more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every
nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the
relations of peace and amity toward other nations.
The inducements of interest, for observing that conduct, will be best
referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a predominant
motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and
mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress, without
interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency which is
necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.
Though, in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am
unconscious of intentional error, I am, nevertheless, too sensible of my
defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors.
Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or
mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me
the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence,
and that, after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service
with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be
consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.
Relying on its kindness in this, as in other things, and actuated by
that fervent love toward it which is so natural to a man who views in it
the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations,
I anticipate, with pleasing expectation, that retreat in which I promise
myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking, in
the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under
a free government--the ever favorite object of my heart--and the happy
reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers.
GEORGE WASHINGTON.
UNITED STATES, _17th September, 1796_.
PRESIDENT JACKSON'S PROCLAMATION,
ISSUED IN 1832, WHEN SOUTH CAROLINA UNDERTOOK TO ANNUL THE FEDERAL
REVENUE LAW.
Whereas a convention, assembled in the State of South Carolina, have
passed an ordinance, by which they declare "that the several acts and
parts of acts of the Congress of the United States, purporting to be
laws for the imposing of duties and imposts on the importation of
foreign commodities, and now having actual operation and effect within
the United States, and more especially 'two acts for the same purposes,
passed on the 29th of May, 1828, and on the 14th of July, 1832,' are
unauthorized by the Constitution of the United States, and violate the
true meaning and intent thereof, and are null and void, and no law," nor
binding on the citizens of that State or its officers; and by the said
ordinance it is further declared to be unlawful for any of the
constituted authorities of the State, or of the United States, to
enforce the payment of the duties imposed by the said acts within the
same State, and that it is the duty of the legislature to pass such laws
as may be necessary to give full effect to the said ordinances:
And whereas, by the said ordinance it is further ordained, that, in no
case of law or equity, decided in the courts of said State, wherein
shall be drawn in question the validity of the said ordinance, or of the
acts of the legislature that may be passed to give it effect, or of the
said laws of the United States, no appeal shall be allowed to the
Supreme Court of the United States, nor shall any copy of the record be
permitted or allowed for that purpose; and that any person attempting to
take such appeal, shall be punished as for a contempt of court:
And, finally, the said ordinance declares that the people of South
Carolina will maintain the said ordinance at every hazard; and that they
will consider the passage of any act by Congress abolishing or closing
the ports of the said State, or otherwise obstructing the free ingress
or egress of vessels to and from the said ports, or any other act of the
Federal Government to coerce the State, shut up her ports, destroy or
harass her commerce, or to enforce the said acts otherwise than through
the civil tribunals of the country, as inconsistent with the longer
continuance of South Carolina in the Union; and that the people of the
said State will thenceforth hold themselves absolved from all further
obligation to maintain or preserve their political connection with the
people of the other States, and will forthwith proceed to organize a
separate government, and do all other acts and things which sovereign
and independent States may of right do:
And whereas the said ordinance prescribes to the people of South
Carolina a course of conduct in direct violation of their duty as
citizens of the United States, contrary to the laws of their country,
subversive of its Constitution, and having for its object the
destruction of the Union--that Union, which, coeval with our political
existence, led our fathers, without any other ties to unite them than
those of patriotism and common cause, through a sanguinary struggle to a
glorious independence--that sacred Union, hitherto, inviolate, which,
perfected by our happy Constitution, has brought us, by the favor of
Heaven, to a state of prosperity at home, and high consideration abroad,
rarely, if ever, equaled in the history of nations; to preserve this
bond of our political existence from destruction, to maintain inviolate
this state of national honor and prosperity, and to justify the
confidence my fellow-citizens have reposed in me, I, Andrew Jackson,
President of the United States, have thought proper to issue this, my
PROCLAMATION, stating my views of the Constitution and laws applicable
to the measures adopted by the Convention of South Carolina, and to the
reasons they have put forth to sustain them, declaring the course which
duty will require me to pursue, and, appealing to the understanding and
patriotism of the people, warn them of the consequences that must
inevitably result from an observance of the dictates of the Convention.
Strict duty would require of me nothing more than the exercise of those
powers with which I am now, or may hereafter be, invested, for
preserving the Union, and for the execution of the laws. But the
imposing aspect which opposition has assumed in this case, by clothing
itself with State authority, and the deep interest which the people of
the United States must all feel in preventing a resort to stronger
measures, while there is a hope that anything will be yielded to
reasoning and remonstrances, perhaps demand, and will certainly justify,
a full exposition to South Carolina and the nation of the views I
entertain of this important question, as well as a distinct enunciation
of the course which my sense of duty will require me to pursue.
The ordinance is founded, not on the indefeasible right of resisting
acts which are plainly unconstitutional, and too oppressive to be
endured, but on the strange position that any one State may not only
declare an act of Congress void, but prohibit its execution--that they
may do this consistently with the Constitution--that the true
construction of that instrument permits a State to retain its place in
the Union, and yet be bound by no other of its laws than those it may
choose to consider as constitutional. It is true they add, that, to
justify this abrogation of a law, it must be palpably contrary to the
Constitution; but it is evident, that to give the right of resisting
laws of that description, coupled with the uncontrolled right to decide
what laws deserve that character, is to give the power of resisting all
laws. For, as by the theory, there is no appeal, the reasons alleged by
the State, good or bad, must prevail. If it should be said that public
opinion is a sufficient check against the abuse of this power, it may be
asked why is it not deemed a sufficient guard against the passage of an
unconstitutional act by Congress. There is, however, a restraint in this
last case, which makes the assumed power of a State more indefensible,
and which does not exist in the other. There are two appeals from an
unconstitutional act passed by Congress--one to the judiciary, the other
to the people and the States. There is no appeal from the State decision
in theory; and the practical illustration shows that the courts are
closed against an application to review it, both judges and jurors
being sworn to decide in its favor. But reasoning on this subject is
superfluous, when our social compact in express terms declares, that the
laws of the United States, its Constitution, and treaties made under it,
are the supreme law of the land; and for greater caution adds, "that the
judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." And
it may be asserted, without fear of refutation, that no federative
government could exist without a similar provision. Look, for a moment,
to the consequence. If South Carolina considers the revenue laws
unconstitutional, and has a right to prevent their execution in the port
of Charleston, there would be a clear constitutional objection to their
collection in every other port, and no revenue could be collected
anywhere; for all imposts must be equal. It is no answer to repeat that
an unconstitutional law is no law, so long as the question of its
legality is to be decided by the State itself; for every law operating
injuriously upon any local interest will be perhaps thought, and
certainly represented, as unconstitutional, and, as has been shown,
there is no appeal.
If this doctrine had been established at an earlier day, the Union would
have been dissolved in its infancy. The excise law in Pennsylvania, the
embargo and non-intercourse law in the Eastern States, the carriage tax
in Virginia, were all deemed unconstitutional, and were more unequal in
their operation than any of the laws now complained of; but,
fortunately, none of those States discovered that they had the right now
claimed by South Carolina. The war into which we were forced, to support
the dignity of the nation and the rights of our citizens, might have
ended in defeat and disgrace, instead of victory and honor, if the
States, who supposed it a ruinous and unconstitutional measure, had
thought they possessed the right of nullifying the act by which it was
declared, and denying supplies for its prosecution. Hardly and unequally
as those measures bore upon several members of the Union, to the
legislatures of none did this efficient and peaceable remedy, as it is
called, suggest itself. The discovery of this important feature in our
Constitution was reserved to the present day. To the statesmen of South
Carolina belongs the invention, and upon the citizens of that State
will, unfortunately, fall the evils of reducing it to practice.
If the doctrine of a State veto upon the laws of the Union carries with
it internal evidence of its impracticable absurdity, our constitutional
history will also afford abundant proof that it would have been
repudiated with indignation had it been proposed to form a feature in
our government.
In our colonial state, although dependent on another power, we very
early considered ourselves as connected by common interest with each
other. Leagues were formed for common defense, and before the
Declaration of Independence, we were known in our aggregate character as
the United Colonies of America. That decisive and important step was
taken jointly. We declared ourselves a nation by a joint, not by several
acts; and when the terms of our confederation were reduced to form, it
was in that of a solemn league of several States, by which they agreed
that they would, collectively, form one nation, for the purpose of
conducting some certain domestic concerns, and all foreign relations. In
the instrument forming that Union, is found an article which declares
that "every State shall abide by the determinations of Congress on all
questions which by that Confederation should be submitted to them."
Under the Confederation, then, no State could legally annul a decision
of the Congress, or refuse to submit to its execution; but no provision
was made to enforce these decisions. Congress made requisitions, but
they were not complied with. The government could not operate on
individuals. They had no judiciary, no means of collecting revenue.
But the defects of the Confederation need not be detailed. Under its
operation we could scarcely be called a nation. We had neither
prosperity at home nor consideration abroad. This state of things could
not be endured, and our present happy Constitution was formed, but
formed in vain, if this fatal doctrine prevails. It was formed for
important objects that are announced in the preamble made in the name
and by the authority of the people of the United States, whose delegates
framed, and whose conventions approved, it.
The most important among these objects, that which is placed first in
rank, on which all the others rest, is "_to form a more perfect Union_."
Now, it is possible that, even if there were no express provision giving
supremacy to the Constitution and laws of the United States over those
of the States, it can be conceived that an instrument made for the
purpose of "_forming a more perfect Union_" than that of the
Confederation, could be so constructed by the assembled wisdom of our
country as to substitute for that confederation a form of government,
dependent for its existence on the local interest, the party spirit of a
State, or of a prevailing faction in a State? Every man, of plain,
unsophisticated understanding, who hears the question, will give such an
answer as will preserve the Union. Metaphysical subtlety, in pursuit of
an impracticable theory, could alone have devised one that is calculated
to destroy it.
I consider, then, the power to annul a law of the United States,
assumed by one State, _incompatible with the existence of the Union,
contradicted expressly by the letter of the Constitution, unauthorized
by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was
founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed_.
After this general view of the leading principle, we must examine the
particular application of it which is made in the ordinance.
The preamble rests its justification on these grounds: It assumes as a
fact, that the obnoxious laws, although they purport to be laws for
raising revenue, were in reality intended for the protection of
manufactures, which purpose it asserts to be unconstitutional; that the
operation of these laws is unequal; that the amount raised by them is
greater than is required by the wants of the government; and, finally,
that the proceeds are to be applied to objects unauthorized by the
Constitution. These are the only causes alleged to justify an open
opposition to the laws of the country, and a threat of seceding from the
Union, if any attempt should be made to enforce them. The first actually
acknowledges that the law in question was passed under power expressly
given by the Constitution, to lay and collect imposts; but its
constitutionality is drawn in question from the motives of those who
passed it. However apparent this purpose may be in the present case,
nothing can be more dangerous than to admit the position that an
unconstitutional purpose, entertained by the members who assent to a law
enacted under a constitutional power, shall make that law void; for how
is that purpose to be ascertained? Who is to make the scrutiny? How
often may bad purposes be falsely imputed? In how many cases are they
concealed by false professions? In how many is no declaration of motive
made? Admit this doctrine, and you give to the States an uncontrolled
right to decide, and every law may be annulled under this pretext. If,
therefore, the absurd and dangerous doctrine should be admitted, that a
State may annul an unconstitutional law, or one that it deems such, it
will not apply to the present case.
The next objection is, that the laws in question operate unequally. This
objection may be made with truth to every law that has been or can be
passed. The wisdom of man never yet contrived a system of taxation that
would operate with perfect equality. If the unequal operation of a law
makes it unconstitutional, and if all laws of that description may be
abrogated by any State for that cause, then, indeed, is the federal
Constitution unworthy of the slightest efforts for its preservation. We
have hitherto relied on it as the perpetual bond of our Union. We have
received it as the work of the assembled wisdom of the nation. We have
trusted to it as to the sheet-anchor of our safety, in the stormy times
of conflict with a foreign or domestic foe. We have looked to it with
sacred awe as the palladium of our liberties, and with all the
solemnities of religion have pledged to each other our lives and
fortunes here, and our hopes of happiness hereafter, in its defense and
support. Were we mistaken, my countrymen, in attaching this importance
to the Constitution of our country? Was our devotion paid to the
wretched, inefficient, clumsy contrivance, which this new doctrine would
make it? Did we pledge ourselves to the support of an airy nothing--a
bubble that must be blown away by the first breath of disaffection? Was
this self-destroying, visionary theory the work of the profound
statesmen, the exalted patriots, to whom the task of constitutional
reform was intrusted? Did the name of Washington sanction, did the
States deliberately ratify, such an anomaly in the history of
fundamental legislation? No. We were not mistaken. The letter of this
great instrument is free from this radical fault; its language directly
contradicts the imputation; its spirit, its evident intent, contradicts
it. No, we did not err. Our Constitution does not contain the absurdity
of giving power to make laws, and another power to resist them. The
sages, whose memory will always be reverenced, have given us a
practical, and, as they hoped, a permanent constitutional compact. The
Father of his Country did not affix his revered name to so palpable an
absurdity. Nor did the States, when they severally ratified it, do so
under the impression that a veto on the laws of the United States was
reserved to them, or that they could exercise it by application. Search
the debates in all their conventions--examine the speeches of the most
zealous opposers of federal authority--look at the amendments that were
proposed. They are all silent--not a syllable uttered, not a vote given,
not a motion made, to correct the explicit supremacy given to the laws
of the Union over those of the States, or to show that implication, as
is now contended, could defeat it. No, we have not erred! The
Constitution is still the object of our reverence, the bond of our
union, our defense in danger, the source of our prosperity in peace. It
shall descend, as we have received it, uncorrupted by sophistical
construction, to our posterity; and the sacrifices of local interest, of
State prejudices, of personal animosities, that were made to bring it
into existence, will again be patriotically offered for its support.
The two remaining objections made by the ordinance to these laws are,
that the sums intended to be raised by them are greater than are
required, and that the proceeds will be unconstitutionally employed. The
Constitution has given expressly to Congress the right of raising
revenue, and of determining the sum the public exigencies will require.
The States have no control over the exercise of this right other than
that which results from the power of changing the representatives who
abuse it, and thus procure redress. Congress may undoubtedly abuse this
discretionary power, but the same may be said of others with which they
are vested. Yet the discretion must exist somewhere. The Constitution
has given it to the representatives of all the people, checked by the
representatives of the States, and by the executive power. The South
Carolina construction gives it to the legislature, or the convention of
a single State, where neither the people of the different States, nor
the States in their separate capacity, nor the chief magistrate elected
by the people, have any representation. Which is the most discreet
disposition of the power? I do not ask you, fellow-citizens, which is
the constitutional disposition--that instrument speaks a language not to
be misunderstood. But if you were assembled in general convention, which
would you think the safest depository of this discretionary power in the
last resort? Would you add a clause giving it to each of the States, or
would you sanction the wise provisions already made by your
Constitution? If this should be the result of your deliberations when
providing for the future, are you--can you--- be ready to risk all that
we hold dear, to establish, for a temporary and a local purpose, that
which you must acknowledge to be destructive, and even absurd, as a
general provision? Carry out the consequences of this right vested in
the different States, and you must perceive that the crisis your conduct
presents at this day would recur whenever any law of the United States
displeased any of the States, and that we should soon cease to be a
nation.
The ordinance, with the same knowledge of the future that characterizes
a former objection, tells you that the proceeds of the tax will be
unconstitutionally applied. If this could be ascertained with certainty,
the objection would, with more propriety, be reserved for the law so
applying the proceeds, but surely can not be urged against the laws
levying the duty.
These are the allegations contained in the ordinance. Examine them
seriously, my fellow-citizens--judge for yourselves. I appeal to you to
determine whether they are so clear, so convincing, as to leave no doubt
of their correctness; and even if you should come to this conclusion,
how far they justify the reckless, destructive course which you are
directed to pursue. Review these objections, and the conclusions drawn
from them once more. What are they? Every law, then, for raising
revenue, according to the South Carolina ordinance, may be rightfully
annulled, unless it be so framed as no law ever will or can be framed.
Congress have a right to pass laws for raising revenue, and each State
has a right to oppose their execution--two rights directly opposed to
each other; and yet is this absurdity supposed to be contained in an
instrument drawn for the express purpose of avoiding collisions between
the States and the general government, by an assembly of the most
enlightened statesmen and purest patriots ever embodied for a similar
purpose.
In vain have these sages declared that Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises--in vain have they
provided that they shall have power to pass laws which shall be
necessary and proper to carry those powers into execution, that those
laws and that Constitution shall be the "supreme law of the land; and
that the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the
constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." In
vain have the people of the several States solemnly sanctioned these
provisions, made them their paramount law, and individually sworn to
support them whenever they were called on to execute any office.