KRITON.
[Side-note: General purpose of the Kriton.]
The dialogue called Kriton is, in one point of view, a second part or
sequel--in another point of view, an antithesis or corrective--of the
Platonic Apology. For that reason, I notice it immediately after the
Apology: though I do not venture to affirm confidently that it was
composed immediately after: it may possibly have been later, as I
believe the Phædon also to have been later.[1]
[Footnote 1: Steinhart affirms with confidence that the Kriton was
composed immediately after the Apology, and shortly after the death of
Sokrates (Einleitung, p. 303). The fact may be so, but I do not feel
thus confident of it when I look to the analogy of the later Phædon.]
[Side-note: Subject of the dialogue--interlocutors.]
The Kriton describes a conversation between Sokrates and his friend
Kriton in the prison, after condemnation, and two days before the cup
of hemlock was administered. Kriton entreats and urges Sokrates (as
the sympathising friends had probably done frequently during the
thirty days of imprisonment) to make his escape from the prison,
informing him that arrangements have already been made for enabling
him to escape with ease and safety, and that money as well as good
recommendations will be provided, so that he may dwell comfortably
either in Thessaly, or wherever else he pleases. Sokrates ought not,
in justice to his children and his friends, to refuse the opportunity
offered, and thus to throw away his life. Should he do so, it will
appear to every one as if his friends had shamefully failed in their
duty, when intervention on their part might easily have saved him. He
might have avoided the trial altogether: even when on trial, he might
easily have escaped the capital sentence. Here is now a third
opportunity of rescue, which if he declines, it will turn this grave
and painful affair into mockery, as if he and his friends were
impotent simpletons.[2] Besides the mournful character of the event,
Sokrates and his friends will thus be disgraced in the opinion of
every one.
[Footnote 2: Plato, Krito. c. 5, p. 45 E. [Greek: ô(s e)/gôge kai\
u(pe\r sou= kai\ u(pe\r ê(mô=n tô=n sô=n e)pitêdei/ôn ai)schu/nomai,
mê\ do/xê| a(/pan to\ pra=gma to\ peri\ se\ a)nandri/a| tini\ tê=|
ê(mete/ra| pepra=chthai, kai\ ê( ei)/sodos tê=s di/kês ei)s to\
dikastê/rion, ô(s ei)sê=lthes, e)xo\n mê\ ei)selthei=n, kai\ au)to\s
o( a)gô\n tê=s di/kês ô(s e)ge/neto, kai\ to\ teleutai=on dê\ touti/,
ô(/sper katage/lôs tê=s pra/xeôs, kaki/a| tini\ kai\ a)nandri/a| tê=|
ê(mete/ra| diapepheuge/nai ê(ma=s dokei=n, oi(tine/s se ou)chi\
e)sô/samen ou)de\ su\ sauto/n, oi(=o/n te o)\n kai\ dunato/n, ei)/ ti
kai\ smikro\n ê(mô=n o)/phelos ê)=n].
This is a remarkable passage, as evincing both the trial and the death
of Sokrates, even in the opinion of his own friends, might have been
avoided without anything which they conceived dishonourable to his
character.
Professor Köchly puts this point very forcibly in his _Vortrag_,
referred to in my notes on the Platonic Apology, p. 410 seq.]
[Side-note: Answer of Sokrates to the appeal made by Kriton.]
"Disgraced in the opinion of every one," replies Sokrates? That is not
the proper test by which the propriety of your recommendation must be
determined. I am now, as I always have been, prepared to follow
nothing but that voice of reason which approves itself to me in
discussion as the best and soundest.[3] We have often discussed this
matter before, and the conclusions on which we agreed are not to be
thrown aside because of my impending death. We agreed that the
opinions general among men ought not to be followed in all cases, but
only in some: that the good opinions, those of the wise men, were to
be followed--the bad opinions, those of the foolish men, to be
disregarded. In the treatment and exercise of the body, we must not
attend to the praise, the blame, or the opinion of every man, but only
to those of the one professional trainer or physician. If we disregard
this one skilful man, and conduct ourselves according to the praise or
blame of the unskilful public, our body will become corrupted and
disabled, so that life itself will not be worth having.
[Footnote 3: Plato, Krito. c. 6, p. 46 B. [Greek: ô(s e)gô\ ou) mo/non
nu=n a)lla\ kai\ a)ei\ toiou=tos, oi(=os tô=n e)mô=n mêdeni\ a)/llô|
pei/thesthai ê)\ tô=| lo/gô|, o(\s a)/n moi logizome/nô| be/ltistos
phai/nêtai.]]
[Side-note: He declares that the judgment of the general public is not
worthy of trust: he appeals to the judgment of the one Expert, who is
wise on the matter in debate.]
In like manner, on the question what is just and unjust, honourable or
base, good or evil, to which our present subject belongs--we must not
yield to the praise and censure of the many, but only to that of the
one, whoever he may be, who is wise on these matters.[4] We must be
afraid and ashamed of him more than of all the rest. Not the verdict
of the many, but that of the one man skilful about just and unjust,
and that of truth itself, must be listened to. Otherwise we shall
suffer the like debasement and corruption of mind as of body in the
former case. Life will become yet more worthless. True--the many may
put us to death. But what we ought to care for most, is, not simply to
live, but to live well, justly, honourably.[5]
[Footnote 4: Plato, Krito. c. 7, p. 47 C-D. [Greek: kai\ dê\ kai\
peri\ tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, kai\ ai)schrô=n kai\ kalô=n, kai\
a)gathô=n kai\ kakô=n, peri\ ô(=n nu=n ê( boulê\ ê(mi=n e)stin,
po/teron tê=| tô=n pollô=n do/xê| dei= ê(ma=s e(/pesthai kai\
phobei=sthai au)tê/n, ê)\ tê=| tou= e(no/s, ei)/ ti/s e)stin
e)pai+/ôn, o(\n dei= kai\ ai)schu/nesthai kai\ phobei=sthai ma=llon
ê)\ xu/mpantas tou\s a)/llous?]
c. 8, p. 48 A. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra pa/nu ê(mi=n ou(/tô phrontiste/on
o(/, ti e)rou=sin oi( polloi\ ê(ma=s, a)ll' o(\, ti o( e)pai+/ôn peri\
tô=n dikai/ôn kai\ a)di/kôn, o( ei)=s, kai\ au)tê\ ê( a)lê/theia.]]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Krito. c. 7-8, pp. 47-48.]
Sokrates thus proceeds:--
The point to be decided, therefore, with reference to your
proposition, Kriton, is, not what will be generally said if I decline,
but whether it will be just or unjust--right or wrong--if I comply;
that is, if I consent to escape from prison against the will of the
Athenians and against the sentence of law.
[Side-note: Principles laid down by Sokrates for determining the
question with Kriton. Is the proceeding recommended just or unjust?
Never in any case to act unjustly.]
To decide the point, I assume this principle, which we have
often before agreed upon in our reasonings, and which must stand
unshaken now.[6]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Krito. c. 9, p. 48 E. [Greek: o(/ra de\ dê\ _tê=s
ske/pseôs tê\n a)rchê/n_], &c.]
We ought not in any case whatever to act wrong or unjustly. To act so
is in every case both bad for the agent and dishonourable to the
agent, whatever may be its consequences. Even though others act wrong
to us, we ought not to act wrong to them in return. Even though others
do evil to us, we ought not to do evil to them in return.[7]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Krito. c. 10, p. 49 B. [Greek: Ou)de\
a)dikou/menon a)/ra a)ntadikei=n, _ô(s oi( polloi\ oi)/ontai_,
e)peidê/ ge ou)damô=s dei = a)dikei=n], &c.]
[Side-note: Sokrates admits that few will agree with him, and that
most persons hold the opposite opinion: but he affirms that the point
is cardinal.]
This is the principle which I assume as true, though I know that very
few persons hold it, or ever will hold it. Most men say the contrary--that
when other persons do wrong or harm to us, we may do wrong or
harm to them in return. This is a cardinal point. Between those who
affirm it, and those who deny it, there can be no common measure or
reasoning. Reciprocal contempt is the sentiment with which, by
necessity, each contemplates the other's resolutions.[8]
[Footnote 8: Plato. Krito. c. 10, p. 49 D. [Greek: Oi)=da ga\r o(/ti
o)li/gois tisi\ tau=ta kai\ dokei= kai\ do/xei; O(=is ou)=n ou(/tô
de/doktai kai\ oi(=s mê/, _tou/tois ou)k e)/sti koinê\ boulê/, a)ll'
a)na/gkê tou/tous a)llê/lôn kataphronei=n, o(rôntas ta\ a)llê/lôn
bouleu/mata_. Sko/pei dê\ ou)=n kai\ su\ eu)= ma/la, po/teron
koinônei=s kai\ xundokei= soi; kai\ _a)rchô/metha e)nteu=then
bouleuo/menoi_, ô(s ou)de/pote o)rthô=s e)/chontos ou)/te tou=
a)dikei=n ou)/te tou= a)ntadikei=n, ou)/te kakô=s pa/schonta
a)mu/nesthai a)ntidrô=nta kakô=s].
Compare the opposite impulse, to revenge yourself upon your country
from which you believe yourself to have received wrong, set forth in
the speech of Alkibiades at Sparta after he had been exiled by the
Athenians. Thucyd. vi. 92. [Greek: to/ te philo/poli ou)k e)n ô(=|
a)dikou=mai e)/chô, a)ll' e)n ô(=| a)sphalô=s e)politeu/thên.]]
[Side-note: Pleading supposed to be addressed by the Laws of Athens to
Sokrates, demanding from him implicit obedience.]
Sokrates then delivers a well-known and eloquent pleading, wherein he
imagines the Laws of Athens to remonstrate with him on his purpose of
secretly quitting the prison, in order to evade a sentence legally
pronounced. By his birth, and long residence in Athens, he has entered
into a covenant to obey exactly and faithfully what the laws
prescribe. Though the laws should deal unjustly with him, he has no
right of redress against them--neither by open disobedience, nor
force, nor evasion. Their rights over him are even more uncontrolled
and indefeasible than those of his father and mother. The laws allow
to every citizen full liberty of trying to persuade the assembled
public: but the citizen who fails in persuading, must obey the public
when they enact a law adverse to his views. Sokrates having been
distinguished beyond all others for the constancy of his residence at
Athens, has thus shown that he was well satisfied with the city, and
with those laws without which it could not exist as a city. If he now
violates his covenants and his duty, by breaking prison like a runaway
slave, he will forfeit all the reputation to which he has pretended
during his long life, as a preacher of justice and virtue.[9]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Krito. c. 11-17, pp. 50-54.]
[Side-note: Purpose of Plato in this pleading--to present the
dispositions of Sokrates in a light different from that which the
Apology had presented--unqualified submission instead of defiance.]
This striking discourse, the general drift of which I have briefly
described, appears intended by Plato--as far as I can pretend to guess
at his purpose--to set forth the personal character and dispositions
of Sokrates in a light different from that which they present in the
Apology. In defending himself before the Dikasts, Sokrates had exalted
himself into a position which would undoubtedly be construed by his
auditors as disobedience and defiance to the city and its
institutions. He professed to be acting under a divine mission, which
was of higher authority than the enactments of his countrymen: he
warned them against condemning him, because his condemnation would be
a mischief, not to him, but to them and because by doing so they would
repudiate and maltreat the missionary sent to them by the Delphian God
as a valuable present.[10] In the judgment of the Athenian Dikasts,
Sokrates by using such language had put himself above the laws; thus
confirming the charge which his accusers advanced, and which they
justified by some of his public remarks. He had manifested by
unmistakable language the same contempt for the Athenian constitution
as that which had been displayed in act by Kritias and Alkibiades,[11]
with whom his own name was associated as teacher and companion.[12]
Xenophon in his Memorabilia recognises this impression as prevalent
among his countrymen against Sokrates, and provides what he thinks a
suitable answer to it. Plato also has his way of answering it; and
such I imagine to be the dramatic purpose of the Kriton.
[Footnote 10: Plato, Apol. c. 17-18, p. 29-30.]
[Footnote 11: This was among the charges urged against Sokrates by
Anytus and the other accusers (Xen. Mem. i. 2, 9. [Greek: u(perora=|n
e)poi/ei tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn tou\s suno/ntas]). It was also the
judgment formed respecting Sokrates by the Roman censor, the elder
Cato; a man very much like the Athenian Anytus, constitutional and
patriotic as a citizen, devoted to the active duties of political
life, but thoroughly averse to philosophy and speculative debate, as
Anytus is depicted in the Menon of Plato.--Plutarch, Cato c. 23, a
passage already cited in a note on the chapter next but one preceding.
The accusation of "putting himself above the laws," appears in the
same way in the Nubes of Aristophanes, 1035-1400, &c.:--
[Greek: ô(s ê(du\ kainoi=s pra/gmasin kai\ dexioi=s o(milei=n
kai\ tô=n kathestô/tôn no/môn u(per phronei=n du/nasthai].
Compare the rhetor Aristeides--[Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], p. 133;
vol. iii. p. 480, Dindorf.]
[Footnote 12: The dramatic position of Sokrates has been compared by
Köchly, p. 382, very suitably with that of Antigoné, who, in burying
her deceased brother, acts upon her own sense of right and family
affections, in defiance of an express interdict from sovereign
authority. This tragical conflict of obligations, indicated by
Aristotle as an ethical question suited for dialectic debate (Topic.
i. p. 105, b. 22), was handled by all the three great tragedians; and
has been ennobled by Sophokles in one of his best remaining tragedies.
The Platonic Apology presents many points of analogy with the
Antigoné, while the Platonic Kriton carries us into an opposite vein
of sentiment. Sokrates after sentence, and Antigoné after sentence,
are totally different persons. The young maiden, though adhering with
unshaken conviction to the rectitude of her past disobedience, cannot
submit to the sentence of death without complaint and protestation.
Though above all fear she is clamorous in remonstrances against both
the injustice of the sentence and the untimely close of her career: so
that she is obliged to be dragged away by the officers (Soph. Antig.
870-877; compare 497-508, with Plato, Krito. p. 49 C; Apolog. p. 28 D,
29 C). All these points enhance the interest of the piece, and are
suited to a destined bride in the flower of her age. But an old
philosopher of seventy years of age has no such attachment to life
remaining. He contemplates death with the eye of calm reason: he has
not only silenced "the child within us who fears death" (to use the
remarkable phrase of Plato, Phædon, p. 77 E), but he knows well that
what remains to him of life must be short; that it will probably be of
little value, with diminished powers, mental as well as bodily; and
that if passed in exile, it will be of no value at all. To close his
life with dignity is the best thing which can happen to him. While by
escape from the prison he would have gained little or nothing; he is
enabled, by refusing the means of escape, to manifest an ostentatious
deference to the law, and to make peace with the Athenian authorities
after the opposition which had been declared in his Apology. Both in
the Kriton and in the Phædon, Sokrates exhibits the specimen of a man
adhering to previous conviction, unaffected by impending death, and by
the apprehensions which that season brings upon ordinary minds;
estimating all things then as before, with the same tranquil and
independent reason.]
[Side-note: Harangue of Sokrates delivered in the name of the Laws,
would have been applauded by all the democratical patriots of Athens.]
This dialogue puts into the mouth of Sokrates a rhetorical harangue
forcible and impressive, which he supposes himself to hear from
personified Nomos or Athens, claiming for herself and her laws plenary
and unmeasured obedience from all her citizens, as a covenant due to
her from each. He declares his own heartfelt adhesion to the claim.
Sokrates is thus made to express the feelings and repeat the language
of a devoted democratical patriot. His doctrine is one which every
Athenian audience would warmly applaud--whether heard from speakers in
the assembly, from litigants in the Dikastery, or from dramatists in
the theatre. It is a doctrine which orators of all varieties
(Perikles, Nikias, Kleon, Lysis, Isokrates, Demosthenes, Æschines,
Lykurgus) would be alike emphatic in upholding: upon which probably
Sophists habitually displayed their own eloquence, and tested the
talents of their pupils. It may be considered as almost an Athenian
common-place. Hence it is all the better fitted for Plato's purpose of
restoring Sokrates to harmony with his fellow-citizens. It serves as
his protestation of allegiance to Athens, in reply to the adverse
impressions prevalent against him. The only singularity which bestows
special pertinence on that which is in substance a discourse of
venerated common-place, is--that Sokrates proclaims and applies his
doctrine of absolute submission, under the precise circumstances in
which many others, generally patriotic, might be disposed to recede
from it--where he is condemned (unjustly, in his own persuasion) to
suffer death--yet has the opportunity to escape. He is thus presented
as a citizen not merely of ordinary loyalty but of extraordinary
patriotism. Moreover his remarkable constancy of residence at Athens
is produced as evidence, showing that the city was eminently
acceptable to him, and that he had no cause of complaint against
it.[13]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Krito. c. 14, p. 52 B. [Greek: ou) ga\r a)/n pote
tô=n a)/llôn A)thênai/ôn a(pa/ntôn diaphero/ntôs e)n au)tê=|
e)pedê/meis, ei) mê/ soi diaphero/ntôs ê)/reske;] c. 12, p. 50 D.
[Greek: phe/re ga/r, ti/ e)gkalô=n ê(li=n te kai\ tê=| po/lei
e)picheirei=s ê(ma=s a)pollu/nai?]]
[Side-note: The harangue insists upon topics common to Sokrates with
other citizens, overlooking the specialties of his character.]
Throughout all this eloquent appeal addressed by Athens to her citizen
Sokrates, the points insisted on are those common to him with other
citizens: the marked specialties of his character being left
unnoticed. Such are the points suitable to the purpose (rather
Xenophontic than Platonic, herein) of the Kriton; when Sokrates is to
be brought back within the pale of democratical citizenship, and
exculpated from the charge of incivism. But when we read the language
of Sokrates both in the Apology and in the Gorgias, we find a very
different picture given of the relations between him and Athens. We
find him there presented as an isolated and eccentric individual, a
dissenter, not only departing altogether from the character and
purposes general among his fellow-citizens, but also certain to incur
dangerous antipathy, in so far as he publicly proclaimed what he was.
The Kriton takes him up as having become a victim to such antipathy:
yet as reconciling himself with the laws by voluntarily accepting the
sentence; and as persuaded to do so, moreover, by a piece of rhetoric
imbued with the most genuine spirit of constitutional democracy. It is
the compromise of his long-standing dissent with the reigning
orthodoxy, just before his death. [Greek: E)n eu)phêmi/a| chrê\
teleuta=|n].[14]
[Footnote 14: Plato, Phædon, p. 117 D.]
[Side-note: Still Sokrates is represented as adopting the resolution
to obey, from his own conviction; by a reason which weighs with him,
but which would not weigh with others.]
Still, however, though adopting the democratical vein of sentiment for
this purpose, Sokrates is made to adopt it on a ground peculiar to
himself. His individuality is thus upheld. He holds the sentence
pronounced against him to have been unjust, but he renounces all use
of that plea, because the sentence has been legally pronounced by the
judicial authority of the city, and because he has entered into a
covenant with the city. He entertains the firm conviction that no one
ought to act unjustly, or to do evil to others, in any case; not even
in the case in which they have done injustice or evil to him. "This
(says Sokrates) is my conviction, and the principle of my reasoning.
Few persons do accept it, or ever will: yet between those who do
accept it, and those who do not--there can be no common counsel: by
necessity of the case, each looks upon the other, and upon the
reasonings of the other, with contempt."[15]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.]
[Side-note: The harangue is not a corollary from this Sokratic reason,
but represents feelings common among Athenian citizens.]
This general doctrine, peculiar to Sokrates, is decisive _per se_, in
its application to the actual case, and might have been made to
conclude the dialogue. But Sokrates introduces it as a foundation to
the arguments urged by the personified Athenian Nomos:--which,
however, are not corollaries from it, nor at all peculiar to Sokrates,
but represent sentiments held by the Athenian democrats more cordially
than they were by Sokrates. It is thus that the dialogue Kriton
embodies, and tries to reconcile, both the two distinct
elements--constitutional allegiance, and Sokratic individuality.
[Side-note: Emphatic declaration of the authority of individual reason
and conscience, for the individual himself.]
Apart from the express purpose of this dialogue, however, the general
doctrine here proclaimed by Sokrates deserves attention, in regard to
the other Platonic dialogues which we shall soon review. The doctrine
involves an emphatic declaration of the paramount authority of
individual reason and conscience; for the individual himself--but for
him alone. "This (says Sokrates) is, and has long been _my_
conviction. It is the basis of the whole reasoning. Look well whether
you agree to it: for few persons do agree to it, or ever will: and
between those who do and those who do not, there can be no common
deliberation: they must of necessity despise each other."[16] Here we
have the Protagorean dogma, _Homo Mensura_--which Sokrates will be
found combating in the Theætêtus--proclaimed by Sokrates himself. As
things appear to me, so they are to me: as they appear to you, so they
are to you. My reason and conscience is the measure for me: yours for
you. It is for you to see whether yours agrees with mine.
[Footnote 16: Plato, Kriton c. 10, p. 49 D.; see p. 428, note i.]
I shall revert to this doctrine in handling other Platonic dialogues,
particularly the Theætêtus.
[Side-note: The Kriton is rhetorical, not dialectical. Difference
between Rhetoric and Dialectic.]
I have already observed that the tone of the Kriton is rhetorical, not
dialectical--especially the harangue ascribed to Athens. The business
of the rhetorician is to plant and establish some given point of
persuasion, whether as to a general resolution or a particular fact,
in the bosoms of certain auditors before him: hence he gives
prominence and emphasis to some views of the question, suppressing or
discrediting others, and especially keeping out of sight all the
difficulties surrounding the conclusion at which he is aiming. On the
other hand, the business of the dialectician is, not to establish any
foreknown conclusion, but to find out which among all supposable
conclusions are untenable, and which is the most tenable or best.
Hence all the difficulties attending every one of them must be brought
fully into view and discussed: until this has been done, the process
is not terminated, nor can we tell whether any assured conclusion is
attainable or not.
Now Plato, in some of his dialogues, especially the Gorgias, greatly
depreciates rhetoric and its purpose of persuasion: elsewhere he
employs it himself with ability and effect. The discourse which we
read in the Kriton is one of his best specimens: appealing to
pre-established and widespread emotions, veneration for parents, love of
country, respect for covenants--to justify the resolution of Sokrates
in the actual case: working up these sentiments into fervour, but
neglecting all difficulties, limits, and counter-considerations:
assuming that the familiar phrases of ethics and politics are
perfectly understood and indisputable.
[Side-note: The Kriton makes powerful appeal to the emotions, but
overlooks the ratiocinative difficulties, or supposes them to be
solved.]
But these last-mentioned elements--difficulties, qualifications,
necessity for definitions even of the most hackneyed words--would have
been brought into the foreground had Sokrates pursued the dialectical
path, which (as we know both from Xenophon and Plato) was his real
habit and genius. He was perpetually engaged (says Xenophon[17]) in
dialectic enquiry. "Wheat is the Holy, what is the Unholy? What is the
Honourable and the Base? What is the Just and the Unjust? &c." Now in
the rhetorical appeal embodied in the Kriton, the important question,
What is the Just and the Unjust (_i.e._ Justice and Injustice in
general), is assumed to be already determined and out of the reach of
dispute. We are called upon to determine what is just and unjust in a
particular case, as if we already knew what justice and injustice
meant generally: to inquire about modifications of justice, before we
have ascertained its essence. This is the fundamental assumption
involved in the rhetorical process; which assumption we shall find
Plato often deprecating as unphilosophical and preposterous.
[Footnote 17: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 16. [Greek: Au)to\s de\ peri\ tô=n
a)nthrôpei/ôn a)ei\ diele/geto, skopô=n, ti/ eu)sebe/s, ti/ a)sebe/s;
ti/ kalo/n, ti/ ai)schro/n; ti/ di/kaion, ti/ a)/dikon; ti/
sôphrosu/nê, ti/ mani/a; ti/ a)ndrei/a, ti/ deili/a; ti/ po/lis, ti/
politiko/s; ti/ a)rchê\ a)nthrô/pôn, ti/ a)rchiko\s a)nthrô/pôn], &c.
We see in Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 40-46, iv. 2, 37, in the Platonic
dialogue Minos and elsewhere, the number of dialectic questions which
Sokrates might have brought to bear upon the harangue in the Kriton,
had it been delivered by any opponent whom he sought to perplex or
confute. What is a law? what are the limits of obedience to the laws?
Are there no limits (as Hobbes is so much denounced for maintaining)?
While the oligarchy of Thirty were the constituted authority at
Athens, they ordered Sokrates himself, together with four other
citizens, to go and arrest a citizen whom they considered dangerous to
the state, the Salaminian Leon. The other four obeyed the order;
Sokrates alone disobeyed, and takes credit for having done so,
considering Leon to be innocent. Which was in the right here? the four
obedient citizens, or the one disobedient? Might not the four have
used substantially the same arguments to justify their obedience, as
those which Sokrates hears from personified Athens in the Kriton? We
must remember that the Thirty had come into authority by resolutions
passed under constitutional forms, when fear of foreign enemies
induced the people to sanction the resolutions proposed by a party
among themselves. The Thirty also ordered Sokrates to abstain from
discourse with young men; he disobeyed (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 3). Was
he right in disobeying?
I have indicated briefly these questions, to show how completely the
rhetorical manner of the Kriton submerges all those difficulties,
which would form the special matter of genuine Sokratic dialectics.
Schleiermacher (Einleit. zum Kriton, pp. 233, 234) considers the
Kriton as a composition of special occasion--Gelegenheitsschrift--which
I think is true; but which may be said also, in my judgment, of
every Platonic dialogue. The term, however, in Schleiermacher's
writing, has a peculiar meaning, viz. a composition for which there is
no place in the regular rank and file of the Platonic dialogues, as he
marshals them. He remarks the absence of dialectic in the Kriton, and
he adduces this as one reason for supposing it not to be genuine.
But it is no surprise to me to find Plato rhetorical in one dialogue,
dialectical in others. Variety, and want of system, seem to me among
his most manifest attributes.
The view taken of the Kriton by Steinhart (Einleit. pp. 291-302), in
the first page of his very rhetorical Introduction, coincides pretty
much with mine.]
So far indeed Sokrates goes in this dialogue, to affirm a positive
analogy. That Just and Honourable are, to the mind, what health and
strength are to the body:--Unjust and Base, what distemper and
weakness are to the body. And he follows this up by saying, that the
general public are incompetent to determine what is just or
honourable--as they are incompetent to decide what is wholesome or
unwholesome. Respecting both one and the other, you must consult some
one among the professional Experts, who alone are competent to
advise.[18]
[Footnote 18: Plato, Kriton, c. 7, p. 47 D. [Greek: tou= e(no\s, ei)/
ti/s e)stin e)pai+/ôn], &c.]
[Side-note: Incompetence of the general public or
[Greek: i)diô=tai]--appeal to the professional Expert.]
Both these two doctrines will be found recurring often, in our survey
of the dialogues. The first of the two is an obscure and imperfect
reply to the great Sokratic problem--What is Justice? What is
Injustice? but it is an analogy useful to keep in mind, as a help to
the exposition of many passages in which Plato is yet more obscure.
The second of the two will also recur frequently. It sets out an
antithesis of great moment in the Platonic dialogues--"The one
specially instructed, professional, theorizing, Expert--_versus_ (the
[Greek: i)diô=tai] of the time and place, or) common sense, common
sentiment, intuition, instinct, prejudice," &c. (all these names
meaning the same objective reality, but diversified according as the
speaker may happen to regard the particular case to which he is
alluding). This antithesis appears as an answer when we put the
question--What is the ultimate authority? where does the right of
final decision reside, on problems and disputes ethical, political,
æsthetical? It resides (Sokrates here answers) with some one among a
few professional Experts. They are the only persons competent.
[Side-note: Procedure of Sokrates after this comparison has been
declared--he does not name who the trustworthy Expert is.]
I shall go more fully into this question elsewhere. Here I shall
merely notice the application which Sokrates makes (in the Kriton) of
the general doctrine. We might anticipate that after having declared
that none was fit to pronounce upon the Just and the Unjust, except a
professional Expert,--he would have proceeded to name some person
corresponding to that designation--to justify the title of that person
to confidence by such evidences as Plato requires in other dialogues--and
then to cite the decision of the judge named, on the case in hand.
This is what Sokrates would have done, if the case had been one of
health or sickness. He would have said "I appeal to Hippokrates,
Akumenus, &c., as professional Experts on medicine: they have given
proof of competence by special study, successful practice, writing,
teaching, &c.: they pronounce so and so". He would not have considered
himself competent to form a judgment or announce a decision of his
own.
[Side-note: Sokrates acts as the Expert himself: he finds authority in
his own reason and conscience.]
But here, when the case in hand is that of Just and Unjust, the
conduct of Sokrates is altogether different. He specifies no
professional Expert, and he proceeds to lay down a dogma of his own;
in which he tells us that few or none will agree, though it is
fundamental, so that dissenters on the point must despise each other
as heretics. We thus see that it is he alone who steps in to act
himself the part of professional Expert, though he does not openly
assume the title. The ultimate authority is proclaimed in words to
reside with some unnamed Expert: in fact and reality, he finds it in
his own reason and conscience. You are not competent to judge for
yourself: you must consult the professional Expert: but your own
reason and conscience must signify to you who the Expert is.
The analogy here produced by Plato of questions about health and
sickness--is followed out only in its negative operation; as it serves
to scare away the multitude, and discredit the Vox Populi. But when
this has been done, no oracular man can be produced or authenticated.
In other dialogues, we shall find Sokrates regretting the absence of
such an oracular man, but professing inability to proceed without him.
In the Kriton, he undertakes the duty himself; unmindful of the many
emphatic speeches in which he had proclaimed his own ignorance, and
taken credit for confessing it without reserve.