CHAPTER X.

1. Having shewed in the precedent chapters, that sense proceedeth

from the action of external objects upon the _brain_, or some

internal _substance_ of the _head_; and that the _passions_ proceed

from the alteration there made, and continued to the _heart_: it is

consequent in the next place, seeing the diversity of degrees in

knowledge in divers men, to be greater than may be ascribed to the

divers _tempers_ of their brain, to declare _what other causes_ may

produce such _odds_, and excess of _capacity_, as we daily observe

in one man above another. As for that difference which ariseth from

_sickness_, and such accidental distempers, I omit the same, as

impertinent to this place, and consider it only in such as have

their _health_, and _organs_ well disposed. If the difference were

in the natural temper of the brain, I can imagine no reason why the

same should not appear first and most of all in the senses, which

being equal both in the wise and less wise, infer an equal temper in

the common organ (namely the brain) of all the senses.

2. But we see by experience, that _joy_ and _grief_ proceed _not_ in

_all_ men from the same _causes_, and that men differ very much in

the constitution of the body; whereby, that which helpeth and

furthereth _vital constitution_ in one, and is therefore delightful,

hindereth it and crosseth it in another, and therefore causeth

grief. The _difference_ therefore of _wits_ hath its original _from_

the _different passions_, and from the _ends_ to which the appetite

leadeth them.

3. And first, those men whose ends are _sensual_ delight, and

generally are addicted to _ease_, _food_, _onerations_ and

_exonerations_ of the body, must needs be the _less_ thereby

delighted with those _imaginations_ that _conduce not_ to those

ends, such as are imaginations of _honour_ and _glory_, which, as I

have said before, have respect to the future: for sensuality

consisteth in the pleasure of the senses, which please only for the

present, and take away the inclination to observe such things as

conduce to honour, and consequently maketh men less curious, and

less ambitious, whereby they less consider the way either to

knowledge or other power; in which two consisteth all the excellency

of power cognitive. And this is it which men call _dulness_, and

proceedeth from the appetite of sensual or bodily delight. And it

may well be conjectured, that such passion hath its beginning from a

_grossness_ and _difficulty_ of the _motion_ of the _spirit_ about

the _heart_.

4. The contrary hereunto, is that _quick ranging_ of mind described,

chapter IV. section 3, which is joined with _curiosity_ of comparing

the things that come into the mind, one with another: in which

comparison, a man delighteth himself either with finding unexpected

_similitude_ of things, otherwise much unlike, in which men place

the excellency of _fancy_, and from whence proceed those grateful

similies, metaphors, and other tropes, by which both _poets_ and

_orators_ have it in their power to make things please or displease,

and shew well or ill to others, as they like themselves; or else in

discerning suddenly _dissimilitude_ in things that otherwise appear

the same. And this virtue of the mind is that by which men attain to

exact and perfect _knowledge_; and the pleasure thereof consisteth

in continual instruction, and in distinction of places, persons, and

seasons, and is commonly termed by the name of _judgment_: for, to

judge is nothing else, but to distinguish or discern: and both

_fancy_ and _judgment_ are commonly comprehended under the name of

_wit_, which seemeth to be a tenuity and agility of spirits,

contrary to that restiness of the spirits supposed in those that are

dull.

5. There is another defect of the mind, which men call _levity_,

which betrayeth also _mobility_ in the spirits, but in excess. An

example whereof is in them that in the midst of any serious

discourse, have their minds diverted to every little jest or witty

observation; which maketh them depart from their discourse by a

parenthesis, and from that parenthesis by another, till at length

they either lose themselves, or make their narration like a dream,

or some studied nonsense. The passion from whence this proceedeth,

is _curiosity_, but with _too much equality_ and indifference: for

when all things make equal impression and delight, they equally

throng to be expressed.

6. The virtue opposite to this defect is _gravity_, or steadiness;

in which the end being the great and master-delight, directeth and

keepeth in the way thereto all other thoughts.

7. The _extremity_ of dullness is that _natural folly_ which may be

called _stolidity_: but the extreme of _levity_, though it be

natural folly distinct from the other, and obvious to every man’s

observation, I know _not_ how to call it.

8. There is a fault of the mind called by the Greeks Ἀμαϑια, which

is _indocibility_, or _difficulty_ of being taught; the which must

needs arise from a _false opinion_ that they _know already_ the

truth of that is called in question: for certainly men are not

otherwise so unequal in capacity as the _evidence_ is unequal

between what is taught by the mathematicians, and what is commonly

discoursed of in other books: and therefore if the minds of men were

all of white paper, they would almost equally be disposed to

acknowledge whatsoever should be in right method, and by right

ratiocination delivered to them: but when men have once acquiesced

in untrue opinions, and registered them as authentical records in

their minds, it is no less impossible to speak intelligibly to such

men, than to write legibly upon a paper already scribbled over. The

immediate _cause_ therefore of _indocibility_, is _prejudice_; and

of prejudice, false opinion of our own knowledge.

9. Another, and a principal defect of the mind, is that which men

call _madness_, which appeareth to be nothing else but some

_imagination_ of some such _predominancy_ above the _rest_, that we

have _no passion but from it_; and this conception is nothing else

but excessive _vain glory_, or _vain dejection_; which is most

probable by these examples following, which proceed in appearance

every one of them from _pride_, or some _dejection_ of mind. As

first, we have had the example of one that preached in Cheapside

from a cart there, instead of a pulpit, that he himself was Christ,

which was _spiritual_ pride or madness. We have had also divers

examples of learned madness, in which men have manifestly been

distracted upon any occasion that hath put them in remembrance of

their own ability. Amongst the learned men, may be remembered, I

think also, those that determine of the time of the world’s end, and

other such the points of prophecy. And the gallant madness of Don

Quixote is nothing else but an expression of such height of vain

glory as reading of _romance_ may produce in pusillanimous men. Also

rage and madness of love, are but great indignations of them in

whose brains is predominant contempt from their enemies, or their

mistresses. And the _pride_ taken in _form_ and _behaviour_, hath

made divers men run mad, and to be so accounted, under the name of

fantastic.

10. And as these are the examples of extremities, so also are there

examples too many of the degrees, which may therefore be well

accounted follies; as it is a degree of the _first_, for a man,

without certain evidence, to think himself to be _inspired_, or to

have any other effect of God’s holy spirit than other godly men

have. Of the _second_, for a man continually to speak his mind in a

_cento_ of other men’s Greek or Latin sentences. Of the _third_,

much of the present gallantry in love and duel. Of _rage_, a degree

is _malice_; and of _fantastic_ madness, _affectation_.

11. As the former examples exhibit to us madness, and the degrees

thereof, proceeding from the excess of self-opinion; so also there

be other examples of madness, and the degrees thereof, proceeding

from _too much vain fear_ and _dejection_; as in those melancholy

men that have imagined themselves brittle as glass, or have had some

other like imagination: and degrees hereof are all those exorbitant

and causeless fears, which we commonly observe in melancholy

persons.

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The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 04 (of 11) · 第 10 / 18 章