EUTHYPHRON.
The dialogue called Euthyphron, over and above its contribution to the
ethical enquiries of Plato, has a certain bearing on the character and
exculpation of Sokrates. It will therefore come conveniently in
immediate sequel to the Apology and the Kriton.
[Side-note: Situation supposed in the dialogue--interlocutors.]
The indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates is assumed to have been
formally entered in the office of the King Archon. Sokrates has come
to plead to it. In the portico before that office, he meets
Euthyphron: a man of ultra-pious pretensions, possessing special
religious knowledge (either from revelation directly to himself, or
from having been initiated in the various mysteries consecrated
throughout Greece), delivering authoritative opinions on doubtful
theological points, and prophesying future events.[1]
[Footnote 1: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 2, p. 3 D; compare Herodot. ii. 51.]
What brings you here, Sokrates (asks Euthyphron), away from your usual
haunts? Is it possible that any one can have preferred an indictment
against you?
[Side-note: Indictment by Melêtus against Sokrates--Antipathy of the
Athenians towards those who spread heretical opinions.]
Yes (replies Sokrates), a young man named Melêtus. He takes
commendable interest in the training of youth, and has indicted me as
a corruptor of youth. He says that I corrupt them by teaching belief
in new gods, and unbelief in the true and ancient Gods.
_Euthyph._--I understand: it is because you talk about the Dæmon or
Genius often communicating with you, that Melêtus calls you an
innovator in religion. He knows that such calumnies find ready
admission with most minds.[2] So also, people laugh at me, when I talk
about religion, and when I predict future events in the assembly. It
must be from jealousy; because all that I have predicted has come
true.
[Footnote 2: Plato, Euthyph. c. 2, p. 3 B: [Greek: phêsi\ ga/r me
poiêtê\n ei)=nai theô=n kai\ ô(s kainou\s poiou=nta theou/s, tou\s d'
a)rchai/ous ou) nomi/zonta, e)gra/psato tou/tôn au)tô=n e(/neka, ô(/s
phêsin]. c. 5, p. 5 A: [Greek: au)toschedia/zonta kai\ kainotomou=nta
peri\ tô=n thei/ôn e)xamarta/nein].]
_Sokr._--To be laughed at is no great matter. The Athenians do not
care much when they regard a man as overwise, but as not given to
teach his wisdom to others: but when they regard him besides, as
likely to make others such as he is himself, they become seriously
angry with him--be it from jealousy, as you say, or from any other
cause. You keep yourself apart, and teach no one; for my part, I
delight in nothing so much as in teaching all that I know. If they
take the matter thus seriously, the result may be very doubtful.[3]
[Footnote 3: Plato, Euthyphr. c. 3, p. 3 C.-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois
ga\r ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)/n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\
me/ntoi didaskaliko\n tê=s au)tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\
a)/llous oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n
phtho/nô|, ô(s su\ le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]]
[Side-note: Euthyphron recounts that he is prosecuting an indictment
for murder against his own father--Displeasure of his friends at the
proceeding.]
Sokrates now learns what is Euthyphron's business at the archontic
office. Euthyphron is prosecuting an indictment before the King
Archon, against his own father; as having caused the death of a
dependent workman, who in a fit of intoxication had quarrelled with
and killed a fellow-servant. The father of Euthyphron, upon this
occurrence, bound the homicide hand and foot, and threw him into a
ditch: at the same time sending to the Exêgêtês (the canonical
adviser, supposed to be conversant with the divine sanctions, whom it
was customary to consult when doubts arose about sacred things) to ask
what was to be done with him. The incident occurred at Naxos, and the
messenger was sent to the Exêgêtês at Athens: before he could return,
the prisoner had perished, from hunger, cold, and bonds. Euthyphron
has indicted his father for homicide, as having caused the death of
the prisoner: who (it would appear) had remained in the ditch, tied
hand and foot, without food, and with no more than his ordinary
clothing, during the time occupied in the voyage from Naxos to Athens,
in obtaining the answer of the Exêgêtês, and in returning to Naxos.
My friends and relatives (says Euthyphron) cry out against me for this
proceeding, as if I were mad. They say that my father did not kill the
man:[4] that even if he had, the man had committed murder: lastly,
that however the case may have been, to indict my own father is
monstrous and inexcusable. Such reasoning is silly. The only point to
be considered is, whether my father killed the deceased justly or
unjustly. If justly there is nothing to be said; if unjustly, then my
father becomes a man tainted with impiety and accursed. I and every
one else, who, knowing the facts, live under the same roof and at the
same table with him, come under the like curse; unless I purify myself
by bringing him to justice. The course which I am now taking is
prescribed by piety or holiness. My friends indeed tell me that it is
unholy for a son to indict his father. But I know better than they,
what holiness is and I should be ashamed of myself if I did not.[5]
[Footnote 4: According to the Attic law every citizen was bound, in
case any one of his relatives ([Greek: me/chris a)nepsiadô=n]) or any
member of his household ([Greek: oi)ke/tês]) had been put to death, to
come forward as prosecutor and indict the murderer. This was binding
upon the citizen alike in law and in religion.
Demosthen. cont. Euerg. et Mnesibul. p. 1161. Jul. Pollux, viii. 118.
Euthyphron would thus have been considered as acting with propriety,
if the person indicted had been a stranger.]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 4. Respecting the [Greek:
mi/asma], which a person who had committed criminal homicide was
supposed to carry about with him wherever he went, communicating it
both to places and to companions, see Antiphon. Tetralog. i. 2, 5, 10;
iii. s. 7, p. 116; and De Herodis Cæde s. 81, p. 139. The argument
here employed by Euthyphron is used also by the Platonic Sokrates in
the Gorgias, 480 C-D. If a man has committed injustice, punishment is
the only way of curing him. That he should escape unpunished is the
worst thing that can happen to him. If you yourself, or your father,
or your friend, have committed injustice, do not seek to avert the
punishment either from yourself or them, but rather invoke it. This is
exactly what Euthyphron is doing, and what the Platonic Sokrates (in
dialogue Euthyphron) calls in question.]
[Side-note: Euthyphron expresses full confidence that this step of his
is both required and warranted by piety or holiness. Sokrates asks
him--What is Holiness?]
I confess myself (says Sokrates) ignorant respecting the question,[6]
and I shall be grateful if you will teach me: the rather as I shall be
able to defend myself better against Melêtus. Tell me what is the
general constituent feature of _Holiness_? What is that common
essence, or same character, which belongs to and distinguishes all
holy or pious acts?[7]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: ti/ ga\r kai\
phê/somen, oi(/ ge kai\ au)toi\ o(mologou=men peri\ au)tô=n mêde\n
ei)de/nai?]]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 D. Among the various
reasons (none of them valid in my judgment) given by Ueberweg
(Untersuch. p. 251) for suspecting the authenticity of the Euthyphron,
one is that [Greek: to\ a)no/sion] is reckoned as an [Greek: ei)=dos]
as well as [Greek: to\ o(/sion]. Ueberweg seems to think this absurd,
since he annexes to the word a note of admiration. But Plato expressly
gives [Greek: to\ a)/dikon] as an [Greek: ei)=dos], along with [Greek:
to\ di/kaion] (Repub. v. 476 A); and one of the objections taken
against his theory by Aristotle was, that it would assume substantive
Ideas corresponding to negative terms--[Greek: tô=n a)popha/seôn
i)de/as]. See Aristot. Metaphys. A. 990, b. 13, with the Scholion of
Alexander, p. 565, a. 81, r.]
[Side-note: Euthyphron alludes to the punishment of Uranus by his son
Kronus and of Kronus by his son Zeus.]
It is holy (replies Euthyphron) to do what I am now doing: to bring to
justice the man who commits impiety, either by homicide or sacrilege
or any other such crime, whoever he be--even though it be your own
father. The examples of the Gods teach us this. Kronus punished his
father Uranus for wrong-doing: Zeus, whom every one holds to be the
best and justest of the Gods, did the like by _his_ father Kronus. I
only follow their example. Those who blame my conduct contradict
themselves when they talk about the Gods and about me.[8]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5-6.
We see here that Euthyphron is made to follow out the precept
delivered by the Platonic Sokrates in the Theætêtus and elsewhere--to
make himself as like to the Gods as possible--([Greek: o(moi/ôsis
theô=| kata\ to\ dunato/n]. Theætêt. p. 176 B; compare Phædrus, 252
C)--only that he conceives the attributes and proceedings of the Gods
differently from Sokrates.]
[Side-note: Sokrates intimates his own hesitation in believing these
stories of discord among the Gods. Euthyphron declares his full belief
in them, as well as in many similar narratives, not in so much
circulation.]
Do you really confidently believe these stories (asks Sokrates), as
well as many others about the discord and conflicts among the Gods,
which are circulated among the public by poets and painters? For my
part, I have some repugnance in believing them;[9] it is for reason
probably, I am now to be indicted, and proclaimed as doing wrong. If
you tell me that you are persuaded of their truth, I must bow to your
superior knowledge. I cannot help doing so, since for my part I
pretend to no knowledge whatever about them.
[Footnote 9: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 A. [Greek: A)ra/ ge tou=t'
e)/stin, ou)= e(/neka tê\n graphê\n pheu/gô, o(/ti ta\ toiau=ta
e)peida/n tis peri\ tô=n theô=n le/gê|, duscherô=s pôs a)pode/chomai?
di' a(\ dê\, ô(s e)/oike, phê/sei ti/s me e)xamarta/nein.]]
I am persuaded that these narratives are true (says Euthyphron): and
not only they, but many other narratives yet more surprising, of which
most persons are ignorant. I can tell you some of them, if you like to
hear. You shall tell me another time (replies Sokrates): now let me
repeat my question to you respecting holiness.[10]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 C.]
[Side-note: Bearing of this dialogue on the relative position of
Sokrates and the Athenian public.]
Before we pursue this enquiry respecting holiness, which is the
portion of the dialogue bearing on the Platonic ethics, I will say one
word on the portion which has preceded, and which appears to bear on
the position and character of Sokrates. He (Sokrates) has incurred
odium from the Dikastery and the public, because he is heretical and
incredulous. "He does not believe in those Gods in whom the city
believes, but introduces religious novelties"--to use the words of the
indictment preferred against him by Melêtus. The Athenian public felt
the same displeasure and offence in hearing their divine legends, such
as those of Zeus and Kronus,[11] called in question or criticised in
an ethical spirit different from their own--as is felt by Jews or
Christians when various narratives of the Old Testament are criticised
in an adverse spirit, and when the proceedings ascribed to Jehovah are
represented as unworthy of a just and beneficent god. We read in
Herodotus what was the sentiment of pious contemporaries respecting
narratives of divine matters. Herodotus keeps back many of them by
design, and announces that he will never recite them except in case of
necessity: while in one instance, where he has been betrayed into
criticism upon a few of them, as inconsiderate and incredible, he is
seized with misgivings, and prays that Gods and heroes will not be
offended with him.[12] The freethinkers, among whom Sokrates was
numbered, were the persons from whom adverse criticism came. It is
these men who are depicted by orthodox opponents as committing lawless
acts, and justifying themselves by precedents drawn from the
proceedings or Zeus.[13] They are, besides, especially accused of
teaching children to despise or even to ill-use their parents.[14]
[Footnote 11: I shall say more about Plato's views on the theological
legends generally believed by his countrymen, when I come to the
language which he puts into the mouth of Sokrates in the second and
third books of the Republic. Eusebius considers it matter of praise
when he says "that Plato rejected all the opinions of his country-men
concerning the Gods and exposed their absurdity"--[Greek: o(/pôs te
pa/sas ta\s patri/ous peri\ tô=n theô=n u(polê/pseis ê)the/tei, kai\
tê\n a)topi/an au)tô=n diê/legchen] (Præp. Evan. xiii. 1)--the very
same thing which is averred in the indictment laid by Melêtus against
Sokrates.]
[Footnote 12: Herodot. ii. 65: [Greek: tô=n de\ ei(/neken a)nei=tai
ta\ i(ra\, ei) le/goimi, katabai/ên a)\n tô=| lo/gô| e)s ta\ thei=a
prê/gmata, ta\ e)gô\ pheu/gô ma/lista a)pêgee/sthai. ta\ de\ kai\
ei)/rêka au)tô=n e)pipsau/sas, a)nagkai/ê katalambano/menos ei)=pon
. . . .] 45. [Greek: Le/gousi de\ polla\ kai\ a)/lla a)nepiske/ptôs
oi( E(/llênes; eu)ê/thês de\ au)tô=n kai\ o(/de o( mu=thos e)sti, to\n
peri\ tou= Ê(rakle/os le/gousi . . . . e)/ti de\ e(/na e)o/nta to\n
Ê(rakle/a, kai\ e)/ti a)/nthrôpon, ô(s dê/ phasi, kô=s phu/sin e)/chei
polla\s muria/das phoneu=sai? kai\ peri\ me\n tou/tôn tosau=ta ê(mi=n
ei)pou=si, kai\ para\ tô=n theô=n kai\ para\ tô=n ê(rô/ôn eu)me/neia
ei)/ê.]
About the [Greek: i(roi\ lo/goi] which he keeps back, see cap. 51, 61,
62, 81, 170, &c.]
[Footnote 13: Aristoph. Nubes, 905-1080.]
[Footnote 14: Aristoph. Nubes, 994-1333-1444. Xenophon, Mem. i. 2, 49.
[Greek: Sôkra/tês--tou\s pate/ras propêlaki/zein e)di/daske]
(accusation by Melêtus).]
[Side-note: Dramatic moral set forth by Aristophanes against Sokrates
and the freethinkers, is here retorted by Plato against the orthodox
champion.]
Now in the dialogue here before us, Plato retorts this attack.
Euthyphron possesses in the fullest measure the virtues of a believer.
He believes not only all that orthodox Athenians usually believed
respecting the Gods, but more besides.[15] His faith is so implicit,
that he proclaims it as accurate knowledge, and carries it into
practice with full confidence; reproaching other orthodox persons with
inconsistency and short-coming, and disregarding the judgment of the
multitude, as Sokrates does in the Kriton.[16] Euthyphron stands
forward as the champion of the Gods, determined not to leave
unpunished the man who has committed impiety, let him be who he
may.[17] These lofty religious pretensions impel him, with full
persuasion of right, to indict his own father for homicide, under the
circumstances above described. Now in the eyes of the Athenian public,
there could hardly be any act more abhorrent, than that of a man thus
invoking upon his father the severest penalties of law. It would
probably be not less abhorrent than that of a son beating his own
father. When therefore we read, in the Nubes of Aristophanes, the
dramatic moral set forth against Sokrates, "See the consequences to
which free-thinking and the new system of education lead[18]--the son
Pheidippides beating his own father, and justifying the action as
right, by citing the violence of Zeus towards his father Kronus"--we
may take the Platonic Euthyphron as an antithesis to this moral,
propounded by a defender of Sokrates, "See the consequences to which
consistent orthodoxy and implicit faith conduct. The son Euthyphron
indicts his own father for homicide; he vindicates the step as
conformable to the proceedings of the gods; he even prides himself on
it as championship on their behalf, such as all religious men ought to
approve."[19]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 6 B. [Greek: kai\ e)/ti ge
tou/tôn thaumasiô/tera, a(\ oi( polloi\ ou)k i)/sasin].
Euthyphron belonged to the class described in Euripides, Hippol. 45:--
[Greek: O(/soi men ou)=n grapha/s te tô=n palaite/rôn
E)/choisin, au)toi/ t' ei)si\n e)n mou/sais a)ei/,
I)/sasin], &c.
Compare also Euripid. Herakleidæ, 404.]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 4, p. 5 A; c. 6, p. 6 A.]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 6, p. 5 E. [Greek: mê\
e)pitre/pein tô=| a)sebou=nti mêd' a)\n o(stisou=n tugcha/nê| ô)=n.]]
[Footnote 18: Aristoph. Nubes, 937. [Greek: tê\n kainê\n pai/deusin],
&c.]
[Footnote 19: Schleiermacher (Einleitung zum Euthyphron, vol. ii. pp.
51-54) has many remarks on the Euthyphron in which I do not concur;
but his conception of its "unverkennbare apologetische Absicht" is
very much the same as mine. He describes Euthyphron as a man "der sich
besonders auf das Göttliche zu verstehen vorgab, und die
rechtglaubigen aus den alten theologischen Dichtern gezogenen Begriffe
tapfer vertheidigte. Diesen nun gerade bei der Anklage des Sokrates
mit ihm in Berührung, und durch den unsittlichen Streich, den sein
Eifer für die Frömmigkeit veranlasste, in Gegensatz zu bringen--war
ein des Platon nicht unwürdiger Gedanke" (p. 54). But when
Schleiermacher affirms that the dialogue was indisputably composed
(unstreitig) between the indictment and the trial of Sokrates,--and
when he explains what he considers the defects of the dialogue, by the
necessity of finishing it in a hurry (p. 53), I dissent from him
altogether, though Steinhart adopts the same opinion. Nor can I
perceive in what way the Euthyphron is (as he affirms) either "a
natural out-growth of the Protagoras," or "an approximation and
preparation for the Parmenidês" (p. 52). Still less do I feel the
force of his reasons for hesitating in admitting it to be a genuine
work of Plato.
I have given my reasons, in a preceding chapter, for believing that
Plato composed no dialogues at all during the lifetime of Sokrates.
But that he should publish such a dialogue while the trial of Sokrates
was impending, is a supposition altogether inadmissible, in my
judgment. The effect of it would be to make the position of Sokrates
much worse on his trial. Herein I agree with Ueberweg (Untersuch. p.
250), though I do not share his doubts of the authenticity of the
dialogue.
The confident assertion of Stallbaum surprises me. "Constat enim
Platonem eo tempore, quo Socrati tantum erat odium conflatum, ut ei
judicii immineret periculum, complures dialogos composuisse; in quibus
id egit, ut viri sanctissimi adversarios in eo ipso genere, in quo
sibi plurimum sapere videbantur, inscitiæ et ignorantiæ coargueret.
Nam Euthyphronem novimus, ad vates ignorantiæ rerum gravissimarum
convincendos, esse compositum; ut in quo eos ne pietatis quidem
notionem tenere ostenditur. In Menone autem id agitur, ut sophistas et
viros civiles non scientiâ atque arte, sed coeco quodam impetu mentis
et sorte divinâ duci demonstretur: quod quidem ita fit, ut colloquium
ex parte cum Anyto, Socratis accusatore, habeatur. . . . . . Nam
Menonem quidem et Euthyphronem Plato eo confecit tempore, quo Socratis
causa haud ita pridem in judicio versabatur, nec tamen jam tanta ei
videbatur imminere calamitas, quanta postea consecuta est. Ex quo sané
verisimiliter colligere licet Ionem, cujus simile argumentum et
consilium est, circa idem tempus literis consignatum esse." Stallbaum,
Prolegom. ad Platonis Ionem, pp. 288-289, vol. iv. [Comp. Stallb.
ibid., 2nd ed. pp. 339-341].
"Imo uno exemplo Euthyphronis, boni quidem hominis ideoque ne Socrati
quidem inimici, sed ejusdem _superstitiosi, vel ut hodie loquuntur,
orthodoxi_, qualis Athenis vulgò esset religionis conditio, declarare
instituit. Ex quo nobis quidem clarissimé videtur apparere Platonem
hoc unum spectavisse, ut judices admonerentur, ne populari
superstitioni in sententiis ferendis plus justo tribuerent."
Stallbaum, Proleg. ad Euthyphron. T. vi. p. 146.
Steinhart also (in his Einleitung, p. 190) calls Euthyphron "ein
rechtgläubiger von reinsten Wasser--ein ueberfrommer, fanatischer,
Mann," &c.
In the two preceding pages Stallbaum defends himself against
objections made to his view, on the ground that Plato, by composing
such dialogues at this critical moment, would increase the
unpopularity and danger of Sokrates, instead of diminishing it.
Stallbaum contends (p. 145) that neither Sokrates nor Plato nor any of
the other Sokratic men, believed that the trial would end in a verdict
of guilty: which is probably true about Plato, and would have been
borne out by the event if Sokrates had made a different defence. But
this does not assist the conclusion which Stallbaum wishes to bring
out; for it is not the less true that the dialogues of Plato, if
published at that moment, would increase the exasperation against
Sokrates, and the chance, whatever it was, that he would be found
guilty. Stallbaum refers by mistake to a passage in the Platonic
Apology (p. 36 A), as if Sokrates there expressed his surprise at the
verdict of guilty, anticipating a verdict of acquittal. The passage
declares the contrary: Sokrates expresses his surprise that the
verdict of guilty had passed by so small a majority as five; he had
expected that it would pass by a larger majority.]
[Side-note: Sequel of the dialogue--Euthyphron gives a particular
example as the reply to a general question.]
I proceed now with that which may be called the Platonic purpose in
the dialogue--the enquiry into the general idea of Holiness. When the
question was first put to Euthyphron, What is the Holy?--he replied,
"That which I am now doing." _Sokr._ That may be: but many other
things besides are also holy.--_Euthyph._ Certainly.--_Sokr._ Then
your answer does not meet the question. You have indicated one particular
holy act, among many. But the question asked was--What is Holiness
generally? What is that specific property, by the common possession of
which all holy things are entitled to be called holy? I want to know
this general Idea, in order that I may keep it in view as a type
wherewith to compare each particular case, thus determining whether
the case deserves to be called holy or not.[20]
[Footnote 20: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 7, p. 6 E.]
Here we have a genuine specimen of the dialectic interrogatory in
which Xenophon affirms[21] Sokrates to have passed his life, and which
Plato prosecutes under his master's name. The question is generalised
much more than in the Kriton.
[Footnote 21: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 16.]
[Side-note: Such mistake frequent in dialectic discussion.]
It is assumed that there is one specific Idea or essence--one
objective characteristic or fact--common to all things called Holy.
The purpose of the questioner is: to determine what this Idea is: to
provide a good definition of the word. The first mistake made by the
respondent is, that he names simply one particular case, coming under
the general Idea. This is a mistake often recurring, and often
corrected in the Platonic dialogues. Even now, such a mistake is not
unfrequent: and in the time of Plato, when general ideas, and the
definition of general terms, had been made so little the subject of
direct attention, it was doubtless perpetually made. When the question
was first put, its bearing would not be properly conceived. And even
if the bearing were properly conceived, men would find it easier then,
and do find it easier now, to make answer by giving one particular
example than to go over many examples, and elicit what is common to
all.
[Side-note: First general answer given by Euthyphron--that which is
pleasing to the Gods is holy. Comments of Sokrates thereon.]
Euthyphron next replies--That which is pleasing to the Gods is holy:
that which is not pleasing, or which is displeasing to the Gods, is
unholy.--_Sokr._ That is the sort of answer which I desired to have:
now let us examine it. We learn from the received theology, which you
implicitly believe, that there has been much discord and quarrel among
the Gods. If the Gods quarrel, they quarrel about the same matters as
men. Now men do not quarrel about questions of quantity--for such
questions can be determined by calculation and measurement: nor about
questions of weight--for there the balance may be appealed to. The
questions about which you and I and other men quarrel are, What is
just or unjust, honourable or base, good or evil? Upon these there is
no accessible standard. Some men feel in one way, some in another; and
each of us fights for his own opinions.[22] We all indeed agree that
the wrong-doer ought to be punished: but we do not agree who the
wrong-doer is, nor what is wrong-doing. The same action which some of
us pronounce to be just, others stigmatise as unjust.[23]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 8, p. 7 C-D. [Greek: Peri\ ti/nos
de\ dê\ dienechthe/ntes kai\ e)pi\ ti/na kri/sin ou) duna/menoi
a)phike/sthai e)chthroi/ ge a)\n a)llê/lois ei)=men kai\
o)rgizoi/metha? i)/sôs ou) pro/cheiro/n soi/ e)stin, a)ll' e)mou=
le/gontos sko/pei, ei) ta/d' e)sti\ to/ te di/kaion kai\ to\ a)/dikon,
kai\ kalo\n kai\ ai)schro/n, kai\ a)gatho\n kai\ kako/n. A)=r' ou)
tau=ta e)sti peri\ ô(=n dienechthe/ntes kai\ ou) duna/menoi e)pi\
i)kanê\n kri/sin au)tô=n e)lthei=n e)chthroi\ a)llê/lois gigno/metha,
o(/tan gignô/metha, kai\ e)gô\ kai\ su\ kai\ oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi
pa/ntes?]]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 9, p. 8 D. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra
e)kei=no/ ge a)mphisbêtou=sin, ô(s ou) to\n a)dikou=nta dei= dido/nai
di/kên; a)ll' e)kei=no i)/sôs a)mphisbêtou=si, to\ _ti/s e)stin o(
a)dikôn_ kai\ _ti/ drô=n_, kai\ _po/te_? Pra/xeô/s tinos peri\
diaphero/menoi, oi( me\n dikai/ôs phasi\n au)tê\n pepra=chthai, oi(
de\ a)di/kôs.]]
So likewise the quarrels of the Gods must turn upon these same
matters--just and unjust, right and wrong, good and evil. What one God
thinks right, another God thinks wrong. What is pleasing to one God,
is displeasing to another. The same action will be both pleasing and
displeasing to the Gods.
According to your definition of holy and unholy, therefore, the same
action may be both holy and unholy. Your definition will not hold, for
it does not enable me to distinguish the one from the other.[24]
[Footnote 24: In regard to Plato's ethical enquiries generally, and to
what we shall find in future dialogues, we must take note of what is
here laid down, that mankind are in perpetual dispute, and have not
yet any determinate standard for just and unjust, right and wrong,
honourable and base, good and evil. Plato had told us, somewhat
differently, in the Kriton, that on these matters, though the judgment
of the many was not to be trusted, yet there was another trustworthy
judgment, that of the one wise man. This point will recur for future
comment.]
_Euthyph._--I am convinced that there are some things which _all_ the
Gods love, and some things which _all_ the Gods hate. That which I am
doing, for example--indicting my father for homicide--belongs to the
former category. Now that which all the Gods love is the holy: that
which they all hate, is the unholy.[25]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 11, p. 9.]
[Side-note: To be loved by the Gods is not the essence of the
Holy--they love it because it is holy. In what then does its essence
consist? Perplexity of Euthyphron.]
_Sokr._--Do the Gods love the holy, because it _is_ holy? Or is it
holy for this reason, because they do love it? _Euthyph._--They love
it because it is holy.[26] _Sokr._--Then the holiness is one thing;
the fact of being loved by the Gods is another. The latter fact is not
of the essence of holiness: it is true, but only as an accident and an
accessory. You have yet to tell me what that essential character is,
by virtue of which the holy comes to be loved by all the Gods, or to
be the subject of various other attributes.[27]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 12, p. 10 A-D. The manner in which
Sokrates conducts this argument is over-subtle. [Greek: Ou)k a)/ra
dio/ti o(rô/menon ge/ e)sti dia\ tou=to o(ra=tai, a)lla\ tou)nanti/on
dio/ti o(ra=tai, dia\ tou=to o(rô/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti a)go/meno/n
e)sti, dia\ tou=to a)/getai, a)lla\ dio/ti a)/getai, dia\ tou=to
a)go/menon; ou)de\ dio/ti phero/menon, phe/retai, a)lla\ dio/ti
phe/retai, phero/menon.]
The difference between the meaning of [Greek: phe/retai] and [Greek:
phero/meno/n e)sti] is not easy to see. The former may mean to affirm
the beginning of an action, the latter the continuance: but in this
case the inference would not necessarily follow.
Compare Aristotel. Physica, p. 185, b. 25, with the Scholion of
Simplikius, p. 330, a. 2nd ed. Bekk. where [Greek: badi/zôn e)/sti] is
recognised as equivalent to [Greek: badi/zei].]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 A. [Greek: kinduneu/eis,
e)rôtô/menos to\ o(/sion, o(/, ti/ pot' e)/stin, tê\n _me\n ou)si/an_
moi au)tou= ou) bou/lesthai dêlô=sai, _pa/thos de/ ti peri\ au)tou=
le/gein, o(/, ti pe/ponthe_ tou=to to\ o(/sion, philei=sthai u(po\
pa/ntôn tô=n theô=n; _o(/, ti de\ o)\n, ou)/pô ei)=pes_. . . . pa/lin
ei)pe\ e)x a)rchê=s, ti/ pote o)\n to\ o(/sion ei)/te philei=tai u(po\
theô=n, ei)/te o(/ti dê\ pa/schei.]]
_Euthyph._--I hardly know how to tell you what I think. None of my
explanations will stand. Your ingenuity turns and twists them in every
way. _Sokr._--If I am ingenious, it is against my own will;[28] for I
am most anxious that some one of the answers should stand unshaken.
But I will now put you in the way of making a different answer. You
will admit that all which is holy is necessarily just. But is all that
is just necessarily holy?
[Footnote: 28: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13, p. 11 D. [Greek: a)/kôn
ei)mi\ sopho/s], &c.]
[Side-note: Sokrates suggests a new answer. The Holy is one branch or
variety of the Just. It is that branch which concerns ministration by
men to the Gods.]
Euthyphron does not at first understand the question. He does not
comprehend the relation between two words, generic and specific with
reference to each other: the former embracing all that the latter
embraces, and more besides (denoting more objects, connoting fewer
attributes). This is explained by analogies and particular examples,
illustrating a logical distinction highly important to be brought out,
at a time when there were no treatises on Logic.[29] So much therefore
is made out--That the Holy is a part, or branch, of the Just. But what
part? or how is it to be distinguished from other parts or branches of
the just? Euthyphron answers. The holy is that portion or branch of
the Just which concerns ministration to the Gods: the remaining branch
of the Just is, what concerns ministration to men.[30]
[Footnote 29: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 13-14, p. 12.]
[Footnote 30: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 14, p. 12 E. [Greek: to\ me/ros
tou= dikai/ou ei)=nai eu)sebe/s te kai\ o(/sion, to\ peri\ tê\n tô=n
theô=n therapei/an; to\ de\ peri\ tê\n tô=n a)nthrô/pôn, to\ loipo\n
ei)=nai tou= dikai/ou me/ros.]]
[Side-note: Ministration to the Gods? How? To what purpose?]\
_Sokr._--What sort of ministration? Other ministrations, to horses,
dogs, working cattle, &c., are intended for the improvement or benefit
of those to whom they are rendered:--besides, they can only be
rendered by a few trained persons. In what manner does ministration,
called _holiness_, benefit or improve the Gods? _Euthyph._--In no way:
it is of the same nature as that which slaves render to their masters.
_Sokr._--You mean, that it is work done by us for the Gods. Tell me--to
what end does the work conduce? What is that end which the Gods
accomplish, through our agency as workmen? Physicians employ their
slaves for the purpose of restoring the sick to health: shipbuilders
put their slaves to the completion of ships. But what are those great
works which the Gods bring about by our agency? _Euthyph._--Their
works are numerous and great. _Sokr._--The like may be said of
generals: but the summary and main purpose of all that generals do is--to
assure victory in war. So too we may say about the husbandman: but
the summary of his many proceedings is, to raise corn from the earth.
State to me, in like manner, the summary of that which the Gods
perform through our agency.[31]
[Footnote 31: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, pp. 13, 14.]
[Side-note: Holiness--rectitude in sacrifice and prayer--right traffic
between men and the Gods.]
_Euthyph._--It would cost me some labour to go through the case fully.
But so much I tell you in plain terms. If a man, when sacrificing and
praying, knows what deeds and what words will be agreeable to the
Gods, that is holiness: this it is which upholds the security both of
private houses and public communities. The contrary is unholiness,
which subverts and ruins them.[32] _Sokr._--Holiness, then, is the
knowledge of rightly sacrificing and praying to the Gods; that is, of
giving to them, and asking from them. To ask rightly, is to ask what
we want from them: to give rightly, is to give to them what they want
from us. Holiness will thus be an art of right traffic between Gods
and men. Still, you must tell me how the Gods are gainers by that
which we give to them. That we are gainers by what they give, is clear
enough; but what do they gain on their side?
[Footnote 32: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 16, p. 14 B. Compare this third
unsuccessful answer of Euthyphron with the third answer assigned to
Hippias (Hipp. Maj. 291 C-E). Both of them appear lengthened,
emphatic, as if intended to settle a question which had become
vexatious.]
[Side-note: This will not stand--the Gods gain nothing--they receive
from men marks of honour and gratitude--they are pleased
therewith--the Holy, therefore, must be that which is pleasing to the
Gods.]
_Euthyph._--The Gods gain nothing. The gifts which we present to them
consist in honour, marks of respect, gratitude. _Sokr._--The holy,
then, is that which obtains favour from the Gods; not that which
gainful to them, nor that which they love. _Euthyph._--Nay: I think
they love it especially. _Sokr._--Then it appears that the holy is
what the Gods love? _Euthyph._--Unquestionably.
[Side-note: This is the same explanation which was before declared
insufficient. A fresh explanation is required from Euthyphron. He
breaks off the dialogue.]
_Sokr._--But this is the very same explanation which we rejected a
short time ago as untenable.[33] It was agreed between us, that to be
loved by the Gods was not of the essence of holiness, and could not
serve as an explanation of holiness: though it might be truly affirmed
thereof as an accompanying predicate. Let us therefore try again to
discover what holiness is. I rely upon you to help me, and I am sure
that you must know, since under a confident persuasion that you know,
you are indicting your own father for homicide.
[Footnote 33: Plato, Euthyphron, c. 19, p. 15 C. [Greek: me/mnêsai
ga/r pou, o(/ti e)n tô=| e)mprosthen to/ te o(/sion kai\ to\
theophile\s ou) tau)to\n ê(mi=n e)pha/nê, a)ll' e(/tera a)llê/lôn.]]
_Euthyph._--"The investigation must stand over to another time, I have
engagements now which call me elsewhere."
[Side-note: Sokratic spirit of the dialogue--confessed ignorance
applying the Elenchus to false persuasion of knowledge.]
So Plato breaks off the dialogue. It is conceived in the truly
Sokratic spirit:--an Elenchus applied to implicit and unexamined
faith, even though that faith be accredited among the public as
orthodoxy: warfare against the confident persuasion of knowledge, upon
topics familiar to every one, and on which deep sentiments and
confused notions have grown up by association in every one's mind,
without deliberate study, systematic teaching, or testing
cross-examination. Euthyphron is a man who feels unshaken confidence
in his own knowledge, and still more in his own correct religious belief.
Sokrates appears in his received character as confessing ignorance,
soliciting instruction, and exposing inconsistencies and contradiction
in that which is given to him for instruction.
[Side-note: The questions always difficult, often impossible to
answer. Sokrates is unable to answer them, though he exposes the bad
answers of others.]
We must (as I have before remarked) take this ignorance on the part of
the Platonic Sokrates not as assumed, but as very real. In no part of
the Platonic writings do we find any tenable definition of the Holy
and the Unholy, such as is here demanded from Euthyphron. The talent
of Sokrates consists in exposing bad definitions, not in providing
good ones. This negative function is all that he claims for himself--with
deep regret that he can do no more. "Sokrates" (says
Aristotle[34]) "put questions, but gave no answers: for he professed
not to know." In those dialogues where Plato makes him attempt more
(there also, against his own will and protest, as in the Philêbus and
Republic), the affirmative Sokrates will be found only to stand his
ground because no negative Sokrates is allowed to attack him. I insist
upon this the rather, because the Platonic commentators usually
present the dialogues in a different light, as if such modesty on the
part of Sokrates was altogether simulated: as if he was himself,[35]
from the beginning, aware of the proper answer to his own questions,
but refrained designedly from announcing it: nay, sometimes, as if the
answers were in themselves easy, and as if the respondents who failed
must be below par in respect of intelligence. This is an erroneous
conception. The questions put by Sokrates, though relating to familiar
topics, are always difficult: they are often even impossible to
answer, because they postulate and require to be assigned a common
objective concept which is not to be found. They only appear easy to
one who has never attempted the task of answering under the pressure
of cross-examination. Most persons indeed never make any such trial,
but go on affirming confidently as if they knew, without trial. It is
exactly against such illusory confidence of knowledge that Sokrates
directs his questions: the fact belongs to our days no less than to
his.[36]
[Footnote 34: Aristotel. Sophist. Elench. p. 183, b. 7. [Greek: e)pei\
kai\ dia\ tou=to Sôkra/tês ê)rô/ta kai\ ou)k a)pekri/neto; ô(molo/gei
ga\r ou)k ei)de/nai.]]
[Footnote 35: See Stallbaum, Prolegg. ad Euthyphron. p. 140.]
[Footnote 36: Adam Smith observes, in his Essay on the Formation of
Languages (p. 20 of the fifth volume of his collected Works), "Ask a
man what relation is expressed by the preposition _of_: and if he has
not beforehand employed his thoughts a good deal upon these subjects,
you may safely allow him a week to consider of his answer."
The Platonic problem assumes, not only that he shall give an answer,
but that it shall be an answer which he can maintain against the
Elenchus of Sokrates.]
[Side-note: Objections of Theopompus to the Platonic procedure.]
The assumptions of some Platonic commentators--that Sokrates and Plato
of course knew the answers to their own questions--that an honest and
pious man, of ordinary intelligence, has the answer to the question in
his heart, though he cannot put it in words--these assumptions were
also made by many of Plato's contemporaries, who depreciated his
questions as frivolous and unprofitable. The rhetor and historian
Theopompus (one of the most eminent among the numerous pupils of
Isokrates, and at the same time unfriendly to Plato, though younger in
age), thus criticised Plato's requirement, that these familiar terms
should be defined: "What! (said he) have none of us before your time
talked about the Good and the Just? Or do you suppose that we cannot
follow out what each of them is, and that we pronounce the words as
empty and unmeaning sounds?"[37] Theopompus was the scholar of
Isokrates, and both of them probably took the same view, as to the
uselessness of that colloquial analysis which aims at determining the
definition of familiar ethical or political words.[38] They considered
that Plato and Sokrates, instead of clearing up what was confused,
wasted their ingenuity in perplexing what was already clear. They
preferred the rhetorical handling (such as we noticed in the Kriton)
which works upon ready-made pre-established sentiments, and impresses
a strong emotional conviction, but presumes that all the intellectual
problems have already been solved.
[Footnote 37: Epiktêtus, ii. 17, 5-10. [Greek: To\ d' e)xapatô=n tou\s
pollou\s tou=t' e)/stin, o(/per kai\ Theo/pompon to\n r(ê/tora o(/s
pou kai\ Pla/tôni e)gkalei= e)pi\ tô=| bou/lesthai e(/kasta
o(ri/zesthai. Ti/ ga\r le/gei? Ou)dei\s ê(mô=n pro\ sou= e)/legen
a)gatho\n ê)\ di/kaion? ê)\ mê\ parakolouthou=ntes ti/ e)sti tou/tôn
e(/kaston, a)sê/môs kai\ kenô=s e)phtheggo/metha ta\s phôna/s?]
Respecting Theopompus, compare Dionys. Hal. Epistol. ad Cn. Pompeium
de Platone, p. 757; also De Præcip. Historicis, p. 782.]
[Footnote 38: Isokrates, Helen. Encom. Or. x. init. De Permut. Or. xv.
sect. 90.
These passages do not name Sokrates and Plato, but have every
appearance of being intended to allude to them.]
[Side-note: Objective view of Ethics, distinguished by Sokrates from
the subjective.]
All this shows the novelty of the Sokratic point of view: the
distinction between the essential constituent and the objective
accidental accompaniment,[39] and the search for a definition
corresponding to the former: which search was first prosecuted by
Sokrates (as Aristotle[40] points out) and was taken up from him by
Plato. It was Sokrates who first brought conspicuously into notice the
objective intellectual, scientific view of ethics--as distinguished
from the subjective, emotional, incoherent, and uninquiring. I mean
that he was the first who proclaimed himself as feeling the want of
such an objective view, and who worked upon other minds so a to create
the like want in them: I do not mean that he provided satisfaction for
this requirement.
[Footnote 39: This distinction is pointedly noticed in the Euthyphron,
p. 11 A.]
[Footnote 40: Aristotel. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 2, M. 1078, b. 28.]
[Side-note: Subjective unanimity coincident with objective dissent.]
Undoubtedly (as Theopompus remarked) men had used these ethical terms
long before the time of Sokrates, and had used them, not as empty and
unmeaning, but with a full body of meaning (_i.e._ emotional meaning).
Strong and marked emotion had become associated with each term; and
the same emotion, similar in character, though not equal in force--was
felt by the greater number of different minds. Subjectively and
emotionally, there was no difference between one man and another,
except as to degree. But it was Sokrates who first called attention to
the fact as a matter for philosophical recognition and criticism,--that
such subjective and emotional unanimity does not exclude the
widest objective and intellectual dissension.[41]
[Footnote 41: It is this distinction between the subjective and the
objective which is implied in the language of Epiktêtus, when he
proceeds to answer the objection cited from Theopompus (note 1 p.
451): [Greek: Ti/s ga\r soi le/gei, Theo/pompe, o(/ti e)nnoi/as ou)k
ei)=chomen e(ka/stou tou/tôn phusika/s kai\ prolê/pseis? A)ll' ou)ch
oi(=on te e)pharmo/zein ta\s prolê/pseis tai=s katallê/lois ou)si/ais,
mê\ diarthrô/santa au)ta/s, kai\ au)to\ tou=to skepsa/menon, poi/an
tina\ e(ka/stê| au)tô=n ou)si/an u(potakte/on.]
To the same purpose Epiktêtus, in another passage, i. 22, 4-9: [Greek:
Au)tê\ e)stin ê( tô=n I)oudai/ôn, kai\ Su/rôn, kai\ Ai)gupti/ôn, kai\
R(ômai/ôn ma/chê; ou) peri\ tou=, o(/ti to\ o(/sion pa/ntôn
protimête/on, kai\ e)n panti\ metadiôkte/on--a)lla\ po/tero/n e)stin
o(/sion tou=to, to\ choirei/ou phagei=n, ê)\ a)no/sion.]
Again, Origen also, in a striking passage of his reply to Celsus (v.
p. 263, ed. Spencer; i. p. 614 ed. Delarue), observes that the name
_Justice_ is the same among all Greeks (he means, the name with the
emotional associations inseparable from it), but that the thing
designated was very different, according to those who pronounced
it:--[Greek: lekte/on, o(/ti to\ tê=s dikaiosu/nês o)/noma tau)ton me\n
e)/stin para\ pa=sin E(/llêsin; ê)/dê de\ a)podei/knutai a)/llê me\n
ê( kat' E)pi/kouron dikaiosu/nê, a)/llê de\ ê( kata\ tou\s a)po\ tê=s
Stoa=s, a)rnoume/nôn to\ trimere\s tê=s psuchê=s, a)/llê de\ kata\
tou\s a)po\ Pla/tônos, i)diopragi/an tô=n merô=n tê=s psuchê=s
pha/skontas ei)=nai tê\n dikaiosu/nên. Ou(/tô de\ kai\ a)/llê me\n ê(
E)pikou/rou a)ndri/a], &c.
"Je n'aime point les mots nouveaux" (said Saint Just, in his
Institutions, composed during the sitting of the French Convention,
1793), "je ne connais que le juste et l'injuste: ces mots sont
entendus par toutes les consciences. Il faut ramener toutes les
définitions à la conscience: l'esprit est un sophiste qui conduit les
vertus à l'échafaud." (Histoire Parlementaire de la Révolution
Française, t. xxxv. p. 277.) This is very much the language which
honest and vehement [Greek: i)diô=tai] of Athens would hold towards
Sokrates and Plato.]
[Side-note: Cross-examination brought to bear upon this mental
condition by Sokrates--position of Sokrates and Plato in regard to
it.]
As the Platonic Sokrates here puts it in the Euthyphron--all men agree
that the person who acts unjustly must be punished; but they dispute
very much _who it is_ that acts unjustly--_which_ of his actions are
unjust--or under _what_ circumstances they are so. The emotion in each
man's mind, as well as the word by which it is expressed, is the
same:[42] but the person, or the acts, to which it is applied by each,
although partly the same, are often so different, and sometimes so
opposite, as to occasion violent dispute. There is subjective
agreement, with objective disagreement. It is upon this disconformity
that the Sokratic cross-examination is brought to bear, making his
hearers feel its existence, for the first time, and dispelling their
fancy of supposed knowledge as well as of supposed unanimity. Sokrates
required them to define the general word--to assign some common
objective characteristic, corresponding in all cases to the common
subjective feeling represented by the word. But no man could comply
with his requirement, nor could he himself comply with it, any more
than his respondents. So far Sokrates proceeded, and no farther,
according to Aristotle. He never altogether lost his hold on
particulars: he assumed that there must be something common to them
all, if you could but find out what it was, constituting the objective
meaning of the general term. Plato made a step beyond him, though
under the name of Sokrates as spokesman. Not being able (any more than
Sokrates) to discover or specify any real objective characteristic,
common to all the particulars--he objectivised[43] the word itself:
that is, he assumed or imagined a new objective Ens of his own, the
Platonic Idea, corresponding to the general word: an idea not common
to the particulars, but existing apart from them in a sphere of its
own--yet nevertheless lending itself in some inexplicable way to be
participated by all the particulars. It was only in this way that
Plato could explain to himself how knowledge was possible: this
universal Ens being the only object of knowledge: particulars being an
indefinite variety of fleeting appearances, and as such in themselves
unknowable. The imagination of Plato created a new world of Forms,
Ideas, Concepts, or objects corresponding to general terms: which he
represents as the only objects of knowledge, and as the only
realities.
[Footnote 42: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 8, C-D, Euripides, Phoenissæ,
499--
[Greek: ei) pa=si tau)to\ kalo\n e)/phu, sopho/n th' a)/ma,
ou)k ê)=n a)\n a)mphilekto\s a)nthrô/pois e)/ris;
nu=n d' ou)th' o(/moion ou)de\n ou)/t' i)/son bro/tois,
plê\n o)noma/sai; to\ d' e)/rgon ou)k e)/stin to/de].
Hobbes expresses, in the following terms, this fact of subjective
similarity co-existent with great objective dissimilarity among
mankind.
"For the similitude of the thoughts and passions of one man, to the
thoughts and passions of another, whoever looketh into himself and
considereth what he does when he does _think_, _opine_, _reason_,
_hope_, _fear_, &c., and upon what grounds, he shall thereby read and
know what are the thoughts and passions of all other men upon the like
occasions. I say the similitude of _passions_, which are the same in
all men, _desire_, _fear_, _hope_, &c., not the similitude of the
_objects_ of the passions, which are the things _desired_, _feared_,
_hoped_, &c., for these the constitution individual, and particular
education do so vary, and they are so easy to be kept from our
knowledge, that the characters of man's heart, blotted and confounded
as they are with lying, dissembling, counterfeiting, and erroneous
doctrines, are legible only to him that searcheth hearts."
Introduction to Leviathan.]
[Footnote 43: Aristot. Metaphys. M. 1078, b. 30, 1086, b. 4.]
[Side-note: The Holy--it has an essential characteristic--what is
this?--not the fact that it is loved by the Gods--this is true, but is
not its constituent essence.]
In the Euthyphron, however, we have not yet passed into this Platonic
world, of self-existent Forms--objects of conception--concepts
detached from sensible particulars. We are still with Sokrates and
with ordinary men among the world of particulars, only that Sokrates
introduced a new mode of looking at all the particulars, and searched
among them for some common feature which he did not find. The Holy
(and the Unholy) is a word freely pronounced by every speaker, and
familiarly understood by every hearer, as if it denoted something one
and the same in all these particulars.[44] What is that something--the
common essence or idea? Euthyphron cannot tell; though he agrees with
Sokrates that there must be such essence. His attempts to explain it
prove failures.
[Footnote 44: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 D, 6 E.]
The definition of the Holy--that it is what the Gods love--is
suggested in this dialogue, but rejected. The Holy is not Holy because
the Gods love it: on the contrary, its holiness is an independent
fact, and the Gods love it because it is Holy. The Holy is thus an
essence, _per se_, common to, or partaken by, all holy persons and
things.
[Side-note: Views of the Xenophontic Sokrates respecting the
Holy--different from those of the Platonic Sokrates--he disallows any
common absolute general type of the Holy--he recognises an indefinite
variety of types, discordant and relative.]
So at least the Platonic Sokrates here regards it. But the Xenophontic
Sokrates, if we can trust the Memorabilia, would not have concurred in
this view: for we read that upon all points connected with piety or
religious observance, he followed the precept which the Pythian
priestess delivered as an answer to all who consulted the Delphian
oracle on similar questions--You will act piously by conforming to the
law of the city. Sokrates (we are told) not only acted upon this
precept himself, but advised his friends to do the like, and regarded
those who acted otherwise as foolish and over-subtle triflers.[45] It
is plain that this doctrine disallows all supposition of any general
essence, called the Holy, to be discovered and appealed to, as type in
cases of doubt; and recognises the equal title of many separate local,
discordant, and variable types, each under the sanction of King Nomos.
The procedure of Sokrates in the Euthyphron would not have been
approved by the Xenophontic Sokrates. It is in the spirit of Plato,
and is an instance of that disposition which he manifests yet more
strongly in the Republic and elsewhere, to look for his supreme
authority in philosophical theory and not in the constituted societies
around him: thus to innovate in matters religious as well as
political--a reproach to him among his own contemporaries, an honour
to him among various subsequent Christian writers. Plato, not
conforming to any one of the modes of religious belief actually
prevalent in his contemporary world, postulates a canon, suitable to
the exigencies of his own mind, of that which the Gods ought to love
and must love. In this respect, as in others, he is in marked contrast
with Herodotus--a large observer of mankind, very pious in his own
way, curious in comparing the actual practices consecrated among
different nations, but not pretending to supersede them by any canon
of his own.
[Footnote 45: Compare Xen. Mem. i. 3, 1. [Greek: ê(/ te ga\r Puthi/a
no/mô| po/leôs a)nairei= poiou=ntas eu)sebô=s a)\n poiei=n; Sôkra/tês
te ou(/tôs kai\ au)to\s e)poi/ei kai\ toi=s a)/llois parê/|nei, tou\s
de\ a)/llôs pôs poiou=ntas perie/rgous kai\ matai/ous e)no/mizen
ei)=nai.]]
[Side-note: The Holy a branch of the Just--not tenable as a
definition, but useful as bringing to view the subordination of
logical terms.]
Though the Holy, and the Unholy, are pronounced to be each an essence,
partaken of by all the particulars so-called; yet what that essence
is, the dialogue Euthyphron noway determines. Even the suggestion of
Sokrates--that the Holy is a branch of the Just, only requiring to be
distinguished by some assignable mark from the other branches of the
Just--is of no avail, since the Just itself had been previously
declared to be one of the matters in perpetual dispute. It procures
for Sokrates however the opportunity of illustrating the logical
subordination of terms; the less general comprehended in the more
general, and requiring to be parted off by some _differentia_ from the
rest of what this latter comprehends. Plato illustrates the matter at
some length;[46] and apparently with a marked purpose of drawing
attention to it. We must keep in mind, that logical distinctions had
at that time received neither special attention nor special
names--however they may have been unconsciously followed in practice.
[Footnote 46: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 12.]
[Side-note: The Euthyphron represents Plato's way of replying to the
charge of impiety, preferred by Melêtus against Sokrates--comparison
with Xenophon's way of replying.]
What I remarked about the Kriton, appears to me also true about the
Euthyphron. It represents Plato's manner of replying to the charge of
impiety advanced by Melêtus and his friends against Sokrates, just as
the four first chapters of the Memorabilia represent Xenophon's manner
of repelling the same charge. Xenophon joins issue with the
accusers,--describes the language and proceedings of Sokrates, so as to
show that he was orthodox and pious, above the measure of ordinary men, in
conduct, in ritual, and in language; and expresses his surprise that
against such a man the verdict of guilty could have been returned by
the Dikasts.[47] Plato handles the charge in the way in which Sokrates
himself would have handled it, if he had been commenting on the same
accusation against another person and as he does in fact deal with
Melêtus, in the Platonic Apology. Plato introduces Euthyphron, a very
religious man, who prides himself upon being forward to prosecute
impiety in whomsoever it is found, and who in this case, under the
special promptings of piety, has entered a capital prosecution against
his own father.[48] The occasion is here favourable to the Sokratic
interrogatories, applicable to Melêtus no less than to Euthyphron. "Of
course, before you took this grave step, you have assured yourself
that you are right, and that you know what piety and impiety are. Pray
tell me, for I am ignorant on the subject: that I may know better and
do better for the future.[49] Tell me, what is the characteristic
essence of piety as well as impiety?" It turns out that the accuser
can make no satisfactory answer: that he involves himself in confusion
and contradiction:--that he has brought capital indictments against
citizens, without having ever studied or appreciated the offence with
which he charges them. Such is the manner in which the Platonic
Sokrates is made to deal with Euthyphron, and in which the real
Sokrates deals with Melêtus:[50] rendering the questions instrumental
to two larger purposes--first, to his habitual crusade against the
false persuasion of knowledge--next, to the administering of a logical
or dialectical lesson. When we come to the Treatise De Legibus (where
Sokrates does not appear) we shall find Plato adopting the dogmatic
and sermonising manner of the first chapters of the Xenophontic
Memorabilia. Here, in the Euthyphron and in the Dialogues of Search
generally, the Platonic Sokrates is something entirely different.[51]
[Footnote 47: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 4; also iv. 8, 11.]
[Footnote 48: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 5 E.]
[Footnote 49: Compare, even in Xenophon, the conversation of Sokrates
with Kritias and Chariklês--Memorab. i. 2, 32-38: and his
cross-examination of the presumptuous youth Glaukon, Plato's
brother (Mem. iii. 7).]
[Footnote 50: Plato, Apol. c. 11, p. 24 C. [Greek: a)dikei=n phêmi\
Me/lêton, o(/ti spoudê=| charienti/zetai, r(a|di/ôs ei)s a)gô=nas
kathista\s a)nthrô/pous], &c.]
[Footnote 51: Steinhart (Einleitung, p. 199) agrees with the opinion
of Schleiermacher and Stallbaum, that the Euthyphron was composed and
published during the interval between the lodging of the indictment
and the trial of Sokrates. K. F. Hermann considers it as posterior to
the death of Sokrates.
I concur on this point with Hermann. Indeed I have already given my
opinion, that not one of the Platonic dialogues was composed before
the death of Sokrates.]
END OF VOL. I.
*************************************
Transcriber's Note
The text is based on versions made available by the Internet Archive.
For the Greek transcriptions the following conventions have been used:
) is for smooth breathing; ( for hard; + for diaeresis; / for acute
accent; \ for grave; = for circumflex; | for iota subscript.
ch is used for chi, ph for phi, ps for psi, th for theta;
ê for eta and ô for omega; u is used for upsilon in all cases.
Corrections to the text, indicated in text with **:
Location Text of scan of 3rd edition Correction
Ch. 1, after fn. 47 devination divination
Ch. 1, fn. 119 Kosmichen Kosmischen
Ch. 1, fn. 146 mizta mixta
Ch. 1, fn. 146 front fronte
Ch. 1, fn. 164 & 8,
Ch. 1, fn. 164 perie/chno perie/chon
Ch. 1, fn. 214 2d 2nd.
Ch. 2, after fn. 21 ultra phenomenal ultra-phenomenal
Ch. 3, fn. 40 Taüschung Täuschung
Ch. 3, fn. 64 vol. iii. vol. ii.
Ch. 3, fn. 66 art act
Ch. 3, fn. 185 Dion. Diog.
Ch. 3, fn. 206 okêtê\neu)d eu)dokêtê\n
Ch. 3, fn. 217 xxix. xxiv.
Ch. 4, fn. 1 chap. xxii. chap. xxi.
Ch. 5, fn. 24 de-describes describes
Ch. 6, before fn. 14 blank space 4.
Ch. 6, fn. 39 passed of : passed off:
Ch. 6, fn. 45 the our the four
Ch. 7, 3rd para. Hippias II. Hippias I.
Ch. 7, fn. 8 409 429
Ch. 7, fn. 8 407 427
Ch. 7, fn. 13 Herman Hermann
Ch. 8, fn. 92 s. 12, s. 11,