virtuous mind, and exhibit a continuance of the Union as a primary
object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common government
can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to
mere speculation, in such a case, were criminal. We are authorized to
hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency
of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy
issue to the experiment. It is well worth a full and fair experiment.
With such powerful and obvious motives to union, affecting all parts of
our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its
impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the
patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to weaken its
bands.
In contemplating the causes which may disturb our Union, it occurs, as a
matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished
for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations--Northern and
Southern, Atlantic and Western--whence designing men may endeavor to
excite a belief that there is real difference of local interests and
views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence within
particular districts is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other
districts. You can not shield yourselves too much against the jealousies
and heart-burnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend
to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by
fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our Western country have lately
had a useful lesson on this head; they have seen in the negotiation by
the Executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the Senate, of the
treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event
throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the
suspicions propagated among them, of a policy in the general government,
and in the Atlantic States, unfriendly to their interests in regard to
the Mississippi; they have been witnesses to the formation of two
treaties--that with Great Britain and that with Spain--which secure to
them everything they could desire in respect to our foreign relations,
toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely
for the preservation of these advantages on the Union by which they were
procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such
there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them
with aliens?
To the efficacy and permanency of your Union, a government for the whole
is indispensable. No alliance, however strict, between the parts, can be
an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions
and interruptions which all alliances, in all time, have experienced.
Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first
essay, by the adoption of a constitution of government better calculated
than your former for an intimate Union, and for the efficacious
management of your common concerns. This government, the offspring of
your own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full
investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its
principles, in the distribution of its powers, uniting security with
energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendment,
has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its
authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are
duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of liberty. The basis of our
political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their
constitutions of government; but the constitution which at any time
exists, till changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole
people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and
the right of the people to establish government presupposes the duty of
every individual to obey the established government.
All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and
associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design
to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberation and
action of the constituted authorities, are destructive to this
fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize
faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to put in the
place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party--often a
small but artful and enterprising minority of the community--and,
according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the
public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous
projects of faction rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome
plans, digested by common counsels, and modified by mutual interests.
However combinations or associations of the above description may now
and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and
things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and
unprincipled men will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and
to usurp for themselves the reins of government; destroying, afterward,
the very engine which had lifted them to unjust dominion.
Toward the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your
present happy state, it is requisite, not only that you steadily
discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but
also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its
principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be
to effect, in the forms of the constitution, alterations which will
impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what cannot be
directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited,
remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true
character of governments as of other human institutions; that experience
is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the
existing constitution of a country; that facility in changes, upon the
credit of mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change, from
the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember,
especially, that for the efficient management of your common interests,
in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is
consistent with the perfect security of liberty is indispensable.
Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly
distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little
else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the
enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the
limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and
tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.
I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with
particular reference to the founding of them on geographical
discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn
you, in the most solemn manner, against the baneful effects of the
spirit of party generally.
This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its
root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists, under
different shapes, in all governments, more or less stifled, controlled,
or repressed; but in those of the popular form it is seen in its
greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.
The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the
spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which, in different
ages and countries, has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is
itself a frightful despotism. But this leads, at length, to a more
formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result
gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the
absolute power of an individual; and, sooner or later, the chief of some
prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors,
turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation on the ruins
of public liberty.
Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which,
nevertheless, ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and
continued mischiefs of the spirit of party are sufficient to make it the
interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.
It serves always to distract the public councils and enfeeble the public
administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies
and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another;
foments, occasionally, riot and insurrection. It opens the door to
foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the
government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the
policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will
of another.
There is an opinion that parties, in free countries, are useful checks
upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the
spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in
governments of a monarchial cast, patriotism may look with indulgence,
if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular
character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be
encouraged. From their natural tendency, it is certain there will always
be enough of that spirit for every salutatory purpose. And there being
constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be by force of public
opinion to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it
demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest,
instead of warming, it should consume.
It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking, in a free
country, should inspire caution in those intrusted with its
administration, to confine themselves within their respective
constitutional spheres, avoiding, in the exercise of the powers of one
department, to encroach upon another. The spirit of encroachment tends
to consolidate the powers of all the departments into one, and thus to
create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just
estimate of that love of power and proneness to abuse it which
predominate in the human heart is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth
of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of
political power, by dividing and distributing it into different
depositories, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal,
against invasion by the others, has been evinced by experiments, ancient
and modern--some of them in our own country and under our own eyes. To
preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the
opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the
constitutional powers be, in any particular, wrong, let it be corrected
by an amendment in the way which the constitution designates. But let
there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may
be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free
governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly
overbalance, in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which
the use can, at any time, yield.
Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity,
religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man
claim the tribute of patriotism who should labor to subvert these great
pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and
citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to
respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their
connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked,
Where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the
sense of religious obligation _desert_ the oaths which are the
instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with
caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without
religion. Whatever maybe conceded to the influence of refined education
on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to
expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious
principles.
It is substantially true, that virtue or morality is a necessary spring
of popular government. The rule, indeed, extends with more or less force
to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it
can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the
fabric?
Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the
general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as a structure of a
government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public
opinion should be enlightened.
As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public
credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as
possible; avoiding occasions of expense by cultivating peace, but
remembering, also, that timely disbursements to prepare for danger
frequently prevent much greater disbursements to repel it; avoiding,
likewise, the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of
expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the
debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned; not ungenerously
throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear. The
execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is
necessary that public opinion should cooperate. To facilitate to them
the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should
practically bear in mind that toward the payment of debts there must be
revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; that no taxes can be
devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that the
intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the proper
objects (which is always a choice of difficulties), ought to be a
decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the
government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the
measures for obtaining revenue which the public exigencies may at any
time dictate.
Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and
harmony with all; religion and morality enjoin this conduct, and can it
be that good policy does not really enjoin it? It will be worthy of a
free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great nation, to give to
mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a people always guided
by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in the course
of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any
temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it?
Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a
nation with its virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by
every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! it is rendered
impossible by its vices?
In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that
permanent inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and
passionate attachments for others, should be excluded, and that, in
place of them, just and amicable feelings toward all should be
cultivated. The nation which indulges toward another an habitual hatred,
or an habitual fondness, is, in some degree, a slave. It is a slave to
its animosity or its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it
astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against
another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay
hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable
when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent
collisions, obstinate, envenomed, and bloody contests. The nation,
prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the
government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government
sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts, through
passion, what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity
of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride,
ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often,
sometimes perhaps the liberty of nations, has been the victim.
So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation to another produces
a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the
illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common
interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other,
betrays the former into a participation into the quarrels and wars of
the latter, without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also
to concessions to the favorite nation of privileges denied to others,
which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions, by
unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by
exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate, in the
parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to
ambitions, corrupted, or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the
favorite nation), facility to betray or sacrifice the interest of their
own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity; gilding with
the appearance of a virtuous sense of obligation, a commendable
deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the
base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.
As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments
are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent
patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic
factions, to practice the art of seduction, to mislead public opinion,
to influence or awe the public councils! Such an attachment of a small
or weak toward a great and powerful nation dooms the former to be the
satellite of the latter.
Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to
believe me, fellow-citizens) the jealousy of a free people ought to be
_constantly_ awake, since history and experience prove that foreign
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But
that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the
instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense
against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation, and excessive
dislike for another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on
one side, and serve to vail, and even second, the arts of influence on
the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite,
are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes
usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their
interests.
The great rule of conduct for us, in regard to foreign nations, is, in
extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little
political connection as possible. So far as we have already formed
engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us
stop.
Europe has set a of primary interests, which to us have none or a very
remote relation. Hence she must be engaged in frequent controversies,
the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence,
therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial
ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary
combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities.
Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a
different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient
government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury
from external annoyance, when we may take such an attitude as will cause
the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously
respected--when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making
acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us
provocation--when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by
justice, shall counsel.
Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own
to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that
of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of
European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?
It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any
portion of the foreign world; so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty
to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing
infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable
to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best
policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in
their genuine sense. But, in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would be
unwise, to extend them.
Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a
respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary
alliances for extraordinary emergencies.
Harmony, and a liberal intercourse with all nations, are recommended by
policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should
hold an equal and impartial hand; neither seeking nor granting exclusive
favors or preferences; consulting the natural course of things;
diffusing and diversifying, by gentle means, the streams of commerce,
but forcing nothing; establishing, with powers so disposed, in order to
give trade a stable course, to define the rights of our merchants, and
to enable the government to support them, conventional rules of
intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinions
will permit, but temporary, and liable to be, from time to time,
abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate;
constantly keeping in view that it is folly in one nation to look for
disinterested favors from another; that it must pay, with a portion of
its independence, for whatever it may accept under that character; that
by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given
equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with
ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to
expect, or calculate upon, real favors from nation to nation, It is an
illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to
discard.
In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and
affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and
lasting impression I could wish--that they will control the usual
current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course
which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations; but if I may even
flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some
occasional good, that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury
of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigues, to
guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism--this hope will be
a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have
been dictated.
How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by
the principles which have been delineated, the public records, and other
evidences of my conduct, must witness to you and the world. To myself,
the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed
myself to be guided by them.
In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of
the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your
approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both Houses of
Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me,
uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.
After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could
obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the
circumstances of the case, had a right to take, and was bound in duty
and interest to take, a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined,
as far as should depend upon me, to maintain it with moderation,
perseverance, and firmness.
The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is
not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that,
according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from
being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually
admitted by all.