1. Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory. 2. Humility and
dejection. 3. Shame. 4. Courage. 5. Anger. 6. Revengefulness. 7.
Repentance. 8. Hope, despair, diffidence. 9. Trust. 10. Pity and
hardness of heart. 11. Indignation. 12. Emulation and envy. 13.
Laughter. 14. Weeping. 15. Lust. 16. Love. 17. Charity. 18.
Admiration and curiosity. 19. Of the passion of them that flock
to see danger. 20. Of magnanimity and pusillanimity. 21. A view
of the passions represented in a race.
[Sidenote: Glory aspiring, false glory, vain glory.]
1. Glory, or internal gloriation or triumph of the mind, is the
passion which proceedeth from the imagination or conception of our
_own power_ above the power of him that contendeth with us; the
_signs_ whereof, besides those in the countenance, and other
gestures of the body which cannot be described, are, _ostentation_
in words, and _insolency_ in actions: and this passion, of them whom
it displeaseth, is called _pride_; by them whom it pleaseth, it is
termed a _just valuation_ of himself. This imagination of our power
or worth, may be from an assured and certain _experience_ of our own
actions; and then is that glory _just_, and well grounded, and
begetteth an opinion of _increasing_ the same by other actions to
follow; in which consisteth the appetite which we call _aspiring_,
or proceeding from one degree of power to another. The same passion
may proceed _not_ from any _conscience_ of our own actions, but from
fame and trust of _others_, whereby one may think well of himself,
and yet be deceived; and this is _false glory_, and the aspiring
consequent thereto procureth ill success. Further, the _fiction_,
which is also imagination, of actions done by ourselves, which never
were done, is _glorying_; but because it begetteth no appetite nor
endeavour to any further attempt, it is merely _vain_ and
unprofitable; as when a man imagineth himself to do the actions
whereof he readeth in some _romance_, or to be like unto some other
man whose acts he admireth: and this is called _vain glory_; and is
exemplified in the fable, by the fly sitting on the axletree, and
saying to himself, What a dust do I make rise! The expression of
_vain glory_ is that wish, which some of the Schools mistaking for
some appetite distinct from all the rest, have called _velleity_,
making a new word, as they made a new passion which was not before.
_Signs_ of _vain glory_ in the _gesture_ are, _imitation_ of others,
counterfeiting and usurping the signs of virtue they have not,
affectation of fashions, captation of honour from their dreams, and
other little stories of themselves, from their country, from their
names, and from the like.
[Sidenote: Humility and dejection.]
2. The passion _contrary to glory_, proceeding from apprehension of
our own infirmity, is called _humility_ by those by whom it is
approved; by the rest, _dejection_ and poorness: which conception
may be well or ill grounded; if well, it produceth fear to attempt
any thing rashly; if ill, it utterly cows a man, that he neither
dares speak publicly, nor expect good success in any action.
[Sidenote: Shame.]
3. It happeneth sometimes, that he that hath a _good_ opinion of
himself, and upon good ground, may nevertheless, by reason of the
_frowardness_ which that passion begetteth, discover in himself some
_defect_ or infirmity, the remembrance whereof dejecteth him; and
this passion is called _shame_; by which being cooled and checked in
his frowardness, he is more wary for the time to come. This passion,
as it is a sign of _infirmity_, which is _dishonour_; so also it is
a sign of _knowledge_, which is _honour_. The sign of it is
_blushing_, which appeareth less in men conscious of their own
defect, because they less betray the infirmities they acknowledge.
[Sidenote: Courage.]
4. _Courage_, in a _large_ signification, is the _absence_ of _fear_
in the presence of any evil whatsoever: but in a _strict_ and more
common meaning, it is _contempt_ of _wounds_ and _death_, when they
oppose a man in the way to his end.
[Sidenote: Anger.]
5. _Anger_ or sudden courage is nothing but the _appetite_ or desire
of _overcoming present_ opposition. It hath been defined commonly to
be grief proceeding from an opinion of contempt; which is confuted
by the often experience which we have of being moved to anger by
things inanimate, and without sense, and consequently incapable of
contemning us.
[Sidenote: Revengefulness.]
6. _Revengefulness_ is that passion which ariseth from an
expectation or _imagination_ of _making_ him that hath _hurt_ us,
_find_ his _own action hurtful_ to himself, and to _acknowledge_ the
same; and this is the height of revenge: for though it be not hard,
by returning evil for evil, to make one’s adversary displeased with
his own fact; yet to make him acknowledge the same, is so difficult,
that many a man had rather die than do it. Revenge aimeth not at the
death, but at the captivity or subjection of an enemy; which was
well expressed in the exclamation of Tiberius Cæsar, concerning one,
that, to frustrate his revenge, had killed himself in prison; _Hath
he escaped me?_ To _kill_, is the aim of them that _hate_, to _rid_
themselves out of fear: _revenge_ aimeth at _triumph_, which over
the dead is not.
[Sidenote: Repentance.]
7. _Repentance_ is the passion which proceedeth from _opinion_ or
knowledge that the _action_ they have done is _out of the way_ to
the _end_ they would attain: the effect whereof is, to pursue that
way no longer, but, by the consideration of the end, to direct
themselves into a better. The first motion therefore in this passion
is _grief_; but the expectation or conception of returning again
into the way, is _joy_; and consequently, the passion of
_repentance_ is compounded and allayed of both: but the
_predominant_ is _joy_; else were the whole grief, which cannot be,
forasmuch as he that proceedeth towards the end, he conceiveth good,
proceedeth with appetite; and appetite is joy, as hath been said,
chapter VII. section 2.
[Sidenote: Hope, despair, diffidence.]
8. _Hope_ is _expectation_ of _good_ to come, as fear is the
expectation of evil: but when there be causes, some that make us
expect good, and some that make us expect evil, alternately working
in our mind; if the causes that make us expect good, be greater than
those that make us expect evil, the whole passion is hope; if
contrarily, the whole is fear. Absolute _privation_ of hope is
_despair_, a degree whereof is _diffidence_.
[Sidenote: Trust.]
9. _Trust_ is a passion proceeding from the _belief of_ him from
whom we _expect_ or _hope_ for good, so _free_ from _doubt_ that
upon the same we pursue no other way to attain the same good; as
_distrust_ or diffidence is _doubt_ that maketh him endeavour to
provide himself by other means. And that this is the meaning of the
words trust and distrust, is manifest from this, that a man never
provideth himself by a second way, but when he mistrusteth that the
first will not hold.
[Sidenote: Pity and hardness of heart.]
10. _Pity_ is _imagination_ or _fiction_ of _future_ calamity to
_ourselves_, proceeding from the sense of _another_ man’s calamity.
But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same,
the compassion is greater, because then there appeareth more
probability that the same may happen to us: for, the evil that
happeneth to an innocent man, may happen to every man. But when we
see a man suffer for great crimes, which we cannot easily think will
fall upon ourselves, the pity is the less. And therefore men are apt
to pity those whom they love: for, whom they love, they think worthy
of good, and therefore not worthy of calamity. Thence it is also,
that men pity the vices of some persons at the first sight only, out
of love to their aspect. The contrary of pity is _hardness of
heart_, proceeding either from _slowness_ of imagination, or some
extreme great _opinion_ of their own _exemption_ from the like
calamity, or from hatred of all or most men.
[Sidenote: Indignation.]
11. _Indignation_ is that _grief_ which consisteth in the conception
of _good success_ happening to them whom they think _unworthy_
thereof. Seeing therefore men think all those unworthy whom they
hate, they think them not only unworthy of the good fortune they
have, but also of their own virtues. And of all the passions of the
mind, these two, indignation and pity, are most raised and increased
by eloquence: for, the _aggravation_ of _the calamity_, and
_extenuation_ of the _fault_, augmenteth _pity_; and the
_extenuation_ of the _worth_ of the person, together with the
magnifying of his success, which are the parts of an orator, are
able to turn these two passions into _fury_.
[Sidenote: Emulation and envy.]
12. _Emulation_ is _grief_ arising from seeing _one’s self exceeded_
or excelled by his _concurrent_, together with _hope_ to _equal_ or
exceed him in time to come, by his own ability. But, _envy_ is the
same _grief_ joined with _pleasure_ conceived in the imagination of
some _ill_ fortune that may befall him.
[Sidenote: Laughter.]
13. There is a passion that hath _no name_; but the sign of it is
that distortion of the countenance which we call _laughter_, which
is always _joy_: but what joy, what we think, and wherein we triumph
when we laugh, is not hitherto declared by any. That it consisteth
in _wit_, or, as they call it, in the _jest_, experience
_confuteth_: for men laugh at mischances and indecencies, wherein
there lieth no wit nor jest at all. And forasmuch as the same thing
is no more ridiculous when it groweth stale or usual, whatsoever it
be that moveth laughter, it must be _new_ and _unexpected_. Men
laugh often, especially such as are greedy of applause from every
thing they do well, at their own actions performed never so little
beyond their own expectations; as also at their own _jests_: and in
this case it is manifest, that the passion of laughter proceedeth
from a _sudden conception_ of some _ability_ in himself that
laugheth. Also men laugh at the _infirmities_ of others, by
comparison wherewith their own abilities are set off and
illustrated. Also men laugh at _jests_, the _wit_ whereof always
consisteth in the elegant _discovering_ and conveying to our minds
some _absurdity_ of _another_: and in this case also the passion of
laughter proceedeth from the _sudden_ imagination of our own odds
and eminency: for what is else the recommending of ourselves to our
own good opinion, by comparison with another man’s infirmity or
absurdity? For when a jest is broken upon ourselves, or friends of
whose dishonour we participate, we never laugh thereat. I may
therefore conclude, that the passion of laughter is nothing else but
_sudden glory_ arising from some sudden _conception_ of some
_eminency_ in ourselves, by _comparison_ with the _infirmity_ of
others, or with our own formerly: for men laugh at the follies of
themselves past, when they come suddenly to remembrance, except they
bring with them any present dishonour. It is no wonder therefore
that men take heinously to be laughed at or derided, that is,
triumphed over. Laughter _without offence_, must be at _absurdities_
and infirmities _abstracted_ from persons, and when all the company
may laugh together: for laughing to one’s-self putteth all the rest
into jealousy and examination of themselves. Besides, it is vain
glory, and an argument of little worth, to think the infirmity of
another, sufficient matter for his triumph.
[Sidenote: Weeping.]
14. The passion opposite hereunto, whose signs are another
distortion of the face with tears, called _weeping_, is the _sudden
falling out with_ ourselves, or sudden conception of defect; and
therefore _children_ weep often; for seeing they think that every
thing ought to be given them which they desire, of necessity every
repulse must be a check of their expectation, and puts them in mind
of their too much weakness to make themselves masters of all they
look for. For the same cause _women_ are more apt to weep than men,
as being not only more accustomed to have their wills, but also to
measure their powers by the power and love of others that protect
them. Men are apt to weep that prosecute revenge, when the revenge
is suddenly stopped or frustrated by the repentance of their
adversary; and such are the tears of _reconciliation_. Also
revengeful men are subject to this passion upon the beholding those
men they pity, and suddenly remember they cannot help. Other weeping
in men proceedeth for the most part from the same cause it
proceedeth from in women and children.
[Sidenote: Lust.]
15. The appetite which men call _lust_, and the fruition that
appertaineth thereunto, is a _sensual_ pleasure, but _not only_
that; there is in it also a delight of the mind: for it consisteth
of two appetites together, to _please_, and to _be pleased_; and the
delight men take in delighting, is not sensual, but a pleasure or
joy of the mind consisting in the imagination of the power they have
so much to please. But the name _lust_ is used where it is
condemned; otherwise it is called by the general word _love_: for
the passion is one and the same indefinite desire of different sex,
as natural as hunger.
[Sidenote: Love.]
16. Of _love_, by which is understood the joy man taketh in the
fruition of any _present_ good, hath been already spoken of in the
first section, chapter VII. under which is contained the _love_ men
bear to one _another_, or pleasure they take in one another’s
company; and by which nature, men are said to be sociable. But there
is another kind of love, which the Greeks call Ἔρως, and is that
which we mean, when we say that a man is in love: forasmuch as this
passion cannot be without diversity of sex, it cannot be denied but
that it _participateth_ of that indefinite _love_ mentioned in the
former section. But there is a great difference betwixt the desire
of a man _indefinite_, and the same desire _limited ad hunc_; and
this is that _love_ which is the great theme of poets: but
notwithstanding their praises, it must be defined by the word
_need_: for it is a conception a man hath of his need of _that one
person_ desired. The cause of this passion is _not_ always _nor_ for
the most part _beauty_, or other quality in the beloved, unless
there be withal _hope_ in the person that loveth: which may be
gathered from this, that in great difference of persons, the
_greater_ have often fallen in love with the _meaner_; but not
contrary. And from hence it is, that for the most part they have
much better fortune in love, whose hopes are built upon something
_in_ _their person_, than those that trust to their _expressions_
and _service_; and they that _care less_, than they that _care
more_: which not perceiving, many men cast away their services, as
one arrow after another, till, in the end, together with their
hopes, they lose their wits.
[Sidenote: Charity.]
17. There is yet another passion sometimes called _love_, but more
properly _good will_ or _charity_. There can be no greater argument
to a man, of his own power, than to find himself able not only to
accomplish his own desires, but also to _assist_ other men in
theirs: and this is that conception wherein consisteth _charity_. In
which, first, is contained that _natural affection_ of parents to
their children, which the Greeks call Στοργὴ, as _also_, that
affection wherewith men seek to _assist_ those that adhere unto
them. But the affection wherewith men many times bestow their
benefits on _strangers_, is not to be called charity, but either
_contract_, whereby they seek to purchase friendship; or _fear_,
which maketh them to purchase peace. The opinion of Plato concerning
honourable love, delivered according to his custom in the person of
Socrates, in the dialogue intituled _Convivium_, is this, that a man
full and pregnant with wisdom and other virtues, naturally seeketh
out some beautiful person, of age and capacity to conceive, in whom
he may, without sensual respects, engender and produce the like. And
this is the _idea_ of the then noted _love_ of Socrates wise and
continent, to Alcibiades young and beautiful: in which, love is not
the sought honour, but the issue of his knowledge; contrary to the
common love, to which though issue sometimes follows, yet men seek
not that, but to please, and to be pleased. It should be therefore
this charity, or desire to assist and advance others. But why then
should the wise seek the ignorant, or be more charitable to the
beautiful than to others? There is something in it savouring of the
use of that time: in which matter though Socrates be acknowledged
for continent, yet the _continent_ have the passion they _contain_,
as _much_ and more than they that _satiate_ the appetite; which
maketh me suspect this _platonic_ love for merely sensual; but with
an honourable pretence for the old to haunt the company of the young
and beautiful.
[Sidenote: Admiration and curiosity.]
18. Forasmuch as all _knowledge_ beginneth from _experience_,
therefore also _new experience_ is the beginning of _new knowledge_,
and the increase of experience the beginning of the increase of
knowledge. Whatsoever therefore happeneth new to a man, giveth him
matter of _hope_ of _knowing_ somewhat that he knew _not before_.
And this hope and expectation of future knowledge from anything that
happeneth new and strange, is that passion which we commonly call
_admiration_; and the same considered as appetite, is called
_curiosity_, which is appetite of knowledge. As in the discerning of
faculties, _man leaveth_ all community with _beasts_ at the faculty
of _imposing names_; so also doth he surmount their nature at this
_passion_ of _curiosity_. For when a beast seeth anything new and
strange to him, he considereth it so far only as to discern whether
it be likely to serve his turn, or hurt him, and accordingly
approacheth nearer to it, or fleeth from it: whereas man, who in
most events remembereth in what manner they were caused and begun,
looketh for the cause and beginning of everything that ariseth new
unto him. And from this passion of admiration and curiosity, have
arisen not only the invention of names, but also supposition of such
causes of all things as they thought might produce them. And from
this beginning is derived all _philosophy_; as _astronomy_ from the
admiration of the course of heaven; _natural philosophy_ from the
strange effects of the elements and other bodies. And from the
degrees of curiosity, proceed also the degrees of knowledge amongst
men: for, to a man in the chase of riches or authority, (which in
respect of knowledge are but sensuality) it is a diversity of little
pleasure, whether it be the motion of the sun or the earth that
maketh the day, or to enter into other contemplations of any strange
accident, otherwise than whether it conduce or not to the end he
pursueth. Because _curiosity_ is _delight_, therefore also _novelty_
is so, but especially that novelty from which a man conceiveth an
_opinion_ true or false of _bettering_ his own estate; for, in such
case, they stand affected with the hope that all gamesters have
while the cards are shuffling.
[Sidenote: Of the passion of them that flock to see danger.]
19. Divers other passions there be, but they want names: whereof
some nevertheless have been by most men observed: for example; from
what passion proceedeth it, that men take _pleasure_ to _behold_
from the shore the _danger_ of them that are at sea in a tempest, or
in fight, or from a safe castle to behold two armies charge one
another in the field? It is certainly, in the whole sum, _joy_; else
men would never flock to such a spectacle. Nevertheless there is in
it both _joy_ and _grief_: for as there is novelty and remembrance
of our own security present, which is _delight_; so there is also
_pity_, which is grief; but the delight is so far predominant, that
men usually are content in such a case to be spectators of the
misery of their friends.
[Sidenote: Of magnanimity and pusillanimity.]
20. _Magnanimity_ is no more than _glory_, of the which I have
spoken in the first section; but _glory well grounded_ upon certain
experience of a power sufficient to attain his end in open manner.
And _pusillanimity_ is the _doubt_ of that. Whatsoever therefore is
a sign of _vain glory_, the same is also a sign of _pusillanimity_:
for sufficient power maketh glory a spur to one’s end. To be
_pleased_ or _displeased_ with _fame true_ or _false_, is a _sign_
of that same, because he that relieth on fame hath not his success
in his own power. Likewise _art_ and _fallacy_ are signs of
pusillanimity, because they depend not upon our own power, but the
ignorance of others. Also _proneness_ to _anger_, because it argueth
difficulty of proceeding. Also _ostentation_ of _ancestors_, because
all men are more inclined to make shew of their own power when they
have it, than of another’s. To be at _enmity_ and contention with
_inferiors_, is a sign of the same, because it proceedeth from want
of power to end the war. To _laugh_ at others, because it is an
affectation of glory from other men’s infirmities, and not from any
ability of their own. Also _irresolution_, which proceedeth from
want of power enough to contemn the little difficulties that make
deliberations hard.
[Sidenote: A view of the passions represented in a race.]
21. The comparison of the life of man to a race, though it hold not
in every part, yet it holdeth so well for this our purpose, that we
may thereby both see and remember almost all the passions before
mentioned. But this _race_ we must suppose to have no other _goal_,
nor other _garland_, but being foremost, and in it:
To endeavour, is _appetite_.
To be remiss, is _sensuality_.
To consider them behind, is _glory_.
To consider them before, is _humility_.
To lose ground with looking back, _vain glory_.
To be holden, _hatred_.
To turn back, _repentance_.
To be in breath, _hope_.
To be weary, _despair_.
To endeavour to overtake the next, _emulation_.
To supplant or overthrow, _envy_.
To resolve to break through a stop foreseen, _courage_.
To break through a sudden stop, _anger_.
To break through with ease, _magnanimity_.
To lose ground by little hindrances, _pusillanimity_.
To fall on the sudden, is disposition to _weep_.
To see another fall, is disposition to _laugh_.
To see one out-gone whom we would not, is _pity_.
To see one out-go whom we would not, is _indignation_.
To hold fast by another, is to _love_.
To carry him on that so holdeth, is _charity_.
To hurt one’s-self for haste, is _shame_.
Continually to be out-gone, is _misery_.
Continually to out-go the next before, is _felicity_.
And to forsake the course, is to _die_.
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