1. Having spoken of the powers and acts of the mind, both cognitive
and motive, considered in every man by _himself, without relation to
others_; it will fall fitly into _this_ chapter, to speak of the
effects of the same power _one upon another_; which effects are also
the signs, by which one taketh notice what another conceiveth and
intendeth. Of these signs, _some_ are such as _cannot_ easily be
_counterfeited_; as actions and gestures, especially if they be
sudden, whereof I have mentioned some; (for example, look in chapter
IX.) with the several passions whereof they are signs: _others_
there are which _may_ be _counterfeited_; and those are _words_ or
_speech_; of the use and effects whereof, I am to speak in this
place.
2. The first use of language, is the _expression_ of our
_conceptions_, that is, the begetting in one another the same
conceptions that we have in ourselves; and this is called
_teaching_; wherein, if the _conception_ of him that teacheth
continually accompany his words, _beginning_ at something true in
_experience_, then it begetteth the like evidence in the hearer that
understandeth them, and maketh him to _know_ something, which he is
therefore said to _learn_: but if there be _not such evidence_, then
such teaching is called _persuasion_, and begetteth no more in the
hearer, than what is in the speaker’s bare _opinion_. And the
_signs_ of two opinions contradictory one to another; namely,
_affirmation_ and _negation_ of the same thing, is called
_controversy_: but _both affirmations_, or both _negations, consent
in opinion_.
3. The _infallible_ sign of _teaching exactly_, and without error,
is this, that _no man_ hath _ever taught_ the _contrary_: not that
few, how few soever, if any; for commonly truth is on the side of
a few, rather than of the multitude: but when in opinions and
questions considered and discussed by many, it happeneth that not
any one of the men that so discussed them differ from another,
then it may be justly inferred, they know what they teach, and
that otherwise they do not. And this appears most manifestly to
them that have considered the divers subjects wherein they have
exercised their pens, and the divers ways in which they have
proceeded, together with the diversity of the success thereof:
for, those men who have taken in hand to consider nothing else but
the comparison of _magnitudes_, _numbers_, _times_, and _motions_,
and how their proportions are to one another, have thereby been
the authors of all those excellencies by which we differ from such
savage people as now inhabit divers places in America; and as have
been the inhabitants heretofore of those countries where at this
day arts and sciences do most flourish: for, from the studies of
these men, have proceeded whatsoever cometh to us for ornament by
_navigation_, and whatsover we have beneficial to human society by
the _division_, _distinction_, and _portraiting the face of the
earth_; whatsoever also we have by the _account of times_, and
_foresight of the course of heaven_; whatsoever by _measuring
distances_, _planes_, and _solids_ of all sorts; and whatsoever
either _elegant_ or _defensible_ in _building_: all which supposed
away, what do we differ from the wildest of the Indians? Yet to
this day was it never heard of, that there was any _controversy_
concerning any conclusion in this subject; the science whereof
hath nevertheless been continually amplified and enriched by the
conclusions of most difficult and profound speculation. The
_reason_ whereof is apparent to every man that looketh into their
writings; for they proceed from most _low_ and _humble_
principles, evident even to the meanest capacity; going on
_slowly_, and with most _scrupulous ratiocination_; viz. from the
imposition of names, they infer the truth of their _first_
propositions; and from two of the first, a _third_; and from any
two of the three, a _fourth_; and so on, according to the steps of
science, mentioned chapter VI. section 4. On the other side, those
men who have written concerning the faculties, passions, and
manners of men, that is to say, of _moral philosophy_, and of
_policy_, _government_, and _laws_, whereof there be infinite
volumes, have been so _far from removing doubt_ and controversy in
the questions they have handled, _that_ they have very much
_multiplied the same_: _nor_ doth any man at this day so much as
pretend to _know_ more than hath been delivered two thousand years
ago by Aristotle: and yet every man thinks that in this subject he
knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no
study but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they
play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or
place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings
and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are
already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the
most part false. There is therefore a great deal of _difference_
between _teaching_ and _persuading_; the sign of _this_ being
_controversy_; the sign of the _former_, _no controversy_.
4. There be _two sorts_ of men that commonly be called _learned_:
one is that sort that proceedeth _evidently_ from humble principles,
as is described in the last section; and those men are called
_mathematici_: _the other_ are they that _take up_ maxims from their
_education_, and from the _authority_ of men, or of custom, and
_take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination_; and
these are called _dogmatici_. Now seeing in the last section those
we call _mathematici_ are absolved of the crime of breeding
controversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be
accused, the fault lieth altogether in the _dogmatics_, that is to
say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to
have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident
demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of
uncontroverted interpretation.
5. The expression of those conceptions which _cause_ in us the
_experience_ of good while we deliberate, as also of those which
cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call _counselling_,
and is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we
ourselves are to do or not to do. The _consequences_ of our actions
are our _counsellors_, by _alternate succession_ in the mind. So in
the counsel which a man taketh from _other_ men, the _counsellors
alternately_ do _make appear the consequences_ of the action, and do
not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is
counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself.
6. Another use of speech is _expression_ of _appetite_, _intention_,
and _will_; as the appetite of knowledge by _interrogation_;
appetite to have a thing done by another, as _request_, _prayer_,
_petition_: expressions of our purpose or intention, as _promise_,
which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in
the future: _threatening_, which is the promise of evil; and
_commanding_, which is that speech by which we signify to another
our _appetite_ or desire _to have_ any _thing done_, or _left
undone_, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it is not
properly said, _Sic volo, sic jubeo_, without that other clause,
_Stet pro ratione voluntas_: and when the command is a sufficient
reason to move us to action, then is that command called a _law_.
7. Another use of speech is _instigation_ and appeasing, by which we
increase or diminish one another’s passion: it is the same thing
with _persuasion_; the difference not being real; for, the begetting
of _opinion_ and _passion_ is the _same_. But whereas in
_persuasion_ we aim at _getting opinion from passion_; _here_, the
end is, _to raise passion from opinion_. And as in raising an
opinion from passion, any premises are good enough to enforce the
desired conclusion; so, in raising passion from opinion, it is no
matter whether the opinion be true or false, or the narration
historical or fabulous; for, _not_ the _truth_, but the _image_,
maketh passion: and a tragedy, well acted, affecteth no less than a
murder.
8. Though words be the _signs_ we have of one another’s _opinions_
and intentions, because the _equivocation_ of them is so _frequent
according_ to the _diversity of contexture_, and of the company
wherewith they go, which, the presence of him that speaketh, our
_sight_ of his _actions_, and _conjecture_ of his _intentions_, must
help to discharge us of; it must therefore be _extremely hard_ to
find the _opinions_ and meaning of those _men_ that are _gone from
us long ago_, and have left us no other signification thereof than
their books, which cannot possibly be understood without _history_,
to discover those aforementioned circumstances, and also without
great prudence to _observe_ them.
9. When it happeneth that a man signifieth unto two _contradictory_
opinions, whereof the _one_ is _clearly_ and directly _signified_,
and the _other_ either _drawn_ from that by _consequence_, or not
known to be contradictory to it; then, when he is not present to
explicate himself better, we are to take the _former_ for his
opinion; for that is clearly signified to be his, and directly;
whereas the other might proceed from error in the deduction, or
ignorance of the repugnancy. The like also is to be held in two
contradictory expressions of a man’s intention and will, for the
same reason.
10. Forasmuch as whosoever _speaketh_ to another, intendeth thereby
to _make_ him _understand_ what he saith, if he speak unto him
either in a language which he that heareth understandeth not, or use
any word in other sense than he believeth is the sense of him that
heareth, he _intendeth also not_ to make him understand what he
saith; which is a _contradiction_ of himself. It is therefore always
to be supposed, that he which intendeth not to deceive, alloweth the
private interpretation of his speech to him to whom it is addressed.
11. _Silence_, in him that _believeth_ that the same shall be taken
for a _sign of his intent_, _is_ a sign thereof indeed: for, if he
did not consent, the labour of speaking so much as to declare the
same, is so little, as it is to be presumed he would have done it.
CONCLUSION.
Thus have we considered the nature of man so far as was requisite
for the finding out the first and most simple elements wherein the
compositions of politic rules and laws are lastly resolved; which
was my present purpose.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DE CORPORE POLITICO:
OR THE
ELEMENTS OF LAW,
MORAL AND POLITIC,
WITH DISCOURSES UPON SEVERAL HEADS:
AS
OF THE LAW OF NATURE; OF OATHS AND COVENANTS;
OF SEVERAL KINDS OF GOVERNMENT;
WITH
THE CHANGES AND REVOLUTIONS OF THEM.
TO THE READER.
-------
READER,
You may be pleased to take notice, that the first part of this work
depends upon a former treatise of Human Nature, written by Mr.
Hobbes, and by a friend of his committed to the press for the
benefit of mankind. It was thought fit, that nothing of so worthy an
author should be left unprinted, especially considering, that this
piece is most useful for the society of reasonable creatures, being
the grounds and principles of policy, without which there would be
nothing but confusion in the world. I am confident, if men’s minds
were but truly fixed upon the centre of this discourse, they would
not prove such weathercocks, to be turned about with the wind of
every false doctrine, and vain opinion. We should then be free from
those disorders which threaten distraction to the soul, and
destruction to the commonwealth. But let others write never so well,
if our practice do not second their instructions, we may be wise
enough to foresee our misery, but never know how to prevent it. What
pity is it, that such rare conclusions as these are, should produce
no other effect, to inform our knowledge, and confute our
conversation, whilst we neglect the truth that is apprehended. Yet
there is some hope, that such observers, whose wisdom hath received
the stamp of goodness, will improve their skill to a real
advancement of those benefits, which lie hoarded up in this curious
cabinet. To whose use and behoof, these excellent notions are
commended, as the best that ever were writ in this kind, and may
serve for a general ground and foundation to all regular
conceptions, that concern the essence and existence of man, the
government of kingdoms and commonwealths, and by consequence our
eternal salvation.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
DE CORPORE POLITICO.
-------
PART THE FIRST.
-------
CHAPTER I.
1, 2. Men by nature equal. 3. By vain glory indisposed to allow
equality with themselves, to others. 4. Apt to provoke another
by comparisons. 5. Apt to encroach one upon another. 6. Right
defined. 7. Right to the end, implieth right to the means. 8.
Every man his own judge by nature. 9. Every man’s strength and
knowledge for his own use. 10. Every man by nature hath right to
all things. 11. War and peace defined. 12. Men by nature in the
state of war. 13. In manifest inequality might is right. 14.
Reason dictateth peace.
[Sidenote: Men by nature equal.]
1. In a former treatise of human nature already printed, hath been
set forth the whole nature of man, consisting in the powers natural
of his body and mind, and may all be comprehended in these four,
_strength of body_, _experience_, _reason_, and _passion_.
2. In this, it will be expedient to consider in what estate of
security this our nature hath placed us, and what probability it
hath left us, of continuing and preserving ourselves against the
violence of one another. And first, if we consider how little odds
there is of strength or knowledge, between men of mature age, and
with how great facility he that is the weaker in strength or in wit,
or in both, may utterly destroy the power of the stronger; since
there needeth but little force to the taking away of a man’s life,
we may conclude, that men considered in mere nature, ought to admit
amongst themselves equality; and that he that claimeth no more, may
be esteemed moderate.
[Sidenote: By vain glory indisposed to allow equality with
themselves, to others.]
3. On the other side, considering the great difference there is in
men, from the diversity of their passions, how some are vainly
glorious, and hope for precedency and superiority above their
fellows, not only when they are equal in power, but also when they
are inferior; we must needs acknowledge that it must necessarily
follow, that those men who are moderate, and look for no more but
equality of nature, shall be obnoxious to the force of others, that
will attempt to subdue them. And from hence shall proceed a general
diffidence in mankind, and mutual fear one of another.
[Sidenote: Apt to provoke another by comparisons.]
4. Further, since men by natural passion are divers ways offensive
one to another, every man thinking well of himself, and hating to
see the same in others, they must needs provoke one another by
words, and other signs of contempt and hatred, which are incident to
all comparison, till at last they must determine the pre-eminence by
strength and force of body.
[Sidenote: Apt to encroach one upon another.]
5. Moreover, considering that many men’s appetites carry them to one
and the same end; which end sometimes can neither be enjoyed in
common, nor divided, it followeth, that the stronger must enjoy it
alone, and that it be decided by battle who is the stronger. And
thus the greatest part of men, upon no assurance of odds, do
nevertheless, through vanity, or comparison, or appetite, provoke
the rest, that otherwise would be contented with equality.
[Sidenote: Right defined.]
6. And forasmuch as necessity of nature maketh men to will and
desire _bonum sibi_, that which is good for themselves, and to avoid
that which is hurtful; but most of all, the terrible enemy of
nature, death, from whom we expect both the loss of all power, and
also the greatest of bodily pains in the losing; it is not against
reason, that a man doth all he can to preserve his own body and
limbs both from death and pain. And that which is not against
reason, men call _right_, or _jus_, or _blameless liberty_ of using
our own natural power and ability. It is therefore a right of
nature, that every man may preserve his own life and limbs, with all
the power he hath.
[Sidenote: Right to the end, implieth right to the means.]
7. And because where a man hath right to the end, and the end cannot
be attained without the means, that is, without such things as are
necessary to the end, it is consequent that it is not against
reason, and therefore right, for a man to use all means, and do
whatsoever action is necessary for the preservation of his body.
[Sidenote: Every man his own judge by nature.]
8. Also, every man by right of nature, is judge himself of the
necessity of the means, and of the greatness of the danger. For if
it be against reason, that I be judge of mine own danger myself,
then it is reason, that another man be judge thereof. But the same
reason that maketh another man judge of those things that concern
me, maketh me also judge of that that concerneth him. And therefore
I have reason to judge of his sentence, whether it be for my
benefit, or not.
[Sidenote: Every man’s strength and knowledge for his own use.]
9. As a man’s judgment in right of nature is to be employed for his
own benefit, so also the strength, knowledge, and art, of every man
is then rightly employed, when he useth it for himself; else must
not a man have right to preserve himself.
[Sidenote: Every man by nature hath right to all things.]
10. Every man by nature hath right to all things, that is to say, to
do whatsoever he listeth to whom he listeth, to possess, use, and
enjoy all things he will and can. For seeing all things he willeth,
must therefore be good unto him in his own judgment, because he
willeth them, and may tend to his preservation some time or other,
or he may judge so, and we have made him judge thereof, section 8,
it followeth, that all things may rightly also be done by him. And
for this cause it is rightly said, _Natura dedit omnia omnibus_,
that Nature hath given all things to all men; insomuch, that _jus_
and _utile_, right and profit, is the same thing. But that right of
all men to all things, is in effect no better than if no man had
right to any thing. For there is little use and benefit of the right
a man hath, when another as strong, or stronger than himself, hath
right to the same.
[Sidenote: War and peace defined.]
11. Seeing then to the offensiveness of man’s nature one to another,
there is added a right of every man to every thing, whereby one man
invadeth with right, and another man with right resisteth, and men
live thereby in perpetual diffidence, and study how to preoccupate
each other; the estate of men in this natural liberty, is the estate
of war. For _war_ is nothing else but that time wherein the will and
contention of contending by force, is either by words or actions
sufficiently declared; and the time which is not war, is _peace_.
[Sidenote: Men by nature in the state of war.]
12. The estate of hostility and war being such, as thereby nature
itself is destroyed, and men kill one another, (as we know also that
it is, both by the experience of savage nations that live at this
day, and by the histories of our ancestors the old inhabitants of
Germany, and other now civil countries, where we find the people
few, and short lived, and without the ornaments and comforts of
life, which by peace and society are usually invented and procured)
he therefore that desireth to live in such an estate as is the
estate of liberty and right of all to all, contradicteth himself.
For every man by natural necessity desireth his own good, to which
this estate is contrary, wherein we suppose contention between men
by nature equal, and able to destroy one another.
[Sidenote: In manifest inequality might is right.]
13. Seeing this right of protecting ourselves by our own discretion
and force, proceedeth from danger, and that danger from the equality
between men’s forces, much more reason is there, that a man prevent
such equality before the danger cometh, and before the necessity of
battle. A man therefore that hath another man in his power to rule
or govern, to do good to, or harm, hath right, by the advantage of
this his present power, to take caution at his pleasure, for his
security against that other in time to come. He therefore that hath
already subdued his adversary, or gotten into his power any other,
that either by infancy, or weakness, is unable to resist him, by
right of nature may take the best caution, that such infant, or such
feeble and subdued person can give him, of being ruled and governed
by him for the time to come. For seeing we intend always our own
safety and preservation, we manifestly contradict that our
intention, if we willingly dismiss such a one, and suffer him at
once to gather strength and be our enemy. Out of which may also be
collected, that irresistible might, in the state of nature, is
right.
[Sidenote: Reason dictateth peace.]
14. But since it is supposed by the equality of strength, and other
natural faculties of men, that no man is of might sufficient, to
assure himself for any long time, of preserving himself thereby,
whilst he remaineth in the state of hostility and war; reason
therefore dictateth to every man for his own good, to seek after
peace, as far forth as there is hope to attain the same; and
strengthen himself with all the help he can procure, for his own
defence against those, from whom such peace cannot be obtained; and
to do all those things which necessarily conduce thereunto.
-------
CHAPTER II.
1. The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but reason.
2. That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all
things, is one precept of nature. 3. What it is to relinquish
and transfer one’s right. 4. The will to transfer, and the will
to accept, both necessary to the passing away of right. 5. Right
not transferred by words _de futuro_ only. 6. Words _de futuro_,
together with other signs of the will, may transfer right. 7.
Free gift defined. 8. Contract, and the sorts of it. 9. Covenant
defined. 10. Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the
estate of hostility. 11. No covenant of men but with one
another. 12. Covenant how dissolved. 13. Covenant extorted by
fear, in the law of nature valid. 14. Covenant contrary to
former covenant, void. 15. An oath defined. 16. Oath to be
administered to every man in his own religion. 17. Oath addeth
not to the obligation. 18. Covenants bind but to endeavour.
[Sidenote: The law of nature consisteth not in consent of men, but
reason.]
1. What it is we call the law of nature, is not agreed upon by
those, that have hitherto written. For the most part, such writers
as have occasion to affirm, that anything is against the law of
nature, do allege no more than this, that it is against the consent
of all nations, or the wisest and most civil nations. But it is not
agreed upon, who shall judge which nations are the wisest. Others
make that against the law of nature, which is contrary to the
consent of all mankind; which definition cannot be allowed, because
then no man could offend against the law of nature; for the nature
of every man is contained under the nature of mankind. But forasmuch
as all men are carried away by the violence of their passion, and by
evil customs do those things which are commonly said to be against
the law of nature; it is not the consent of passions, or consent in
some error gotten by custom, that makes the law of nature. Reason is
no less of the nature of man than passion, and is the same in all
men, because all men agree in the will to be directed and governed
in the way to that which they desire to attain, namely, their own
good, which is the work of reason: there can therefore be no other
law of nature than reason, nor no other precepts of _natural law_,
than those which declare unto us the ways of peace, where the same
may be obtained, and of defence where it may not.
[Sidenote: That every man divest himself of the right he hath to all
things, is one precept of nature.]
2. One precept of the law of nature therefore is this, _that every
man divest himself of the right he hath to all things by nature_.
For when divers men having right not only to all things else, but to
one another’s persons, if they use the same, there ariseth thereby
invasion on the one part, and resistance on the other, which is
_war_, and therefore contrary to the law of nature, the sum whereof
consisteth in making peace.
[Sidenote: What it is to relinquish and transfer one’s right.]
3. When a man divesteth and putteth from himself his right, he
either simply relinquisheth it, or transferreth the same to another
man. To _relinquish_ it, is by sufficient signs to declare, that it
is his will no more to do that action, which of right he might have
done before. To _transfer_ right to another, is by sufficient signs
to declare to that other accepting thereof, that it is his will not
to resist, or hinder him, according to that right he had thereto
before he transferred it. For seeing that by nature every man hath
right to every thing, it is impossible for a man to transfer unto
another any right that he had not before. And therefore all that a
man doth in transferring of right, is no more but a declaring of the
will, to suffer him, to whom he hath so transferred his right, to
make benefit of the same, without molestation. As for example, when
a man giveth his lands or goods to another, he taketh from himself
the right to enter into, and make use of the said lands or goods, or
otherwise to hinder him of the use of what he hath given.
[Sidenote: The will to transfer, and the will to accept, both
necessary to the passing away of right.]
4. In transferring of right, two things therefore are required: one
on the part of him that transferreth, which is a sufficient
signification of his will therein; the other, on the part of him to
whom it is transferred, which is a sufficient signification of his
acceptation thereof. Either of these failing, the right remaineth
where it was: nor is it to be supposed, that he which giveth his
right to one that accepteth it not, doth thereby simply relinquish
it, and transfer it to whomsoever will receive it: inasmuch as the
cause of transferring the same to one, rather than to another, is in
the one, rather than in the rest.
[Sidenote: Right not transferred by words _de futuro_ only.]
5. When there appear no other signs that a man hath relinquished, or
transferred his right, but only words, it behoveth that the same be
done in words, that signify the present time, or the time past, and
not only the time to come. For he that saith of the time to come, as
for example, to-morrow I will give, declareth evidently, that he
hath not yet given. The right, therefore, remaineth in him to-day,
and so continues, till he have given actually. But he that saith, I
give, presently, or have given to another anything, to have and
enjoy the same to-morrow, or any other time further, hath now
actually transferred the said right, which otherwise he should have
had at the time that the other is to enjoy it.
[Sidenote: Words _de futuro_, together with other signs of the will,
may transfer right.]
6. But because words alone are not a sufficient declaration of the
mind, as hath been shown chapter XIII. section 8, words spoken _de
futuro_, when the will of him that speaketh them may be gathered by
other signs, may be taken very often as if they were meant _de
præsenti_: for when it appeareth, that he that giveth, would have
his words so understood by him to whom he giveth, as if he did
actually transfer his right, then he must needs be understood to
will all that is necessary to the same.
[Sidenote: Free gift defined.]
7. When a man transferreth any right of his to another, without
consideration of reciprocal benefit, past, present, or to come, this
is called _free gift_. And in free gift, no other words can be
binding, but those which are _de præsenti_, or _de præterito_: for
being _de futuro_ only, they transfer nothing, nor can they be
understood, as if they proceeded from the will of the giver; because
being a free gift, it carrieth with it no obligation greater than
that which is enforced by the words. For he that promiseth to give,
without any other consideration but his own affection, so long as he
hath not given, deliberateth still, according as the causes of his
affections continue, or diminish; and he that deliberateth, hath not
yet willed, because the will is the last act of his deliberation. He
that promiseth therefore, is not thereby a _donor_, but _doson_;
which name was given to that Antiochus, that promised often, but
seldom gave.
[Sidenote: Contract, and the sorts of it.]
8. When a man transferreth his right upon consideration of
reciprocal benefit, this is not free gift, but mutual _donation_,
and is called _contract_. And in all contracts, either both parties
presently perform, and put each other into a certainty and assurance
of enjoying what they contract for, as when men buy or sell, or
barter; or one party performeth presently, and the other promiseth,
as when one selleth upon trust; or else neither party performeth
presently, but trust one another. And it is impossible there should
be any kind of contract besides these three. For either both the
contractors trust, or neither; or else one trusteth, and the other
not.
[Sidenote: Covenant defined.]
9. In all contracts where there is trust, the promise of him that is
trusted, is called a _covenant_. And this, though it be a promise,
and of the time to come, yet it doth transfer the right, when that
time cometh, no less than an actual donation. For it is a manifest
sign, that he which did perform, understood it was the will of him
that was trusted, to perform also. Promises therefore, upon
consideration of reciprocal benefit, are covenants and signs of the
will, or last act of deliberation, whereby the liberty of
performing, or not performing, is taken away, and consequently are
obligatory. For where liberty ceaseth, there beginneth obligation.
[Sidenote: Contract of mutual trust, is of no validity in the estate
of hostility.]
10. Nevertheless, in contracts that consist of such mutual trust, as
that nothing be by either party performed for the present, when the
contract is between such as are not compellable, he that performeth
first, considering the disposition of men to take advantage of every
thing for their benefit, doth but betray himself thereby to the
covetousness, or other passion of him with whom he contracteth. And
therefore such covenants are of none effect. For there is no reason
why the one should perform first, if the other be likely not to
perform afterward. And whether he be likely or not, he that
doubteth, shall be judge himself, as hath been said chap. I. sect.
8, as long as they remain in the estate and liberty of nature. But
when there shall be such power coercive over both the parties, as
shall deprive them of their private judgments in this point, then
may such covenants be effectual, seeing he that performeth first
shall have no reasonable cause to doubt of the performance of the
other, that may be compelled thereunto.
[Sidenote: No covenant of men but with one another.]
11. And forasmuch as in all covenants, and contracts, and donations,
the acceptance of him to whom the right is transferred, is necessary
to the essence of those covenants, donations, &c., it is impossible
to make a covenant or donation to any, that by nature, or absence,
are unable, or if able, do not actually declare their acceptation of
the same. First of all, therefore, it is impossible for any man to
make a covenant with God Almighty, further than it hath pleased him
to declare who shall receive and accept of the said covenant in his
name. Also it is impossible to make covenant with those living
creatures, of whose wills we have no sufficient sign, for want of
common language.
[Sidenote: Covenant how dissolved.]
12. A covenant to do any action at a certain time and place, is then
dissolved by the covenanter, when that time cometh, either by the
performance, or by the violation. For a covenant is void that is
once impossible. But a covenant not to do, without time limited,
which is as much as to say, a covenant never to do, is dissolved by
the covenanter then only, when he violateth it, or dieth. And
generally, all covenants are dischargeable by the covenantee, to
whose benefit, and by whose right, he that maketh the covenant is
obliged. This right therefore of the covenantee relinquished, is a
release of the covenant. And universally, for the same reason, all
obligations are determinable at the will of the obliger.
[Sidenote: Covenant extorted by fear, in the law of nature valid.]
13. It is a question often moved, whether such covenants oblige, as
are extorted from men by fear. As for example, whether if a man for
fear of death, hath promised to give a thief an hundred pounds the
next day, and not discover him; whether such covenant be obligatory,
or not. And though in some cases such covenant may be void, yet it
is not therefore void, because extorted by fear. For there appeareth
no reason, why that which we do upon fear, should be less firm than
that which we do for covetousness. For both the one and the other
maketh the action voluntary. And if no covenant should be good, that
proceedeth from fear of death, no conditions of peace between
enemies, nor any laws, could be of force, which are all consented to
from that fear. For who would lose the liberty that nature hath
given him, of governing himself by his own will and power, if they
feared not death in the retaining of it? What prisoner in war might
be trusted to seek his ransom, and ought not rather to be killed, if
he were not tied by the grant of his life, to perform his promise?
But after the introduction of policy and laws, the case may alter;
for if by the law the performance of such a covenant be forbidden,
then he that promiseth anything to a thief, not only may, but must
refuse to perform it. But if the law forbid not the performance, but
leave it to the will of the promiser, then is the performance still
lawful: and the covenant of things lawful is obligatory, even
towards a thief.
[Sidenote: Covenant contrary to former covenant, void.]
14. He that giveth, promiseth or covenanteth to one, and after,
giveth, promiseth, or covenanteth the same to another, maketh void
the latter act. For it is impossible for a man to transfer that
right which he himself hath not; and that right he hath not, which
he himself hath before transferred.
[Sidenote: An oath defined.]
15. An _oath_ is a clause annexed to a promise, containing a
renunciation of God’s mercy by him that promiseth, in case he
perform not as far as is lawful and possible for him to do. And this
appeareth by the words which make the essence of the oath, _so help
me God_. So also was it amongst the heathen. And the form of the
Romans was, _Thou Jupiter kill him that breaketh, as I kill this
beast_. The intention therefore of an oath being to provoke
vengeance upon the _breakers_ of covenant; it is to no purpose to
swear by men, be they never so great, because their punishment by
divers accidents may be avoided, whether they will, or no, but God’s
punishment not. Though it were a custom of many nations, to swear by
the life of their princes; yet those princes being ambitious of
divine honour, give sufficient testimony, that they believed,
nothing ought to be sworn by, but the Deity.
[Sidenote: Oath to be administered to every man in his own
religion.]
16. And seeing men cannot be afraid of the power they believe not,
and an oath is to no purpose, without fear of him they swear by, it
is necessary that he that sweareth, do it in that form which himself
admitteth in his own religion, and not in that form which he useth,
that putteth him to the oath. For though all men may know by nature,
that there is an Almighty power, nevertheless they believe not, that
they swear by him in any other form or name, than what their own,
which they think the true, religion teacheth them.
[Sidenote: Oath addeth not to the obligation.]
17. And by the definition of an oath, it appeareth that it addeth
not a greater obligation to perform the covenant sworn, than the
covenant carrieth in itself, but it putteth a man into a greater
danger, and of greater punishment.
[Sidenote: Covenants bind but to endeavour.]
18. Covenants and oaths are _de voluntariis_, that is, _de
possibilibus_. Nor can the covenantee understand the covenanter to
promise _impossibles_; for they fall not under deliberation: and
consequently, (by chap. XIII. sect. 10 of the _Treatise of Human
Nature_, which maketh the covenantee interpreter) no covenant is
understood to bind further, than to our best endeavour, either in
performance of the thing promised, or in something equivalent.
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CHAPTER III.
1. That men stand to their covenants. 2. Injury defined. 3. That
injury is done only to the covenantee. 4. The signification of
those names, just, unjust. 5. Justice not rightly divided into
commutative, and distributive. 6. It is a law of nature, that he
that is trusted, turn not that trust to the damage of him that
trusteth. 7. Ingratitude defined. 8. It is a law of nature, to
endeavour to accommodate one another: 9. And that man forgive
upon caution for the future: 10. And that revenge ought to
respect the future only: 11. That reproach and contempt
declared, is against the law of nature: 12. That indifference of
commerce is of the law of nature: 13. That messengers employed
to procure or maintain peace, ought to be safe by the law of
nature.
[Sidenote: That men stand to their covenants.]
1. It is a common saying that nature maketh nothing in vain. And it
is most certain, that as the truth of a conclusion, is no more but
the truth of the premises that make it; so the force of the command,
or law of nature, is no more than the force of the reasons inducing
thereunto. Therefore the law of nature mentioned in the former
chapter, section 2, namely, _That every man should divest himself of
the right_, &c. were utterly vain, and of none effect, if this also
were not a law of the same nature, _That every man is obliged to
stand to, and perform, those covenants he maketh_. For what benefit
is it to a man, that any thing be promised, or given unto him, if he
that giveth, or promiseth, performeth not, or retaineth still the
right of taking back what he hath given?
[Sidenote: Injury defined.]
2. The breach or violation of covenant, is that which men call
_injury_, consisting in some action or omission, which is therefore
called _unjust_. For it is action or omission, without _jus_, or
right, which was transferred or relinquished before. There is a
great similitude between that we call _injury_, or _injustice_ in
the actions and conversations of men in the world, and that which is
called _absurd_ in the arguments and disputations of the Schools.
For as he, which is driven to contradict an assertion by him before
maintained, is said to be reduced to an absurdity; so he that
through passion doth, or omitteth that which before by covenant he
promised to do, or not to omit, is said to commit injustice; and
there is in every breach of covenant a contradiction properly so
called. For he that covenanteth, willeth to do, or omit, in the time
to come. And he that doth any action, willeth it in that present,
which is part of the future time contained in the covenant. And
therefore he that violateth a covenant, willeth the doing and the
not doing of the same thing, at the same time, which is a plain
contradiction. And so _injury_ is an _absurdity_ of conversation, as
absurdity is a kind of injustice in disputation.
[Sidenote: That injury is done only to the covenantee.]
3. In all violation of covenant, (to whomsoever accrueth the damage)
the injury is done only to him to whom the covenant was made. For
example, if a man covenant to obey his master, and the master
command him to give money to a third, which he promiseth to do, and
doth not, though this be to the damage of the third, yet the injury
is done to the master only. For he could violate no covenant with
him, with whom none was made, and therefore doth him no injury. For
injury consisteth in violation of covenant by the definition
thereof.
[Sidenote: The signification of those names, just and unjust.]
4. The names of _just_, _unjust_, _justice_, _injustice_, are
equivocal, and signify diversly. For justice and injustice, when
they be attributed to actions, signify the same thing with _no
injury_, and _injury_, and denominate the action _just_, or
_unjust_, but not the man so. For they denominate him _guilty_, or
_not guilty_. But when justice or injustice, are attributed to men,
they signify _proneness_, and affection and inclination of nature,
that is to say, passions of the mind, apt to produce just and unjust
actions. So that when a man is said to be just, or unjust; not the
action, but the passion and aptitude, to do such actions, is
considered. And therefore a just man may have committed an unjust
act; and an unjust man may have done justly, not only one, but most
of his actions. For there is an _oderunt peccare_ in the unjust, as
well as in the just, but from different causes. For the unjust man
who abstaineth from injuries for fear of punishment, declareth
plainly, that the justice of his actions dependeth upon civil
constitution, from whence punishments proceed, which would otherwise
in the estate of nature be unjust, according to the fountain from
whence they spring. This distinction therefore of _justice_, and
_injustice_, ought to be remembered, that when injustice is taken
for guilty, the action is unjust, but not therefore the man; and
when justice is taken for _guiltlessness_, the actions are just, and
yet not always the man. Likewise when justice and injustice are
taken for habits of the mind, the man may be just, or unjust, and
yet not all his actions so.
[Sidenote: Justice not rightly divided into commutative, and
distributive.]
5. Concerning the justice of actions, the same is usually divided
into two kinds, whereof men call the one _commutative_, and the
other _distributive_; and are said to consist, the one in proportion
_arithmetical_; the other in _geometrical_: and _commutative_
justice, they place in permutation, as buying, selling, and
bartering; _distributive_, in giving to every man according to their
deserts. Which distinction is not well made, inasmuch as injury,
which is the injustice of action, consisteth not in the inequality
of the things changed, or distributed, but in the inequality that
men, contrary to nature and reason, assume unto themselves above
their fellows. Of which inequality, shall be spoken hereafter. And
for _commutative_ justice placed in buying and selling, though the
thing bought be unequal to the price given for it, yet forasmuch as
both the buyer and the seller are made judges of the value, and are
thereby both satisfied, there can be no injury done on either side,
neither party having trusted, or covenanted with the other. And for
_distributive_ justice, which consisteth in the distribution of our
own benefits, seeing a thing is therefore said to be our own,
because we may dispose of it at our own pleasure, it can be no
injury to any man, though our liberality be farther extended towards
another, than towards him; unless we be thereto obliged by covenant:
and then the injustice consisteth in the violation of that covenant,
and not in the inequality of distribution.
[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, that he that is trusted, turn not
that trust to the damage of him that trusteth]
6. It happeneth many times that man benefitteth, or contributeth, to
the power of another, without any covenant, but only upon confidence
and trust of obtaining the grace and favour of that other, whereby
he may procure a greater, or no less benefit, and assistance to
himself. For by necessity of nature, every man doth in all his
voluntary actions intend some good unto himself. In this case it is
a law of nature, _That no man suffer him, that thus trusteth to his
charity, or good affection towards him, to be in the worse estate
for his trusting_. For if he shall so do, men will not dare to
confer mutually to each other’s defence, nor put themselves into
each other’s mercy upon any terms whatsoever, but rather abide the
utmost and worst event of hostility; by which general diffidence,
men will not only be enforced to war, but also afraid to come so
much within the danger of one another, as to make any overture of
peace. But this is to be understood of those only, that confer their
benefits (as I have said) upon trust only, and not for triumph or
ostentation. For as when they do it upon trust, the end they aimed
at, namely to be well used, is the reward; so also when they do it
for ostentation, they have the reward in themselves.
[Sidenote: Ingratitude defined.]
7. But seeing in this case there passeth no covenant, the breach of
this law of nature is not to be called _injury_. It hath another
name, to wit, _ingratitude_.
[Sidenote: It is a law of nature, to endeavour to accommodate one
another.]
8. It is also a law of nature, _That every man do help and endeavour
to accommodate each other as far as may be, without danger of their
persons, and loss of their means, to maintain and defend
themselves_. For seeing the causes of war and desolation proceed
from those passions, by which we strive to accommodate ourselves,
and to leave others as far as we can behind us, it followeth, that
that passion by which we strive mutually to accommodate each other,
must be the cause of peace. And this passion is that charity defined
chapter IX. section 17.
[Sidenote: And that man forgive, upon caution for the future.]
9. And in this precept of nature, is included and comprehended also
this, _That a man forgive and pardon him that hath done him wrong,
upon his repentance and caution for the future_. For _pardon_ is
peace granted to him, that, having provoked to war, demandeth it. It
is not therefore charity, but fear, when a man giveth peace to him
that repenteth not, nor giveth caution for maintaining thereof in
the time to come. For he that repenteth not, remaineth with the
affection of an enemy; as also doth he that refuseth to give
caution, and consequently, is presumed not to seek after peace, but
advantage. And therefore to forgive him is not commanded in this law
of nature, nor is charity, but may sometime be prudence. Otherwise,
not to pardon upon repentance and caution, considering men cannot
abstain from provoking one another, is never to give _peace_. And
that is against the general definition of the law of nature.
[Sidenote: And that revenge ought to respect the future only.]
10. And seeing the law of nature commandeth pardon, when there is
repentance and caution for the future, it followeth, that the same
law ordaineth, _That no revenge be taken upon the consideration only
of the offence past, but of the benefit to come_; that is to say,
that all revenge ought to tend to amendment, either of the person
offending, or of others, by the example of his punishment; which is
sufficiently apparent, in that the law of nature commandeth pardon,
where the future time is secured. The same is also apparent by this,
that revenge when it considereth the offence past, is nothing else,
but present triumph and glory, and directeth to no end: and what is
directed to no end, is therefore unprofitable; and consequently the
triumph of revenge, is vain glory: and whatsoever is vain, is
against reason; and to hurt one another without reason, is contrary
to that, which by supposition is every man’s benefit, namely peace;
and what is contrary to peace, is contrary to the law of nature.
[Sidenote: That reproach and contempt declared is against the law of
nature.]
11. And because all signs which we shew to one another of hatred and
contempt, provoke in the highest degree to quarrel and battle,
(inasmuch as life itself, with the condition of enduring scorn, is
not esteemed worth the enjoying, much less peace) it must
necessarily be implied as a law of nature, _That no man reproach,
revile, deride, or any otherwise declare his hatred, contempt, or
disesteem of any other_. But this law is very little practised. For
what is more ordinary than reproaches of those that are rich,
towards them that are not? or of those that sit in place of
judicature, towards those that are accused at the bar? although to
grieve them in that manner, be no part of the punishment for their
crime, nor contained in their office. But use hath prevailed, that
what was lawful in the lord towards the servant whom he maintaineth,
is also practised as lawful in the more mighty towards the less;
though they contribute nothing towards their maintenance.
[Sidenote: That indifference of commerce is of the law of nature.]
12. It is also a law of nature, _That one man allow commerce and
traffic indifferently to one another_. For he that alloweth that to
one man, which he denieth to another, declareth his hatred to him,
to whom he denieth. And to declare hatred is war. And upon this
title was grounded the great war between the Athenians and the
Peloponnesians. For would the Athenians have condescended to suffer
the Megareans, their neighbours, to traffic in their ports and
markets, that war had not begun.
[Sidenote: That messengers employed to procure or maintain peace,
ought to be safe by the law of nature.]
13. And this also is a law of nature, _That all messengers of peace,
and such as are employed to procure and maintain amity between man
and man, may safely come and go_. For seeing peace is the general
law of nature, the means thereto, such as are these men, must in the
same law be comprehended.
sp 2
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CHAPTER IV.
1. A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his equal.
2. Another, that men allow _æqualia æqualibus_. 3. Another, that
those things which cannot be divided, be used in common. 4.
Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be divided
by lot. 5. Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession. 6.
That men submit to arbitration. 7. Of an arbitrator. 8. That no
man press his counsel upon any man against his will. 9. How to
know suddenly what is the law of nature. 10. That the law of
nature taketh place after security from others to observe the
same. 11. The right of nature not to be taken away by custom,
nor the law of nature abrogated by any act. 12. Why the dictates
of nature are called laws. 13. Whatsoever is against conscience
in a man that is his own judge, is against the law of nature.
14. Of _malum pœnæ, malum culpæ_; virtue and vice. 15. Aptitude
to society fulfilleth the law of nature.
[Sidenote: A law of nature, that every man acknowledge other for his
equal.]
1. The question, which is the better man, is determinable only in
the estate of government and policy, though it be mistaken for a
question of nature, not only by ignorant men, that think one man’s
blood better than another’s by nature, but also by him, whose
opinions are at this day, and in these parts, of greater authority
than any other human writings. For he putteth so much difference
between the powers of men by nature, that he doubteth not to set
down, as the ground of all his politics, that some men are by nature
worthy to govern, and others by nature ought to serve. Which
foundation hath not only weakened the whole frame of his politics,
but hath also given men colour and pretences, whereby to disturb and
hinder the peace of one another. For though there were such a
difference of nature, that master and servant were not by consent of
men, but by inherent virtue; yet who hath that eminency of virtue,
above others, and who is so stupid, as not to govern himself, shall
never be agreed upon amongst men, who do every one naturally think
himself, as able, at the least, to govern another, as another to
govern him. And when there was any contention between the finer and
the courser wits, (as there hath been often in times of sedition and
civil war) for the most part, these latter carried away the victory;
and as long as men arrogate to themselves more honour than they give
to others, it cannot be imagined, how they can possibly live in
peace: and consequently we are to suppose, that for peace sake,
nature hath ordained this law, _That every man acknowledge other for
his equal_. And the breach of this law, is that we call _pride_.
[Sidenote: Another, that men allow _æqualia æqualibus_.]
2. As it was necessary that a man should not retain his right to
every thing, so also was it, that he should retain his right to
some things; to his own body, for example, the right of
defending, whereof he could not transfer; to the use of fire,
water, free air, and place to live in, and to all things
necessary for life. Nor doth the law of nature command any
divesting of other rights, than of those only which cannot be
retained without the loss of peace. Seeing then many rights are
retained, when we enter into peace one with another, reason and
the law of nature dictateth, _Whatsoever right any man requireth
to retain, he allow every other man to retain the same_. For he
that doth not so, alloweth not the equality mentioned in the
former section. For there is no acknowledgment of worth, without
attribution of the equality of benefit and respect. And this
allowance of _æqualia æqualibus_, is the same thing with the
allowing of _proportionalia proportionalibus_. For when a man
alloweth to every man alike, the allowance he maketh, will be in
the same proportion, in which are the numbers of men to whom
they are made. And this is it men mean by _distributive
justice_, and is properly termed _equity_. The breach of the law
is that which the Greeks call Πλεονεξία, which is commonly
rendered _covetousness_, but seemeth to be more precisely
expressed by the word _encroaching_.
[Sidenote: Another, that those things which cannot be divided, be
used in common.]
3. If there pass no other covenant, the law of nature is, _That such
things as cannot be divided, be used in common, proportionably to
the numbers of them that are to use the same, or without limitation,
when the quantity thereof sufficeth_. For first supposing the thing
to be used in common, not sufficient for them that are to use it
without limitation, if a few shall make more use thereof than the
rest, that equality is not observed, which is required in the second
section. And this is to be understood, as all the rest of the laws
of nature, without any other covenant antecedent: for a man may have
given away his right of common, and so the case be altered.
[Sidenote: Another, that things indivisible and incommunicable, be
divided by lot.]
4. In those things which neither can be divided, nor used in common,
the rule of nature must needs be one of these, _lot_, or _alternate
use_: for besides these two ways, there can no other equality be
imagined; and for alternate use, he that beginneth, hath the
advantage; and to reduce that advantage to equality, there is no
other way but lot, in things, therefore indivisible and
incommunicable, it is the law of nature, _That the use be alternate,
or the advantage given away by lot_; because there is no other way
of equality. And equality is the law of nature.
[Sidenote: Natural lot, primogeniture, and first possession.]
5. There be two sorts of lots; one arbitrary, made by men, and
commonly known by the names of _lot_, _chance_, _hazard_, and the
like; and there is _natural lot_, such as is _primogeniture_, which
is no more but the chance, or lot, of being first born, which it
seemeth they considered, that call inheritance by the name of
κληρονομία, which signifieth _distribution_ by lot. Secondly, _prima
occupatio_, first seizing, or finding of a thing, whereof no man
made use before, which for the most part also is merely _chance_.
[Sidenote: That men submit to arbitration.]
6. Although men agree upon these laws of nature, and endeavour to
observe the same; yet considering the passions of men, that make it
difficult to understand by what actions, and circumstances of
actions, those laws are broken, there must needs arise many great
controversies about the interpretation thereof, by which the peace
must needs be dissolved, and men return again to their former estate
of hostility. For the taking away of which controversies, it is
necessary that there be some common _arbitrator_ and _judge_, to
whose sentence both the parties in the controversies ought to stand.
And therefore it is a law of nature, _That in every controversy, the
parties thereto ought mutually to agree upon an arbitrator, whom
they both trust; and mutually to covenant to stand to the sentence
he shall give therein_. For where every man is his own _judge_,
there properly is no judge at all; as where every man carveth out
his own right, it hath the same effect, as if there were no right at
all: and where is no judge, there is no end of controversy: and
therefore the right of hostility remaineth.
[Sidenote: Of an arbitrator.]
7. An _arbitrator_ therefore, or he that is judge, is trusted by the
parties to any controversy, to determine the same by the declaration
of his own judgment therein. Out of which followeth first, that the
judge ought not to be concerned in the controversy he endeth; for in
that case he is a party, and ought by the same reason to be judged
by another. Secondly, that he maketh no covenant with either of the
parties, to pronounce sentence for the one, more than for the other.
Nor doth he covenant so much, as that his sentence shall be just;
for that were to make the parties judges of the sentence, whereby
the controversy would remain still undecided. Nevertheless for the
trust reposed in him, and for the equality which the law of nature
requireth him to consider in the parties, he violateth that law, if
for favour, or hatred to either party, he give other sentence than
he thinketh right. And thirdly, that no man ought to make himself
judge in any controversy between others, unless they consent and
agree thereto.
[Sidenote: That no man press his counsel upon any man against his
will.]
8. It is also the law of nature, _That no man obtrude or press his
advice or counsel to any man, that declareth himself unwilling to
hear the same_. For seeing a man taketh counsel concerning what is
good or hurt of himself only, and not of his counsellor, and that
counsel is a voluntary action, and therefore tendeth also to the
good of the counsellor, there may be often just cause to suspect the
counsellor: and though there be none, yet seeing counsel unwillingly
heard, is a needless offence to him that is not willing to hear it,
and offences tend all to the breach of peace, it is therefore
against the law of nature to obtrude it.
[Sidenote: How to know suddenly what is the law of nature.]
9. A man that shall see these laws of nature set down and inferred
with so many words, and so much ado, may think there is yet much
more difficulty and subtlety required to acknowledge and do
according to the said laws in every sudden occasion, when a man hath
but a little time to consider. And while we consider man in most
passions, as of _anger_, _ambition_, _covetousness_, _vain glory_,
and the like, that tend to the excluding of natural equality, it is
true. But without these passions, there is an easy rule to know upon
a sudden, whether the action I be to do, be against the law of
nature, or not. And it is but this: _That a man imagine himself in
place of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in
his_. Which is no more but a changing, as it were, of the scales.
For every man’s passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in
the scale of his neighbour. And this rule is very well known and
expressed in this old dictate, _Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne
feceris_.
[Sidenote: That the law of nature taketh place after security from
others to observe the same.]
10. These laws of nature, the sum whereof consisteth in forbidding
us to be our own judges, and our own carvers, and in commanding us
to accommodate one another, in case they should be observed by some,
and not by others, would make the observers but a prey to them that
should neglect them, leaving the good both without defence against
the wicked, and also with a charge to assist them: which is against
the scope of the said laws, that are made only for the protection
and defence of them that keep them. Reason therefore, and the law of
nature over and above all these particular laws, doth dictate this
law in general, _That those particular laws be so far observed, as
they subject us not to any incommodity, that in our own judgments
may arise, by the neglect thereof in those towards whom we observe
them_; and consequently requireth no more but the desire and
constant intention to endeavour and be ready to observe them, unless
there be cause to the contrary in other men’s refusal to observe
them towards us. The force therefore of the law of nature, is not
_in foro externo_, till there be security for men to obey it, but is
always _in foro interno_, wherein the action of obedience being
unsafe, the will and readiness to perform, is taken for the
performance.
[Sidenote: The right of nature not to be taken away by custom, nor
the law of nature abrogated by any act.]
11. Amongst the laws of nature, customs and prescriptions are not
numbered. For whatsoever action is against reason, though it be
reiterated never so often, or that there be never so many
precedents thereof, is still against reason, and therefore not a
law of nature, but contrary to it. But consent and covenant may so
alter the cases, which in the law of nature may be put, by
changing the circumstances, that that which was reason before, may
afterwards be against it; and yet is reason still the law. For
though every man be bound to allow equality to another, yet if
that other shall see cause to renounce the same, and make himself
inferior, then, if from thenceforth he consider him as inferior,
he breaketh not thereby that law of nature that commandeth to
allow equality. In sum, _a mans own consent may abridge him of the
liberty which the law of nature leaveth him, but custom not_; nor
can either of them abrogate either these, or or any other law of
nature.
[Sidenote: Why the dictates of nature are called laws.]
12. And forasmuch as law, to speak properly, is a command, and these
dictates, as they proceed from nature, are not commands, they are
not therefore called laws, in respect of nature, but in respect of
the author of nature, God Almighty.
[Sidenote: Whatsoever is against conscience in a man, that is his
own judge, is against the law of nature.]
13. And seeing the laws of nature concern the conscience, not he
only breaketh them that doth any action contrary, but also he whose
action is conformable to them, in case he think it contrary. For
though the action chance to be right, yet in his judgment he
despiseth the law.
[Sidenote: Of _malum pœnæ, malum culpæ_; virtue and vice.]
14. Every man by natural passion, calleth that good which pleaseth
him for the present, or so far forth as he can foresee; and in like
manner, that which displeaseth him, evil. And therefore he that
foreseeth the whole way to his preservation, which is the end that
every one by nature aimeth at, must also call it good, and the
contrary evil. And this is that good and evil, which not every man
in passion calleth so, but all men by reason. And therefore the
fulfilling of all these laws is good in reason, and the breaking of
them evil. And so also the habit, or disposition, or intention to
fulfil them good; and the neglect of them evil. And from hence
cometh that distinction of _malum pœnæ_, and _malum culpæ_; for
_malum pœnæ_ is any pain or molestation of the mind whatsoever; but
_malum culpæ_ is that action which is contrary to reason and the law
of nature: as also the habit of doing according to these and other
laws of nature, that tend to our preservation, is that we call
_virtue_; and the habit of doing the contrary, _vice_. As for
example, justice is that habit by which we stand to covenants,
injustice the contrary vice; equity that habit by which we allow
equality of nature, arrogancy the contrary vice; gratitude the habit
whereby we requite the benefit and trust of others, ingratitude the
contrary vice; temperance the habit by which we abstain from all
things that tend to our destruction, intemperance the contrary vice;
prudence, the same with virtue in general. As for the common
opinion, that virtue consisteth in mediocrity, and vice in extremes,
I see no ground for it, nor can find any such mediocrity. Courage
may be virtue, when the daring is extreme, if the cause be good, and
extreme fear no vice when the danger is extreme. To give a man more
than his due, is no injustice, though it be to give him less: and in
gifts it is not the sum that maketh liberality, but the reason. And
so in all other virtues and vices. I know that this doctrine of
mediocrity is Aristotle’s, but his opinions concerning virtue and
vice, are no other than those, which were received then, and are
still by the generality of men unstudied, and therefore not very
likely to be accurate.
[Sidenote: Aptitude to society, fulfilleth the law of nature.]
15. The sum of virtue is to be sociable with them that will be
sociable, and formidable to them that will not. And the same is the
sum of the law of nature: for in being sociable, the law of nature
taketh place by way of peace and society; and to be formidable, is
the law of nature in war, where to be feared is a protection a man
hath from his own power: and as the former consisteth in actions of
equity and justice, the latter consisteth in actions of honour. And
equity, justice, and honour, contain all virtues whatsoever.
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CHAPTER V.
A Confirmation out of Holy Scripture of the principal points
mentioned in the two last Chapters concerning the Law of Nature.
[Sidenote: Confirmation out of Scripture, &c.]
1. The laws mentioned in the former chapters, as they are called the
laws of nature, for that they are the dictates of natural reason,
and also moral laws, because they concern the manners and
conversation of men, one towards another; so are they also divine
laws in respect of the author thereof, God Almighty; and ought
therefore to agree, or at least, not to be repugnant to the word of
God revealed in Holy Scripture. In this chapter therefore, I shall
produce such places of Scripture, as appear to be most consonant to
the said laws.
2. And first, the word of God seemeth to place the divine law in
reason, by all such texts as ascribe the same to the heart and
understanding; as Psalm xl. 8: _Thy law is in my heart_. Heb. viii.
10: _After those days, saith the Lord, I will put my laws in their
mind_: and Heb. x. 16, the same. Psalm xxxvii. 31, speaking of the
righteous man, he saith, _The law of God is in his heart_. Psalm
xix. 7, 8: _The law of God is perfect, converting the soul. It
giveth wisdom to the simple, and, light unto the eyes_. Jer. xxxi.
33: _I will put my law in their inward parts, and write it in their
hearts_. And (John i.) the lawgiver himself, God Almighty, is called
by the name of Λόγος, which is also called (verse 4) _The light of
men_; and (verse 9) _The light which lighteth every man, which
cometh into the world_. All which are descriptions of natural
reason.
3. And that the law divine, for so much as is moral, are those
precepts which tend to peace, seemeth to be much confirmed by such
places of Scripture as these: Rom. iii. 17, righteousness which is
the fulfilling of the law, is called _The way of peace_. And Psalm
lxxxv. 10: _Righteousness and peace shall kiss each other_. And
Matth. v. 9: _Blessed are the peace-makers_. And Heb. vii. 2,
_Melchisedec king of Salem_ is interpreted _king of righteousness_,
and _king of peace_. And (verse 21) our Saviour Christ is said to be
_a priest for ever after the order of Melchisedec_: out of which may
be inferred, that the doctrine of our Saviour Christ annexeth the
fulfilling of the law to peace.
4. That the law of nature is unalterable, is intimated by this, that
the priesthood of Melchisedec is everlasting; and by the words of
our Saviour, (Matth. v. 18): _Heaven and earth shall pass away, but
one jot or tittle of the law shall not pass till all things be
fulfilled_.
5. That men ought to stand to their covenants, is taught Psalm xv,
where the question being asked (verse 1), _Lord who shall dwell in
thy tabernacle_, &c. It is answered (verse 4), _He that sweareth to
his own hindrance, and yet changeth not_. And that men ought to be
gratified, where no covenant passeth, Deut. xxv. 4: _Thou shalt not
muzzle the ox that treadeth out the corn_, which St. Paul (1 Cor.
ix. 9) interpreteth not of oxen but of men.
6. That men content themselves with equality, as it is the
foundation of natural law, so also is it of the second table, of the
divine law, Matth. xxii. 39, 40: _Thou shalt love thy neighbour as
thyself. On these two laws depend the whole law and the prophets_;
which is not so to be understood, as that a man should study so much
his neighbour’s profit as his own, or that he should divide his
goods amongst his neighbours; but that he should esteem his
neighbour worthy all rights and privileges that himself enjoyeth;
and attribute unto him, whatsoever he looketh should be attributed
unto himself: which is no more, but that he should be humble, meek,
and content with equality.
7. And that in distributing of right amongst equals, that
distribution is to be made according to the proportions of
the numbers, which is the giving of _æqualia æqualibus, et
proportionalia proportionalibus_; we have Numb. xxvi. 53, 54, the
commandment of God to Moses: _Thou shalt divide the land according
to the number of names; to many thou shalt give more, to few thou
shalt give less, to every one according to his number_. That
decision by lot is a means of peace, Prov. xviii. 18: _The lot
causeth contention to cease, and maketh partition among the mighty_.
8. That the accommodation and forgiveness of one another, which have
before been put for laws of nature, are also law divine, there is no
question. For they are the essence of charity, which is the scope of
the whole law. That we ought not to reproach, or reprehend one
another, is the doctrine of our Saviour, Matth. vii. 1: _Judge not,
that ye be not judged_: (verse 3): _Why seest thou the mote that is
in thy brother’s eye, and seest not the beam that is in thine own
eye?_ Also the law that forbiddeth us to press our counsel upon
others further than they admit, is a divine law. For after our
charity and desire to rectify one another is rejected, to press it
further, is to reprehend him, and condemn him, which is forbidden in
the text last recited; as also Rom. xiv. 12, 13: _Every one of us
shall give account of himself to God. Let us not therefore judge one
another any more, but use your judgment rather in this, that no man
put an occasion to fall, or a stumbling block before his brother._
9. Further, the rule of men concerning the law of nature, _Quod tibi
fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris_, is confirmed by the like, Matth.
vii. 12: _Whatsoever therefore you would have men do unto you, that
do you unto them: for this is the law and the prophets_. And Rom.
ii. 1: _In that thou judgest another, thou condemnest thyself_, &c.
10. It is also manifest by the Scriptures, that these laws concern
only the tribunal of our conscience; and that the actions contrary
to them, shall be no further punished by God Almighty, than as they
proceed from negligence, or contempt. And first, that these laws are
made to the conscience, appeareth, Matth. v. 20: _For I say unto
you, except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the
Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of
heaven._ Now the Pharisees were the most exact amongst the Jews in
the external performance; they therefore must want the sincerity of
conscience; else could not our Saviour have required a greater
righteousness than theirs. For the same reason our Saviour Christ
saith (Luke, xviii. 14): _The publican departed from the temple
justified, rather than the Pharisee_. And Christ saith, (Matth. xi.
30): _My yoke is easy, and my burthen light_; which proceedeth from
this, that Christ required no more than our best endeavour. And Rom.
xiv. 23: _He that doubteth, is condemned, if he eat_. And in
innumerable places both in the Old and New Testament, God Almighty
declareth, that he taketh the will for the deed, both in good and
evil actions. By all which it plainly appears, that the divine law
is dictated to the conscience. On the other side it is no less
plain, that how many and heinous actions soever a man commit through
infirmity, he shall nevertheless, whensoever he shall condemn the
same in his own conscience, be freed from the punishments that to
such actions otherwise belong. For, _At what time soever a sinner
doth repent him of his sins from the bottom of his heart, I will put
all his iniquities out of my remembrance, saith the Lord_.
11. Concerning revenge, which by the law of nature ought not to aim,
as I have said chapter III. section 10, at present delight, but
future profit, there is some difficulty made, as if the same
accorded not with the law divine, by such as object the continuance
of punishment after the day of judgment, when there shall be no
place, neither for amendment, nor for example. This objection had
been of some force, if such punishment had been ordained after all
sins were past; but considering the punishment was instituted before
sin, it serveth to the benefit of mankind, because it keepeth men in
peaceable and virtuous conversation by the terror. And therefore
such revenge was directed to the future only.
12. Finally, there is no law of natural reason, that can be against
the law divine: for God Almighty hath given reason to a man to be a
light unto him. And I hope it is no impiety to think, that God
Almighty will require a strict account thereof, at the day of
judgment, as of the instructions which we were to follow in our
peregrination here, notwithstanding the opposition and affronts of
supernaturalists now a-days, to rational and moral conversation.
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CHAPTER VI.
1. That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the state of
war, till they have security one against another. 2. The law of
nature in war, is nothing but honour. 3. No security without the
concord of many. 4. That concord of many cannot be maintained
without power to keep them all in awe. 5. The cause why concord
remaineth in a multitude of some irrational creatures, and not
of men. 6. That union is necessary for the maintaining of
concord. 7. How union is made. 8. Body politic defined. 9.
Corporation defined. 10. Sovereign and subject defined. 11. Two
sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and commonwealth.
[Sidenote: That men, notwithstanding these laws, are still in the
state of war, till they have security one against
another.]
1. In chapter XII. section 6, of the _Treatise of Human Nature_, it
hath been shewed, that the opinions men have of the rewards and
punishments which are to follow their actions, are the causes that
make and govern the will to those actions. In this estate of man
therefore, wherein all men are equal, and every man allowed to be
his own judge, the fears they have one of another are equal, and
every man’s hopes consist in his own sleight and strength: and
consequently when any man by his natural passion, is provoked to
break these laws of nature, there is no security in any other man of
his own defence but _anticipation_. And for this cause, every man’s
right, howsoever he be inclined to peace, of doing whatsoever
seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth with him still, as the
necessary means of his preservation. And therefore till there be
security amongst men for the keeping of the law of nature one
towards another, men are still in the estate of war, and nothing is
unlawful to any man that tendeth to his own safety or commodity: and
this safety and commodity consisteth in the mutual aid and help of
one another, whereby also followeth the mutual fear of one another.
[Sidenote: The law of nature in war, is nothing but honour.]
2. It is a proverbial saying, _inter arma silent leges_. There is a
little therefore to be said concerning the laws that men are to
observe one towards another in time of war, wherein every man’s
being and well-being is the rule of his actions. Yet thus much the
law of nature commandeth in war, that men satiate not the cruelty of
their present passions, whereby in their own conscience they foresee
no benefit to come. For that betrayeth not a necessity, but a
disposition of the mind to war, which is against the law of nature.
And in old time we read, that rapine was a trade of life, wherein
nevertheless many of them that used it, did not only spare the lives
of those they invaded, but left them also such things, as were
necessary to preserve that life which they had given them; as namely
their oxen and instruments for tillage, though they carried away all
their other cattle and substance. And as the rapine itself was
warranted in the law of nature, by the want of security otherwise to
maintain themselves, so the exercise of cruelty was forbidden by the
same law of nature, unless fear suggested anything to the contrary.
For nothing but fear can justify the taking away of another’s life.
And because fear can hardly be made manifest, but by some action
dishonourable, that bewrayeth the conscience of one’s own weakness,
all men, in whom the passion of courage or magnanimity hath been
predominant, have abstained from cruelty; insomuch, that though
there be in war no law, the breach whereof is injury, yet there are
in war those laws, the breach whereof is dishonour. In one word,
therefore, the only law of actions in war, is _honour_; and the
right of war, _providence_.
[Sidenote: No security without the concord of many.]
3. And seeing natural aid is necessary for defence, as mutual fear
is necessary for peace, we are to consider how great aids are
required for such defence, and for the causing of such mutual fear,
as men may not easily adventure on one another. And first, it is
evident, that the mutual aid of two or three men is of very little
security. For the odds on the other side, of a man or two, giveth
sufficient encouragement to an assault. And therefore before men
have sufficient security in the help of one another, their number
must be so great, that the odds of a few which the enemy may have,
be no certain and sensible advantage.
[Sidenote: That concord of many cannot be maintained without power
to keep them all in awe.]
4. And supposing how great a number soever of men assembled together
for their mutual defence, yet shall not the effect follow, unless
they all direct their actions to one and the same end; which
direction to one and the same end is that which, chap. XII. sect. 7,
is called _consent_. This _consent_, or concord, amongst so many
men, though it may be made by the fear of a present invader, or by
the hope of a present conquest, or booty, and endure as long as that
action endureth, nevertheless, by the diversity of judgments and
passions in so many men contending naturally for honour and
advantage one above another, it is impossible, not only that their
consent to aid each other against an enemy, but also that the peace
should last between themselves, without some mutual and common fear
to rule them.
[Sidenote: The cause why concord remaineth in a multitude of some
irrational creatures, and not of men.]
5. But contrary hereunto may be objected, the experience we have of
certain living creatures irrational, that nevertheless continually
live in such good order and government for their common benefit, and
are so free from sedition and war amongst themselves, that for
peace, profit, and defence, nothing more can be imaginable. And the
experience we have in this, is in that little creature the bee,
which is therefore reckoned amongst _animalia politica_. Why
therefore may not men, that foresee the benefit of concord,
continually maintain the same without compulsion, as well as they?
To which I answer, that amongst other living creatures, there is no
question of precedence in their own species, nor strife about
honour, or acknowledgment of one another’s wisdom, as there is
amongst men, from whence arise envy and hatred of one towards
another, and from thence sedition and war. Secondly, those living
creatures aim every one at peace and food common to them all; men
aim at dominion, superiority, and private wealth, which are distinct
in every man, and breed contention. Thirdly, those living creatures
that are without reason, have not learning enough to espy, or to
think they espy, any defect in the government; and therefore are
contented therewith. But in a multitude of men, there are always
some that think themselves wiser than the rest, and strive to alter
what they think amiss, and divers of them strive to alter divers
ways, and that causeth war. Fourthly, they want speech, and are
therefore unable to instigate one another to faction, which men want
not. Fifthly, they have no conception of right and wrong, but only
of pleasure and pain, and therefore also no censure of one another,
nor of their commander, as long as they are themselves at ease;
whereas men that make themselves judges of right and wrong, are then
least at quiet, when they are most at ease. Lastly, natural concord,
such as is amongst those creatures, is the work of God by the way of
nature; but concord amongst men is artificial, and by way of
covenant. And therefore no wonder, if such irrational creatures as
govern themselves in multitude, do it much more firmly than mankind,
that do it by arbitrary institution.
[Sidenote: That union is necessary for the maintaining of concord.]
6. It remaineth therefore still, that consent, by which I understand
the concurrence of many men’s wills to one action, is not sufficient
security for their common peace, without the erection of some common
power, by the fear whereof they may be compelled both to keep the
peace amongst themselves, and to join their strengths together,
against a common enemy. And that this may be done, there is no way
imaginable, but only union, which is defined, chapter XII. section
8, to be the involving, or including the wills of many in the will
of one man, or in the will of the greatest part of any one number of
men, that is to say, in the will of one man, or of one _council_.
For a council is nothing else but an _assembly_ of men deliberating
concerning something common to them all.
[Sidenote: How union is made.]
7. The making of union consisteth in this, that every man by
covenant oblige himself to some one and the same man, or to some one
and the same council, by them all named and determined, to do those
actions, which the said man or council shall command them to do, and
to do no action, which he or they shall forbid, or command them not
to do. And further, in case it be a council, whose commands they
covenant to obey, that then also they covenant, that every man shall
hold that for the command of the whole council, which is the command
of the greater part of those men, whereof such council consisteth.
And though the will of man being not voluntary, but the beginning of
voluntary actions, is not subject to deliberation and covenant; yet
when a man covenanteth to subject his will to the command of
another, he obligeth himself to this, that he resign his strength
and means to him, whom he covenanteth to obey. And hereby he that is
to command, may by the use of all their means and strength, be able
by the terror thereof, to frame the will of them all to unity and
concord, amongst themselves.
[Sidenote: Body politic defined.]
8. This union so made, is that which men call now a-days, a _body
politic_, or civil society; and the Greeks call it πόλις, that is to
say, a city, which may be defined to be a multitude of men, united
as one person, by a common power, for their common peace, defence,
and benefit.
[Sidenote: Corporation defined.]
9. And as this union into a city or body politic, is instituted with
common power over all the particular persons, or members thereof, to
the common good of them all; so also may there be amongst a
multitude of those members instituted, a subordinate union of
certain men, for certain common actions to be done by those men for
some common benefit of theirs, or of the whole city; as for
subordinate government, for counsel, for trade, and the like. And
these subordinate bodies politic are usually called _corporations_;
and their power such over the particulars of their own society, as
the whole city, whereof they are members, have allowed them.
[Sidenote: Sovereign and subject defined.]
10. In all cities, or bodies politic not subordinate, but
independent, that one man, or one council, to whom the particular
members have given that common power, is called their _sovereign_,
and his power, the sovereign power; which consisteth in the power
and the strength, that every of the members have transferrred to him
from themselves by covenant. And because it is impossible for any
man really to transfer his own strength to another, or for that
other to receive it; it is to be understood, that to transfer a
man’s power and strength, is no more but to lay by, or relinquish
his own right of resisting him to whom he so transferreth it. And
every member of the body politic, is called a _subject_, to wit, to
the _sovereign_.
[Sidenote: Two sorts of bodies politic, patrimonial and
commonwealth.]
11. The cause in general, which moveth a man to become subject to
another, is (as I have said already) the fear of not otherwise
preserving himself. And a man may subject himself to him that
invadeth, or may invade him, for fear of him; or men may join
amongst themselves, to subject themselves to such as they shall
agree upon for fear of others. And when many men subject themselves
the former way, there ariseth thence a body politic, as it were
naturally. From whence proceedeth _dominion_, _paternal_ and
_despotic_. And when they subject themselves the other way, by
mutual agreement amongst many, the body politic they make, is for
the most part, called a _commonwealth_, in distinction from the
former, though the name be the general name for them both. And I
shall speak in the first place of commonwealths, and afterwards of
bodies politic, patrimonial, and despotical.
THE SECOND PART.
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CHAPTER I.
1. Introduction. 2. A multitude before their union, &c. 3.
Express consent of every particular, &c. 4. Democratical,
aristocratical, and monarchical union may be instituted for
ever, or, &c. 5. Without security no private right relinquished.
6. Covenants of government, without power of coercion, are no
security. 7. Power coercive, &c. 8. The sword of war, &c. 9.
Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword. 10. Laws
civil, &c. 11. Appointment of magistrates, &c. 12. Sovereign
power includeth impunity. 13. A supposed commonwealth, where
laws are made first, and the commonwealth after. 14. The same
refelled. 15. Mixed forms of government supposed in sovereignty.
16. That refelled. 17. Mixed government, &c. 18. Reason and
experience to prove absolute sovereignty somewhere in all
commonwealths. 19. Some principal, &c. marks of sovereignty.
[Sidenote: Introduction.]
1. That _Treatise of Human Nature_, which was formerly printed, hath
been wholly spent in the consideration of the natural power, and the
natural estate of man, namely, of his cognition and passions in the
first eleven chapters, and how from thence proceed his actions; in
the twelfth, how men know one another’s minds: in the last, in what
estate men’s passions set them. In the first, second, third, fourth,
and fifth chapters of the former Part of this Treatise is showed,
what estate they are directed unto by the dictates of reason, that
is to say, what be the principal articles of the law of nature. And
lastly, how a multitude of persons natural, are united by covenants
into one person civil, or body politic. In this part therefore shall
be considered, the nature of a body politic, and the laws thereof,
otherwise called civil laws. And whereas it hath been said in the
last chapter, and last section of the former part, that there be two
ways of erecting a body politic; one by arbitrary institution of
many men assembled together, which is like a creation out of nothing
by human wit; the other by compulsion, which is as it were a
generation thereof out of natural force; I shall first speak of such
erection of a body politic, as proceedeth from the assembly and
consent of a multitude.
[Sidenote: A multitude before their union, &c.]
2. Having in this place to consider, a multitude of men about to
unite themselves into a body politic, for their security, both
against one another, and against common enemies, and that by
covenants; the knowledge of what covenants they must needs make,
dependeth on the knowledge of the persons, and the knowledge of
their end. First, for their persons they are many, and (as yet) not
one; nor can any action done in a multitude of people met together,
be attributed to the multitude, or truly called the action of the
multitude, unless every man’s hand, and every man’s will, (not so
much as one excepted) have concurred thereto. For multitude, though
in their persons they run together, yet they concur not always in
their designs. For even at that time when men are in tumult, though
they agree a number of them to one mischief, and a number of them to
another; yet, in the whole, they are amongst themselves in the state
of hostility, and not of peace; like the seditious Jews besieged in
Jerusalem, that could join against their enemies, and fight amongst
themselves. Whensoever therefore any man saith, that a number of men
hath done any act, it is to be understood, that every particular man
in that number hath consented thereunto, and not the greatest part
only. Secondly, though thus assembled with intention to unite
themselves, they are yet in that estate in which every man hath
right to everything, and consequently, as hath been said, chapter I.
section 10, in an estate of enjoying nothing. And therefore _meum_
and _tuum_ hath no place amongst them.
[Sidenote: Express consent of every particular, &c.]
3. The first thing therefore they are to do, is expressly every man
to consent to something, by which they may come near to their ends,
which can be nothing else imaginable, but this, that they allow the
wills of the major part of their whole number, or the wills of the
major part of some certain number of men by them determined and
named; or lastly, the will of some one man, to involve and be taken
for the wills of every man. And this done, they are united, and a
_body politic_. And if the major part of their whole number be
supposed to involve the wills of all the particulars, then are they
said to be a _democracy_, that is to say, a government wherein the
whole number, or so many of them as please, being assembled
together, are the sovereign, and every particular man a subject. If
the major part of a certain number of men named or distinguished
from the rest, be supposed to involve the wills of every one of the
particulars, then are they said to be an _oligarchy_, or
_aristocracy_, which two words signify the same thing, together with
the divers passions of those that use them. For when the men that be
in that office please, they are called an aristocracy, or otherwise
an oligarchy, wherein those, the major part of which declare the
wills of the whole multitude being assembled, are the sovereign, and
every man severally a subject. Lastly, if their consent be such,
that the will of one man, whom they name, shall stand for the wills
of them all, then is their government or union called a _monarchy_,
and that one man a sovereign, and every of the rest a subject.
[Sidenote: Democratical, aristocratical, and monarchical union may
be instituted for ever.]
4. And those several sorts of unions, governments, and subjections
of man’s will, may be understood to be made, either absolutely, that
is to say, for all future time, or for a time limited only. But
forasmuch as we speak here of a body politic, instituted for the
perpetual benefit and defence of them that make it; which therefore
men desire should last for ever, I will omit to speak of those that
be temporary, and consider of those that be for ever.
[Sidenote: Without security no private right relinquished.]
5. The end for which one man giveth up, and relinquisheth to
another, or others, the right of protecting and defending himself by
his own power, is the security which he expecteth thereby, of
protection and defence from those to whom he doth so relinquish it;
and a man may then account himself in the estate of security, when
he can foresee no violence to be done unto him, from which the doer
may not be deterred by the power of that sovereign, to whom they
have every one subjected themselves: and without that security,
there is no reason for a man to deprive himself of his own
advantages, and make himself a prey to others. And therefore when
there is not such a sovereign power erected, as may afford this
security, it is to be understood, that every man’s right of doing
whatsoever seemeth good in his own eyes, remaineth still with him;
and contrariwise, where any subject hath right by his own judgment
and discretion, to make use of his force, it is to be understood,
that every man hath the like, and consequently, that there is no
commonwealth at all established. How far therefore in the making of
a commonwealth, man subjecteth his will to the power of others, must
appear from the end, namely, security. For whatsoever is necessary
to be by covenant transferred, for the attaining thereof, so much is
transferred, or else every man is in his natural liberty to secure
himself.
[Sidenote: Covenants of government without power of coercion, are no
security.]
6. Covenants agreed upon by every man assembled for the making of a
commonwealth, and put in writing without erecting of a power of
coercion, are no reasonable security for any of them that so
covenant, nor are to be called laws, and leave men still in the
estate of nature and hostility. For seeing the wills of most men are
governed only by fear, and where there is no power of coercion,
there is no fear, the wills of most men will follow their passions
of covetousness, lust, anger, and the like, to the breaking of those
covenants, whereby the rest, also, who otherwise would keep them,
are set at liberty, and have no law, but from themselves.
[Sidenote: Power coercive, &c.]
7. This power of coercion, as hath been said, chap. II. sect. 3, of
the former part, consisteth in the transferring of every man’s right
of resistance against him, to whom he hath transferred the power of
coercion. It followeth therefore, that no man in any commonwealth
whatsoever, hath right to resist him, or them, to whom they have
transferred this power coercive, or (as men use to call it) the
sword of justice, supposing the not-resistance possible. For, Part
I. chapter II. sect. 18, covenants bind but to the utmost of our
endeavour.
[Sidenote: The sword of war, &c.]
8. And forasmuch as they who are amongst themselves in security, by
the means of this sword of justice, that keeps them all in awe, are
nevertheless in danger of enemies from without, if there be not some
means found, to unite their strengths and natural forces, in the
resistance of such enemies, their peace amongst themselves is but in
vain. And therefore it is to be understood as a covenant of every
member to contribute their several forces for the defence of the
whole, whereby to make one power as sufficient, as is possible for
their defence. Now seeing that every man hath already transferred
the use of his strength to him, or them, that have the sword of
justice, it followeth, that the power of defence, that is to say,
the sword of war, be in the same hands wherein is the sword of
justice; and consequently those two swords are but one, and that
inseparably and essentially annexed to the sovereign power.
[Sidenote: Decision in all debates, &c. annexed to the sword.]
9. Moreover, seeing to have the right of the sword, is nothing else
but to have the use thereof depending only on the judgment and
discretion of him or them that have it, it followeth, that the power
of indenture in all controversies, wherein the sword of justice is
to be used; and in all deliberations concerning war, wherein the use
of that sword is required, the right of resolving and determining
what is to be done, belong to the same sovereign.
[Sidenote: Laws civil, &c.]
10. Further, considering it is no less, but much more necessary to
prevent violence and rapine, than to punish the same when it is
committed, and all violence proceedeth from controversies that arise
between men concerning _meum_ and _tuum_, right and wrong, good and
bad, and the like, which men use every one to measure by their own
judgments, it belongeth also to the judgment of the same sovereign
power, to set forth and make known the common measure by which every
man is to know what is his, and what another’s; what is good, and
what bad, and what he ought to do, and what not, and to command the
same to be observed. And these measures of the actions of the
subjects are those, which men call _laws politic_, or civil: the
making whereof, must of right belong to him that hath the power of
the sword, by which men are compelled to observe them; for otherwise
they should be made in vain.
[Sidenote: Appointment of magistrates, &c.]
11. Furthermore, seeing it is impossible that any one man that hath
such sovereign power, can be able, in person, to hear and determine
all controversies, to be present at all deliberations concerning
common good, and to execute and perform all those common actions
that belong thereunto, whereby there will be necessity of
magistrates and ministers of public affairs; it is consequent, that
the appointment, nomination, and limitation of the same be
understood, as an inseparable part of the same sovereignty, to which
the sum of all judicature, and execution, hath been already annexed.
[Sidenote: Sovereign power includeth impunity.]
12. And forasmuch, as the right to use the forces of every
particular member, is transferred from themselves, to their
sovereign, a man will easily fall upon this conclusion of himself,
that to sovereign power, whatsoever it doth, there belongeth
impunity.
[Sidenote: A supposed commonwealth where laws are made first, and
the commonwealth after.]