APOLOGY OF SOKRATES.
Adopting the order of precedence above described, for the review of
the Platonic compositions, and taking the point of departure from
Sokrates or the Sokratic point of view, I begin with the memorable
composition called the Apology.
[Side-note: The Apology is the real defence delivered by Sokrates
before the Dikasts, reported by Plato, without intentional
transformation.]
I agree with Schleiermacher[1]--with the more recent investigations of
Ueberweg--and with what (until recent times) seems to have been the
common opinion,--that this is in substance the real defence pronounced
by Sokrates; reported, and of course drest up, yet not intentionally
transformed, by Plato.[2] If such be the case, it is likely to have
been put together shortly after the trial, and may thus be ranked
among the earliest of the Platonic compositions: for I have already
intimated my belief that Plato composed no dialogues under the name of
Sokrates, during the lifetime of Sokrates.
[Footnote 1: Zeller is of opinion that the Apology, as well as the
Kriton, were put together at Megara by Plato, shortly after the death
of Sokrates. (Zeller, De Hermodoro Ephesio, p. 19.)
Schleiermacher, Einl. zur Apologie, vol. ii. pp. 182-185. Ueberweg,
Ueber die Aechtheit der Plat. Schrift. p. 246.
Steinhart thinks (Einleitung, pp. 236-238) that the Apology contains
more of Plato, and less of Sokrates: but he does not make his view
very clear to me. Ast, on the contrary, treats the Apology as spurious
and unworthy of Plato. (Ueber Platon's Leben und Schriften, p. 477,
seq.) His arguments are rather objections against the merits of the
composition, than reasons for believing it not to be the work of
Plato. I dissent from them entirely: but they show that an acute
critic can make out a plausible case, satisfactory to himself, against
any dialogue. If it be once conceded that the question of genuine or
spurious is to be tried upon such purely internal grounds of critical
admiration and complete harmony of sentiment, Ast might have made out
a case even stronger against the genuineness of the Phædrus,
Symposion, Philêbus, Parmenidês.]
[Footnote 2: See chapter lxviii. of my History of Greece.
The reader will find in that chapter a full narrative of all the
circumstances known to us respecting both the life and the
condemnation of Sokrates.
A very admirable account may also be seen of the character of
Sokrates, and his position with reference to the Athenian people, in
the article entitled _Sokrates und Sein Volk_, Akademischer Vortrag,
by Professor Hermann Köchly; a lecture delivered at Zurich in 1855,
and published with enlargements in 1859.
Professor Köchly's article (contained in a volume entitled
_Akademische Vorträge_, Zurich, 1859) is eminently deserving of
perusal. It not only contains a careful summary of the contemporary
history, so far as Sokrates is concerned, but it has farther the great
merit of fairly estimating that illustrious man in reference to the
actual feeling of the time, and to the real public among whom he
moved. I feel much satisfaction in seeing that Professor Köchly's
picture, composed without any knowledge of my History of Greece,
presents substantially the same view of Sokrates and his
contemporaries as that which is taken in my sixty-eighth chapter.
Köchly considers that the Platonic Apology preserves the Sokratic
character more faithfully than any of Plato's writings; and that it
represents what Sokrates said, as nearly as the "dichterische Natur"
of Plato would permit (Köchly, pp. 302-364.)]
[Side-note: Even if it be Plato's own composition, it comes naturally
first in the review of his dialogues.]
Such, in my judgment, is the most probable hypothesis respecting the
Apology. But even if we discard this hypothesis; if we treat the
Apology as a pure product of the Platonic imagination (like the
dialogues), and therefore not necessarily connected in point of time
with the event to which it refers--still there are good reasons for
putting it first in the order of review. For it would then be Plato's
own exposition, given more explicitly and solemnly than anywhere else,
of the Sokratic point of view and life-purpose. It would be an
exposition embodying that union of generalising impulse, mistrust of
established common-places, and aggressive cross-examining ardour--with
eccentric religious persuasion, as well as with perpetual immersion in
the crowd of the palæstra and the market-place: which immersion was
not less indispensable to Sokrates than repugnant to the feelings of
Plato himself. An exposition, lastly, disavowing all that taste for
cosmical speculation, and that transcendental dogmatism, which formed
one among the leading features of Plato as distinguished from
Sokrates. In whichever way we look at the Apology, whether as a real
or as an imaginary defence, it contains more of pure Sokratism than
any other composition of Plato, and as such will occupy the first
place in the arrangement which I adopt.[3]
[Footnote 3: Dionysius Hal. regards the Apology, not as a report of
what Sokrates really said, nor as approximating thereunto, but as a
pure composition of Plato himself, for three purposes combined:--1. To
defend and extol Sokrates. 2. To accuse the Athenian public and
Dikasts. 3. To furnish a picture of what a philosopher ought to be.--All
these purposes are to a certain extent included and merged in a
fourth, which I hold to be the true one,--to exhibit what Sokrates was
and had been, in relation to the Athenian public.
The comparison drawn by Dionysius between the Apology and the oration
De Coronâ of Demosthenes, appears to me unsuitable. The two are
altogether disparate, in spirit, in purpose, and in execution. (See
Dion. H. Ars Rhet. pp. 295-298: De Adm. Vi Dic. Demosth. p. 1026.)]
In my History of Greece, I have already spoken of this impressive
discourse as it concerns the relations between Sokrates himself and
the Dikasts to whom he addressed it. I here regard it only as it
concerns Plato; and as it forms a convenient point of departure for
entering upon and appreciating the Platonic dialogues.
[Side-note: General character of the Apology--Sentiments entertained
towards Sokrates at Athens.]
The Apology of Sokrates is not a dialogue but a continuous discourse
addressed to the Dikasts, containing nevertheless a few questions and
answers interchanged between him and the accuser Melêtus in open
court. It is occupied, partly, in rebutting the counts of the
indictment (_viz._, 1. That Sokrates did not believe in the Gods or in
the Dæmons generally recognised by his countrymen: 2. That he was a
corruptor of youth[4])--partly in setting forth those proceedings of
his life out of which such charges had grown, and by which he had
become obnoxious to a wide-spread feeling of personal hatred. By his
companions, by those who best knew him, and by a considerable number
of ardent young men, he was greatly esteemed and admired: by the
general public, too, his acuteness as well as his self-sufficing and
independent character, were appreciated with a certain respect. Yet he
was at the same time disliked, as an aggressive disputant who "tilted
at all he met"--who raised questions novel as well as perplexing, who
pretended to special intimations from the Gods--and whose views no one
could distinctly make out.[5] By the eminent citizens of all
varieties--politicians, rhetors, Sophists, tragic and comic poets,
artisans, &c.--he had made himself both hated and feared.[6] He
emphatically denies the accusation of general disbelief in the Gods,
advanced by Melêtus: and he affirms generally (though less distinctly)
that the Gods in whom he believed, were just the same as those in whom
the whole city believed. Especially does he repudiate the idea, that
he could be so absurd as to doubt the divinity of Helios and Selênê,
in which all the world believed;[7] and to adopt the heresy of
Anaxagoras, who degraded these Divinities into physical masses.
Respecting his general creed, he thus puts himself within the pale of
Athenian orthodoxy. He even invokes that very sentiment (with some
doubt whether the Dikasts will believe him[8]) for the justification
of the obnoxious and obtrusive peculiarities of his life; representing
himself as having acted under the mission of the Delphian God,
expressly transmitted from the oracle.
[Footnote 4: Xenoph. Mem. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês, ou(\s
me\n e( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn; e(/tera de\ kaina\
daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn; a)dikei= de\ kai\ tou\s ne/ous diaphthei/rôn].
Plato, Apolog. c. 3, p. 19 B. [Greek: Sôkra/tês a)dikei= kai\
perierga/zetai, zêtô=n ta/ te u(po\ gê=s kai\ ta\ e)poura/nia, kai\
to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô poiô=n, kai\ a)/llous tau)ta\ tau=ta
dida/skôn].
The reading of Xenophon was conformable to the copy of the indictment
preserved in the Metrôon at Athens in the time of Favorinus. There
were three distinct accusers--Melêtus, Anytus, and Lykon. Plat. Apol.
p. 23-24 B.]
[Footnote 5: Plato, Apol. c. 28, p. 38 A; c. 23, p. 35 A.]
[Footnote 6: Plato, Apol. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23. [Greek: e)k tautêsi\ dê\
tê\s e)xeta/seôs pollai\ me\n a)pe/chtheiai/ moi gego/nasi kai\ oi)=ai
chalepô/tatai kai\ baru/tatai, ô(/ste polla\s diabola\s a)p' au)tô=n
gegone/nai, o)/noma de\ tou=to le/gesthai, sopho\s ei)=nai.]]
[Footnote 7: Plato, Apol. c. 14, p. 26 D. [Greek: ô)= thauma/sie
Me/lête, i(na ti/ tau=ta le/geis? ou)de\ ê(/lion ou)de\ selê/nên a)/ra
nomi/zô theou\s ei)=nai, ô(/sper oi( a)/lloi a)/nthrôpoi?]]
[Footnote 8: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D.]
[Side-note: Declaration from the Delphian oracle respecting the wisdom
of Sokrates, interpreted by him as a mission to cross-examine the
citizens generally--The oracle is proved to be true.]
According to his statement, his friend and earnest admirer Chærephon,
had asked the question at the oracle of Delphi, whether any one was
wiser than Sokrates? The reply of the oracle declared, that no one was
wiser. On hearing this declaration from an infallible authority,
Sokrates was greatly perplexed: for he was conscious to himself of not
being wise upon any matter, great or small.[9] He at length concluded
that the declaration of the oracle could be proved true, only on the
hypothesis that other persons were less wise than they seemed to be or
fancied themselves. To verify this hypothesis, he proceeded to
cross-examine the most eminent persons in many different walks--political
men, rhetors, Sophists, poets, artisans. On applying his Elenchus, and
putting to them testing interrogations, he found them all without
exception destitute of any real wisdom, yet fully persuaded that they
_were_ wise, and incapable of being shaken in that persuasion. The
artisans indeed did really know each his own special trade; but then,
on account of this knowledge, they believed themselves to be wise on
other great matters also. So also the poets were great in their own
compositions; but on being questioned respecting these very
compositions, they were unable to give any rational or consistent
explanations: so that they plainly appeared to have written beautiful
verses, not from any wisdom of their own, but through inspiration from
the Gods, or spontaneous promptings of nature. The result was, that
these men were all proved to possess no more real wisdom than
Sokrates: but _he_ was aware of his own deficiency; while _they_ were
fully convinced of their own wisdom, and could not be made sensible of
the contrary. In this way Sokrates justified the certificate of
superiority vouchsafed to him by the oracle. He, like all other
persons, was destitute of wisdom; but he was the only one who knew, or
could be made to feel, his own real mental condition. With others, and
most of all with the most conspicuous men, the false persuasion of
their own wisdom was universal and inexpugnable.[10]
[Footnote 9: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: tau=ta ga\r e)gô\
a)kou/sas e)nethumou/mên ou(tôsi/, Ti/ pote le/gei o( theo\s kai\ ti/
pote ai)ni/ttetai? e)gô\ ga\r dê\ ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n
xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n; ti/ ou)=n pote le/gei pha/skôn e)me\
sophô/taton ei)=nai? ou) ga\r dê/pou pseu/detai/ ge; ou) ga\r the/mis
au)tô=|. Kai\ polu\n me\n chro/non ê)po/roun], &c.]
[Footnote 10: Plato, Apolog. c. 8-9, pp. 22-23.]
[Side-note: False persuasion of wisdom is universal--the God alone is
wise.]
This then was the philosophical mission of Sokrates, imposed upon him
by the Delphian oracle, and in which he passed the mature portion of
his life: to cross-examine every one, to expose that false persuasion
of knowledge which every one felt, and to demonstrate the truth of
that which the oracle really meant by declaring the superior wisdom of
Sokrates. "People suppose me to be wise myself (says Sokrates) on
those matters on which I detect and prove the non-wisdom of
others.[11] But that is a mistake. The God alone is wise: and his
oracle declares human wisdom to be worth little or nothing, employing
the name of Sokrates as an example. He is the wisest of men, who, like
Sokrates, knows well that he is in truth worthless so far as wisdom is
concerned.[12] The really disgraceful ignorance is--to think that you
know what you do not really know."[13]
[Footnote 11: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A. [Greek: oi)/ontai ga/r me
e(ka/stote oi( paro/ntes tau=ta au)to\n ei)=nai sopho/n, a(\ a)\n
a)/llon e)xele/gxô.]]
[Footnote 12: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A; c. 17, p. 28 E.]
[Footnote 13: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 B. [Greek: kai\ tou=to pô=s
ou)k a)mathi/a e)sti\n au)tê\ ê( e)ponei/distos, ê( tou= oi)/esthai
ei)de/nai a(\ ou)k oi)=den?]]
[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the cross-examining
mission imposed upon him by the God.]
"The God has marked for me my post, to pass my life in the search for
wisdom, cross-examining myself as well as others: I shall be
disgraced, if I desert that post from fear either of death or of any
other evil."[14] "Even if you Dikasts acquit me, I shall not alter my
course: I shall continue, as long as I hold life and strength, to
exhort and interrogate in my usual strain, telling every one whom I
meet[15]--You, a citizen of the great and intelligent Athens, are you
not ashamed of busying yourself to procure wealth, reputation, and
glory, in the greatest possible quantity; while you take neither
thought nor pains about truth, or wisdom, or the fullest measure of
goodness for your mind? If any one denies the charge, and professes
that he _does_ take thought for these objects,--I shall not let him
off without questioning, cross-examining, and exposing him.[16] And if
he appears to me to affirm that he is virtuous without being so in
reality, I shall reproach him for caring least about the greater
matter, and most about the smaller. This course I shall pursue with
every one whom I meet, young or old, citizen or non-citizen: most of
all with you citizens, because you are most nearly connected with me.
For this, you know, is what the God commands, and I think that no
greater blessing has ever happened to the city than this ministration
of mine under orders from the God. For I go about incessantly
persuading you all, old as well as young, not to care about your
bodies, or about riches, so much as about acquiring the largest
measure of virtue for your minds. I urge upon you that virtue is not
the fruit of wealth, but that wealth, together with all the other
things good for mankind publicly and privately, are the fruits of
virtue.[17] If I am a corruptor of youth, it is by these discourses
that I corrupt them: and if any one gives a different version of my
discourses, he talks idly. Accordingly, men of Athens, I must tell you
plainly: decide with Anytus, or not,--acquit me or not--I shall do
nothing different from what I have done, even if I am to die many
times over for it."
[Footnote 14: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 28 E.]
[Footnote 15: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 D. [Greek: ou) mê\ pau/sômai
philosophô=n kai\ u(mi=n parakeleuo/meno/s te kai\ e)ndeiknu/menos,
o(/tô| a)\n a)ei\ e)ntugcha/nô u(mô=n, le/gôn oi(=a/per ei)/ôtha],
&c.]
[Footnote 16: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 E. [Greek: kai\ e)a/n tis
u(mô=n a)mphisbêtê/sê| kai\ phê=| e)pimelei=sthai, ou)k eu)thu\s
a)phê/sô au)to\n ou)d' a)/peimi, a)ll' e)rê/somai au)to\n kai\
e)xeta/sô kai\ e)le/gxô, kai\ e)a/n moi mê\ dokê=| kektê=sthai
a)retê/n, pha/nai de/, o)neidiô=], &c.]
[Footnote 17: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 30, B. [Greek: le/gôn o(/ti ou)k
e)k chrêma/tôn a)retê\ gi/gnetai, a)ll' e)x a)retê=s chrê/mata kai\
ta)/lla a)gatha\ toi=s a)nthrô/pois a(/panta kai\ i)di/a| kai\
dêmosi/a|.]]
[Side-note: He had devoted his life to the execution of this mission,
and he intended to persevere in spite of obloquy or danger.]
Such is the description given by Sokrates of his own profession and
standing purpose, imposed upon him as a duty by the Delphian God. He
neglected all labour either for profit, or for political importance,
or for the public service; he devoted himself, from morning till
night, to the task of stirring up the Athenian public, as the gadfly
worries a large and high-bred but over-sleek horse:[18] stimulating
them by interrogation, persuasion, reproach, to render account of
their lives and to seek with greater energy the path of virtue. By
continually persisting in such universal cross-examination, he had
rendered himself obnoxious to the Athenians generally;[19] who were
offended when called upon to render account, and when reproached that
they did not live rightly. Sokrates predicts that after his death,
younger cross-examiners, hitherto kept down by his celebrity, would
arise in numbers,[20] and would pursue the same process with greater
keenness and acrimony than he had done.
[Footnote 18: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 E. [Greek: a)technô=s, ei)
kai\ geloio/teron ei)pei=n, proskei/menon tê=| po/lei u(po\ tou=
theou= ô(/sper i(/ppô| mega/lô| me\n kai\ gennai/ô|, u(po\ mege/thous
de\ nôtheste/rô| kai\ _deome/nô| e)gei/resthai u(po\ mu/ôpo/s tinos_;
oi(=on dê/ moi dokei= o( theo\s e)me\ tê=| po/lei prostetheike/nai
toiou=to/n tina, o(\s u(ma=s _e)gei/rôn kai\ pei/thôn kai\
o)neidi/zôn_ e(/na e(/kaston ou)de\n pau/omai tê\n ê(me/ran o(/lên
pantachou= proskathi/zôn]. Also c. 26, p. 36 D.]
[Footnote 19: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 D; c. 16, p. 28 A; c. 30, p. 39
C.]
[Footnote 20 Plato, Apol. c. 30, p. 39 C. [Greek: nu=n ga\r tou=to
ei)/rgasthe] (i.e. [Greek: e)me\ a)pekto/nate]) [Greek: _oi)o/menoi
a)palla/xesthai tou= dido/nai e)/legchon tou= bi/ou_. to\ de\ u(mi=n
polu\ e)nanti/on a)pobê/setai, ô(s e)go/ phêmi. plei/ous e)/sontai
u(ma=s oi( e)le/gchontes, ou(=s nu=n e)gô\ katei=chon, u(mei=s de\
ou)k ê)|stha/nesthe; kai\ chalepô/teroi e)/sontai o(/sô| neô/teroi/
ei)si, kai\ u(mei=s ma=llon a)ganaktê/sete], &c.
I have already remarked (in chapter lxviii. of my general History of
Greece relating to Sokrates) that this prediction was not fulfilled.]
[Side-note: He disclaims the function of a teacher--he cannot teach,
for he is not wiser than others. He differs from others by being
conscious of his own ignorance.]
While Sokrates thus extols, and sanctifies under the authority of the
Delphian God, his habitual occupation of interrogating,
cross-examining, and stimulating to virtue, the Athenians
indiscriminately--he disclaims altogether the function of a teacher.
His disclaimer on this point is unequivocal and emphatic. He cannot
teach others, because he is not at all wiser than they. He is fully
aware that he is not wise on any point, great or small--that he knows
nothing at all, so to speak.[21] He can convict others, by their own
answers, of real though unconscious ignorance, or (under another
name) false persuasion of knowledge: and because he can do so, he is
presumed to possess positive knowledge on the points to which the
exposure refers. But this presumption is altogether unfounded: he
possesses no such positive knowledge. Wisdom is not to be found in
any man, even among the most distinguished: Sokrates is as ignorant
as others; and his only point of superiority is, that he is fully
conscious of his own ignorance, while others, far from having the
like consciousness, confidently believe themselves to be in
possession of wisdom and truth.[22] In this consciousness of his
own ignorance Sokrates stands alone; on which special ground he is
proclaimed by the Delphian God as the wisest of mankind.
[Footnote 21: Plato, Apol. c. 6, p. 21 B. [Greek: e)gô\ ga\r dê\
ou)/te me/ga ou)/te smikro\n xu/noida e)mautô=| sopho\s ô)/n], &c. c.
8, p. 22 D. [Greek: e)mautô=| ga\r xunê/|dein ou)de\n e)pistame/nô|,
ô(s e)/pos ei)pei=n.]]
[Footnote 22: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 A-B. [Greek: Ou(=tos u(mô=n,
ô)= a)/nthrôpoi, sophô/tato/s e)stin, o(/stis ô(/sper Sôkra/tês
e)/gnôken o(/ti ou)deno\s a)/xio/s e)sti tê=| a)lêthei/a| pro\s
sophi/an.]]
[Side-note: He does not know where competent teachers can be found. He
is perpetually seeking for them, but in vain.]
Being thus a partner in the common ignorance, Sokrates cannot of
course teach others. He utterly disclaims having ever taught, or
professed to teach. He would be proud indeed, if he possessed the
knowledge of human and social virtue: but he does not know it himself,
nor can he find out who else knows it.[23] He is certain that there
cannot be more than a few select individuals who possess the art of
making mankind wiser or better--just as in the case of horses, none
but a few practised trainers know how to make them better, while the
handling of these or other animals, by ordinary men, certainly does
not improve the animals, and generally even makes them worse.[24] But
where any such select few are to be found, who alone can train
men--Sokrates is obliged to inquire from others; he cannot divine for
himself.[25] He is perpetually going about, with the lantern of
cross-examination, in search of a wise man: but he can find only
those who pretend to be wise, and whom his cross-examination exposes
as pretenders.[26]
[Footnote 23: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20 B-C. [Greek: ti/s tê=s
toiau/tês a)retê=s, tê=s a)nthrôpi/nês te kai\ politikê=s, e)pistê/môn
e)sti/n? . . . e)gô\ gou=n kai\ au)to\s e)kalluno/mên te kai\
ê(bruno/mên a)\n, ei) ê)pista/mên tau=ta; a)ll' ou) ga\r e)pi/stamai,
ô)= a)/ndres A)thênai=oi].
c. 21, p. 33 A. [Greek: e)gô\ de\ dida/skalos me\n ou)deno\s pô/pot'
e)geno/mên]. c. 4, p. 19 E.]
[Footnote 24: Plato, Apol. c. 12, p. 25 B.]
[Footnote 25: Plato, Apol. c. 4, p. 20.]
[Footnote 26: Plato, Apol. c. 9, p. 23 B. [Greek: tau=t' ou)=n e)gô\
me\n e)/ti kai\ nu=n periiô\n zêtô= kai\ e)reunô= kata\ to\n theo/n,
kai\ tô=n a)stôn kai\ tô=n xe/nôn a)\n tina oi)/ômai sopho\n ei)=nai;
kai\ e)peida/n moi mê\ dokê=|, tô=| theô=| boêthô=n e)ndei/knumai
o(/ti ou)k e)/sti sopho/s]. c. 32, p. 41 B.]
This _then_is the mission and vocation of Sokrates--1. To
cross-examine men, and to destroy that false persuasion of wisdom and
virtue which is so widely diffused among them. 2. To reproach them,
and make them ashamed of pursuing wealth and glory more than wisdom
and virtue.[27]
[Footnote 27: Plato, Apol. c. 33, p. 41 E.]
But Sokrates is not empowered to do more for them. He cannot impart
any positive knowledge to heal their ignorance. He cannot teach them
what WISDOM OR VIRTUE is.
[Side-note: Impression made by the Platonic Apology on Zeno the
Stoic.]
Such is the substance of the Platonic Apology of Sokrates. How strong
was the impression which it made, on many philosophical readers, we
may judge from the fact, that Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school,
being a native of Kition in Cyprus, derived from the perusal of the
Apology his first inducement to come over to Athens, and devote
himself to the study and teaching of philosophy in that city.[28]
Sokrates depicts, with fearless sincerity, what he regards as the
intellectual and moral deficiencies of his countrymen, as well as the
unpalatable medicine and treatment which he was enjoined to administer
to them. With equal sincerity does he declare the limits within which
that treatment was confined.
[Footnote 28: Themistius, Orat. xxiii. (Sophistês) p. 357, Dindorf.
[Greek: Ta\ de\ a)mphi\ Zê/nônos a)ri/dêla/ te/ e)sti kai\ a)|do/mena
u(po\ pollôn, o(/ti au)to\n ê( Sôkra/tous a)pologi/a e)k Phoini/kês
ê)/gagen ei)s tê\n Poiki/lên].
This statement deserves full belief: it probably came from Zeno
himself, a voluminous writer. The father of Zeno was a merchant who
traded with Athens, and brought back books for his son to read,
Sokratic books among them. Diogen. Laert. vii. 31.
Respecting another statement made by Themistius in the same page, I do
not feel so certain. He says that the accusatory discourse pronounced
against Sokrates by Anytus was composed by Polykrates, as a [Greek:
logogra/phos], and paid for. This may be the fact but the words of
Isokrates in the Busiris rather lead me to the belief that the [Greek:
katêgori/a Sôkra/tous] composed by Polykrates was a sophistical
exercise, composed to acquire reputation and pupils, not a discourse
really delivered in the Dikastery.]
[Side-note: Extent of efficacious influence claimed by Sokrates for
himself--exemplified by Plato throughout the Dialogues of
Search--Xenophon and Plato enlarge it.]
But neither of his two most eminent companions can endure to restrict
his competence within such narrow limits. Xenophon[29] affirms that
Sokrates was assiduous in communicating useful instruction and
positive edification to his hearers. Plato sometimes, though more
rarely, intimates the same: but for the most part, and in the
Dialogues of Search throughout, he keeps Sokrates within the circle of
procedure which the Apology claims for him. These dialogues exemplify
in detail the aggressive operations, announced therein by Sokrates in
general terms as his missionary life-purpose, against contemporaries
of note, very different from each other--against aspiring youths,
statesmen, generals, Rhetors, Sophists, orthodox pietists, poets,
rhapsodes, &c. Sokrates cross-examines them all, and convicts them of
humiliating ignorance: but he does not furnish, nor does he profess to
be able to furnish, any solution of his own difficulties. Many of the
persons cross-examined bear historical names: but I think it necessary
to warn the reader, that all of them speak both language and
sentiments provided for them by Plato, and not their own.[30]
[Footnote 29: Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 64, i. 3. 1, i. 4, 2, iv. 2, 40;
iv. 3, 4.]
[Footnote 30: It might seem superfluous to give such a warning; but
many commentators speak as if they required it. They denounce the
Platonic speakers in harsh terms, which have no pertinence, unless
supposed to be applied to a real man expressing his own thoughts and
feelings.
It is useless to enjoin us, as Stallbaum and Steinhart do, to mark the
aristocratical conceit of Menon!--the pompous ostentation and
pretensive verbosity of Protagoras and Gorgias!--the exorbitant
selfishness of Polus and Kalliklês!--the impudent brutality of
Thrasymachus!--when all these persons speak entirely under the
prompting of Plato himself.
You might just as well judge of Sokrates by what we read in the Nubes
of Aristophanes, or of Meton by what we find in the Aves, as describe
the historical characters of the above-named personages out of the
Platonic dialogues. They ought to be appreciated as dramatic pictures,
drest up by the author for his own purpose, and delivering such
opinions as he assigns to them--whether he intends them to be refuted
by others, or not.]
[Side-note: Assumption by modern critics, that Sokrates is a positive
teacher, employing indirect methods for the inculcation of theories of
his own.]
The disclaimer, so often repeated by Sokrates,--that he possessed
neither positive knowledge nor wisdom in his own person,--was
frequently treated by his contemporaries as ironical. He was not
supposed to be in earnest when he made it. Every one presumed that he
must himself know that which he proved others not to know, whatever
motive he might have for affecting ignorance.[31] His personal manner
and homely vein of illustration seemed to favour the supposition that
he was bantering. This interpretation of the character of Sokrates
appears in the main to be preferred by modern critics. Of course (they
imagine) an able man who cross-questions others on the definitions of
Law, Justice, Democracy, &c., has already meditated on the subject,
and framed for himself unimpeachable definitions of these terms.
Sokrates (they suppose) is a positive teacher and theorist, employing
a method, which, though indirect and circuitous, is nevertheless
calculated deliberately beforehand for the purpose of introducing and
inculcating premeditated doctrines of his own. Pursuant to this
hypothesis, it is presumed that the positive theory of Sokrates is to
be found in his negative cross-examinations,--not indeed set down
clearly in any one sentence, so that he who runs may read--yet
disseminated in separate syllables or letters, which may be
distinguished, picked out, and put together into propositions, by an
acute detective examiner. And the same presumption is usually applied
to the Sokrates of the Platonic dialogues: that is, to Plato employing
Sokrates as spokesman. Interpreters sift with microscopic accuracy the
negative dialogues of Plato, in hopes of detecting the ultimate
elements of that positive solution which he is supposed to have lodged
therein, and which, when found, may be put together so as to clear up
all the antecedent difficulties.
[Footnote 31: Plato, Apol. c. 5, p. 20 D; c. 9, p. 23 A.
Aristeides the Rhetor furnishes a valuable confirmation of the truth
of that picture of Sokrates, which we find in the Platonic Apology.
All the other companions of Sokrates who wrote dialogues about him
(not preserved to us), presented the same general features. 1. Avowed
ignorance. 2. The same declaration of the oracle concerning him. 3.
The feeling of frequent signs from [Greek: to\ daimo/nion].
[Greek: O(mologei=tai me/n ge le/gein au)to\n] (Sokrates) [Greek: ô(s
a)/ra ou)de\n e)pi/staito, _kai\ pa/ntes tou=to/ phasin oi(
suggeno/menoi_; o(mologei=tai d' au)= kai\ tou=to, sophô/taton ei)=nai
Sôkra/tê tê\n Puthi/an ei)rêke/nai], &c.
(Aristeides, Orat. xlv. [Greek: Peri\ R(êtorikê=s], pp. 23, 24, 25,
Dindorf.)]
[Side-note: Incorrectness of such assumption--the Sokratic Elenchus
does not furnish a solution, but works upon the mind of the
respondent, stimulating him to seek for a solution of his own.]
I have already said (in the preceding chapter) that I cannot take this
view either of Sokrates or of Plato. Without doubt, each of them had
affirmative doctrines and convictions, though not both the same. But
the affirmative vein, with both of them, runs in a channel completely
distinct from the negative. The affirmative theory has its roots
_aliunde_, and is neither generated, nor adapted, with a view to
reconcile the contradictions, or elucidate the obscurities, which the
negative Elenchus has exposed. That exposure does indeed render the
embarrassed respondent painfully conscious of the want of some
rational, consistent, and adequate theoretical explanation: it farther
stimulates him to make efforts of his own for the supply of that want.
But such efforts must be really his own; the Elenchus gives no farther
help: it furnishes problems, but no solutions, nor even any assurance
that the problems as presented, admit of affirmative solutions.
Whoever expects that such consummate masters of the negative process
as Sokrates and Plato, when they come to deliver affirmative dogmas of
their own, will be kept under restraint by their own previous
Elenchus, and will take care that their dogmas shall not be vulnerable
by the same weapons as they had employed against others--will be
disappointed. They do not employ any negative test against themselves.
When Sokrates preaches in the Xenophontic Memorabilia, or the Athenian
Stranger in the Platonic Leges, they jump over, or suppose to be
already solved, the difficulties under the pressure of which other
disputants had been previously discredited: they assume all the
undefinable common-places to be clearly understood, and all the
inconsistent generalities to be brought into harmony. Thus it is that
the negative cross-examination, and the affirmative dogmatism, are
(both in Sokrates and in Plato) two unconnected operations of thought:
the one does not lead to, or involve, or verify, the other.
[Side-note: Value and importance of this process--stimulating active
individual minds to theorise each for itself.]
Those who depreciate the negative process simply, unless followed up
by some new positive doctrine which shall be proof against all such
attack--cannot be expected to admire Sokrates greatly, even as he
stands rated by himself. Even if I concurred in this opinion, I should
still think myself obliged to exhibit him as he really was. But I do
not concur in the opinion. I think that the creation and furtherance
of individual, self-thinking minds, each instigated to form some
rational and consistent theory for itself, is a material benefit, even
though no farther aid be rendered to the process except in the way of
negative suggestion. That such minds should be made to feel the
arbitrary and incoherent character of that which they have imbibed by
passive association as ethics and æsthetics,--and that they should
endeavour to test it by some rational and consistent standard--would
be an improving process, though no one theory could be framed
satisfactory to all. The Sokratic Elenchus went directly to this
result. Plato followed in the same track, not of pouring new matter of
knowledge into the pupil, but of eliciting new thoughts and beliefs
out of him, by kindling the latent forces of his intellect. A large
proportion of Plato's dialogues have no other purpose or value. And in
entering upon the consideration of these dialogues, we cannot take a
better point of departure than the Apology of Sokrates, wherein the
speaker, alike honest and decided in his convictions, at the close of
a long cross-examining career, re-asserts expressly his devoted
allegiance to the negative process, and disclaims with equal emphasis
all power over the affirmative.
[Side-note: View taken by Sokrates about death. Other men profess to
know what it is, and think it a great misfortune: he does not know.]
In that touching discourse, the Universal Cross-Examiner declares a
thorough resolution to follow his own individual conviction and his
own sense of duty--whether agreeing or disagreeing with the
convictions of his countrymen, and whether leading to danger or to
death for himself. "Where a man may have posted himself either--under
his own belief that it is best, or under orders from the
magistrate--there he must stay and affront danger, not caring for death or
anything else in comparison with disgrace."[32] As to death, Sokrates
knows very little what it is, nor whether it is good or evil. The fear
of death, in his view, is only one case of the prevalent mental
malady--men believing themselves to know that of which they really
know nothing. If death be an extinction of all sensation, like a
perpetual and dreamless sleep, he will regard it as a prodigious
benefit compared with life: even the Great King will not be a loser by
the exchange.[33] If on the contrary death be a transition into Hades,
to keep company with those who have died before--Homer, Hesiod, the
heroes of the Trojan war, &c.--Sokrates will consider it supreme
happiness to converse with and cross-examine the potentates and clever
men of the past--Agamemnon, Odysseus, Sisyphus; thus discriminating
which of them are really wise, and which of them are only unconscious
pretenders. He is convinced that no evil can ever happen to the good
man; that the protection, of the Gods can never be wanting to him,
whether alive or dead.[34] "It is not lawful for a better man to be
injured by a worse. He may indeed be killed, or banished, or
disfranchised; and these may appear great evils, in the eye of others.
But I do not think them so. It is a far greater evil to do what
Melêtus is now doing--trying to kill a man unjustly."[35]
[Footnote 32: Plato, Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D.]
[Footnote 33: Plato, Apol. c. 17, p. 29 A. c. 32, p. 40 D. [Greek: kai\
ei)/te dê\ mêdemi/a ai)/sthêsi/s e)stin, a)ll' oi(=on u(/pnos,
e)peida/n tis katheu/dôn mêd' o)/nar mêde\n o(ra=|, thauma/sion
ke/rdos a)\n ei)/ê o( tha/natos].
Ast remarks (Plat. Leb. und Schrift. p. 488) that the language of
doubt and uncertainty in which Sokrates here speaks of the
consequences of death, is greatly at variance with the language which
he is made to hold in Phædon. Ast adduces this as one of his arguments
for disallowing the authenticity of the Apology. I do not admit the
inference. I am prepared for divergence between the opinions of
Sokrates in different dialogues; and I believe, moreover, that the
Sokrates of the Phædon is spokesman chosen to argue in support of the
main thesis of that dialogue. But it is impossible to deny the
variance which Ast points out, and which is also admitted by
Stallbaum. Steinhart indeed (Einleitung, p. 246) goes the length of
denying it, in which I cannot follow him. The sentiment of Sokrates in
the Apology embodies the same alternative uncertainty, as what we read
in Marcus Antoninus, v. 33. [Greek: Ti/ ou)=n? perime/neis i(/leôs
tê\n ei)/te sbe/sin ei)/te meta/stasin], &c.]
[Footnote 34: Plato, Apol. c. 32, p. 41 A-B.]
[Footnote 35: Plato, Apol. c. 18, p. 30 D.]
[Side-note: Reliance of Sokrates on his own individual reason, whether
agreeing or disagreeing with others.]
Sokrates here gives his own estimate of comparative good and evil.
Death, banishment, disfranchisement, &c., are no great evils: to put
another man to death unjustly, is a great evil to the doer: the good
man can suffer no evil at all. These are given as the judgments of
Sokrates, and as dissentient from most others. Whether they are
Sokratic or Platonic opinions, or common to both--we shall find them
reappearing in various other Platonic dialogues, hereafter to be
noticed. We have also to notice that marked feature in the character
of Sokrates[36]--the standing upon his own individual reason and
measure of good and evil: nay, even pushing his confidence in it so
far, as to believe in a divine voice informing and moving him. This
reliance on the individual reason is sometimes recognised, at other
times rejected, in the Platonic dialogues. Plato rejects it in his
comments (contained in the dialogue Theætêtus) on the doctrine of
Protagoras: he rejects it also in the constructive dialogues, Republic
and Leges, where he constitutes himself despotic legislator,
prescribing a standard of orthodox opinion; he proclaims it in the
Gorgias, and implies it very generally throughout the negative
dialogues.
[Footnote 36: Plat. Apol. c. 16, p. 28 D. [Greek: ou(= a)/n tis e(auto\n
ta/xê| ê)\ ê(gêsa/menos be/ltion ei)=nai ê)\ u(p' a)/rchontos
tachthê=|, e)ntau=tha dei=, ô(s e)moi\ dokei=, me/nonta kinduneu/ein],
&c.
Xenophon, Memorab. iv. 8, 11 [Greek: phro/nimos de/, ô(/ste mê\
diamarta/nein kri/nôn ta\ belti/ô kai\ ta\ chei/rô, mêde\ a)/llou
prosde/esthai, a)ll' au)ta/rchês ei)=nai pro\s tê\n tou/tôn gnô=sin],
&c.
Compare this with Memor. i. 1, 3-4-5, and the Xenophontic Apology, 4,
5, 13, where this [Greek: au)tarkei/a] finds for itself a
justification in the hypothesis of a divine monitor without.
The debaters in the treatise of Plutarch, De Genio Socratis, upon the
question of the Sokratic [Greek: daimo/nion], insist upon this
resolute persuasion and self-determination as the most indisputable
fact in the case (c. 11, p. 581 C) [Greek: Ai( de\ Sôkra/tous o(rmai\
to\ be/baion e)/chousai kai\ sphodro/têta phai/nontai pro\s a(/pan,
ô(s a)\n e)x o)rthê=s kai\ i)schura=s a)pheime/nai kri/eôs kai\
a)rchê=s]. Compare p. 589 E. The speculations of the speakers upon the
[Greek: ou)si/a] and [Greek: du/namis tou= Sôkra/tous daimoni/ou],
come to little result.
There is a curious passage in Plutarch's life of Coriolanus (c. 32),
where he describes the way in which the Gods act upon the minds of
particular men, under difficult and trying circumstances. They do not
inspire new resolutions or volitions, but they work upon the
associative principle, suggesting new ideas which conduct to the
appropriate volition--[Greek: ou)d' o(rma\s e)nergazo/menon, a)lla\
phantasi/as o(rmô=n a)gôgou/s], &c.]
[Side-note: Formidable efficacy of established public beliefs,
generated without any ostensible author.]
Lastly, we find also in the Apology distinct notice of the formidable
efficacy of established public impressions, generated without any
ostensible author, circulated in the common talk, and passing without
examination from one man to another, as portions of accredited faith.
"My accusers Melêtus and Anytus (says Sokrates) are difficult enough
to deal with: yet far less difficult than the prejudiced public, who
have heard false reports concerning me for years past, and have
contracted a settled belief about my character, from nameless authors
whom I cannot summon here to be confuted."[37]
[Footnote 37: Plato, Apol. c. 2, p. 18 C-D.]
It is against this ancient, established belief, passing for
knowledge--communicated by unconscious contagion without any rational
process--against the "procès jugé mais non plaidé", whereby King Nomos
governs--that the general mission of Sokrates is directed. It is against
the like belief, in one of its countless manifestations, that he here
defends himself before the Dikastery.