themselves for the spreading of the Gospel, and continually as they
converted any number of men, in any city or region, to the faith,
they chose out such as they thought fittest, to direct them in
matter of conversation and life, according to Christ’s law, and to
explicate unto them, that mystery of Christ come in the flesh, that
is to say, to unfold unto them at large the office of the Messiah.
And of those elders, some were subordinate to others, according as
the apostles, who ordained them, thought meet. So St. Paul gave
power unto Titus, to ordain elders in Crete, and to redress things
that were amiss. So that Titus was both an elder, and ordained
elders (Tit. i. 5): _For this cause I left thee in Crete, that thou
shouldest continue to redress the things that remain, and ordain
elders in every city_; where the word is καταστήσρς, that is
constitute; whereby it appeareth, that in the apostles' times, one
elder had authority over another, to ordain and rule them. For 1
Tim. v. 19, Timothy an elder, is made judge of accusations against
other elders. And Acts xiv. 23, the disciples are said to ordain
elders, for all the congregations of the cities they had preached
in. And though the word there be χειροτονήσαντες, yet it signifieth
not election by holding up of hands, but simply and absolutely
ordination. For the ordinary choosing of magistrates amongst the
Grecians, which were all either popularly governed, or else by
_oligarchy_, being performed by holding up of hands, made that word
be taken simply, for an election or ordination, howsoever made. And
thus in the primitive church, the hierarchy of the church, was
apostles, elders that governed other elders, and elders that ruled
not, but their office was to preach, to administer the sacraments,
to offer up prayers and thanksgiving in the name of the people. But
at that time there appeared no distinction between the names of
bishop and elder. But immediately after the apostles' time, the word
bishop was taken to signify such an elder as had the government of
elders, and other elders were called by the name of priests, which
signifieth the same that elder doth. And thus the government of
bishops hath a divine pattern in the twelve rulers, and seventy
elders of Israel, in the twelve apostles and seventy disciples of
our Saviour, in the ruling elders, and not ruling elders, in the
time of the apostles.
[Sidenote: The preaching of the gospel was not commanding, but
persuading.]
9. And thus much of the magistrates over Christ’s flock in the
primitive church. For the office of a minister, or ministress, was
to be subject to the flock, and to serve them in those things which
appertain to their temporal business. The next thing to be
considered is the authority which our Saviour gave them, either over
those whom they had converted, or those whom they were about to
convert. And for these latter, which as yet were without the church,
the authority which our Saviour gave to his apostles was no more but
this, to preach unto them that Jesus was the Christ, and to
explicate the same in all points, that concern the kingdom of
heaven, and to persuade men to embrace our Saviour’s doctrine, but
by no means to compel any man to be subject to them: for seeing the
laws of the kingdom of heaven, as hath been showed, Part I, chap. V.
sect. 10, are dictated to the conscience only, which is not subject
to compulsion and constraint, it was not congruent to the style of
the King of Heaven to constrain men to submit their actions to him,
but to advise them only; nor for him that professeth the sum of his
law to be love, to extort any duty from us with fear of temporal
punishment. And therefore as the mighty men in the world, that hold
others in subjection by force, are called in Scripture by the name
of hunters; so our Saviour calleth those whom he appointed to draw
the world unto him, by subduing their affections, _fishers_. And
therefore he saith to Peter and Andrew, (Matth. iv. 19): _Follow me,
and I will make ye fishers of men_. And Luke x. 3: _Behold_, saith
Christ, _I send ye forth as lambs amongst wolves_. And it were to no
end to give them the right of compelling, without strengthening the
same with greater power than of _lambs_ amongst _wolves_. Moreover,
Matth. x, where our Saviour giveth a commission to his apostles, to
go forth and convert the nations to the faith, he giveth them no
authority of _coercion_ and punishment, but only saith, (verse 14,
15) _Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye
depart out of that house, or that city, shake off the dust of your
feet. It shall be easier for the land of Sodom and Gomorrah in the
day of judgment, than for that city._ Whereby it is manifest, that
all that the apostles could do by their authority, was no more than
to renounce communion with them, and leave their punishment to God
Almighty, in the day of judgment. Likewise the comparisons of the
kingdom of heaven to the seed, Matth. xiii. 3, and to the leaven,
Matth. xiii. 33, doth intimate unto us that the increase thereof
ought to proceed from internal operation of God’s word preached, and
not from any law or compulsion of them that preach it. Moreover our
Saviour himself saith (John xviii. 36), _That_ his _kingdom is not
of this world_; and consequently his magistrates derive not from him
any authority of punishing men in this world. And therefore also,
Matth. xxvi. 52, after St. Peter had drawn his sword in his defence,
our Saviour saith, _Put up thy sword into his place. For all that
take the sword, shall perish by the sword._ And, verse 54, _How then
shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, which say, that it must be so?_
showing out of the Scriptures, that the kingdom of Christ was not to
be defended by the sword.
[Sidenote: Excommunication. Sovereigns immediate rulers
ecclesiastical under Christ.]
10. But concerning the authority of the apostles or bishops over
those who were already converted and within the church, there be
that think it greater than over them without. For some have said,
(Bellarmin. _Lib. de Rom. Pont._ cap. 29,) _Though the law of Christ
deprive no prince of his dominion, and Paul did rightly appeal unto
Cæsar, whilst kings were infidels and out of the church; yet when
they became Christians, and of their own accord underwent the laws
of the gospel, presently as sheep to a shepherd, and as members to
the head, they became subject to the prelate of the ecclesiastical
hierarchy_. Which, whether it be true or not, is to be considered by
that light which we have from the Holy Scripture, concerning the
power of our Saviour and his apostles, over such as they had
converted. But our Saviour, as he imitated the commonwealth of the
Jews in his magistrates, the twelve and the seventy; so did he also
in the censure of the church, which was _excommunication_; but
amongst the Jews, the church did put the excommunicated persons from
the congregation, which they might do by their power temporal; but
our Saviour and his apostles, who took upon them no such power,
could not forbid the excommunicated person to enter into any place
and congregation, into which he was permitted to enter, by the
prince, or sovereign of the place. For that had been to deprive the
sovereign of his authority. And therefore the excommunication of a
person subject to an earthly power, was but a declaration of the
church, which did excommunicate, that the person so excommunicated
was to be reputed still as an infidel, but not to be driven by their
authority, out of any company, he might otherwise lawfully come
into. And this is it our Saviour saith (Matth. xviii. 17): _If he
refuse to hear the church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man
and a publican_. So that the whole effect of excommunicating a
Christian prince, is no more than he or they that so excommunicate
him depart and banish themselves out of his dominion. Nor can they
thereupon discharge any of his subjects of their obedience to him;
for that were to deprive him of his dominion; which they may not do,
for being out of the church. It is confessed by them that make this
objection, and proved in the former section, that our Saviour gave
no authority to his apostles to be judges over them. And therefore
in no case can the sovereign power of a commonwealth be subject to
any authority ecclesiastical, besides that of Christ himself. And
though he be informed concerning the kingdom of heaven, and subject
himself thereto at the persuasions of persons ecclesiastical, yet is
he not thereby subject to their government and rule. For if it were
by their authority he took that yoke upon him, and not by their
persuasion, then by the same authority he might cast it off. But
this is unlawful. For if all the churches in the world should
renounce the Christian faith, yet is not this sufficient authority
for any of the members to do the same. It is manifest therefore,
that they who have sovereign power, are immediate rulers of the
church under Christ, and all other but subordinate to them. If that
were not, but kings should command one thing upon pain of death, and
priests another, upon pain of damnation, it would be impossible that
peace and religion should stand together.
[Sidenote: That no man hath any just pretence of religion against
obedience to commonwealth. God speaketh to man by his
vicegerents.]
11. And therefore there is no just cause for any man to withdraw his
obedience from the sovereign state, upon pretence that Christ hath
ordained any state ecclesiastical above it. And though kings take
not upon them the ministerial priesthood, yet are they not so merely
laic, as not to have sacerdotal jurisdiction. To conclude this
chapter, since God speaketh not in these days to any man by his
private interpretation of the Scriptures, nor by the interpretation
of any power above, or not depending on the sovereign power of every
commonwealth, it remaineth, that he speaketh by his vice-gods, or
lieutenants here on earth, that is to say, by sovereign kings, or
such as have sovereign authority as well as they.
-------
CHAPTER VIII.
1. The things that dispose to rebellion, discontent, pretence, and
hope of success. 2. Discontent that disposeth to sedition,
consisteth partly in fear of want, or punishment: 3. Partly in
ambition. 4. Six heads of pretences to rebellion. 5. The first
of them, that men ought to do nothing against conscience,
confuted. 6. The second, that sovereigns are subject to their
own laws, confuted. 7. The third, that the sovereignty is
divisible, confuted. 8. The fourth, that subjects have a
propriety distinct from the dominion of the sovereign, confuted.
9. The fifth, that the people is a person distinct from the
sovereign, confuted. 10. The sixth, that tyrannicide is lawful,
confuted. 11. Four heads of hope of success in rebellion. 12.
Two things necessary to an author of rebellion, much eloquence,
and little wisdom. 13. That the authors of rebellion necessarily
are to be men of little wisdom. 14. That the same are
necessarily eloquent. 15. In what manner they concur to their
common effects.
[Sidenote: The things that dispose to rebellion, discontent,
pretence, and hope of success.]
1. Hitherto of the causes why, and the manner how, men have made
commonwealth. In this chapter I shall show briefly by what causes,
and in what manner, they be again destroyed; not meaning to say
anything concerning the dissolution of a commonwealth, from foreign
invasions, which is as it were the violent death thereof. I shall
speak only of sedition, which is also the death of the commonwealth,
but like to that which happeneth to a man from sickness and
distemper. To dispose men to sedition, three things concur. The
first is discontent; for as long as a man thinketh himself well, and
that the present government standeth not in his way to hinder his
proceeding from well to better, it is impossible for him to desire
the change thereof. The second is pretence of right; for though a
man be discontent, yet if in his own opinion there be no just cause
of stirring against, or resisting the government established, nor
any pretence to justify his resistance, and to procure aid, he will
never show it. The third is hope of success; for it were madness to
attempt without hope, when to fail, is to die the death of a
traitor. Without these three, discontent, pretence, and hope, there
can be no rebellion: and when the same are all together, there
wanteth nothing thereto, but a man of credit to set up the standard,
and to blow the trumpet.
[Sidenote: Discontent that disposeth to sedition, consisteth partly
in fear of want, or punishment:]
2. And as for discontent, it is of two sorts: for it consisteth
either in bodily pain present or expected, or else in trouble of the
mind; which is the general division of pleasure and pain, _Human
Nature_, chap. VII. sect. 8. The presence of bodily pain disposeth
not to sedition; the fear of it doth. As for example; when a great
multitude, or heap of people, have concurred to a crime worthy of
death, they join together, and take arms to defend themselves for
fear thereof. So also the fear of want, or in present want, the fear
of arrests and imprisonment dispose to sedition. And therefore great
exactions, though the right thereof be acknowledged, have caused
great seditions. As in the time of Henry VII. the seditions of the
Cornish men, that refused to pay a subsidy, and, under the conduct
of the Lord Audley, gave the King battle upon Blackheath; and that
of the northern people, who in the same king’s time, for demanding a
subsidy granted in parliament, murdered the Earl of Northumberland
in his house.
[Sidenote: Partly in ambition.]
3. Thirdly, the other sort of discontent, which troubleth the mind
of them who otherwise live at ease, without fear of want, or danger
of violence, ariseth only from a sense of their want of that power,
and that honour and testimony thereof, which they think is due unto
them. For all joy and grief of mind consisting (as hath been said,
_Human Nature_, chap. IX. sect. 21) in a contention for precedence
to them with whom they compare themselves; such men must needs take
it ill, and be grieved with the state, as find themselves postposed
to those in honour, whom they think they excel in virtue and ability
to govern. And this is it for which they think themselves regarded
but as slaves. Now seeing freedom cannot stand together with
subjection, liberty in a commonwealth is nothing but government and
rule, which because it cannot be divided, men must expect in common;
and that can be no where but in the popular state, or democracy. And
Aristotle saith well, (lib. VI. cap. 2 of his _Politics_), _The
ground or intention of a democracy, is liberty_. Which he confirmeth
in these words: _For men ordinarily say this, that no man can
partake of liberty, but only in a popular commonwealth_. Whosoever
therefore in a monarchical estate, where the sovereign power is
absolutely in one man, claimeth liberty, claimeth (if the hardest
construction should be made thereof) either to have the sovereignty
in his turn, or to be colleague with him that hath it, or to have
the monarchy changed into a democracy. But if the same be construed,
with pardon of that unskilful expression, according to the intention
of him that claimeth, then doth he thereby claim no more but this,
that the sovereign should take notice of his ability and deserving,
and put him into employment and place of subordinate government,
rather than others that deserve less. And as one claimeth, so doth
another, every man esteeming his own desert greatest. Amongst all
those that pretend to, or are ambitious of such honour, a few only
can be served, unless it be in a _democracy_; the rest therefore
must be discontent. And so much of the first thing that disposeth to
rebellion, namely, discontent, consisting in fear and ambition.
[Sidenote: Six heads of pretences to rebellion.]
4. The second thing that disposeth to rebellion, is _pretence of
right_. And that is when men have an opinion, or pretend to have an
opinion, that in certain cases they may lawfully resist him or them
that have the sovereign power, or deprive him or them of the means
to execute the same. Of which pretences, there be six special cases.
One is, when the command is against their conscience, and they
believe it is unlawful for a subject at the command of the sovereign
power to do any action, which he thinketh in his own conscience not
lawful for him to do, or to omit any action, which he thinketh not
lawful for him to omit. Another is, when the command is against the
laws, and they think the sovereign power in such sort obliged to his
own laws, as the subject is; and that when he performeth not his
duty, they may resist his power. A third is, when they receive
commands from some man or men, and a _supersedeas_ to the same from
others, and think the authority is equal, as if the sovereign power
were divided. A fourth is, when they are commanded to contribute
their persons or money to the public service, and think they have a
propriety in the same distinct from the dominion of the sovereign
power; and that therefore they are not bound to contribute their
goods and persons, no more than every man shall of himself think
fit. A fifth, when the commands seem hurtful to the people; and they
think, every one of them, that the opinion and sense of the people,
is the same with the opinion of himself, and those that consent with
him; calling by the name of people, any multitude of his own
faction. The sixth is, when the commands are grievous; and they
account him that commandeth grievous things a tyrant; and
tyrannicide, that is, the killing of a tyrant, not only lawful, but
also laudable.
[Sidenote: The first of them, that men ought to do nothing against
conscience, confuted.]
5. All these opinions are maintained in the books of the
_dogmatics_, and divers of them taught in public chairs, and
nevertheless are most incompatible with peace and government, and
contradictory to the necessary and demonstrable rules of the same.
And for the first, namely, that a man may lawfully do or omit any
thing against his conscience, and from whence arise all seditions
concerning religion and ecclesiastical government, it hath been
plainly declared in the two last chapters, that such opinion is
erroneous. For those two chapters have been wholly spent, to prove,
that Christian religion not only forbiddeth not, but also
commandeth, that in every commonwealth, every subject should in all
things to the uttermost of his power obey the commands of him or
them that is the sovereign thereof, and that a man in so obeying,
doth according to his conscience and judgment, as having deposited
his judgment in all controversies in the hands of the sovereign
power; and that this error proceedeth from the ignorance of what and
by whom God Almighty speaketh.
[Sidenote: The second, that sovereigns are subject to their own
laws, confuted.]
6. As for the second opinion, which is this, that the sovereign is
in such sort obliged to his own laws, as the subject is; the
contrary thereof hath been showed, Part II. chapter I. sections
7-12, by which it appeareth, that the sovereign power is not to be
resisted; that it carrieth the sword both of war and justice; that
it hath the right of deciding all controversies, both judicial and
deliberative; that it hath the making of all the laws civil; that it
appointeth magistrates and public ministers, and that it implieth an
universal impunity. How then can he or they be said to be subject to
the laws which they may abrogate at their pleasure, or break without
fear of punishment? And this error seemeth to proceed from this,
that men ordinarily understand not aright, what is meant by this
word law, confounding law and covenant, as if they signify the same
thing. But law implieth a command; covenant is but a promise. And
not every command is a law, but only (_Human Nature_, chap. XIII.
sect. 6) when the command is the reason we have of doing the action
commanded. And then only is the reason of our actions in the
command, when the omitting is therefore hurtful, because the action
was commanded, not because it was hurtful of itself; and doing
contrary to a command, were not at all hurtful, if there were not a
right in him that commandeth to punish him that so doth. He or they
that have all punishments in their own disposing, cannot be so
commanded, as to receive hurt for disobeying, and consequently no
command can be a law unto them. It is an error therefore to think,
that the power which is virtually the whole power of the
commonwealth, and which in whomsoever it resideth, is usually called
supreme or sovereign, can be subject to any law but that of God
Almighty.
[Sidenote: The third, that the sovereignty is divisible, confuted.]
7. The third opinion, _that the sovereign power may be divided_, is
no less an error than the former, as hath been proved, Part II.
chapter I. sect. 15. And if there were a commonwealth, wherein the
rights of sovereignty were divided, we must confess with Bodin, Lib.
II. chap. I. _De Republica_, that they are not rightly to be called
commonwealths, but the corruption of commonwealths. For if one part
should have power to make the laws for all, they would by their laws
at their pleasure, forbid others, to make peace or war, to levy
taxes, or to yield fealty and homage without their leave; and they
that had the right to make peace and war, and command the _militia_,
would forbid the making of other laws, than what themselves liked.
And though monarchies stand long, wherein the right of sovereignty
hath seemed so divided, because monarchy of itself is a durable kind
of government, yet monarchs have been thereby divers times thrust
out of their possession. But the truth is, that the right of
sovereignty is such, as he or they that have it, cannot, though they
would, give away any part thereof, and retain the rest. As for
example; if we should suppose the people of Rome to have had the
absolute sovereignty of the Roman state, and to have chosen them a
council by the name of the senate, and that to this senate they had
given the supreme power of making laws, reserving nevertheless to
themselves, in direct and express terms, the whole right and title
of the sovereignty; which may easily happen amongst them that see
not the inseparable connexion between the sovereign power, and the
power of making laws: I say, this grant of the people to the senate
is of no effect, and the power of making laws is in the people
still. For the senate understanding it to be the will and intention
of the people, to retain the sovereignty, ought not to take that for
granted, which was contradictory thereto, and passed by error. For
(_Human Nature_, chap. XIII. sect. 9) in contradictory promises,
that which is directly promised, is preferred before that which is
opposite thereunto by consequence; because the consequence of a
thing is not always obscured, as is the thing itself. The error
concerning mixed government hath proceeded from want of
understanding of what is meant by this word _body politic_, and how
it signifieth not the concord, but the union of many men. And though
in the chapters of subordinate corporations, a corporation being
declared to be one person in law, yet the same hath not been taken
notice of in the body of a commonwealth or city, nor have any of
those innumerable writers of politics, observed any such union.
[Sidenote: The fourth, that subjects have a propriety distinct from
the dominion of the sovereign, confuted.]
8. The fourth opinion, to wit, that subjects have their _meum_,
_tuum_, and _suum_, in property, not only by virtue of the sovereign
power over them all, distinct from one another, but also against the
sovereign himself, by which they would pretend to contribute nothing
to the public, but what they please, hath been already confuted, by
proving the absoluteness of the sovereignty, and more particularly,
Part II. chapter V. sect. 2; and ariseth from this, that they
understand not ordinarily that before the institution of sovereign
power, _meum_ and _tuum_, implied no propriety, but a community,
where every man had right to every thing, and was in state of war
with every man.
[Sidenote: The fifth, that the people is a person distinct from the
sovereign, confuted.]
9. The fifth opinion, _That the people is a distinct body from him
or them that have the sovereignty over them_, is an error already
confuted, Part II. chap. II. sect 11, where it is showed, that when
men say, _the people rebelleth_, it is to be understood of those
particular persons only, and not of the whole nation. And when the
people claimeth any thing otherwise than by the voice of the
sovereign power, it is not the claim of the people, but only of
those particular men, that claim in their own persons; and this
error ariseth from the equivocation of the word _people_.
[Sidenote: The sixth, that tyrannicide is lawful, confuted.]
10. Lastly, for the opinion, _that tyrannicide is lawful_, meaning
by a tyrant any man in whom resideth the right of sovereignty, is no
less false and pernicious to human society, than frequent in the
writings of those moral philosophers, Seneca and others, so greatly
esteemed amongst us. For when a man hath the right of sovereignty,
he cannot justly be punished, as hath been often showed already, and
therefore much less deposed, or put to death. And howsoever he might
deserve punishment, yet punishment is unjust without judgment
preceding, and judgment unjust without power of judicature, which a
subject hath not over a sovereign. But this doctrine proceedeth from
the Schools of Greece, and from those that writ in the Roman state,
in which not only the name of a tyrant, but of a king, was hateful.
[Sidenote: Four heads of hope of success in rebellion.]
11. Besides _discontent_, to the disposing of a man to rebellion,
and pretence, there is required, in the third place, _hope of
success_, which consisteth in four points: I. That the discontented
have mutual intelligence; II. That they have sufficient number; III.
That they have arms; IV. That they agree upon a head. For these four
must concur to the making of one body of rebellion, in which
intelligence is the life, number the limbs, arms the strength, and a
head the unity, by which they are directed to one and the same
action.
[Sidenote: Two things necessary to an author of rebellion, much
eloquence, and little wisdom.]
12. The authors of rebellion, that is, the men that breed these
dispositions to rebel in others, of necessity must have in them
these three qualities: I. To be discontented themselves; II. To be
men of mean judgment and capacity; and, III. To be eloquent men, or
good orators. And as for their discontent, from whence it may
proceed, hath been already declared. And for the second and third, I
am to show now, first, how they may stand together; for it seemeth a
contradiction, to place small judgment and great eloquence, or, as
they call it, powerful speaking, in the same man: and then in what
manner they concur, to dispose other men to sedition.
[Sidenote: That the authors of rebellion necessarily, are to be men
of little wisdom.]
13. It was noted by Sallust, that in Catiline, who was author of the
greatest sedition that ever was in Rome, there was _Eloquentiæ
satis, sapientiæ parum_; _eloquence sufficient_, but _little
wisdom_. And perhaps this was said of Catiline, as he was Catiline:
but it was true of him as an author of sedition. For the conjunction
of these two qualities made him not Catiline, but seditious. And
that it may be understood, how want of _wisdom_, and store of
_eloquence_, may stand together, we are to consider, what it is we
call wisdom, and what eloquence. And therefore I shall here again
remember some things, that have been said already, _Human Nature_,
chap. V. VI. It is manifest that wisdom consisteth in knowledge. Now
of knowledge there are two kinds; whereof the one is the remembrance
of such things, as we have conceived by our senses, and of the order
in which they follow one another. And this _knowledge_ is called
_experience_; and the wisdom that proceedeth from it, is that
ability to conjecture by the present, of what is past, and to come,
which men call _prudence_. This being so, it is manifest presently,
that the author of sedition, whosoever he be, must not be prudent.
For if he consider and take his experiences aright, concerning the
success which they have had, who have been the movers and authors of
sedition, either in this or any other state, he shall find, that for
one man that hath thereby advanced himself to honour, twenty have
come to a reproachful end. The other kind of knowledge, is the
remembrance of the names or appellations of things, and how every
thing is called, which is, in matters of common conversation, a
remembrance of pacts and covenants of men made amongst themselves,
concerning how to be understood of one another. And this kind of
knowledge is generally called science, and the conclusions thereof
truth. But when men remember not how things are named, by general
agreement, but either mistake and misname things, or name them
aright by chance, they are not said to have science, but opinion,
and the conclusions thence proceeding, are uncertain, and for the
most part erroneous. Now that science in particular, from which
proceed the true and evident conclusions of what is right and wrong,
and what is good and hurtful to the being, and well-being of
mankind, the Latins call _sapientia_, and we by the general name of
wisdom. For generally, not he that hath skill in geometry, or any
other science speculative, but only he that understandeth what
conduceth to the good and government of the people, is called a wise
man. Now that no author of sedition can be wise in this acceptation
of the word, is sufficiently proved, in that it hath been already
demonstrated, that no pretence of sedition can be right or just. And
therefore the authors of sedition must be ignorant of the right of
state, that is to say, unwise. It remaineth therefore, that they be
such, as name things, not according to their true and generally
agreed upon names, but call right and wrong, good and bad, according
to their passions, or according to the authorities of such as they
admire, as Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, and others of like authority,
who have given the names of right and wrong, as their passions have
dictated; or have followed the authority of other men, as we do
theirs. It is required therefore in an author of sedition, that he
think right, that which is wrong; and profitable, that which is
pernicious; and consequently that there be in him _sapientiæ parum_,
little wisdom.
[Sidenote: That the same are necessarily eloquent.]
14. Eloquence is nothing else but the power of winning belief of
what we say. And to that end we must have aid from the passions of
the hearer. Now to demonstration and teaching of the truth, there
are required long deductions, and great attention, which is
unpleasant to the hearer. Therefore they which seek not truth, but
belief, must take another way, and not only derive what they would
have to be believed, from somewhat believed already, but also, by
aggravations and extenuations, make good and bad, right and wrong,
appear great or less, according as shall serve their turns. And such
is the power of eloquence, as many times a man is made to believe
thereby, that he sensibly feeleth smart and damage, when he feeleth
none, and to enter into rage and indignation, without any other
cause, than what is in the words and passion of the speaker. This
considered, together with the business that he hath to do, who is
the author of rebellion, namely, to make men believe that their
rebellion is just, their discontents grounded upon great injuries,
and their hopes great; there needeth no more to prove, there can be
no author of rebellion, that is not an eloquent and powerful
speaker, and withal, as hath been said before, a man of little
wisdom. For the faculty of speaking powerfully, consisteth in a
habit gotten of putting together passionate words, and applying them
to the present passions of the hearer. are not able to effect.
[Sidenote: In what manner they concur to their common effects.]
15. Seeing then eloquence and want of discretion concur to the
stirring of rebellion, it may be demanded, what part each of these
acteth therein? The daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, desiring
to restore their old decrepit father to the vigour of his youth, by
the counsel of Medea, chopped him in pieces, and set him a boiling
with I know not what herbs in a cauldron, but could not revive him
again. So when eloquence and want of judgment go together, want of
judgment, like the daughters of Pelias, consenteth, through
eloquence, which is as the witchcraft of Medea, to cut the
commonwealth in pieces, upon pretence or hope of reformation, which
when things are in combustion, they are not able to effect.
-------
CHAPTER IX.
1. The law over sovereigns, _salus populi_. 2. That sovereigns ought
to establish the religion they hold for best. 3. That to forbid
unnatural copulation, promiscuous use of women, &c. is the law
of nature. 4. That to leave man as much liberty as may be, &c.
is the duty of a sovereign by the law of nature. 5. _Meum_ and
_tuum_, to be set out to the subjects, distinct from one
another, &c. a duty of sovereigns by the law of nature. 6. An
extraordinary power for judging the abuses of magistrates,
necessary, &c. 7. The suppressing of popularity, &c. necessary,
&c. 8. The instruction of youth, &c. necessary, &c. 9. Avoiding
of unnecessary war, a necessary duty of the sovereign, &c.
[Sidenote: The law over sovereigns _salus populi_.]
1. Having hitherto set forth how a body politic is made, and how it
may be destroyed, this place requireth to say something concerning
the preservation of the same, not purposing to enter into the
particulars of the art of government, but to sum up the general
heads, wherein such art is to be employed, and in which consisteth
the duty of him or them that have the sovereign power. For the duty
of a sovereign consisteth in the good government of the people. And
although the acts of sovereign power be no injuries to the subjects
who have consented to the same by their implicit wills, yet when
they tend to the hurt of the people in general, they be breaches of
the law of nature, and of the divine law; and consequently, the
contrary acts are the duties of sovereigns, and required at their
hands to the utmost of their endeavour, by God Almighty, under the
pain of eternal death. And as the art and duty of sovereigns consist
in the same acts, so also doth their profit. For the end of art, is
profit; and governing to the profit of the subjects, is governing to
the profit of the sovereign, as hath been showed Part II. chapter V.
section 1. And these three: 1. The law over them that have sovereign
power: 2. Their duty: 3. Their profit: are one and the same thing
contained in this sentence, _Salus populi suprema lex_. By which
must be understood, not the mere preservation of their lives, but
generally their benefit and good. So that this is the general law
for sovereigns, _That they procure, to the uttermost of their
endeavour, the good of the people_.
[Sidenote: That sovereigns ought to establish the religion they hold
for best.]
2. And forasmuch as eternal is better than temporal good, it is
evident, that they who are in sovereign authority, are by the law of
nature obliged to further the establishing of all such doctrines and
rule, and the commanding of all such actions, as in their conscience
they believe to be the true way thereunto. For unless they do so, it
cannot be said truly, that they have done the uttermost of their
endeavour.
[Sidenote: That to forbid unnatural copulation, promiscuous use of
women, &c. is the law of nature.]
3. For the temporal good of the people, it consisteth in four
points: 1. Multitude: 2. Commodity of living: 3. Peace amongst
themselves: 4. Defence against foreign power. Concerning multitude,
it is the duty of them that are in sovereign authority, to increase
the people, in as much as they are governors of mankind under God
Almighty, who having created but one man, and one woman, declared,
that it was his will they should be multiplied and increased
afterwards. And seeing this is to be done by ordinances concerning
copulation, they are by the law of nature bound to make such
ordinances concerning the same, as may tend to the increase of
mankind. And hence it cometh, that in them who have sovereign
authority, not to forbid such copulations as are against the use of
nature; not to forbid the promiscuous use of women, not to forbid
one woman to have many husbands, not to forbid marriages within
certain degrees of kindred and affinity, are against the law of
nature. For though it be not evident, that a private man living
under the law of natural reason only, doth break the same, by doing
any of the things aforesaid; yet it is manifestly apparent, that
being so prejudicial as they are to the improvement of mankind, that
not to forbid the same, is against the law of natural reason in him,
that hath taken into his hands any portion of mankind to improve.
[Sidenote: That to leave man as much liberty as may be, &c. is the
duty of a sovereign by the law of nature.]
4. The commodity of living consisteth in liberty and wealth. By
liberty, I mean, that there be no prohibition without necessity of
any thing to any man, which was lawful to him in the law of nature;
that is to say, that there be no restraint of natural liberty, but
what is necessary for the good of the commonwealth, and that
well-meaning men may not fall into the danger of laws, as into
snares, before they be aware. It appertaineth also to this liberty,
that a man may have commodious passage from place to place, and not
be imprisoned or confined with the difficulty of ways, and want of
means for transportation of things necessary. And for the wealth of
people, it consisteth in three things, the well ordering of trade,
procuring of labour, and forbidding the superfluous consuming of
food and apparel. All those therefore that are in sovereign
authority, and have taken upon them the government of people, are
bound by the law of nature to make ordinances consisting in the
points afore named, as being contrary to the law of nature,
unnecessarily, either for one’s own fancy, to enthral, or tie men
so, as they cannot move without danger; or to suffer them whose
maintenance is our benefit, to want anything necessary for them, by
our negligence.
[Sidenote: _Meum_ and _tuum_, to be set out to the subjects,
distinct from one another, &c. a duty of sovereigns by
the law of nature.]
5. For maintaining of peace at home, there be so many things
necessarily to be considered, and taken order in, as there be
several causes concurring to sedition. And first, it is necessary to
set out to every subject, his propriety, and distinct lands and
goods, upon which he may exercise and have the benefit of his own
industry, and without which men would fall out amongst themselves,
as did the herdsmen of Abraham and Lot, every man encroaching and
usurping as much of the common benefit as he can, which tendeth to
quarrel and sedition. Secondly, to divide the burthens and charges
of the commonwealth proportionably. Now there is a _proportionably_
to every man’s ability, and there is a _proportionably_ to his
benefit by commonwealth: and this latter is it, which is according
to the law of nature. For the burdens of the commonwealth being the
price that we pay for the benefit thereof, they ought to be measured
thereby. And there is no reason, when two men equally enjoying, by
the benefit of the commonwealth, their peace and liberty, to use
their industry to get their livings, whereof one spareth, and layeth
up somewhat, the other spendeth all he gets, why they should not
equally contribute to the common charge. That seemeth therefore to
be the most equal way of dividing the burden of public charge, when
every man shall contribute according to what he spendeth, and not
according to what he gets. And this is then done, when men pay the
commonwealth’s part in the payments they make for their own
provision. And this seemeth not only most equal, but also least
sensible, and least to trouble the mind of them that pay it. For
there is nothing so aggravateth the grief of parting with money to
the public, as to think they are over-rated, and that their
neighbours whom they envy, do thereupon insult over them, and this
disposeth them to resistance, and, after that such resistance hath
produced a mischief, to rebellion.
[Sidenote: An extraordinary power for judging the abuses of
magistrates, necessary, &c.]
6. Another thing necessary for the maintaining of peace, is the due
execution of justice, which consisteth principally in the right
performance of their duties, which are the magistrates, ordained for
the same by and under the authority of the sovereign power, which
being private men in respect of the sovereign, and consequently such
as may have private ends, whereby they may be corrupted with gifts,
or intercession of friends, ought to be kept in awe by an higher
power, lest people, grieved by their injustice, should take upon
them to make their own revenges, to the disturbance of the common
peace; which can by no way be avoided in the principal and immediate
magistrates, without the judicature of the sovereign himself, or
some extraordinary power delegated by him. It is therefore
necessary, that there be a power extraordinary, as there shall be
occasion from time to time, for the syndication of judges and other
magistrates, that shall abuse their authority, to the wrong and
discontent of the people; and a free and open way for the presenting
of grievances to him or them that have the sovereign authority.
[Sidenote: The suppressing of popularity, &c. necessary, &c.]
7. Besides these considerations, by which are prevented the
discontents that arise from oppression, there ought to be some means
for the keeping under of those, that are disposed to rebellion by
ambition; which consist principally in the constancy of him that
hath the sovereign power, who ought therefore constantly to grace
and encourage such, as being able to serve the commonwealth, do
nevertheless contain themselves within the bounds of modesty,
without repining at the authority of such as are employed, and
without aggravating the errors, which, as men, they may commit,
especially when they suffer not in their own particular; and
constantly to show displeasure, and dislike of the contrary. And not
only so, but also to ordain severe punishments for such, as shall by
reprehension of public actions, affect popularity and applause
amongst the multitude, by which they may be enabled to have a
faction in the commonwealth at their devotion.
[Sidenote: The instruction of youth, &c. necessary, &c.]
8. Another thing necessary, is the rooting out of the consciences of
men, all those opinions which seem to justify and give pretence of
right to rebellious actions; such as are the opinions, that a man
can do nothing lawfully against his private conscience; that they
who have the sovereignty, are subject to the civil laws; that there
is any authority of subjects, whose negative may hinder the
affirmative of the sovereign power; that any subject hath a
propriety distinct from the dominion of the commonwealth; that there
is a body of the people without him or them that have the sovereign
power; and that any lawful sovereign may be resisted under the name
of a tyrant; which opinions are they, which, Part II. chap. VIII.
sect. 5-10, have been declared to dispose men to rebellion. And
because opinions which are gotten by education, and in length of
time, are made habitual, cannot be taken away by force, and upon the
sudden; they must therefore be taken away also by time and
education. And seeing the said opinions have proceeded from private
and public teaching, and those teachers have received them from
grounds and principles, which they have learned in the Universities,
from the doctrine of Aristotle, and others, who have delivered
nothing concerning morality and policy demonstratively; but being
passionately addicted to popular government, have insinuated their
opinions by eloquent sophistry. There is no doubt, if the true
doctrine concerning the law of nature, and the properties of a body
politic, and the nature of law in general, were perspicuously set
down and taught in the Universities, but that young men, who come
thither void of prejudice, and whose minds are as white paper,
capable of any instruction, would more easily receive the same, and
afterward teach it to the people, both in books and otherwise, than
now they do the contrary.
[Sidenote: Avoiding of unnecessary war, a necessary duty of the
sovereign, &c.]
9. The last thing contained in that supreme law, _salus populi_, is
their defence; and consisteth partly in the obedience and unity of
the subjects, of which hath been already spoken, and in which
consisteth the means of levying soldiers, and of having money, arms,
ships, and fortified places in readiness for defence; and partly, in
the avoiding of unnecessary wars. For such commonwealths, or such
monarchs, as affect war for itself, that is to say, out of ambition,
or of vain-glory, or that make account to revenge every little
injury, or disgrace done by their neighbours, if they ruin not
themselves, their fortune must be better than they have reason to
expect.
-------
CHAPTER X.
1. All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are either
covenant, counsel, or command. 2. The difference between a law
and a covenant. 3. The command of him whose command is law in
one thing, is law in every thing. 4. The difference between law
and counsel. 5. The difference between _jus_ and _lex_. 6. The
division of laws, &c. 7. That the divine moral law, and the law
of nature, is the same. 8. That the civil laws are the common
measure of right and wrong, &c. 9. Martial law is civil law. 10.
Written laws, &c. Unwritten, &c. Customs and opinions, &c.
[Sidenote: All expressions, &c. concerning future actions, are
either covenant, counsel, or command.]
1. Thus far concerning the Nature of Man, and the constitution and
properties of a Body Politic. There remaineth only for the last
chapter, to speak of the nature and sorts of law. And first it is
manifest, that all laws are declarations of the mind, concerning
some action future to be done, or omitted. And all declarations and
expressions of the mind concerning future actions and omissions, are
either _promissive_, as _I will do, or not do_; or _provisive_, as
for example, _If this be done or not done, this will follow_; or
_imperative_, as _Do this, or do it not_. In the first sort of these
expressions, consisteth the nature of a covenant; in the second,
consisteth counsel; in the third, command.
[Sidenote: The difference between a law and a covenant.]
2. It is evident when a man doth, or forbeareth to do any action, if
he be moved thereto by this only consideration, that the same is
good or evil in itself; and that there be no reason why the will or
pleasure of another, should be of any weight in his deliberation,
that then neither to do nor omit the action deliberated, is any
breach of law. And consequently, whatsoever is a law to a man,
respecteth the will of another, and the declaration thereof. But a
covenant is a declaration of a man’s own will. And therefore a law
and a covenant differ: and though they be both obligatory, and a law
obligeth no otherwise than by virtue of some covenant made by him
who is subject thereunto, yet they oblige by several sorts of
promises. For a covenant obligeth by promise of an action, or
omission especially named and limited; but a law bindeth by a
promise of obedience in general, whereby the action to be done, or
left undone, is referred to the determination of him, to whom the
covenant is made. So that the difference between a covenant and a
law, standeth thus: in simple covenant, the action to be done, or
not done, is first limited and made known, and then followeth the
promise to do or not do; but in a law, the obligation to do or not
to do, precedeth, and the declaration what is to be done, or not
done, followeth after.
[Sidenote: The command of him whose command is law in one thing, is
law in every thing.]
3. And from this may be deduced, that which to some may seem a
_paradox, That the command of him, whose command is a law in one
thing, is a law in every thing_. For seeing a man is obliged to
obedience before what he is to do be known, he is obliged to obey in
general, that is to say, in every thing.
[Sidenote: The difference between law and counsel.]
4. That the counsel of a man is no law to him that is counselled,
and that he who alloweth another to give him counsel, doth not
thereby oblige himself to follow the same, is manifest enough. And
yet men usually call counselling, by the name of governing; not that
they are not able to distinguish between them, but because they envy
many times those men that are called to counsel, and are therefore
angry with them that they are counselled. But if to counsellors
there should be given a right to have their counsel followed, then
are they no more counsellors, but masters of them whom they counsel;
and their counsels no more counsels, but laws. For the difference
between a law and a counsel being no more but this, that in counsel
the expression is, _Do, because it is best_; in a law, _Do, because
I have a right to compel you_; or _Do, because I say, do_; when
counsel should give the reason of the action it adviseth to, because
the reason thereof itself is no more counsel, but a law.
[Sidenote: The difference between _jus_ & _lex_.]
5. The names _lex_ and _jus_, that is to say, law and right, are
often confounded, and yet scarce are there any two words of more
contrary signification. For right is that liberty which law leaveth
us, and laws those restraints by which we agree mutually to abridge
one another’s liberty. Law and right therefore are no less different
than restraint and liberty, which are contrary; and whatsoever a man
doth, that liveth in a commonwealth _jure_, he doth it _jure
civili_, _jure naturæ_, and _jure divino_. For whatsoever is against
any of these laws, cannot be said to be _jure_. For the civil law
cannot make that to be done _jure_, which is against the law
_divine_, or of _nature_. And therefore whatsoever any subject doth,
if it be not contrary to the civil law, and whatsoever a sovereign
doth, if it be not against the law of nature, he doth it _jure
divino_, by _divine right_. But to say, _lege divinâ_, by _divine
law_, is another thing. For the laws of God and nature allowing
greater liberty than is allowed by the law civil; for subordinate
laws do still bind more than superior laws, the essence of law being
not to loose, but to bind, a man may be commanded that by a law
civil, which is not commanded by the law of nature, nor by the law
divine. So that of things done _lege_, that is to say, by command of
the law, there is some place for a distinction between _lege
divinâ_, and _lege civili_. As when a man giveth an alms, or helpeth
him that is in need, he doth it not _lege civili_, but _lege
divinâ_, by the divine law, the precept whereof is _charity_. But
for things that are done _jure_, nothing can be said to be done
_jure divino_, that is not also _jure civili_, unless it be done by
them that having sovereign power, are not subject to the civil law.
[Sidenote: The division of laws, &c.]
6. The differences of laws, are according to the differences, either
of the authors and lawmakers, or of the promulgation, or of those
that are subject to them. From the difference of the authors, or
lawmakers, cometh the division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and
_civil_. From the difference of promulgation, proceedeth the
division of laws into _written_ and _unwritten_. And from the
difference of the persons to whom the law appertaineth, it
proceedeth, that some laws are called simply laws, and some penal.
As for example, _thou shalt not steal_, is simply a law; but this,
_he that stealeth an ox, shall restore four-fold_, is a penal, or as
others call it, a judicial law. Now in those laws, which are simply
laws, the commandment is addressed to every man; but in penal laws
the commandment is addressed to the magistrate, who is only guilty
of the breach of it, when the penalties ordained, are not inflicted;
to the rest appertained nothing, but to take notice of their danger.
[Sidenote: That the divine moral law, and the law of nature, is the
same.]
7. As for the first division of law into _divine_, _natural_, and
_civil_, the first two branches are one and the same law. For the
law of nature, which is also the moral law, is the law of the author
of nature, God Almighty; and the law of God taught by our Saviour
Christ, is the moral law. For the sum of God’s law is, _Thou shalt
love God above all, and thy neighbour as thyself_; and the same is
the sum of the law of nature, as hath been showed, Part I. chap. V.
And although the doctrine of our Saviour be of three parts, _moral_,
_theological_, and _ecclesiastical_; the former part only, which is
the moral, is of the nature of a law universal; the latter part is a
branch of the law civil; and the theological, which containeth those
articles concerning the divinity and kingdom of our Saviour, without
which there is no salvation, is not delivered in the nature of laws,
but of counsel and direction, how to avoid the punishment, which by
the violation of the moral law, men are subject to. For it is not
infidelity that condemneth, though it be faith that saveth, but the
breach of the law and commandments of God, written first in man’s
heart, and afterwards in tables, and delivered to the Jews by the
hands of Moses.
[Sidenote: That the civil laws are the common measure of right and
wrong, &c.]
8. In the state of nature, where every man is his own judge, and
differeth from other concerning the names and appellations of
things, and from those differences arise quarrels and breach of
peace, it was necessary there should be a common measure of all
things, that might fall in controversy. As for example; of what is
to be called right, what good, what virtue, what much, what little,
what _meum_ and _tuum_, what a pound, what a quart, &c. For in these
things private judgments may differ, and beget controversy. This
common measure, some say, is _right reason_: with whom I should
consent, if there were any such thing to be found or known _in rerum
naturâ_. But commonly they that call for _right reason_ to decide
any controversy, do mean their own. But this is certain, seeing
_right reason_ is not existent, the reason of some man or men must
supply the place thereof; and that man or men, is he or they, that
have the sovereign power, as hath been already proved; and
consequently the civil laws are to all subjects the measures of
their actions, whereby to determine, whether they be right or wrong,
profitable or unprofitable, virtuous or vicious; and by them the use
and definition of all names not agreed upon, and tending to
controversy, shall be established. As for example, when upon
occasion of some strange and deformed birth, it shall not be decided
by Aristotle, or the philosophers, whether the same be a man, or no,
but by the laws; the civil law containing in it the ecclesiastical,
as a part thereof, proceeding from the power of ecclesiastical
government, given by our Saviour to all Christian sovereigns, as his
immediate vicars, as hath been said Part II. chap. VII. sect. 10.
[Sidenote: Martial law is civil law.]
9. But seeing it hath been said, that all laws are either natural or
civil, it may be demanded, to which of these shall be referred that
law, which is called martial law, and by the Romans, _disciplina
militaris_? And it may seem to be the same with the law of nature;
because the laws by which a multitude of soldiers are governed in an
army are not constant, but continually changing with the occasion;
and that is still a law, which is reason for the present, and reason
is the law of nature. It is nevertheless true, that martial law is
civil law, because an army is a body politic, the whole power
whereof is in the General, and the laws thereof made by him; and
though they still follow and change as reason requireth, yet it is
not, as the reason of every private man, but as the reason of the
General requireth.
[Sidenote: Written laws, Unwritten, &c. Customs, and Opinions, &c.]
10. When he or they in whom is the sovereign power of a
commonwealth, are to ordain laws for the government and good order
of the people, it is not possible they should comprehend all cases
of controversy that may fall out, or perhaps any considerable
diversity of them: but as time shall instruct them by the rising of
new occasions, so are also laws from time to time to be ordained:
and in such cases where no special law is made, the law of nature
keepeth its place, and the magistrates ought to give sentence
according thereunto, that is to say, according to natural reason.
The constitutions therefore of the sovereign power, by which the
liberty of nature is abridged, are written, because there is no
other way to take notice of them; whereas the laws of nature are
supposed to be written in men’s hearts. Written laws therefore are
the constitutions of a commonwealth expressed; and unwritten, are
the laws of natural reason. Custom of itself maketh no laws.
Nevertheless when a sentence hath been once given, by them that
judge by their natural reason, whether the same be right or wrong,
it may attain to the vigour of a law; not because the like sentence
hath of custom been given in the like case, but because the
sovereign power is supposed tacitly to have approved such sentence
for right, and thereby it cometh to be a law, and numbered amongst
the written laws of the commonwealth. For if custom were sufficient
to introduce a law, then it would be in the power of every one that
is deputed to hear a cause, to make his errors laws. In the like
manner, those laws that go under the title of _responsa prudentum_,
that is to say, the opinions of lawyers, are not therefore laws,
because _responsa prudentum_, but because they are admitted by the
sovereign. And from this may be collected, that when there is a case
of private contract between the sovereign and the subject, a
precedent against reason shall not prejudice the cause of the
sovereign; no precedent being made a law, but upon supposition that
the same was reasonable from the beginning.
And thus much concerning the elements and general grounds of laws
natural and politic. As for the law of nations, it is the same with
the law of nature. For that which is the law of nature between man
and man, before the constitution of commonwealth, is the law of
nations between sovereign and sovereign, after.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
OF
LIBERTY AND NECESSITY:
A TREATISE,
WHEREIN ALL CONTROVERSY CONCERNING
PREDESTINATION, ELECTION, FREE-WILL, GRACE,
MERITS, REPROBATION, &c.
IS FULLY DECIDED AND CLEARED.
IN ANSWER TO A TREATISE
WRITTEN BY THE BISHOP OF LONDONDERRY,
ON THE SAME SUBJECT.
TO THE
SOBER AND DISCREET READER.
It made St. Chrysostom tremble whenever he reflected on the
proportion, which those that went the _narrow_ way, bore to those
which marched in the _broad_, how _many_ were the called, and how
_few_ the chosen, how many they were that were created for and in a
capacity of eternal beatitude, and how few attained it. This
consideration certainly would make a man look upon the Holy
Scriptures, among Christians, as the greatest indulgence of heaven,
being all the directions it hath been pleased to afford poor _man_
in so difficult a journey as that of his eternal bliss or misery.
But when a man cometh to look into those transcendant writings, he
finds them to be the works of a sort of innocent harmless men, that
had little acquaintance or familiarity with the world, and
consequently not much interested in the troubles and quarrels of
several countries; that though they are all but necessary, yet were
they written occasionally, rather than out of design; and lastly,
that their main business is, to abstract man from this world, and to
persuade him to prefer the bare hope of what he can neither _see_,
_hear_, nor _conceive_, before all the present enjoyments this world
can afford. This begat a reverence and esteem to them in all those
who endeavour to work out their salvation out of them. But if a man,
not weighing them in themselves, shall consider the practices of
those, who pretend to be the interpreters of them, and to make them
fit meat for the people; how that instead of renouncing the world,
they endeavour to raise themselves into the greatest promotions,
leisure, and luxury; that they make them the decoys of the people,
to carry on designs and intrigues of state, and study the enjoyments
of this world more than any other people: he will find some grounds
to conclude, the practices of such men to be the greatest
disturbance, burden, and vexation of the Christian part of the
world. The complaint is as true as sad; instead of acquainting the
credulous vulgar, with the main end of their functions, and the
great business of their embassy, what a great measure of felicity is
prepared for them, and how easily it may be forfeited; they involve
their consciences in the briars of a thousand needless scruples,
they spin out volumes out of half sentences, nay, out of points and
accents, and raise endless controversies about things, (were men
free from passion and prejudice), in themselves clear enough: and
when they have canvassed their questions, till they are weary
themselves, and have wearied hearers and readers, and all they have
to do with, every one sits down under his own vine, and hugs his own
apprehensions; so that after all their pains, bandings, and
implacable adhesion to parties, the inconvenience remains still, and
we as far from any solid conviction, as at first setting out.
The controversies betwixt _Rome_ and the _Reformation_ are long
since beaten out of the pit, by other combatants of their own brood;
so that if we speak of _Protestant_ and _Catholic_, they are in a
manner content to sit down with their present acquests: for as to
conviction, he certainly is a rare _proselyte_, at whose conversion,
_interest_, _humour_, _discontent_, _inclination_, are not admitted
to the debate.
But to come yet nearer our purpose, let us consider our own
fractions of fractions of _religion_ here in England, where if that
saying, that _it is better to live where nothing is lawful, than
where all things_, be as true in _religion_ as _policy_, posterity
may haply feel the sad consequence of it. What, I pray, is the
effect of so many _sermons_, _teachings_, _preachings_,
_exercises_, and _exercising of gifts_, _meetings_, _disputations_,
_conferences_, _conventicles_, _printed books_, written with so much
distraction and presumption upon God Almighty, and abuse of his Holy
Word? Marry this: it is the seminary of many vexatious, endless, and
fruitless controversies, the consequence whereof are jealousies,
heart-burnings, exasperation of parties, the introduction of
factions and national quarrels into matters of religion, and
consequently all the calamities of war and devastation. Besides,
they are good lawful diversions for the duller sort of _citizens_,
who contract diseases for want of motion; they supply the building
of pyramids among the Egyptians, by diverting the thoughts of the
people from matters of state, and consequently from rebellion.
They find work for _printers_, &c. if the parties interested are
troubled with the itch of popularity, and will suffer themselves to
be scratched out of somewhat by way of contribution to the
impression. Hence is the _stationer’s_ shop furnished, and thence
the _minister’s_ study in the country, who having found out the
humour of his auditory, consults with his stationer, on what books
his money is best bestowed; who very gravely, it may be, will
commend _Cole upon the Philippians_ before the excellent, but
borrowed, _Caryl upon Job_. But as to any matter of conviction, we
see every one _acquiesces_ in his own sentiments, every one hears
the teacher who is most to his humour; and when he hath been at
church, and pretends to have sat at his feet, comes home and
censures him as he pleases.
To be yet a little more particular, what shall we think of those
vast and involuble volumes concerning _predestination_, _free-will_,
_free-grace_, _election_, _reprobation_, &c., which fill not only
our libraries, but the world with their noise and disturbance,
whereof the least thing we are to expect is _conviction_; every side
endeavouring to make good their own grounds, and keep the cudgels in
their hands as long as they can? What stir is there between the
Molinists and Jansenists about _grace_ and _merits_; and yet both
pretend St. Augustin!
Must we not expect, that the Jesuits will, were it for no other end
but to vindicate that reputation of learning they have obtained in
the world, endeavour to make good their tenets, though the other
were the truer opinion? Is truth then retired to that inaccessible
rock that admits no approaches? Or are we all turned Ixions, and
instead of enjoying that Juno, entertain ourselves with the _clouds_
of our own persuasions; of which unnatural coition, what other issue
can there be but Centaurs and monstrous opinions? To these questions
I shall not presume to answer, but in the words of this great
author, who answering the charge of _impiety_ laid upon the holding
of necessity, says thus; _If we consider the greatest part of
mankind, not as they should be, but as they are, that is as men,
whom either the study of acquiring wealth and preferment, or whom
the appetite of sensual delights, or the impatience of meditating,
or the rash embracing of wrong principles, have made unapt to
discuss the truth of things, I must confess, &c._
Certainly we have some reason to expect an effectual cure from this
man, since he hath so fortunately found out the disease. Now if he
in so few sheets hath performed more than all the voluminous
works of the _priests and ministers_, and that in points of
soul-concernment and Christian interest, as _predestination_,
_free-will_, _grace_, _merits_, _election_, _reprobation_,
_necessity_, and _liberty_ of actions, and others, the main hinges
of human _salvation_; and to do this, being a person, whom not only
the averseness of his nature to engage himself in matters
of controversy of this kind, but his severer study of the
_mathematics_, might justly exempt from any such skirmishes; we may
not stick to infer, that the _black-coats_, generally taken, are a
sort of ignorant _tinkers_, who in matters of their own profession,
such as is the _mending_ and _soldering_ of men’s _consciences_,
have made more _holes_ than they found; nay, what makes them more
impardonable, they have neither the gratitude nor ingenuity to
acknowledge this repairer of their breaches, and assertor of their
reputation, who hath now effected what they all this while have been
tampering about. I know this author is little beholden to the
_ministers_, and they make a great part of the nation; and besides
them, I know there are many illiterate, obstinate, and inconvincible
spirits: yet I dare advance this proposition, how bold soever it may
seem to some; that this book, how little and contemptible soever it
may seem, contains more evidence and conviction in the matters it
treats of, than all the volumes, nay libraries, which the _priests_,
_jesuits_, and _ministers_ have, to our great charge, distraction,
and loss of precious time, furnished us with. Which if so, I shall
undertake for any rational man, that all the controversial labours
concerning religion in the world, all the polemical treatises of the
most ancient or modern, shall never breed any maggots of scruples,
or dissatisfactions in his brains, nor shall his eyes or head ever
ache with turning them over; but he shall be so resolved in mind, as
never to importune God Almighty with impertinent addresses, nor ever
become any of those enthusiastical _spiritati_, who, as the most
learned Mr. White says, _expound Scripture without sense or reason_,
and are not to be disputed with but with the same success as men
write on sand, and trouble their neighbours with their dreams,
revelations, and spiritual whimsies. No! here is solid conviction,
at least so far as the metaphysical mysteries of our religion will
admit. If God be _omnipotent_, he is _irresistible_; if so, _just_
in all his actions, though we, who have as much capacity to measure
the justice of God’s actions as a man born blind to judge of
colours, haply may not discern it. What then need any man trouble
his head, whether he be predestinated or no? Let him live justly and
honestly according to the _religion_ of his _country_, and refer
himself to God for the rest, since he is the potter, and may do what
he please with the vessel. But I leave the reader to find his
satisfaction in the treatise itself, since it may be I derogate from
it by saying so much before it. This book, I doubt not, will find no
worse entertainment than the _Leviathan_, both in regard of its
bulk, and that it doth not strike so home at the _ministers_ and
_Catholic_ party as that did. And yet here we must complain of want
of sufficiency or ingenuity to acknowledge the truths or confute the
errors of that book; which till it is done, we shall not count the
author an heretic. On this side the sea, besides the dirt and
slander cast on him in _sermons_ and private meetings, none hath put
anything in print against him, but Mr. Rosse; one who may be said to
have had so much learning, as to have been perpetually barking at
the works of the most learned. How he hath been received beyond seas
I know not, but certainly, not without the regret of the
_Catholics_; who building their _church_ on other foundations than
those of the _Scriptures_, and pretending _infallibility_,
_certitude_, and _unity_ in _religion_, cannot but be discontented
that these prerogatives of religion are taken away, not only from
_tradition_, that is to say, from the _church_, but also from the
_Scriptures_, and are invested in the _supreme power_ of the nation,
be it of what persuasion it will.
Thus much, Reader, I have thought fit to acquaint thee with, that
thou mightest know what a jewel thou hast in thy hands, which thou
must accordingly value, not by the bulk, but the preciousness. Thou
hast here in a few sheets what might prove work enough for many
thousand sermons and exercises; and more than the _catechisms_ and
_confessions_ of a thousand _assemblies_ could furnish thee with:
thou hast what will cast an eternal blemish on all the _cornered_
caps of _priests_ and _jesuits_, and all the _black and white_ caps
of the _canting tribe_; to be short, thou art now acquainted with
that man, who, in matters of so great importance as those of thy
salvation, furnishes thee with better instructions, than any thou
hast ever yet been acquainted with, what _profession_, _persuasion_,
_opinion_, or _church_ soever thou art of; of whom and his works
make the best use thou canst. Farewell.
pm hrdbl
TO THE
LORD MARQUIS OF NEWCASTLE.
-------
RIGHT HONOURABLE,
I had once resolved to answer my Lord Bishop’s objections to my book
DE CIVE in the first place, as that which concerns me most; and
afterwards to examine his Discourse of LIBERTY and NECESSITY, which,
because I had never uttered my opinion of it, concerned me the less.
But seeing it was your Lordship’s and my Lord Bishop’s desire that I
should begin with the _latter_, I was contented so to do, and here I
present and submit it to your Lordship’s judgment.
And first I assure your Lordship I find in it no new argument
neither from _Scripture_ nor from _reason_, that I have not often
heard before, which is as much as to say, I am not surprised.
The _preface_ is a handsome one, but it appeareth even in that, that
he hath mistaken the question. For whereas he says thus, _If I be
free to write this Discourse, I have obtained the cause_: I deny
that to be true, for it is enough to his freedom of writing, that he
had not written it, unless he would himself. If he will obtain the
cause, he must prove that before he writ it, it was not necessary he
should prove it afterward. It may be his Lordship thinks it all one
to say, _I was free_ to write it, and, _It was not necessary_ I
should write it. But I think otherwise. For he is _free_ to do a
thing, that may do it if he have the will to do it, and may forbear,
if he have the will to forbear. And yet if there be a _necessity_
that he shall have the _will_ to do it, the action is necessarily to
follow: and if there be a _necessity_ that he shall have the _will_
to forbear, the forbearing also will be necessary. The question
therefore is not, whether a man be a _free agent_, that is to say,
whether he can write or forbear, speak or be silent, according to
his _will_; but, whether the _will_ to write, and the _will_ to
forbear, come upon him according to his _will_, or according to
anything else in his own power. I acknowledge this _liberty_, that I
_can_ do if I _will_; but to say, I can _will_ if I _will_, I take
to be an absurd speech. Wherefore I cannot grant my Lord the cause
upon his _preface_.
In the next place, he maketh certain distinctions of _liberty_, and
says he meaneth not _liberty_ from sin, nor from _servitude_, nor
from _violence_; but, from _necessity_, _necessitation_,
_inevitability_, and _determination to one_.
It had been better to _define_ liberty, than thus to _distinguish_.
For I understand never the more what he means by _liberty_; and
though he say he means _liberty_ from _necessitation_, yet I
understand not how such a _liberty_ can be, and it is a taking of
the question without proof. For what is else the question between
us, but whether _such_ a liberty be possible or not?
There are in the same place other distinctions: as a liberty of
_exercise only_, which he calls a _liberty of contradiction_, namely
of doing not good, or evil _simply_, but of doing this or that good,
or this or that evil _respectively_, and a _liberty of specification
and exercise also_, which he calls a liberty of _contrariety_,
namely a liberty not only to do good or evil, but also to do or not
do this or that good or evil.
And with these _distinctions_ his Lordship says he _clears the
coast_, whereas in truth, he darkeneth his own meaning and
the question, not only with the jargon of _exercise only_,
_specification also_, _contradiction_, _contrariety_, but also with
pretending distinction where none is: for how is it possible that
the _liberty_ of doing or not doing this or that good or evil, can
consist, as he says it does in God and good angels, without a
liberty of doing or not doing good or evil?
The next thing his Lordship does, after clearing of the coast, is
the dividing of his forces, as he calls them, into _two_ squadrons,
_one_ of places _of Scriptures_, the _other_ of _reasons_, which
allegory he useth, I suppose, because he addresseth the discourse to
your Lordship, who is a military man. All that I have to say
touching this, is, that I observe a great part of those his _forces_
do look and _march_ another way, and some of them _fight_ amongst
themselves.
And the first place of _Scripture_, taken from Numb. xxx. 13, is one
of those that look another way; the words are, _If a wife make a
vow, it is left to her husband’s choice either to establish it or
make it void_. For it proves no more but that the husband is a
_free_ and _voluntary agent_, but not that his _choice_ therein is
not _necessitated_ or not _determined_ to what he shall choose, by
precedent _necessary_ causes.
For if there come into the husband’s mind greater good by
establishing than abrogating such a vow, the establishing will
follow necessarily; and if the evil that will follow in the
husband’s opinion outweigh the good, the contrary must needs follow:
and yet in this following of one’s _hopes_ and _fears_, consisteth
the nature of _election_. So that a man may both choose this, and
cannot but choose this, and consequently _choosing_ and _necessity_
are joined together.
The second place of Scripture is Joshua, xxiv. 15. The third is 2
Sam. xxiv. 12, whereby it is clearly proved, that there is
_election_ in _man_, but not proved that such _election_ was not
_necessitated_ by the _hopes_, and _fears_, and considerations of
_good_ and _bad_ to follow, which depend not on the _will_, nor are
subject to _election_. And therefore one answer serves all such
places, if there were a thousand.
But his Lordship supposing, it seems, I might answer, as I have
done, that _necessity_ and _election_ might stand together, and
instance in the actions of _children_, _fools_, or _brute beasts_,
whose _fancies_, I might say, are _necessitated_ and _determined_ to
_one_; before these his proofs out of Scripture, desires to prevent
that instance, and therefore says that the actions of _children_,
_fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_, are indeed _determined_, but that
they proceed not from _election_, nor from _free_, but from
_spontaneous agents_. As for example, that the _bee_, when it maketh
honey, does it _spontaneously_; and when the _spider_ makes his web,
he does it _spontaneously_, but not by _election_.
Though I never meant to ground my answer upon the experience of what
_children_, _fools_, _madmen_, and _beasts_ do; yet that your
Lordship may understand what can be meant by _spontaneous_, and how
it differeth from _voluntary_, I will answer that _distinction_, and
show that it _fighteth_ against its fellow arguments.
Your Lordship therefore is to consider, that all _voluntary_
actions, where the thing that induceth the _will_ is not _fear_, are
called also _spontaneous_, and said to be done by a man’s _own_
accord. As when a man giveth money voluntarily to another for
merchandise, or out of affection, he is said to do it of his own
accord, which in Latin is _sponte_, and therefore the action is
_spontaneous_; though to give one’s money willingly to a thief to
avoid killing, or throw it into the sea to avoid drowning, where the
motive is _fear_, be not called _spontaneous_. But every
_spontaneous_ action is not therefore _voluntary_, for _voluntary_
presupposes some precedent _deliberation_, that is to say, some
_consideration_, and _meditation_, of what is likely to _follow_,
both upon the doing, and abstaining from the action deliberated of;
whereas many actions are done of our _own_ accord, and are therefore
_spontaneous_, for which nevertheless, as my Lord thinks, we never
_consulted_ nor _deliberated_ in ourselves. As when making no
question nor any the least doubt in the world, but the thing we are
about is good, we _eat_ and _walk_, or in anger _strike_ or
_revile_, which my Lord thinks spontaneous, but not voluntary nor
elective actions, and with _such_ kind of actions, he says
_necessitation_ may stand, but not with such as are _voluntary_, and
proceed upon _election_ and _deliberation_. Now if I make it appear
to your Lordship, that those actions, which, he says, proceed from
_spontaneity_, and which he ascribes to _children_, _fools_,
_madmen_, and _beasts_, proceed from _election_ and _deliberation_,
and that actions _inconsiderate_, _rash_, and _spontaneous_, are
ordinarily found in those, that are by themselves and many more
thought as _wise_, or wiser than ordinarily men are, then my Lord
Bishop’s argument concludeth, that _necessity_ and _election_ may
stand together, which is contrary to that which he intendeth by all
the rest of his arguments to prove.
And first your Lordship’s own experience furnishes you with proof
enough, that _horses_, _dogs_, and other brute _beasts_, do _demur_
oftentimes upon the way they are to take, the horse retiring from
some strange figure that he sees, and coming on again to avoid the
spur. And what else doth a man that _deliberateth_, but one while
_proceed_ toward action, another while _retire_ from it, as the
_hope_ of greater _good_ draws him, or the _fear_ of greater evil
_drives_ him away.
A _child_ may be so young as to do what it does without all
_deliberation_, but that is but till it have the chance to be hurt
by doing of somewhat, or till it be of age to understand the rod:
for the actions, wherein he hath once had a check, shall be
_deliberated_ on the second time.
_Fools_ and _madmen_ manifestly _deliberate_ no less than the
_wisest_ men, though they make not so good a _choice_, the images of
things being by disease altered.
For _bees_ and _spiders_, if my Lord Bishop had had so little to do
as to be a spectator of their actions, he would have confessed not
only _election_, but _art_, _prudence_, and _policy_, in them, very
near equal to that of mankind. Of _bees_, Aristotle says, _their
life is civil_.
Again, his Lordship is deceived, if he think any _spontaneous_
action, after once being checked in it, differs from an action
_voluntary_ and _elective_: for even the setting of a man’s foot, in
the posture for _walking_, and the action of ordinary _eating_, was
once _deliberated_ of how and when it should be done, and though
afterward it became _easy_ and _habitual_, so as to be done without
_forethought_; yet that does not hinder but that the act is
_voluntary_, and proceedeth from _election_. So also are the
_rashest_ actions of _choleric_ persons _voluntary_ and upon
_deliberation_: for who is there but very young children, that hath
not _considered_ when and how far he _ought_, or safely _may_ strike
or revile? Seeing then his Lordship agrees with me, that such
actions are _necessitated_, and the _fancy_ of those that do them
_determined_ to the action they do, it follows out of his Lordship’s
own doctrine, that the liberty of _election_ does not take away the
_necessity_ of _electing_ this or that _individual_ thing. And thus
one of his arguments fights against another.
The second argument from Scripture, consisteth in histories of men
that did one thing, when if they would, they might have done
another; the places are two: one is 1 Kings iii. 10, where the
history says, God was pleased that Solomon, who might, if he would,
have asked _riches_, or _revenge_, did nevertheless ask _wisdom_ at
God’s hands: the other is the words of St. Peter to Ananias, Acts v.
4: _After it was sold, was it not in thine own power?_
To which the answer is the same with that I answered to the former
places, that they prove there is _election_, but do not disprove the
_necessity_, which I maintain, of what they so elect.
The fourth argument (for to the third and fifth I shall make but one
answer) is to this effect; _If the decrees of God, or his
foreknowledge, or the influence of the stars, or the concatenation
of causes, or the physical or moral efficacy of causes, or the last
dictate of the understanding, or whatsoever it be, do take away true
liberty, then Adam before his fall had no true liberty. Quicquid
ostendes mihi sic incredulus odi._
_That_ which I say _necessitateth and determinateth every action_,
that his Lordship may no longer doubt of my meaning, _is the sum of
all things, which being now existent, conduce and concur to the
production of that action hereafter, whereof if any one thing now
were wanting, the effect could not be produced_. This _concourse_ of
_causes_, whereof every one is _determined_ to be such as it is by a
like concourse of _former_ causes, may well be called (in respect
they were all set and ordered by the eternal cause of all things,
God Almighty) the _decree_ of God.
But that the _foreknowledge_ of God should be a cause of any thing,
cannot be truly said, seeing foreknowledge is knowledge, and
knowledge depends on the existence of the things known, and not they
on it.
The _influence of the stars_ is but a small part of the whole cause,
consisting of the concourse of all agents.
Nor does the _concourse of all causes_ make one simple _chain_ or
concatenation, but an innumerable number of chains, joined together,
not in all parts, but in the first link God Almighty; and
consequently the whole cause of an event, doth not always depend on
one single chain, but on many together.
_Natural_ efficacy of _objects_ does _determine voluntary_ agents,
and _necessitates_ the _will_, and consequently the _action_; but
for _moral_ efficacy, I understand not what he means.
_The last dictate of the judgment_, concerning the good or bad, that
may follow on any action, is not properly the _whole cause_, but the
last part of it, and yet may be said to produce the effect
_necessarily_, in such manner as the last feather may be said to
break a horse’s back, when there were so many laid on before as
there wanted but that one to do it.
Now for his _argument_, that _if the concourse of all the causes
necessitate the effect, that then it follows, Adam had no true
liberty_: I deny the consequence; for I make not only the _effect_,
but also the _election_, of that particular effect _necessary_,
inasmuch as the will itself, and each propension of a man during his
deliberation, is as much necessitated, and depends on a sufficient
cause, as any thing else whatsoever. As for example, it is no more
necessary that fire should burn, than that a man or other creature,
whose limbs be moved by fancy, should have _election_, that is
_liberty_, to do what he hath a fancy to do, though it be not in his
_will_ or _power_ to _choose_ his _fancy_, or choose his _election_
and _will_.
This doctrine, because my Lord Bishop says he hates, I doubt had
better been suppressed, as it should have been, if both your
Lordship and he had not pressed me to an answer.
The arguments of greatest consequence, are the third and the fifth,
and they fall both into one, namely: _If there be a necessity of all
events, that it will follow, that praise and reprehension, and
reward and punishment, are all vain and unjust; and that if God
should openly forbid, and secretly necessitate the same action,
punishing men for what they could not avoid, there would be no
belief among them of heaven and hell_.
To oppose hereunto I must borrow an answer from St. Paul, Rom. ix.
20, 21. From the eleventh verse of the chapter to the eighteenth, is
laid down the very same objection in these words: _When they_,
meaning Esau and Jacob, _were yet unborn, and had done neither good
nor evil, that the purpose of God according to election, not by
works, but by him that calleth, might remain firm, it was said unto
her_ (_viz._ Rebecca) _that the elder should serve the younger_, &c.
_What then shall we say? Is there injustice with God? God forbid. It
is not therefore in him that willeth, nor in him that runneth, but
in God that showeth mercy. For the Scripture saith to Pharaoh, I
have stirred thee up that I might show my power in thee, and that my
name might be set forth in all the earth. Therefore whom God
willeth, he hath mercy on, and whom he willeth he hardeneth._ Thus
you see the case put by St. Paul, is the same with that of my Lord
Bishop, and the same objection in these words following:
_Thou wilt ask me then, why does God yet complain, for who hath
resisted his will?_
To this therefore the Apostle answers, not by denying it was God’s
_will_, or that the decree of God concerning Esau was not before he
had sinned, or that Esau was not necessitated to do what he did; but
thus: _Who art thou, O man, that interrogatest God? Shall the work
say to the workman, why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter
power over the clay, of the same stuff to make one vessel to honour,
another to dishonour?_ According therefore to this answer of St.
Paul, I answer my Lord’s objection, and say, the _power_ of God
alone without other helps is sufficient _justification_ of any
action he doth. That which men make amongst themselves here by pacts
and covenants, and call by the name of justice, and according
whereunto men are accounted and termed rightly _just_ or _unjust_,
is not that by which God Almighty’s actions are to be measured or
called just, no more than his counsels are to be measured by human
wisdom. That which he does, is made just by his doing it; just, I
say, in him, though not always just in us.
For a man that shall command a thing openly, and plot secretly the
hindrance of the same, if he punish him that he so commandeth, for
not doing it, it is unjust. So also, his counsels are therefore not
in vain, because they be his, whether we see the use of them or not.
When God afflicted Job, he did object no sin unto him, but justified
his afflicting of him, by telling him of his _power_: (Job xl. 9:)
_Hast thou, saith God, an arm like mine?_ (Job xxviii. 4): _Where
wert thou when I laid the foundations of the earth?_ and the like.
So our Saviour, (John ix. 3) concerning the man that was born blind,
said, it was not for his sin, or for his parents' sin, but that the
power of God might be shown in him. _Beasts_ are subject to death
and torments, yet they cannot sin: it was God’s will they should be
so. _Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly_,
in whomsoever it be found; less power does not, and because such
power is in God only, he must needs be just in all actions, and we,
that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit
injustice in it.
I am not ignorant of the usual reply to his answer, by
distinguishing between _will_ and _permission_, as that God Almighty
does indeed sometimes _permit_ sins, and that he also foreknoweth
that the sin he permitteth, shall be committed, but does not _will_
it, nor _necessitate_ it.
I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action,
saying, that God Almighty does indeed cause the _action_, whatsoever
action it be, but not the _sinfulness_ or _irregularity_ of it, that
is, the _discordance_ between the _action_ and the _law_. Such
distinctions as these dazzle my understanding; I find no difference
between the _will_ to have a thing done, and the _permission_ to do
it, when he that permitteth can hinder it, and knows that it will be
done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an
_action_ and the _sin_ of that action; as for example, between the
killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah, nor when
_one_ is _cause_ both of the _action_ and of the _law_, how
_another_ can be cause of the _disagreement_ between them, no more
than how one man making a longer and a shorter garment, another can
make the inequality that is between them. This I know; God cannot
sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently, no
sin; as also because whatsoever can sin, is subject to another’s
law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can
sin; but to say, that God can so order the world, as a sin may be
necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any
dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other _distinctions_ can
make it clear, that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s
actions proceeded from the _will_ and _purpose_ of God, or that
proceeding from his will, could not therefore without injustice be
blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto
my Lord’s opinion: for I now hold nothing in all this question
betwixt us, but what seemeth to me, not obscurely, but most
expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to
his places of Scripture.
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TO THE ARGUMENTS FROM REASON.
Of the arguments from _reason_, the first is that which his Lordship
saith is drawn from Zeno’s beating of his man, which is therefore
called _argumentum baculinum_, that is to say, a wooden argument.
The story is this; Zeno held, that all actions were necessary; his
man therefore being for some fault beaten, excused himself upon the
necessity of it: to avoid this excuse, his master pleaded likewise
the necessity of beating him. So that not he that maintained, but he
that derided the necessity, was beaten, contrary to that his
Lordship would infer. And the argument was rather withdrawn than
drawn from the story.
The second argument is taken from certain inconveniences which his
Lordship thinks would follow such an opinion. It is true that ill
use might be made of it, and therefore your Lordship and my Lord
Bishop ought, at my request, to keep private what I say here of it.
But the inconveniences are indeed none, and what use soever be made
of truth, yet truth is truth, and now the question is not, what is
fit to be preached, but, what is true.
The first inconvenience he says, is this; _That the laws, which
prohibit any action, will be unjust_.
2. _That all consultations are vain._
3. _That admonitions to men of understanding, are of no more use,
than to children, fools, and madmen._
4. _That, praise, dispraise, reward and punishment, are in vain._
5, 6. _That counsels, acts, arms, books, instruments, study, tutors,
medicines, are in vain._
To which arguments his Lordship expecting I should answer, by
saying, the ignorance of the event were enough to make us use the
means, adds, as it were a reply to my answer foreseen, these words:
_Alas! how should our not knowing the event be a sufficient motive
to make us use the means?_ Wherein his Lordship says right, but my
answer is not that which he expecteth: I answer,
First, that the _necessity_ of an _action_ doth not make the _laws_,
that prohibit it, _unjust_. To let pass, that not the _necessity_,
but the _will_ to break the _law_, maketh the action _unjust_,
because the _law_ regardeth the _will_, and no other precedent
causes of action. And to let pass, that no _law_ can possibly be
_unjust_, inasmuch as every man maketh, by his consent, the law he
is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man
can be unjust to himself. I say, what _necessary_ cause soever
precede an _action_, yet if the action be _forbidden_, he that doth
it _willingly_ may justly be punished. For instance, suppose the law
on pain of death prohibit stealing, and that there be a man, who by
the strength of temptation is _necessitated_ to steal, and is
thereupon put to death, does not this punishment deter others from
theft? Is it not a cause that others steal not? Doth it not frame
and make their wills to justice?
To make the _law_, is therefore to make a _cause_ of _justice_, and
to _necessitate_ justice; and consequently, it is no injustice to
make such a law.
The intention of the _law_ is not to grieve the _delinquent_, for
that which is past, and not to be undone; but to make him and others
_just_, that else would not be so, and respecteth not the evil act
_past_, but the _good to come_; insomuch as without the good
intention for the future, no past act of a delinquent could justify
his killing in the sight of God. But you will say, how is it just to
kill one man to amend another, if what were done were _necessary_?
To this I answer, that men are justly killed, not for that their
_actions_ are not _necessitated_, but because they are _noxious_,
and they are spared and preserved whose actions are not noxious. For
where there is no law, there no killing nor anything else can be
unjust; and by the right of nature, we destroy, without being
unjust, all that is noxious, both beasts and men; and for beasts we
kill them justly, when we do it in order to our own preservation,
and yet my Lord himself confesseth, that their actions, as being
only _spontaneous_, and not _free_, are all _necessitated_ and
determined to that one thing they shall do. For men, when we make
societies or commonwealths, we lay not down our right to kill,
excepting in certain cases, as murder, theft or other offensive
action; so that the right, which the _commonwealth_ hath to put a
man to death for crimes, is not created by the _law_, but remains
from the first right of _nature_, which every man hath to preserve
himself; for that the law doth not take the right away in the case
of criminals, who were by the law excepted. Men are not therefore
put to death, or punished, for that their theft proceedeth from
_election_; but because it was _noxious_ and contrary to men’s
preservation, and the punishment conducing to the preservation of
the rest, inasmuch as to punish those that do voluntary hurt, and
none else, frameth and maketh men’s _wills_ such as men would have
them. And thus it is plain, that from the _necessity_ of a
_voluntary_ action, cannot be inferred the _injustice_ of the _law_
that forbiddeth it, or the magistrate that punisheth it.
Secondly, I deny that it maketh _consultations_ to be in _vain_; it
is the _consultation_ that _causeth_ a man, and _necessitateth_ him
to _choose_ to do one thing rather than another: so that unless a
man say that that cause is in vain which necessitateth the effect,
he cannot infer the superfluousness of consultation out of the
necessity of the election proceeding from it. But it seemeth his
Lordship reasons thus: If I must do this rather than that, I shall
do this rather than that, though I consult not at all; which is a
false proposition and a false consequence, and no better than this:
If I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though
I run myself through with a sword to-day. If there be a _necessity_
that an action shall be done, or that any effect shall be brought to
pass, it does not therefore follow, that there is nothing
necessarily requisite as a means to bring it to pass; and therefore
when it is determined, that one thing shall be chosen before
another, it is determined also for what _cause_ it shall so be
chosen, which cause, for the most part, is _deliberation_ or
_consultation_, and therefore consultation is not in vain, and
indeed the less in vain by how much the election is more
necessitated, if _more_ and _less_ had any place in _necessity_.
The same answer is to be given to the third supposed inconvenience,
namely, that _admonitions_ are in _vain_; for the admonitions are
parts of consultation, the admonitor being a counsellor for the time
to him that is admonished.
The fourth pretended inconvenience is, that _praise_, _dispraise_,
_reward_, and _punishment_ will be in _vain_. To which I answer,
that for _praise_ and _dispraise_, they depend not at all on the
_necessity_ of the action praised or dispraised. For what is it else
to _praise_, but to say a thing is good? Good, I say, for me, or for
somebody else, or for the state and commonwealth? And what is it to
say an action is good, but to say it is as I would wish? or as
another would have it, or according to the will of the state? that
is to say, according to the law. Does my Lord think that no action
can please me, or him, or the commonwealth, that should proceed from
_necessity_? Things may be therefore _necessary_, and yet
_praise-worthy_, as also _necessary_, and yet _dispraised_, and
neither of them both in vain, because _praise_ and _dispraise_, and
likewise _reward_ and _punishment_, do by example make and conform
the will to good and evil. It was a very great praise in my opinion,
that Velleius Paterculus (Lib. ii. 35) gives Cato, where he says
that he was good by _nature_, _et quia aliter esse non potuit_.
To the fifth and sixth inconveniences, that _counsels_, _arts_,
_arms_, _instruments_, _books_, _study_, _medicines_, and the like,
would be _superfluous_, the same answer serves as to the former,
that is to say, that this consequence, _if the effect shall
necessarily come to pass, then it shall come to pass without its
causes_, is a false one, and those things named counsels, arts,
arms, &c. are the causes of these effects.
His Lordship’s _third_ argument consisteth in other
_inconveniences_, which he saith will follow, namely, _impiety_ and
_negligence_ of religious duties, as repentance, and _zeal_ to God’s
service, &c.
To which I answer as to the rest, that they follow not. I must
confess, if we consider the greatest part of mankind, not as they
should be, but as they are, that is, as men, whom either the study
of acquiring wealth, or preferment, or whom the appetite of sensual
delights, or the impatience of meditating, or the rash embracing of
wrong principles, have made unapt to discuss the truth of things: I
must, I say, confess that the dispute of this question will rather
hurt than help their piety; and therefore if his Lordship had not
desired this answer, I should not have written it, nor do I write it
but in hopes your Lordship and his will keep it private.
Nevertheless in very truth, the _necessity_ of events does not of
itself draw with it any _impiety_ at all. For _piety_ consisteth
only in _two_ things; one, that we honour God in our hearts, which
is, that we think as highly of his _power_ as we can, for to honour
anything is nothing else but to think it to be of great power; the
other is, that we signify that honour and esteem by our words and
actions, which is called _cultus_, or _worship of God_. He therefore
that thinketh that all things proceed from God’s _eternal will_, and
consequently are _necessary_, does he not think God _omnipotent_?
Does he not esteem of his _power_ as highly as is possible? which is
to honour God as much as may be in his heart. Again, he that
thinketh so, is he not more apt by _external_ acts and words to
acknowledge it, than he that thinketh otherwise? yet is this
external acknowledgment the same thing which we call _worship_. So
that this opinion fortifies _piety_ in both kinds, external and
internal; therefore is far from destroying it. And for _repentance_,
which is nothing else but a glad returning into the right way, after
the grief of being out of the way; though the cause that made him go
astray were necessary, yet there is no reason why he should not
grieve; and, again though the cause why he returned into the way
were necessary, there remained still the causes of joy. So that the
_necessity_ of the actions taketh away neither of those parts of
_repentance_, grief for the error, and joy for returning.
And for _prayer_, whereas he saith that the _necessity_ of things
destroy _prayer_, I deny it; for though _prayer_ be none of the
_causes_ that _move_ God’s _will_, his will being unchangeable, yet
since we find in God’s word, he will not give his blessings but to
those that ask, the motive of prayer is the same. _Prayer_ is the
gift of God no less than the _blessing_, and the prayer is decreed
together in the same decree wherein the blessing is decreed. It is
manifest that _thanksgiving_ is no cause of the blessing past, and
that which is past is sure and necessary, yet even amongst men
thanks is in use as an acknowledgment of the benefit past, though we
should expect no new benefit for our gratitude. And prayer to God
Almighty is but thanksgiving for God’s blessings in general, and
though it precede the particular thing we ask, yet it is not a cause
or means of it, but a signification that we expect nothing but from
God, in such manner, as he, not as we, will; and our Saviour by word
of mouth bids us pray, _thy will_, not our will, _be done_, and by
example teaches us the same; for he prayed thus, _Father if it be
thy will, let this cup pass_, &c. The end of prayer, as of
thanksgiving, is not to _move_ but to _honour_ God Almighty, in
acknowledging that what we ask can be effected by him only.
_The fourth argument from reason is this: the order, beauty, and
perfection of the world requireth that in the universe should be
agents of all sorts; some necessary, some free, some contingent. He
that shall make all things necessary, or all things free, or all
things contingent, doth overthrow the beauty and perfection of the
world._
In which argument I observe, first a _contradiction_; for seeing he
that _maketh_ anything, in that he maketh it, maketh it to be
_necessary_; it followeth that he that maketh all things, maketh all
things necessarily to be: as if a workman make a garment, the
garment must necessarily be; so if God make every thing, every thing
must necessarily be. Perhaps the beauty of the world requireth,
though we know it not, that some agents should work without
deliberation (which his lordship calls _necessary_ agents) and some
agents with deliberation (and those both he and I call _free_
agents) and that some agents should work, and we not know how (and
their effects we both call _contingents_); but this hinders not but
that he that electeth may have his _election_ necessarily determined
to _one_ by _former_ causes, and that which is _contingent_, and
imputed to fortune, be nevertheless _necessary_ and depend on
_precedent_ necessary causes. For by _contingent_, men do not mean
that which hath _no_ cause, but that which hath not for cause
anything that we perceive; as for example, when a traveller meets
with a shower, the journey had a cause, and the rain had a cause
sufficient to produce it; but because the journey caused not the
rain, nor the rain the journey, we say they were contingent one to
another. And thus you see that though there be three sorts of
events, _necessary_, _contingent_, and _free_, yet they may be _all_
necessary without destruction of the beauty or perfection of the
universe.
To the first argument from reason, which is, _That if liberty be
taken away, the nature and formal reason of sin is taken away_; I
answer by denying the consequence: the nature of sin consisteth in
this, that the _action_ done proceed from our _will_ and be against
the _law_. A judge in judging whether it be sin or no, which is done
against the law, looks at no higher cause of the action, than the
will of the doer. Now when I say the action was _necessary_, I do
not say it was done _against_ the will of the doer, but _with_ his
will, and _necessarily_, because man’s will, that is every volition
or act of the will and purpose of man had a _sufficient_, and
therefore a _necessary_ cause, and consequently every _voluntary_
action was _necessitated_. An action therefore may be _voluntary_
and a _sin_, and nevertheless be _necessary_; and because God may
afflict by a right derived from his _omnipotence_, though sin were
not, and because the example of punishment on voluntary sinners, is
the cause that produceth justice, and maketh sin less frequent, for
God to punish such sinners, as I have said before, is no injustice.
And thus you have my answer to his Lordship’s objections both out of
Scripture, and from reason.
-------
CERTAIN DISTINCTIONS, WHICH HIS LORDSHIP SUPPOSING
MIGHT BE BROUGHT TO EVADE HIS
ARGUMENTS, ARE BY HIM REMOVED.
He says a man may perhaps answer, that the _necessity_ of things
held by him, is not a _stoical_ necessity, but a _Christian_
necessity, &c. But this _distinction_ I have not used, nor indeed
ever heard before, nor could I think any man could make _stoical_
and _Christian_ two kinds of _necessity_, though they may be two
kinds of _doctrine_. Nor have I drawn my answer to his Lordship’s
arguments from the authority of any sect, but from the nature of the
things themselves.