[Side-note: False persuasion of knowledge--had reference to topics

social, political, ethical.]

What those topics were, in respect to which Sokrates found this

universal belief of knowledge, without the reality of knowledge--we

know, not merely from the dialogues of Plato, but also from the

Memorabilia of Xenophon. Sokrates did not touch upon recondite

matters--upon the Kosmos, astronomy, meteorology. Such studies he

discountenanced as useless, and even as irreligious.[64] The subjects

on which he interrogated were those of common, familiar, every-day

talk: those which every one believed himself to know, and on which

every one had a confident opinion to give: the respondent being

surprised that any one could put the questions, or that there could be

any doubt requiring solution. What is justice? what is injustice? what

are temperance and courage? what is law, lawlessness, democracy,

aristocracy? what is the government of mankind, and the attributes

which qualify any one for exercising such government? Here were

matters upon which every one talked familiarly, and would have been

ashamed to be thought incapable of delivering an opinion. Yet it was

upon these matters that Sokrates detected universal ignorance, coupled

with a firm, but illusory, persuasion of knowledge. The conversation

of Sokrates with Euthydêmus, in the Xenophontic Memorabilia[65]--the

first Alkibiadês, Lachês, Charmidês, Euthyphron, &c., of Plato--are

among the most marked specimens of such cross-examination or Elenchus--a

string of questions, to which there are responses in indefinite

number successively given, tested, and exposed as unsatisfactory.

[Footnote 64: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1.]

[Footnote 65: Xenoph. Memor. iv. 2. A passage from Paley's preface to

his "Principles of Moral Philosophy," illustrates well this Sokratic

process: "Concerning the principle of morals, it would be premature to

speak: but concerning the manner of unfolding and explaining that

principle, I have somewhat which I wish to be remarked. An experience

of nine years in the office of a public tutor in one of the

Universities, and in that department of education to which these

sections relate, afforded me frequent opportunity to observe, that in

discoursing to young minds upon topics of morality, it _required much

more pains to make them perceive the difficulty than to understand the

solution_: that unless the subject was so drawn up to a point as to

exhibit the full force of an objection, or the exact place of a doubt,

before any explanation was entered upon--in other words, unless some

curiosity was excited, before it was attempted to be satisfied--the

teacher's labour was lost. When information was not desired, it was

seldom, I found, retained. I have made this observation my guide in

the following work: that is, I have endeavoured, before I suffered

myself to proceed in the disquisition, to put the reader in complete

possession of the question: _and to do it in a way that I thought most

likely to stir up his own doubts and solicitude about it_."]

[Side-note: To those topics, on which each community possesses

established dogmas, laws, customs, sentiments, consecrated and

traditional, peculiar to itself. The local creed, which is never

formally proclaimed or taught, but is enforced unconsciously by every

one upon every one else. Omnipotence of King Nomos.]

The answers which Sokrates elicited and exposed were simple

expressions of the ordinary prevalent belief upon matters on which

each community possesses established dogmas, laws, customs,

sentiments, fashions, points of view, &c., belonging to itself. When

Herodotus passed over to Egypt, he was astonished to find the

judgment, feelings, institutions, and practices of the Egyptians,

contrasting most forcibly with those of all other countries. He

remarks the same (though less in degree) respecting Babylonians,

Indians, Scythians, and others; and he is not less impressed with the

veneration of each community for its own creed and habits, coupled

with indifference or antipathy towards other creeds, disparate or

discordant, prevailing elsewhere.[66]

[Footnote 66: Herodot. ii. 35-36-64; iii. 38-94, seq. i. 196; iv.

76-77-80. The discordance between the various institutions established

among the separate aggregations of mankind, often proceeding to the

pitch of reciprocal antipathy--the imperative character of each in its

own region, assuming the appearance of natural right and propriety--all

this appears brought to view by the inquisitive and observant

Herodotus, as well as by others (Xenophon, Cyropæd. i. 3-18): but many

new facts, illustrating the same thesis, were noticed by Aristotle and

the Peripatetics, when a larger extent of the globe became opened to

Hellenic survey. Compare Aristotle, Ethic. Nik. i. 3, 1094, b. 15;

Sextus Empiric. Pyrr. Hypotyp. i. sect 145-156, iii. sect 198-234; and

the remarkable extract from Bardesanes Syrus, cited by Eusebius, Præp.

Evang. vi., and published in Orelli's collection, pp. 202-219,

Alexandri Aphrodis. et Aliorum De Fato, Zurich, 1824.

Many interesting passages in illustration of the same thesis might be

borrowed from Montaigne, Pascal, and others. But the most forcible of

all illustrations are those furnished by the Oriental world, when

surveyed or studied by intelligent Europeans, as it has been more

fully during the last century. See especially Sir William Sleeman's

Rambles and Recollections of an Indian Official: two volumes which

unfold with equal penetration and fidelity the manifestations of

established sentiment among the Hindoos and Mahomedans. Vol. i. ch.

iv., describing a Suttee on the Nerbudda, is one of the most

impressive chapters in the work: the rather as it describes the

continuance of a hallowed custom, transmitted even from the days of

Alexander. I transcribe also some valuable matter from an eminent

living scholar, whose extensive erudition comprises Oriental as well

as Hellenic philosophy.

M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire (Premier Mémoire sur le Sânkhya, Paris,

1852, pp. 392-396) observes as follows respecting the Sanscrit system

of philosophy called _Sânkhya_, the doctrine expounded and enforced by

the philosopher Kapila--and respecting Buddha and Buddhism which was

built upon the Sânkhya, amending or modifying it. Buddha is believed

to have lived about 547 B.C. Both the system of Buddha, and that of

Kapila, are atheistic, as described by M. St. Hilaire.

"Le second point où Bouddha se sépare de Kapila concerne la doctrine.

L'homme ne peut rester dans l'incertitude que Kapila lui laisse

encore. L'âme délivrée, selon les doctrines de Kapila, peut toujours

renaître. Il n'y a qu'un moyen, un seul moyen, de le sauver,--c'est de

l'anéantir. Le néant seul est un sûr asile: on ne revient pas de celui

là.--Bouddha lui promet le néant; et c'est avec cette promesse inouie

qu'il a passionné les hommes et converti les peuples. Que cette

monstrueuse croyance, partagée aujourd'hui par trois cents millions de

sectateurs, révolte en nous les instincts les plus énergiques de notre

nature--qu'elle soulève toutes les répugnances et toutes les horreurs

de notre âme--qu'elle nous paraisse aussi incompréhensible que

hideuse--peu importe. Une partie considérable de l'humanité l'a

reçue,--prête même à la justifier par toutes les subtilités de la

metaphysique la plus raffinée, et à la confesser dans les tortures des

plus affreux supplices et les austérités homicides d'un fanatisme

aveugle. Si c'est une gloire que de dominer souverainement, à travers

les âges, la foi des hommes,--jamais fondateur de religion n'en eut

une plus grande que le Bouddha: car aucun n'eut de prosélytes plus

fidèles ni plus nombreux. Mais je me trompe: le Bouddha ne prétendait

jamais fonder une réligion. Il n'était que philosophe: et instruit

dans toutes les sciences des Brahmans, il ne voulut personnellement

que fonder, à leur exemple, un nouveau système. Seulement, les moyens

qu'il employait durent mener ses disciples plus loin qu'il ne comptait

aller lui même. En s'adressant à la foule, il faut bientôt la

discipliner et la régler. De là, cette ordination réligieuse que le

Bouddha donnait à ses adeptes, la hiérarchie qu'il établissait entre

eux, fondée uniquement, comme la science l'exigeait, sur le mérite

divers des intelligences et des vertus--la douce et sainte morale

qu'il prêchait,--le détachement de toutes choses en ce monde, si

convenable à des ascètes qui ne pensent qu'au salut éternel--le voeu

de pauvreté, qui est la première loi des Bouddhistes--et tout cet

ensemble de dispositions qui constituent un gouvernement au lieu d'une

école.

"Mais ce n'est là que l'extérieur du Bouddhisme: c'en est le

développement matériel et nécessaire. Au fond, son principe est celui

du Sânkhya: seulement, il l'applique en grand.--C'est la science qui

délivre l'homme: et le Bouddha ajoute--Pour que l'homme soit délivré à

jamais, il faut qu'il arrive au Nirvâna, c'est à dire, qu'il soit

absolument anéanti. Le néant est donc le bout de la science: et le

salut eternel, c'est l'anéantissement."

The same line of argument is insisted on by M. Barthélemy St. Hilaire

in his other work--Bouddha et sa réligion, Paris, 1862, ed. 2nd:

especially in his Chapter on the Nirvâna: wherein moreover he

complains justly of the little notice which authors take of the

established beliefs of those varieties of the human race which are

found apart from Christian Europe.]

This aggregate of beliefs and predispositions to believe, ethical,

religious, æsthetical, social, respecting what is true or false,

probable or improbable, just or unjust, holy or unholy, honourable or

base, respectable or contemptible, pure or impure, beautiful or ugly,

decent or indecent, obligatory to do or obligatory to avoid,

respecting the status and relations of each individual in the society,

respecting even the admissible fashions of amusement and recreation--this

is an established fact and condition of things, the real origin

of which is for the most part unknown, but which each new member of

the society is born to and finds subsisting. It is transmitted by

tradition from parents to children, and is imbibed by the latter

almost unconsciously from what they see and hear around, without any

special season of teaching, or special persons to teach. It becomes a

part of each person's nature--a standing habit of mind, or fixed set

of mental tendencies, according to which, particular experience is

interpreted and particular persons appreciated.[67] It is not set

forth in systematic proclamation, nor impugned, nor defended: it is

enforced by a sanction of its own, the same real sanction or force in

all countries, by fear of displeasure from the Gods, and by certainty

of evil from neighbours and fellow-citizens. The community hate,

despise, or deride, any individual member who proclaims his dissent

from their social creed, or even openly calls it in question. Their

hatred manifests itself in different ways at different times and

occasions, sometimes by burning or excommunication, sometimes by

banishment or interdiction[68] from fire and water; at the very least,

by exclusion from that amount of forbearance, good-will, and

estimation, without which the life of an individual becomes

insupportable: for society, though its power to make an individual

happy is but limited, has complete power, easily exercised, to make

him miserable. The orthodox public do not recognise in any individual

citizen a right to scrutinise their creed, and to reject it if not

approved by his own rational judgment. They expect that he will

embrace it in the natural course of things, by the mere force of

authority and contagion--as they have adopted it themselves: as they

have adopted also the current language, weights, measures, divisions

of time, &c. If he dissents, he is guilty of an offence described in

the terms of the indictment preferred against Sokrates--"Sokrates

commits crime, inasmuch as he does not believe in the Gods, in whom

the city believes, but introduces new religious beliefs," &c.[69]

"Nomos (Law and Custom), King of All" (to borrow the phrase which

Herodotus cites from Pindar[70]), exercises plenary power, spiritual

as well as temporal, over individual minds; moulding the emotions as

well as the intellect according to the local type--determining the

sentiments, the belief, and the predisposition in regard to new

matters tendered for belief, of every one--fashioning thought, speech,

and points of view, no less than action--and reigning under the

appearance of habitual, self-suggested tendencies. Plato, when he

assumes the function of Constructor, establishes special officers for

enforcing in detail the authority of King Nomos in his Platonic

variety. But even where no such special officers exist, we find Plato

himself describing forcibly (in the speech assigned to Protagoras)[71]

the working of that spontaneous ever-present police by whom the

authority of King Nomos is enforced in detail--a police not the less

omnipotent because they wear no uniform, and carry no recognised

title.

[Footnote 67: This general fact is powerfully set forth by Cicero, in

the beginning of the third Tusculan Disputation. Chrysippus the Stoic,

"ut est in omni historiâ curiosus," had collected striking examples of

these consecrated practices, cherished in one territory, abhorrent

elsewhere. (Cic. Tusc. Disp. i. 45, 108.)]

[Footnote 68: See the description of the treatment of Aristodêmus, one

of the two Spartans who survived the battle of Thermopylæ, after his

return home, Herodot. vii. 231, ix. 71. The interdiction from

communion of fire, water, eating, sacrifice, &c., is the strongest

manifestation of repugnance: so insupportable to the person

excommunicated, that it counted for a sentence of exile in the Roman

law. (Deinarchus cont. Aristogeiton, s. 9. Heineccius, Ant. Rom. i.

16, 9, 10.)]

[Footnote 69: Xenophon. Memor. i. 1, 1. [Greek: A)dikei= Sôkra/tês,

ou(\s me\n ê( po/lis nomi/zei theou\s ou) nomi/zôn, e(/tera de\ kaina\

daimo/nia ei)sphe/rôn], &c. Plato (Leges, x. 909, 910) and Cicero

(Legib. ii. 19-25) forbid [Greek: kaina\ daimo/nia], "separatim nemo

habessit Deos," &c.]

[Footnote 70: [Greek: No/mos pa/ntôn basileu/s] (Herodot. iii. 38). It

will be seen from Herodotus, as well as elsewhere, that the idea

really intended to be expressed by the word [Greek: No/mos] is much

larger than what is now commonly understood by _Law_. It is equivalent

to that which Epiktêtus calls [Greek: to\ do/gma--pantachou=

a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma] (Epiktet. iii. 16). It includes what is meant

by [Greek: to\ no/mimon] (Xenoph. Memor. iv. 4, 13-24), [Greek: ta\

no/mima, ta\ nomizo/mena, ta pa/tria, ta\ no/maia], including both

positive morality, and social æsthetical precepts, as well as civil or

political, and even personal habits, such as that of abstinence from

spitting or wiping the nose (Xenoph. Cyrop. viii. 8, 8-10). The case

which Herodotus quotes to illustrate his general thesis is the

different treatment which, among different nations, is considered

dutiful and respectful towards senior relatives and the corpses of

deceased relatives; which matters come under [Greek: ta)/grapta

ka)sphalê= Theô=n No/mima] (Soph. Antig. 440)--of immemorial

antiquity;--

[Greek: Ou) ga/r ti nu=n ge ka)chthe\s a)ll' a)ei/ pote

Zê=| tau=ta, kou)dei\s oi)=den e)x' o(/tou' pha/nê].

[Greek: No/mos] and [Greek: e)pitê/deuma] run together in Plato's

mind, dictating every hour's proceeding of the citizen through life

(Leges, vii. 807-808-823).

We find Plato, in the Leges, which represents the altered tone and

compressive orthodoxy of his old age, extolling the simple goodness

([Greek: eu)ê/theia]) of our early forefathers, who believed

implicitly all that was told them, and were not clever enough to raise

doubts, [Greek: ô(/sper tanu=n] (Legg. iii. 679, 680). Plato dwells

much upon the danger of permitting any innovation on the fixed modes

of song and dance (Legg. v. 727, vii. 797-800), and forbids it under

heavy penalties. He says that the lawgiver both _can_ consecrate

common talk, and ought to consecrate it--[Greek: kathierô=sai tê\n

phê/mên] (Legg. 838), the dicta of [Greek: No/mos Basileu/s].

Pascal describes, in forcible terms, the wide-spread authority of

[Greek: No/mos Basileu/s]:--"Il ne faut pas se méconnaître, nous

sommes automates autant qu'esprit: et delà vient que l'instrument, par

lequel la persuasion se fait, n'est pas la seule démonstration.

Combien y a-t-il peu de choses démontrées! Les preuves ne convainquent

que l'esprit. La coutume fait nos preuves les plus fortes et les plus

crues: _elle incline l'automate, qui entraîne l'esprit sans qu'il y

pense_. Qui a démontré qu'il sera demain jour, et que nous mourrons--et

qu'y a-t-il de plus cru? C'est donc la coutume qui nous en

persuade, c'est elle qui fait tant de Chrétiens, c'est elle qui fait

les Turcs les Paiens, les métiers, les soldats, &c. Enfin, il faut

avoir recours à elle quand une fois l'esprit a vu où est la vérité,

afin de nous abreuver et nous teindre de cette créance, qui nous

échappe à toute heure; car d'en avoir toujours les preuves présentes,

c'est trop d'affaire. Il faut acquérir une créance plus facile, qui

est celle de l'habitude, qui, sans violence, sans art, sans argument,

nous fait croire les choses, et incline toutes nos puissances à cette

croyance, en sorte que notre âme y tombe naturellement. Quand on ne

croit que par la force de la conviction, et que l'automate est incliné

à croire le contraire, ce n'est pas assez." (Pascal, Pensées, ch. xi.

p. 237, ed. Louandre, Paris, 1854.)

Herein Pascal coincides with Montaigne, of whom he often speaks

harshly enough: "Comme de vray nous n'avons aultre mire de la vérité

et de la raison, que l'exemple et idée des opinions et usances du païs

où nous sommes: là est tousiours la parfaicte religion, la parfaicte

police, parfaict et accomply usage de toutes choses." (Essais de

Montaigne, liv. i. ch. 30.) Compare the same train of thought in

Descartes (Discours sur la Méthode, pp. 132-139, ed. Cousin).]

[Footnote 71: Plat. Protag. 320-328. The large sense of the word

[Greek: No/mos], as conceived by Pindar and Herodotus, must be kept in

mind, comprising positive morality, religious ritual, consecrated

habits, the local turns of sympathy and antipathy, &c. M. Salvador

observes, respecting the Mosaic Law: "Qu'on écrive tous les rapports

publics et privés qui unissent les membres d'un peuple quelconque, et

tous les principes sur lesquels ces rapports sont fondés--il en

résultera un ensemble complet, un véritable système plus ou moins

raisonnable, qui sera l'expression exacte de la manière d'exister de

ce peuple. Or, cet ensemble ou ce système est ce que les Hébreux

appellent la _tora_, la loi ou la constitution publique--en prenant ce

mot dans le sens le plus étendu." (Salvador, Histoire des Institutions

de Moise, liv. i. ch. ii. p. 96.)

Compare also about the sense of the word _Lex_, as conceived by the

Arabs, M. Renan, Averroès, p. 286, and Mr. Mill's chapter respecting

the all-comprehensive character of the Hindoo law (Hist. of India, ch.

iv., beginning): "In the law books of the Hindus, the details of

jurisprudence and judicature occupy comparatively a very moderate

space. The doctrines and ceremonies of religion; the rules and

practice of education; the institutions, duties, and customs of

domestic life; the maxims of private morality, and even of domestic

economy; the rules of government, of war, and of negotiation; all form

essential parts of the Hindu code of law, and are treated in the same

style, and laid down with the same authority, as the rules for the

distribution of justice."

Mr. Maine, in his admirable work on Ancient Law, notes both the

all-comprehensive and the irresistible ascendancy of what is called _Law_

in early societies. He remarks emphatically that "the stationary

condition of the human race is the rule--the progressive condition the

exception--a rare exception in the history of the world". (Chap. i.

pp. 16-18-19; chap. ii. pp. 22-24.)

Again, Mr. Maine observes:--"The other liability, to which the infancy

of society is exposed, has prevented or arrested the progress of far

the greater part of mankind. The rigidity of ancient law, arising

chiefly from its early association and identification with religion,

has chained down the mass of the human race to those views of life and

conduct which they entertained at the time when their institutions

were first consolidated into a systematic form. There were one or two

races exempted by a marvellous fate from this calamity: and grafts

from these stocks have fertilised a few modern societies. But it is

still true that over the larger part of the world, the perfection of

law has always been considered as consisting in adherence to the

ground-plan supposed to have been marked out by the legislator. _If

intellect has in such cases been exercised upon jurisprudence, it has

uniformly prided itself on the subtle perversity of the conclusions it

could build on ancient texts, without discoverable departure from

their literal tenor._" (Maine, Ancient Law, ch. iv. pp. 77-78.)]

[Side-note: Small minority of exceptional individual minds, who do not

yield to the established orthodoxy, but insist on exercising their own

judgment.]

There are, however, generally a few exceptional minds to whom this

omnipotent authority of King Nomos is repugnant, and who claim a right

to investigate and judge for themselves on many points already settled

and foreclosed by the prevalent orthodoxy. In childhood and youth

these minds must have gone through the ordinary influences,[72] but

without the permanent stamp which such influences commonly leave

behind. Either the internal intellectual force of the individual is

greater, or he contracts a reverence for some new authority, or (as in

the case of Sokrates) he believes himself to have received a special

mission from the Gods--in one way or other the imperative character of

the orthodoxy around him is so far enfeebled, that he feels at liberty

to scrutinise for himself the assemblage of beliefs and sentiments

around him. If he continues to adhere to them, this is because they

approve themselves to his individual reason: unless this last

condition be fulfilled, he becomes a dissenter, proclaiming his

dissent more or less openly, according to circumstances. Such

disengagement from authority traditionally consecrated ([Greek:

e)xallagê\ tô=n ei)ôtho/tôn nomi/môn]),[73] and assertion of the right

of self-judgment, on the part of a small minority of [Greek:

i)diognô/mones],[74] is the first condition of existence for

philosophy or "reasoned truth".

[Footnote 72: Cicero, Tusc. D. iii. 2; Aristot. Ethic. Nikom. x. 10,

1179, b. 23. [Greek: o( de\ lo/gos kai\ ê( didachê\ mê/ pot' ou)k e)n

a(/pasin i)schu/ê|, a)lla\ de/ê| prodieirga/sthai toi=s e)/thesi tê\n

tou= a)kroatou= psuchê\n pro\s to\ kalô=s chai/rein kai\ misei=n,

ô(/sper gê=n tê\n thre/psousan to\ spe/rma]. To the same purpose

Plato, Republ. iii. 402 A, Legg. ii. 653 B, 659 E, Plato and Aristotle

(and even Xenophon, Cyrop. i. 2, 3), aiming at the formation of a body

of citizens, and a community very different from anything which they

saw around them--require to have the means of shaping the early

sentiments, love, hatred, &c., of children, in a manner favourable to

their own ultimate views. This is exactly what [Greek: No/mos

Basileu\s] does effectively in existing societies, without need of

special provision for the purpose. See Plato, Protagor. 325, 326.]

[Footnote 73: Plato, Phædrus, 265 A. See Sir Will. Hamilton's Lectures

on Logic, Lect. 29, pp. 88-90. In the Timæus (p. 40 E) Plato

interrupts the thread of his own speculations on cosmogony, to take in

all the current theogony on the authority of King Nomos. [Greek:

a)du/naton ou)=n theô=n paisi\n a)pistei=n, kai/per a)/neu te

ei)ko/tôn kai\ a)nagkai/ôn a)podei/xeôn le/gousin, a)ll' ô(s oi)kei=a

pha/skousin a)pagge/llein e(pome/nous tô=| no/mô| pisteute/on].

Hegel adverts to this severance of the individual consciousness from

the common consciousness of the community, as the point of departure

for philosophical theory:--"On one hand we are now called upon to find

some specific matter for the general form of Good; such closer

determination of The Good is the criterion required. On the other

hand, the exigencies of the individual subject come prominently

forward: this is the consequence of the revolution which Sokrates

operated in the Greek mind. So long as the religion, the laws, the

political constitution, of any people, are in full force--so long as

each individual citizen is in complete harmony with them all--no one

raises the question, What has the Individual to do for himself? In a

moralised and religious social harmony, each individual finds his

destination prescribed by the established routine; while this positive

morality, religion, laws, form also the routine of _his own_ mind. On

the contrary, if the Individual no longer stands on the custom of his

nation, nor feels himself in full agreement with the religion and

laws--he then no longer finds what he desires, nor obtains

satisfaction in the medium around him. When once such discord has

become confirmed, the Individual must fall back on his own

reflections, and seek his destination there. This is what gives rise

to the question--What is the essential scheme for the Individual? To

what ought he to conform--what shall he aim at? An _ideal_ is thus set

up for the Individual. This is, the Wise Man, or the Ideal of the Wise

Man, which is, in truth, the separate working of individual

self-consciousness, conceived as an universal or typical character."

(Hegel, Geschichte der Philosophie, Part ii. pp. 132, 133.)]

[Footnote 74: This is an expression of the learned Huet, Bishop of

Avranches:--"Si quelqu'un me demande maintenant, ce que nous sommes,

puisque nous ne voulons être ni Académiciens, ni Sceptiques, ni

Eclectiques, ni d'aucune autre Secte, je répondrai que _nous sommes

nôtres_--c'est à dire libres: ne voulans soumettre notre esprit à

aucune autorité, et n'approuvans que ce qui nous paroit s'approcher

plus près de la vérité. Que si quelqu'un, par mocquerie ou par

flatterie, nous appelle [Greek: i)diognô/monas]--c'est à dire,

attachés à nos propres sentimens, nous n'y répugnerons pas." (Huet,

Traité Philosophique de la Foiblesse de l'Esprit Humain, liv. ii. ch.

xi. p. 224, ed. 1741.)]

[Side-note: Early appearance of a few free-judging individuals, or

free-thinkers in Greece.]

Amidst the epic and lyric poets of Greece, with their varied

productive impulse--as well as amidst the Gnomic philosophers, the

best of whom were also poets--there are not a few manifestations of

such freely judging individuality. Xenophanes the philosopher, who

wrote in poetry, censured severely several of the current narratives

about the Gods and Pindar, though in more respectful terms, does the

like. So too, the theories about the Kosmos, propounded by various

philosophers, Thales, Anaximenes, Pythagoras, Herakleitus, Anaxagoras,

&c., were each of them the free offspring of an individual mind. But

these were counter-affirmations: novel theories, departing from the

common belief, yet accompanied by little or no debate, or attack, or

defence: indeed the proverbial obscurity of Herakleitus, and the

recluse mysticism of the Pythagoreans, almost excluded discussion.

These philosophers (to use the phrase of Aristotle[75]) had no concern

with Dialectic: which last commenced in the fifth century B.C., with

the Athenian drama and dikastery, and was enlisted in the service of

philosophy by Zeno the Eleate and Sokrates.

[Footnote 75: Aristot. Metaphys. A. 987, b. 32. Eusebius, having set

forth the dissentient and discordant opinions of the various Hellenic

philosophers, triumphantly contrasts with them the steady adherence of

Jews and Christians to one body of truth, handed down by an uniform

tradition from father to son, from the first generation of

man--[Greek: a)po\ prô/tês a)nthrôpogoni/as]. (Præp. Ev. xiv. 3.)

Cicero, in the treatise (not preserved) entitled _Hortensius_--set

forth, at some length, an attack and a defence of philosophy; the

former he assigned to Hortensius, the latter he undertook in his own

name. One of the arguments urged by Hortensius against philosophy, to

prove that it was not "vera sapientia," was, that it was both a human

invention and a recent novelty, not handed down by tradition _a

principio_, therefore not natural to man. "Quæ si secundum hominis

naturam est, cum homine ipso coeperit necesse est; si vero non est,

nec capere quidem illam posset humana natura. Ubi apud antiquiores

latuit amor iste investigandæ veritatis?" (Lactantius, Inst. Divin.

iii. 16.) The loss of this Ciceronian pleading (Philosophy _versus_

Consecrated Tradition) is much to be deplored. Lactantius and Augustin

seem to have used it largely.

The Hermotimus of Lucian, manifesting all his lively Sokratic

acuteness, is a dialogue intended to expose the worthlessness of all

speculative philosophy. The respondent Hermotimus happens to be a

Stoic, but the assailant expressly declares (c. 85) that the arguments

would be equally valid against Platonists or Aristotelians. Hermotimus

is advised to desist from philosophy, to renounce inquiry, to employ

himself in some of the necessary affairs of life, and to acquiesce in

the common received opinions, which would carry him smoothly along the

remainder of his life ([Greek: a)xiô= pra/ttein ti tô=n a)nagkai/ôn,

kai\ o(/ se parape/mpsei e)s to\ loipo\n tou= bi/ou, ta\ koina\ tau=ta

phronou=nta], c. 72). Among the worthless philosophical speculations

Lucian ranks geometry: the geometrical definitions (point and line) he

declares to be nonsensical and inadmissible (c. 74).]

[Side-note: Rise of Dialectic--Effect of the Drama and the Dikastery.]

Both the drama and the dikastery recognise two or more different ways

of looking at a question, and require that no conclusion shall be

pronounced until opposing disputants have been heard and compared. The

Eumenides plead against Apollo, Prometheus against the mandates and

dispositions of Zeus, in spite of the superior dignity as well as

power with which Zeus is invested: every Athenian citizen, in his

character of dikast, took an oath to hear both the litigant parties

alike, and to decide upon the pleadings and evidence according to law.

Zeno, in his debates with the anti-Parmenidean philosophers, did not

trouble himself to parry their thrusts. He assumed the aggressive,

impugned the theories of his opponents, and exposed the contradictions

in which they involved themselves. The dialectic process, in which

there are (at the least) two opposite points of view both represented--the

negative and the affirmative--became both prevalent and

interesting.

[Side-note: Application of Negative scrutiny to ethical and social

topics by Sokrates.]

I have in a former chapter explained the dialectic of Zeno, as it bore

upon the theories of the anti-Parmenidean philosophers. Still more

important was the proceeding of Sokrates, when he applied the like

scrutiny to ethical, social, political, religious topics. He did not

come forward with any counter-theories: he declared expressly that he

had none to propose, and that he was ignorant. He put questions to

those who on their side professed to know, and he invited answers from

them. His mission, as he himself described it, was, to scrutinise and

expose false pretensions to knowledge. Without such scrutiny, he

declares life itself to be not worth having. He impugned the common

and traditional creed, not in the name of any competing doctrine, but

by putting questions on the familiar terms in which it was confidently

enunciated, and by making its defenders contradict themselves and feel

the shame of their own contradictions. The persons who held it were

shown to be incapable of defending it, when tested by an acute

cross-examiner; and their supposed knowledge, gathered up insensibly

from the tradition around them, deserved the language which Bacon applies

to the science of his day, conducting indirectly to the necessity of

that remedial course which Bacon recommends. "Nemo adhuc tantâ mentis

constantiâ et rigore inventus est, ut decreverit et sibi proposuerit,

theorias et notiones communes penitus abolere, et intellectum abrasum

et æquum ad particularia rursus applicare. Itaque ratio illa quam

habemus, ex multâ fide et multo etiam casu, necnon ex puerilibus quas

primo hausimus notionibus, farrago quædam est et congeries."[76]

[Footnote 76: Bacon, Nov. Org. Aph. 97. I have already cited this

passage in a note on the 68th chapter of my 'History of Greece,' pp.

612-613; in which note I have also alluded to other striking passages

of Bacon, indicating the confusion, inconsistencies, and

misapprehensions of the "_intellectus sibi permissus_". In that note,

and in the text of the chapter, I have endeavoured to illustrate the

same view of the Sokratic procedure as that which is here taken.]

[Side-note: Emphatic assertion by Sokrates of the right of

satisfaction for his own individual reason.]

Never before (so far as we know) had the authority of King Nomos been

exposed to such an enemy as this dialectic or cross-examination by

Sokrates: the prescriptive creed and unconsciously imbibed sentiment

("ratio ex fide, casu, et puerilibus notionibus") being thrown upon

their defence against negative scrutiny brought to bear upon them by

the inquisitive reason of an individual citizen. In the Apology,

Sokrates clothes his own strong intellectual _oestrus_ in the belief

(doubtless sincerely entertained) of a divine mission. In the Gorgias,

the Platonic Sokrates asserts it in naked and simple, yet not less

emphatic, language. "You, Polus, bring against me the authority of the

multitude, as well as that of the most eminent citizens, all of whom

agree in upholding your view. But I, one man standing here alone, do

_not_ agree with you. And I engage to compel you, my one respondent,

to agree with _me_."[77] The autonomy or independence of individual

reason against established authority, and the title of negative reason

as one of the litigants in the process of philosophising, are first

brought distinctly to view in the career of Sokrates.

[Footnote 77: Plato, Gorgias, p. 472 A. [Greek: kai\ nu=n, peri\ ô(=n

su\ le/geis, o)li/gou soi\ pa/ntes sumphê/sousi tau)ta A)thênai=oi

kai\ oi( xe/noi, e)a\n bou/lê kat' e)mou= ma/rturas parasche/sthai ô(s

ou)k a)lêthê= le/gô; marturê/sousi/ soi, e)a\n me\n bou/lê|, Niki/as

o( Nikêra/tou kai\ oi( a)delphoi\ met' au)tou=--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|,

A)ristokra/tês o( Skelli/ou--e)a\n de\ bou/lê|, ê( Perikle/ous o(/lê

oi)ki/a ê)\ a)/llê sugge/neia, ê(/ntina a)\n bou/lê| tô=n e)/nthade

e)kle/xasthai. _A)ll' e)gô/ soi ei)=s ô(\n ou)ch o(mologô=_; ou) ga/r

me su\ a)nagka/zeis], &c.]

[Side-note: Aversion of the Athenian public to the negative procedure

of Sokrates. Mistake of supposing that that negative procedure belongs

peculiarly to the Sophists and the Megarici.]

With such a career, we need not wonder that Sokrates, though esteemed

and admired by a select band of adherents, incurred a large amount of

general unpopularity. The public (as I have before observed) do not

admit the claim of independent exercise for individual reason. In the

natural process of growth in the human mind, belief does not follow

proof, but springs up apart from and independent of it: an immature

intelligence believes first, and proves (if indeed it ever seeks

proof) afterwards.[78] This mental tendency is farther confirmed by

the pressure and authority of King Nomos; who is peremptory in

exacting belief, but neither furnishes nor requires proof. The

community, themselves deeply persuaded, will not hear with calmness

the voice of a solitary reasoner, adverse to opinions thus

established; nor do they like to be required to explain, analyse, or

reconcile those opinions.[79] They disapprove especially that

dialectic debate which gives free play and efficacious prominence to

the negative arm. The like disapprobation is felt even by most of the

historians of philosophy; who nevertheless, having an interest in the

philosophising process, might be supposed to perceive that nothing

worthy of being called _reasoned truth_ can exist, without full and

equal scope to negative as well as to affirmative.

[Footnote 78: See Professor Bain's Chapter on Belief; one of the most

original and instructive chapters in his volume on the Emotions and

the Will, pp. 578-584. [Third Ed., pp. 505-538.]]

[Footnote 79: This antithesis and reciprocal repulsion--between the

speculative reason of the philosopher who thinks for himself, and the

established traditional convictions of the public--is nowhere more

strikingly enforced than by Plato in the sixth and seventh books of

the Republic; together with the corrupting influence exercised by King

Nomos, at the head of his vehement and unanimous public, over those

few gifted natures which are competent to philosophical speculation.

See Plato, Rep. vi. 492-493.

The unfavourable feelings with which the attempts to analyse morality

(especially when quite novel, as such attempts were in the time of

Sokrates) are received in a community--are noticed by Mr. John Stuart

Mill, in his tract on Utilitarianism, ch. iii. pp. 38-39:--

"The question is often asked, and properly so, in regard to any

supposed moral standard, What is its sanction? What are the motives to

obey it? or more specifically, What is the source of its obligation?

Whence does it derive its binding force? It is a necessary part of

moral philosophy to provide the answer to this question: which though

frequently assuming the shape of an objection to the utilitarian

morality, as if it had some special applicability to that above

others, really arises in _regard to all standards_. It arises in fact

whenever a person is called on to adopt a standard, or refer morality

to any basis on which he has not been accustomed to rest it. For the

customary morality, that which education and opinion have consecrated,

is the only one which presents itself to the mind with the feeling of

being _in itself_ obligatory: and when a person is asked to believe

that this morality _derives_ its obligation from some general

principle round which custom has not thrown the same halo, the

assertion is to him a paradox. The supposed corollaries seem to have a

more binding force than the original theorem: the superstructure seems

to stand better without than with what is represented as its

foundation. . . . The difficulty has no peculiar application to the

doctrine of utility, but is inherent in every attempt to analyse

morality, and reduce it to principles: which, unless the principle is

already in men's minds invested with as much sacredness as any of its

applications, always seems to divest them of a part of their

sanctity."

Epiktêtus observes that the refined doctrines acquired by the

self-reasoning philosopher, often failed to attain that intense hold

on his conviction, which the "rotten doctrines" inculcated from childhood

possessed over the conviction of ordinary men. [Greek: Dia\ ti/ ou)=n

e)kei=noi (oi( polloi\, oi( i)diô=tai) u(mô=n (tôn philoso/phôn)

i)schuro/teroi? O(/ti e)kei=noi me\n ta\ sapra\ tau=ta a)po\ dogma/tôn

lalou=sin? u(mei=s de\ ta\ kompsa\ a)po\ tô=n cheilô=n . . . . . Ou(/tôs

u(ma=s oi( i)diô=tai nikô=si; Pantachou= ga\r i)schuro\n to\ do/gma;

a)ni/kêton to\ do/gma]. (Epiktêtus, iii. 16.)]

[Side-note: The same charges which the historians of philosophy bring

against the Sophists were brought by contemporary Athenians against

Sokrates. They represent the standing dislike of free inquiry, usual

with an orthodox public.]

These historians usually speak in very harsh terms of the Sophists, as

well as of Eukleides and the Megaric sect; who are taken as the great

apostles of negation. But the truth is, that the Megarics inherited it

from Sokrates, and shared it with Plato. Eukleides cannot have laid

down a larger programme of negation than that which we read in the

Apology of Sokrates,--nor composed a dialogue more ultra-negative than

the Platonic Parmenidês: nor, again, did he depart so widely, in

principle as well as in precept, from existing institutions, as Plato

in his Republic. The charges which historians of philosophy urge

against the Megarics as well as against the persons whom they call the

Sophists--such as corruption of youth--perversion of truth and

morality, by making the worse appear the better reason--subversion of

established beliefs--innovation as well as deception--all these were

urged against Sokrates himself by his contemporaries,[80] and indeed

against all the philosophers indiscriminately, as we learn from

Sokrates himself in the Apology.[81] They are outbursts of feeling

natural to the practical, orthodox citizen, who represents the common

sense of the time and place; declaring his antipathy to these

speculative, freethinking innovations of theory, which challenges the

prescriptive maxims of traditional custom and tests them by a standard

approved by herself. The orthodox citizen does not feel himself in

need of philosophers to tell him what is truth or what is virtue, nor

what is the difference between real and fancied knowledge. On these

matters he holds already settled persuasions, acquired from his

fathers and his ancestors, and from the acknowledged civic

authorities, spiritual and temporal;[82] who are to him exponents of

the creed guaranteed by tradition:--

"Quod sapio, satis est mihi: non ego curo

Esse quod Arcesilas ærumnosique Solones."

[Footnote 80: Themistius, in defending himself against contemporary

opponents, whom he represents to have calumniated him, consoles

himself by saying, among other observations, that these arrows have

been aimed at all the philosophers successively--Sokrates, Plato,

Aristotle, Theophrastus. [Greek: O( ga\r sophistê\s kai\ a)lazô\n kai\

kaino/tomos prô=ton me\n Sôkra/tous o)nei/dê ê)=n, e)/peita Pla/tônos

e)phexê=s, ei)=th' u(/steron A)ristote/lous kai\ Theophra/stou].

(Orat. xxiii. p. 346, Dindorf.)

We read in Zeller's account of the Platonic philosophy (Phil. der

Griech. vol. ii. p. 368, ed. 2nd):

"Die propädeutische Begründung der Platonischen Philosophie besteht im

Allgemeinen darin, dass der unphilosophische Standpunkt aufgelöst, und

die Erhebung zum philosophischen in ihrer Nothwendigkeit nachgewiesen

wird. Im Besondern können wir drey Stadien dieses Wegs unterscheiden.

Den Ausgangspunkt bildet das gewöhnliche Bewusstsein. Indem die

_Voraussetzungen, welche Diesem für ein Erstes und Festes gegolten

hatten, dialektisch zersetzt werden, so erhalten wir zunächst das

negative Resultat der Sophistik_. Erst wenn auch diese überwunden ist,

kann der philosophische Standpunkt positiv entwickelt werden."

Zeller here affirms that it was the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus,

Hippias and others) who first applied negative analysis to the common

consciousness; breaking up, by their dialectic scrutiny, those

hypotheses which had before exercised authority therein, as first

principles not to be disputed.

I dissent from this position. I conceive that the Sophists

(Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias) did _not_ do what Zeller affirms, and

that Sokrates (and Plato after him) _did_ do it. The negative analysis

was the weapon of Sokrates, and not of Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias,

&c. It was he who declared (see Platonic Apology) that false

persuasion of knowledge was at once universal and ruinous, and who

devoted his life to the task of exposing it by cross-examination. The

conversation of the Xenophontic Sokrates with Euthydêmus (Memor. iv.

2), exhibits a complete specimen of that aggressive analysis, brought

to bear on the common consciousness, which Zeller ascribes to the

Sophists: the Platonic dialogues, in which Sokrates cross-examines

upon Justice, Temperance, Courage, Piety, Virtue, &c., are of the like

character; and we know from Xenophon (Mem. i. 1-16) that Sokrates

passed much time in such examinations with pre-eminent success.

I notice this statement of Zeller, not because it is peculiar to him

(for most of the modern historians of philosophy affirm the same; and

his history, which is the best that I know, merely repeats the

ordinary view), but because it illustrates clearly the view which I

take of the Sophists and Sokrates. Instead of the unmeaning abstract

"_Sophistik_," given by Zeller and others, we ought properly to insert

the word "_Sokratik_," if we are to have any abstract term at all.

Again--The negative analysis, which these authors call "Sophistik,"

they usually censure as discreditable and corrupting. To me it

appears, on the contrary, both original and valuable, as one essential

condition for bringing social and ethical topics under the domain of

philosophy or "reasoned truth".

Professor Charles Thurot (in his Études sur Aristote, Paris, 1860, p.

119) takes a juster view than Zeller of the difference between Plato

and the Sophists (Protagoras, Prodikus, Hippias). "Les Sophistes,

comme tous ceux qui dissertent superficiellement sur des questions de

philosophie, et en particulier sur la morale et la politique,

s'appuyaient sur l'autorité et le témoignage; ils alléguaient les vers

des poètes célèbres qui passaient aux yeux des Grecs pour des oracles

de sagesse: ils invoquaient l'opinion du commun des hommes. Platon

récusait absolument ces deux espèces de témoignages. Ni les poètes ni

le commun des hommes ne savent ce qu'ils disent, puisqu'ils ne peuvent

en rendre raison. . . . . . Aux yeux de Platon, il n'y a d'autre méthode,

pour arriver au vrai et pour le communiquer, que la dialectique: qui

est à la fois l'art d'interroger et de répondre, et l'art de définir

et de diviser."

M. Thurot here declares (in my judgment very truly) that the Sophists

appealed to the established ethical authorities, and dwelt upon or

adorned the received common-places--that Plato denied these

authorities, and brought his battery of negative cross-examination to

bear upon them as well as upon their defenders. M. Thurot thus gives a

totally different version of the procedure of the Sophists from that

which is given by Zeller. Nevertheless he perfectly agrees with

Zeller, and with Anytus, the accuser of Sokrates (Plat. Menon, pp.

91-92), in describing the Sophists as a class who made money by

deceiving and perverting the minds of hearers (p. 120).]

[Footnote 81: Plato, Apol. Sokr. p. 23 D. [Greek: i(/na de\ mê\

dokô=sin a)porei=n, _ta\ kata\ pa/ntôn tô=n philosophou/ntôn

pro/cheira tau=ta le/gousin_, o(/ti ta\ mete/ôra kai\ ta\ u(po\ gê=s

_kai\ theou\s mê\ nomi/zein kai\ to\n ê(/ttô lo/gon krei/ttô

poiei=n_], &c.

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 31. [Greek: to\ koinê=| toi=s philoso/phois u(po\

tô=n pollô=n epitimô/menon]. The rich families in Athens severely

reproached their relatives who frequented the society of Sokrates.

Xenophon, Sympos. iv. 32.]

[Footnote 82: See this point strikingly set forth by Plato, Politikus,

299: also Plutarch, [Greek: E)rôtiko/s], c. 13, 756 A.

This is the "auctoritas majorum," put forward by Cotta in his official

character of _Pontifex_, as conclusive _per se_: when reasons are

produced to sustain it, the reasons fail. (Cic. Nat. Deor. iii. 3, 5,

6, 9.)

The "auctoritas maiorum," proclaimed by the Pontifex Cotta, may be

illustrated by what we read in Father Paul's History of the Council of

Trent, respecting the proceedings of that Council when it imposed the

duty of accepting the authoritative interpretation of

Scripture:--"Lorsqu'on fut à opiner sur le quatrième Article, presque tous

se rendirent à l'avis du Cardinal Pachèco, qui représenta: Que l'Écriture

ayant été expliquée par tant de gens éminens en piété et en doctrine,

l'on ne pouvoit pas espérer de rien ajouter de meilleur: Que les

nouvelles Hérésies etant toutes nées des nouveaux sens qu'on avoit

donnés à l'Écriture, il étoit nécessaire d'arrêter la licence des

esprits modernes, et de les obliger de se laisser gouverner par les

Anciens et par l'Église: Et que si quelqu'un naissoit avec un esprit

singulier, on devoit le forcer à le renfermer au dedans de lui-même,

et à ne pas troubler le monde en publiant tout ce qu'il pensoit." (Fra

Paolo, Histoire du Concile de Trente, traduction Françoise, par Le

Courayer, Livre II. p. 284, 285, in 1546, pontificate of Paul III.)

P. 289. "Par le second Décret, il étoit ordonné en substance, de tenir

l'Edition Vulgate pour authentique dans les leçons publiques, les

disputes, les prédications, et les explications; et défendre à qui que

ce fut de la rejeter. On y défendoit aussi d'expliquer la Saint

Écriture dans un sens contraire à celui que lui donne la Sainte Église

notre Mère, et au consentement unanime des Pères, quand bien même on

auroit intention de tenir ces explications secrètes; et on ordonnoit

que ceux qui contreviendroient à cette défense fussent punis par les

Ordinaires."]

* * * * *

He will not listen to ingenious sophistry respecting these consecrated

traditions; he does not approve the tribe of fools who despise what

they are born to, and dream of distant, unattainable novelties:[83] he

cannot tolerate the nice discoursers, ingenious hair-splitters,

priests of subtleties and trifles--dissenters from the established

opinions, who corrupt the youth, teaching their pupils to be wise

above the laws, to despise or even beat their fathers and mothers,[84]

and to cheat their creditors--mischievous instructors, whose

appropriate audience are the thieves and malefactors, and who ought to

be silenced if they display ability to pervert others.[85] Such

feeling of disapprobation and antipathy against speculative philosophy

and dialectic--against the _libertas philosophandi_--counts as a

branch of virtue among practical and orthodox citizens, rich or poor,

oligarchical or democratical, military or civil, ancient or modern. It

is an antipathy common to men in other respects very different, to

Nikias as well as Kleon, to Eupolis and Aristophanes as well as to

Anytus and Demochares. It was expressed forcibly by the Roman Cato

(the Censor), when he censured Sokrates as a dangerous and violent

citizen; aiming, in his own way, to subvert the institutions and

customs of the country, and poisoning the minds of his fellow-citizens

with opinions hostile to the laws.[86] How much courage is required in

any individual citizen, to proclaim conscientious dissent in the face

of wide-spread and established convictions, is recognised by Plato

himself, and that too in the most orthodox and intolerant of all his

compositions.[87] He (and Aristotle after him), far from recognising

the infallibility of established King Nomos, were bold enough[88] to

try and condemn him, and to imagine (each of them) a new [Greek:

No/mos] of his own, representing the political Art or Theory of

Politics--a notion which would not have been understood by

Themistokles or Aristeides.

[Footnote 83: Pindar, Pyth. iii. 21.

[Greek: E)/sti de\ phu=lon e)n a)nthrô/poisi mataiotaton,

O(/stis ai)schu/nôn e)pichô/ria paptai/nei ta\ po/rsô,

Metamô/nia thêreu/ôn a)kra/ntois e)lpi/sin.]]

[Footnote 84: [Greek: Ou)de\n sophizo/mestha toi=si dai/mosi;

Patri/ous paradocha\s, a(\s th' o(mê/likas chro/nô|

Kektê/meth', ou)dei\s au)ta\ katabalei= lo/gos,

Ou)/d' ei) di' a)/krôn to\ sopho\n êu(/rêtai phrenô=n].

(Euripides, Bacchæ, 200.)

Illud in his rebus vereor, ne forté rearis

Impia te rationis inire elementa, viamque

Endogredi sceleris. (Lucretius, i. 85.)

Compare Valckenaer, Diatrib. Eurip. pp. 38, 39, cap. 5.

About the accusations against Sokrates, of leading the youth to

contract doubts and to slight the authority of their fathers, see

Xenoph. Memor. i. 2, 52; Plato, Gorgias, 522 B, p. 79, Menon, p. 70. A

touching anecdote, illustrating this displeasure of the fathers

against Sokrates, may be found in Xenophon, Cyropæd. iii. 1, 89, where

the father of Tigranes puts to death the [Greek: sophistê\s] who had

taught his son, because that son had contracted a greater attachment

to the [Greek: sophistê\s] than to his own father.

Xenophon, Memor. i. 2, 9; i. 2, 49. Apolog. So. s. 20; compare the

speech of Kleon in Thucyd. iii. 37. Plato, Politikus, p. 299 E.

Timon in the Silli bestows on Sokrates and his successors the title of

[Greek: a)kribo/logoi]. Diog. Laert. ii. 19. Sext. Emp. adv. Mathem.

vii. 8. Aristophan. Nubes, 130, where Strepsiades says--

[Greek: pôs ou)=n gerô\n ô)=n ka)pilê/smôn kai\ bradu\s

lo/gôn a)kribô=n schindala/mous mathê/somai?]

Compare 320-359 of the same comedy--[Greek: su/ te leptota/tôn lê/rôn

i(ereu=]--also Ranæ, 149, b.

When Euripides ([Greek: o( skêniko\s philo/sophos]) went down to

Hades, he is described by Aristophanes as giving clever exhibitions

among the malefactors there, with great success and applause. Ranæ,

771--

[Greek: O(/te dê\ katê=lth' Eu)ripi/dês, e)pedei/knuto

toi=s lôpodu/tais kai\ toi=s balantiêto/mois . . .

o(/per e)/st' e)n A(/|dou plê=thos; oi( d' a)kroô/menoi

tô=n a)ntilogiô=n kai\ lugismô=n kai strophô=n

u(perema/nêsan, ka)no/misan sophô/taton].

These astute cavils and quibbles of Euripides are attributed by

Aristophanes, and the other comic writers, to his frequent

conversations with Sokrates. Ranæ, 1490-1500. Dionys. Hal. Ars Rhet.

p. 301-355. Valckenaer, Diatribe in Euripid. c. 4. Aristophanes

describes Sokrates as having stolen a garment from the palæstra

(Nubes, 180); and Eupolis also introduces him as having stolen a

wine-ladle (Schol. ad loc. Eupolis, Fragm. Incert. ix. ed. Meineke).

The fragment of Eupolis (xi. p. 553, [Greek: A)doleschei=n au)to\n

e)kdi/daxon, ô)= sophista/]) seems to apply to Sokrates. About the

sympathy of the people with the attacks of the comic writers on

Sokrates, see Lucian, Piscat. c. 25.

The rhetor Aristeides (Orat. xlvi. [Greek: U(pe\r tô=n Tetta/rôn], pp.

406-407-408, Dindorf), after remarking on the very vague and general

manner in which the title [Greek: Sophistê\s] was applied among the

Greeks (Herodotus having so designated both Solon and Pythagoras),

mentions that Androtion not only spoke of the seven wise men as

[Greek: tou\s e(/pta sophista/s], but also called Sokrates [Greek:

sophistê\n tou=ton to\n pa/nu]: that Lysias called Plato [Greek:

sophistê\n], and called Æschines (the Sokratic) by the same title;

that Isokrates represented himself, and rhetors and politicians like

himself, as [Greek: philoso/phous], while he termed the dialecticians

and critics [Greek: sophista/s]. Nothing could be more indeterminate

than these names, [Greek: sophistê\s] and [Greek: philo/sophos]. It

was Plato who applied himself chiefly to discredit the name [Greek:

sophistê\s (o( ma/lista e)panasta\s tô=| o)no/mati)] but others had

tried to discredit [Greek: philo/sophos] and [Greek: to\

philosophei=n] in like manner. It deserves notice that in the

restrictive or censorial law (proposed by Sophokles, and enacted by

the Athenians in B.C. 307, but repealed in the following year) against

the philosophers and their schools, the philosophers generally are

designated as [Greek: sophistai/]. Pollux, Onomast. ix. 42 [Greek:

e)/sti de\ kai\ no/mos A)ttiko\s kata\ tô=n philosophou/ntôn

graphei/s, o(\n Sophoklê=s A)mphiklei/dou Sounieu\s ei)=pen, e)n ô(=|

tina kata\ au)tô=n proeipô\n, e)pê/gage, mê\ e)xei=nai mêdeni\ _tô=n

sophistô=n_ diatribê\n kataskeua/sasthai.]]

[Footnote 85: Plato, Euthyphron, p. 3 C-D. [Greek: A)thênai/ois ga\r

ou) spho/dra me/lei, a)\n tina deino\n oi)/ôntai ei)=nai, mê\ me/ntoi

didaskaliko\n tê=s au(tou= sophi/as; o(\n d' a)\n kai\ a)/llous

oi)/ôntai poiei=n toiou/tous, thumou=ntai, ei)=t' ou)=n phtho/nô|, ô(s

su le/geis, ei)/te di' a)/llo ti.]]

[Footnote 86: Plato, Menon, pp. 90-92. The antipathy manifested here by

Anytus against the Sophists, is the same feeling which led him to

indict Sokrates, and which induced also Cato the Censor to hate the

character of Sokrates, and Greek letters generally. Plutarch, Cato,

23: [Greek: o(/lôs philosophi/a| proskekroukô\s, kai\ pa=san

E(llênikê\n mou=san kai\ paidei/an u(po\ philotimi/as propêlaki/zôn;

o(\s ge kai\ Sôkra/tê phêsi\ la/lon kai\ bi/aion geno/menon

e)picheirei=n, ô(=| tro/pô| dunato\n ê)=n, turannei=n tê=s patri/dos,

katalu/onta ta\ e)/thê, kai\ pro\s e)nanti/as toi=s no/mois do/xas

e(/lkonta kai\ methi/stanta tou\s poli/tas]. Comp. Cato, Epist. ap.

Plin. H. N. xxix. 7.]

[Footnote 87: Plato, Legg. viii. p. 835 C. [Greek: nu=n de a)nthrô/pou

tolmêrou= kinduneu/ei dei=sthai/ tinos, o(\s par)r(êsi/an

diaphero/ntôs timô=n e)rei= ta\ dokou=nta a)/rist' ei)=nai po/lei kai\

poli/tais, e)n psuchai=s diephtharme/nais to\ pre/pon kai\ e(po/menon

pa/sê| tê=| politei/a| ta/ttôn, e)nanti/a le/gôn tai=s megi/staisin

e)pithumi/ais kai\ ou)k e)/chôn boêtho\n a)nthrô/pôn ou)de/na, lo/gô|

e(po/menos mo/nô| mo/nos].

Here the dissenter who proclaims his sincere convictions is spoken of

with respect: compare the contrary feeling, Leges, ix. 881 A, and in

the tenth book generally. In the striking passage of the Republic,

referred to in a previous note (vi. 492) Plato declares the lessons

taught by the multitude--the contagion of established custom and

tradition, communicated by the crowd of earnest assembled believers--to

be of overwhelming and almost omnipotent force. The individual

philosopher (he says), who examines for himself and tries to stand

against it, can hardly maintain himself without special divine aid.]

[Footnote 88: In the dialogue called Politikus, Plato announces

formally and explicitly (what the historical Sokrates had asserted

before him, Xen. Mem. iii. 9, 10) the exclusive pretensions of the

[Greek: Basileu\s Techniko\s] (representing political science, art, or

theory) to rule mankind--the illusory nature of all other titles to

rule and the mischievous working of all existing governments. The same

view is developed in the Republic and the Leges. Compare also

Aristotel. Ethic. Nikom. x. p. 1180, b. 27 ad fin.

In a remarkable passage of the Leges (i. 637 D, 638 C), Plato

observes, in touching upon the discrepancy between different local

institutions at Sparta, Krete, Keos. Tarentum, &c.:--"If natives of

different cities argue with each other about their respective

institutions, each of them has a good and sufficient reason. This is

the custom _with us; with you perhaps it is different_. But we, who

are now conversing, do not apply our criticisms to the private

citizen; we criticise the lawgiver himself, and try to determine

whether his laws are good or bad." [Greek: ê(mi=n d' e)sti\n ou) peri\

tô=n a)nthrô/pôn tô=n a)/llôn o( lo/gos, a)lla\ peri\ tô=n nomothetô=n

au)tô=n kaki/as te kai\ a)retê=s]. King Nomos was not at all pleased

to be thus put upon his trial.]

[Side-note: Aversion towards Sokrates aggravated by his extreme

publicity of speech. His declaration, that false persuasion of

knowledge is universal; must be understood as a basis in appreciating

Plato's Dialogues of Search.]

The dislike so constantly felt by communities having established

opinions, towards free speculation and dialectic, was aggravated in

its application to Sokrates, because his dialectic was not only novel,

but also public, obtrusive, and indiscriminate.[89] The name of

Sokrates, after his death, was employed not merely by Plato, but by

all the Sokratic companions, to cover their own ethical speculations:

moreover, all of them either composed works or gave lectures. But in

either case, readers or hearers were comparatively few in number, and

were chiefly persons prompted by some special taste or interest: while

Sokrates passed his day in the most public place, eager to interrogate

every one, and sometimes forcing his interrogations even upon

reluctant hearers.[90] That he could have been allowed to persist in

this course of life for thirty years, when we read his own account (in

the Platonic Apology) of the antipathy which he provoked--and when we

recollect that the Thirty, during their short dominion, put him under

an interdict--is a remarkable proof of the comparative tolerance of

Athenian practice.

[Footnote 89: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3. "Est enim philosophia paucis

contenta judicibus, multitudinem consulto ipsa fugiens, eique ipsi et

suspecta et invisa," &c.

The extreme publicity, and indiscriminate, aggressive conversation of

Sokrates, is strongly insisted on by Themistius (Orat. xxvi. p. 384,

[Greek: U(pe\r tou= le/gein]) as aggravating the displeasure of the

public against him.]

[Footnote 90: Xenophon, Memor. iv. 2, 3-5-40.]

However this may be, it is from the conversation of Sokrates that the

Platonic Dialogues of Search take their rise, and we must read them

under those same fundamental postulates which Sokrates enunciates to

the Dikasts. "False persuasion of knowledge is almost universal: the

Elenchus, which eradicates this, is salutary and indispensable: the

dialectic search for truth between two active, self-working minds,

both of them ignorant, yet both feeling their own ignorance, is

instructive, as well as fascinating, though it should end without

finding any truth at all, and without any other result than that of

discovering some proposed hypotheses to be untrue." The modern reader

must be invited to keep these postulates in mind, if he would fairly

appreciate the Platonic Dialogues of Search. He must learn to esteem

the mental exercise of free debate as valuable in itself,[91] even

though the goal recedes before him in proportion to the steps which he

makes in advance. He perceives a lively antithesis of opinions,

several distinct and dissentient points of view opened, various

tentatives of advance made and broken off. He has the first half of

the process of truth-seeking, without the last; and even without full

certainty that the last half can be worked out, or that the problem as

propounded is one which admits of an affirmative solution.[92] But

Plato presumes that the search will be renewed, either by the same

interlocutors or by others. He reckons upon responsive energy in the

youthful subject; he addresses himself to men of earnest purpose and

stirring intellect, who will be spurred on by the dialectic exercise

itself to farther pursuit--men who, having listened to the working out

of different points of view, will meditate on these points for

themselves, and apply a judicial estimate conformable to the measure

of their own minds. Those respondents, who, after having been puzzled

and put to shame by one cross-examination, became disgusted and never

presented themselves again--were despised by Sokrates as lazy and

stupid.[93] For him, as well as for Plato, the search after truth

counted as the main business of life.

[Footnote 91: Aristotel. Topica, i. p. 101, a. 29, with the Scholion

of Alexander of Aphrodisias, who remarks that the habit of colloquial

debate had been very frequent in the days of Aristotle, and

afterwards; but had comparatively ceased in his own time, haying been

exchanged for written treatises. P. 254, b. Schol. Brandis, also

Plato, Parmenid. pp. 135, 136, and the Commentary of Proklus

thereupon, p. 776 seqq., and p. 917, ed. Stallbaum.]

[Footnote 92: A passage in one of the speeches composed by Lysias,

addressed by a plaintiff in court to the Dikasts, shows how debate and

free antithesis of opposite opinions were accounted as essential to

the process [Greek: tou= philosophei=n--kai\ e)gô\ me\n ô)/|mên

philosophou=ntas au)tou\s peri\ tou= pra/gmatos a)ntile/gein to\n

e)nanti/on lo/gon; oi( d' a)/ra ou)k ante/legon, a)ll' a)nte/pratton].

(Lysias, Or. viii. [Greek: Kakologiô=n] s. 11,** p. 273; compare

Plat. Apolog. p. 28 E.)

Bacon describes his own intellectual cast of mind, in terms which

illustrate the Platonic [Greek: dia/logoi zêtêtikoi/],--the character

of the searcher, doubter, and tester, as contrasted with that of the

confident affirmer and expositor:--"Me ipsum autem ad veritatis

contemplationes quam ad alia magis fabrefactum deprehendi, ut qui

mentem et ad rerum similitudinem (quod maximum est) agnoscendum satis

mobilem, et ad differentiarum subtilitates observandas satis fixam et

intentam haberem--qui et _quærendi desiderium_, et _dubitandi

patientiam_, et _meditandi voluptatem_, et _asserendi cunctationem_,

et _resipiscendi facilitatem_, et disponendi sollicitudinem

tenerem--quique nec novitatem affectarem, nec antiquitatem admirarer, et

omnem imposturam odissem. Quare naturam meam cum veritate quandam

familiaritatem et cognationem habere judicavi." (Impetus Philosophici,

De Interpretatione Naturæ Prooemium.)

[Greek: Sôkratikô=s ei)s e(ka/teron] is the phrase of Cicero, ad

Atticum ii. 3.]

[Footnote 93: Xenoph. Mem. iv. 2, 40.

Mr. John Stuart Mill, in his Essay on Liberty, has the following

remarks, illustrating Plato's Dialogues of Search. I should have been

glad if I could have transcribed here many other pages of that

admirable Essay: which stands almost alone as an unreserved

vindication of the rights of the searching individual intelligence,

against the compression and repression of King Nomos (pp. 79-80-81):--

"The loss of so important an aid to the intelligent and living

apprehension of a truth, as is afforded by the necessity of explaining

it to or defending it against opponents, though not sufficient to

outweigh, is no trifling drawback from, the benefits of its universal

recognition. Where this advantage cannot be had, I confess I should

like to see the teachers of mankind endeavouring to provide a

substitute for it: some contrivance for making the difficulties of the

question as present to the learner's consciousness, as if they were

pressed upon him by a dissentient champion eager for his conversion.

"But instead of seeking contrivances for this purpose, they have lost

those they formerly had. The Sokratic dialectics, so magnificently

exemplified in the dialogues of Plato, were a contrivance of this

description. They were essentially a discussion of the great questions

of life and philosophy, directed with consummate skill to the purpose

of convincing any one, who had merely adopted the common-places of

received opinion, that he did not understand the subject--that he as

yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrines he professed: in

order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he might be put in the

way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clear apprehension both of

the meaning of doctrines and of their evidence. The

school-disputations of the middle ages had a similar object. They were

intended to make sure that the pupil understood his own opinion, and

(by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it--and could

enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of the other. These

last-mentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect, that the

premisses appealed to were taken from authority, not from reason; and

as a discipline to the mind they were in every respect inferior to the

powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the 'Socratici

viri'. But the modern mind owes far more to both than it is generally

willing to admit; and the present modes of instruction contain nothing

which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the one or

of the other. . . It is the fashion of the present time to disparage

negative logic--that which points out weaknesses in theory or errors

in practice, without establishing positive truths. Such negative

criticism would indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result, but as a

means to attaining any positive knowledge or conviction worthy the

name, it cannot be valued too highly; and until people are again

systematically trained to it, there will be few great thinkers, and a

low general average of intellect, in any but the mathematical and

physical departments of speculation. On any other subject no one's

opinions deserve the name of knowledge, except so far as he has either

had forced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same

mental process which would have been required of him in carrying on an

active controversy with opponents."]

[Side-note: Result called _Knowledge_, which Plato aspires to. Power

of going through a Sokratic cross examination; not attainable except

through the Platonic process and method.]

Another matter must here be noticed, in regard to these Dialogues of

Search. We must understand how Plato conceived the goal towards which

they tend: that is the state of mind which he calls _knowledge_ or

_cognition_. Knowledge (in his view) is not attained until the mind is

brought into clear view of the Universal Forms or Ideas, and intimate

communion with them: but the test (as I have already observed) for

determining whether a man has yet attained this end or not, is to

ascertain whether he can give to others a full account of all that he

professes to know, and can extract from them a full account of all

that they profess to know: whether he can perform, in a manner

exhaustive as well as unerring, the double and correlative function of

asking and answering: in other words, whether he can administer the

Sokratic cross-examination effectively to others, and reply to it

without faltering or contradiction when administered to himself.[94]

Such being the way in which Plato conceives knowledge, we may easily

see that it cannot be produced, or even approached, by direct,

demonstrative, didactic communication: by simply announcing to the

hearer, and lodging in his memory, a theorem to be proved, together

with the steps whereby it is proved. He must be made familiar with

each subject on many sides, and under several different aspects and

analogies: he must have had before him objections with their

refutation, and the fallacious arguments which appear to prove the

theorem, but do not really prove it:[95] he must be introduced to the

principal counter-theorems, with the means whereby an opponent will

enforce them: he must be practised in the use of equivocal terms and

sophistry, either to be detected when the opponent is cross-examining

him, or to be employed when he is cross-examining an opponent. All

these accomplishments must be acquired, together with full promptitude

and flexibility, before he will be competent to perform those two

difficult functions, which Plato considers to be the test of

knowledge. You may say that such a result is indefinitely distant and

hopeless: Plato considers it attainable, though he admits the arduous

efforts which it will cost. But the point which I wish to show is,

that if attainable at all, it can only be attained through a long and

varied course of such dialectic discussion as that which we read in

the Platonic Dialogues of Search. The state and aptitude of mind

called knowledge, can only be generated as a last result of this

continued practice (to borrow an expression of Longinus).[96] The

Platonic method is thus in perfect harmony and co-ordination with the

Platonic result, as described and pursued.

[Footnote 94: See Plato, Republic, vii. 518, B, C, about [Greek:

paidei/a], as developing [Greek: tê\n e)nou=san e(ka/stou du/namin e0n

tê=| psuchê=|]: and 534, about [Greek: e)pistê/mê], with its test,

[Greek: to\ dou=nai kai\ de/xasthai lo/gon]. Compare also Republic, v.

477, 478, with Theætêt. 175, C, D; Phædon, 76, B, Phædrus, 276; and

Sympos. 202 A. [Greek: to\ o)rtha\ doxa/zein kai\ a)/neu tou= e)/chein

lo/gon dou=nai, ou)k oi)=sth' o(/ti ou)/te e)pi/stasthai e)stin?

a)/logon ga\r pra=gma pô=s a)\n ei)/ê e)pistê/mê?]

[Footnote 95: On this point the scholastic manner of handling in the

Middle Ages furnishes a good illustration for the Platonic dialectic.

I borrow a passage from the treatise of M Hauréau, De la Phil.

Scolastique, vol. ii. p. 190.

"Saint Thomas pouvait s'en tenir là: nous le comprenons, nous avons

tout son système sur l'origine des idées, et nous pouvons croire qu'il

n'a plus rien à nous apprendre à ce sujet: mais en scolastique, il ne

suffit pas de démontrer, par deux ou trois arguments, réputés

invincibles, ce que l'on suppose être la vérité, il faut, en outre,

répondre aux objections première, seconde, troisième, &c., &c., de

divers interlocuteurs, souvent imaginaires; il faut établir la

parfaite concordance de la conclusion enoncée et des conclusions

precédents ou subséquentes; il faut réproduire, à l'occasion de tout

problème controversé, l'ensemble de la doctrine pour laquelle on s'est

déclaré."]

[Footnote 96: Longinus De Sublim. s. 6. [Greek: kai/toi to\ pra=gma

du/slêpton; ê( ga\r tô=n lo/gôn kri/sis pollê=s e)sti pei/ras

teleutai=on e)pige/nnêma]. Compare what is said in a succeeding

chapter about the Hippias Minor. And see also Sir W. Hamilton's

Lectures on Logic, Lect. 35, p. 224.]

[Side-note: Platonic process adapted to Platonic topics--man and

society.]

Moreover, not merely method and result are in harmony, but also the

topics discussed. These topics were ethical, social, and political:

matters especially human[97] (to use the phrase of Sokrates himself)

familiar to every man,--handled, unphilosophically, by speakers in the

assembly, pleaders in the dikastery, dramatists in the theatre. Now it

is exactly upon such topics that debate can be made most interesting,

varied, and abundant. The facts, multifarious in themselves, connected

with man and society, depend upon a variety of causes, co-operating

and conflicting. Account must be taken of many different points of

view, each of which has a certain range of application, and each of

which serves to limit or modify the others: the generalities, even

when true, are true only on the balance, and under ordinary

circumstances; they are liable to exception, if those circumstances

undergo important change. There are always objections, real as well as

apparent, which require to be rebutted or elucidated. To such

changeful and complicated states of fact, the Platonic dialectic was

adapted: furnishing abundant premisses and comparisons, bringing into

notice many distinct points of view, each of which must be looked at

and appreciated, before any tenable principle can be arrived at. Not

only Platonic method and result, but also Platonic topics, are thus

well suited to each other. The general terms of ethics were familiar

but undefined: the tentative definitions suggested, followed up by

objections available against each, included a large and instructive

survey of ethical phenomena in all their bearings.

[Footnote 97: Xenoph. Memor. i. 1, 12-15. I transcribe the following

passage from an article in the Edinburgh Review (April, 1866, pp.

325-326), on the first edition of the present work: an article not

merely profound and striking as to thought, but indicating the most

comprehensive study and appreciation of the Platonic writings:--

"The enemy against whom Plato really fought, and the warfare against

whom was the incessant occupation of his life and writings, was--not

Sophistry, either in the ancient or modern sense of the term,

but--_Commonplace_. It was the acceptance of traditional opinions and

current sentiments as an ultimate fact; and bandying of the abstract

terms which express approbation and disapprobation, desire and

aversion, admiration and disgust, as if they had a meaning thoroughly

understood and universally assented to. The men of his day (like those

of ours) thought that they knew what Good and Evil, Just and Unjust,

Honourable and Shameful, were--because they could use the words

glibly, and affirm them of this or that, in agreement with existing

custom. But what the property was, which these several instances

possessed in common, justifying the application of the term, nobody

had considered; neither the Sophists, nor the rhetoricians, nor the

statesmen, nor any of those who set themselves up, or were set up by

others, as wise. Yet whoever could not answer this question was

wandering in darkness--had no standard by which his judgments were

regulated, and which kept them consistent with one another--no rule

which he knew and could stand by for the guidance of his life. Not

knowing what Justice and Virtue are, it was impossible to be just and

virtuous: not knowing what Good is, we not only fail to reach it, but

are certain to embrace evil instead. Such a condition, to any one

capable of thought, made life not worth having. The grand business of

human intellect ought to consist in subjecting these terms to the most

rigorous scrutiny, and bringing to light the ideas that lie at the

bottom of them. Even if this cannot be done and real knowledge

attained, it is already no small benefit to expel the false opinion of

knowledge: to make men conscious of the things most needful to be

known, fill them with shame and uneasiness at their own state, and

rouse a pungent internal stimulus, summoning up all their energies to

attack those greatest of all problems, and never rest until, as far as

possible, the true solutions are reached. This is Plato's notion of

the condition of the human mind in his time, and of what philosophy

could do to help it: and any one who does not think the description

applicable, with slight modifications, to the majority of educated

minds in our own time and in all times known to us, certainly has not

brought either the teachers or the practical men of any time to the

Platonic test."

The Reviewer farther illustrates this impressive description by a

valuable citation from Max Müller to the same purpose (Lectures on the

Science of Language, Second Series, pp. 520-527). "Such terms as

Nature, Law, Freedom, Necessity, Body, Substance, Matter, Church,

State, Revelation, Inspiration, Knowledge, Belief, &c., are tossed

about in the war of words as if every body knew what they meant, and

as if every body used them exactly in the same sense; whereas most

people, and particularly those who represent public opinion, pick up

these complicated terms as children, beginning with the vaguest

conceptions, adding to them from time to time--perhaps correcting

likewise at haphazard some of their involuntary errors--but never

taking stock, never either enquiring into the history of the terms

which they handle so freely, or realising the fulness of their meaning

according to the strict rules of logical definition."]

[Side-note: Plato does not provide solutions for the difficulties

which he has raised. The affirmative and negative veins are in him

completely distinct. His dogmas are enunciations _à priori_ of some

impressive sentiment.]

The negative procedure is so conspicuous, and even so preponderant, in

the Platonic dialogues, that no historian of philosophy can omit to

notice it. But many of them (like Xenophon in describing Sokrates)

assign to it only a subordinate place and a qualified application:

while some (and Schleiermacher especially) represent all the doubts

and difficulties in the negative dialogues as exercises to call forth

the intellectual efforts of the reader, preparatory to full and

satisfactory solutions which Plato has given in the dogmatic dialogues

at the end. The first half of this hypothesis I accept: the last half

I believe to be unfounded. The doubts and difficulties were certainly

exercises to the mind of Plato himself, and were intended as exercises

to his readers; but he has nowhere provided a key to the solution of

them. Where he propounds positive dogmas, he does not bring them face

to face with objections, nor verify their authority by showing that

they afford satisfactory solution of the difficulties exhibited in his

negative procedure. The two currents of his speculation, the

affirmative and the negative, are distinct and independent of each

other. Where the affirmative is especially present (as in Timæus), the

negative altogether disappears. Timæus is made to proclaim the most

sweeping theories, not one of which the real Sokrates would have

suffered to pass without abundant cross-examination: but the Platonic

Sokrates hears them with respectful silence, and commends afterwards.

The declaration so often made by Sokrates that he is a searcher, not a

teacher--that he feels doubts keenly himself, and can impress them

upon others, but cannot discover any good solution of them--this

declaration, which is usually considered mere irony, is literally

true.[98] The Platonic theory of Objective Ideas separate and

absolute, which the commentators often announce as if it cleared up

all difficulties--not only clears up none, but introduces fresh ones

belonging to itself. When Plato comes forward to affirm, his dogmas

are altogether _à priori_: they enunciate preconceptions or

hypotheses, which derive their hold upon his belief, not from any

aptitude for solving the objections which he has raised, but from deep

and solemn sentiment of some kind or other--religious, ethical,

æsthetical, poetical, &c., the worship of numerical symmetry or

exactness, &c. The dogmas are enunciations of some grand sentiment of

the divine, good, just, beautiful, symmetrical, &c.,[99] which Plato

follows out into corollaries. But this is a process of itself; and

while he is performing it, the doubts previously raised are not called

up to be solved, but are forgotten or kept out of sight. It is

therefore a mistake to suppose[100] that Plato ties knots in one

dialogue only with a view to untie them in another; and that the

doubts which he propounds are already fully solved in his own mind,

only that he defers the announcement of the solution until the

embarrassed hearer has struggled to find it for himself.

[Footnote 98: See the conversation between Menippus and Sokrates.

(Lucian, Dialog. Mortuor. xx.)]

[Footnote 99: Dionysius of Halikarnassus remarks that the topics upon

which Plato renounces the character of a searcher, and passes into

that of a vehement affirmative dogmatist, are those which are above

human investigation and evidence--the transcendental: [Greek: kai\

ga\r e)kei=nos] (Plato) [Greek: ta\ do/gmata ou)k au)to\s

a)pophai/netai, ei)=ta peri\ au)tô=n diagôni/zetai; a)ll' e)n mesô|

tê\n zê/têsin poiou/menos pro\s tou\s dialegome/nous, eu(ri/skôn

ma=llon to\ de/on do/gma, ê)\ philoneikô=n u(pe\r au)tou= phai/netai;

plê\n o(/sa peri\ tô=n kreitto/nôn, ê)\ kath' ê(ma=s, le/getai] (Dion.

Hal. Ars Rhet. c. 10, p. 376, Reiske.)

M. Arago, in the following passage, points to a style of theorising in

the physical sciences, very analogous to that of Plato, generally:--

Arago, Biographies, vol. i. p. 149, Vie de Fresnel. "De ces deux

explications des phénomènes de la lumière, l'une s'appelle la théorie

de l'émission; l'autre est connue sous le nom de système des ondes. On

trouve déjà des traces de la première dans les écrits d'Empédocle.

Chez les modernes, je pourrais citer parmi ses adhérents Képler,

Newton, Laplace. Le système des ondes ne compte pas des partisans

moins illustres: Aristote, Descartes, Hooke, Huygens, Euler, l'avaient

adopté . .

"Au reste, si l'on s'étonnait de voir d'aussi grands génies ainsi

divisés, je dirais que de leurs temps la question on litige ne pouvait

être résolue; que les expériences nécessaires manquaient; qu'alors les

divers systèmes sur la lumière étaient, non _des déductions logiques

des faits_, mais, si je puis m'exprimer ainsi, de _simples vérités de

sentiment_, qu'enfin, le don de l'infaillibilité n'est pas accordé

même aux plus habiles, des qu'en sortant du domaine des observations,

et se jetant dans celui des conjectures, ils abandonnent la marche

sévère et assurée dont les sciences se prévalent de nos jours avec

raison, et qui leur a fait faire de si incontestables progrès."]

[Footnote 100: Several of the Platonic critics speak as if they

thought that Plato would never suggest any difficulty which he had

not, beforehand and ready-made, the means of solving; and Munk treats

the idea which I have stated in the text as ridiculous. "Plato (he

observes) must have held preposterous doctrines on the subject of

pædagogy. He undertakes to instruct others by his writings, before he

has yet cleared up his own ideas on the question, he proposes, in

propædeutic writings, enigmas for his scholars to solve, while he has

not yet solved them himself; and all this for the praiseworthy

(_ironically said_) purpose of correcting in their minds the false

persuasion of knowledge." (Die natürliche Ordnung der Platon Schrift.

p. 515.)

That which Munk here derides, appears stated, again and again, by the

Platonic Sokrates, as his real purpose. Munk is at liberty to treat it

as ridiculous, but the ridicule falls upon Plato himself. The Platonic

Sokrates disclaims the pædagogic function, describing himself as

nothing more than a fellow searcher with the rest.

So too Munk declares (p. 79-80, and Zeller also, Philos. der Griech.

vol. ii. p. 472, ed. 2nd) that Plato could not have composed the

Parmenidês, including, as it does, such an assemblage of difficulties

and objections against the theory of Ideas, until he possessed the

means of solving all of them himself. This is a bold assertion,

altogether conjectural; for there is no solution of them given in any

of Plato's writings, and the solutions to which Munk alludes as given

by Zeller and Steinhart (even assuming them to be satisfactory, which

I do not admit) travel much beyond the limits of Plato.

Ueberweg maintains the same opinion (Ueber die Aechtheit der Platon.

Schriften, p. 103-104); that Sokrates, in the Platonic Dialogues,

though he appears as a Searcher, must nevertheless be looked upon as a

matured thinker, who has already gone through the investigation for

himself, and solved all the difficulties, but who goes back upon the

work of search over again, for the instruction of the interlocutors.

"The special talent and dexterity (Virtuosität) which Sokrates

displays in conducting the dialogue, can only be explained by

supposing that he has already acquired for himself a firm and certain

conviction on the question discussed."

This opinion of Ueberweg appears to me quite untenable, as well as

inconsistent with a previous opinion which he had given elsewhere

(Platonische Welt-seele, p. 69-70)--That the Platonic Ideenlehre was

altogether insufficient for explanation. The impression which the

Dialogues of Search make upon me is directly the reverse. My

difficulty is, to understand how the constructor of all these puzzles,

if he has the answer ready drawn up in his pocket, can avoid letting

it slip out. At any rate, I stand upon the literal declarations, often

repeated, of Sokrates; while Munk and Ueberweg contradict them.

For the doubt and hesitation which Plato puts into the mouth of

Sokrates (even in the Republic, one of his most expository

compositions) see a remarkable passage, Rep. v. p. 450 E. [Greek:

a)pistou=nta de\ kai\ zêtou=nta a)/ma tou\s lo/gous poiei=sthai, o(\

dê\ e)gô\ drô=], &c.]

[Side-note: Hypothesis--that Plato had solved all his own difficulties

for himself; but that he communicated the solution only to a few

select auditors in oral lectures--Untenable.]

Some critics, assuming confidently that Plato must have produced a

full breadth of positive philosophy to countervail his own negative

fertility, yet not finding enough of it in the written dialogues look

for it elsewhere. Tennemann thinks, and his opinion is partly shared

by Boeckh and K. F. Hermann, that the direct, affirmative, and highest

principles of Plato's philosophy were enunciated only in his lectures:

that the core, the central points, the great principles of his system

(der Kern) were revealed thus orally to a few select students in plain

and broad terms, while the dialogues were intentionally written so as

to convey only indirect hints, illustrations, applications of these

great principles, together with refutation of various errors opposed

to them: that Plato did not think it safe or prudent to make any full,

direct, or systematic revelation to the general public.[101] I have

already said that I think this opinion untenable. Among the few points

which we know respecting the oral lectures, one is, that they were

delivered not to a select and prepared few, but to a numerous and

unprepared audience: while among the written dialogues, there are some

which, far from being popular or adapted to an ordinary understanding,

are highly perplexing and abstruse. The Timæus does not confine itself

to indirect hints, but delivers positive dogmas about the

super-sensible world: though they are of a mystical cast, as we know

that the oral lectures De Bono were also.

[Footnote 101: Tennemann, Gesch. der Philos. ii. p. 205-220. Hermann,

Ueber Plato's Schriftsteller. Motive, pp. 290-294.

Hermann considers this reserve and double doctrine to be unworthy of

Plato, and ascribes it to Protagoras and other Sophists, on the

authority of a passage in the Theætêtus (152 C), which does not at all

sustain his allegation.

Hermann considers "die akroamatischen Lehren als Fortsetzung und

Schlussstein der schriftlichen, die dort erst zur vollen Klarheit

principieller Auffassung erhoben wurden, ohne jedoch über den

nämlichen Gegenstand, soweit die Rede auf denselben kommen musste,

etwas wesentlich Verschiedenes zu lehren" (p. 293).]]

[Side-note: Characteristic of the oral lectures--that they were

delivered in Plato's own name. In what other respects they departed

from the dialogues, we cannot say.]

Towards filling up this gap, then, the oral lectures cannot be shown

to lend any assistance. The cardinal point of difference between them

and the dialogues was, that they were delivered by Plato himself, in

his own name; whereas he never published any written composition in

his own name. But we do not know enough to say, in what particular way

this difference would manifest itself. Besides the oral lectures,

delivered to a numerous auditory, it is very probable that Plato held

special communications upon philosophy with a few advanced pupils.

Here however we are completely in the dark. Yet I see nothing, either

in these supposed private communications or in the oral lectures, to

controvert what was said in the last page--that Plato's affirmative

philosophy is not fitted on to his negative philosophy, but grows out

of other mental impulses, distinct and apart. Plato (as Aristotle

tells us[102]) felt it difficult to determine, whether the march of

philosophy was an ascending one toward the _principia_ ([Greek:

a)rcha\s]), or a descending one down from the _principia_. A good

philosophy ought to suffice for both, conjointly and alternately: in

Plato's philosophy, there is no road explicable either upwards or

downwards, between the two: no justifiable mode of participation

([Greek: me/thexis]) between the two disparate worlds--intellect and

sense. The _principia_ of Plato take an impressive hold on the

imagination: but they remove few or none of the Platonic difficulties;

and they only seem to do this because the Sokratic Elenchus, so

effective whenever it is applied, is never seriously brought to bear

against them.

[Footnote 102: Aristot. Eth. Nik. i. 4, 5. [Greek: eu)= ga\r kai\

Pla/tôn ê)po/rei tou=to kai\ e)zê/tei po/teron a)po\ tô=n archô=n ê)\

e)pi\ ta\s a)rcha/s e)stin ê( o(do/s.]]

[Side-note: Apart from any result, Plato has an interest in the

process of search and debate _per se_. Protracted enquiry is a

valuable privilege, not a tiresome obligation.]

With persons who complain of prolixity in the dialogue--of threads

which are taken up only to be broken off, devious turns and "passages

which lead to nothing"--of much talk "about it and about it," without

any peremptory decision from an authorised judge--with such

complainants Plato has no sympathy. He feels a strong interest in the

process of enquiry, in the debate _per se_: and he presumes a like

interest in his readers. He has no wish to shorten the process, nor to

reach the end and dismiss the question as settled.[103] On the

contrary, he claims it as the privilege of philosophical research,

that persons engaged in such discussions are noway tied to time; they

are not like judicial pleaders, who, with a klepsydra or water-clock

to measure the length of each speech, are under slavish dependence on

the feelings of the Dikasts, and are therefore obliged to keep

strictly to the point.[104] Whoever desires accurate training of mind

must submit to go through a long and tiresome circuit.[105] Plato

regards the process of enquiry as being in itself, both a stimulus and

a discipline, in which the minds both of questioner and respondent are

implicated and improved, each being indispensable to the other: he

also represents it as a process, carried on under the immediate

inspiration of the moment, without reflection or foreknowledge of the

result.[106] Lastly, Plato has an interest in the dialogue, not merely

as a mental discipline, but as an artistic piece of workmanship,

whereby the taste and imagination are charmed. The dialogue was to him

what the tragedy was to Sophokles, and the rhetorical discourse to

Isokrates. He went on "combing and curling it" (to use the phrase of

Dionysius) for as many years as Isokrates bestowed on the composition

of the Panegyrical Oration. He handles the dialectic drama so as to

exhibit some one among the many diverse ethical points of view, and to

show what it involves as well as what it excludes in the way of

consequence. We shall not find the ethical point of view always the

same: there are material inconsistencies and differences in this

respect between one dialogue and another.

[Footnote 103: As an illustration of that class of minds which take

delight in the search for truth in different directions, I copy the

following passage respecting Dr. Priestley, from an excellent modern

scientific biography. "Dr. Priestley had seen so much of the evil of

obstinate adherence to opinions which time had rendered decrepit, not

venerable--and had been so richly rewarded in his capacity of natural

philosopher, by his adventurous explorations of new territories in

science--that he unavoidably and unconsciously over-estimated the

value of what was novel, and held himself free to change his opinions

to an extent not easily sympathised with by minds of a different

order. Some men love to _rest_ in truth, or at least in settled

opinions, and are uneasy till they find repose. They alter their

beliefs with great reluctance, and dread the charge of inconsistency,

even in reference to trifling matters. Priestley, on the other hand,

was a _follower after truth, who delighted in the chase, and was all

his life long pursuing, not resting in it_.

On all subjects which interested him he held by certain cardinal

doctrines, but he left the outlines of his systems to be filled up as

he gained experience, and to an extent very few men have done,

disavowed any attempt to reconcile his changing views with each other,

or to deprecate the charge of inconsistency. . . I think it must be

acknowledged by all who have studied his writings, that in his

scientific researches at least he carried this feeling too far, and

that often when he had reached a truth in which he might and should

have rested, his dread of anything like a too hasty stereotyping of a

supposed discovery, induced him to welcome whatever seemed to justify

him in renewing the _pursuit_ of truth, and thus led him completely

astray. Priestley indeed missed many a discovery, the clue to which

was in his hands and in his alone, by not knowing where to stop."

(Dr. Geo Wilson--Life of the Hon. H. Cavendish, among the publications

of the Cavendish Society, 1851, p. 110-111.)]

[Footnote 104: Plato, Theætêt. p. 172.]

[Footnote 105: Plato, Republic, v. 450 B. [Greek: me/tron de/ g',

e)/phê, ô)= Sô/krates, o( Glau/kôn, toiou/tôn lo/gôn a)kou/ein, o(/los

o( bi/os nou=n e)/chousin]. vi. 504 D. [Greek: Tê\n makrote/ran

peri+ite/on tô=| toiou/tô|, kai\ ou)ch ê(=tton mantha/nonti ponête/on

ê)\ gumnazome/nô|]. Also Phædrus, 274 A, Parmenid. p. 135 D, 136 D,

[Greek: a)mê/chanon pragmatei/an--a)doleschi/as], &c. Compare

Politikus, 286, in respect to the charge of prolixity against him.

In the Hermotimus of Lucian, the assailant of philosophy draws one of

his strongest arguments from the number of years required to examine

the doctrines of all the philosophical sects--the whole of life would

be insufficient (Lucian, Hermot. c. 47-48). The passages above cited,

especially the first of them, show that Sokrates and Plato would not

have been discouraged by this protracted work.]

[Footnote 106: Plato, Republic, iii. 394 D. [Greek: Manteu/omai] (says

Glaukon) [Greek: skopei=sthai se, ei)/te paradexo/metha tragô|di/an te

kai\ kômô|di/an ei)s tê\n po/lin, ei)/te kai\ ou)/. I)/sôs] (says

Sokrates) [Greek: kai\ plei/ô e)/ti tou/tôn; _ou) ga\r dê\ e)/gôge pô

oi)=da, a)ll' o(/pê| a)\n o( lo/gos ô(/sper pneu=ma phe/rê|, tau/tê|

i)teon_. Kai\ kalô=s g', e)/phê, le/geis].

The Republic, from the second book to the close, is one of those

Platonic compositions in which Sokrates is most expository.

We find a remarkable passage in Des Cartes, wherein that very

self-working philosopher expresses his conviction that the longer he

continued enquiring, the more his own mind would become armed for the

better appreciation of truth--and in which he strongly protests

against any barrier restraining the indefinite liberty of enquiry.

"Et encore qu'il y en ait peut-être d'aussi bien sensés parmi les

Perses ou les Chinois que parmi nous, il me sembloit que le plus utile

étoit, de me régler selon ceux avec lesquels j'aurois à vivre; et que,

pour savoir quelles étoient véritablement leurs opinions, je devois

plutôt prendre garde à ce qu'ils pratiquaient qu'à ce qu'ils disaient;

non seulement à cause qu'en la corruption de nos moeurs, _il y a peu

de gens qui veuillent dire tout ce qu'ils croient--mais aussi à cause

que plusieurs l'ignorent eux mêmes; car l'action de la pensée, par

laquelle on croit une chose étant différente de celle par laquelle on

connoit qu'on la croit, elles sont souvent l'une sans l'autre._ Et

entre plusieurs opinions également reçues, je ne choisissois que les

plus modérées; tant à cause que ce sont toujours les plus commodes

pour la pratique, et vraisemblablement les meilleures--tous excès

ayans coutume d'être mauvais--comme aussi afin de me détourner moins

du vrai chemin, en cas que je faillisse, que si, ayant choisi l'un des

deux extrêmes, c'eût été l'autre qu'il eut fallu suivre.

"Et particulièrement, je _mettois entre les excès toutes les promesses

par lesquelles on retranche quelque chose de sa liberté_; non que je

désapprouvasse les lois, qui pour remédier à l'inconstance des esprits

foibles, permettent, lorsqu'on a quelque bon dessein (ou même, pour la

sureté du commerce, quelque dessein qui n'est qu'indifférent), qu'on

fasse des voeux ou des contrats qui obligent à y persévérer: mais à

cause que je ne voyois au monde aucune chose qui demeurât toujours en

même état, et _que comme pour mon particulier, je me promettois de

perfectionner de plus en plus en mes jugemens, et non point de les

rendre pires, j'eusse pensé commettre une grande faute contre le bon

sens, si, parceque j'approuvois alors quelque chose, je me fusse

obligé de la prendre pour bonne encore après, lorsqu'elle auroit

peut-être cessé de l'être, ou que j'aurois cessé de l'estimer telle_."

Discours de la Méthode, part iii. p. 147-148, Cousin edit.; p. 16,

Simon edit.]

[Side-note: Plato has done more than any one else to make the process

of enquiry interesting to others, as it was to himself.]

But amidst all these differences--and partly indeed by reason of these

differences--Plato succeeds in inspiring his readers with much of the

same interest in the process of dialectic enquiry which he evidently

felt in his own bosom. The charm, with which he invests the process of

philosophising, is one main cause of the preservation of his writings

from the terrible ship-wreck which has overtaken so much of the

abundant contemporary literature. It constitutes also one of his

principle titles to the gratitude of intellectual men. This is a merit

which may be claimed for Cicero also, but hardly for Aristotle, in so

far as we can judge from the preserved portion of the Aristotelian

writings: whether for the other _viri Socratici_ his contemporaries,

or in what proportion, we are unable to say. Plato's works charmed and

instructed all; so that they were read not merely by disciples and

admirers (as the Stoic and Epikurean treatises were), but by those who

dissented from him as well as by those who agreed with him.[107] The

process of philosophising is one not naturally attractive except to a

few minds: the more therefore do we owe to the colloquy of Sokrates

and the writing of Plato, who handled it so as to diffuse the appetite

for enquiry, and for sifting dissentient opinions. The stimulating and

suggestive influence exercised by Plato--the variety of new roads

pointed out to the free enquiring mind--are in themselves sufficiently

valuable: whatever we may think of the positive results in which he

himself acquiesced.[108]

[Footnote 107: Cicero, Tusc. Disp. ii. 3, 8.

Cicero farther commends the Stoic Panætius for having relinquished the

"tristitiam atque asperitatem" of his Stoic predecessors, Zeno,

Chrysippus, &c., and for endeavouring to reproduce the style and

graces of Plato and Aristotle, whom he was always commending to his

students (De Fin. iv. 28, 79).]

[Footnote 108: The observation which Cicero applies to Varro, is

applicable to the Platonic writings also. "Philosophiam multis locis

_inchoasti_, ad impellendum satis, ad edocendum parum" (Academ.

Poster. i. 3, 9).

I shall say more about this when I touch upon the Platonic Kleitophon;

an unfinished dialogue, which takes up the point of view here

indicated by Cicero.]

I have said thus much respecting what is common to the Dialogues of

Search, because this is a species of composition now rare and strange.

Modern readers do not understand what is meant by publishing an

enquiry without any result--a story without an end. Respecting the

Dialogues of Exposition, there is not the like difficulty. This is a

species of composition, the purpose of which is generally understood.

Whether the exposition be clear or obscure--orderly or confused--true

or false--we shall see when we come to examine each separately. But

these Dialogues of Exposition exhibit Plato in a different character:

as the counterpart, not of Sokrates, but of Lykurgus (Republic and

Leges) or of Pythagoras (in Timæus).[109]

[Footnote 109: See the citation from Plutarch in an earlier note of

this chapter.]

[Side-note: Process of generalisation always kept in view and

illustrated throughout the Platonic Dialogues of Search--general terms

and propositions made subjects of conscious analysis.]

A farther remark which may be made, bearing upon most of the

dialogues, relates to matter and not to manner. Everywhere (both in

the Dialogues of Search and in those of exposition) the process of

generalisation is kept in view and brought into conscious notice,

directly or indirectly. The relation of the universal to its

particulars, the contrast of the constant and essential with the

variable and accidental, are turned and returned in a thousand

different ways. The principles of classification, with the breaking

down of an extensive genus into species and sub-species, form the

special subject of illustration in two of the most elaborate Platonic

dialogues, and are often partially applied in the rest. To see the One

in the Many, and the Many in the One, is represented as the great aim

and characteristic attribute of the real philosopher. The testing of

general terms, and of abstractions already embodied in familiar

language, by interrogations applying them to many concrete and

particular cases--is one manifestation of the Sokratic cross-examining

process, which Plato multiplies and diversifies without limit. It is

in his writings and in the conversation of Sokrates, that general

terms and propositions first become the subject of conscious attention

and analysis, and Plato was well aware that he was here opening the

new road towards formal logic, unknown to his predecessors, unfamiliar

even to his contemporaries. This process is indeed often overlaid in

his writings by exuberant poetical imagery and by transcendental

hypothesis: but the important fact is, that it was constantly present

to his own mind and is impressed upon the notice of his readers.

[Side-note: The Dialogues must be reviewed as distinct compositions by

the same author, illustrating each other, but without assignable

inter-dependence.]

After these various remarks, having a common bearing upon all, or

nearly all, the Platonic dialogues, I shall proceed to give some

account of each dialogue separately. It is doubtless both practicable

and useful to illustrate one of them by others, sometimes in the way

of analogy, sometimes in that of contrast. But I shall not affect to

handle them as contributories to one positive doctrinal system--nor as

occupying each an intentional place in the gradual unfolding of one

preconceived scheme--nor as successive manifestations of change,

knowable and determinable, in the views of the author. For us they

exist as distinct imaginary conversations, composed by the same author

at unknown times and under unknown specialities of circumstance. Of

course it is necessary to prefer some one order for reviewing the

Dialogues, and for that purpose more or less of hypothesis must be

admitted; but I shall endeavour to assume as little as possible.

[Side-note: Order of the Dialogues, chosen for bringing them under

separate review. Apology will come first; Timæus, Kritias, Leges,

Epinomis last.]

The order which I shall adopt for considering the dialogues coincides

to a certain extent with that which some other expositors have

adopted. It begins with those dialogues which delineate Sokrates, and

which confine themselves to the subjects and points of view belonging

to him, known as he is upon the independent testimony of Xenophon.

First of all will come the Platonic Apology, containing the explicit

negative programme of Sokrates, enunciated by himself a month before

his death, when Plato was 28 years of age.

Last of all, I shall take those dialogues which depart most widely

from Sokrates, and which are believed to be the products of Plato's

most advanced age--Timæus, Kritias, and Leges, with the sequel,

Epinomis. These dialogues present a glaring contrast to the searching

questions, the negative acuteness, the confessed ignorance, of

Sokrates: Plato in his old age has not maintained consistency with his

youth, as Sokrates did, but has passed round from the negative to the

affirmative pole of philosophy.

[Side-note: Kriton and Euthyphron come immediately after Apology. The

intermediate dialogues present no convincing grounds for any

determinate order.]

Between the Apology and the dialogues named as last--I shall examine

the intermediate dialogues according as they seem to approximate or

recede from Sokrates and the negative dialectic. Here, however, the

reasons for preference are noway satisfactory. Of the many dissentient

schemes, professing to determine the real order in which the Platonic

dialogues were composed, I find a certain plausibility in some, but no

conclusive reason in any. Of course the reasons in favour of each one

scheme, count against all the rest. I believe (as I have already said)

that none of Plato's dialogues were composed until after the death of

Sokrates: but at what dates, or in what order, after that event, they

were composed, it is impossible to determine. The Republic and

Philêbus rank among the constructive dialogues, and may suitably be

taken immediately before Timæus: though the Republic belongs to the

highest point of Plato's genius, and includes a large measure of his

negative acuteness combined with his most elaborate positive

combinations. In the Sophistês and Politikus, Sokrates appears only in

the character of a listener: in the Parmenidês also, the part assigned

to him, instead of being aggressive and victorious, is subordinate to

that of Parmenidês and confined to an unsuccessful defence. These

dialogues, then, occupy a place late in the series. On the other hand,

Kriton and Euthyphron have an immediate bearing upon the trial of

Sokrates and the feelings connected with it. I shall take them in

immediate sequel to the Apology.

For the intermediate dialogues, the order is less marked and

justifiable. In so far as a reason can be given, for preference as to

former and later, I shall give it when the case arises.