1. It hath been declared already, how _external_ objects cause
_conceptions_, and conceptions, _appetite_ and _fear_, which are the
_first unperceived beginnings of our actions_: for _either_ the
actions immediately follow the first appetite, as when we do
anything upon a sudden; _or else_ to our first appetite there
succeedeth some conception of evil to happen to us by such actions,
which is fear, and which holdeth us from proceeding. And to that
fear may succeed a new appetite, and to that appetite another fear
alternately, till the action be either done, or some accident come
between, to make it impossible; and so this alternate appetite and
fear ceaseth. This _alternate succession of appetite and fear_
during all the time the action is in our power to do or not to do,
is that we call _deliberation_; which name hath been given it for
that part of the definition wherein it is said that it lasteth so
long as the action, whereof we deliberate, is in our power: for, so
long we have liberty to do or not to do; and deliberation signifieth
a taking away of our own liberty.
2. _Deliberation_ therefore requireth in the action deliberated _two
conditions_; one, that it be _future_; the other, that there be
_hope_ of doing it, or possibility of not doing it; for, _appetite_
and _fear_ are _expectations_ of the future; and there is no
expectation of good, without hope; or of evil, without possibility:
of _necessaries_ therefore there is _no deliberation_. In
deliberation, the last appetite, as also the last fear, is called
_will_, viz. the last appetite, will to do, or will to omit. It is
all one therefore to say _will_ and _last will_: for, though a man
express his present inclination and appetite concerning the
disposing of his goods, by words or writings; yet shall it not be
counted his will, because he hath still liberty to dispose of them
otherways: but when death taketh away that liberty, then it is his
will.
3. _Voluntary_ actions and omissions are such as have beginning in
the _will_; all other are _involuntary_, or _mixed voluntary_;
_involuntary_, such as he doth by necessity of nature, as when he is
pushed, or falleth, and thereby doth good or hurt to another:
_mixed_, such as participate of both; as when a man is carried to
prison, going is voluntary, to the prison, is involuntary: the
example of him that throweth his goods out of a ship into the sea,
to save his person, is of an action altogether voluntary: for, there
is nothing therein involuntary, but the hardness of the choice,
which is not his action, but the action of the winds: what he
himself doth, is no more against his will, than to flee from danger
is against the will of him that seeth no other means to preserve
himself.
4. _Voluntary_ also are the actions that proceed from sudden
_anger_, or _other_ sudden _appetite_ in such men as can discern
good or evil: for, in them the time precedent _is_ to be judged
deliberation: for then also he deliberateth in what cases it is good
to strike, deride, or do any other action proceeding from anger or
other such sudden passion.
5. _Appetite_, _fear_, _hope_, and the rest of the passions are
_not_ called _voluntary_; for they proceed _not from, but are the
will_; and the will is not voluntary: for, a man can no more say he
will will, than he will will will, and so make an infinite
repetition of the word [_will_]; which is absurd, and insignificant.
6. Forasmuch as _will to do_ is _appetite_, and _will to omit_,
_fear_; the _cause_ of _appetite_ and _fear_ is the _cause_ also of
our _will_: but the propounding of the benefits and of harms, that
is to say, of reward and punishment, is the cause of our appetite,
and of our fears, and therefore also of our wills, so far forth as
we believe that such rewards and benefits as are propounded, shall
arrive unto us; and consequently, our _wills_ follow our _opinions_,
as our _actions_ follow our _wills_; in which sense they say truly,
and properly, that say the world is governed by opinion.
7. When the wills of many concur to one and the same action and
effect, this _concourse_ of their _wills_ is called _consent_; by
which we must not understand one will of many men, for every man
hath his several will, but many wills to the producing of one
effect: but when the _wills_ of two divers men _produce_ such
actions as are reciprocally _resistant_ one to the other, this is
called _contention_; and, being upon the persons one of another,
_battle_: whereas actions proceeding from _consent_, are mutual
_aid_.
8. When many wills are involved or included in the will of one or
more consenting, (which how it may be, shall be hereafter declared)
then is that involving of many wills in one or more, called _union_.
9. In _deliberations_ interrupted, as they may be by _diversion_ of
other business, or by _sleep_, the last _appetite_ of such part of
the deliberation is called _intention_, or _purpose_.
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