1, 2. Wherein consist the pleasures of sense. 3, 4. Of the
imagination, or conception of power in man. 5. Honour,
honourable, worth. 6. Signs of honour. 7. Reverence. 8.
Passions.
[Sidenote: Wherein consist the pleasures of sense.]
1. Having in the first section of the precedent chapter presupposed,
that motion and _agitation of the brain_ which we call conception,
to be continued _to the heart_, and there to be called _passion_; I
have therefore obliged myself, as far forth as I am able, to search
out and declare _from what_ conception _proceedeth_ every one of
those _passions_ which we commonly take notice of: for, seeing the
things that please and displease, are innumerable, and work
innumerable ways, men have not taken notice but of a very few, which
also are many of them without name.
2. And first, we are to consider, that of conceptions there are
_three sorts_, whereof one is of that which is _present_, which is
_sense_; another, of that which is _past_, which is _remembrance_;
and the third, of that which is _future_, which we call
_expectation_: all which have been manifestly declared in the second
and third chapters; and every of these conceptions is _pleasure_ or
_pain_ _present_. And first for the pleasures of the _body_ which
affect the sense of _touch_ and _taste_, as far forth as they be
_organical_, their conceptions are _sense_: so also is the pleasure
of all _exonerations_ of nature: all which passions I have before
named, _sensual pleasures_; and their contrary, _sensual pains_: to
which also may be added the pleasures and displeasures of _odours_,
if any of them shall be found organical, which for the most part
they are not, as appeareth by this experience which every man hath,
that the same smells, when they seem to proceed from others,
displease, though they proceed from ourselves; but when we think
they proceed from ourselves, they displease not, though they come
from others: the displeasure of this is a conception of hurt thereby
from those odours, as being unwholesome, and is therefore a
conception of evil to come, and not present. Concerning the delight
of _hearing_, it is diverse, and the organ itself not affected
thereby: _simple sounds_ please by _equality_, as the sound of a
bell or lute: insomuch as it seems, an equality continued by the
percussion of the object upon the ear, is pleasure; the contrary is
called _harshness_, such as is grating, and some other sounds, which
do not always affect the body, but only sometime, and that with a
kind of horror beginning at the teeth. _Harmony_, or many sounds
together agreeing, please by the same reason as the _unison_, which
is the sound of equal strings equally stretched. Sounds that differ
in any _height_, please by _inequality and equality alternate_, that
is to say, the higher note striketh twice, for one stroke of the
other, whereby they strike together every second time; as is well
proved by Galileo, in the first dialogue concerning local motion:
where he also sheweth, that two sounds differing a _fifth_, delight
the ear by an _equality_ of striking _after two inequalities_; for
the higher note striketh the ear thrice, while the other strikes but
twice. In like manner he sheweth wherein consisteth the pleasure of
concord, and the displeasure of discord, in other difference of
notes. There is yet _another_ pleasure and displeasure of sounds,
which consisteth in _consequence of one note after another,
diversified_ both by _accent_ and _measure_; whereof that which
pleaseth is called an _air_; but for what reason one succession in
tone and measure is a more pleasing air than another, I confess I
know not; but I conjecture the reason to be, for that some of them
imitate and revive some passion which otherwise we take no notice
of, and the other not; for _no air pleaseth but for a time_, no more
doth imitation. Also the pleasures of the _eye_ consist in a certain
_equality_ of _colour_: for _light_, the most glorious of all
colours, is made by _equal_ operation of the object; whereas
_colour_ is _perturbed_, that is to say, unequal light, as hath been
said, chapter II. section 8. And therefore colours, the more
equality is in them, the more resplendent they are; and as _harmony_
is pleasure to the _ear_, which consisteth of _divers sounds_; so
perhaps may some mixture of _divers colours_ be _harmony_ to the
_eye_, more than another mixture. There is yet another delight by
the _ear_, which happeneth only to men of skill in music, which is
of another nature, and not, as these, conception of the present, but
rejoicing of their own skill; of which nature are the passions of
which I am to speak next.
[Sidenote: Of the imagination, or conception of power in man.]
3. Conception of the _future_, is but a _supposition_ of the _same_,
proceeding from _remembrance_ of what is past; and we so far
_conceive_ that anything _will be hereafter_, as we _know_ there is
_something at the present_ that hath power to produce it: and that
anything hath power now to produce another thing hereafter, we
cannot conceive, but by remembrance that it hath produced the like
heretofore. Wherefore all conception of future, is conception of
power able to produce something. Whosoever therefore expecteth
pleasure to come, must conceive withal some power in himself by
which the same may be attained. And because the passions, whereof I
am to speak next, consist in conception of the future, that is to
say, in conception of power past, and the act to come; before I go
any further, I must in the next place speak somewhat concerning this
power.
4. By this power I mean the same with the faculties of the _body_,
_nutritive_, _generative_, _motive_, and of the _mind_, _knowledge_;
and besides these, such _further_ power as by them is acquired,
_viz._ _riches_, _place_ of authority, _friendship_ or _favour_, and
_good fortune_; _which_ last is really nothing else but the favour
of God Almighty. The _contraries_ of these are _impotencies_,
_infirmities_, or _defects_ of the said powers respectively. And
because the power of one man resisteth and hindereth the effects of
the power of another, _power_ simply is no more, but the _excess_ of
the power of one above that of another: for equal powers opposed,
destroy one another; and such their opposition is called contention.
[Sidenote: Honour, honourable, worth.]
5. _signs_ by which we know our own _power_, are those _actions_
which proceed from the same; and the signs by which _other men_ know
it, are such _actions_, _gesture_, _countenance_ and _speech_, as
usually such powers produce: and the _acknowledgment_ of power is
called _honour_; and to honour a man inwardly, is to conceive or
acknowledge that that man hath the odds or excess of that power
above him with whom he contendeth or compareth himself. And
honourable are those signs for which one man acknowledgeth power or
excess above his concurrent in another: as for example, _beauty_ of
person, consisting in a lively aspect of the countenance, and other
_signs_ of _natural heat_, are honourable, being signs precedent of
power _generative_, and much issue; as also, general reputation
among those of the other sex, because signs consequent of the same.
And actions proceeding from _strength of body_, and open force, are
honourable, as signs consequent of power _motive_, such as are
victory in battle or duel; _a d’avoir tué son homme_. Also to
adventure upon great exploits and danger, as being a sign consequent
of opinion of our own strength, and that opinion a sign of the
strength itself. And to teach or persuade are honourable, because
they be signs of _knowledge_. And riches are honourable; as signs of
the power that acquired them: and gifts, cost, and magnificence of
houses, apparel, and the like, are honourable, as signs of riches.
And _nobility_ is honourable by reflection, as a sign of power in
the ancestors: and _authority_, because a sign of the strength,
wisdom, favour or riches by which it is attained. And _good fortune_
or casual prosperity is honourable, because a sign of the favour of
God, to whom is to be ascribed all that cometh to us by fortune, no
less than that we attain unto by industry. And the contraries and
defects of these signs are dishonourable; and according to the signs
of honour and dishonour, so we estimate and make the value or worth
of a man: for so much worth is every thing, as a man will give for
the use of all it can do.
[Sidenote: Signs of honour.]
6. The _signs_ of _honour_ are those by which we perceive that one
man acknowledgeth the power and worth of another; such as these, to
_praise_, to _magnify_, to _bless_, to call happy, to pray or
supplicate to, to thank, to offer unto or present, to obey, to
hearken unto with attention, to speak to with consideration, to
approach unto in decent manner, to keep distance from, to give way
to, and the like, which are the honour the inferior giveth to the
superior.
But the _signs of honour_ from the superior to the inferior, are
such as these; to _praise_ or prefer him before his concurrent, to
hear more willingly, to speak to him more familiarly, to admit him
nearer, to employ him rather, to ask his advice rather, to take his
opinions, and to give him _any gifts rather than money_; or if
money, so much as may _not_ imply his _need_ of a _little_: for need
of a little is greater poverty than need of much. And this is enough
for examples of the signs of honour and power.
[Sidenote: Reverence.]
7. _Reverence_ is the conception we have concerning another, that he
hath the _power_ to do unto us both _good_ and _hurt_, but _not_ the
_will_ to do us _hurt_.
[Sidenote: Passions.]
8. In the pleasure men have, or displeasure from the signs of honour
or dishonour done unto them, consisteth the nature of the passions,
whereof we are to speak in the next chapter.
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