Chapter VII

1814

ON THE OCEAN

_Strictness of the blockade--Cruise of Rodgers--Cruise of the_

Constitution--_Her unsuccessful chase of_ La Pique--_Attack on the_

Alligator--_The_ Essex _captured--The_ Frolic _captured--The_

Peacock _captures the_ Epervier--_Commodore Barney's flotilla--The

British in the Chesapeake--The_ Wasp _captures the_ Reindeer _and

sinks the_ Avon--_Cruise and loss of the_ Adams--_The privateer_

General Armstrong--_The privateer_ Prince de Neufchatel--_Loss of

the gunboats in Lake Borgne--Fighting near New Orleans--Summary_.

During this year the blockade of the American coast was kept up

with ever increasing rigor. The British frigates hovered like hawks

off every seaport that was known to harbor any fighting craft; they

almost invariably went in couples, to support one another and to

lighten, as far as was possible, the severity of their work. On the

northern coasts in particular, the intense cold of the furious winter

gales rendered it no easy task to keep the assigned stations; the

ropes were turned into stiff and brittle bars, the hulls were coated

with ice, and many, both of men and officers, were frost-bitten and

crippled. But no stress of weather could long keep the stubborn and

hardy British from their posts. With ceaseless vigilance they traversed

continually the allotted cruising grounds, capturing the privateers,

harrying the coasters, and keeping the more powerful ships confined

to port; "no American frigate could proceed singly to sea without

imminent risk of being crushed by the superior force of the numerous

British squadrons." [Footnote: Captain Broke's letter of challenge

to Captain Lawrence.] But the sloops of war, commanded by officers

as skillful as they were daring, and manned by as hardy seamen as

ever sailed salt water, could often slip out; generally on some dark

night, when a heavy gale was blowing, they would make the attempt,

under storm canvas, and with almost invariable success. The harder

the weather, the better was their chance; once clear of the coast

the greatest danger ceased, though throughout the cruise the most

untiring vigilance was needed. The new sloops that I have mentioned

as being built proved themselves the best possible vessels for this

kind of work; they were fast enough to escape from most cruisers of

superior force, and were overmatches for any British flush-decked

ship, that is, for any thing below the rank of the frigate-built

corvettes of the _Cyane's_ class. The danger of recapture was too

great to permit of the prizes being sent in, so they were generally

destroyed as soon as captured; and as the cruising grounds were chosen

right in the track of commerce, the damage done and consternation

caused were very great.

Besides the numerous frigates cruising along the coast in couples

or small squadrons, there were two or three places that were blockaded

by a heavier force. One of these was New London, before which cruised

a squadron under the direction of Sir Thomas Hardy, in the 74 gun-ship

_Ramillies_. Most of the other cruising squadrons off the coast contained

razees or two-deckers. The boats of the _Hogue_, 74, took part in

the destruction of some coasters and fishing-boats at Pettipauge in

April; and those of the _Superb_, 74, shared in a similar expedition

against Wareham in June. [Footnote: James, vi. 474.] The command on

the coast of North America was now given to Vice-Admiral Sir Alexander

Cochrane. The main British force continued to lie in the Chesapeake,

where about 50 sail were collected. During the first part of this

year these were under the command of Sir Robert Barrie, but in May

he was relieved by Rear-Admiral Cockburn.[Footnote: James, vi, 437.]

The _President_, 44, Commodore Rodgers, at the beginning of 1814

was still out, cruising among the Barbadoes and West Indies, only

making a few prizes of not much value. She then turned toward the

American coast, striking soundings near St. Augustine, and thence

proceeding north along the coast to Sandy Hook, which was reached

on Feb. 18th. The light was passed in the night, and shortly afterward

several sail were made out, when the _President_ was at once cleared

for action. [Footnote: Letter of Commodore Rodgers, Feb. 20, 1814.]

One of these strange sail was the _Loire_, 38 (British), Capt. Thomas

Brown, which ran down to close the _President_, unaware of her force;

but on discovering her to be a 44, hauled to the wind and made off.

[Footnote: James, vi, 412.] The _President_ did not pursue, another

frigate and a gunbrig being in sight. [Footnote: "Naval Monument,"

p. 235.] This rencontre gave rise to nonsensical boastings on both

sides; one American writer calls the _Loire_ the _Plantagenet_, 74;

James, on the other hand, states that the _President_ was afraid to

engage the 38-gun frigate, and that the only reason the latter declined

the combat was because she was short of men. The best answer to this

is a quotation from his own work (vol. vi, p. 402), that "the admiralty

had issued an order that no 18-pounder frigate was voluntarily to

engage one of the 24-pounder frigates of America." Coupling this

order with the results of the combats that had already taken place

between frigates of these classes, it can always be safely set down

as sheer bravado when any talk is made of an American 44 refusing

to give battle to a British 38; and it is even more absurd to say

that a British line-of-battle ship would hesitate for a minute about

engaging _any_ frigate.

On Jan. 1st, the _Constitution_, which had been lying in Boston harbor

undergoing complete repairs, put out to sea under the command of

Capt. Charles Stewart. The British 38-gun frigate _Nymphe_ had been

lying before the port, but she disappeared long before the

_Constitution_ was in condition, in obedience to the order already

mentioned. Capt. Stewart ran down toward the Barbadoes, and on the

14th of February captured and destroyed the British 14-gun schooner

_Pictou_, with a crew of 75 men. After making a few other prizes

and reaching the coast of Guiana she turned homeward, and on the

23d of the same month fell in, at the entrance to the Mona passage,

with the British 36-gun frigate _Pique_ (late French _Pallas_), Captain

Maitland. The _Constitution_ at once made sail for the _Pique_, steering

free; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Stewart, April 8, 1814.] the latter

at first hauled to the wind and waited for her antagonist, but when

the latter was still 3 miles distant she made out her force and

immediately made all sail to escape; the _Constitution_, however,

gained steadily till 8 P.M., when the night and thick squally weather

caused her to lose sight of the chase. Captain Maitland had on board

the prohibitory order issued by the admiralty, [Footnote: James,

vi, 477.] and acted correctly. His ship was altogether too light

for his antagonist. James, however, is not satisfied with this, and

wishes to prove that _both_ ships were desirous of avoiding the combat.

He says that Capt. Stewart came near enough to count "13 ports and

a bridle on the _Pique's_ main-deck," and "saw at once that she was

of a class inferior to the _Guerrière_ or _Java_," but "thought the

_Pique's_ 18's were 24's, and therefore did not make an effort to

bring her to action." He portrays very picturesquely the grief of

the _Pique's_ crew when they find they are not going to engage; how

they come aft and request to be taken into action; how Captain Maitland

reads them his instructions, but "fails to persuade them that there

had been any necessity of issuing them"; and, finally, how the sailors,

overcome by woe and indignation, refuse to take their supper-time

grog,--which was certainly remarkable. As the _Constitution_ had

twice captured British frigates "with impunity," according to James

himself, is it likely that she would now shrink from an encounter

with a ship which she "saw at once was of an inferior class" to those

already conquered? Even such abject cowards as James' Americans would

not be guilty of so stupid an action. Of course neither Capt. Stewart

nor any one else supposed for an instant that a 36-gun frigate was

armed with 24-pounders.

It is worth while mentioning as an instance of how utterly untrustworthy

James is in dealing with American affairs, that he says (p. 476)

the _Constitution_ had now "what the Americans would call a bad crew,"

whereas, in her previous battles, all her men had been "picked."

Curiously enough, this is the exact reverse of the truth. In no case

was an American ship manned with a "picked" crew, but the nearest

approach to such was the crew the _Constitution_ carried in this

and the next cruise, when "she probably possessed as fine a crew

as ever manned a frigate. They were principally New England men,

and it has been said of them that they were almost qualified to fight

the ship without her officers." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 463.] The

statement that such men, commanded by one of the bravest and most

skilful captains of our navy, would shrink from attacking a greatly

inferior foe, is hardly worth while denying; and, fortunately, such

denial is needless, Captain Stewart's account being fully corroborated

in the "Memoir of Admiral Durham," written by his nephew, Captain

Murray, London, 1846.

The _Constitution_ arrived off the port of Marblehead on April 3d,

and at 7 A.M. fell in with the two British 38-gun frigates _Junon_,

Captain Upton, and _Tenedos_, Captain Parker. "The American frigate

was standing to the westward with the wind about north by west and

bore from the two British frigates about northwest by west. The

_Junon_ and _Tenedos_ quickly hauled up in chase, and the _Constitution_

crowded sail in the direction of Marblehead. At 9.30, finding the

_Tenedos_ rather gaining upon her, the _Constitution_ started her

water and threw overboard a quantity of provisions and other articles.

At 11.30 she hoisted her colors, and the two British frigates, who

were now dropping slowly in the chase, did the same. At 1.30 P.M.

the _Constitution_ anchored in the harbor of Marblehead. Captain

Parker was anxious to follow her into the port, which had no defences;

but the _Tenedos_ was recalled by a signal from the _Junon_."

[Footnote: James, vi, 479.] Shortly afterward the _Constitution_

again put out, and reached Boston unmolested.

On Jan. 29, 1814, the small U.S. coasting schooner _Alligator_, of

4 guns and 40 men, Sailing-master R. Basset, was lying at anchor

in the mouth of Stone River, S. C., when a frigate and a brig were

perceived close inshore near the breakers. Judging from their motions

that they would attempt to cut him out when it was dark, Mr. Basset

made his preparations accordingly. [Footnote: Letter of Sailing-master

Basset, Jan. 31, 1814.] At half-past seven six boats were observed

approaching cautiously under cover of the marsh, with muffled oars;

on being hailed they cheered and opened with boat carronades and

musketry, coming on at full speed; whereupon the _Alligator_ cut

her cable and made sail, the wind being light from the southwest;

while the crew opened such a heavy fire on the assailants, who were

then not thirty yards off, that they stopped the advance and fell

astern. At this moment the _Alligator_ grounded, but the enemy had

suffered so severely that they made no attempt to renew the attack,

rowing off down stream. On board the _Alligator_ two men were killed

and two wounded, including the pilot, who was struck down by a

grape-shot while standing at the helm; and her sails and rigging

were much cut. The extent of the enemy's loss was never known; next

day one of his cutters was picked up at North Edisto, much injured

and containing the bodies of an officer and a seaman. [Footnote:

Letter from Commander J. H. Dent, Feb. 21, 1814.] For his skill and

gallantry Mr. Basset was promoted to a lieutenancy, and for a time

his exploit put a complete stop to the cutting-out expeditions along

that part of the coast. The _Alligator_ herself sank in a squall on

July 1st, but was afterward raised and refitted.

It is much to be regretted that it is almost impossible to get at

the British account of any of these expeditions which ended

successfully for the Americans; all such cases are generally ignored

by the British historians; so that I am obliged to rely solely upon

the accounts of the victors, who, with the best intentions in the

world, could hardly be perfectly accurate.

At the close of 1813 Captain Porter was still cruising in the Pacific.

Early in January the _Essex_, now with 255 men aboard, made the South

American coast, and on the 12th of that month anchored in the harbor

of Valparaiso. She had in company a prize, re-christened the _Essex

Junior_, with a crew of 60 men, and 20 guns, 10 long sixes and 10

eighteen-pound carronades. Of course she could not be used in a combat

with regular cruisers.

On Feb. 8th, the British frigate _Phoebe_, 36, Captain James Hilyar,

accompanied by the _Cherub_, 18, Captain Thomas Tudor Tucker, the

former carrying 300 and the latter 140 men, [Footnote: They afterward

took on board enough men from British merchant-vessels to raise their

complements respectively to 320 and 180.] made their appearance,

and apparently proposed to take the _Essex_ by a _coup de main_.

They hauled into the harbor on a wind, the _Cherub_ falling to leeward;

while the _Phoebe_ made the port quarter of the _Essex_, and then,

putting her helm down, luffed up on her starboard bow, but 10 or

15 feet distant. Porter's crew were all at quarters, the powder-boys

with slow matches ready to discharge the guns, the boarders standing

by, cutlass in hand, to board in the smoke; every thing was cleared

for action on both frigates. Captain Hilyar now probably saw that

there was no chance of carrying the _Essex_ by surprise, and, standing

on the after-gun, he inquired after Captain Porter's health; the

latter returned the inquiry, but warned Hilyar not to fall foul.

The British captain then braced back his yards, remarking that if

he did fall aboard it would be purely accidental. "Well," said

Porter, "you have no business where you are; if you touch a rope-yarn

of this ship I shall board instantly." [Footnote: "Life of Farragut,"

p. 33.] The _Phoebe_, in her then position, was completely at the

mercy of the American ships, and Hilyar, greatly agitated, assured

Porter that he meant nothing hostile; and the _Phoebe_ backed down,

her yards passing over those of the _Essex_ without touching a rope,

and anchored half a mile astern. Shortly afterward the two captains

met on shore, when Hilyar thanked Porter for his behavior, and, on

his inquiry, assured him that after thus owing his safety to the

latter's forbearance, Porter need be under no apprehension as to

his breaking the neutrality.

[Illustration: The _Essex_: a watercolor by Joseph Howard of Salem,

circa 1801. (Courtesy Peabody Museum of Salem)]

The British ships now began a blockade of the port. On Feb. 27th,

the _Phoebe_ being hove to close off the port, and the _Cherub_ a

league to leeward, the former fired a weather-gun; the _Essex_

interpreting this as a challenge, took the crew of the _Essex Junior_

aboard and went out to attack the British frigate. But the latter did

not await the combat; she bore up, set her studding-sails, and ran

down to the _Cherub_. The American officers were intensely irritated

over this, and American writers have sneered much at "a British 36

refusing combat with an American 32." But the armaments of the two

frigates were so wholly dissimilar that it is hard to make comparison.

When the fight really took place, the Essex was so crippled and the

water so smooth that the British ships fought at their own distance;

and as they had long guns to oppose to Porter's carronades, this

really made the _Cherub_ more nearly suited to contend with the _Essex_

than the latter was to fight the _Phoebe_. But when the _Essex_ in

fairly heavy weather, with the crew of the _Essex Junior_ aboard,

was to windward, the circumstances were very different; she carried

as many men and guns as the _Phoebe_, and in close combat, or in

a hand-to-hand struggle, could probably have taken her. Still, Hilyar's

conduct in avoiding Porter except when the _Cherub_ was in company

was certainly over-cautious, and very difficult to explain in a man

of his tried courage.

On March 27th Porter decided to run out of the harbor on the first

opportunity, so as to draw away his two antagonists in chase, and

let the _Essex Junior_ escape. This plan had to be tried sooner than

was expected. The two vessels were always ready, the _Essex_ only

having her proper complement of 255 men aboard. On the next day,

the 28th, it came on to blow from the south, when the _Essex_ parted

her port cable and dragged the starboard anchor to leeward, so she

got under way, and made sail; by several trials it had been found

that she was faster than the _Phoebe_, and that the _Cherub_ was

very slow indeed, so Porter had little anxiety about his own ship,

only fearing for his consort. The British vessels were close in with

the weather-most point of the bay, but Porter thought he could weather

them, and hauled up for that purpose. Just as he was rounding the

outermost point, which, if accomplished, would have secured his safety,

a heavy squall struck the _Essex_, and when she was nearly gunwale

under, the main-top-mast went by the board. She now wore and stood

in for the harbor, but the wind had shifted, and on account of her

crippled condition she could not gain it; so she bore up and anchored

in a small bay, three miles from Valparaiso, and half a mile from

a detached Chilian battery of one gun, the _Essex_ being within

pistol-shot of the shore. [Footnote: Letter of Captain David Porter,

July 3, 1814.] The _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ now bore down upon her,

covered with ensigns, union-jacks, and motto flags; and it became

evident that Hilyar did not intend to keep his word, as soon as he

saw that Porter was disabled. So the _Essex_ prepared for action,

though there could be no chance whatever of success. Her flags were

flying from every mast, and every thing was made ready as far as

was possible. The attack was made before springs could be got on

her cables. She was anchored so near the shore as to preclude the

possibility of Captain Hilyar's passing ahead of her; [Footnote:

Letter of Captain James Hilyar, March 30, 1814.] so his two ships

came cautiously down, the _Cherub_ taking her position on the

starboard bow of the _Essex_, and the _Phoebe_ under the latter's

stern. The attack began at 4 P.M. [Footnote: Mean time. Porter says

3.45; Hilyar, a few minutes past 4. The former says the first attack

lasted half an hour; the latter, but 10 minutes. I accordingly make

it 20.] Some of the bow-guns of the American frigate bore upon the

_Cherub_, and, as soon as she found this out, the sloop ran down

and stationed herself near the _Phoebe_. The latter had opened with

her broadside of long 18's, from a position in which not one of

Porter's guns could reach her. Three times springs were got on the

cables of the _Essex_, in order to bring her round till her broadside

bore; but in each instance they were shot away, as soon as they were

hauled taut. Three long 12's were got out of the stern-ports, and

with these an animated fire was kept up on the two British ships,

the aim being especially to cripple their rigging. A good many of

Porter's crew were killed during the first five minutes, before he

could bring any guns to bear; but afterward he did not suffer much,

and at 4.20, after a quarter of an hour's fight between the three

long 12's of the _Essex_, and the whole 36 broadside guns of the

_Phoebe_ and _Cherub_, the latter were actually driven off. They

wore, and again began with their long guns; but, these producing

no visible effect, both of the British ships hauled out of the fight

at 4.30. "Having lost the use of main-sail, jib, and main-stay,

appearances looked a little inauspicious," writes Captain Hilyar.

But the damages were soon repaired, and his two ships stood back

for the crippled foe. Both stationed themselves on her port-quarter,

the _Phoebe_ at anchor, with a spring, firing her broadside, while

the _Cherub_ kept under way, using her long bow-chasers. Their fire

was very destructive, for they were out of reach of the _Essex's_

carronades, and not one of her long guns could be brought to bear

on them. Porter now cut his cable, at 5.20, and tried to close with

his antagonists. After many ineffectual efforts sail was made. The

flying-jib halyards were the only serviceable ropes uncut. That sail

was hoisted, and the foretop-sail and fore-sail let fall, though the

want of sheets and tacks rendered them almost useless. Still the

_Essex_ drove down on her assailants, and for the first time got

near enough to use her carronades; for a minute or two the firing

was tremendous, but after the first broadside the _Cherub_ hauled

out of the fight in great haste, and during the remainder of the

action confined herself to using her bow-guns from a distance.

Immediately afterward the _Phoebe_ also edged off, and by her

superiority of sailing, her foe being now almost helpless, was enabled

to choose her own distance, and again opened from her long 18's,

out of range of Porter's carronades. [Footnote: American writers

often sneer at Hilyar for keeping away from the _Essex_, and out

of reach of her short guns; but his conduct was eminently proper

in this respect. It was no part of his duty to fight the _Essex_

at the distance which best suited her; but, on the contrary, at

that which least suited her. He, of course, wished to win the victory

with the least possible loss to himself, and acted accordingly. His

conduct in the action itself could not be improved upon.] The carnage

on board the _Essex_ had now made her decks look like shambles. One

gun was manned three times, fifteen men being slam at it; its captain

alone escaped without a wound. There were but one or two instances

of flinching; the wounded, many of whom were killed by flying splinters

while under the hands of the doctors, cheered on their comrades,

and themselves worked at the guns like fiends as long as they could

stand. At one of the bow-guns was stationed a young Scotchman, named

Bissly, who had one leg shot off close by the groin. Using his

handkerchief as a tourniquet, he said, turning to his American

shipmates: "I left my own country and adopted the United States,

to fight for her. I hope I have this day proved myself worthy of

the country of my adoption. I am no longer of any use to you or to

her, so good-by!" With these words he leaned on the sill of the port,

and threw himself overboard. [Footnote: This and most of the other

anecdotes are taken from the invaluable "Life of Farragut," pp. 37-46.]

Among the very few men who flinched was one named William Roach;

Porter sent one of his midshipmen to shoot him, but he was not to

be found. He was discovered by a man named William Call, whose leg

had been shot off and was hanging by the skin, and who dragged the

shattered stump all round the bag-house, pistol in hand, trying to

get a shot at him. Lieut. J. G. Cowell had his leg shot off above

the knee, and his life might have been saved had it been amputated

at once; but the surgeons already had rows of wounded men waiting

for them, and when it was proposed to him that he should be attended

to out of order, he replied: "No, doctor, none of that; fair play's

a jewel. One man's life is as dear as another's; I would not cheat

any poor fellow out of his turn." So he stayed at his post, and

died from loss of blood.

[Illustration: Captain David Porter: an unattributed early-19th-century

portrait. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Finding it hopeless to try to close, the _Essex_ stood for the land,

Porter intending to run her ashore and burn her. But when she had

drifted close to the bluffs the wind suddenly shifted, took her flat

aback and paid her head off shore, exposing her to a raking fire. At

this moment Lieutenant Downes, commanding the _Junior_, pulled out

in a boat, through all the fire, to see if he could do any thing.

Three of the men with him, including an old boatswain's mate, named

Kingsbury, had come out expressly "to share the fate of their old

ship"; so they remained aboard, and, in their places, Lieutenant

Downes took some of the wounded ashore, while the Cherub kept up a

tremendous fire upon him. The shift of the wind gave Porter a faint

hope of closing; and once more the riddled hulk of the little American

frigate was headed for her foes. But Hilyar put his helm up to avoid

close quarters; the battle was his already, and the cool old captain

was too good an officer to leave any thing to chance. Seeing he

could not close, Porter had a hawser bent on the sheet-anchor and

let go. This brought the ship's head round, keeping her stationary;

and from such of her guns as were not dismounted and had men enough

left to man them, a broadside was fired at the _Phoebe_. The wind

was now very light, and the _Phoebe_, whose main- and mizzen-masts

and main-yard were rather seriously wounded, and who had suffered

a great loss of canvas and cordage aloft, besides receiving a number

of shot between wind and water, [Footnote: Captain Hilyar's letter.

James says the _Phoebe_ had 7 shot between wind and water, and one

below the water-line. Porter says she had 18 12-pound shot below

the water-line. The latter statement must have been an exaggeration;

and James is probably farther wrong still] and was thus a good deal

crippled, began to drift slowly to leeward. It was hoped that she

would drift out of gun-shot, but this last chance was lost by the

parting of the hawser, which left the _Essex_ at the mercy of the

British vessels. Their fire was deliberate and destructive, and could

only be occasionally replied to by a shot from one of the long 12's

of the _Essex_. The ship caught fire, and the flames came bursting

up the hatchway, and a quantity of powder exploded below. Many of

the crew were knocked overboard by shot, and drowned; others leaped

into the water, thinking the ship was about to blow up, and tried

to swim to the land. Some succeeded; among them was one man who had

sixteen or eighteen pieces of iron in his leg, scales from the muzzle

of his gun. The frigate had been shattered to pieces above the

water-line, although from the smoothness of the sea she was not harmed

enough below it to reduce her to a sinking condition. [Footnote:

An exactly analogous case to that of the British sloop _Reindeer_.]

The carpenter reported that he alone of his crew was fit for duty;

the others were dead or disabled. Lieutenant Wilmer was knocked

overboard by a splinter, and drowned; his little negro boy, "Ruff,"

came up on deck, and, hearing of the disaster, deliberately leaped

into the sea and shared his master's fate. Lieutenant Odenheimer

was also knocked overboard, but afterward regained the ship. A shot,

glancing upward, killed four of the men who were standing by a gun,

striking the last one in the head and scattering his brains over

his comrades. The only commissioned officer left on duty was Lieutenant

Decatur McKnight. The sailing-master, Barnwell, when terribly wounded,

remained at his post till he fainted from loss of blood. Of the 255

men aboard the _Essex_ when the battle began, 58 had been killed,

66 wounded, and 31 drowned ("missing"), while 24 had succeeded in

reaching shore. But 76 men were left unwounded, and many of these

had been bruised or otherwise injured. Porter himself was knocked

down by the windage of a passing shot. While the young midshipman,

Farragut, was on the ward-room ladder, going below for gun-primers,

the captain of the gun directly opposite the hatchway was struck

full in the face by an 18-pound shot, and tumbled back on him. They

fell down the hatch together, Farragut being stunned for some minutes.

Later, while standing by the man at the wheel, an old quartermaster

named Francis Bland, a shot coming over the fore-yard took off the

quartermaster's right leg, carrying away at the same time one of

Farragut's coat tails. The old fellow was helped below, but he died

for lack of a tourniquet, before he could be attended to.

Nothing remained to be done, and at 6.20 the _Essex_ surrendered

and was taken possession of. The _Phoebe_ had lost 4 men killed,

including her first lieutenant, William Ingram, and 7 wounded; the

_Cherub_, 1 killed, and 3, including Captain Tucker, wounded. Total,

5 killed and 10 wounded. [Footnote: James says that most of the loss

was occasioned by the first three broadsides of the _Essex_; this

is not surprising, as in all she hardly fired half a dozen, and the

last were discharged when half of the guns had been disabled, and

there were scarcely men enough to man the remainder. Most of the

time her resistance was limited to firing such of her six long guns

as would bear.] The difference in loss was natural, as, owing to

their having long guns and the choice of position, the British had

been able to fire ten shot to the Americans' one.

The conduct of the two English captains in attacking Porter as soon

as he was disabled, in neutral waters, while they had been very careful

to abstain from breaking the neutrality while he was in good condition,

does not look well; at the best it shows that Hilyar had only been

withheld hitherto from the attack by timidity, and it looks all the

worse when it is remembered that Hilyar owed his ship's previous

escape entirely to Porter's forbearance on a former occasion when

the British frigate was entirely at his mercy, and that the British

captain had afterward expressly said that he would not break the

neutrality. Still, the British in this war did not act very differently

from the way we ourselves did on one or two occasions in the Civil

War,--witness the capture of the _Florida_. And after the battle

was once begun the sneers which most of our historians, as well as

the participators in the fight, have showered upon the British

captains for not foregoing the advantages which their entire masts

and better artillery gave them by coming to close quarters, are

decidedly foolish. Hilyar's conduct during the battle, as well as

his treatment of the prisoners afterward, was perfect, and as a minor

matter it may be mentioned that his official letter is singularly

just and fair-minded. Says Lord Howard Douglass: [Footnote: "Naval

Gunnery," p. 149.] "The action displayed all that can reflect honor

on the science and admirable conduct of Captain Hilyar and his crew,

which, without the assistance of the _Cherub_, would have insured

the same termination. Captain Porter's sneers at the respectful

distance the _Phoebe_ kept are in fact acknowledgments of the ability

with which Captain Hilyar availed himself of the superiority of his

arms; it was a brilliant affair." While endorsing this criticism,

it may be worth while to compare it with some of the author's comments

upon the other actions, as that between Decatur and the _Macedonian_.

To make the odds here as great against Garden as they were against

Porter, it would be necessary to suppose that the _Macedonian_ had

lost her main-top-mast, had but six long 18's to oppose to her

antagonist's 24's, and that the latter was assisted by the corvette

_Adams_; so that as a matter of fact Porter fought at fully double

or treble the disadvantage Garden did, and, instead of surrendering

when he had lost a third of his crew, fought till three fifths of

his men were dead or wounded, and, moreover, inflicted greater loss

and damage on his antagonists than Garden did. If, then, as Lord

Douglass says, the defence of the _Macedonian_ brilliantly upheld

the character of the British navy for courage, how much more did

that of the _Essex_ show for the American navy; and if Hilyar's

conduct was "brilliant," that of Decatur was more so.

This was an action in which it is difficult to tell exactly how to

award praise. Captain Hilyar deserves it, for the coolness and skill

with which he made his approaches and took his positions so as to

destroy his adversary with least loss to himself, and also for the

precision of his fire. The Cherub's behavior was more remarkable

for extreme caution than for any thing else. As regards the mere

fight, Porter certainly did every thing a man could do to contend

successfully with the overwhelming force opposed to him, and the

few guns that were available were served with the utmost precision.

As an exhibition of dogged courage it has never been surpassed since

the time when the Dutch captain, Klaesoon, after fighting two long

days, blew up his disabled ship, devoting himself and all his crew

to death, rather than surrender to the hereditary foes of his race,

and was bitterly avenged afterward by the grim "sea-beggars" of

Holland; the days when Drake singed the beard of the Catholic king,

and the small English craft were the dread and scourge of the great

floating castles of Spain. Any man reading Farragut's account is

forcibly reminded of some of the deeds of "derring do" in that, the

heroic age of the Teutonic navies. Captain Hilyar in his letter says:

"The defence of the _Essex_, taking into consideration our superiority

of force and the very discouraging circumstances of her having lost

her main-top-mast and being twice on fire, did honor to her brave

defenders, and most fully evinced the courage of Captain Porter and

those under his command. Her colors were not struck until the loss

in killed and wounded was so awfully great and her shattered condition

so seriously bad as to render all further resistance unavailing."

[Footnote: James (p. 419) says: "The _Essex_, as far as is borne

out by proof (the only safe way where an American is concerned),

had 24 men killed and 45 wounded. But Capt. Porter, thinking by

exaggerating his loss to prop up his fame, talks of 58 killed and

mortally wounded, 39 severely, 27 slightly," etc., etc. This would

be no more worthy of notice than any other of his falsifications,

were it not followed by various British writers. Hilyar states that

he has 161 prisoners, has found 23 dead, that 3 wounded were taken

off, between 20 and 30 reached the shore, and that the "remainder

are either killed or wounded." It is by wilfully preserving silence

about this last sentence that James makes out his case. It will be

observed that Hilyar enumerates 161 + 23 + 3 + 25 (say) or 212, and

says the remainder were either killed or wounded; Porter having 255

men at first, this remainder was 43. Hilyar stating that of his 161

prisoners, 42 were wounded, his account thus gives the Americans 111

killed and wounded. James' silence about Hilyat's last sentence

enables him to make the loss but 69, and his wilful omission is quite

on a par with the other meannesses and falsehoods which utterly

destroy the reliability of his work. By Hilyar's own letter it is

thus seen that Porter's loss in killed and wounded was certainly 111,

perhaps 116, or if Porter had, as James says, 265 men, 126. There

still remain some discrepancies between the official accounts, which

can be compared in tabular form:

Hilyar. Porter.

Prisoners unwounded. 119 75 prisoners unwounded.

" wounded. 42 27 " slightly wounded,

Taken away wounded. 3 39 " severely "

Those who reached shore. 25 58 killed.

Remainder killed or wounded. 43 31 missing.

Killed. 23 25 reached shore.

------ -----

255 255

The explanation probably is that Hilyar's "42 wounded" do not include

Porter's "27 slightly wounded," and that his "161 prisoners" include

Porter's "25 who reached shore," and his "25 who reached shore" comes

under Porter's "31 missing." This would make the accounts nearly

tally. At any rate in Porter's book are to be found the names of

all his killed, wounded, and missing; and their relatives received

pensions from the American government, which, if the returns were

false, would certainly have been a most elaborate piece of deception.

It is far more likely that Hilyar was mistaken; or he may have

counted in the _Essex Junior's_ crew, which would entirely account

for the discrepancies. In any event it must be remembered that he

makes the American killed and wounded 111 (Porter, 124), and _not_

69, as James says. The latter's statement is wilfully false, as he

had seen Hilyar's letter.] He also bears very candid testimony to

the defence of the _Essex_ having been effective enough to at one

time render the result doubtful, saying: "Our first attack * * *

produced no visible effect. Our second * * * was not more successful;

and having lost the use of our main-sail, jib, and main-stay,

appearances looked a little inauspicious." Throughout the war no

ship was so desperately defended as the _Essex_, taking into account

the frightful odds against which she fought, which always enhances

the merit of a defence. The _Lawrence_, which suffered even more,

was backed by a fleet; the _Frolic_ was overcome by an equal foe;

and the _Reindeer_ fought at far less of a disadvantage, and suffered

less. None of the frigates, British or American, were defended with

any thing like the resolution she displayed.

But it is perhaps permissible to inquire whether Porter's course,

after the accident to his top-mast occurred, was altogether the best

that could have been taken. On such a question no opinion could have

been better than Farragut's, although of course his judgment was

_ex post facto_, as he was very young at the time of the fight.

"In the first place, I consider our original and greatest error was

in attempting to regain the anchorage; being greatly superior in

sailing powers we should have borne up and run before the wind.

If we had come in contact with the _Phoebe_ we should have carried

her by boarding; if she avoided us, as she might have done by her

greater ability to manoeuvre, then we should have taken her fire

and passed on, leaving both vessels behind until we had replaced

our top-mast, by which time they would have been separated, as unless

they did so it would have been no chase, the _Cherub_ being a dull

sailer.

"Secondly, when it was apparent to everybody that we had no chance

of success under the circumstances, the ship should have been run

ashore, throwing her broadside to the beach to prevent raking, and

fought as long as was consistent with humanity, and then set on fire.

But having determined upon anchoring we should have bent a spring

on to the ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable, where it was

exposed, and could be shot away as fast as put on."

But it must be remembered that when Porter decided to anchor near

shore, in neutral water, he could not anticipate Hilyar's deliberate

and treacherous breach of faith. I do not allude to the mere disregard

of neutrality. Whatever international moralists may say, such

disregard is a mere question of expediency. If the benefits to be

gained by attacking a hostile ship in neutral waters are such as to

counterbalance the risk of incurring the enmity of the neutral

power, why then the attack ought to be made. Had Hilyar, when he

first made his appearance off Valparaiso, sailed in with his two

ships, the men at quarters and guns out, and at once attacked

Porter, considering the destruction of the _Essex_ as outweighing

the insult to Chili, why his behavior would have been perfectly

justifiable. In fact this is unquestionably what he intended to do,

but he suddenly found himself in such a position, that in the even

of hostilities, _his_ ship would be the captured one, and he owed

his escape purely to Porter's over-forbearance, under great provocation

Then he gave his word to Potter that he would not infringe on the

neutrality; and he never dared to break it, until he saw Porter was

disabled and almost helpless! This may seem strong language to use

about a British officer, but it is justly strong. Exactly as any

outsider must consider Warrington's attack on the British brig

_Nautilus_ in 1815, as a piece of needless cruelty; so any outsider

must consider Hilyar as having most treacherously broken faith with

Porter.

After the fight Hilyar behaved most kindly and courteously to the

prisoners; and, as already said, he fought his ship most ably, for

it would have been quixotic to a degree to forego his advantages.

But previous to the battle his conduct had been over-cautious. It

was to be expected that the _Essex_ would make her escape as soon

as practicable, and so he should have used every effort to bring

her to action. Instead of this he always declined the fight when

alone; and he owed his ultimate success to the fact that the _Essex_

instead of escaping, as she could several times have done, stayed,

hoping to bring the _Phoebe_ to action single-handed. It must be

remembered that the _Essex_ was almost as weak compared to the

_Phoebe_, as the _Cherub_ was compared to the _Essex_. The latter

was just about midway between the British ships, as may be seen by

the following comparison. In the action the _Essex_ fought all six

of her long 12's, and the _Cherub_ both her long 9's, instead of

the corresponding broadside carronades which the ships regularly

used. This gives the _Essex_ a better armament than she would have

had fighting her guns as they were regularly used; but it can be

seen how great the inequality still was. It must also be kept in

mind, that while in the battles between the American 44's and

British 38's, the short weight 24-pounders of the former had in

reality no greater range or accuracy than the full weight 18's of

their opponents, in this case the _Phoebe's_ full weight 18's had

a very much greater range and accuracy than the short weight 12's

of the _Essex_.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Men. Broadside Guns. Weight. Total.

_Phoebe_, 320 13 long 18's 234 lbs.

1 " 12 12 "

1 " 9 9 " (255)

7 short 32's 224 "

1 " 18 18 " (242)

__________ _____

23 guns. 497 lbs.

_Cherub_, 180 2 long 9's 18 lbs. (18)

2 short 18's 36 "

9 " 32's 288 " (342)

___________ ______

13 guns. 342 lbs.

______________________________ ______ _____

500 men. 36 guns. 839 lbs. metal.

-+- 273 long. -+-

'- 566 short. -'

_Essex_, 255 6 long 12's 66 lbs. -+- Taking 7 per

17 short 32's 504 " | cent off

| for short

'- weight.

____________ _____________ ________ _______________

255 men, 32 guns, 570 lbs.

All accounts agree as to the armament of the _Essex_. I have taken

that of the _Phoebe_ and _Cherub_ from James; but Captain Porter's

official letter, and all the other American accounts make the

_Phoebe's_ broadside 15 long 18's and 8 short 32's, and give the

_Cherub_, in all, 18 short 32's, 8 short 24's, and two long nines.

This would make their broadside 904 lbs., 288 long, 616 short. I

would have no doubt that the American accounts were right if the

question rested solely on James' veracity; but he probably took his

figures from official sources. At any rate, remembering the difference

between long guns and carronades, it appears that the _Essex_ was

really nearly intermediate in force between the _Phoebe_ and the

_Cherub_. The battle being fought, with a very trifling exception,

at long range, it was in reality a conflict between a crippled ship

throwing a broadside of 66 lbs. of metal, and two ships throwing

273 lbs., who by their ability to manoeuvre could choose positions

where they could act with full effect, while their antagonist could

not return a shot. Contemporary history does not afford a single

instance of so determined a defence against such frightful odds.

The official letters of Captains Hilyar and Porter agree substantially

in all respects; the details of the fight, as seen in the _Essex_,

are found in the "Life of Farragut." But although the British captain

does full justice to his foe, British historians have universally

tried to belittle Porter's conduct. It is much to be regretted that

we have no British account worth paying attention to of the proceedings

before the fight, when the _Phoebe_ declined single combat with the

_Essex_. James, of course, states that the _Phoebe_ did not decline

it, but he gives no authority, and his unsupported assertion would

be valueless even if uncontradicted. His account of the action is

grossly inaccurate as he has inexcusably garbled Hilyar's report.

One instance of this I have already mentioned, as regards Hilyar's

account of Porter's loss. Again, Hilyar distinctly states that the

_Essex_ was twice on fire, yet James (p. 418) utterly denies this,

thereby impliedly accusing the British captain of falsehood. There

is really no need of the corroboration of Porter's letter, but he

has it most fully in the "Life of Farragut," p. 37: "The men came

rushing up from below, many with their clothes burning, which were

torn from them as quickly as possible, and those for whom this could

not be done were told to jump overboard and quench the flames. * * *

One man swam to shore with scarcely a square inch of his body which

had not been burned, and, although he was deranged for some days,

he ultimately recovered, and afterward served with me in the West

Indies." The third unfounded statement in James' account is that

buckets of spirits were found in all parts of the main deck of the

_Essex_, and that most of the prisoners were drunk. No authority

is cited for this, and there is not a shadow of truth in it. He ends

by stating that "few even in his own country will venture to speak

well of Captain David Porter." After these various paragraphs we

are certainly justified in rejecting James' account _in toto_. An

occasional mistake is perfectly excusable, and gross ignorance of

a good many facts does not invalidate a man's testimony with regard

to some others with which he is acquainted; but a wilful and systematic

perversion of the truth in a number of cases throws a very strong

doubt on a historian's remaining statements, unless they are supported

by unquestionable authority.

But if British historians have generally given Porter much less than

his due, by omitting all reference to the inferiority of his guns,

his lost top-mast, etc., it is no worse than Americans have done in

similar cases. The latter, for example, will make great allowances

in the case of the _Essex_ for her having carronades only, but utterly

fail to allude to the _Cyane_ and _Levant_ as having suffered under

the same disadvantage. They should remember that the rules cut both ways.

The _Essex_ having suffered chiefly above the waterline, she was

repaired sufficiently in Valparaiso to enable her to make the voyage

to England, where she was added to the British navy. The _Essex Junior_

was disarmed and the American prisoners embarked in her for New York,

on parole. But Lieutenant McKnight, Chaplain Adams, Midshipman Lyman,

and 11 seamen were exchanged on the spot for some of the British

prisoners on board the _Essex Junior_. McKnight and Lyman accompanied

the _Phoebe_ to Rio Janeiro, where they embarked on a Swedish vessel,

were taken out of her by the _Wasp_, Captain Blakely, and were lost

with the rest of the crew of that vessel. The others reached New

York in safety. Of the prizes made by the _Essex_, some were burnt

or sunk by the Americans, and some retaken by the British. And so,

after nearly two years' uninterrupted success, the career of the

_Essex_ terminated amid disasters of all kinds. But at least her

officers and crew could reflect that they had afforded an example

of courage in adversity that it would be difficult to match elsewhere.

The first of the new heavy sloops of war that got to sea was the

_Frolic_, Master Commandant Joseph Bainbridge, which put out early

in February. Shortly afterward she encountered a large Carthagenian

privateer, which refused to surrender and was sunk by a broadside,

nearly a hundred of her crew being drowned. Before daylight on the

20th of April, lat. 24° 12' N., long. 81° 25' W., she fell in with

the British 36-gun frigate _Orpheus_, Capt. Pigot, and the 12-gun

schooner _Shelburne_, Lieut. Hope, both to leeward. The schooner

soon weathered the _Frolic_, but of course was afraid to close, and

the American sloop continued beating to windward, in the effort to

escape, for nearly 13 hours; the water was started, the anchors cut

away, and finally the guns thrown overboard--a measure by means of

which both the _Hornet_, the _Rattlesnake_, and the _Adams_ succeeded

in escaping under similar circumstances,--but all was of no avail,

and she was finally captured. The court of inquiry honorably acquitted

both officers and crew. As was to be expected James considers the

surrender a disgraceful one, because the guns were thrown overboard.

As I have said, this was a measure which had proved successful in

several cases of a like nature; the criticism is a piece of petty

meanness. Fortunately we have Admiral Codrington's dictum on the

surrender ("Memoirs," vol. 1, p. 310), which he evidently considered

as perfectly honorable.

[Illustration: Master Commandant Lewis Warrington: a contemporary

portrait by Rembrandt Peale. (Courtesy Naval Historical Foundation)]

A sister ship to the _Frolic_, the _Peacock_, Capt. Lewis Warrington,

sailed from New York on March 12th, and cruised southward; on the

28th of April, at seven in the morning, lat. 17° 47' N., long. 80°

7' W., several sail were made to windward. [Footnote: Official letter

of Capt. Warrington, April 29. 1814.] These were a small convoy of

merchant-men, bound for the Bermudas, under the protection of the

18-gun brig-sloop _Epervier_, Capt. Wales, 5 days out of Havana,

and with $118,000 in specie on board. [Footnote: James, vi, 424.]

The _Epervier_ when discovered was steering north by east, the wind

being from the eastward; soon afterward the wind veered gradually

round to the southward, and the _Epervier_ hauled up close on the

port tack, while the convoy made all sail away, and the _Peacock_

came down with the wind on her starboard quarter. At 10 A.M. the

vessels were within gun-shot, and the _Peacock_ edged away to get

in a raking broadside, but the _Epervier_ frustrated this by putting

her helm up until close on her adversary's bow, when she rounded to

and fired her starboard guns, receiving in return the starboard

broadside of the _Peacock_ at 10.20 A.M. These first broadsides took

effect aloft, the brig being partially dismantled, while the

_Peacock's_ fore-yard was totally disabled by two round shot in the

starboard quarter, which deprived the ship of the use of her fore-sail

and fore-top-sail, and compelled her to run large. However, the

_Epervier_ eased away [Footnote: According to some accounts she at

this time tacked.] when abaft her foe's beam, and ran off alongside

of her (using her port guns, while the American still had the

starboard battery engaged) at 10.35. The _Peacock's_ fire was now

very hot, and directed chiefly at her adversary's hull, on which

it told heavily, while she did not suffer at all in return. The

_Epervier_ coming up into the wind, owing somewhat to the loss of

head-sail, Capt. Wales called his crew aft to try boarding, but they

refused, saying "she's too heavy for us," [Footnote: James, "Naval

Occurrences," p. 243.] and then, at 11.05 the colors were hauled down.

[Illustration of the action between _PEACOCK_ and _EPERVIER_ between

10.10 and 11.05.]

Except the injury to her fore-yard, the _Peacock's_ damages were

confined to the loss of a few top-mast and top-gallant backstays,

and some shot-holes through her sails. Of her crew, consisting, all

told, of 166 men and boys, [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi. 196,

says only 160; the above is taken from Warrington's letter of June

1st, preserved with the other manuscript letters in the Naval Archives.

The crew contained about 10 boys, was not composed of picked men,

and did not number 185--_vide_ James.] only two were wounded, both

slightly. The _Epervier_, on the other hand, had 45 shot-holes in

her hull, 5 feet of water in her hold, main-top-mast over the side,

main-mast nearly in two, main-boom shot away, bowsprit wounded

severely, and most of the fore-rigging and stays shot away; and of

her crew of 128 men (according to the list of prisoners given by

Captain Warrington; James says 118, but he is not backed up by any

official report) 9 were killed and mortally wounded, and 14 severely

and slightly wounded. Instead of two long sixes for bow-chasers,

and a shifting carronade, she had two 18-pound carronades (according

to the American prize-lists; [Footnote: American State Papers, vol.

xiv, p. 427.] Capt. Warrington says 32's). Otherwise she was armed

as usual. She was, like the rest of her kind, very "tubby," being

as broad as the _Peacock_, though 10 feet shorter on deck. Allowing,

as usual, 7 per cent, for short weight of the American shot, we get the

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Tons. No. Broadside Guns. Weight Metal. Crew. Loss.

_Peacock_ 509 11 315 166 2

_Epervier_ 477 9 274 128 23

That is, the relative force being as 12 is to 10, the relative

execution done was as 12 is to 1, and the _Epervier_ surrendered

before she had lost a fifth of her crew. The case of the _Epervier_

closely resembles that of the _Argus_. In both cases the officers

behaved finely; in both cases, too, the victorious foe was heavier,

in about the same proportion, while neither the crew of the _Argus_,

nor the crew of the _Epervier_ fought with the determined bravery

displayed by the combatants in almost every other struggle of the

war. But it must be added that the _Epervier_ did worse than the

_Argus_, and the _Peacock_ (American) better than the _Pelican_.

The gunnery of the _Epervier_ was extraordinarily poor; "the most

disgraceful part of the affair was that our ship was cut to pieces

and the enemy hardly scratched." [Footnote: "Memoirs of Admiral

Codrington," i, 322.] James states that after the first two or three

broadsides several carronades became unshipped, and that the others

were dismounted by the fire of the _Peacock_; that the men had not

been exercised at the guns; and, most important of all, that the

crew (which contained "several foreigners," but was chiefly British;

as the _Argus_ was chiefly American) was disgracefully bad. The

_Peacock_, on the contrary, showed skilful seamanship as well as

excellent gunnery. In 45 minutes after the fight was over the fore-yard

had been sent down and fished, the fore-sail set up, and every thing

in complete order again; [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, April

29, 1814.] the prize was got in sailing order by dark, though great

exertions had to be made to prevent her sinking. Mr. Nicholson, first

of the _Peacock_, was put in charge as prize-master. The next day

the two vessels were abreast of Amelia Island, when two frigates were

discovered in the north, to leeward. Capt. Warrington at once directed

the prize to proceed to St. Mary's, while he separated and made sail

on a wind to the south, intending to draw the frigates after him,

as he was confident that the _Peacock_, a very fast vessel, could

outsail them. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, May 4, 1814.]

The plan succeeded perfectly, the brig reaching Savannah on the first

of May, and the ship three days afterward. The _Epervier_ was purchased

for the U.S. navy, under the same name and rate. The _Peacock_ sailed

again on June 4th, [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Warrington, Oct. 30, 1814.]

going first northward to the Grand Banks, then to the Azores; then

she stationed herself in the mouth of the Irish Channel, and afterward

cruised off Cork, the mouth of the _Shannon_, and the north of Ireland,

capturing several very valuable prizes and creating great consternation.

She then changed her station, to elude the numerous vessels that

had been sent after her, and sailed southward, off Cape Ortegal,

Cape Finisterre, and finally among the Barbadoes, reaching New York,

Oct. 29th. During this cruise she encountered no war vessel smaller

than a frigate; but captured 14 sail of merchant-men, some containing

valuable cargoes, and manned by 148 men.

On April 29th, H.M.S. schooner _Ballahou_, 6, Lieut. King, while

cruising off the American coast was captured by the _Perry_, privateer,

a much heavier vessel, after an action of 10 minutes' duration.

The general peace prevailing in Europe allowed the British to turn

their energies altogether to America; and in no place was this

increased vigor so much felt as in Chesapeake Bay where a great

number of line-of-battle ships, frigates, sloops, and transports

had assembled, in preparation for the assault on Washington and

Baltimore. The defence of these waters was confided to Capt. Joshua

Barney, [Footnote: He was born at Baltimore, July 7, 1759; James,

with habitual accuracy, calls him an Irishman. He makes Decatur,

by the way, commit the geographical solecism of being born in

"Maryland, Virginia."] with a flotilla of gun-boats. These consisted

of three or four sloops and schooners, but mainly of barges, which

were often smaller than the ship's boats that were sent against them.

These gun-boats were manned by from 20 to 40 men each, and each

carried, according to its size, one or two long 24-, 18-, or 12-pounders.

They were bad craft at best; and, in addition, it is difficult to

believe that they were handled to the fullest advantage.

On June 1st Commodore Barney, with the block sloop _Scorpion_ and

14 smaller "gun-boats," chiefly row gallies, passed the mouth of

the Patuxent, and chased the British schooner _St. Lawrence_ and

seven boats, under Captain Barrie, until they took refuge with the

_Dragon_, 74, which in turn chased Barney's flotilla into the Patuxent,

where she blockaded it in company with the _Albion_, 74. They were

afterward joined by the _Loire_, 38, _Narcissus_, 32, and _Lasseur_,

18, and Commodore Barney moved two miles up St. Leonard's Creek,

while the frigates and sloop blockaded its mouth. A deadlock now

ensued; the gunboats were afraid to attack the ships, and the ships'

boats were just as afraid of the gun-boats. On the 8th, 9th, and

11th skirmishes occurred; on each occasion the British boats came

up till they caught sight of Barney's flotilla, and were promptly

chased off by the latter, which, however, took good care not to

meddle with the larger vessels. Finally, Colonel Wadsworth, of the

artillery, with two long 18-pounders, assisted by the marines, under

Captain Miller, and a few regulars, offered to cooperate from the

shore while Barney assailed the two frigates with the flotilla. On

the 26th the joint attack took place most successfully; the _Loire_

and _Narcissus_ were driven off, although not much damaged, and the

flotilla rowed out in triumph, with a loss of but 4 killed and 7

wounded. But in spite of this small success, which was mainly due

to Colonel Wadsworth, Commodore Barney made no more attempts with

his gun-boats. The bravery and skill which the flotilla men showed

at Bladensburg prove conclusively that their ill success on the water

was due to the craft they were in, and not to any failing of the men.

At the same period the French gun-boats were even more unsuccessful,

but the Danes certainly did very well with theirs.

Barney's flotilla in the Patuxent remained quiet until August 22d,

and then was burned when the British advanced on Washington. The

history of this advance, as well as of the unsuccessful one on

Baltimore, concerns less the American than the British navy, and

will be but briefly alluded to here. On August 20th Major-General

Ross and Rear-Admiral Cockburn, with about 5,000 soldiers and marines,

moved on Washington by land; while a squadron, composed of the

_Seahorse_, 38, _Euryalus_, 36, bombs _Devastation_, _Aetna_, and

_Meteor_, and rocket-ship _Erebus_, under Captain James Alexander

Gordon, moved up the Potomac to attack Fort Washington, near

Alexandria; and Sir Peter Parker, in the _Menelaus_, 38, was sent

"to create a diversion" above Baltimore. Sir Peter's "diversion"

turned out most unfortunately for him: for, having landed to attack

120 Maryland militia, under Colonel Reade, he lost his own life,

while fifty of his followers were placed _hors de combat_ and the

remainder chased back to the ship by the victors, who had but three

wounded.

The American army, which was to oppose Ross and Cockburn, consisted

of some seven thousand militia, who fled so quickly that only about

1,500 British had time to become engaged. The fight was really between

these 1,500 British regulars and the American flotilla men. These

consisted of 78 marines, under Captain Miller, and 370 sailors, some

of whom served under Captain Barney, who had a battery of two 18's

and three 12's, while the others were armed with muskets and pikes,

and acted with the marines. Both sailors and marines did nobly,

inflicting most of the loss the British suffered, which amounted

to 256 men, and in return lost over a hundred of their own men,

including the two captains, who were wounded and captured, with

the guns. [Footnote: The optimistic Cooper thinks that two regular

regiments would have given the Americans this battle--which is open

to doubt.] Ross took Washington and burned the public buildings;

and the panic-struck Americans foolishly burned the _Columbia_, 44,

and _Argus_, 18, which were nearly ready for service.

Captain Gordon's attack on Fort Washington was conducted with great

skill and success. Fort Washington was abandoned as soon as fired

upon, and the city of Alexandria surrendered upon most humiliating

conditions. Captain Gordon was now joined by the _Fairy_, 18, Captain

Baker, who brought him orders to return from Vice-Admiral Cochrane;

and the squadron began to work down the river, which was very difficult

to navigate. Commodore Rodgers, with some of the crew of the two

44's, _Guerrière_ and _Java_, tried to bar their progress, but had

not sufficient means. On September 1st an attempt was made to destroy

the _Devastation_ by fire-ships, but it failed; on the 4th the attempt

was repeated by Commodore Rodgers, with a party of some forty men,

but they were driven off and attacked by the British boats, under

Captain Baker, who in turn was repulsed with the loss of his second

lieutenant killed, and some twenty-five men killed or wounded. The

squadron also had to pass and silence a battery of light field-pieces

on the 5th, where they suffered enough to raise their total loss to

seven killed and thirty-five wounded. Gordon's inland expedition was

thus concluded most successfully, at a very trivial cost; it was

a most venturesome feat, reflecting great honor on the captains and

crews engaged in it.

Baltimore was threatened actively by sea and land early in September.

On the 13th an indecisive conflict took place between the British

regulars and American militia, in which the former came off with

the honor, and the latter with the profit. The regulars held the

field, losing 350 men, including General Ross; the militia retreated

in fair order with a loss of but 200. The water attack was also

unsuccessful. At 5 A.M. on the 13th the bomb vessels _Meteor_,

_Aetna_, _Terror_, _Volcano_, and _Devastation_, the rocket-ship

_Erebus_, and the frigates _Severn_, _Euryalus_, _Havannah_, and

_Hebrus_ opened on Fort McHenry, some of the other fortifications

being occasionally fired at. A furious but harmless cannonade was

kept up between the forts and ships until 7 A.M. on the 14th, when

the British fleet and army retired.

I have related these events out of their natural order because they

really had very little to do with our navy, and yet it is necessary

to mention them in order to give an idea of the course of events.

The British and American accounts of the various gun-boat attacks

differ widely; but it is very certain that the gun-boats accomplished

little or nothing of importance. On the other hand, their loss amounted

to nothing, for many of those that were sunk were afterward raised,

and the total tonnage of those destroyed would not much exceed that

of the British barges captured by them from time to time or destroyed

by the land batteries.

The purchased brig _Rattlesnake_, 16, had been cruising in the

Atlantic with a good deal of success; but in lat. 40° N., long. 33° W.,

was chased by a frigate from which Lieutenant Renshaw, the brig's

commander, managed to escape only by throwing overboard all his

guns except two long nines; and on June 22d he was captured by

the _Leander_, 50, Captain Sir George Ralph Collier, K. C. B.

The third of the new sloops to get to sea was the _Wasp_, 22, Captain

Johnston Blakely, which left Portsmouth on May 1st, with a very fine

crew of 173 men, almost exclusively New Englanders; there was said

not to have been a single foreign seaman on board. It is, at all

events, certain that during the whole war no vessel was ever better

manned and commanded than this daring and resolute cruiser. The _Wasp_

slipped unperceived through the blockading frigates, and ran into

the mouth of the English Channel, right in the thick of the English

cruisers; here she remained several weeks, burning and scuttling

many ships. Finally, on June 28th, at 4 A.M., in lat. 48° 36' N.,

long. 11° 15' W., [Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8,

1814.] while in chase of two merchant-men, a sail was made on the

weather-beam. This was the British brig-sloop _Reindeer_, 18,

Captain William Manners, [Footnote: James, vi, 429.] with a crew

of 118, as brave men as ever sailed or fought on the narrow seas.

Like the _Peacock_ (British) the _Reindeer_ was only armed with

24-pounders, and Captain Manners must have known well that he was

to do battle with a foe heavier than himself; but there was no more

gallant seaman in the whole British navy, fertile as it was in men

who cared but little for odds of size or strength. As the day broke,

the _Reindeer_ made sail for the _Wasp_, then lying in the west-southwest.

The sky was overcast with clouds, and the smoothness of the sea was

hardly disturbed by the light breeze that blew out of the northeast.

Captain Blakely hauled up and stood for his antagonist, as the latter

came slowly down with the wind nearly aft, and so light was the weather

that the vessels kept almost on even keels. It was not till quarter

past one that the _Wasp's_ drum rolled out its loud challenge as

it beat to quarters, and a few minutes afterward the ship put about

and stood for the foe, thinking to weather him; but at 1.50 the brig

also tacked and stood away, each of the cool and skilful captains

being bent on keeping the weather-gage. At half past two the _Reindeer_

again tacked, and, taking in her stay-sails, stood for the _Wasp_,

who furled her royals; and, seeing that she would be weathered, at

2.50, put about in her turn and ran off, with the wind a little forward

the port beam, brailing up the mizzen, while the _Reindeer_ hoisted

her flying-jib, to close, and gradually came up on the _Wasp's_

weather-quarter. At 17 minutes past three, when the vessels were

not sixty yards apart, the British opened the conflict, firing the

shifting 12-pound carronade, loaded with round and grape. To this

the Americans could make no return, and it was again loaded and fired,

with the utmost deliberation; this was repeated five times, and would

have been a trying ordeal to a crew less perfectly disciplined than

the _Wasp's_. At 3.26 Captain Blakely, finding his enemy did not

get on his beam, put his helm a-lee and luffed up, firing his guns

from aft forward as they bore. For ten minutes the ship and the brig

lay abreast, not twenty yards apart, while the cannonade was terribly

destructive. The concussion of the explosions almost deadened what

little way the vessels had on, and the smoke hung over them like a

pall. The men worked at the guns with desperate energy, but the odds

in weight of metal (3 to 2) were too great against the _Reindeer_,

where both sides played their parts so manfully. Captain Manners

stood at his post, as resolute as ever, though wounded again and

again. A grape-shot passed through both his thighs, bringing him

to the deck; but, maimed and bleeding to death, he sprang to his

feet, cheering on the seamen. The vessels were now almost touching,

and putting his helm aweather, he ran the _Wasp_ aboard on her port

[Footnote: Letter of Captain Blakely, July 8, 1814. Cooper starboard:

it is a point of little importance; all accounts agree as to the

_relative_ positions of the craft.] quarter, while the boarders

gathered forward, to try it with the steel. But the Carolina captain

had prepared for this with cool confidence; the marines came aft;

close under the bulwarks crouched the boarders, grasping in their

hands the naked cutlasses, while behind them were drawn up the pikemen.

As the vessels came grinding together the men hacked and thrust at

one another through the open port-holes, while the black smoke curled

up from between the hulls. Then through the smoke appeared the grim

faces of the British sea-dogs, and the fighting was bloody enough;

for the stubborn English stood well in the hard hand play. But those

who escaped the deadly fire of the topmen, escaped only to be riddled

through by the long Yankee pikes; so, avenged by their own hands,

the foremost of the assailants died, and the others gave back. The

attack was foiled, though the _Reindeer's_ marines kept answering

well the American fire. Then the English captain, already mortally

wounded, but with the indomitable courage that nothing but death

could conquer, cheering and rallying his men, himself sprang, sword

in hand, into the rigging, to lead them on; and they followed him

with a will. At that instant a ball from the _Wasp's_ main-top

crashed through his skull, and, still clenching in his right hand

the sword he had shown he could wear so worthily, with his face to

the foe, he fell back on his own deck dead, while above him yet

floated the flag for which he had given his life. No Norse Viking,

slain over shield, ever died better. As the British leader fell and

his men recoiled, Captain Blakely passed the word to board; with

wild hurrahs the boarders swarmed over the hammock nettings, there

was a moment's furious struggle, the surviving British were slain

or driven below, and the captain's clerk, _the highest officer left_,

surrendered the brig, at 3.44, just 27 minutes after the _Reindeer_

had fired the first gun, and just 18 after the _Wasp_ had responded.

[Illustration showing the action between the _WASP_ and the _REINDEER_

from 3.17 to 3.45.]

Both ships had suffered severely in the short struggle; but, as with

the _Shannon_ and _Chesapeake_, the injuries were much less severe

aloft than in the hulls. All the spars were in their places. The

_Wasp's_ hull had received 6 round, and many grape; a 24-pound shot

had passed through the foremast; and of her crew of 173, 11 were

killed or mortally wounded, and 15 wounded severely or slightly.

The _Reindeer_ was completely cut to pieces in a line with her ports;

her upper works, boats, and spare spars being one entire wreck. Of

her crew of 118 men, 33 were killed outright or died later, and 34

were wounded, nearly all severely.

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

Broadside Weight No.

Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss

_Wasp,_ 509 11 315 173 26

_Reindeer,_ 477 10 210 118 67

It is thus seen that the _Reindeer_ fought at a greater disadvantage

than any other of the various British sloops that were captured in

single action during the war; and yet she made a better fight than

any of them (though the _Frolic_, and the _Frolic_ only, was defended

with the same desperate courage); a pretty sure proof that heavy

metal is not the only factor to be considered in accounting for the

American victories. "It is difficult to say which vessel behaved the

best in this short but gallant combat." [Footnote: Cooper, ii, 287.]

I doubt if the war produced two better single-ship commanders than

Captain Blakely and Captain Manners; and an equal meed of praise

attaches to both crews. The British could rightly say that they

yielded purely to heavy odds in men and metal; and the Americans,

that the difference in execution was fully proportioned to the

difference in force. It is difficult to know which to admire most,

the wary skill with which each captain manoeuvred before the fight,

the perfect training and discipline that their crews showed, the

decision and promptitude with which Captain Manners tried to retrieve

the day by boarding, and the desperate bravery with which the attempt

was made; or the readiness with which Captain Blakely made his

preparations, and the cool courage with which the assault was foiled.

All people of the English stock, no matter on which side of the

Atlantic they live, if they have any pride in the many feats of

fierce prowess done by the men of their blood and race, should never

forget this fight; although we cannot but feel grieved to find that

such men--men of one race and one speech; brothers in blood, as well

as in bravery--should ever have had to turn their weapons against

one another.

The day after the conflict the prize's foremast went by the board,

and, as she was much damaged by shot, Captain Blakely burned her,

put a portion of his wounded prisoners on board a neutral, and with

the remainder proceeded to France, reaching l'Orient on the 8th day

of July.

On July 4th Sailing-master Percival and 30 volunteers of the New York

flotilla [Footnote: Letter of Com. J. Lewis, July 6, 1814.] concealed

themselves on board a fishing-smack, and carried by surprise the

_Eagle_ tender, which contained a 32-pound howitzer and 14 men, 4

of whom were wounded.

On July 12th, while off the west coast of South Africa, the American

brig _Syren_ was captured after a chase of 11 hours by the _Medway_,

74, Capt. Brine. The chase was to windward during the whole time,

and made every effort to escape, throwing overboard all her boats,

anchors, cables, and spare spars. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. Brine

to Vice-Admiral Tyler, July 12. 1814.] Her commander, Captain Parker,

had died, and she was in charge of Lieut. N. J. Nicholson. By a curious

coincidence, on the same day, July 12th, H. M. cutter _Landrail_, 4,

[Footnote: James, vi, 436: his statement is wrong as regards the

privateer.] of 20 men, Lieut. Lancaster, was captured by the American

privateer _Syren_, a schooner mounting 1 long heavy gun, with a crew

of 70 men; the _Landrail_ had 7, and the _Syren_ 3 men wounded.

On July 14th Gun-boat No. 88, Sailing-master George Clement, captured

after a short skirmish the tender of the _Tenedos_ frigate, with

her second lieutenant, 2 midshipmen, and 10 seamen. [Footnote: Letter

of Capt. Isaac Hull, July 15. 1814.]

The _Wasp_ stayed in l'Orient till she was thoroughly refitted, and

had filled, in part, the gaps in her crew, from the American privateers

in port. On Aug. 27th, Captain Blakely sailed again, making two prizes

during the next three days. On Sept. 1st she came up to a convoy of

10 sail under the protection of the _Armada_, 74, all bound for

Gibraltar; the swift cruiser hovered round the merchant-men like

a hawk, and though chased off again and again by the line-of-battle

ship, always returned the instant the pursuit stopped, and finally

actually succeeded in cutting off and capturing one ship, laden with

iron and brass cannon, muskets, and other military stores of great

value. At half past six on the evening of the same day, in lat. 47°

30' N., long. 11° W., while running almost free, four sail, two on

the starboard bow, and two on the port, rather more to leeward, were

made out. [Footnote: Official letter of Capt. Blakely. Sept. 8, 1814.]

Capt. Blakely at once made sail for the most weatherly of the four

ships in sight, though well aware that more than one of them might

prove to be hostile cruisers, and they were all of unknown force.

But the determined Carolinian was not one to be troubled by such

considerations. He probably had several men less under his command

than in the former action, but had profited by his experience with

the _Reindeer_ in one point, having taken aboard her 12-pounder

boat carronade, of whose efficacy he had had very practical proof.

The chase, the British brig-sloop _Avon_, 18, Captain the Honorable

James Arbuthnot, [Footnote: James, vi, 432] was steering almost

southwest; the wind, which was blowing fresh from the southeast,

being a little abaft the port beam. At 7.00 the _Avon_ began making

night signals with the lanterns, but the _Wasp_, disregarding these,

came steadily on; at 8.38 the _Avon_ fired a shot from her stern-chaser,

[Footnote: James, vi, 432.] and shortly afterward another from one

of her lee or starboard guns. At 20 minutes past 9, the _Wasp_ was

on the port or weather-quarter of the _Avon_, and the vessels interchanged

several hails; one of the American officers then came forward on

the forecastle and ordered the brig to heave to, which the latter

declined doing, and set her port foretop-mast studding sail. The

_Wasp_ then, at 9.29, fired the 12-pound carronade into her, to which

the _Avon_ responded with her stern-chaser and the aftermost port

guns. Capt. Blakely then put his helm up, for fear his adversary

would try to escape, and ran to leeward of her, and then ranged up

alongside, having poured a broadside into her quarter. A close and

furious engagement began, at such short range that the only one of

the _Wasp's_ crew who was wounded, was hit by a wad; four round shot

struck her hull, killing two men, and she suffered a good deal in

her rigging. The men on board did not know the name of their antagonist;

but they could see through the smoke and the gloom of the night,

as her black hull surged through the water, that she was a large

brig; and aloft, against the sky, the sailors could be discerned,

clustering in the tops. [Footnote: Captain Blakely's letter.] In

spite of the darkness the _Wasp's_ fire was directed with deadly

precision; the _Avon's_ gaff was shot away at almost the first

broadside, and most of her main-rigging and spars followed suit.

She was hulled again and again, often below water-line; some of her

carronades were dismounted, and finally the main-mast went by the

board. At 10.00, after 31 minutes of combat, her fire had been

completely silenced and Captain Blakely hailed to know if she had

struck. No answer being received, and the brig firing a few random

shot, the action recommended; but at 10.12 the _Avon_ was again

hailed, and this time answered that she had struck. While lowering

away a boat to take possession, another sail (H. B. M. brig-sloop

_Castilian_, 18, Captain Braimer) was seen astern. The men were again

called to quarters, and every thing put in readiness as rapidly as

possible; but at 10.36 two more sail were seen (one of which was

H. B. M. _Tartarus_, 20 [Footnote: "Niles' Register," vi. 216.]).

The braces being cut away, the _Wasp_ was put before the wind until

new ones could be rove. The _Castilian_ pursued till she came up

close, when she fired her lee guns into, or rather over, the

weather-quarter of the _Wasp_, cutting her rigging slightly. Repeated

signals of distress having now been made by the _Avon_ (which had

lost 10 men killed and 32 wounded), the _Castilian_ tacked and stood

for her, and on closing found out she was sinking. Hardly had her

crew been taken out when she went down.

[Illustration of the action between _WASP_ and _AVON_ from 9.25

to 10.00.]

Counting the _Wasp's_ complement as full (though it was probably

two or three short), taking James' statement of the crew of the

_Avon_ as true, including the boat carronades of both vessels, and

considering the _Avon's_ stern-chaser to have been a six-pounder,

we get the

COMPARATIVE FORCE.

No. Weight No.

Tons. Guns. Metal. Men. Loss.

_Wasp,_ 509 12 327 160 3

_Avon,_ 477 11 280 117 42

It is self-evident that in the case of this action the odds, 14 to

11, are neither enough to account for the loss inflicted being as

14 to 1, nor for the rapidity with which, during a night encounter,

the _Avon_ was placed in a sinking condition. "The gallantry of the

_Avon's_ officers and crew cannot for a moment be questioned; but

the gunnery of the latter appears to have been not one whit better

than, to the discredit of the British navy, had frequently before

been displayed in combats of this kind. Nor, judging from the specimen

given by the _Castilian_, is it likely that she would have performed

any better." [Footnote: James, vi, 435.] On the other hand, "Capt.

Blakely's conduct on this occasion had all the merit shown in the

previous action, with the additional claim of engaging an enemy

under circumstances which led him to believe that her consorts were

in the immediate vicinity. The steady, officer-like way in which

the _Avon_ was destroyed, and the coolness with which he prepared

to engage the _Castilian_ within ten minutes after his first antagonist

had struck, are the best encomiums on this officer's character and

spirit, as well as on the school in which he had been trained."

[Footnote: Cooper, ii, 291.]

The _Wasp_ now cruised to the southward and westward, taking and

scuttling one or two prizes. On Sept. 21st, lat. 33° 12' N., long.

14° 56' W., she captured the brig _Atalanta_, 8, with 19 men, which

proved a valuable prize, and was sent in with one of the midshipmen,

Mr. Geisinger, aboard, as prize-master, who reached Savannah in safety

on Nov. 4th. Meanwhile the _Wasp_ kept on toward the southeast. On

Oct. 9th, in lat. 18° 35' N., long. 30° 10' W., she spoke and boarded

the Swedish brig _Adonis_, and took out of her Lieut. McKnight and

Mr. Lyman, a master's mate, both late of the _Essex_, on their way

to England from Brazil.

This was the last that was ever heard of the gallant but ill-fated

_Wasp_. How she perished none ever knew; all that is certain is that

she was never seen again. She was as good a ship, as well manned,

and as ably commanded as any vessel in our little navy; and it may

be doubted if there was at that time any foreign sloop of war of her

size and strength that could have stood against her in fair fight.

As I have said, the _Wasp_ was manned almost exclusively by Americans.

James says they were mostly Irish; the reason he gives for the

assertion being that Capt. Blakely spent the first 16 months of his

life in Dublin. This argument is quite on a par with another piece

of logic which I cannot resist noticing. The point he wishes to prove

is that Americans are cowards. Accordingly, on p. 475: "On her capstan

the _Constitution_ now mounted a piece resembling 7 musket barrels,

fixed together with iron bands. It was discharged by one lock, and

each barrel threw 25 balls. * * * What could have impelled the Americans

to invent such extraordinary implements of war but fear, down-right

fear?" Then a little further on: "The men were provided with leather

boarding-caps, fitted with bands of iron, * * * another strong symptom

of fear!" Now, such a piece of writing as this is simply evidence

of an unsound mind; it is not so much malicious as idiotic. I only

reproduce it to help prove what I have all along insisted on, that

any of James' unsupported statements about the Americans, whether

respecting the tonnage of the ships or the courage of the crews,

are not worth the paper they are written on; on all points connected

purely with the British navy, or which can be checked off by official

documents or ships' logs, or where there would be no particular object

in falsifying, James is an invaluable assistant, from the diligence

and painstaking care he shows, and the thoroughness and minuteness

with which he goes into details.

A fair-minded and interesting English critic, [Footnote: Lord Howard

Douglass, "Treatise on Naval Gunnery," p. 416.] whose remarks are

generally very just, seems to me to have erred somewhat in commenting

on this last sloop action. He says that the _Avon_ was first crippled

by dismantling shot from _long guns_. Now, the _Wasp_ had but _one_

long gun on the side engaged, and, moreover, began the action with

the shortest and lightest of her carronades. Then he continues that

the _Avon_, like the _Peacock_, "was hulled so low that the shot-holes

could not be got at, and yielded to this fatal circumstance only."

It certainly cannot be said when a brig has been dismasted, has had

a third of her crew placed _hors de combat_, and has been rendered

an unmanageable hulk, that she yields _only_ because she has received

a few shot below the water-line. These shot-holes undoubtedly hastened

the result, but both the _Peacock_ and the _Avon_ would have

surrendered even if they had remained absolutely water-tight.

The _Adams_, 28, had been cut down to a sloop of war at Washington,

and then lengthened into a flush-decked, heavy corvette, mounting

on each side 13 medium 18's, or columbiads, and 1 long 12, with a

crew of 220 men, under the command of Capt. Charles Morris, late

first lieut. of the _Constitution_. [Footnote: "Autobiography of

Commodore Morris," Annapolis, 1880, p. 172.] She slipped out of the

Potomac and past the blockaders on Jan. 18th, and cruised eastward

to the African coast and along it from Cape Mount to Cape Palmas,

thence to the Canaries and Cape de Verd. She returned very nearly

along the Equator, thence going toward the West Indies. The cruise

was unlucky, but a few small prizes, laden with palm-oil and ivory,

being made. In hazy weather, on March 25th, a large Indiaman (the

_Woodbridge_) was captured; but while taking possession the weather

cleared up, and Capt. Morris found himself to leeward of 25 sail,

two of which, a two-decker and a frigate, were making for him, and

it took him till the next day to shake them off. He entered Savannah

on May 1st and sailed again on the 8th, standing in to the Gulf

Stream, between Makanilla and Florida, to look out for the Jamaica

fleet. He found this fleet on the 24th, but the discovery failed

to do him much good, as the ships were under the convoy of a 74,

two frigates, and three brigs. The _Adams_ hovered on their skirts

for a couple of days, but nothing could be done with them, for the

merchant-men sailed in the closest possible order and the six war

vessels exercised the greatest vigilance. So the corvette passed

northward to the Newfoundland Banks, where she met with nothing but

fogs and floating ice, and then turned her prow toward Ireland. On

July 4th she made out and chased two sail, who escaped into the mouth

of the Shannon. After this the _Adams_, heartily tired of fogs and

cold, stood to the southward and made a few prizes; then, in lat.

44° N., long. 10° W., on July 15th, she stumbled across the 18-pounder

36-gun frigate _Tigris_, Capt. Henderson. The frigate was to leeward,

and a hard chase ensued. It was only by dint of cutting away her

anchors and throwing overboard some of her guns that the _Adams_

held her own till sunset, when it fell calm. Capt. Morris and his

first lieutenant, Mr. Wadsworth, had been the first and second

lieutenants of _Old Ironsides_ in Hull's famous cruise, and they

proved that they had not forgotten their early experience, for they

got out the boats to tow, and employed their time so well that by

sunrise the frigate was two leagues astern. After 18 hours' more

chase the _Adams_ dropped her. But in a day or two she ran across

a couple more, one of which, an old bluff-bows, was soon thrown out;

but the other was very fast, and kept close on the corvette's heels.

As before, the frigate was to leeward. The _Adams_ had been built

by contract; one side was let to a sub-contractor of economical

instincts, and accordingly turned out rather shorter than the other;

the result was, the ship sailed a good deal faster on one tack than

on the other. In this chase she finally got on her good tack in the

night, and so escaped. [Footnote: This statement is somewhat

traditional; I have also seen it made about the _John Adams_. But

some old officers have told me positively that it occurred to the

_Adams_ on this cruise.] Capt. Morris now turned homeward. During

his two cruises he had made but 10 prizes (manned by 161 men), none

of very great value. His luck grew worse and worse. The continual

cold and damp produced scurvy, and soon half of his crew were

prostrated by the disease; and the weather kept on foggy as ever.

Off the Maine coast a brig-sloop (the _Rifleman_, Capt. Pearce) was

discovered and chased, but it escaped in the thick weather. The fog

grew heavier, and early on the morning of Aug. 17th the _Adams_ struck

land--literally struck it, too, for she grounded on the Isle of Haute,

and had to throw over provisions, spare spars, etc., before she could

be got off. Then she entered the Penobscot, and sailed 27 miles up

it to Hampden. The _Rifleman_ meanwhile conveyed intelligence of

her whereabouts to a British fleet, consisting of two line-of-battle

ships, three frigates, three sloops, and ten troop transports, under

the joint command of Rear-Admiral Griffeth and Lieutenant-General

Sherbrooke. [Footnote: James, vi, 479.]

This expedition accordingly went into the Penobscot and anchored

off Castine. Captain Morris made every preparation he could to defend

his ship, but his means were very limited; seventy of his men were

dead or disabled by the scurvy; the remainder, many of them also

diseased, were mustered out, to the number of 130 officers and seamen

(without muskets) and 20 marines. He was joined, however, by 30

regulars, and later by over 300 militia armed with squirrel guns,

ducking- and fowling-pieces, etc.,--in all between 500 and 550 men,

[Footnote: "Autobiography of Commodore Morris."] only 180 of whom,

with 50 muskets among them, could be depended upon. On Sept. 3d the

British advanced by land and water, the land-force being under the

direction of Lieutenant-Colonel John, and consisting of 600 troops,

80 marines, and 80 seamen. [Footnote: James, vi. 481. Whenever militia

are concerned James has not much fear of official documents and lets

his imagination run riot; he here says the Americans had 1,400 men,

which is as accurate as he generally is in writing about this species

of force. His aim being to overestimate the number of the Americans

in the various engagements, he always supplies militia _ad libitum_,

to make up any possible deficiency.] The flotilla was composed of

barges, launches, and rocket-boats, under the command of Captain

Barry of the _Dragon_, 74. In all there were over 1,500 men. The

seamen of the _Adams_, from the wharf, opened fire on the flotilla,

which returned it with rockets and carronades; but the advance was

checked. Meanwhile the British land-forces attacked the militia,

who acted up to the traditional militia standard, and retreated with

the utmost promptitude and celerity, omitting the empty formality

of firing. This left Captain Morris surrounded by eight times his

number, and there was nothing to do but set fire to the corvette

and retreat. The seamen, marines, and regulars behaved well, and

no attempt was made to molest them. None of Captain Morris' men

were hit; his loss was confined to one sailor and one marine who

were too much weakened by scurvy to retreat with the others, who

marched to Portland, 200 miles off. The British lost ten men killed

or wounded.

On Sept. 9th Gunboats No. 160 and 151, commanded by Mr. Thomas M.

Pendleton, captured off Sapoleo Bar, Ga., the British privateer

_Fortune of War_, armed with two heavy pivot guns, and 35 men. She

made a brief resistance, losing two of her men. [Footnote: Letter

from Commodore H. E. Campbell, St. Mary's, Sept. 12, 1814.]

On Sept. 15th the British 20-gun ship-sloops _Hermes_ and _Carron_,

and 18-gun brig-sloops _Sophie_ and _Childers_, and a force of 200

men on shore, [Footnote: James, vi, 527.] attacked Fort Bowyer, on

Mobile Point, but were repulsed without being able to do any damage

whatever to the Americans. The _Hermes_ was sunk and the assailants

lost about 80 men.

[Illustration: Captain Samuel C. Reid: a portrait painted by John

Wesley Jarvis in 1815. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

On the 26th of September, while the privateer-schooner _General

Armstrong_, of New York, Captain Samuel C. Reid, of one long 24,

eight long 9's, and 90 men, was lying at anchor in the road of Fayal,

a British squadron, composed of the _Plantagenet_, 74, Captain Robert

Floyd, _Rota_, 38, Captain Philip Somerville, and _Carnation_, 18,

Captain George Bentham, hove in sight. [Footnote: Letter of Captain

S. C. Reid, Oct. 7, 1814; and of John B. Dabney, Consul at Fayal,

Oct. 5, 1814.] One or more boats were sent in by the British, to

reconnoitre the schooner, as they asserted, or, according to the

American accounts, to carry her by a _coup de main_. At any rate,

after repeatedly warning them off, the privateer fired into them,

and they withdrew. Captain Reid then anchored, with springs on his

cables, nearer shore, to await the expected attack, which was not

long deferred. At 8 P.M. four boats from the _Plantagenet_ and three

from the _Rota_, containing in all 180 men, [Footnote: James, vi,

509: Both American accounts say 12 boats, with 400 men, and give

the British loss as 250. According to my usual rule, I take each

side's statement of its own force and loss.] under the command of

Lieutenant William Matterface, first of the _Rota_, pulled in toward

the road, while the _Carnation_ accompanied them to attack the schooner

if she got under way. The boats pulled in under cover of a small

reef of rocks, where they lay for some time, and about midnight

made the attack. The Americans opened with the pivot gun, and

immediately afterward with their long 9's, while the boats replied

with their carronades, and, pulling spiritedly on amidst a terrific

fire of musketry from both sides, laid the schooner aboard on her

bow and starboard quarter. The struggle was savage enough, the British

hacking at the nettings and trying to clamber up on deck, while the

Americans fired their muskets and pistols in the faces of their

assailants and thrust the foremost through with their long pikes.

The boats on the quarter were driven off; but on the forecastle all

three of the American lieutenants were killed or disabled, and the

men were giving back when Captain Reid led all the after-division

up and drove the British back into their boats. This put an end to

the assault. Two boats were sunk, most of the wounded being saved

as the shore was so near; two others were captured, and but three

of the scattered flotilla returned to the ships. Of the Americans,

2 were killed, including the second lieutenant, Alexander O. Williams,

and 7 were wounded, including the first and third lieutenants,

Frederick A. Worth and Robert Johnson. Of the British, 34 were killed

and 86 were wounded; among the former being the Rota's first and

third lieutenants, William Matterface and Charles R. Norman, and

among the latter her second lieutenant and first lieutenant of

marines, Richard Rawle and Thomas Park. The schooner's long 24 had

been knocked off its carriage by a carronade shot, but it was replaced

and the deck cleared for another action. Next day the _Carnation_

came in to destroy the privateer, but was driven off by the judicious

use the latter made of her "Long Tom." But affairs being now hopeless,

the _General Armstrong_ was scuttled and burned, and the Americans

retreated to the land. The British squadron was bound for New Orleans,

and on account of the delay and loss that it suffered, it was late

in arriving, so that this action may be said to have helped in saving

the Crescent City. Few regular commanders could have done as well

as Captain Reid.

On October 6th, while Gun-boat No. 160 was convoying some coasters

from Savannah, it was carried by a British tender and nine boats.

[Footnote: Letter from Commander H. C. Campbell, Oct. 12, 1814.]

The gun-vessel was lying at anchor about eight leagues from St.

Mary's, and the boats approached with muffled oars early in the

morning. They were not discovered till nearly aboard, but the defence

though short was spirited, the British losing about 20 men. Of the

gun-boat's 30 men but 16 were fit for action: those, under

Sailing-master Thomas Paine, behaved well. Mr. Paine, especially,

fought with the greatest gallantry; his thigh was broken by a

grape-shot at the very beginning, but he hobbled up on his other

leg to resist the boarders, fighting till he was thrust through by

a pike and had received two sabre cuts. Any one of his wounds would

have been enough to put an ordinary man _hors de combat_.

On October 11th, another desperate privateer battle took place.

The brigantine _Prince-de-Neufchatel_, Captain Ordronaux, of New

York, was a superbly built vessel of 310 tons, mounting 17 guns,

and originally possessing a crew of 150 men. [Footnote: "History

of American Privateers," by George Coggeshall, p. 241, New York,

1876.] She had made a very successful cruise, having on board goods

to the amount of $300,000, but had manned and sent in so many prizes

that only 40 of her crew were left on board, while 37 prisoners were

confined in the hold. One of her prizes was in company, but had

drifted off to such a distance that she was unable to take part in

the fight. At mid-day, on the 11th of October, while off Nantucket,

the British frigate _Endymion_, 40, Captain Henry Hope, discovered

the privateer and made sail in chase. [Footnote: James, vi, p. 527.]

At 8.30 P.M., a calm having come on, the frigate despatched 5 boats,

containing 111 men, [Footnote: According to Captain Ordronaux; James

does not give the number, but says 28 were killed, 37 wounded, and

the crew of the launch captured. Ten of the latter were unwounded,

and 18 wounded. I do not know if he included these last among his

"37 wounded."] under the command of the first lieutenant, Abel Hawkins,

to take the brigantine; while the latter triced up the boarding

nettings, loaded the guns with grape and bullets, and prepared herself

in every way for the coming encounter. She opened fire on the boats

as they drew near, but they were soon alongside, and a most desperate

engagement ensued. Some of the British actually cut through the

nettings and reached the deck, but were killed by the privateersmen;

and in a few minutes one boat was sunk, three others drifted off,

and the launch, which was under the brigantine's stern, was taken

possession of. The slaughter had been frightful, considering the

number of the combatants. The victorious privateersmen had lost

7 killed, 15 badly and 9 slightly wounded, leaving but 9 untouched!

Of the _Endymion's_ men, James says 28, including the first lieutenant

and a midshipman, were killed, and 37, including the second lieutenant

and a master's mate, wounded; "besides which the launch was captured

and the crew made prisoners." I do not know if this means 37 wounded,

_besides_ the wounded in the launch, or not [Footnote: I think James

does not include the wounded in the launch, as he says 28 wounded

were sent aboard the _Saturn_; this could hardly have included the

men who had been captured.]; of the prisoners captured 18 were

wounded and 10 unhurt, so the loss was either 28 killed, 55 wounded,

and 10 unhurt prisoners; or else 28 killed, 37 wounded, and 10

prisoners; but whether the total was 93 or 75 does not much matter.

It was a most desperate conflict, and, remembering how short-handed

the brigantine was, it reflected the highest honor on the American

captain and his crew.

After their repulse before Baltimore the British concentrated their

forces for an attack upon New Orleans. Accordingly a great fleet

of line-of-battle ships, frigates, and smaller vessels, under

Vice-Admiral Cochrane, convoying a still larger number of store-ships

and transports, containing the army of General Packenham, appeared

off the Chandeleur Islands on Dec. 8th. The American navy in these

parts consisted of the ship _Louisiana_ and schooner _Carolina_ in

the Mississippi river, and in the shallow bayous a few gun-boats,

of course without quarters, low in the water, and perfectly easy

of entrance. There were also a few tenders and small boats. The

British frigates and sloops anchored off the broad, shallow inlet

called Lake Borgne on the 12th; on this inlet there were 5 gun-boats

and 2 small tenders, under the command of Lieut. Thomas Catesby Jones.

It was impossible for the British to transport their troops across

Lake Borgne, as contemplated, until this flotilla was destroyed.

Accordingly, on the night of the 12th, 42 launches, armed with

24-, 18-, and 12-pounder carronades, and 3 unarmed gigs, carrying

980 seamen and marines, under the orders of Capt. Lockyer, [Footnote:

James, vi, 521.] pushed off from the _Armide_, 38, in three divisions;

the first under the command of Capt. Lockyer, the second under Capt.

Montresor, and the third under Capt. Roberts. [Footnote: Letter of

Capt. Lockyer to Vice-Admiral Cochrane, Dec. 18, 1814.] Lieut. Jones

was at anchor with his boats at the Malheureux Islands, when he

discovered, on the 13th, the British flotilla advancing toward Port

Christian. He at once despatched the _Seahorse_ of one 6-pounder

and 14 men, under Sailing-master William Johnston, to destroy the

stores at Bay St. Louis. She moored herself under the bank, where

she was assisted by two 6-pounders. There the British attacked her

with seven of their smaller boats, which were repulsed after sustaining

for nearly half an hour a very destructive fire. [Footnote: James,

vi, 521.] However, Mr. Johnston had to burn his boat to prevent it

from being taken by a larger force. Meanwhile Lieut. Jones got under

way with the five gun-vessels, trying to reach Les Petites Coquilles,

near a small fort at the mouth of a creek. But as the wind was light

and baffling, and the current very strong, the effort was given up,

and the vessels came to anchor off Malheureux Island passage at

1 A.M. on the 14th. [Footnote: Official letter of Lieut. Jones, March

12, 1815.] The other tender, the _Alligator_, Sailing-master Sheppard,

of one 4-pounder and 8 men, was discovered next morning trying to

get to her consorts, and taken with a rush by Capt. Roberts and his

division. At daybreak Lieut. Jones saw the British boats about nine

miles to the eastward, and moored his 5-gun vessel abreast in the

channel, with their boarding nettings triced up, and every thing

in readiness; but the force of the current drifted two of them,

Nos. 156 and 163, a hundred yards down the pass and out of line,

No. 156 being the headmost of all. Their exact force was as follows:

No. 156, Lieut. Jones, 41 men and 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 12-pound

carronades); No. 163, Sailing-master Geo. Ulrick, 21 men, 3 guns

(1 long 24 and 2 12-pound carronades); No. 162, Lieut. Robert Speddes,

35 men, 5 guns (1 long 24 and 4 light sixes); No. 5, Sailing-master

John D. Ferris, 36 men, 5 guns (1 long 24, 4 12-pound carronades);

No. 23, Lieut. Isaac McKeever, 39 men and 5 guns (1 long 32 and 4

light sixes). There were thus, in all, 182 men and a broadside of

14 guns, throwing 212 pounds of shot. The British forces amounted,

as I have said, to 980 men, and (supposing they had equal numbers

of 24's, 18's and 12's,) the flotilla threw seven hundred and

fifty-eight pounds of shot. The odds of course were not as much

against the Americans as these figures would make them, for they

were stationary, had some long, heavy guns and boarding nettings;

on the other hand the fact that two of their vessels had drifted

out of line was a very serious misfortune. At any rate, the odds

were great enough, considering that he had British sailors to deal

with, to make it any thing but a cheerful look-out for Lieut. Jones;

but nowise daunted by the almost certain prospect of defeat the American

officers and seamen prepared very coolly for the fight. In this

connection it should be remembered that simply to run the boats on

shore would have permitted the men to escape, if they had chosen to

do so.

[Illustration: The Battle of Lake Borgne: an early-19th-century

painting by Thomas Hornbrook. (Courtesy U.S. Naval Academy Museum)]

Captain Lockyer acted as coolly as his antagonist. When he had reached

a point just out of gun-shot, he brought the boats to a grapnel,

to let the sailors eat breakfast and get a little rest after the

fatigue of their long row. When his men were rested and in good trim

he formed the boats in open order, and they pulled gallantly on against

the strong current. At 10.50 the Americans opened fire from their

long guns, and in about 15 minutes the cannonade became general on

both sides. At 11.50 [Footnote: Lieut. Jones' letter.] Captain Lockyer's

barge was laid alongside No. 156, and a very obstinate struggle ensued,

"in which the greater part of the officers and crew of the barge were

killed or wounded," [Footnote: Captain Lockyer's letter.] including

among the latter the gallant captain himself, severely, and his equally

gallant first lieutenant, Mr. Pratt, of the _Seahorse_ frigate, mortally.

At the same time Lieut. Tatnall (of the _Tonnant_) also laid his

barge aboard the gun-boat, only to have it sunk; another shared the

same fate; and the assailants were for the moment repulsed. But at

this time Lieut. Jones, who had shown as much personal bravery during

the assault, as forethought in preparing for it, received a dangerous

and disabling wound, while many of his men received the same fate;

the boarding nettings, too, had all been cut or shot away. Several

more barges at once assailed the boats, the command of which had

devolved on a young midshipman, Mr. George Parker; the latter, fighting

as bravely as his commander, was like him severely wounded, whereupon

the boat was carried at 12.10. Its guns were turned on No. 163, and

this, the smallest of the gun-boats, was soon taken; then the British

dashed at No. 162 and carried it, after a very gallant defence, in

which Lieut. Speddes was badly wounded. No. 5 had her long 24 dismounted

by the recoil, and was next carried; finally, No. 23, being left

entirely alone, hauled down her flag at 12.30. [Footnote: Minutes

of the Court of Inquiry, held May 15, 1851.*] The Americans had lost

6 killed and 35 wounded; the British 17 killed and 77 (many mortally)

wounded. The greater part of the loss on both sides occurred in boarding

No. 156, and also the next two gun-boats.

__________________________________

* Poster's note: the date 1851 above may well have been 1815

in the original; if you have a copy of this book, we would

appreciate confirmation.

__________________________________

I have in this case, as usual, taken each commander's account of

his own force and loss. Lieut. Jones states the British force to

have been 1,000, which tallies almost exactly with their own account;

but believes that they lost 300 in killed and wounded. Captain

Lockyer, on the other hand, gives the Americans 225 men and three

additional light guns. But on the main points the two accounts agree

perfectly. The victors certainly deserve great credit for the

perseverance, gallantry and dash they displayed; but still more

belongs to the vanquished for the cool skill and obstinate courage

with which they fought, although with the certainty of ultimate defeat

before them,--which is always the severest test of bravery. No comment

is needed to prove the effectiveness of their resistance. Even James

says that the Americans made an obstinate struggle, that Lieut. Jones

displayed great personal bravery, and that the British loss was very

severe.

On the night of Dec. 23d Gen. Jackson beat up the quarters of the

British encamped on the bank of the Mississippi. The attack was

opened by Capt. Patterson in the schooner _Carolina_, 14; she was

manned by 70 men, and mounted on each side six 12-pound carronades

and one long 12. Dropping down the stream unobserved, till opposite

the bivouac of the troops and so close to the shore that his first

command to fire was plainly heard by the foe, Patterson opened a

slaughtering cannonade on the flank of the British, and kept it up

without suffering any loss in return, as long as the attack lasted.

But on the 27th the British had their revenge, attacking the little

schooner as she lay at anchor, unable to ascend the current on account

of the rapid current and a strong head-wind. The assailants had a

battery of 5 guns, throwing hot shot and shell, while the only gun

of the schooner's that would reach was the long 12. After half an

hour's fighting the schooner was set on fire and blown up; the crew

escaped to the shore with the loss of 7 men killed and wounded. The

only remaining vessel, exclusive of some small, unarmed row-boats,

was the _Louisiana_, 16, carrying on each side eight long 24's. She

was of great assistance in the battle of the 28th, throwing during

the course of the cannonade over 800 shot, and suffering very little

in return. [Footnote: Cooper, ii, p. 320.] Afterward the American

seamen and marines played a most gallant part in all the engagements

on shore; they made very efficient artillerists.

SUMMARY.

The following vessels were got ready for sea during this year:

[Footnote: Am. State Papers, xiv, p. 828; also Emmons' statistical

"History."]

Name. Rig. Where Built. Cost. Men. Guns. Tons. Remarks

_Wasp_, Ship Newburyport $77,459.60 160 22 509 Built

_Frolic_, " Boston 72,094.82 " " " "

_Peacock_, " New York 75,644.36 " " " "

_Ontario_, " Baltimore 59,343.69 " " " "

_Erie_, " " 56,174.36 " " " "

_Tom Bowline_, Schooner Portsmouth 13,000.00 90 12 260 Purchased

_Lynx_, " Washington 50 6 Built

_Epervier_, Brig England 50,000.00 130 18 477 Captured

_Flambeau_, " Baltimore 14,000.00 90 14 300 Purchased

-+- _Spark_, " " 17,389.00 " " " "

| _Firefly_, " " 17,435.00 " " 333 "

| _Torch_, Schooner " 13,000.00 60 12 260 "

| _Spitfire_, " " 20,000.00 " " 286 "

'- _Eagle_, " N.O. " " 270 "

-+- _Prometheus_, " Philadelphia 20,000.00 " " 290 "

| _Chippeway_, Brig R.I. 52,000.00 90 14 390 "

| _Saranac_, " Middleton 26,000.00 " " 360 "

'- _Boxer_, " " 26,000.00 " " 370 "

_Despatch_, Schooner 23 2 52

The first 5 small vessels that are bracketed were to cruise under

Commodore Porter; the next 4 under Commodore Perry; but the news

of peace arrived before either squadron put to sea. Some of the

vessels under this catalogue were really almost ready for sea at

the end of 1813; and some that I have included in the catalogue of

1815 were almost completely fitted at the end of 1814,--but this

arrangement is practically the best.

LIST OF VESSELS LOST TO THE BRITISH.

1. Destroyed by British Armies.

Name. Tons. Guns.

_Columbia_, 1,508 52-+- Destroyed to prevent them

_Adams_, 760 28 | falling into hands of enemy.

_Argus_. 509 22 '-

_Carolina_. 230 14 Destroyed by battery.

----- ----

3,007 116

2. Captured, Etc., By British Navy on Ocean.

Name. Tons. Guns.

_Essex_. 860 46 Captured by frigate and corvette.

_Frolic_. 509 22 " by frigate and schooner.

_Rattlesnake_, 258 16 " by frigate.

_Syren_, 250 16 " by seventy-four.

--- ----

1,877 100

Total, 4,884 tons. 216 guns

There were also a good many gun-boats, which I do not count, because,

as already said, they were often not as large as the barges that

were sunk and taken in attacking them, as at Craney Island, etc.

LIST OF VESSELS TAKEN FROM THE BRITISH.

1. Captured by American Privateers.

Name. Tons. Guns.

_Ballabou_, 86 4

_Landrail_, 76 4

2. Captured, Etc., By British Navy on Ocean.

Name. Tons. Guns.

_Epervier_, 477 18 captured by sloop _Peacock_.

_Avon_, 477 20 sunk " " _Wasp_.

_Reindeer_, 477 19 " " " ".

_Pictou_, 300 14 captured by frigate.

3. Sunk in Attacking Fort.

Name. Tons. Guns.

_Hermes_, 500 22

----- -----

2,393 101

Taking into account the losses on the lakes, there was not very much

difference in the amount of damage done to each combatant by the other;

but both as regards the material results and the moral effects, the

balance inclined largely to the Americans. The chief damage done

to our navy was by the British land-forces, and consisted mainly

in forcing us to burn an unfinished frigate and sloop. On the ocean

our three sloops were captured in each case by an overwhelming force,

against which no resistance could be made, and the same was true

of the captured British schooner. The _Essex_ certainly gained as

much honor as her opponents. There were but three single ship actions,

in all of which the Americans were so superior in force as to give

them a very great advantage; nevertheless, in two of them the victory

was won with such perfect impunity and the difference in the loss

and damage inflicted was so very great, that I doubt if the result

would have been affected if the odds had been reversed. In the other

case, that of the _Reindeer_, the defeated party fought at a still

greater disadvantage, and yet came out of the conflict with full

as much honor as the victor. No man with a particle of generosity

in his nature can help feeling the most honest admiration for the

unflinching courage and cool skill displayed by Capt. Manners and

his crew. It is worthy of notice (remembering the sneers of so many

of the British authors at the "wary circumspection" of the Americans)

that Capt. Manners, who has left a more honorable name than any other

British commander of the war, excepting Capt. Broke, behaved with

the greatest caution as long as it would serve his purpose, while

he showed the most splendid personal courage afterward. It is this

combination of courage and skill that made him so dangerous an

antagonist; it showed that the traditional British bravery was not

impaired by refusing to adhere to the traditional British tactics

of rushing into a fight "bull-headed." Needless exposure to danger

denotes not so much pluck as stupidity. Capt. Manners had no intention

of giving his adversary any advantage he could prevent. No one can

help feeling regret that he was killed; but if he was to fall, what

more glorious death could he meet? It must be remembered that while

paying all homage to Capt. Manners, Capt. Blakely did equally well.

It was a case where the victory between two combatants, equal in

courage and skill, was decided by superior weight of metal and number

of men.

PRIZES MADE.

Name of ship. Number of prizes.

_President_ 3

_Constitution_ 6

_Adams_ 10

_Frolic_ 2

_Wasp_ 15

_Peacock_ 15

_Hornet_ 1

Small craft 35

---

87