforcements of

horse and foot were demanded from Lusitania, by Petreius; from the

Celtiberi, Cantabri, and all the barbarous nations which border on the

ocean, by Afranius. When they were raised, Petreius immediately marched

through the Vettones to Afranius. They resolved by joint consent to

carry on the war in the vicinity of Ilerda, on account of the advantages

of its situation.

XXXIX.--Afranius, as above mentioned, had three legions, Petreius two.

There were besides about eighty cohorts raised in Hither and Further

Spain (of which, the troops belonging to the former province had

shields, those of the latter targets), and about five thousand horse

raised in both provinces. Caesar had sent his legions into Spain, with

about six thousand auxiliary foot, and three thousand horse, which had

served under him in all his former wars, and the same number from Gaul,

which he himself had provided, having expressly called out all the most

noble and valiant men of each state. The bravest of these were from the

Aquitani and the mountaineers, who border on the Province in Gaul. He

had been informed that Pompey was marching through Mauritania with his

legions to Spain, and would shortly arrive. He at the same time borrowed

money from the tribunes and centurions, which he distributed amongst his

soldiers. By this proceeding he gained two points; he secured the

interest of the centurions by this pledge in his hands, and by his

liberality he purchased the affections of his army.

XL.--Fabius sounded the inclinations of the neighbouring states by

letters and messengers. He had made two bridges over the river Segre, at

the distance of four miles from each other. He sent foraging parties

over these bridges, because he had already consumed all the forage that

was on his side of the river. The generals of Pompey's army did almost

the same thing, and for the same reason: and the horse had frequent

skirmishes with each other. When two of Fabius's legions had, as was

their constant practice, gone forth as the usual protection to the

foragers, and had crossed the river, and the baggage, and all the horse

were following them, on a sudden, from the weight of the cattle, and the

mass of water, the bridge fell, and all the horse were cut off from the

main army, which being known to Petreius and Afranius, from the timber

and hurdles that were carried down the river, Afranius immediately

crossed his own bridge, which communicated between his camp and the

town, with four legions and all the cavalry, and marched against

Fabius's two legions. When his approach was announced, Lucius Plancus,

who had the command of those legions, compelled by the emergency, took

post on a rising ground; and drew up his army with two fronts, that it

might not be surrounded by the cavalry. Thus, though engaged with

superior numbers, he sustained the furious charge of the legions and the

horse. When the battle was begun by the horse, there were observed at a

distance by both sides the colours of two legions, which Caius Fabius

had sent round by the further bridge to reinforce our men, suspecting,

as the event verified, that the enemy's generals would take advantage of

the opportunity which fortune had put in their way, to attack our men.

Their approach put an end to the battle, and each general led back his

legions to their respective camps.

XLI.--In two days after Caesar came to the camp with nine hundred horse,

which he had retained for a bodyguard. The bridge which had been broken

down by the storm was almost repaired, and he ordered it to be finished

in the night. Being acquainted with the nature of the country, he left

behind him six cohorts to guard the bridge, the camp, and all his

baggage, and the next day set off in person for Ilerda, with all his

forces drawn up in three lines, and halted just before the camp of

Afranius, and having remained there a short time under arms, he offered

him battle on equal terms. When this offer was made, Afranius drew out

his forces, and posted them on the middle of a hill, near his camp. When

Caesar perceived that Afranius declined coming to an engagement, he

resolved to encamp at somewhat less than half a mile's distance from the

very foot of the mountain; and that his soldiers whilst engaged in their

works, might not be terrified by any sudden attack of the enemy, or

disturbed in their work, he ordered them not to fortify it with a wall,

which must rise high, and be seen at a distance, but draw, on the front

opposite the enemy, a trench fifteen feet broad. The first and second

lines continued under arms as was from the first appointed. Behind them

the third line was carrying on the work without being seen; so that the

whole was completed before Afranius discovered that the camp was being

fortified.

XLII.--In the evening Caesar drew his legions within this trench, and

rested them under arms the next night. The day following he kept his

whole army within it, and as it was necessary to bring materials from a

considerable distance, he for the present pursued the same plan in his

work; and to each legion, one after the other, he assigned one side of

the camp to fortify, and ordered trenches of the same magnitude to be

cut: he kept the rest of the legions under arms without baggage to

oppose the enemy. Afranius and Petreius, to frighten us and obstruct the

work, drew out their forces at the very foot of the mountain, and

challenged us to battle. Caesar, however, did not interrupt his work,

relying on the protection of the three legions, and the strength of the

fosse. After staying for a short time, and advancing no great distance

from the bottom of the hill, they led back their forces to their camp.

The third day Caesar fortified his camp with a rampart, and ordered the

other cohorts which he had left in the upper camp, and his baggage to be

removed to it.

XLIIL-Between the town of Ilerda and the next hill, on which Afranius

and Petreius were encamped, there was a plain about three hundred paces

broad, and near the middle of it an eminence somewhat raised above the

level: Caesar hoped that if he could get possession of this and fortify

it, he should be able to cut off the enemy from the town, the bridge,

and all the stores which they had laid up in the town. In expectation of

this he led three legions out of the camp, and, drawing up his army in

an advantageous position, he ordered the advanced men of one legion to

hasten forward and seize the eminence. Upon intelligence of this the

cohorts which were on guard before Afranius's camp were instantly sent a

nearer way to occupy the same post. The two parties engage, and as

Afranius's men had reached the eminence first, our men were repulsed,

and, on a reinforcement being sent, they were obliged to turn their

backs and retreat to the standards of legions.

XLIV.--The manner of fighting of those soldiers was to run forward with

great impetuosity and boldly take a post, and not to keep their ranks

strictly, but to fight in small scattered parties: if hard pressed they

thought it no disgrace to retire and give up the post, being accustomed

to this manner of fighting among the Lusitanians and other barbarous

nations; for it commonly happens that soldiers are strongly influenced

by the customs of those countries in which they have spent much time.

This method, however, alarmed our men, who were not used to such a

description of warfare. For they imagined that they were about to be

surrounded on their exposed flank by the single men who ran forward from

their ranks; and they thought it their duty to keep their ranks, and not

to quit their colours, nor, without good reason, to give up the post

which they had taken. Accordingly, when the advanced guard gave way, the

legion which was stationed on that wing did not keep its ground, but

retreated to the next hill.

XLV.--Almost the whole army being daunted at this, because it had

occurred contrary to their expectations and custom, Caesar encouraged

his men and led the ninth legion to their relief, and checked the

insolent and eager pursuit of the enemy, and obliged them, in their

turn, to show their backs and retreat to Ilerda, and take post under the

walls. But the soldiers of the ninth legion, being over zealous to

repair the dishonour which had been sustained, having rashly pursued the

fleeing enemy, advanced into disadvantageous ground and went up to the

foot of the mountain on which the town Ilerda was built. And when they

wished to retire they were again attacked by the enemy from the rising

ground. The place was craggy in the front and steep on either side, and

was so narrow that even three cohorts, drawn up in order of battle,

would fill it; but no relief could be sent on the flanks, and the horse

could be of no service to them when hard pressed. From the town, indeed,

the precipice inclined with a gentle slope for near four hundred paces.

Our men had to retreat this way, as they had, through their eagerness,

advanced too inconsiderately. The greatest contest was in this place,

which was much to the disadvantage of our troops, both on account of its

narrowness, and because they were posted at the foot of the mountain, so

that no weapon was thrown at them without effect: yet they exerted their

valour and patience, and bore every wound. The enemy's forces were

increasing, and cohorts were frequently sent to their aid from the camp

through the town, that fresh men might relieve the weary. Caesar was

obliged to do the same, and relieve the fatigued by sending cohorts to

that post.

XLVI.--After the battle had in this manner continued incessantly for

five hours, and our men had suffered much from superior numbers, having

spent all their javelins, they drew their swords and charged the enemy

up the hill, and, having killed a few, obliged the rest to fly. The

cohorts being beaten back to the wall, and some being driven by their

fears into the town, an easy retreat was afforded to our men. Our

cavalry also, on either flank, though stationed on sloping or low

ground, yet bravely struggled up to the top of the hill, and, riding

between the two armies, made our retreat more easy and secure. Such were

the various turns of fortune in the battle. In the first encounter about

seventy of our men fell: amongst them Quintus Fulgenius, first centurion

of the second line of the fourteenth legion, who, for his extraordinary

valour, had been promoted from the lower ranks to that post. About six

hundred were wounded. Of Afranius's party there were killed Titus

Caecilius, principal centurion, and four other centurions, and above two

hundred men.

XLVII.--But this opinion is spread abroad concerning this day, that each

party thought that they came off conquerors. Afranius's soldiers,

because, though they were esteemed inferior in the opinion of all, yet

they had stood our attack and sustained our charge, and, at first, had

kept the post and the hill which had been the occasion of the dispute;

and, in the first encounter, had obliged our men to fly: but ours,

because, notwithstanding the disadvantage of the ground and the

disparity of numbers, they had maintained the battle for five hours, had

advanced up the hill sword in hand, and had forced the enemy to fly from

the higher ground and driven them into the town. The enemy fortified the

hill, about which the contest had been, with strong works, and posted a

garrison on it.

XLVIII.--In two days after this transaction, there happened an

unexpected misfortune. For so great a storm arose, that it was agreed

that there were never seen higher floods in those countries; it swept

down the snow from all the mountains, and broke over the banks of the

river, and in one day carried away both the bridges which Fabius had

built,--a circumstance which caused great difficulties to Caesar's army.

For as our camp, as already mentioned, was pitched between two rivers,

the Segre and Cinca, and as neither of these could be forded for the

space of thirty miles, they were all of necessity confined within these

narrow limits. Neither could the states, which had espoused Caesar's

cause, furnish him with corn, nor the troops, which had gone far to

forage, return, as they were stopped by the waters: nor could the

convoys, coming from Italy and Gaul, make their way to the camp.

Besides, it was the most distressing season of the year, when there was

no corn in the blade, and it was nearly ripe: and the states were

exhausted, because Afranius had conveyed almost all the corn, before

Caesar's arrival, into Ilerda, and whatever he had left, had been

already consumed by Caesar. The cattle, which might have served as a

secondary resource against want, had been removed by the states to a

great distance on account of the war. They who had gone out to get

forage or corn, were chased by the light troops of the Lusitanians, and

the targeteers of Hither Spain, who were well acquainted with the

country, and could readily swim across the river, because it is the

custom of all those people not to join their armies without bladders.

XLIX.--But Afranius's army had abundance of everything; a great stock of

corn had been provided and laid in long before, a large quantity was

coming in from the whole province: they had a good store of forage. The

bridge of Ilerda afforded an opportunity of getting all these without

any danger, and the places beyond the bridge, to which Caesar had no

access, were as yet untouched.

L.--Those floods continued several days. Caesar endeavoured to repair

the bridges, but the height of the water did not allow him: and the

cohorts disposed along the banks did not suffer them to be completed;

and it was easy for them to prevent it, both from the nature of the

river and the height of the water, but especially because their darts

were thrown from the whole course of the bank on one confined spot; and

it was no easy matter at one and the same time to execute a work in a

very rapid flood, and to avoid the darts.

LI.--Intelligence was brought to Afranius that the great convoys, which

were on their march to Caesar, had halted at the river. Archers from the

Rutheni, and horse from the Gauls, with a long train of baggage,

according to the Gallic custom of travelling, had arrived there; there

were besides about six thousand people of all descriptions, with slaves

and freed men. But there was no order, or regular discipline, as every

one followed his own humour, and all travelled without apprehension,

taking the same liberty as on former marches. There were several young

noblemen, sons of senators, and of equestrian rank; there were

ambassadors from several states; there were lieutenants of Caesar's. The

river stopped them all. To attack them by surprise, Afranius set out in

the beginning of the night, with all his cavalry and three legions, and

sent the horse on before, to fall on them unawares; but the Gallic horse

soon got themselves in readiness, and attacked them. Though but few,

they withstood the vast number of the enemy, as long as they fought on

equal terms: but when the legions began to approach, having lost a few

men, they retreated to the next mountains. The delay occasioned by this

battle was of great importance to the security of our men; for having

gained time, they retired to the higher grounds. There were missing that

day about two hundred bow-men, a few horse, and an inconsiderable number

of servants and baggage.

LII.--However, by all these things, the price of provisions was raised,

which is commonly a disaster attendant, not only on a time of present

scarcity, but on the apprehension of future want. Provisions had now

reached fifty denarii each bushel; and the want of corn had diminished

the strength of the soldiers; and the inconveniences were increasing

every day: and so great an alteration was wrought in a few days, and

fortune had so changed sides, that our men had to struggle with the want

of every necessary; while the enemy had an abundant supply of all

things, and were considered to have the advantage. Caesar demanded from

those states which had acceded to his alliance, a supply of cattle, as

they had but little corn. He sent away the camp followers to the more

distant states, and endeavoured to remedy the present scarcity by every

resource in his power.

LIII.--Afranius and Petreius, and their friends, sent fuller and more

circumstantial accounts of these things to Rome, to their acquaintances.

Report exaggerated them so that the war appeared to be almost at an end.

When these letters and despatches were received at Rome, a great

concourse of people resorted to the house of Afranius, and

congratulations ran high: several went out of Italy to Cneius Pompey;

some of them, to be the first to bring him the intelligence; others,

that they might not be thought to have waited the issue of the war, and

to have come last of all.