of the sword in peace and war, the making and abrogating of laws,
_supreme judicature, and decision_, in all debates judicial and
deliberative, the nomination of all magistrates and ministers, with
other rights contained in the same, make the sovereign power no less
absolute in the commonwealth, than before commonwealth every man was
absolute in himself, to do, or not to do, what he thought good;
which men, that have not had the experience of that miserable
estate, to which men are reduced by long war, think so hard a
condition, that they cannot easily acknowledge such covenants, and
subjection on their parts, as are here set down, to have been ever
necessary to their peace. And therefore some have imagined, that a
commonwealth may be constituted in such manner, as the sovereign
power may be so limited, and moderated, as they shall think fit
themselves. For example: they suppose a multitude of men to have
agreed upon certain articles, which they presently call laws,
declaring how they will be governed, and that done, to agree further
upon some man, or number of men, to see the same articles performed,
and put in execution; and to enable him, or them, thereunto, they
allot unto them a provision limited, as of certain lands, taxes,
penalties, and the like, than which, if mispent, they shall have no
more, without a new consent of the same men that allowed the former.
And thus they think they have made a commonwealth, in which it is
unlawful for any private man to make use of his own sword for his
security; wherein they deceive themselves.
[Sidenote: The same refelled.]
14. For first, if to the revenue, it did necessarily follow, that
there might be forces raised and procured at the will of him that
hath such revenue; yet since the revenue is limited, so must also
the forces: but limited forces against the power of an enemy, which
we cannot limit, are unsufficient. Whensoever therefore there
happeneth an invasion greater than those forces are able to resist,
and there be no other right to levy more, then is every man, by
necessity of nature, allowed to make the best provision he can for
himself; and thus is the private sword, and the estate of war again
reduced. But seeing revenue, without the right of commanding men, is
of no use, neither in peace, nor war, it is necessary to be
supposed, that he that hath the administration of those articles,
which are in the former section supposed, must have also right to
make use of the strengths of particular men. And what reason soever
giveth him that right over any one, giveth him the same over all.
And then is his right absolute. For he that hath right to all their
forces, hath right to dispose of the same. Again, supposing those
limited forces and revenue, either by the necessary, or negligent
use of them, to fail, and that for a supply, the same multitude be
again to be assembled, who shall have power to assemble them, that
is to compel them to come together? If he that demandeth the supply
hath that right, to wit, the right to compel them all, then is his
sovereignty absolute; if not, then is every particular man at
liberty to come or not; to frame a new commonwealth, or not, and so
the right of the private sword returneth. But suppose them
willingly, and of their own accord, assembled to consider of this
supply, if now it be still in their choice, whether they shall give
it, or not, it is also in their choice, whether the commonwealth
shall stand or not. And therefore there lieth not upon any of them
any civil obligation that may hinder them from using force, in case
they think it tend to their defence. This device therefore of them
that will make civil laws first, and then a civil body afterwards,
(as if policy made a body politic, and not a body politic made
policy) is of no effect.
[Sidenote: Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.]
15. Others, to avoid the hard condition, as they take it, of
absolute subjection, which, in hatred thereto, they also call
slavery, have devised a government, as they think, mixed of the
three sorts of sovereignty. As for example: they suppose the power
of making laws, given to some great assembly democratical, the power
of judicature to some other assembly, and the administration of the
laws to a third, or to some one man; and this policy they call mixed
monarchy, or mixed aristocracy, or mixed democracy, according as any
of these three sorts do most visibly predominate. And in this estate
of government, they think the use of the private sword excluded.
[Sidenote: That refelled.]
16. And supposing it were so, how were this condition, which they
call _slavery_, eased thereby. For in this estate they would have no
man allowed, either to be his own judge, or own carver, or to make
any laws unto himself; and as long as these three agree, they are as
absolutely subject to them, as is a child to the father, or a slave
to the master, in the state of nature. The ease therefore of this
subjection, must consist in the disagreement of those amongst whom
they have distributed the rights of sovereign power. But the same
disagreement is war. The division therefore of the sovereignty,
either worketh no effect to the taking away of simple subjection, or
introduceth war, wherein the private sword hath place again. But the
truth is, as hath been already showed in the seventh, eighth, ninth,
tenth, eleventh, and twelfth precedent sections, the sovereignty is
indivisible. And that seeming mixture of several kinds of
government, is not mixture of the things themselves, but confusion
in our understandings, that cannot find out readily to whom we have
subjected ourselves.
[Sidenote: Mixed government, &c.]
17. But though the sovereignty be not mixed, but be always either
simple democracy, or simple aristocracy, or pure monarchy,
nevertheless in the administration thereof, all those sorts of
government may have place subordinate. For suppose the sovereign
power be democracy, as it was sometimes in Rome, yet at the same
time they may have a council aristocratical, such as was the senate;
and at the same time they may have a subordinate monarch, such as
was their dictator, who had, for a time, the exercise of the whole
sovereignty, and such as are all generals in war. So also in
monarchy there may be a council aristocratical of men, chosen by the
monarch; or democratical of men, chosen by the consent, the monarch
permitting, of all the particular men of the commonwealth. And this
mixture is it that imposeth, as if it were the mixture of
sovereignty. As if a man should think, because the great council of
Venice doth nothing ordinarily but choose magistrates, ministers of
state, captains, and governors of towns, ambassadors, counsellors,
and the like, that therefore their part of the sovereignty is only
choosing of magistrates; and that the making of war, and peace, and
laws, were not theirs, but the part of such counsellors as they
appointed thereto: whereas it is the part of _these_ to do it but
subordinately, the supreme authority thereof being in the great
council that choose them.
[Sidenote: Reason and experience to prove absolute sovereignty
somewhere in all commonwealths.]
18. And as reason teacheth us, that a man, considered out of
subjection to laws, and out of all covenants obligatory to others,
is free to do and undo, and deliberate as long as he listeth, every
member being obedient to the will of the whole man, that liberty
being nothing else but his natural power, without which he is no
better than an inanimate creature, not able to help himself; so also
it teacheth us, that a body politic, of what kind soever, not
subject to another, nor obliged by covenants, ought to be free, and
in all actions to be assisted by the members, every one in their
place, or at least, not resisted by them. For otherwise, the power
of a body politic, the essence whereof is the not-resistance of the
members, is none, nor a body politic of any benefit. And the same is
confirmed by the use of all nations and commonwealths, wherein that
man or council, which is virtually the whole, hath any absolute
power over every particular member; or what nation or commonwealth
is there, that hath not power and right to constitute a general in
their wars? But the power of a general is absolute; and consequently
there was absolute power in the commonwealth, from whom it was
derived. For no person, natural or civil, can transfer unto another
more power than himself hath.
[Sidenote: Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.]
19. In every commonwealth, where particular men are deprived of
their right to protect themselves, there resideth an absolute
sovereignty, as I have already showed. But in what man, or in what
assembly of men the same is placed, is not so manifest, as not to
need some marks, whereby it may be discerned. And first, it is an
infallible mark of absolute sovereignty in a man, or in an assembly
of men, if there be no right in any other person, natural or civil,
to punish that man, or to dissolve that assembly. For he that cannot
of right be punished, cannot of right be resisted; and he that
cannot of right be resisted, hath coercive power over all the rest,
and thereby can frame and govern their actions at his pleasure,
which is absolute sovereignty. Contrariwise, he that in a
commonwealth is punishable by any, or that assembly that is
dissolvable, is not sovereign. For a greater power is always
required to punish and dissolve, than theirs who are punished or
dissolved; and that power cannot be called sovereign, than which
there is a greater. Secondly, that man or assembly, that by their
own right not derived from the present right of any other, may make
laws, or abrogate them at his or their pleasure, have the
sovereignty absolute. For seeing the laws they make, are supposed to
be made by right, the members of the commonwealth, to whom they are
made, are obliged to obey them, and consequently not resist the
execution of them; which not-resistance, maketh the power absolute
of him that ordaineth them. It is likewise a mark of this
sovereignty, to have the right original of appointing magistrates,
judges, counsellors, and ministers of state. For without that power,
no act of sovereignty, or government, can be performed. Lastly, and
generally, whosoever by his own authority independent, can do any
act, which another of the same commonwealth may not, must needs be
understood to have the sovereign power. For by nature men have equal
right. This inequality therefore must proceed from the power of the
commonwealth. He therefore that doth any act lawfully by his own
authority, which another may not, doth it by the power of the
commonwealth in himself, which is absolute sovereignty.
-------
CHAPTER II.
1. Democracy precedeth all other, &c. 2.. The sovereign people
covenanteth not with the subjects. 3. The sovereign, &c. cannot,
&c. do injury, &c. 4. The faults of the sovereign people, &c. 5.
Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators. 6. Aristocracy how
made. 7. The body of the _optimates_ not properly said to injure
the subjects. 8. The election of the _optimates_, &c. 9. An
elective king, &c. 10. A conditional king, &c. 11. The word
people equivocal. 12. Obedience discharged by release, &c. 13.
How such releases are to be understood. 14. Obedience discharged
by exile: 15. By conquest: 16. By ignorance of the right of
succession.
[Sidenote: Democracy precedeth all other, &c.]
1. Having spoken in general concerning instituted policy in the
former chapter, I come in this, to speak of the sorts thereof in
special, how every of them is instituted. The first in order of time
of these three sorts, is democracy; and it must be so of necessity,
because an aristocracy and a monarchy, require nomination of persons
agreed upon, which agreement in a great multitude of men, must
consist in the consent of the major part; and where the votes of the
major part involve the votes of the rest, there is actually a
democracy.
[Sidenote: The sovereign people covenanteth not with the subjects.]
2. In the making of a democracy, there passeth no covenant between
the sovereign, and any subject. For while the democracy is a making,
there is no sovereign with whom to contract. For it cannot be
imagined, that the multitude should contract with itself, or with
any one man, or number of men, parcel of itself, to make itself
sovereign; nor that a multitude, considered as one aggregate, can
give itself anything which before it had not. Seeing then that
sovereignty democratical is not conferred by the covenant of any
multitude, which supposeth union and sovereignty already made, it
resteth, that the same be conferred by the particular covenants of
every several man; that is to say, every man with every man, for and
in consideration of the benefit of his own peace and defence,
covenanteth to stand to and obey whatsoever the major part of their
whole number, or the major part of such a number of them, as shall
be pleased to assemble at a certain time and place, shall determine
and command. And this is that which giveth being to a democracy,
wherein the sovereign assembly was called of the Greeks, by the name
of _Demus_, that is, the people, from whence cometh democracy. So
that, where to the supreme and independent court, every man may come
that will, and give his vote, there the sovereign is called the
people.
[Sidenote: The sovereign, &c. cannot, &c. do injury, &c.]
3. Out of this that hath been said, may readily be drawn, that
whatsoever the people doth to any one particular member or subject
of the commonwealth, the same by him ought not to be styled injury.
For first, injury, by the definition, Part I. chap. III. sect. 2, is
breach of covenant; but covenants, as hath been said in the
precedent section, there passed none from the people to any private
man; and consequently it, to wit, the people, can do him no injury.
Secondly, how unjust soever the action be, that this sovereign
_demus_ shall do, is done by the will of every particular man
subject to him, who are therefore guilty of the same. If therefore
they style it _injury_, they but accuse themselves. And it is
against reason for the same man, both to do and complain; implying
this contradiction, that whereas he first ratified the people’s acts
in general, he now disalloweth the same of them in particular. It is
therefore said truly, _volenti non fit injuria_. Nevertheless
nothing doth hinder, but that divers actions done by the people, may
be unjust before God Almighty, as breaches of the laws of nature.
[Sidenote: The faults of the sovereign people, &c.]
4. And when it happeneth, that the people by plurality of voices,
decree or command anything contrary to the law of God or nature,
though the decree and command be the act of every man, not only
present in the assembly, but also absent from it; yet is not the
injustice of the decree, the injustice of every particular man, but
only of those men, by whose express suffrages, the decree or command
was passed. For a body politic, as it is a fictitious body, so are
the faculties and will thereof fictitious also. But to make a
particular man unjust, which consisteth of a body and soul natural,
there is required a natural and very will.
[Sidenote: Democracy, &c. an aristocracy of orators.]
5. In all democracies, though the right of sovereignty be in the
assembly, which is virtually the whole body; yet the use thereof is
always in one, or a few particular men. For in such great
assemblies, as those must be, whereinto every man may enter at his
pleasure, there is no means any ways to deliberate and give counsel
what to do, but by long and set orations, whereby to every man there
is more or less hope given, to incline and sway the assembly to
their own ends. In a multitude of speakers therefore, where always
either one is eminent alone, or a few being equal amongst
themselves, are eminent above the rest, that one or few must of
necessity sway the whole. Insomuch, that a democracy, in effect, is
no more than an aristocracy of orators, interrupted sometimes with
the temporary monarchy of one orator.
[Sidenote: Aristocracy how made.]
6. And seeing a democracy is by institution, the beginning both of
aristocracy and monarchy, we are to consider next, how aristocracy
is derived from it. When the particular members of the commonwealth
growing weary of attendance at public courts, as dwelling far off,
or being attentive to their private businesses, and withal,
displeased with the government of the people, assemble themselves to
make an aristocracy, there is no more required to the making thereof
but putting to the question one by one, the names of such men as it
shall consist of, and assenting to their election; and by plurality
of vote, to transfer that power, which before the people had, to the
number of men so named and chosen.
[Sidenote: The body of the _optimates_ not properly said to injure
the subjects.]
7. And from this manner of erecting an aristocracy, it is manifest,
that the few, or _optimates_, have entered into no covenant with any
of the particular members of the commonwealth, whereof they are
sovereign; and consequently cannot do any thing to any private man,
that can be called _injury_ to him, howsoever their act be wicked
before Almighty God, according to that which hath been said before,
section 3. Further, it is impossible, that the people, as one body
politic, should covenant with the aristocracy or _optimates_, on
whom they intend to transfer their sovereignty. For no sooner is the
aristocracy erected, but the democracy is annihilated, and the
covenants made unto them void.
[Sidenote: The election of the _optimates_, &c.]
8. In all aristocracies, the admission of such, as are from time to
time to have vote in the sovereign assembly, dependeth on the will
and decree of the present _optimates_. For they being the sovereign,
have the nomination, by the eleventh section of the former chapter,
of all magistrates, ministers, and counsellors of state whatsoever,
and may therefore choose either to make them elective, or
hereditary, at their pleasure.
[Sidenote: An elective king, &c.]
9. Out of the same democracy, the institution of a political monarch
proceedeth in the same manner, as did the institution of the
aristocracy, to wit, by a decree of the sovereign people, to pass
the sovereignty to one man named and approved by plurality of
suffrage. And if this sovereignty be truly and indeed transferred,
the estate or commonwealth is an absolute monarchy, wherein the
monarch is at liberty, to dispose as well of the succession, as of
the possession, and not an elective kingdom. For suppose a decree be
made first in this manner, that such a one shall have the
sovereignty for his life, and that afterward they will choose a-new.
In this case, the power of the people is dissolved, or not; if
dissolved, then after the death of him that is chosen, there is no
man bound to stand to the decrees of them that shall, as private
men, run together to make a new election; and consequently, if there
be any man, who by the advantage of the reign of him that is dead,
hath strength enough to hold the multitude in peace and obedience,
he may lawfully, or rather is by the law of nature obliged so to do:
if this power of the people were not dissolved at the choosing of
their king for life, then is the people sovereign still, and the
king a minister thereof only, but so, as to put the whole
sovereignty in execution; a great minister, but no otherwise for his
time, than a dictator was in Rome. In this case, at the death of him
that was chosen, they that meet for a new election, have no new, but
their old authority for the same. For they were the sovereign all
the time, as appeareth by the acts of those elective kings, that
have procured from the people, that their children might succeed
them. For it is to be understood, when a man receiveth any thing
from the authority of the people, he receiveth it not from the
people his subjects, but from the people his sovereign. And further,
though in the election of a king for his life, the people grant him
the exercise of their sovereignty for that time; yet if they see
cause, they may recall the same before the time. As a prince that
conferreth an office for life, may nevertheless, upon suspicion of
abuse thereof, recall it at his pleasure; inasmuch as offices that
require labour and care, are understood to pass from him that giveth
them, as _onera_, _burthens_, to them that have them; the recalling
whereof are therefore not _injury_, but _favour_. Nevertheless, if
in making an elective king, with intention to reserve the
sovereignty, they reserve not a power at certain known and
determined times and places to assemble themselves, the reservation
of their sovereignty is of no effect, inasmuch as no man is bound to
stand to the decrees and determinations of those that assemble
themselves without the sovereign authority.
[Sidenote: A conditional king, &c.]
10. In the former section is showed, that elective kings that
exercise their sovereignty for a time, which determines with their
life, either are subjects, or not sovereigns; and that it is, when
the people in election of them, reserve unto themselves the right of
assembling at certain times and places limited and made known; or
else absolute sovereigns, to dispose of the succession at their
pleasure, and that is, when the people in their election have
declared no time nor place of their meeting, or have left it to the
power of the elected king, to assemble and dissolve them at such
times, as he himself shall think good. There is another kind of
limitation of time, to him that shall be elected to use the
sovereign power, which whether it hath been practised anywhere, or
not, I know not, but it may be imagined, and hath been objected
against the rigour of sovereign power; and it is this, that the
people transfer their sovereignty upon conditions. As for example,
for so long as he shall observe such and such laws, as they then
prescribe him. And here as before in elected kings, the question is
to be made, whether in the electing of such a sovereign, they
reserved to themselves a right of assembling at times and places
limited and known, or not; if not, then is the sovereignty of the
people dissolved, and they have neither power to judge of the breach
of the conditions given him, nor to command any forces for the
deposing of him, whom on that condition they had set up, but are in
the estate of war amongst themselves, as they were before they made
themselves a democracy: and consequently, if he that is elected by
the advantage of the possession he hath of the public means, be able
to compel them to unity and obedience, he hath not only the right of
nature to warrant him, but the law of nature to oblige him
thereunto. But if in electing him, they reserved to themselves a
right of assembling, and appointed certain times and places to that
purpose, then are they sovereign still, and may call their
conditional king to account at their pleasure, and deprive him of
his government, if they judge he deserve it, either by breach of the
condition set him, or otherwise. For the sovereign power can by no
covenant with a subject be bound to continue him in the charge he
undergoeth by their command, as a burden imposed not particularly
for his good, but for the good of the sovereign people.
[Sidenote: The word people equivocal]
11. The controversies that arise concerning the right of the people,
proceed from the equivocation of the word. For the word people hath
a double signification. In one sense it signifieth only a number of
men, distinguished by the place of their habitation; as the _people_
of England, or the _people_ of France, which is no more, but the
multitude of those particular persons that inhabit those regions,
without consideration of any contracts or covenants amongst them, by
which any one of them is obliged to the rest. In another sense, it
signifieth a person civil, that is to say, either one man, or one
council, in the will whereof, is included and involved the will of
every one in particular. As for example, in this latter sense, the
lower house of parliament is all the commons, as long as they sit
there with authority and right thereto; but after they be dissolved,
though they remain, they be no more the people, nor the commons, but
only the aggregate, or multitude of the particular men there
sitting, how well soever they agree, or concur, in opinions amongst
themselves; whereupon, they that do not distinguish between these
two significations, do usually attribute such rights to a dissolved
multitude, as belong only to the people virtually contained in the
body of the commonwealth or sovereignty. And when a great number of
their own authority flock together in any nation, they usually give
them the name of the whole nation. In which sense they say the
people rebelleth, or the people demandeth, when it is no more than a
dissolved multitude, of which though any one man may be said to
demand or have right to something, yet the heap, or multitude,
cannot be said to demand or have right to anything. For where every
man hath his right distinct, there is nothing left for the multitude
to have right unto: and when the particulars say, this is mine, this
is thine, and this is his, and have shared all amongst them, there
can be nothing whereof the multitude can say, this is mine; nor are
they one body, as behoveth them to be, that demand anything under
the name of mine, or his: and when they say ours, every man is
understood to pretend in several, and not the multitude. On the
other side, when the multitude is united into a body politic, and
thereby are a people in the other signification, and their wills
virtually in the sovereign, there the rights and demands of the
particulars do cease; and he or they that have the sovereign power,
doth for them all, demand, and vindicate under the name of his, that
which before they called in the plural, theirs.
[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by release, &c.]
12. We have seen how particular men enter into subjection, by
transferring their rights; it followeth to consider, how such
subjection may be discharged. And first, if he or they that have the
sovereign power, shall relinquish the same voluntarily, there is no
doubt, but every man is again at liberty to obey, or not. Likewise,
if he or they retaining the sovereignty over the rest, do
nevertheless exempt some one or more, from their subjection, every
man so exempted, is discharged. For he or they to whom any man is
obliged, hath the power to release him.
[Sidenote: How such releases are to be understood.]
13. And here it is to be understood, that when he or they that have
the sovereign power, give such exemption, or privilege, to a
subject, as is not separable from the sovereignty, and nevertheless
directly retaineth the sovereign power, not knowing the consequence
of the privilege they grant, the person or persons exempted or
privileged, are not thereby released. For in contradictory
significations of the will (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9),
that which is directly signified, is to be understood for the will,
before that which is drawn from it by consequence.
[Sidenote: Obedience discharged by exile.]
14. Also exile perpetual, is a release of subjection, forasmuch, as
being out of the protection of the sovereignty that expelled him, he
hath no means of subsisting but from himself. Now every man may
lawfully defend himself, that hath no other defence; else there had
been no necessity that any man should enter into voluntary
subjection, as they do in commonwealths.
[Sidenote: By conquest.]
15. Likewise a man is released of his subjection by conquest. For
when it cometh to pass, that the power of a commonwealth is
overthrown, and any particular man thereby lying under the sword of
his enemy, yieldeth himself captive, he is thereby bound to serve
him that taketh him, and consequently discharged of his obligation
to the former. For no man can serve two masters.
[Sidenote: By ignorance of the right of succession.]
16. Lastly, ignorance of the succession dischargeth obedience. For
no man can be understood to be obliged to obey he knoweth not whom.
CHAPTER III.
1, 2. Titles to dominion: master and servant, &c. 3. Chains and
other, &c. Bonds, &c. Slave defined. 4. Servants have no
property against their lord, &c. 5. The master hath right to
alienate his servant. 6. The servant of the servant, &c. 7. How
servitude is discharged. 8. The middle lord, &c. 9. The title of
man, &c. over beasts.
[Sidenote: Titles to dominion; master and servant, &c.]
1. Having set forth in the two preceding chapters, the nature of a
commonwealth _institutive_ by the consent of many men together, I
come now to speak of dominion, or a body politic by acquisition,
which is commonly called a _patrimonial_ kingdom. But before I enter
thereinto, it is necessary to make known upon what title one man may
acquire right, that is to say, property or dominion, over the person
of another. For when one man hath dominion over another, there is a
little kingdom. And to be a king by acquisition, is nothing else,
but to have acquired a right or dominion over many.
2. Considering men therefore again in the state of nature, without
covenants or subjection one to another, as if they were but even now
all at once created male and female, there be three titles only, by
which one man may have right and dominion over another; whereof two
may take place presently, and those are, voluntary offer of
subjection, and yielding by compulsion: the third is to take place,
upon the supposition of children begotten amongst them. Concerning
the first of these three titles, it is handled before in the two
last chapters. For from thence cometh the right of sovereigns over
their subjects in a commonwealth institutive. Concerning the second
title, which is when a man submitteth to an assailant for fear of
death, thereby accrueth a right of dominion. For where every man, as
it happeneth in this case, hath right to all things, there needs no
more for the making of the said right effectual, but a covenant from
him that is overcome, not to resist him that overcometh. And thus
cometh the victor to have right of absolute dominion over the
conquered. By which there is presently constituted a little body
politic, which consisteth of two persons, the one sovereign, which
is called the _master_, or lord; the other subject, which is called
the _servant_. And when a man hath acquired right over a number of
servants so considerable, as they cannot by their neighbours be
securely invaded, this body politic is a kingdom despotical.
[Sidenote: Chains and other, &c. bonds, &c. slave defined.]
3. And it is to be understood, that when a servant taken in the
wars, is kept bound in natural bonds, as chains, and the like, or in
prison, there hath passed no covenant from the servant to his
master. For those natural bonds have no need of strengthening by the
verbal bonds of covenant, and they show that the servant is not
trusted. But covenant, (Part I. chapter II. section 9,) supposeth
trust. There remaineth therefore in the servant thus kept bound, or
in prison, a right of delivering himself, if he can, by what means
soever. This kind of servant is that which ordinarily and without
passion, is called a _slave_. The Romans had no such distinct name,
but comprehended all under the name of _servus_; whereof such as
they loved and durst trust, were suffered to go at liberty, and
admitted to places of office, both near to their persons, and in
their affairs abroad; the rest were kept chained, or otherwise
restrained with natural impediments to their resistance. And as it
was amongst the Romans, so it was amongst other nations, the former
sort having no other bond but a supposed covenant, without which the
master had no reason to trust them; the latter being without
covenant, and no otherwise tied to obedience, but by chains, or
other like forcible custody.
[Sidenote: Servants have no property against their lord, &c.]
4. A master therefore is to be supposed to have no less right over
those, whose bodies he leaveth at liberty, than over those he
keepeth in bonds and imprisonment, and hath absolute dominion over
both, and may say of his servant, that he is his, as he may of any
other thing. And whatsoever the servant had, and might call his, is
now the master’s; for he that disposeth of the person, disposeth of
all the person could dispose of: insomuch, as though there be _meum_
and _tuum_ amongst servants distinct from one another by the
dispensation, and for the benefit of their master; yet there is no
_meum_ and _tuum_ belonging to any of them against the master
himself, whom they are not to resist, but to obey all his commands
as law.
[Sidenote: The master hath right to alienate his servant.]
5. And seeing both the servant and all that is committed to him, is
the property of the master, and every man may dispose of his own,
and transfer the same at his pleasure, the master may therefore
alienate his dominion over them, or give the same by his last will
to whom he list.
[Sidenote: The servant of the servant, &c.]
6. And if it happen, that the master himself by captivity or
voluntary subjection, become servant to another, then is that other
master _paramount_; and those servants of him that becometh servant,
are no further obliged, than their master paramount shall think
good; forasmuch as he disposing of the master subordinate, disposeth
of all he hath, and consequently of his servants, so that the
restriction of absolute power in masters, proceedeth not from the
law of nature, but from the political law of him that is their
master supreme or sovereign.
[Sidenote: How servitude is discharged.]
7. Servants immediate to the supreme master, are discharged of their
servitude, or subjection, in the same manner that subjects are
released of their allegiance in a commonwealth institutive. As
first, by release. For he that captiveth, which is done by accepting
what the captive transferreth to him, setteth again at liberty, by
transferring back the same. And this kind of release is called
_manumission_. Secondly, by exile. For that is no more but
manumission given to a servant, not in the way of benefit, but
punishment. Thirdly, by a new captivity, where the servant having
done his endeavour to defend himself, hath thereby performed his
covenant to his former master, and for the safety of his life,
entering into new covenant with the conqueror, is bound to do his
best endeavour to keep that likewise. Fourthly, ignorance of who is
successor to his deceased master, dischargeth him of obedience: for
no covenant holdeth longer than a man knoweth to whom he is to
perform it. And lastly, that servant that is no longer trusted, but
committed to his chains and custody, is thereby discharged of the
obligation _in foro interno_, and therefore if he can get loose, may
lawfully go his way.
[Sidenote: The middle lord, &c.]
8. But servants subordinate, though manumitted by their immediate
lord, are not thereby discharged of their subjection to their lord
paramount. For the immediate master hath no property in them, having
transferred his right before to another, namely, to his own and
supreme master. Nor if the chief lord should manumit his immediate
servant, doth he thereby release his servants of their obligation to
him that is so manumitted. For by this manumission, he recovereth
again the absolute dominion he had over them before. For after a
release, which is the discharge of a covenant, the right standeth as
it did before the covenant was made.
[Sidenote: The title of man, &c. over beasts.]
9. This right of conquest, as it maketh one man master over another,
so also maketh it a man to be master of the irrational creatures.
For if a man in the state of nature be in hostility with men, and
thereby have lawful title to subdue or kill, according as his own
conscience and discretion shall suggest unto him for his safety and
benefit, much more may he do the same to beasts; that is to say,
save and preserve for his own service, according to his discretion,
such as are of nature apt to obey, and commodious for use; and to
kill and destroy, with perpetual war, all other, as fierce, and
noisome to him. And this dominion is therefore of the law of nature,
and not of the divine law positive. For if there had been no such
right before the revealing of God’s will in the Scripture, then
should no man, to whom the Scripture hath not come, have right to
make use of those his creatures, either for his food or sustenance.
And it were a hard condition of mankind, that a fierce and savage
beast should with more right kill a man, than a man a beast.
-------
CHAPTER IV.
1. The dominion over the child, &c. 2. Pre-eminence of sex giveth
not the child to the father, rather than to the mother. 3. The
title of the father or mother, &c. 4. The child of a
woman-servant, &c. 5. The right to the child given from the
mother, &c. 6. The child of the concubine, &c. 7. The child of
the husband and the wife, &c. 8. The father, or he or she that
bringeth up the child, have absolute power over him. 9. Freedom
in subjects what it is. 10. A great family is a patrimonial
kingdom. 11. Succession of the sovereign power, &c. 12. Though
the successor be not declared, yet there is always one to be
presumed. 13. The children preferred to the succession, &c. 14.
The males before the females. 15. The eldest before the rest of
the brothers. 16. The brother next to the children. 17. The
succession of the possessor, &c.
[Sidenote: The dominion over the child, &c.]
1. Of three ways by which a man becometh subject to another,
mentioned section 2, chapter the last, namely, voluntary offer,
captivity and birth, the former two have been spoken of, under the
name of subjects, and servants. In the next place, we are to set
down the third way of subjection, under the name of children, and by
what title one man cometh to have propriety in a child, that
proceedeth from the common generation of two; to wit, of male and
female. And considering men again dissolved from all covenants one
with another, and that (Part I. chap. IV. sect. 2) every man by the
law of nature, hath right or propriety to his own body, the child
ought rather to be the propriety of the mother, of whose body it is
part, till the time of separation, than of the father. For the
understanding therefore of the right that a man or woman hath to his
or their child, two things are to be considered; first, what title
the mother, or any other, originally hath, to a child new born:
secondly, how the father, or any other man, pretendeth by the
mother.
[Sidenote: Pre-eminence of sex giveth not the child to the father,
rather than to the mother.]
2. For the first, they that have written of this subject, have made
generation to be a title of dominion over persons, as well as the
consent of the persons themselves. And because generation giveth
title to two, namely, father and mother, whereas dominion is
indivisible, they therefore ascribe dominion over the child to the
father only, _ob præstantiam sexûs_; but they show not, neither can
I find out by what coherence, either generation inferreth dominion,
or advantage of so much strength, which, for the most part, a man
hath more than a woman, should generally and universally entitle the
father to a propriety in the child, and take it away from the
mother.
[Sidenote: The title of the father or mother, &c.]
3. The title to dominion over a child, proceedeth not from the
generation, but from the preservation of it; and therefore in the
estate of nature, the mother, in whose power it is to save or
destroy it, hath right thereto by that power, according to that
which hath been said, Part I. chapter I. sect. 13. And if the mother
shall think fit to abandon, or expose her child to death, whatsoever
man or woman shall find the child so exposed, shall have the same
right which the mother had before; and for this same reason, namely,
for the power not of generating, but preserving. And though the
child thus preserved, do in time acquire strength, whereby he might
pretend equality with him or her that hath preserved him, yet shall
that pretence be thought unreasonable, both because his strength was
the gift of him, against whom he pretendeth, and also because it is
to be presumed, that he which giveth sustenance to another, whereby
to strengthen him, hath received a promise of obedience in
consideration thereof. For else it would be wisdom in men, rather to
let their children perish, while they are infants, than to live in
their danger or subjection, when they are grown.
[Sidenote: The child of a woman servant, &c.]
4. For the pretences which a man may have to dominion over a child
by the right of the mother, they be of divers kinds. One by the
absolute subjection of the mother; another, by some particular
covenant from her, which is less than a covenant of such subjection.
By absolute subjection, the master of the mother, hath right to her
child, according to section 6, chapter III, whether he be the father
thereof, or not. And thus the children of the servant are the goods
of the master _in perpetuum_.
[Sidenote: The right to the child given from the mother, &c.]
5. Of covenants that amount not to subjection between a man and
woman, there be some which are made for a time; they are covenants
of cohabitation, or else of copulation only. And in this latter
case, the children pass by covenants particular. And thus in the
copulation of the Amazons with their neighbours, the fathers by
covenant had the male children only, the mothers retaining the
females.
[Sidenote: The child of the concubine, &c.]
6. And covenants of cohabitation are either for society of bed, or
for society of all things; if for society of bed only, then is the
woman called _a concubine_. And here also the child shall be his or
hers, as they shall agree particularly by covenant. For although for
the most part, a concubine is supposed to yield up the right of her
children to the father, yet doth not concubinate enforce so much.
[Sidenote: The child of the husband and the wife, &c.]
7. But if the covenants of cohabitation be for society of all
things, it is necessary that but one of them govern and dispose of
all that is common to them both; without which, as hath been often
said before, society cannot last. And therefore the man, to whom for
the most part the woman yieldeth the government, hath for the most
part, also, the sole right and dominion over the children. And the
man is called the husband, and the woman the wife. But because
sometimes the government may belong to the wife only, sometimes also
the dominion over the children shall be in her only. As in the case
of a sovereign queen, there is no reason that her marriage should
take from her the dominion over her children.
[Sidenote: The father, or he or she that bringeth up the child, have
absolute power over him.]
8. Children therefore, whether they be brought up and preserved by
the father, or by the mother, or by whomsoever, are in most absolute
subjection to him or her, that so bringeth them up, or preserveth
them. And they may alienate them, that is, assign his or her
dominion, by selling, or giving them, in adoption or servitude to
others; or may pawn them for hostages, kill them for rebellion, or
sacrifice them for peace, by the law of nature, when he or she, in
his or her conscience, think it to be necessary.
[Sidenote: Freedom in subjects what it is.]
9. The subjection of them who institute a commonwealth amongst
themselves, is no less absolute, than the subjection of servants.
And therein they are in equal estate. But the hope of those is
greater than the hope of these. For he that subjecteth himself
uncompelled, thinketh there is reason he should be better used, than
he that doth it upon compulsion; and coming in freely, calleth
himself, though in subjection, a _freeman_; whereby it appeareth,
that liberty is not any exemption from subjection and obedience to
the sovereign power, but a state of better hope than theirs, that
have been subjected by force and conquest. And this was the reason,
that the name which signifieth children in the Latin tongue, is
_liberi_, which also signifieth _freemen_. And yet in Rome, nothing
at that time was so obnoxious to the power of others, as children in
the family of their fathers. For both the state had power over their
life without consent of their fathers, and the father might kill his
son by his own authority, without any warrant from the state.
Freedom therefore in commonwealths is nothing but the honour of
equality of favour with other subjects, and servitude the estate of
the rest. A freeman therefore may expect employments of honour,
rather than a servant. And this is all that can be understood by the
liberty of the subject. For in all other senses, liberty is the
state of him that is not subject.
[Sidenote: A great family is a patrimonial kingdom.]
10. Now when a father that hath children, hath servants also, the
children, not by the right of the child, but by the natural
indulgence of the parents, are such freemen. And the whole,
consisting of the father or mother, or both, and of the children,
and of the servants, is called a _family_, wherein the father or
mother of the family is sovereign of the same, and the rest, both
children and servants equally, subjects. The same family, if it grow
by multiplication of children, either by generation, or adoption; or
of servants, either by generation, conquest, or voluntary
submission, to be so great and numerous, as in probability it may
protect itself, then is that family called a _patrimonial kingdom_,
or monarchy by acquisition, wherein the sovereignty is in one man,
as it is in a monarch made by _political institution_. So that
whatsoever rights be in the one, the same also be in the other. And
therefore I shall no more speak of them as distinct, but of monarchy
in general.
[Sidenote: Succession of the sovereign power, &c.]
11. Having showed by what right the several sorts of commonwealths,
democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy, are erected, it followeth, to
show by what right they are continued. The right by which they are
continued, is called the right of succession to the sovereign power;
whereof there is nothing to be said in a democracy, because the
sovereign dieth not, as long as there be subjects alive: nor in an
aristocracy, because it cannot easily fall out, that the _optimates_
should every one fail at once; and if it should so fall out, there
is no question, but the commonwealth is thereby dissolved. It is
therefore in a monarchy only, that there can happen a question
concerning the succession. And first, forasmuch as a monarch, which
is absolute sovereign, hath the dominion in his own right, he may
dispose thereof at his own will. If therefore by his last will, he
shall name his successor, the right passeth by that will.
[Sidenote: Though the successor be not declared, yet there is always
one to be presumed.]
12. Nor if the monarch die without any will concerning the
succession declared, it is not therefore to be presumed, it was his
will, his subjects, which are to him as his children and servants,
should return again to the state of anarchy, that is, to war and
hostility. For that were expressly against the law of nature, which
commandeth to procure peace, and to maintain the same. It is
therefore to be conjectured with reason, that it was his intention
to bequeath them peace, that is to say, a power coercive, whereby to
keep them from sedition amongst themselves; and rather in the form
of a monarchy, than any other government; forasmuch as he, by the
exercise thereof in his own person, hath declared, that he approveth
the same.
[Sidenote: The children preferred to the succession, &c.]
13. Further, it is to be supposed, his intention was, that his own
children should be preferred in the succession, when nothing to the
contrary is expressly declared, before any other. For men naturally
seek their own honour, and that consisteth in the honour of their
children after them.
[Sidenote: The males before the females.]
14. Again, seeing every monarch is supposed to desire to continue
the government in his successors, as long as he may; and that
generally men are endued with greater parts of wisdom and courage,
by which all monarchies are kept from dissolution, than women are;
it is to be presumed, where no express will is extant to the
contrary, he preferreth his male children before the female. Not but
that women may govern, and have in divers ages and places governed
wisely, but are not so apt thereto in general, as men.
[Sidenote: The eldest before the rest of the brothers.]
15. Because the sovereign power is indivisible, it cannot be
supposed, that he intended the same should be divided, but that it
should descend entirely upon one of them, which is to be presumed,
should be the eldest, assigned thereto by the lot of nature, because
he appointed no other lot for the decision thereof. Besides, what
difference of ability soever there may be amongst the brethren, the
odds shall be adjudged to the elder, because no subject hath
authority otherwise to judge thereof.
[Sidenote: The brother next to the children.]
16. And for want of issue in the possessor, the brother shall be
presumed successor. For by the judgment of nature, next in blood is
next in love; and next in love is next to preferment.
[Sidenote: The succession of the possessor, &c.]
17. And as the succession followeth the first monarch, so also it
followeth him or her that is in possession; and consequently, the
children of him in possession, shall be preferred before the
children of his father, or predecessor.
-------
CHAPTER V.
1. The utility of the commonwealth, &c. 2. The loss of liberty, &c.
3. Monarchy approved by, &c. 4. Monarchy less subject to
passion, &c. 5, 6. Subjects in monarchy, &c. 7. Laws in monarchy
less changeable, &c. 8. Monarchies less subject to dissolution.
[Sidenote: The utility of the commonwealth, &c.]
1. Having set forth the nature of a Body Politic, and the three
sorts thereof, democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy; in this chapter
shall be declared, the _conveniences_, and _inconveniences_, that
arise from the same, both in general, and of the said several sorts
in particular. And first, seeing a body politic is erected only for
the ruling and governing of particular men, the benefit and damage
thereof, consisteth in the benefit or damage of being ruled. The
benefit is that for which a body politic was instituted, namely, the
peace and preservation of every particular man, than which it is not
possible there can be a greater, as hath been touched before, Part
I. chapter I. section 12. And this benefit extendeth equally both to
the _sovereign_, and to the _subjects_. For he or they that have the
sovereign power, have but the defence of their persons, by the
assistance of the particulars; and every particular man hath his
defence by their union in the sovereign. As for other benefits,
which pertain not to their safety and sufficiency, but to their well
and delightful being, such as are superfluous riches, they so belong
to the sovereign, as they must also be in the subject; and so to the
subject, as they must also be in the sovereign. For the riches and
treasure of the sovereign, is the dominion he hath over the riches
of his subjects. If therefore the sovereign provide not so as that
particular men may have means, both to preserve themselves, and also
to preserve the public; the common or sovereign treasure can be
none. And on the other side, if it were not for a common and public
treasure belonging to the sovereign power, men’s private riches
would sooner serve to put them into confusion and war, than to
secure and maintain them. Insomuch, as the profit of the sovereign
and subject goeth always together. That distinction therefore of
government, that there is one government for the good of him that
governeth, and another for the good of them that be governed;
whereof the former is _despotical_, that is lordly; the other, a
government of _freemen_, is not right. No more is the opinion of
them that hold it to be no city, which consisteth of a master and
his servants. They might as well say, it were no city, that
consisted in a father and his own issue, how numerous soever they
were. For to a master that hath no children, the servants have in
them all those respects, for which men love their children. For they
are his strength and his honour. And his power is no greater over
them, than over his children.
[Sidenote: The loss of liberty, &c.]
2. The inconvenience arising from government in general to him that
governeth, consisteth partly in the continual care and trouble about
the business of other men, that are his subjects; and partly, in the
danger of his person. For the head always is that part, not only
where the care resideth, but also against which the stroke of an
enemy most commonly is directed. To balance this incommodity, the
sovereignty, together with the necessity of this care and danger,
comprehendeth so much honour, riches, and means, whereby to delight
the mind, as no private man’s wealth can attain unto. The
inconveniences of government in general to a subject are none at
all, if well considered, but in appearance. There be two things that
may trouble his mind, or two general grievances; the one is, loss of
liberty; the other, the uncertainty of _meum_ and _tuum_. For the
first, it consisteth in this, that a subject may no more govern his
own actions according to his own discretion and judgment, or, which
is all one, conscience, as the present occasions from time to time
shall dictate to him; but must be tied to do according to that will
only, which once for all he had long ago laid up, and involved in
the wills of the major part of an assembly, or in the will of some
one man. But this is really no inconvenience. For, as it hath been
showed before, it is the only means, by which we have any
possibility of preserving ourselves. For if every man were allowed
this liberty of following his conscience, in such difference of
consciences, they would not live together in peace an hour. But it
appeareth a great inconvenience to every man in particular, to be
debarred of this liberty, because every one apart considereth it as
in himself, and not as in the rest; by which means, liberty
appeareth in the likeness of rule and government over others. For
where one man is at liberty, and the rest bound, there that one hath
government; which honour, he that understandeth not so much,
demanding by the name simply of liberty, thinketh it a great
grievance and injury to be denied it. For the second grievance
concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, it is also none, but in appearance
only; it consisteth in this, that the sovereign power taketh from
him that which he used to enjoy, knowing no other propriety, but use
and custom. But without such sovereign power, the right of men is
not propriety to anything, but a community, no better than to have
no right at all, as hath been showed, Part I. chapter I. section 10.
Propriety therefore being derived from the sovereign power, is not
to be pretended against the same, especially, when by it every
subject hath his propriety against every other subject, which when
sovereignty ceaseth, he hath not, because in that case they return
to war amongst themselves. Those levies therefore which are made
upon men’s estates, by the sovereign authority, are no more but the
price of that peace and defence which the sovereignty maintaineth
for them. If this were not so, no money nor forces for the wars, nor
any other public occasion, could justly be levied in the world. For
neither king, nor democracy, nor aristocracy, nor the estates of any
land, could do it, if the sovereignty could not. For in all those
cases, it is levied by virtue of the sovereignty. Nay more, by the
three estates here, the land of one man may be transferred to
another, without crime of him from whom it was taken, and without
pretence of public benefit, as hath been done; and this without
injury, because done by the sovereign power. For the power whereby
it is done, is no less than sovereign, and cannot be greater.
Therefore this grievance for _meum_ and _tuum_ is not real, unless
more be exacted than is necessary; but it seemeth a grievance,
because to them that either know not the right of sovereignty, or to
whom that right belongeth, it seemeth an injury; and injury, how
little soever the damage, is always grievous, as putting us in mind
of our disability to help ourselves, and into envy of the power to
do us wrong.
[Sidenote: Monarchy approved by, &c.]
3. Having spoken of the inconveniences of the subject, by government
in general, let us consider the same in the three several sorts
thereof, namely, _democracy_, _aristocracy_ and _monarchy_; whereof
the two former are in effect but one. For, as I have showed before,
democracy is but the government of a few orators. The comparison
therefore will be between monarchy and aristocracy: and to omit that
the world, as it was created, so also it is governed by one God
Almighty; and that all the ancients have preferred monarchy before
other governments, both in opinion, because they feigned a
monarchical government amongst their gods, and also by their custom;
for that in the most ancient times all people were so governed: and
that paternal government, which is monarchy, was instituted in the
beginning from the creation; and that other governments have
proceeded from the dissolution thereof, caused by the rebellious
nature of mankind, and be but pieces of broken monarchies cemented
by human wit, I will insist only on this comparison, upon the
inconveniences that may happen to the subjects in consequence to
each of these governments.
[Sidenote: Monarchy less subject to passion, &c.]
4. And first, it seemeth inconvenient there should be committed so
great a power to one man, as that it might be lawful to no other man
or men to resist the same; and some think it inconvenient _eo
nomine_, because he hath the power. But this reason we may not by
any means admit, for it maketh it inconvenient to be ruled by
Almighty God, who without question hath more power over every man,
than can be conferred upon any monarch. This inconvenience therefore
must be derived not from the power, but from the affections and
passions which reign in every one, as well monarch as subject, by
which the monarch may be swayed to use that power amiss: and because
an aristocracy consisteth of men, if the passions of many men be
more violent when they are assembled together, than the passions of
one man alone, it will follow, that the inconvenience arising from
passions will be greater in an _aristocracy_, than a _monarchy_. But
there is no doubt, when things are debated in great assemblies, but
every man delivering his opinion at large without interruption,
endeavoureth to make whatsoever he is to set forth for good, better;
and what he would have apprehended as evil, worse, as much as is
possible, to the end his counsel may take place; which counsel also
is never without aim at his own benefit, or honour; every man’s end
being some good to himself. Now this cannot be done without working
on the passions of the rest. And thus the passions of these that are
singly moderate, are altogether vehement; even as a great many
coals, though but warm asunder, being put together, inflame one
another.
[Sidenote: Subjects in monarchy, &c.]
5. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is this, that the monarch,
besides the riches necessary for the defence of the commonwealth,
may take so much more from the subjects, as may enrich his children,
kindred and favourites, to what degree he pleaseth; which though it
be indeed an inconvenience, if he should so do, yet is the same both
greater in an aristocracy, and also more likely to come to pass, for
there not one only, but many have children, kindred, and friends to
raise. And in that point they are as twenty monarchs for one, and
likely to set forward one another’s designs mutually, to the
oppression of all the rest. The same also happeneth in a democracy,
if they all do agree; otherwise they bring a worse inconvenience; to
wit, sedition.
6. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of dispensing
with the execution of justice, whereby the family and friends of the
monarch, may, with impunity, commit outrages upon the people, or
oppress them with extortion. But in aristocracies, not only one, but
many have power of taking men out of the hands of justice, and no
man is willing his kindred or friends should be punished according
to their demerits. And therefore they understand amongst themselves
without further speaking, as a tacit covenant, _hodie mihi, cras
tibi_.
[Sidenote: Laws in monarchy less changeable, &c.]
7. Another inconvenience of monarchy, is the power of altering laws.
Concerning which, it is necessary that such a power be, that laws
may be altered, according as men’s manners change, or as the
conjuncture of all circumstances within and without the commonwealth
shall require; the change of law being then inconvenient, when it
proceedeth from the change, not of the occasion, but of the minds of
him or them, by whose authority the laws are made. Now it is
manifest enough of itself, that the mind of one man is not so
variable in that point, as are the decrees of an assembly. For not
only they have all their natural changes, but the change of any one
man may be enough, with eloquence and reputation, or by solicitation
and faction, to make that law to-day, which another by the very same
means, shall abrogate to-morrow.
[Sidenote: Monarchies less subject to dissolution.]
8. Lastly, the greatest inconvenience that can happen to a
commonwealth, is the aptitude to dissolve into civil war; and to
this are monarchies much less subject, than any other governments.
For where the union, or band of a commonwealth, is one man, there is
no distraction; whereas in assemblies, those that are of different
opinions, and give different counsel, are apt to fall out amongst
themselves, and to cross the designs of the commonwealth for one
another’s sake: and when they cannot have the honour of making good
their own devices, they yet seek the honour to make the counsels of
their adversaries prove vain. And in this contention, when the
opposite factions happen to be anything equal in strength, they
presently fall to war. Wherein necessity teacheth both sides, that
an absolute monarch, to wit, a general, is necessary both for their
defence against one another, and also for the peace of each faction
within itself. But this aptitude to dissolution, is to be understood
for an inconvenience in such aristocracies only where the affairs of
state are debated in great and numerous assemblies, as they were
anciently in Athens, and in Rome; and not in such as do nothing else
in great assemblies, but choose magistrates and counsellors, and
commit the handling of state affairs to a few; such as is the
aristocracy of Venice at this day. For these are no more apt to
dissolve from this occasion, than monarchies, the counsel of state
being both in the one and the other alike.
-------
CHAPTER VI.
1. A difficulty concerning absolute subjection to man, arising
from our absolute subjection to God Almighty, propounded. 2.
That this difficulty is only amongst those Christians that
deny the interpretation of the Scripture to depend upon the
sovereign authority of the commonwealth. 3. That human laws
are not made to govern the consciences of men, but their words
and actions. 4. Places of Scripture to prove obedience due
from Christians to their sovereign in all things. 5. A
distinction propounded between a fundamental point of faith,
and a superstruction. 6. An explication of the points of
faith, that be fundamental. 7. That the belief of those
fundamental points, is all that is required to salvation, as
of faith. 8. That other points not fundamental, are not
necessary to salvation as matter of faith; and that no more is
required by way of faith to the salvation of one man, than to
the salvation of another. 9. That superstructions are not
points of the faith necessary to a Christian. 10. How faith
and justice concur to salvation. 11. That in Christian
commonwealths, obedience to God and man stand well together.
12. This tenet, whatsoever is against the conscience, is sin,
interpreted. 13. That all men do confess the necessity of
submitting of controversies to some human authority. 14. That
Christians under an infidel are discharged of the injustice of
disobeying him, in that which concerneth the faith necessary
to salvation, by not resisting.
[Sidenote: A difficulty concerning absolute subjection to man,
arising from our absolute subjection to God Almighty,
propounded.]
1. Having showed, that in all commonwealths whatsoever, the
necessity of peace and government requireth, that there be existent
some power, either in one man, or in one assembly of men, by the
name of the power sovereign, which it is not lawful for any member
of the same commonwealth to disobey; there occurreth now a
difficulty, which, if it be not removed, maketh it unlawful for a
man to put himself under the command of such absolute sovereignty as
is required thereto. And the difficulty is this; we have amongst us
the Word of God for the rule of our actions: now if we shall subject
ourselves to men also, obliging ourselves to do such actions as
shall be by them commanded, when the commands of God and man shall
differ, we are to obey God, rather than man; and consequently, the
covenant of general obedience to man is unlawful.
[Sidenote: That this difficulty is only amongst those Christians
that deny the interpretation of Scripture to depend upon
the sovereign authority of the commonwealth.]
2. This difficulty hath not been of very great antiquity in the
world. There was no such _dilemma_ amongst the Jews; for their civil
law, and divine law, was one and the same law of Moses; the
interpreters whereof were the priests, whose power was subordinate
to the power of the king; as was the power of Aaron, to the power of
Moses. Nor is it a controversy that was ever taken notice of amongst
the Grecians, Romans, or other Gentiles: for amongst these their
several civil laws were the rules whereby not only righteousness and
virtue, but also religion, and the external worship of God, was
ordered and approved; that being esteemed the true worship of God,
which was κατὰ τὰ νόμιμα, according to the laws civil. Also those
Christians that dwell under the temporal dominion of the bishop of
Rome, are free from this question; for that they allow unto him,
their sovereign, to interpret the Scriptures, which are the law of
God, as he in his own judgment shall think right. This difficulty
therefore remaineth amongst, and troubleth those Christians only, to
whom it is allowed, to take for the sense of the Scripture, that
which they make thereof, either by their own private interpretation,
or by the interpretation of such as are not called thereunto by
public authority; they that follow their own interpretation
continually, demanding liberty of conscience; and those that follow
the interpretation of others not ordained thereunto by the sovereign
of the commonwealth, requiring a power in matters of religion either
above the power civil, or at least not depending on it.
[Sidenote: That human laws are not made to govern the consciences of
men, but their words & actions.]
3. To take away this scruple of conscience, concerning obedience to
human laws, amongst those that interpret to themselves the word of
God in the Holy Scriptures, I propound to their consideration,
first, that no human law is intended to oblige the conscience of a
man, unless it break out into action, either of the tongue, or other
part of the body. The law made thereupon would be of none effect,
because no man is able to discern, but by word or other action
whether such law be kept or broken. Nor did the apostles themselves
pretend dominion over men’s consciences, concerning the faith they
preached, but only persuasion and instruction. And therefore St.
Paul saith (2 Cor. i. 24), writing to the Corinthians, concerning
their controversies, that he and the rest of the apostles had no
dominion over their faith, but were helpers of their joy.
[Sidenote: Places of Scripture to prove obedience due from
Christians to their sovereign in all things.]
4. And for the actions of men which proceed from their consciences,
the regulating of which actions is the only means of peace, if they
might not stand with justice, it were impossible that justice
towards God, and peace amongst men, should stand together in that
religion that teacheth us, that _justice and peace shall kiss each
other_, and in which we have so many precepts of absolute obedience
to human authority; as Matth. xxiii. 2, 3, we have this precept:
_The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses' seat; all therefore
whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe and do_. And yet were
the Scribes and Pharisees not priests, but men of temporal
authority. Again Luke xi. 17: _Every kingdom divided against itself
shall be desolate_; and is not that kingdom divided against itself,
where the actions of every one shall be ruled by his private
opinion, or conscience, and yet those actions such as give occasion
of offence and breach of peace? Again Rom. xiii. 5: _Wherefore you
must be subject, not because of wrath only, but also for conscience
sake_. Titus iii. 1: _Put them in remembrance, that they be subject
to principalities and powers_. 1 Peter ii. 13, 14: _Submit
yourselves unto all manner of ordinance of man, for the Lord’s sake,
whether it be unto the king, as unto the superior, or unto
governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of
evil doers_. Jude, verse 8: _These dreamers also that defile the
flesh, and despise government, and speak evil of them that are in
authority_. And forasmuch as all subjects in commonwealths are in
the nature of children and servants, that which is a command to
them, is a command to all subjects. But to these St. Paul saith
(Colos. iii. 20, 22): _Children, obey your parents in all things;
servants, be obedient to your masters according to the flesh in all
things_. And verse 23: _Do it heartily as to the Lord_. These places
considered, it seemeth strange to me, that any man in a Christian
commonwealth, should have any occasion to deny his obedience to
public authority, upon this ground, that _it is better to obey God
than man_. For though St. Peter and the apostles did so answer the
council of the Jews, that forbad them to preach Christ, there
appeareth no reason that Christians should allege the same against
their Christian governors, that command them to preach Christ. To
reconcile this seeming contradiction of simple obedience to God, and
simple obedience to man, we are to consider a Christian subject, as
under a Christian sovereign, or under an infidel.
[Sidenote: A distinction propounded between a fundamental point of
faith and a superstruction.]
5. And under a Christian sovereign we are to consider, what actions
we are forbidden by God Almighty to obey them in, and what not. The
actions we are forbidden to obey them in, are such only, as imply a
denial of that faith which is necessary to our salvation: for
otherwise there can be no pretence of disobedience; for why should a
man incur the danger of a temporal death, by displeasing of his
superior, if it were not for fear of eternal death hereafter? It
must therefore be enquired, what those propositions and articles be,
the belief whereof our Saviour or his apostles have declared to be
such, as without believing them, a man cannot be saved; and then all
other points, that are now controverted, and made distinction of
sects, Papists, Lutherans, Calvinists, Arminians, &c. (as in old
time, the like made Paulists, Apollonians, and Cephasians), must
needs be such, as a man needeth not for the holding thereof, deny
obedience to his superiors. And for the points of faith necessary to
salvation, I shall call them _fundamental_, and every other point a
_superstruction_.
[Sidenote: An explication of the points of faith, that be
fundamental.]
6. And without all controversy, there is not any more necessary
point to be believed for man’s salvation than this, that _Jesus is
the Messiah_, that is, _the Christ_; which proposition is explicated
in sundry sorts, but still the same in effect; as, that _he is God’s
anointed_; for that is signified by the word Christ: that _he was
the true and lawful king of Israel, the son of David, the Saviour of
the world, the redeemer of Israel, the salvation of God, he that
should come into the world, the son of God_, and, which I desire by
the way to have noted, against the now sect of Arians, _the begotten
Son of God_, Acts iii. 13; Heb. v. 5: _The only begotten Son of
God_, John i. 14, 18; John iii. 16, 18; 1 John iv. 9: _That he was
God_, John i. 1; John xx. 28: _That the fulness of the Godhead dwelt
in him bodily_, Coloss. ii. 9: Moreover, _the Holy One, the Holy One
of God, the forgiver of sins, that he is risen from the dead_. These
are explications, and parts of that general article, that _Jesus is
the Christ_. This point therefore, and all the explications thereof
are fundamental: as also all such as be evidently inferred from
thence; as, BELIEF IN GOD THE FATHER: John xii. 44: _He that
believeth in me, believeth not in me, but in him that sent me_; 1
John ii. 23: _He that denieth the Son, hath not the Father_: BELIEF
IN GOD THE HOLY GHOST, of whom Christ saith, John xiv. 26: _But the
Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my
name_: and John xv. 26: _But when the Comforter shall come, whom I
will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth_:
BELIEF OF THE SCRIPTURES, by which we believe those points and of
the immortality of the soul, without which we cannot believe he is a
Saviour.
[Sidenote: That the belief of those fundamental points, is all that
is required to salvation, as of faith.]
7. And as these are the fundamental points of faith necessary to
salvation; so also are they only necessary as matter of faith, and
only essential to the calling of a Christian; as may appear by many
evident places of Holy Scripture: John v. 39: _Search the
Scriptures, for in them ye think ye have eternal life, and they are
they which testify of me_. Now, forasmuch as by the _Scripture_, is
meant there the Old Testament (the New being then not written), the
belief of that which was written concerning our Saviour in the Old
Testament, was sufficient belief for the obtaining of eternal life:
but in the Old Testament, there is nothing revealed concerning
Christ, but that he is the Messiah, and such things as belong to the
fundamental points thereupon depending. And therefore those
_fundamental_ points are sufficient to salvation as of faith. And
John vi. 28, 29: _Then said they unto him, What shall we do, that we
might work the works of God? Jesus answered and said unto them. This
is the work of God, that ye believe in him, whom he hath sent._ So
that the point to be believed is, _That Jesus Christ came forth from
God, and he which believeth it, worketh the works of God_. John xi.
26, 27: _Whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die.
Believest thou this? She said unto him, Yea, Lord, I believe that
thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the
world._ Hence followeth, _He that believeth this, shall never die_.
John xx. 31: _But these things are written, that ye might believe,
that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing, ye
might have life through his name_. By which appeareth, that this
_fundamental_ point is all that is required, as of faith to our
salvation. 1 John iv. 2: _Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus
Christ is come in the flesh, is of God_: 1 John v. 1: _Whosoever
believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God_; and (verse 5)
_Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth, that
Jesus is the Son of God_: and verse 13: _These things have I written
unto you that believe in the name of the Son of God, that ye may
know that ye have eternal life_. Acts, viii. 36, 37: _The eunuch
said, Here is water, what doth hinder me to be baptized? And Philip
said unto him, If thou believest with all thy heart, thou mayest. He
answered and said, I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God._
This point therefore was sufficient for the reception of man into
baptism, that is to say, to Christianity. And Acts, xvi. 29-31: _The
keeper of the prison fell down before Paul and Silas, and said,
Sirs, what shall I do to be saved? And they said, Believe in the
Lord Jesus Christ._ And the sermon of St. Peter, upon the day of
Pentecost, was nothing else but an explication, that _Jesus was the
Christ. And when they had heard him, they asked him, What shall we
do? He said unto them_, (Acts, ii. 38): _Amend your lives, and be
baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the
remission of sins_. Rom. x. 9: _If thou shalt confess with thy mouth
the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart, that God raised him
up from the dead, thou shalt be saved_. To these places may be
added, that wheresoever our Saviour Christ doth approve the faith of
any man, the proposition believed, if the same be to be collected
out of the text, is always some of these fundamental points before
mentioned, or something equivalent: as the faith of the centurion
(Matth. viii. 8): _Speak the word only, and my servant shall be
healed_; believing he was omnipotent: the faith of the woman, which
had an issue of blood, (Matth. ix. 21): _If I may but touch the hem
of his garment_; implying, he was the Messiah: the faith required of
the blind men, (Matth. ix. 28): _Believe you that I am able to do
this?_ the faith of the Canaanitish woman, (Matth. xv. 22), that he
was the _Son of David_, implying the same. And so it is in every one
of those places, none excepted, where our Saviour commendeth any
man’s faith, which because they are too many to insert here, I omit,
and refer them to his inquisition that is not otherwise satisfied.
And as there is no other faith required, so there was no other
preaching: for the prophets of the Old Testament preached no other;
and John the Baptist preached only the approach of the kingdom of
heaven, that is to say, of the kingdom of Christ. The same was the
commission of the apostles (Matth. x. 7): _Go preach, saying, The
kingdom of heaven is at hand_. And Paul preaching amongst the Jews,
(Acts, xviii. 5), did but testify unto the Jews, that _Jesus was the
Christ_. And the heathens took notice of Christians no otherwise,
but by this name, that they believed _Jesus to be a king_, crying
out, (Acts, xvii. 6, 7): _These are they that have subverted the
state of the world, and here they are, whom Jason hath received. And
these all do against the decrees of Cæsar, saying, that there is
another king, one Jesus._ And this was the sum of the predictions,
the sum of the confessions of them that believed, as well men as
devils. This was the title of his cross, _Jesus of Nazareth, king of
the Jews_; this the occasion of the crown of thorns, sceptre of
reed, and a man to carry his cross; this was the subject of the
_Hosannas_; and this was the title, by which our Saviour, commanding
to take another man’s goods, bade them say, _The Lord hath need_;
and by this title he purged the temple of the profane market kept
there. Nor did the apostles themselves believe any more than that
_Jesus was the Messiah_, nor understand so much; for they understood
the Messiah to be no more than a temporal king, till after our
Saviour’s resurrection. Furthermore, this point, that _Christ is the
Messiah_, is particularly set forth for _fundamental_ by that word,
or some other equivalent thereunto in divers places. Upon the
confession of Peter (Matth. xvi. 16): _Thou art the Christ, the son
of the living God_, our Saviour (verse 18) saith, _Upon this rock
will I build my church_. This point therefore is the whole
foundation of Christ’s church. St. Paul saith, (Rom. xv. 20) _I so
enforced myself to preach the Gospel, not where Christ was named,
lest I should have built upon another man’s foundation_. St. Paul,
(1 Cor. iii. 10) when he had reprehended the Corinthians for their
sects, and curious doctrines and questions, he distinguisheth
between _fundamental_ points, and _superstruction_; and saith, _I
have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereupon; but let
every man take heed how he buildeth upon it. For other foundation
can no man lay than that which is laid, which is Jesus Christ._
Coloss. ii. 6, 7: _As you have received Christ Jesus the Lord, so
walk in him, rooted and builded in him, and stablished in the
faith_.
[Sidenote: That other points not fundamental, are not necessary to
salvation as matters of faith; and that no more is
required by way of faith to the salvation of one man than
to the salvation of another.]
8. Having showed this proposition, _Jesus is the Christ_, to be the
only fundamental and necessary point of faith, I shall set down a
few places more, to show, that other points, though they may be
true, are not so necessary to be believed, as that a man may not be
saved, though he believe them not. And first, if a man could not be
saved without assent of the heart to the truth of all controversies,
which are now in agitation concerning religion, I cannot see, how
any man living can be saved; so full of subtilty, and curious
knowledge it is to be so great a divine. Why therefore should a man
think that our Saviour, who (Matth. xi. 30), saith, that his _yoke
is easy_, should require a matter of that difficulty? or how are
little children said to believe, (Matth. xviii. 6); or how could the
good thief be thought sufficiently catechised upon the cross? or St.
Paul so perfect a Christian presently upon his conversion? and
though there may be more obedience required in him that hath the
fundamental points explicated unto him, than in him that hath
received the same but implicitly; yet there is no more faith
required for salvation in one man, than another. For if it be true,
that _Whosoever shall confess with his mouth the Lord Jesus, and
believe in his heart, that God raised him from the dead, shall be
saved_; as it is, Rom. x. 9, and that _Whosoever believeth that
Jesus is the Christ, is born of God_; the belief of that point is
sufficient for the salvation of any man whosoever he be, forasmuch
as concerneth faith. And seeing he that believeth not that _Jesus is
the Christ_, whatsoever he believe else, cannot be saved; it
followeth, that there is no more required of the salvation of one
man, than another, in matter of faith.
[Sidenote: That superstructions are not points of the faith
necessary to a Christian.]
9. About these points fundamental, there is little controversy
amongst Christians, though otherwise of different sects amongst
themselves. And therefore the controversies of religion, are
altogether about points unnecessary to salvation; whereof some are
doctrines raised by human ratiocination, from the points
_fundamental_. As for example; such doctrines as concern the manner
of the real presence, wherein are mingled tenets of faith concerning
the omnipotency and divinity of Christ, with the tenets of Aristotle
and the Peripatetics concerning substance and accidents, species,
hypostasis, and the subsistence and migration of accidents from
place to place; words some of them without meaning, and nothing but
the canting of Grecian sophisters. And these doctrines are condemned
expressly, Col. ii. 8, where after St. Paul had exhorted them to _be
rooted and builded in Christ_, he giveth them this further caveat:
_Beware lest there be any man that spoil you through philosophy and
vain deceits, through the traditions of men, according to the
rudiments of the world_. And such are such doctrines, as are raised
out of such places of the Scriptures, as concern not the foundation,
by men’s natural reason; as about the concatenation of causes, and
the manner of God’s predestination; which are also mingled with
philosophy: as if it were possible for men that know not in what
manner God seeth, heareth, or speaketh, to know nevertheless the
manner how he intendeth, and predestinateth. A man therefore ought
not to examine by reason any point, or draw any consequence out of
Scripture by reason, concerning the nature of God Almighty, of which
reason is not capable. And therefore St. Paul, (Rom. xii. 3) giveth
a good rule, _That no man presume to understand above that which is
meet to understand, but that he understand according to sobriety_:
which they do not, who presume out of Scripture, by their own
interpretation, to raise any doctrine to the understanding,
concerning those things which are incomprehensible. And this whole
controversy concerning the predestination of God, and the free-will
of man, is not peculiar to Christian men. For we have huge volumes
of this subject, under the name of _fate_ and _contingency_,
disputed between the Epicureans and the Stoics, and consequently it
is not matter of faith, but of philosophy: and so are also all the
questions concerning any other point, but the foundation before
named; and God receiveth a man, which part of the question soever he
holdeth. It was a controversy in St. Paul’s time, whether a
Christian Gentile might eat freely of any thing which the Christian
Jews did not; and the Jew condemned the Gentile that he did eat, to
whom St. Paul saith, (Rom. xiv. 3): _Let not him that eateth not,
judge him that eateth; for God hath received him_. And verse 6, in
the question concerning the observing of holy days, wherein the
Gentiles and Jews differed, he saith unto them, _He that observeth
the day, observeth it to the Lord; and he that observeth not the
day, observeth it not to the Lord_. And they who strive concerning
such questions, and divide themselves into sects, are not therefore
to be accounted zealous of the faith, their strife being but carnal,
which is confirmed by St. Paul (1 Cor. iii. 4): _When one saith, I
am of Paul, and another, I am of Appollos, are ye not carnal?_ For
they are not questions of faith, but of wit, wherein, carnally, men
are inclined to seek the mastery one of another. For nothing is
truly a point of faith, but that _Jesus is the Christ_; as St. Paul
testifieth, (1 Cor. ii. 2): _For I esteemed not the knowledge of any
thing amongst you, save Jesus Christ, and him crucified_. And 1 Tim.
vi. 20, 21: _O Timotheus, keep that which is committed unto thee,
and avoid profane and vain babblings, and opposition of science
falsely so called, which while some profess, they have erred
concerning the faith_. 2 Tim. ii. 16: _Shun profane and vain
babblings, &c._ Verse 17, 18: _Of which sort is Hymenæus and
Philetus, which as concerning the truth, have erred, saying, that
the resurrection is past already_. Whereby St. Paul showed, that the
raising of questions by human ratiocination, though it be from the
fundamental points themselves, is not only not necessary, but most
dangerous to the faith of a Christian. Out of all these places, I
draw only this conclusion in general, that neither the points now in
controversy amongst Christians of different sects, or in any point
that ever shall be in controversy, excepting only those that are
contained in this article, _Jesus is the Christ_, are necessary to
salvation, as of faith; though in matter of obedience, a man may be
bound not to oppose the same.
[Sidenote: How faith and justice concur to salvation.]
10. Although to the obtaining of salvation, there be required no
more, as hath been already declared, out of the Holy Scriptures, as
matter of faith, but the belief of those fundamental articles before
set forth; nevertheless, there are required other things, as matter
of obedience. For, as it is not enough in temporal kingdoms, to
avoid the punishment which kings may inflict, to acknowledge the
right and title of the king, without obedience also to his laws: so
also it is not enough, to acknowledge our Saviour Christ to be the
king of heaven, in which consisteth Christian faith, unless also we
endeavour to obey his laws, which are the laws of the kingdom of
heaven, in which consisteth Christian obedience. And forasmuch as
the laws of the kingdom of heaven, are the laws of nature, as hath
been showed, Part I. chapter V., not only faith, but also the
observation of the law of nature, (which is that for which a man is
called just or righteous, in that sense, in which justice is taken
not for the absence of guilt, but for the endeavour and constant
will to do that which is just) not only faith, but this justice,
which also from the effect thereof, is called repentance, and
sometimes works, is necessary to salvation. So that faith and
justice do both concur thereto; and in the several acceptation of
this word (justification) are properly said both of them to justify;
and the want of either of them is properly said to condemn. For not
only he that resisteth a king upon doubt of his title, but also he
that doth it upon the inordinateness of his passions, deserveth
punishment. And when faith and works are separated, not only the
faith is called dead without works, but also works are called dead
works without faith. And therefore St. James, (chapter ii. 17),
saith, _Even so the faith, if it have no works, is dead in itself_;
and verse 26: _For as the body without the spirit is dead, even so
faith without works is dead_. And St. Paul, (Heb. vi. 1), calleth
works without faith, _dead works_, where he saith, _Not laying again
the foundation of repentance from dead works_. And by these dead
works, is understood not the obedience and justice of the inward
man, but the _opus operatum_, or external action, proceeding from
fear of punishment, or from vain-glory, and desire to be honoured of
men: and these may be separated from faith, and conduce no way to a
man’s justification. And for that cause, St. Paul, (Rom. iv.)
excludeth the righteousness of the law, from having part in the
justification of a sinner. For by the law of Moses, which is applied
to men’s actions, and requireth the absence of guilt, all men living
are liable to damnation; and therefore no man is justified by works,
but by faith only. But if works be taken for the endeavour to do
them, that is, if the will be taken for the deed, or internal for
external righteousness, then do works contribute to salvation. And
then taketh place that of St. James, (chap. ii. 24): _Ye see then,
how that of works a man is justified, and not of faith only_. And
both of these are joined to salvation, as in St. Mark i. 15: _Repent
and believe the gospel_. And Luke xviii. 18-22, when a certain ruler
asked our Saviour, what he ought to do to inherit eternal life, he
propounded to him the keeping of the commandments; which when the
ruler said he had kept, he propounded to him the faith, _Sell all
that thou hast, and follow me_. And John iii. 36: _He that believeth
in the Son, hath everlasting life_. And _He that obeyeth not the
Son, shall not see life_. Where he manifestly joineth obedience and
faith together. And Rom. i. 17: _The just shall live by faith_; not
every one, but _the just_. For also _the devils believe and
tremble_. But though both faith and justice (meaning still by
justice, not absence of guilt, but the good intentions of the mind,
which is called righteousness by God, that taketh the will for the
deed) be both of them said to justify, yet are their parts in the
act of justification to be distinguished. For justice is said to
justify, not because it absolveth, but because it denominates him
just, and setteth him in an estate, or capacity of salvation,
whensoever he shall have faith. But faith is said to justify, that
is, to absolve, because by it a just man is absolved of, and
forgiven his unjust actions. And thus are reconciled the places of
St. Paul and St. James, that _Faith only justifieth_, and _a man is
not justified by faith only_; and showed how faith and repentance
must concur to salvation.
[Sidenote: That in Christian commonwealths, obedience to God and man
stand well together.]
11. These things considered, it will easily appear, that under the
sovereign power of a Christian commonwealth, there is no danger of
damnation from simple obedience to human laws; for in that the
sovereign alloweth Christianity, no man is compelled to renounce
that faith, which is enough for his salvation, that is to say, the
fundamental points. And for other points, seeing they are not
necessary to salvation, if we conform our actions to the laws, we do
not only what we are allowed, but also what we are commanded by the
law of nature, which is the moral law taught by our Saviour himself.
And it is part of that obedience which must concur to our salvation.
[Sidenote: This tenet, whatsoever is against the conscience is sin,
interpreted.]
12. And though it be true, whatsoever a man doth against his
conscience, is sin; yet the obedience in these cases, is neither
sin, nor against the conscience. For the conscience being nothing
else but a man’s settled judgment and opinion, when he hath once
transferred his right of judging to another, that which shall be
commanded, is no less his judgment, than the judgment of that other.
So that in obedience to laws, a man doth still according to his own
conscience, but not his private conscience. And whatsoever is done
contrary to private conscience, is then a sin, when the laws have
left him to his own liberty, and never else. And then whatsoever a
man doth, not only believing it is ill done, but doubting whether it
be ill or not, is done ill, in case he may lawfully omit the doing.
[Sidenote: That all men do confess the necessity of submitting of
controversies to some human authority.]
13. And as it hath been proved, that a man must submit his opinions
in matter of controversy to the authority of the commonwealth; so
also is the same confessed by the practice of every one of them that
otherwise deny it. For who is there differing in opinion from
another, and thinking himself to be in the right, and the other in
the wrong, that would not think it reasonable, if he be of the same
opinion that the whole state alloweth, that the other should submit
his opinion also thereunto; or that would not be content, if not
that one or a few men, yet all the divines of a whole nation, or at
least an assembly of all those he liketh, should have the power to
determine all the controversies of religion? or, who is there that
would not be content, to submit his opinions, either to the pope, or
to a general council, or to a provincial council, or to a presbytery
of his own nation? And yet in all these cases he submitteth himself
to no greater than human authority. Nor can a man be said to submit
himself to Holy Scripture, that doth not submit himself to some or
other for the interpretation thereof. Or, why should there be any
church government at all instituted, if the Scripture itself could
do the office of a judge in controversies of faith? But the truth is
apparent, by continual experience, that men seek not only liberty of
conscience, but of their actions; nor that only, but a further
liberty of persuading others to their opinions; nor that only, for
every man desireth, that the sovereign authority should admit no
other opinions to be maintained, but such as he himself holdeth.
[Sidenote: That Christians under an infidel are discharged of the
injustice of disobeying him, in that which concerneth the
faith necessary to salvation, by not resisting.]
14. The difficulty therefore of obeying both God and man in a
Christian commonwealth is none: all the difficulty resteth in this
point, whether he that hath received the faith of Christ, having
before subjected himself to the authority of an infidel, be
discharged of his obedience thereby, or not, in matters of religion.
In which case it seemeth reasonable to think, that since all
covenants of obedience are entered into for the preservation of a
man’s life, if a man be content without resistance to lay down his
life, rather than obey the commands of an infidel, in so hard a case
he hath sufficiently discharged himself thereof. For no covenant
bindeth further than to endeavour; and if a man cannot assure
himself to perform a just duty, when thereby he is assured of
present death, much less can it be expected that a man should
perform that, for which he believeth in his heart he shall be damned
eternally. And thus much concerning the scruple of conscience, that
may arise concerning obedience to human laws, in them that interpret
the law of God to themselves. It remaineth, to remove the same
scruple from them, that submit their controversies to others not
ordained thereunto by the sovereign authority. And this I refer to
the chapter following.
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CHAPTER VII.
1. The question propounded, who are the magistrates in the kingdom
of Christ. 2. The question exemplified, in the controversies
between Moses and Aaron, and between Moses and Corah. 3. Amongst
the Jews, the power temporal and spiritual in the same hand. 4.
Parallel of the twelve princes of Israel, and the twelve
apostles. 5. Parallel of seventy elders, and seventy disciples.
6. The hierarchy of the church in our Saviour’s time, consisted
in the twelve, and in the seventy. 7. Why Christ ordained no
priests for sacrifices, as Moses did. 8. The hierarchy of the
church in the apostles' time, apostles, bishops, and priests. 9.
The preaching of the gospel was not commanding, but persuading.
10. Excommunication. Sovereigns immediate rulers ecclesiastical
under Christ. 11. That no man hath any just pretence of religion
against obedience to commonwealth. God speaketh to man by his
vicegerents.
[Sidenote: The question propounded, who are the magistrates in the
kingdom of Christ.]
1. In the former chapter have been removed those difficulties
opposing our obedience to human authority, which arise from
misunderstanding of our Saviour’s title and laws: in the former
whereof, namely, his title, consisteth our faith; and in the latter,
our justice. Now they who differ not amongst themselves concerning
his title and laws, may nevertheless have different opinions
concerning his magistrates, and the authority he hath given them.
And this is the cause, why many Christians have denied obedience to
their princes, pretending that our Saviour Christ hath not given
this magistracy to them, but to others. As for example: some say, to
the pope universally; some, to a synod aristocratical; some, to a
synod democratical in every several commonwealth; and the
magistrates of Christ being they by whom he speaketh, the question
is, whether he speak unto us by the pope, or by convocations of
bishops and ministers, or by them that have the sovereign power in
every commonwealth.
[Sidenote: The question exemplified, in the controversies between
Moses and Aaron, and between Moses and Corah.]
2. This controversy was the cause of those two mutinies, that
happened against Moses in the wilderness. The first by Aaron and his
sister Miriam, who took upon them to censure Moses, for marrying an
Ethiopian woman. And the state of the question between them and
Moses, they set forth (Numb. xii. 2) in these words: _What hath the
Lord spoken but only by Moses? hath he not spoken also by us? And
the Lord heard this_, &c., and punished the same in Miriam,
forgiving Aaron upon his repentance. And this is the case of all
them that set up the priesthood against the sovereignty. The other
was of Corah, Dathan, and Abiram, who with two hundred and fifty
captains gathered themselves together against Moses, and against
Aaron. The state of their controversy was this, whether God were not
with the multitude, as well as with Moses, and every man as holy as
he. For (Numb. xvi. 3) thus they say, _You take too much upon you,
seeing all the congregation is holy; every one of them, and the Lord
is amongst them: wherefore then lift ye yourselves above the
congregation of the Lord?_ And this is the case of them that set up
their private consciences, and unite themselves to take the
government of religion out of the hands of him or them, that have
the sovereign power of the commonwealth: which how well it pleaseth
God, may appear by the hideous punishment of Corah and his
accomplices.
[Sidenote: Amongst the Jews, the power temporal and spiritual in the
same hand.]
3. In the government therefore of Moses there was no power, neither
civil, nor spiritual, that was not derived from him. Nor in the
state of Israel under kings, was there any earthly power, by which
those kings were compellable to any thing, or any subject allowed to
resist them in any case whatsoever. For though the prophets by
extraordinary calling, did often admonish and threaten them, yet
they had no authority over them. And therefore amongst the Jews, the
power spiritual and temporal, was always in the same hand.
[Sidenote: Parallel of the twelve princes of Israel, and the twelve
apostles.]
4. Our Saviour Christ, as he was the rightful king of the Jews in
particular, as well as king of the kingdom of Heaven, in the
ordaining of magistrates, received that form of policy which was
used by Moses. According to the number of the children of Jacob,
Moses took unto him by the appointment of God (Numb. i. 4) twelve
men, every one of the chief of their tribe, which were to assist him
in the muster of Israel. And these twelve, verse 44, are called the
_princes of Israel, twelve men, every one for the house of their
fathers_; which are said also (Numb. vii. 2), _to be heads over the
houses of their fathers, and princes of the tribes, and over them
that were numbered_. And these were every one equal amongst
themselves. In like manner our Saviour took unto him twelve
apostles, to be next unto him in authority, of whom he saith (Matth.
xix. 28), _When the Son of Man shall sit in the throne of his
majesty, ye which follow me in the regeneration, shall sit also upon
twelve thrones, and judge the twelve tribes of Israel_. And
concerning the equality of the twelve apostles amongst themselves,
our Saviour saith (Matth. xx. 25), _Ye know that the Lords of the
Gentiles have domination over them, &c._ Verse 26: _But it shall not
be so amongst you; but whosoever will be greatest among you, let him
be your servant_. And Matth. xxiii. 11: _He that is greatest among
you, let him be your servant_. And a little before, verse 8, _Be not
called Rabbi; for one is your doctor, Christ, and all ye are
brethren_. And Acts i. in choosing of Matthias to be an apostle,
though St. Peter used the part of a _prolocutor_, yet did no man
take upon him the authority of election, but referred the same to
lot.
[Sidenote: Parallel of the seventy elders & seventy disciples.]
5. Again, Moses had the command of God, Numb. xi. 16: _Gather to me
seventy men of the elders of Israel, whom thou knowest that they are
the elders of the people, and governors over them, and bring them
unto the tabernacle, &c._ And Moses, verse 24, did accordingly. And
these were chosen to help Moses in bearing the burthen of the
government, as appeareth, verse 17 of the same chapter. And as the
twelve princes of the tribes were according to the number of Jacob’s
children; so were the seventy elders according to the number of the
persons that went down with Jacob into Egypt. In like manner our
Saviour in his kingdom of Heaven, the church, out of the whole
number of those that believed in him, ordained seventy persons,
which peculiarly were called the seventy disciples, to whom he gave
power to preach the Gospel and baptize.
[Sidenote: The hierarchy of the church in our Saviour’s time,
consisted in the twelve, and in the seventy.]
6. In our Saviour’s time therefore, the hierarchy of the church
consisted, besides himself that was the head, of twelve apostles,
who were equal amongst themselves, but ordained over others, as were
the twelve heads of the tribes, and seventy disciples, who had every
one of them power to baptize and teach, and help to govern the whole
flock.
[Sidenote: Why Christ ordained no priests for sacrifices, as Moses
did.]
7. And whereas in the commonwealth instituted by Moses, there was
not only a high-priest for the present, but also a succession and
order of priests; it may be demanded, why our Saviour Christ did not
ordain the like? To which may be answered, that the high-priesthood,
forasmuch as concerneth the authority thereof, was in the person of
Christ, as he was Christ, that is king. So also was it in Moses,
Aaron having the ministerial part only. For notwithstanding that
Aaron was the high-priest, yet the consecration of him belonged
(Exod. xxix. 1) to Moses. All the utensils of sacrifice, and other
holy things, were ordered by Moses; and in sum, the whole Levitical
law was delivered by God by the hand of Moses, who was to Aaron a
God, and Aaron to him a mouth. And for the ministerial part, there
could no high-priest be ordained but himself; for seeing our Saviour
was himself the sacrifice, who but himself could offer him up? And
for the celebration of that sacrifice for ever after, our Saviour
annexed the priesthood to those whom he had appointed to govern in
the church.
[Sidenote: The hierarchy of the church, in the apostles' time,
apostles, bishops, and priests.]