1814
ON THE LAKES
_ONTARIO-The contest one of ship-building merely--Extreme caution
of the commanders, verging on timidity--Yeo takes Oswego, and
blockades Sackett's Harbor--British gun-boats captured--Chauncy
blockades Kingston--ERIE--Captain Sinclair's unsuccessful
expedition--Daring and successful cutting-out expeditions of the
British--CHAMPLAIN--Macdonough's victory._
Ontario.
The winter was spent by both parties in preparing more formidable
fleets for the ensuing summer. All the American schooners had proved
themselves so unfit for service that they were converted into
transports, except the _Sylph_, which was brig-rigged and armed like
the _Oneida_. Sackett's Harbor possessed but slight fortifications,
and the Americans were kept constantly on the alert, through fear
lest the British should cross over. Commodore Chauncy and Mr. Eckford
were as unremitting in their exertions as ever. In February two 22-gun
brigs, the _Jefferson_ and _Jones_, and one large frigate of 50 guns,
the _Superior_, were laid; afterward a deserter brought in news of
the enormous size of one of the new British frigates, and the
_Superior_ was enlarged to permit her carrying 62 guns. The _Jefferson_
was launched on April 7th, the _Jones_ on the 10th; and the _Superior_
on May 2d,--an attempt on the part of the British to blow her up
having been foiled a few days before. Another frigate, the _Mohawk_,
42, was at once begun. Neither guns nor men for the first three ships
had as yet arrived, but they soon began to come in, as the roads
got better and the streams opened. Chauncy and Eckford, besides
building ships that were literally laid down in the forest, and
seeing that they were armed with heavy guns, which, as well as all
their stores, had to be carried overland hundreds of miles through
the wilderness, were obliged to settle quarrels that occurred among
the men, the most serious being one that arose from a sentinel's
accidentally killing a shipwright, whose companions instantly struck
work in a body. What was more serious, they had to contend with such
constant and virulent sickness that it almost assumed the proportions
of a plague. During the winter it was seldom that two thirds of the
force were fit for duty, and nearly a sixth of the whole number of
men in the port died before navigation opened. [Footnote: Cooper
mentions that in five months the _Madison_ buried a fifth of her crew.]
Meanwhile Yeo had been nearly as active at Kingston, laying down
two frigates and a huge line-of-battle ship, but his shipwrights
did not succeed in getting the latter ready much before navigation
closed. The _Prince Regent_, 58, and _Princess Charlotte_, 42, were
launched on April 15th. I shall anticipate somewhat by giving tabular
lists of the comparative forces, after the two British frigates, the
two American frigates, and the two American brigs had all been equipped
and manned. Commodore Yeo's original six cruisers had been all renamed,
some of them re-armed, and both the schooners changed into brigs.
The _Wolfe_, _Royal George_, _Melville_, _Moira_, _Beresford_, and
_Sydney Smith_, were now named respectively _Montreal_, _Niagara_,
_Star_, _Charwell_, _Netly_, and _Magnet_. On the American side there
had been but slight changes, beyond the alteration of the _Sylph_
into a brig armed like the _Oneida_. Of the _Superior's_ 62 guns,
4 were very shortly sent on shore again.
CHAUNCY'S SQUADRON.
Broadside
Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament.
_Superior_, ship, 1,580 500 1,050lbs. +- 30 long 32's
| 2 " 24's
- 26 short 42's
_Mohawk_, " 1,350 350 554 lbs. -+- 26 long 24's
| 2 " 18's
'- 14 short 32's
_Pike_, " 875 300 360 " -+- 26 long 24's
'- 2 " 24's
_Madison_, " 593 200 364 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 22 short 32's
_Jones_, brig, 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 20 short 32's
_Jefferson_, " 500 160 332 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 20 short 32's
_Sylph_, " 300 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 14 short 24's
_Oneida_, " 243 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 14 short 24's
__________ _____ _____ __________ ________
8 vessels, 5,941 1,870 3,352 lbs. 228 guns.
This is considerably less than James makes it, as he includes all
the schooners, which were abandoned as cruisers, and only used as
transports or gun-boats. Similarly Sir James had a large number of
gun-boats, which are not included in his cruising force. James thus
makes Chauncy's force 2,321 men, and a broadside of 4,188 lbs.
YEO'S SQUADRON
Broadside
Name. Rig. Tonnage. Crew. Metal. Armament.
_Prince ship, 1,450 485 872 lbs. -+- 32 long 24's
Regent_, | 4 short 68's
'- 22 " 32's
_Princess " 1,215 315 604 " -+- 26 long 24's
Charlotte_, | 2 short 68's
'- 14 " 32's
_Montreal_, " 637 220 258 " -+- 7 long 24's
'- 18 " 18's
_Niagara_, " 510 200 332 " -+- 2 long 12's
'- 20 short 32's
_Charwell_, brig, 279 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12's
'-14 short 32's
_Star_, " 262 110 236 " -+- 2 long 12's
'-14 short 32's
_Netly_, " 216 100 180 " -+- 2 long 12's
'-14 short 24's
_Magnet_, " 187 80 156 " -+- 2 long 12's
'-12 short 24's
__________ _____ _____ _________ ________
8 vessels, 4,756 1,620 2,874 lbs. 209 guns.
This tallies pretty well with James' statement, which (on p. 488)
is 1,517 men, and a broadside of 2,752 lbs. But there are very
probably errors as regards the armaments of the small brigs, which
were continually changed. At any rate the American fleet was certainly
the stronger, about in the proportion of six to five. The disproportion
was enough to justify Sir James in his determination not to hazard
a battle, although the odds were certainly not such as British
commanders had been previously accustomed to pay much regard to.
Chauncy would have acted exactly as his opponent did, had he been
similarly placed. The odds against the British commodore were too
great to be overcome, where the combatants were otherwise on a par,
although the refusal to do battle against them would certainly preclude
Yeo from advancing any claims to _superiority_ in skill or courage.
The _Princess Charlotte_ and _Niagara_ were just about equal to the
_Mohawk_ and _Madison_, and so were the _Charwell_ and _Netly_ to
the _Oneida_ and _Sylph_; but both the _Star_ and _Magnet_ together
could hardly have matched either the _Jones_ or the _Jefferson_,
while the main-deck 32's of the _Superior_ gave her a great advantage
over the _Prince Regent's_ 24's, where the crews were so equal; and
the _Pike_ was certainly too heavy for the _Montreal_. A decided
superiority in the effectiveness of both crews and captains could
alone have warranted Sir James Lucas Yeo in engaging, and this
superiority he certainly did not possess.
This year the British architects outstripped ours in the race for
supremacy, and Commodore Yeo put out of port with his eight vessels
long before the Americans were ready. His first attempt was a
successful attack on Oswego. This town is situated some 60 miles
distant from Sackett's Harbor, and is the first port on the lake
which the stores, sent from the seaboard to Chauncy, reached.
Accordingly it was a place of some little importance, but was very
much neglected by the American authorities. It was insufficiently
garrisoned, and was defended only by an entirely ruined fort of 6
guns, two of them dismounted. Commodore Yeo sailed from Kingston
to attack it on the 3d of May, having on board his ships a detachment
of 1,080 troops. Oswego was garrisoned by less than 300 men, [Footnote:
General order of Gen. Jacob Brown, by R. Jones, Ass. Adj.-General,
May 12, 1814.] chiefly belonging to a light artillery regiment, with
a score or two of militia; they were under the command of Colonel
Mitchell. The recaptured schooner _Growler_ was in port, with 7 guns
destined for the Harbor; she was sunk by her commander, but afterward
raised and carried off by the foe.
On the 5th Yeo appeared off Oswego and sent in Captain Collier and
13 gun-boats to draw the fort's fire; after some firing between them
and the four guns mounted in the fort (two long 24's, one long 12,
and one long 6), the gun-boats retired. The next day the attack was
seriously made. The _Princess Charlotte_, _Montreal_, and _Niagara_
engaged the batteries, while the _Charwell_ and _Star_ scoured the
woods with grape to clear them of the militia. [Footnote: Letter of
General Gordon Drummond, May 7, 1814.] The debarkation of the troops
was superintended by Captain O'Connor, and until it was accomplished
the _Montreal_ sustained almost the whole fire of the fort, being
set on fire three times, and much cut up in hull, masts, and rigging.
[Footnote: Letter of Sir James Lucas Yeo, May 17, 1814.] Under this
fire 800 British troops were landed, under Lieutenant-Colonel Fischer,
assisted by 200 seamen, armed with long pikes, under Captain Mulcaster.
They moved gallantly up the hill, under a heavy fire, and carried
the fort by assault; Mitchell then fell back unmolested to the Falls,
about 12 miles above the town, where there was a large quantity of
stores. But he was not again attacked. The Americans lost 6 men killed,
including Lieutenant Blaeny, 38 wounded, and 25 missing, both of
these last falling into the enemy's hands. The British lost 22
soldiers, marines, and seamen (including Captain Hollaway) killed,
and 73 (including the gallant Captain Mulcaster dangerously, and
Captain Popham slightly) wounded, [Footnote: Letter of Lieut.-Col.
V. Fischer, May 17, 1814. James says "18 killed and 64 wounded,"
why I do not know; the official report of Col. Fischer, as quoted,
says: "Of the army, 19 killed and 62 wounded; of the navy, 3 killed
and 11 wounded."] the total loss being 95--nearly a third of the
American force engaged. General Drummond, in his official letter,
reports that "the fort being everywhere almost open, the whole of
the garrison * * * effected their escape, except about 60 men, half
of them wounded." No doubt the fort's being "everywhere almost open"
afforded excellent opportunities for retreat; but it was not much
of a recommendation of it as a structure intended for defence.
The British destroyed the four guns in the battery, and raised the
_Growler_ and carried her off, with her valuable cargo of seven long
guns. They also carried off a small quantity of ordnance stores and
some flour, and burned the barracks; otherwise but little damage was
done, and the Americans reoccupied the place at once. It certainly
showed great lack of energy on Commodore Yeo's part that he did not
strike a really important blow by sending an expedition up to destroy
the quantity of stores and ordnance collected at the Falls. But the
attack itself was admirably managed. The ships were well placed,
and kept up so heavy a fire on the fort as to effectually cover the
debarkation of the troops, which was very cleverly accomplished; and
the soldiers and seamen behaved with great gallantry and steadiness,
their officers leading them, sword in hand, up a long, steep hill,
under a destructive fire. It was similar to Chauncy's attacks on
York and Fort George, except that in this case the assailants suffered
a much severer loss compared to that inflicted on the assailed. Colonel
Mitchell managed the defence with skill, doing all he could with
his insufficient materials.
After returning to Kingston, Yeo sailed with his squadron for
Sackett's Harbor, where he appeared on May 19th and began a strict
blockade. This was especially troublesome because most of the guns
and cables for the two frigates had not yet arrived, and though the
lighter pieces and stores could be carried over land, the heavier
ones could only go by water, which route was now made dangerous by
the presence of the blockading squadron. The very important duty
of convoying these great guns was entrusted to Captain Woolsey, an
officer of tried merit. He decided to take them by water to Stony
Creek, whence they might be carried by land to the Harbor, which
was but three miles distant; and on the success of his enterprise
depended Chauncy's chances of regaining command of the lake. On
the 28th of May, at sunset, Woolsey left Oswego with 19 boats,
carrying 21 long 32's, 10 long 24's, three 42-pound carronades, and
10 cables--one of the latter, for the _Superior_, being a huge rope
22 inches in circumference and weighing 9,600 pounds. The boats
rowed all through the night, and at sunrise on the 29th 18 of them
found themselves off the Big Salmon River, and, as it was unsafe
to travel by daylight, Woolsey ran up into Big Sandy Creek, 8 miles
from the Harbor. The other boat, containing two long 24's and a
cable, got out of line, ran into the British squadron, and was
captured. The news she brought induced Sir James Yeo at once to
send out an expedition to capture the others. He accordingly
despatched Captains Popham and Spilsbury in two gun-boats, one armed
with one 68-pound and one 24-pound carronade, and the other with
a long 32, accompanied by three cutters and a gig, mounting between
them two long 12's and two brass 6's, with a total of 180 men.
[Footnote: James, vi. 487; while Cooper says 186, James says the
British loss was 18 killed and 50 wounded; Major Appling says "14
were killed, 28 wounded, and 27 marines and 106 sailors captured."]
They rowed up to Sandy Creek and lay off its mouth all the night,
and began ascending it shortly after daylight on the 30th. Their
force, however, was absurdly inadequate for the accomplishment of
their object. Captain Woolsey had been reinforced by some Oneida
Indians, a company of light artillery, and some militia, so that
his only care was, not to repulse, but to capture the British party
entire, and even this did not need any exertion. He accordingly
despatched Major Appling down the river with 120 riflemen [Footnote:
Letter from Major D. Appling, May 30, 1814.] and some Indians to
lie in ambush. [Footnote: Letter of Capt. M. T. Woolsey, June 1,
1814. There were about 60 Indians: In all, the American force amounted
to 180 men. James adds 30 riflemen, 140 Indians, and "a large body
of militia and cavalry,"--none of whom were present.] When going
up the creek the British marines, under Lieutenant Cox, were landed
on the left bank, and the small-arm men, under Lieutenant Brown,
on the right bank; while the two captains rowed up the stream between
them, throwing grape into the bushes to disperse the Indians. Major
Appling waited until the British were close up, when his riflemen
opened with so destructive a volley as to completely demoralize and
"stampede" them, and their whole force was captured with hardly any
resistance, the American having only one man slightly wounded. The
British loss was severe,--18 killed and 50 dangerously wounded,
according to Captain Popham's report, as quoted by James; or "14
killed and 28 wounded," according to Major Appling's letter. It was
a very clever and successful ambush.
On June 6th Yeo raised the blockade of the Harbor, but Chauncy's
squadron was not in condition to put out till six weeks later,
during which time nothing was done by either fleet, except that two
very gallant cutting-out expeditions were successfully attempted
by Lieutenant Francis H. Gregory, U.S.N. On June 16th he left the
Harbor, accompanied by Sailing-masters Vaughan and Dixon and 22
seamen, in three gigs, to intercept some of the enemy's provision
schooners; on the 19th he was discovered by the British gun-boat
_Black Snake_, of one 18-pound carronade and 18 men, commanded by
Captain H. Landon. Lieutenant Gregory dashed at the gun-boat and
carried it without the loss of a man; he was afterward obliged to
burn it, but he brought the prisoners, chiefly royal marines, safely
into port. On the 1st of July he again started out, with Messrs.
Vaughan and Dixon, and two gigs. The plucky little party suffered
greatly from hunger, but on the 5th he made a sudden descent on
Presque Isle, and burned a 14-gun schooner just ready for launching;
he was off before the foe could assemble, and reached the Harbor
in safety next day.
On July 31st Commodore Chauncy sailed with his fleet; some days
previously the larger British vessels had retired to Kingston, where
a 100-gun two-decker was building. Chauncy sailed up to the head
of the lake, where he intercepted the small brig _Magnet_. The
_Sylph_ was sent in to destroy her, but her crew ran her ashore and
burned her. The _Jefferson_, _Sylph_, and _Oneida_ were left to watch
some other small craft in the Niagara; the _Jones_ was kept cruising
between the Harbor and Oswego, and with the four larger vessels
Chauncy blockaded Yeo's four large vessels lying in Kingston. The
four American vessels were in the aggregate of 4,398 tons, manned
by rather more than 1,350 men, and presenting in broadside 77 guns,
throwing 2,328 lbs. of shot. The four British vessels measured in
all _about_ 3,812 tons, manned by 1,220 men, and presenting in
broadside 74 guns, throwing 2,066 lbs. of shot. The former were thus
superior by about 15 per cent., and Sir James Yeo very properly
declined to fight with the odds against him--although it was a nicer
calculation than British commanders had been accustomed to enter into.
Major-General Brown had written to Commodore Chauncy on July 13th:
"I do not doubt my ability to meet the enemy in the field and to
march in any direction over his country, your fleet carrying for
me the necessary supplies. We can threaten Forts George and Niagara,
and carry Burlington Heights and York, and proceed direct to Kingston
and carry that place. For God's sake let me see you: Sir James will
not fight." To which Chauncy replied: "I shall afford every assistance
in my power to cooperate with the army whenever it can be done without
losing sight of the great object for the attainment of which this
fleet has been created,--the capture or destruction of the enemy's
fleet. But that I consider the primary object. * * * We are intended
to seek and fight the enemy's fleet, and I shall not be diverted
from my efforts to effectuate it by any sinister attempt to render
us subordinate to, or an appendage of, the army." That is, by any
"sinister attempt" to make him cooperate intelligently in a really
well-concerted scheme of invasion. In further support of these noble
and independent sentiments, he writes to the Secretary of the Navy
on August 10th [Footnote: See Niles, vii, 12, and other places (under
"Chauncy" in index).], "I told (General Brown) that I should not
visit the head of the lake unless the enemy's fleet did so. * * *
To deprive the enemy of an apology for not meeting me, I have sent
ashore four guns from the _Superior_ to reduce her armament in number
to an equality with the _Prince Regent_'s, yielding the advantage
of their 68-pounders. The _Mohawk_ mounts two guns less than the
_Princess Charlotte_, and the _Montreal_ and _Niagara_ are equal
to the _Pike_ and _Madison_." He here justifies his refusal to
co-operate with General Brown by saying that he was of only equal
force with Sir James, and that he has deprived the latter of "an
apology" for not meeting him. This last was not at all true. The
_Mohawk_ and _Madison_ were just about equal to the _Princess
Charlotte_ and _Niagara_: but the _Pike_ was half as strong again
as the _Montreal_; and Chauncy could very well afford to "yield the
advantage of their 68-pounders," when in return Sir James had to
yield the advantage of Chauncy's long 32's and 42-pound carronades.
The _Superior_ was a 32-pounder frigate, and, even without her four
extra guns, was about a fourth heavier than the _Prince Regent_ with
her 24-pounders. Sir James was not acting more warily than Chauncy
had acted during June and July, 1813. Then he had a fleet which tonned
1,701, was manned by 680 men, and threw at a broadside 1,099 lbs.
of shot; and he declined to go out of port or in any way try to check
the operation of Yeo's fleet which tonned 2,091, was manned by 770
men, and threw at a broadside 1,374 lbs. of shot. Chauncy then acted
perfectly proper, no doubt, but he could not afford to sneer at Yeo
for behaving in the same way. Whatever either commander might write,
in reality he well knew that his officers and crews were, man for
man, just about on a par with those of his antagonists, and so, after
the first brush or two, he was exceedingly careful to see that the
odds were not against him. Chauncy, in his petulant answers to Brown's
letter, ignored the fact that his superiority of force would prevent
his opponent from giving battle, and would, therefore, prevent any
thing more important than a blockade occurring.
His ideas of the purpose for which his command had been created were
erroneous and very hurtful to the American cause. That purpose was
not, except incidentally, "the destruction of the enemy's fleet";
and, if it was, he entirely failed to accomplish it. The real purpose
was to enable Canada to be successfully invaded, or to assist in
repelling an invasion of the United States. These services could
only be efficiently performed by acting in union with the land-forces,
for his independent action could evidently have little effect. The
only important services he had performed had been in attacking Forts
George and York, where he _had_ been rendered "subordinate to, and
an appendage of, the army." His only chance of accomplishing any
thing lay in similar acts of cooperation, and he refused to do these.
Had he acted as he ought to have done, and assisted Brown to the
utmost, he would certainly have accomplished much more than he did,
and might have enabled Brown to assault Kingston, when Yeo's fleet
would of course have been captured. The insubordination, petty
stickling for his own dignity, and lack of appreciation of the
necessity of acting in concert that he showed, were the very faults
which proved most fatal to the success of our various land commanders
in the early part of the war. Even had Chauncy's assistance availed
nothing, he could not have accomplished less than he did. He remained
off Kingston blockading Yeo, being once or twice blown off by gales.
He sent Lieutenant Gregory, accompanied by Midshipman Hart and six
men, in to reconnoitre on August 25th; the lieutenant ran across
two barges containing 30 men, and was captured after the midshipman
had been killed and the lieutenant and four men wounded. On September
21st he transported General Izard and 3,000 men from Sackett's Harbor
to the Genesee; and then again blockaded Kingston until the two-decker
was nearly completed, when he promptly retired to the Harbor.
The equally cautious Yeo did not come out on the lake till Oct. 15th;
he did not indulge in the empty and useless formality of blockading
his antagonist, but assisted the British army on the Niagara frontier
till navigation closed, about Nov. 21st. A couple of days before,
Midshipman McGowan headed an expedition to blow up the two-decker
(named the _St. Lawrence_) with a torpedo, but was discovered by
two of the enemy's boats, which he captured and brought in; the
attempt was abandoned, because the _St. Lawrence_ was found not to
be lying in Kingston.
For this year the material loss again fell heaviest on the British,
amounting to one 14-gun brig burned by her crew, one 10-gun schooner
burned on the stocks, three gun-boats, three cutters, and one gig
captured; while in return the Americans lost one schooner loaded
with seven guns, one boat loaded with two, and a gig captured and
four guns destroyed at Oswego. In men the British loss was heavier
still relatively to that of the Americans, being in killed, wounded,
and prisoners about 300 to 80. But in spite of this loss and damage,
which was too trivial to be of any account to either side, the
success of the season was with the British, inasmuch as they held
command over the lake for more than four months, during which time
they could coöperate with their army; while the Americans held it
for barely two months and a half. In fact the conduct of the two
fleets on Lake Ontario during the latter part of the war was almost
farcical. As soon as one, by building, acquired the superiority,
the foe at once retired to port, where he waited until _he_ had built
another vessel or two, when he came out, and the other went into
port in turn. Under such circumstances it was hopeless ever to finish
the contest by a stand-up sea-fight, each commander calculating the
chances with mathematical exactness. The only hope of destroying
the enemy's fleet was by cooperating with the land-forces in a
successful attack on his main post, when he would be forced to be
either destroyed or to fight--and this cooperation Chauncy refused
to give. He seems to have been an excellent organizer, but he did
not use (certainly not in the summer of 1813) his materials by any
means to the best advantage. He was hardly equal to his opponent,
and the latter seems to have been little more than an average officer.
Yeo blundered several times, as in the attack on Sackett's Harbor,
in not following up his advantage at Oswego, in showing so little
resource in the action off the Genesee, etc., and he was not troubled
by any excess of daring; but during the period when he was actually
cruising against Chauncy on the lake he certainly showed to better
advantage than the American did. With an inferior force he won a
partial victory over his opponent off Niagara, and then kept him
in check for six weeks; while Chauncy, with his superior force, was
not only partially defeated once, but, when he did gain a partial
victory, failed to take advantage of it.
In commenting upon the timid and dilatory tactics of the two commanders
on Ontario, however, it must be remembered that the indecisive nature
of the results attained had been often paralleled by the numerous
similar encounters that took place on the ocean during the wars of
the preceding century. In the War of the American Revolution, the
English fought some 19 fleet actions with the French, Dutch, and
Spaniards; one victory was gained over the French, and one over the
Spaniards, while the 17 others were all indecisive, both sides claiming
the victory, and neither winning it. Of course, some of them, though
indecisive as regards loss and damage, were strategetical victories:
thus, Admiral Arbuthnot beat back Admiral Barras off the Chesapeake,
in March of 1781; and near the same place in September of the same
year the French had their revenge in the victory (one at least in
its results) of the Comte de Grasse over Sir Thomas Graves. In the
five desperate and bloody combats which De Suffrein waged with Sir
Edward Hughes in the East Indies, the laurels were very evenly divided.
These five conflicts were not rendered indecisive by any overwariness
in manoeuvring, for De Suffrein's attacks were carried out with as
much boldness as skill, and his stubborn antagonist was never inclined
to baulk him of a fair battle; but the two hardy fighters were so
evenly matched that they would pound one another till each was helpless
to inflict injury. Very different were the three consecutive battles
that took place in the same waters, on the 25th of April, 1758, the
3d of August, 1758, and on the 10th of September, 1759, between Pocock
and d'Aché [Footnote: "La Marine Française sous le Regne de Louis XV,"
par Henri Riviere, Lieutenant de Vaisseau, Chevalier de la Legion d'
Honneur. (Paris et Toulon, 1859), pp. 385 and 439.], where, by skilful
manoeuvring, the French admiral saved his somewhat inferior force
from capture, and the English admiral gained indecisive victories.
M. Riviere, after giving a most just and impartial account of the
battles, sums up with the following excellent criticism. [Footnote:
_Ibid_., p. 425. I pay more attention to the sense than to the letter
in my translation.]
"It is this battle, won by Hawke, the 20th of November, 1757, and
the combats of Pocock and d'Aché, from which date two distinct schools
in the naval affairs of the 18th century: one of these was all for
promptness and audacity, which were regarded as the indispensable
conditions for victory; the other, on the contrary, praised skilful
delays and able evolutions, and created success by science united
to prudence. * * * But these two schools were true only according
to circumstances, not absolutely. When two fleets of equal worth
are facing one another, as in the War of the American Revolution,
then tactics should come into play, and audacity would often be mere
foolhardiness. If it happens, on the other hand, as in the Republic,
or during the last years of Louis XV, that an irresolute fleet, without
organization, has to contend with a fleet prepared in every way,
then, on the part of this last, audacity is wisdom and prudence would
be cowardice, for it would give an enemy who distrusts himself time
to become more hardy. The only school always true is that one which,
freed from all routine, produces men whose genius will unite in one,
in knowing how to apply them appropriately, the audacity which will
carry off victory, and the prudence which knows how to obtain it in
preparing for it."
These generalizations are drawn from the results of mighty battles,
but they apply just as well to the campaigns carried on on a small
scale, or even to single-ship actions. Chauncy, as already said,
does not deserve the praise which most American historians, and
especially Cooper, have lavished on him as well as on all our other
officers of that period. Such indiscriminate eulogy entirely detracts
from the worth of a writer's favorable criticisms. Our _average_
commander was, I firmly believe, at that time superior to the average
commander of any other nation; but to get at this average we must
include Chauncy, Rodgers, and Angus, as well as Hull, Macdonough,
Perry, Porter, Bainbridge, Biddle, Lawrence, and Warrington.
Sir James Yeo did to the full as well as his opponent, and like him
was a good organizer; but he did little enough. His campaigns must
be considered as being conducted well or ill according as he is believed
to have commanded better men than his opponent, or not. If, as many
British writers contend, his crews were an overmatch for the Americans,
man for man, even to a slight degree, then Yeo's conduct was very
cowardly; if, on the contrary, the officers and men of the two fleets
were on a par, then he acted properly and outgeneralled his opponent.
It is to be regretted that most of the histories written on the subject,
on either side of the Atlantic, should be of the "hurrah" order of
literature, with no attempt whatever to get at the truth, but merely
to explain away the defeats or immensely exaggerate the victories
suffered or gained by their own side.
Erie and the Upper Lakes.
Hitherto the vessels on these lakes (as well as on Ontario) had been
under the command of Commodore Chauncy; but they were now formed into
a separate department, under Captain Arthur Sinclair. The Americans
had, of course, complete supremacy, and no attempt was seriously made
to contest it with them; but they received a couple of stinging, if
not very important, defeats. It is rather singular that here the
British, who began with a large force, while there was none whatever
to oppose it, should have had it by degrees completely annihilated;
and should have then, and not till then, when apparently rendered
harmless, have turned round and partially revenged themselves by
two cutting-out expeditions which were as boldly executed as they
were skilfully planned.
Captain Sinclair sailed into Lake Huron with the _Niagara_, _Caledonia_,
_Ariel_, _Scorpion_, and _Tigress_, and on July 20th burnt the fort
and barracks of St. Joseph, which were abandoned by their garrison.
On Aug. 4th he arrived off the fort of Machilimacinac (Mackinaw),
which was situated on such an eminence that the guns of the vessels
could not reach it. Accordingly, the troops under Col. Croghan were
landed, covered by the fire of the schooners, very successfully; but
when they tried to carry the fort they were driven back with the loss
of 70 men. Thence Sinclair sailed to the Nattagawassa Creek, attacked
and destroyed a block-house three miles up it, which mounted three
light guns, and also a schooner called the _Nancy_; but the commander
of the schooner, Lieutenant Worsely, with his crew, escaped up the
river. Captain Sinclair then departed for Lake Erie, leaving the
_Scorpion_, Lieutenant Turner, and _Tigress_, Sailing-master Champlin,
to blockade the Nattagawassa. News was received by the British from
a party of Indians that the two American vessels were five leagues
apart, and it was at once resolved to attempt their capture. On the
first of September, in the evening, four boats started out, one manned
by 20 seamen, under Lieutenant Worsely, the three others by 72 soldiers
under Lieutenants Bulger, Armstrong, and Raderhurst of the army--in
all 92 men and two guns, a 6- and a 3-pounder. A number of Indians
accompanied the expedition but took no part in the fighting. At sunset
on the 2d the boats arrived at St. Mary's Strait, and spent 24 hours
in finding out where the American schooners were. At 6 P.M. on the 3d,
the nearest vessel, the _Tigress_, was made out, six miles off, and
they pulled for her. It was very dark, and they were not discovered
till they had come within fifty yards, when Champlin at once fired
his long 24 at them; before it could be reloaded the four boats had
dashed up, those of Lieutenants Worsely and Armstrong placing themselves
on the starboard, and those of Lieutenants Bulger and Raderhurst on
the port side. There was a short, sharp struggle, and the schooner
was carried. Of her crew of 28 men, 3 were killed and five, including
Mr. Champlin, dangerously wounded. The assailants lost three seamen
killed, Lieutenant Bulger, seven soldiers and several seamen wounded.
[Footnote: Letter of Lieutenant A. H. Bulger, Sept. 7, 1814. James
says only 3 killed and 8 wounded; but Lieutenant Bulger distinctly
says in addition, "and several seamen wounded."] "The defence of
this vessel," writes Lieut. Bulger, "did credit to her officers,
who were all severely wounded." Next day the prisoners were sent
on shore; and on the 5th the _Scorpion_ was discovered working up
to join her consort, entirely ignorant of what had happened. She
anchored about 2 miles from the _Tigress_; and next morning at 6
o'clock the latter slipped her cable and ran down under the jib and
fore-sail, the American ensign and pendant still flying. When within
10 yards of the _Scorpion_, the concealed soldiers jumped up, poured
a volley into her which killed 2 and wounded 2 men, and the next
moment carried her, her surprised crew of 30 men making no resistance.
The whole affair reflected great credit on the enterprise and pluck
of the British without being discreditable to the Americans. It was
like Lieut. Elliot's capture of the _Detroit_ and _Caledonia_.
Meanwhile a still more daring cutting-out expedition had taken place
at the foot of Lake Erie. The three American schooners, _Ohio_,
_Somers_, and _Porcupine_, each with 30 men, under Lieut. Conkling,
were anchored just at the outlet of the lake, to cover the flank of
the works at Fort Erie. On the night of August 12th, Capt. Dobbs,
of the _Charwell_, and Lieut. Radcliffe, of the _Netly_, with 75
seamen and marines from their two vessels, which were lying off Fort
Erie, resolved to attempt the capture of the schooners. The seamen
carried the captain's gig upon their shoulders from Queenstown to
Frenchman's Creek, a distance of 20 miles; thence, by the aid of
some militia, 5 batteaux as well as the gig were carried 8 miles
across the woods to Lake Erie, and the party (whether with or without
the militia I do not know) embarked in them. Between 11 and 12 the
boats were discovered a short distance ahead of the _Somers_ and
hailed. They answered "provision boats," which deceived the officer
on deck, as such boats had been in the habit of passing and repassing
continually during the night. Before he discovered his mistake the
boats drifted across his hawse, cut his cables, and ran him aboard
with a volley of musketry, which wounded two of his men, and before
the others could get on deck the schooner was captured. In another
moment the British boats were alongside the _Ohio_, Lieut. Conkling's
vessel. Here the people had hurried on deck, and there was a moment's
sharp struggle, in which the assailants lost Lieut. Radcliffe and
one seaman killed and six seamen and marines wounded; but on board
the _Ohio_ Lieut. Conkling and Sailing-master M. Cally were shot
down, one seaman killed, and four wounded, and Captain Dobbs carried
her, sword in hand. The _Porcupine_ was not molested, and made no
effort to interfere with the British in their retreat; so they drifted
down the rapids with their two prizes and secured them below. The
boldness of this enterprise will be appreciated when it is remembered
that but 75 British seamen (unless there were some militia along),
with no artillery, attacked and captured two out of three fine
schooners, armed each with a long 32 or 24, and an aggregate of 90
men; and that this had been done in waters where the gig and five
batteaux of the victors were the only British vessels afloat.
CHAMPLAIN.
This lake, which had hitherto played but an inconspicuous part, was
now to become the scene of the greatest naval battle of the war. A
British army of 11,000 men under Sir George Prevost undertook the
invasion of New York by advancing up the western bank of Lake Champlain.
This advance was impracticable unless there was a sufficiently strong
British naval force to drive back the American squadron at the same
time. Accordingly, the British began to construct a frigate, the
_Confiance_, to be added to their already existing force, which consisted
of a brig, two sloops, and 12 or 14 gun-boats. The Americans already
possessed a heavy corvette, a schooner, a small sloop, and 10 gun-boats
or row-galleys; they now began to build a large brig, the _Eagle_,
which was launched about the 16th of August. Nine days later, on the
25th, the _Confiance_ was launched. The two squadrons were equally
deficient in stores, etc.; the _Confiance_ having locks to her guns,
some of which could not be used, while the American schooner
_Ticonderoga_ had to fire her guns by means of pistols flashed at
the touchholes (like Barclay on Lake Erie). Macdonough and Downie
were hurried into action before they had time to prepare themselves
thoroughly; but it was a disadvantage common to both, and arose from
the nature of the case, which called for immediate action. The British
army advanced slowly toward Plattsburg, which was held by General
Macomb with less than 2,000 effective American troops. Captain Thomas
Macdonough, the American commodore, took the lake a day or two before
his antagonist, and came to anchor in Plattsburg harbor. The British
fleet, under Captain George Downie, moved from Isle-aux-Noix on Sept.
8th, and on the morning of the 11th sailed into Plattsburg harbor.
The American force consisted of the ship _Saratoga_, Captain T.
Macdonough, of about 734 tons, [Footnote: In the Naval Archives
("Masters'-Commandant Letters," 1814, 1, No. 134) is a letter from
Macdonough in which he states that the _Saratoga_ is intermediate
in size between the _Pike_, of 875, and the _Madison_, of 593 tons;
this would make her 734. The _Eagle_ was very nearly the size of
the _Lawrence_ or _Niagara_, on Lake Erie. The _Ticonderoga_ was
originally a small steamer, but Commodore Macdonough had her
schooner-rigged, because he found that her machinery got out of
order on almost every trip that she took. Her tonnage is only
approximately known, but she was of the same size as the _Linnet_.]
carrying eight long 24-pounders, six 42-pound and twelve 32-pound
carronades; the brig _Eagle_, Captain Robert Henly, of about 500
tons, carrying eight long 18's and twelve 32-pound carronades; schooner
_Ticonderoga_, Lieut.-Com. Stephen Cassin, of about 350 tons carrying
eight long 12-pounders, four long 18-pounders, and five 32-pound
carronades; sloop _Preble_, Lieutenant Charles Budd, of about 80
tons, mounting seven long 9's; the row-galleys _Boxer_, _Centipede_,
_Nettle_, _Allen_, _Viper_, and _Burrows_, each of about 70 tons,
and mounting one long 24- and one short 18-pounder; and the row-galleys
_Wilmer_, _Ludlow_, _Aylwin_, and _Ballard_, each of about 40 tons,
and mounting one long 12. James puts down the number of men on board
the squadron as 950,--merely a guess, as he gives no authority. Cooper
says "about 850 men, including officers, and a small detachment of
soldiers to act as marines." Lossing (p. 866, note 1) says 882 in all.
Vol. xiv of the "American State Papers" contains on p. 572 the
prize-money list presented by the purser, George Beale, Jr. This
numbers the men (the dead being represented by their heirs or executors)
up to 915, including soldiers and seamen, but many of the numbers
are omitted, probably owing to the fact that their owners, though
belonging on board; happened to be absent on shore, or in the hospital;
so that the actual number of names tallies very closely with that
given by Lossing; and accordingly I shall take that. [Footnote: In
the Naval Archives are numerous letters from Macdonough, in which he
states continually that, as fast as they arrive, he substitutes sailors
for the soldiers with which the vessels were originally manned. Men
were continually being sent ashore on account of sickness. In the
Bureau of Navigation is the log-book of "sloop-of-war _Surprise_,
Captain Robert Henly" (_Surprise_ was the name the _Eagle_ originally
went by). It mentions from time to time that men were buried and sent
ashore to the hospital (five being sent ashore on September 2d); and
finally mentions that the places of the absent were partially filled
by a draft of 21 soldiers, to act as marines. The notes on the day
of battle are very brief.] The total number of men in the galleys
(including a number of soldiers, as there were not enough sailors)
was 350. The exact proportions in which this force was distributed
among the gunboats can not be told, but it may be roughly said to
be 41 in each large galley and 26 in each small one. The complement
of the _Saratoga_ was 210, of the _Eagle_, 130, of the _Ticonderoga_,
100, and of the _Preble_, 30; but the first three had also a few
soldiers distributed between them. The following list is probably
pretty accurate as to the aggregate; but there may have been a score
or two fewer men on the gun-boats, or more on the larger vessels.
MACDONOUGH'S FORCE.
Metal, from long
Name. Tons. Crew. Broadside. or short guns.
_Saratoga_, 734 240 414 lbs. -+- long, 96
'- short, 318
_Eagle_, 500 150 264 " -+- long, 72
'- short, 192
_Ticonderoga_, 350 112 180 " -+- long, 84
'- short, 96
_Preble_, 80 30 36 " long, 36
Six gun-boats, 420 246 252 " -+- long, 144
'- short, 108
Four gun-boats, 160 104 48 " long, 48
In all, 14 vessels of 2,244 tons and 882 men, with 86 guns throwing
at a broadside 1,194 lbs. of shot, 480 from long, and 714 from short guns.
[Illustration: Commodore Thomas Macdonough: a contemporary
portrait by Gilbert Stuart. (Courtesy National Gallery of
Art, Mellon Collection)]
The force of the British squadron in guns and ships is known accurately,
as most of it was captured. The _Confiance_ rated for years in our
lists as a frigate of the class of the _Constellation_, _Congress_,
and _Macedonian_; she was thus of over 1,200 tons. (Cooper says more,
"nearly double the tonnage of the _Saratoga._") She carried on her
main-deck thirty long 24's, fifteen in each broadside. She did not
have a complete spar-deck; on her poop, which came forward to the
mizzen-mast, were two 32-pound (or possibly 42-pound) carronades
and on her spacious top-gallant forecastle were four 32--(or 42-)
pound carronades, and a long 24 on a pivot. [Footnote: This is her
armament as given by Cooper, on the authority of Lieutenant E. A.
F. Lavallette. who was in charge of her for three months, and went
aboard her ten minutes after the _Linnet_ struck.] She had aboard her
a furnace for heating shot; eight or ten of which heated shot were
found with the furnace. [Footnote: James stigmatizes the statement
of Commodore Macdonough about the furnace as "as gross a falsehood
as ever was uttered"; but he gives no authority for the denial, and
it appears to have been merely an ebullition of spleen on his part.
Every American officer who went aboard the _Confiance_ saw the furnace
and the hot shot.] This was, of course, a perfectly legitimate advantage.
The _Linnet_, Captain Daniel Pring, was a brig of the same size as
the _Ticonderoga_, mounting 16 long 12's. The _Chubb_ and _Finch_,
Lieutenants James McGhie and William Hicks, were formerly the
American sloops _Growler_ and _Eagle_, of 112 and 110 tons respectively.
The former mounted ten 18-pound carronades and one long 6; the latter,
six 18-pound carronades, four long 6's, and one short 18. There were
twelve gun-boats. [Footnote: Letter of General George Prevost, Sept.
11, 1814. All the American accounts say 13; the British official
account had best be taken. James says only ten, but gives no authority;
he appears to have been entirely ignorant of all things connected with
this action.] Five of these were large, of about 70 tons each; three
mounted a long 24 and a 32-pound carronade each; one mounted a long
18 and a 32-pound carronade; one a long 18 and a short 18. Seven
were smaller, of about 40 tons each; three of these carried each a
long 18, and four carried each a 32-pound carronade. There is greater
difficulty in finding out the number of men in the British fleet.
American historians are unanimous in stating it at from 1,000 to
1,100; British historians never do any thing but copy James blindly.
Midshipman Lea of the _Confiance_, in a letter (already quoted)
published in the "London Naval Chronicle," vol. xxxii, p. 292, gives
her crew as 300; but more than this amount of dead and prisoners
were taken out of her. The number given her by Commander Ward in
his "Naval Tactics," is probably nearest right--325. [Footnote: James
gives her but 270 men,--without stating his authority.] The _Linnet_
had about 125 men, and the _Chubb_ and _Finch_ about 50 men each.
According to Admiral Paulding (given by Lossing, in his "Field Book
of the War of 1812," p. 868) their gun-boats averaged 50 men each.
This is probably true, as they were manned largely by soldiers, any
number of whom could be spared from Sir George Prevost's great army;
but it may be best to consider the large ones as having 41, and the
small 26 men, which were the complements of the American gun-boats
of the same sizes. The following, then, is the force of
DOWNIE'S SQUADRON.
From what guns,
Name. Tonnage. Crew. Broadside. long or short.
_Confiance_, 1200 325 480 lbs. -+- long, 384
'- short, 96
_Linnet_, 350 125 96 " long, 96
_Chubb_, 112 50 96 " -+- long, 6
'- short, 90
_Finch_, 110 50 84 " -+- long, 12
'- short, 72
Five gun-boats, 350 205 254 " -+- long, 12
'- short, 72
Seven gun-boats, 280 182 182 " -+- long, 54
'- short, 128
In all, 16 vessels, of about 2,402 tons, with 937 men, [Footnote:
About; there were probably more rather than less.] and a total of
92 guns, throwing at a broadside 1,192 lbs., 660 from long and
532 from short pieces.
These are widely different from the figures that appear in the pages
of most British historians, from Sir Archibald Alison down and up.
Thus, in the "History of the British Navy," by C. D. Yonge (already
quoted), it is said that on Lake Champlain "our (the British) force
was manifestly and vastly inferior, * * * their (the American) broadside
outweighing ours in more than the proportion of three to two, while
the difference in their tonnage and in the number of their crews was
still more in their favor." None of these historians, or quasi-historians,
have made the faintest effort to find out the facts for themselves,
following James' figures with blind reliance, and accordingly it is
only necessary to discuss the latter. This reputable gentleman ends
his account ("Naval Occurrences," p. 424) by remarking that Macdonough
wrote as he did because "he knew that nothing would stamp a falsehood
with currency equal to a pious expression, * * * his falsehoods
equalling in number the lines of his letter." These remarks are
interesting as showing the unbiassed and truthful character of the
author, rather than for any particular weight they will have in
influencing any one's judgment on Commodore Macdonough. James gives
the engaged force of the British as "8 vessels, of 1,426 tons, with
537 men, and throwing 765 lbs. of shot." To reduce the force down
to this, he first excludes the _Finch_, because she "grounded opposite
an American battery _before the engagement commenced_," which reads
especially well in connection with Capt. Pring's official letter:
"Lieut. Hicks, of the _Finch_, had the mortification to strike on
a reef of rocks to the eastward of Crab Island _about the middle of
the engagement_." [Footnote: The italics are mine. The letter is
given in full in the "Naval Chronicle."] What James means cannot
be imagined; no stretch of language will convert "about the middle
of" into "before." The _Finch_ struck on the reef in consequence of
having been disabled and rendered helpless by the fire from the
_Ticonderoga_. Adding her force to James' statement (counting her
crew only as he gives it), we get 9 vessels, 1,536 tons, 577 men,
849 lbs. of shot. James also excludes five gun-boats, because they
ran away almost as soon as the action commenced (vol. vi, p. 501).
This assertion is by no means equivalent to the statement in Captain
Pring's letter "that the flotilla of gun-boats had abandoned the
object assigned to them," and, if it was, it would not warrant his
excluding the five gun-boats. Their flight may have been disgraceful,
but they formed part of the attacking force nevertheless; almost
any general could say that he had won against superior numbers if
he refused to count in any of his own men whom he suspected of behaving
badly. James gives his 10 gun-boats 294 men and 13 guns (two long
24's, five long 18's, six 32-pound carronades), and makes them average
45 tons; adding on the five he leaves out, we get 14 vessels, of
1,761 tons, with 714 men, throwing at a broadside 1,025 lbs. of
shot (591 from long guns, 434 from carronades). But Sir George Prevost,
in the letter already quoted, says there were 12 gun-boats, and the
American accounts say more. Supposing the two gun-boats James did
not include at all to be equal respectively to one of the largest
and one of the smallest of the gun-boats as he gives them ("Naval
Occurrences," p. 417); that is, one to have had 35 men, a long 24,
and a 32-pound carronade, the other, 25 men and a 32-pound carronade,
we get for Downie's force 16 vessels, of 1,851 tons, with 774 men,
throwing at a broadside 1,113 lbs. of shot (615 from long guns,
498 from carronades). It must be remembered that so far I have merely
corrected James by means of the authorities from which he draws his
account--the official letters of the British commanders. I have not
brought up a single American authority against him, but have only
made such alterations as a writer could with nothing whatever but
the accounts of Sir George Prevost and Captain Pring before him to
compare with James. Thus it is seen that according to James himself
Downie really had 774 men to Macdonough's 882, and threw at a broadside
1,113 lbs. of shot to Macdonough's 1,194 lbs. James says ("Naval
Occurrences," pp. 410, 413): "Let it be recollected, no musketry
was employed on either side," and "The marines were of no use, as
the action was fought out of the range of musketry"; the 106 additional
men on the part of the Americans were thus not of much consequence,
the action being fought at anchor, and there being men enough to
manage the guns and perform every other duty. So we need only attend
to the broadside force. Here, then, Downie could present at a broadside
615 lbs. of shot from long guns to Macdonough's 480, and 498 lbs.
from carronades to Macdonough's 714; or, he threw 135 lbs. of shot
more from his long guns, and 216 less from his carronades. This is
equivalent to Downie's having seven long 18's and one long 9, and
Macdonough's having one 24-pound and six 32-pound carronades. A
32-pound carronade is not equal to a long 18; so that _even by
James' own showing Downie's force was slightly the superior_.
Thus far, I may repeat, I have corrected James solely by the evidence
of his own side; now I shall bring in some American authorities.
These do not contradict the British official letters, for they virtually
agree with them; but they do go against James' unsupported assertions,
and, being made by naval officers of irreproachable reputation, will
certainly outweigh them. In the first place, James asserts that on
the main-deck of the _Confiance_ but 13 guns were presented in broadside,
two 32-pound carronades being thrust through the bridle- and two
others through the stern-ports; so he excludes two of her guns from
the broadside. Such guns would have been of great use to her at certain
stages of the combat, and ought to be included in the force. But
besides this the American officers positively say that she had a
_broadside_ of 15 guns. Adding these two guns, and making a trifling
change in the arrangement of the guns in the row-galleys, we get
a broadside of 1,192 lbs., exactly as I have given it above. There
is no difficulty in accounting for the difference of tonnage as given
by James and by the Americans, for we have considered the same subject
in reference to the battle of Lake Erie. James calculates the American
tonnage as if for sea-vessels of deep holds, while, as regards the
British vessels, he allows for the shallow holds that all the lake
craft had; that is, he gives in one the nominal, in the other the
real, tonnage. This fully accounts for the discrepancy. It only remains
to account for the difference in the number of men. From James we
can get 772. In the first place, we can reason by analogy. I have
already shown that, as regards the battle of Lake Erie, he is convicted
(by English, not by American, evidence) of having underestimated
Barclay's force by about 25 per cent. If he did the same thing here,
the British force was over 1,000 strong, and I have no doubt that
it was. But we have other proofs. On p. 417 of the "Naval Occurrences"
he says the complement of the four captured British vessels amounted
to 420 men, of whom 54 were killed in action, leaving 366 prisoners,
including the wounded. But the report of prisoners, as given by the
American authorities, gives 369 officers and seamen unhurt or but
slightly wounded, 57 wounded men paroled, and other wounded whose
number was unspecified. Supposing this number to have been 82, and
adding 54 dead, we would get in all 550 men for the four ships, the
number I have adopted in my list. This would make the British wounded
129 instead of 116, as James says: but neither the Americans nor
the British seem to have enumerated all their wounded in this fight.
Taking into account all these considerations, it will be seen that
the figures I have given are probably approximately correct, and,
at any rate, indicate pretty closely the _relative_ strength of the
two squadrons. The slight differences in tonnage and crews (158 tons
and 55 men, in favor of the British) are so trivial that they need
not be taken into account, and we will merely consider the broadside
force. In absolute weight of metal the two combatants were evenly
matched--almost exactly;--but whereas from Downie's broadside of
1,192 lbs. 660 were from long and 532 from short guns, of Macdonough's
broadside of 1,194 lbs., but 480 were from long and 714 from short
pieces. The forces were thus equal, except that Downie opposed 180
lbs. from long guns to 182 from carronades; as if 10 long 18's were
opposed to ten 18-pound carronades. This would make the odds on their
face about 10 to 9 against the Americans; in reality they were greater,
for the possession of the _Confiance_ was a very great advantage.
The action is, as regards metal, the exact reverse of those between
Chauncy and Yeo. Take, for example, the fight off Burlington on
Sept. 28, 1813. Yeo's broadside was 1,374 lbs. to Chauncy's 1,288;
but whereas only 180 of Yeo's was from long guns, of Chauncy's but
536 was from carronades. Chauncy's fleet was thus much the superior.
At least we must say this: if Macdonough beat merely an equal force,
then Yeo made a most disgraceful and cowardly flight before an
inferior foe; but if we contend that Macdonough's force was inferior
to that of his antagonist, then we must admit that Yeo's was in
like manner inferior to Chauncy's. These rules work both ways. The
_Confiance_ was a heavier vessel than the _Pike_, presenting in
broadside one long 24- and three 32-pound carronades more than the
latter. James (vol. vi, p. 355) says: "The _Pike_ alone was nearly
a match for Sir James Yeo's squadron," and Brenton says (vol. ii,
503): "The _General Pike_ was more than a match for the whole British
squadron." Neither of these writers means quite as much as he says,
for the logical result would be that the _Confiance_ alone was a
match for all of Macdonough's force. Still it is safe to say that
the _Pike_ gave Chauncy a great advantage, and that the _Confiance_
made Downie's fleet much superior to Macdonough's.
Macdonough saw that the British would be forced to make the attack
in order to get the control of the waters. On this long, narrow lake
the winds usually blow pretty nearly north or south, and the set of
the current is of course northward; all the vessels, being flat and
shallow, could not beat to windward well, so there was little chance
of the British making the attack when there was a southerly wind
blowing. So late in the season there was danger of sudden and furious
gales, which would make it risky for Downie to wait outside the bay
till the wind suited him; and inside the bay the wind was pretty
sure to be light and baffling. Young Macdonough (then but 28 years
of age) calculated all these chances very coolly and decided to await
the attack at anchor in Plattsburg Bay, with the head of his line
so far to the north that it could hardly be turned; and then proceeded
to make all the other preparations with the same foresight. Not
only were his vessels provided with springs, but also with anchors
to be used astern in any emergency. The _Saratoga _was further
prepared for a change of wind, or for the necessity of winding ship,
by having a kedge planted broad off on each of her bows, with a hawser
and preventer hawser (hanging in bights under water) leading from
each quarter to the kedge on that side. There had not been time to
train the men thoroughly at the guns; and to make these produce their
full effect the constant supervision of the officers had to be exerted.
The British were laboring under this same disadvantage, but neither
side felt the want very much, as the smooth water, stationary position
of the ships, and fair range, made the fire of both sides very destructive.
Plattsburg Bay is deep and opens to the southward; so that a wind
which would enable the British to sail up the lake would force them
to beat when entering the bay. The east side of the mouth of the
bay is formed by Cumberland Head; the entrance is about a mile and
a half across, and the other boundary, southwest from the Head, is
an extensive shoal, and a small, low island. This is called Crab
Island, and on it was a hospital and one six-pounder gun, which was
to be manned in case of necessity by the strongest patients. Macdonough
had anchored in a north-and-south line a little to the south of the
outlet of the Saranac, and out of range of the shore batteries, being
two miles from the western shore. The head of his line was so near
Cumberland Head that an attempt to turn it would place the opponent
under a very heavy fire, while to the south the shoal prevented a
flank attack. The _Eagle_ lay to the north, flanked on each side
by a couple of gun-boats; then came the _Saratoga_, with three
gun-boats between her and the _Ticonderoga_, the next in line; then
came three gun-boats and the _Preble_. The four large vessels were
at anchor; the galleys being under their sweeps and forming a second
line about 40 yards back, some of them keeping their places and some
not doing so. By this arrangement his line could not be doubled upon,
there was not room to anchor on his broadside out of reach of his
carronades, and the enemy was forced to attack him by standing in bows on.
The morning of September 11th opened with a light breeze from the
northeast. Downie's fleet weighed anchor at daylight, and came down
the lake with the wind nearly aft, the booms of the two sloops
swinging out to starboard. At half-past seven, [Footnote: The letters
of the two commanders conflict a little as to time, both absolutely
and relatively. Pring says the action lasted two hours and three
quarters, the American accounts, two hours and twenty minutes. Pring
says it began at 8.00; Macdonough says a few minutes before nine, etc.
I take the mean time.] the people in the ships could see their
adversaries' upper sails across the narrow strip of land ending in
Cumberland Head, before the British doubled the latter. Captain Downie
hove to with his four large vessels when he had fairly opened the
Bay, and waited for his galleys to overtake him. Then his four vessels
filled on the starboard tack and headed for the American line, going
abreast, the _Chubb_ to the north, heading well to windward of the
_Eagle_, for whose bows the _Linnet_ was headed, while the _Confiance_
was to be laid athwart the hawse of the _Saratoga_; the _Finch_ was
to leeward with the twelve gun-boats, and was to engage the rear of
the American line.
As the English squadron stood bravely in, young Macdonough, who feared
his foes not at all, but his God a great deal, knelt for a moment,
with his officers, on the quarter-deck; and then ensued a few minutes
of perfect quiet, the men waiting with grim expectancy for the opening
of the fight. The Eagle spoke first with her long 18's, but to no
effect, for the shot fell short. Then, as the _Linnet_ passed the
_Saratoga_, she fired her broadside of long 12's, but her shot also
fell short, except one that struck a hen-coop which happened to be
aboard the _Saratoga_. There was a game cock inside, and, instead
of being frightened at his sudden release, he jumped up on a gun-slide,
clapped his wings, and crowed lustily. The men laughed and cheered;
and immediately afterward Macdonough himself fired the first shot
from one of the long guns. The 24-pound ball struck the _Confiance_
near the hawse-hole and ranged the length of her deck, killing and
wounding several men. All the American long guns now opened and were
replied to by the British galleys.
The _Confiance_ stood steadily on without replying. But she was
baffled by shifting winds, and was soon so cut up, having both her
port bow-anchors shot away, and suffering much loss, that she was
obliged to port her helm and come to while still nearly a quarter
of a mile distant from the _Saratoga_. Captain Downie came to anchor
in grand style,--securing every thing carefully before he fired a
gun, and then opening with a terribly destructive broadside. The
_Chubb_ and _Linnet_ stood farther in, and anchored forward the
_Eagle's_ beam. Meanwhile the _Finch_ got abreast of the _Ticonderoga_,
under her sweeps, supported by the gun-boats. The main fighting was
thus to take place between the vans, where the _Eagle_, _Saratoga_,
and six or seven gun-boats were engaged with the _Chubb_, _Linnet_,
_Confiance_, and two or three gun-boats; while in the rear, the
_Ticonderoga_, the _Preble_, and the other American galleys engaged
the _Finch_ and the remaining nine or ten English galleys. The battle
at the foot of the line was fought on the part of the Americans to
prevent their flank being turned, and on the part of the British
to effect that object. At first, the fighting was at long range,
but gradually the British galleys closed up, firing very well. The
American galleys at this end of the line were chiefly the small ones,
armed with one 12-pounder apiece, and they by degrees drew back before
the heavy fire of their opponents. About an hour after the discharge
of the first gun had been fired the _Finch_ closed up toward the
_Ticonderoga_, and was completely crippled by a couple of broadsides
from the latter. She drifted helplessly down the line and grounded
near Crab Island; some of the convalescent patients manned the
six-pounder and fired a shot or two at her, when she struck, nearly
half of her crew being killed or wounded. About the same time the
British gun-boats forced the _Preble_ out of line, whereupon she
cut her cable and drifted inshore out of the fight. Two or three
of the British gun-boats had already been sufficiently damaged by
some of the shot from the _Ticonderoga's_ long guns to make them
wary; and the contest at this part of the line narrowed down to one
between the American schooner and the remaining British gun-boats,
who combined to make a most determined attack upon her. So hastily
had the squadron been fitted out that many of the matches for her
guns were at the last moment found to be defective. The captain of
one of the divisions was a midshipman, but sixteen years old, Hiram
Paulding. When he found the matches to be bad he fired the guns of
his section by having pistols flashed at them, and continued this
through the whole fight. The _Ticonderoga's_ commander, Lieut. Cassin,
fought his schooner most nobly. He kept walking the taffrail amidst
showers of musketry and grape, coolly watching the movements of the
galleys and directing the guns to be loaded with canister and bags
of bullets, when the enemy tried to board. The British galleys were
handled with determined gallantry, under the command of Lieutenant
Bell. Had they driven off the _Ticonderoga_ they would have won
the day for their side, and they pushed up till they were not a
boat-hook's length distant, to try to carry her by boarding; but
every attempt was repulsed and they were forced to draw off, some
of them so crippled by the slaughter they had suffered that they
could hardly man the oars.
Meanwhile the fighting at the head of the line had been even fiercer.
The first broadside of the _Confiance_, fired from 16 long 24's,
double shotted, coolly sighted, in smooth water, at point-blank range,
produced the most terrible effect on the _Saratoga_. Her hull shivered
all over with the shock, and when the crash subsided nearly half of
her people were seen stretched on deck, for many had been knocked
down who were not seriously hurt. Among the slain was her first
lieutenant, Peter Gamble; he was kneeling down to sight the bow-gun,
when a shot entered the port, split the quoin, and drove a portion
of it against his side, killing him without breaking the skin. The
survivors carried on the fight with undiminished energy. Macdonough
himself worked like a common sailor, in pointing and handling a
favorite gun. While bending over to sight it a round shot cut in
two the spanker boom, which fell on his head and struck him senseless
for two or three minutes; he then leaped to his feet and continued
as before, when a shot took off the head of the captain of the gun
and drove it in his face with such a force as to knock him to the
other side of the deck. But after the first broadside not so much
injury was done; the guns of the _Confiance_ had been levelled to
point-blank range, and as the quoins were loosened by the successive
discharges they were not properly replaced, so that her broadsides
kept going higher and higher and doing less and less damage. Very
shortly after the beginning of the action her gallant captain was
slain. He was standing behind one of the long guns when a shot from
the _Saratoga_ struck it and threw it completely off the carriage
against his right groin, killing him almost instantly. His skin was
not broken; a black mark, about the size of a small plate, was the
only visible injury. His watch was found flattened, with its hands
pointing to the very second at which he received the fatal blow. As
the contest went on the fire gradually decreased in weight, the guns
being disabled. The inexperience of both crews partly caused this.
The American sailors overloaded their carronades so as to very much
destroy the effect of their fire; when the officers became disabled,
the men would cram the guns with shot till the last projected from
the muzzle. Of course, this lessened the execution, and also gradually
crippled the guns. On board the _Confiance_ the confusion was even
worse: after the battle the charges of the guns were drawn, and on
the side she had fought one was found with a canvas bag containing
two round of shot rammed home and wadded without any powder; another
with two cartridges and no shot; and a third with a wad below the
cartridge.
At the extreme head of the line the advantage had been with the British.
The _Chubb_ and _Linnet_ had begun a brisk engagement with the _Eagle_
and American gun-boats. In a short time the _Chubb_ had her cable,
bowsprit, and main-boom shot away, drifted within the American lines,
and was taken possession of by one of the _Saratoga's_ midshipmen.
The _Linnet_ paid no attention to the American gunboats, directing
her whole fire against the _Eagle_, and the latter was, in addition,
exposed to part of the fire of the _Confiance_. After keeping up a
heavy fire for a long time her springs were shot away, and she came
up into the wind, hanging so that she could not return a shot to
the well-directed broadsides of the _Linnet_. Henly accordingly cut
his cable, started home his top-sails, ran down, and anchored by
the stern between and inshore of the _Confiance_ and _Ticonderoga_,
from which position he opened on the _Confiance_. The _Linnet_ now
directed her attention to the American gun-boats, which at this end
of the line were very well fought, but she soon drove them off, and
then sprung her broadside so as to rake the _Saratoga_ on her bows.
Macdonough by this time had his hands full, and his fire was slackening;
he was bearing the whole brunt of the action, with the frigate on
his beam and the brig raking him. Twice his ship had been set on
fire by the hot shot of the _Confiance_; one by one his long guns
were disabled by shot, and his carronades were either treated the
same way or else rendered useless by excessive overcharging. Finally
but a single carronade was left in the starboard batteries, and on
firing it the naval-bolt broke, the gun flew off the carriage and
fell down the main hatch, leaving the Commodore without a single
gun to oppose to the few the _Confiance_ still presented. The battle
would have been lost had not Macdonough's foresight provided the
means of retrieving it. The anchor suspended astern of the _Saratoga_
was let go, and the men hauled in on the hawser that led to the
starboard quarter, bringing the ship's stern up over the kedge. The
ship now rode by the kedge and by a line that had been bent to a
bight in the stream cable, and she was raked badly by the accurate
fire of the _Linnet_. By rousing on the line the ship was at length
got so far round that the aftermost gun of the port broadside bore
on the _Confiance_. The men had been sent forward to keep as much
out of harm's way as possible, and now some were at once called back
to man the piece, which then opened with effect. The next gun was
treated in the same manner; but the ship now hung and would go no
farther round. The hawser leading from the port quarter was then
got forward under the bows and passed aft to the starboard quarter,
and a minute afterward the ship's whole port battery opened with
fatal effect. The _Confiance_ meanwhile had also attempted to round.
Her springs, like those of the _Linnet_, were on the starboard side,
and so of course could not be shot away as the _Eagle's_ were; but,
as she had nothing but springs to rely on, her efforts did little
beyond forcing her forward, and she hung with her head to the wind.
She had lost over half of her crew, [Footnote: Midshipman Lee, in
his letter already quoted, says "not five men were left unhurt";
this would of course include bruises, etc., as hurts.] most of her
guns on the engaged side were dismounted, and her stout masts had
been splintered till they looked like bundles of matches; her sails
had been torn to rags, and she was forced to strike, about two hours
after she had fired the first broadside. Without pausing a minute
the _Saratoga_ again hauled on her starboard hawser till her broadside
was sprung to bear on the _Linnet_, and the ship and brig began a
brisk fight, which the _Eagle_ from her position could take no part
in, while the _Ticonderoga_ was just finishing up the British galleys.
The shattered and disabled state of the _Linnet's_ masts, sails,
and yards precluded the most distant hope of Capt. Pring's effecting
his escape by cutting his cable; but he kept up a most gallant fight
with his greatly superior foe, in hopes that some of the gun-boats
would come and tow him off, and despatched a lieutenant to the
_Confiance_ to ascertain her state. The lieutenant returned with
news of Capt. Downie's death, while the British gun-boats had been
driven half a mile off; and, after having maintained the fight
single-handed for fifteen minutes, until, from the number of shot
between wind and water, the water had risen a foot above her lower
deck, the plucky little brig hauled down her colors, and the fight
ended, a little over two hours and a half after the first gun had
been fired. Not one of the larger vessels had a mast that would bear
canvas, and the prizes were in a sinking condition. The British
galleys drifted to leeward, none with their colors up; but as the
_Saratoga's_ boarding-officer passed along the deck of the _Confiance_
he accidentally ran against a lock-string of one of her starboard
guns, [Footnote: A sufficient commentary, by the way, on James'
assertion that the guns of the _Confiance_ had to be fired by matches,
as the gun-locks did not fit!] and it went off. This was apparently
understood as a signal by the galleys, and they moved slowly off,
pulling but a very few sweeps, and not one of them hoisting an ensign.
On both sides the ships had been cut up in the most extraordinary
manner; the _Saratoga_ had 55 shot-holes in her hull, and the
_Confiance_ 105 in hers, and the _Eagle_ and _Linnet_ had suffered
in proportion. The number of killed and wounded can not be exactly
stated; it was probably about 200 on the American side, and over
300 on the British. [Footnote: Macdonough returned his loss as follows:
Killed. Wounded.
_Saratoga_. 28 29
_Eagle_. 13 20
_Ticonderoga_ 6 6
_Preble_. 2
_Boxer_. 3 1
_Centipede_. 1
_Wilmer_. 1
A total of 52 killed and 58 wounded; but the latter head apparently
only included those who had to go to the hospital. Probably about
90 additional were more or less slightly wounded. Captain Pring,
in his letter of Sept. 12th, says the _Confiance_ had 41 killed and
40 wounded; the _Linnet_, 10 killed and 14 wounded; the _Chubb_,
6 killed and 16 wounded; the _Finch_, 2 wounded: in all, 57 killed
and 72 wounded. But he adds "that no opportunity has offered to
muster * * * this is the whole as yet ascertained to be killed or
wounded." The Americans took out 180 dead and wounded from the
_Confiance_, 50 from the _Linnet_, and 40 from the _Chubb_ and
_Finch_; in all, 270. James ("Naval Occurrences," p. 412) says the
_Confiance_ had 83 wounded. As Captain Pring wrote his letter in
Plattsburg Bay the day after the action, he of course could not give
the loss aboard the British gun-boats; so James at once assumed that
they suffered none. As well as could be found out they had between
50 and 100 killed and wounded. The total British loss was between
300 and 400, as nearly as can be ascertained. For this action, as
already shown, James is of no use whatever. Compare his statements,
for example, with those of Midshipman Lee, in the "Naval Chronicle."
The comparative loss, as a means of testing the competitive prowess
of the combatants, is not of much consequence in this case, as the
weaker party in point of force conquered.]
Captain Macdonough at once returned the British officers their swords.
Captain Pring writes: "I have much satisfaction in making you acquainted
with the humane treatment the wounded have received from Commodore
Macdonough; they were immediately removed to his own hospital on
Crab Island, and furnished with every requisite. His generous and
polite attention to myself, the officers, and men, will ever hereafter
be gratefully remembered." The effects of the victory were immediate
and of the highest importance. Sir George Prevost and his army at
once fled in great haste and confusion back to Canada, leaving our
northern frontier clear for the remainder of the war; while the victory
had a very great effect on the negotiations for peace.
In this battle the crews on both sides behaved with equal bravery,
and left nothing to be desired in this respect; but from their rawness
they of course showed far less skill than the crews of most of the
American and some of the British ocean cruisers, such as the
_Constitution_, _United States_, or _Shannon_, the _Hornet_, _Wasp_,
or _Reindeer_, Lieut. Cassin handled the _Ticonderoga_, and Captain
Pring the _Linnet_, with the utmost gallantry and skill, and, after
Macdonough, they divide the honors of the day. But Macdonough in
this battle won a higher fame than any other commander of the war,
British or American. He had a decidedly superior force to contend
against, the officers and men of the two sides being about on a par
in every respect; and it was solely owing to his foresight and resource
that we won the victory. He forced the British to engage at a
disadvantage by his excellent choice of position; and he prepared
beforehand for every possible contingency. His personal prowess had
already been shown at the cost of the rovers of Tripoli, and in this
action he helped fight the guns as ably as the best sailor. His skill,
seamanship, quick eye, readiness of resource, and indomitable pluck,
are beyond all praise. Down to the time of the Civil War he is the
greatest figure in our naval history. A thoroughly religious man,
he was as generous and humane as he was skilful and brave; one of
the greatest of our sea-captains, he has left a stainless name
behind him.
BRITISH LOSS.
Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks.
Brig, 100 10 Burnt by Lieut. Gregory.
_Magnet_, 187 12 " by her crew.
_Black Snake_, 30 1 Captured.
Gun-boat, 50 2 "
" 50 3 "
_Confiance_, 1,200 37 "
_Linnet_, 350 16 "
_Chubb_, 112 11 "
_Finch_, 110 11 "
_____ ___
9 vessels 2,189 103
AMERICAN LOSS.
Name. Tons. Guns. Remarks.
_Growler_, 81 7 Captured.
Boat, 50 2 "
_Tigress_, 96 1 "
_Scorpion_, 86 2 "
_Ohio_, 94 1 "
_Somers_, 98 2 "
___ __
6 vessels, 505 15