wanted to keep, the most important of which were Dresden, Danzig,
Stettin, Zamosk, Torgau and Modlin, were already in the hands of
the enemy.
The circumstances surrounding the taking over of the first two of
these fortresses do not reflect much honour on the allies. After
the battle of Leipzig, Napoleon withdrew with the remains of his
army, leaving at Dresden a corps of 25000 men commanded by
Marshal Saint-Cyr, who tried by force of arms to cut a passage
through the enemies who blocked his way. He drove them back
several times, but eventually overcome by stronger forces and
short of food, he was compelled to accept the honourable
capitulation which was offered to him. This stipulated that the
garrison would keep its arms, would not be made prisoners of war
and would march back to France in day-long stages.
The Marshal wanted his troops to move as a corps and to bivouac
all together at the same place, which would allow them to defend
themselves in case of treachery; but the enemy generals pointed
out that owing to the exhaustion of the countryside, it would be
impossible to provide at any one place twenty-five thousand
rations, and the French marshal had to accept this. He then
agreed that his force should be divided into several small
columns of 2 or 3000 men who would travel one or even two days
apart.
For the first few days all went well, but as soon as the last
French column had left Dresden, having handed over the fort and
the munitions of war, the foreign generals announced that they
did not have the authority to sign the capitulation without the
agreement of their generalissimo, Prince Schwartzenberg, and as
he did not approve, the agreement was null and void. They offered
to allow our troops to return to Dresden in exactly the same
state as they had been previously, that is to say with only
enough food for a few days, a shortage which they had concealed
from the enemy for as long as they occupied the place, and which,
as it was now known to them, made the offer worthless.
Our troops were indignant at this odious lack of good faith, but
what action could be taken by isolated detachments of 2 or 3000
men, whom the enemy had taken the precaution of surrounding by
battalions of their own, before they could hear of the breakdown
of the capitulation? Any resistance was impossible and our men
were forced to lay down their arms.
To the treachery practised on the field of battle, was now added
that of the breaking of agreements of capitulation. This did not
prevent the Germans from celebrating a victory, for they regarded
any measures, however despicable, as justified in order to defeat
Napoleon. This new morality was put into operation at Danzig.
General Rapp had defended this place for a long time, but having
run out of food, he was compelled to surrender on condition that
the garrison would be allowed to return to France. However, in
spite of a treaty signed by the Prince of Wurtemberg, the
commander of the army which conducted the siege, the conditions
were violated and the garrison of 16000 men were sent as
prisoners to Russia where most of them died.
One of the most remarkable stories of this siege concerns a
Captain de Chambure, who asked for and obtained permission to
form an independent company, chosen from hand-picked volunteers.
They engaged on the most daring ventures, going out at night and
surprising enemy posts, getting into their entrenchments, into
their camps, destroying their siege-works under the nose of their
batteries, spiking their guns and going far into the country to
capture or pillage their convoys. Chambure, having gone out one
night with his men, surprised a Russian cantonment, set fire to
an ammunition dump, destroyed several stores and killed or
wounded one hundred and fifty men, for the loss of three of his
own; and returned to the fort in triumph.
Now, however, let us return to examine the position of the French
armies in December 1813.
Spain, the principal cause of all the catastrophes which marked
the end of Napoleon's reign, had been stripped, in the course of
the year, of all its best troops, which the Emperor had sent to
reinforce the army in Germany. However, the effective strength of
those who remained in the Iberian peninsula amounted to more than
100,000 men. A number which, although inadequate, would have
contained the enemy if Napoleon had left the command to Marshal
Soult. But as he most earnestly wished to make of his brother
Joseph a general who could defend the kingdom which he had given
him, it was to this prince, an estimable man, but no soldier,
that the Emperor entrusted the command of the armies of Spain. He
gave him, it is true, as chief of staff and military advisor,
Marshal Jourdan; but the Marshal was prematurely aged and had not
been involved in active warfare since the first campaigns of the
revolution; he was so worn out, both mentally and physically,
that he inspired no confidence in the troops. So, in spite of the
talents displayed by the generals who served under the orders of
King Joseph, the Anglo-Portuguese army commanded by Lord
Wellington and helped by Spanish guerrillas, caused us
irreparable losses.
The French, under pressure at every point, had already been
compelled to abandon Madrid, the two Castiles, and to recross the
Ebro, to concentrate their main forces round the town of
Vittoria. Attacked in this position by three times their number,
they lost a battle; a loss which was made all the more disastrous
by the fact that King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan had made no
arrangements for the carrying out of a retreat, so that it became
chaotic. The King's suite, the artillery parks, the many coaches
of a crowd of Spaniards, who having taken sides with Joseph,
sought to escape the vengence of their compatriots, the wagons of
the treasury, of the military administration, etc., etc., all
found themselves piled up in confusion, so that the roads were
obstructed and the regiments had great difficulty in moving.
However they did not lose their formation, and in spite of
vigorous attacks by the enemy, the greater part of the army
managed to reach Salvatierra and the road to Pamplona, by which
the retreat was made.
The battle of Vittoria demonstrated the talent and courage of
General Clausel, who rallied the army and gave it some direction.
It was, however, an unhappy day. The French lost 6000 men killed,
wounded or taken prisoner, and left in the hands of the enemy a
large part of their artillery and almost all their baggage.
Despite this set-back, the troops, whose morale was excellent,
could have remained in Navarre, with the aid of the fortress of
Pamplona and the Pyrenees mountains, but King Joseph ordered the
continuation of the retreat and the crossing of the Bidassoa,
where our rear-guard, commanded by General Foy, was ordered to
blow up the bridge. So, from the end of June, we abandoned that
part of the Spanish frontier; nevertheless, Marshal Suchet still
held out in Aragon (The region of Zaragossa. Ed.), and Catalonia,
and in the kingdom of Valencia; but the results of the battle of
Vittoria had so much weakened us that when Wellington sent
reinforcements to central Spain, Suchet found it necessary to
leave the town and the kingdom.
These events were taking place at a time when Napoleon was still
triumphant in Germany. As soon as he was told of the state of
affairs across the Pyrenees, he hastily revoked the powers which
he had given to King Joseph and Marshal Jourden, and appointed
Marshal Soult commander of all the armies in Spain.
Soult, after re-organising the divisions, made a great effort to
help the French garrison left in Pamplona, but in vain; they were
forced to capitulate and Marshal Soult had to take his troops
back across the Bidassoa. The fortress of San-Sebastian, governed
by General Rey, held out for a long time; but was eventually
taken by assault by the Anglo-Portuguese, who, ignoring the laws
of humanity, robbed, raped and massacred the unfortunate
inhabitants of this Spanish town, although they were their
allies! The English officers made no attempt to stop these
atrocities, which went on for three days, to the shame of
Wellington, his generals, and the English.
Marshal Soult defended the Pyrenees foot by foot, and beat
Wellington on several occasions; but the greater numbers at the
latter's disposal allowed him unceasingly to take the offensive,
so that he was able eventually to cross our frontier and set up
his headquarters in Saint-Jean de Luz, the first town in France,
which had never previously been lost, even during the defeats
suffered by Francis I, or the disastrous wars of the end of the
reign of Louis XIV.
It was evident that after the defection of the German troops at
Leipzig, Marshal Soult could not hope to keep in the army of the
Pyrenees several thousand soldiers from across the Rhine. They
all went over to the enemy in a single night, thus augmenting
Wellington's strength.
However, Marshal Soult, after concentrating several divisions
below the ramparts of Bayonne, once more attacked the
Anglo-Portuguese. On the 9th of December, at Saint-Pierre de
Rube, there was a battle which lasted for five days, and was one
of the bloodiest of the war, for it cost the enemy 16,000 lives
and the French 10,000, but we were able to remain in position
around Bayonne.
Before these events in the Pyrenees, Marshal Suchet, having
learned of the reverses suffered by Napoleon in Germany, realised
that it would be impossible for him to remain in the middle of
Spain, and prepared to return to France. To do this he withdrew
to Tarragon, where after taking the garrison into his army he
blew up the ramparts. The retreat, although harried by the
Spanish, was carried out in good order, and by the end of
December 1813, Suchet and the troops under his command were
established in Gerona.
To complete this examination of the position of the French armies
at the end of 1813, one needs to recall that in the spring of
that year, the Emperor, who distrusted Austria, had built up in
the Tyrol and in his kingdom of Italy, a large army, the command
of which he had given to his step-son Eugene de Beauharnais, the
viceroy of the country. This prince was a good man, very gentle
and greatly devoted to the Emperor, but although much more of a
soldier than King Joseph of Spain, he lacked many of the
qualities required to lead an army. The Emperor's affection for
Eugene led him astray in this matter.
It was on the 24th of August, the day when the armistice between
Napoleon and the allies was due to expire, that the Austrians
abandoned their neutrality and declared themselves our enemies.
The Italian troops continued to serve with us, but the Dalmatians
(Croats) left us to join the Austrians. Prince Eugene had under
his command a number of excellent lieutenants, but the fighting
was never very strenuous because the commanders on both sides
realised that the events in Germany would determine the outcome
of the campaign. There were however, a number of actions, with
various results. In the end the larger forces of the Austrians,
who were shortly joined by an English contingent which
disembarked in Tuscany forced the viceroy to lead the
Franco-Italian army beyond the Adige.
In November came news of the defection of Murat, the King of
Naples. The Emperor, to whom he owed everything, could not at
first believe it. It was, however, only too true. Murat had
joined forces with the Austrians, against whom he had fought for
so long, and his troops already occupied Bologna. Such is the
volatility of the Italians that everywhere they welcomed with
acclamation the Austro-Neapolitans, whom they had previously
detested, and whom they would soon hate even more. By December,
the vice-roi's army of only 43,000 men, occupied Verona and its
surroundings.
The Emperor, seeing the whole of Europe combined against him,
could not fail to realise that the first condition which a peace
would demand of him would be the re-installment of the Bourbons
on the throne of Spain. He decided therefore to do of his own
volition what he would be forced to do later: he set free King
Ferdinand, who had been detained at Valancay, and ordered
Suchet's army to retire behind the Pyrenees.
Thus, at the end of 1813, we had lost all of Germany, all of
Spain, the greater part of Italy, and Wellington's army, which
had crossed the Bidassoa and the western Pyrenees, was encamped
on French soil and threatening Bayonne, Navarre, and Bordeaux.
Chap. 34.
I began the year 1814 at Mons. Where I did not undergo such
physical dangers as I had done in previous years, but where I
suffered much more mentally.
As I had left, at Nimeguen, all the troopers of my regiment who
still had horses, I had none at Mons, where the depot was
situated, except dismounted men, for whom I was trying to get
horses from the Ardennes, when events prevented this.
On the 1st of January, the enemies, after hesitating for three
months before invading France, crossed the Rhine at several
points, the two most important of these being firstly at Kaub, a
market town situated between Bingen and Coblentz, where a rocky
gorge greatly reduces the width of the river, and then at Basle
where the Swiss handed over the stone bridge, in violation of
their neutrality, a neutrality which they maintain or abandon
according to their interests.
It is estimated that some five to six hundred thousand allied
soldiers entered a France exhausted by twenty-five years of war,
half of whose troops were prisoners in foreign lands, and many of
whose provinces were ready to defect on the first suitable
occasion, amongst which was that containing the department of
Jemmapes, of which Mons was the principal town.
This huge area of rich country which had been annexed to France,
firstly "de facto" by the war of 1792, and then by right after
the treaty of Amiens, had been so accustomed to this union that
after the disasters of the Russian campaign, it had shown great
enthusiasm and made considerable sacrifices to help the Emperor
to put his troops back on a sound footing. Men, horses,
equipment, clothing... it had complied with all demands without a
murmur! But the losses we had suffered in Germany had discouraged
the Belgians, and I found the attitude of the populace had
completely changed. They loudly regretted the paternal government
of the house of Austria, under which they had lived for so long,
and were most anxious to separate themselves from France, whose
continual wars were ruining their trade and industry. In a word,
Belgium awaited only a favourable moment to revolt, an event
which would be the more serious for us because, by its
geographical situation, the province was in the rear of the
weakened army corps which we still had on the Rhine. The Emperor
sent some troops to Brussels, whom he placed under the command of
General Maisons, a capable and very determined man. Maisons,
having, visited several departments, recognised that Jemmapes,
and particularly the town of Mons, was the most disaffected.
There was there, open discussion of the possibility of taking up
arms against the weak French garrison, something which its
commander general "O"... could not have prevented, for the old
general, stricken by gout, and lacking in energy, who had been
born in Belgium, seemed afraid to earn the dislike of his
compatriots. General Maisons suspended him from duty and gave me
the command of the department of Jemmapes.
My job was made more difficult because, after the inhabitants of
Liege, those who live in Borinage are the boldest and most
turbulent in all Belgium, and to control them I had only a small
unit of 400 conscripts, a few gendarmes and 200 unmounted
cavalrymen from my regiment, among whom there were some fifty men
who were born in the area and who, in case of trouble, would join
the insurgents. I could rely entirely only on the other 150
Chasseurs, who born in France, and having been in action with me,
would have followed me anywhere.
There were some good officers; those in the infantry, and in
particular the battalion commander, were very willing to back me
up.
I could not, however, disguise the fact that if it came to blows,
the two sides were not equally matched. From the hotel where I
stayed I saw every day 3 or 4,000 peasants and workmen from the
town, armed with big sticks who gathered in the main square to
listen to speeches from former Austrian officers, all of them
wealthy nobles, who had quitted the service on the union of
Belgium with France, and now spoke out against the Empire which
had loaded them with taxes, taken their children to send them to
the wars, etc.,etc. These speeches were listened to with all the
more attention, in that they were delivered by great landed
proprietors, and addressed to their tenants and employees, over
whom they wielded much influence.
Add to this that each day brought news of the advance of our
enemies, who were approaching Brussels, driving before them the
debris of Marshal Macdonald's Corps. All the French employees
left the department to take refuge in Valenciennes and Cambrai.
Finally the mayor of Mons, M. Duval of Beaulieu, an honourable
man, thought it his duty to warn me that neither my feeble
garrison nor myself were safe in the midst of an excited and
numerous population, and that I would be wise to leave the town,
a move which would not be opposed since my regiment and I had
always lived at peace with the inhabitants.
I was aware that this proposition came from a committee composed
of former Austrian officers, which had instructed the mayor to
put it to me, in the hope that I would be intimidated. I resolved
then to show my teeth, I said to M. Duval that I would be most
grateful if he would summon the town council and the leading
citizens, and that I would then give my reply to the proposals
which he had brought me.
Half an hour later, all the garrison were armed, and when the
municipal council accompanied by the wealthiest citizens had
assembled in the square, I mounted on horseback, in order to be
heard by all, and after I had told the mayor that before talking
with him and his council, I had an important order to give to my
troops, I told my men about the suggestion which had been made
that we should abandon, without a struggle, the town which had
been put in our care.
They were most indignant, and said so loudly! I added that I
could not conceal the fact that the ramparts were broken down at
several points, and a lack of artillery would make defence
difficult against regular troops, though if need be we would do
our best; but that if it was the inhabitants of the town and the
countryside who rose against us, we would not confine ourselves
to defence, we would attack with all the means at our disposal,
for we would be dealing with revolutionaries. As a consequence I
was ordering my men to take over the church tower, from where,
after a delay of half an hour and three rolls on the drums they
would fire on the occupants of the square, while patrols would
clear the streets by shooting, mainly at those who had left their
work in the country to come and do us harm. I added that if it
came to fighting, I would order, as the best means of defence,
the setting on fire of the town, in order to keep the inhabitants
busy, and I would shoot at them continually to prevent its
extinction.
This speech may seem a little drastic, but consider the critical
position in which I found myself; with no more than 700 men, few
of whom had seen action, no expectation of reinforcements, and
surrounded by a multitude which increased in size by the moment,
for the officer in charge of the detachment sent to the church
tower told me that the roads leading to the town were full of
miners from the pits of Jemmapes, heading for the town of Mons.
My little troupe and I were at risk of being wiped out if I had
not taken decisive action. My address had produced a marked
effect among the rich noblemen, the promoters of this
disturbance, and also among the townspeople, who began to
disperse, but as the peasants did not budge, I brought up two
ammunition wagons to issue a hundred cartridges to each soldier,
and when they had loaded their weapons, I ordered the three rolls
on the drums, the prelude to the fusillade.
At this frightening sound, the huge crowd which filled the square
began to run in tumult to the neighbouring streets, where each
one rushed to find shelter, and a few moments later the leaders
of the Austrian party, with the mayor at their head, came to
clutch at my hand and beg me to spare the town. I agreed on the
condition that they would send immediately to tell the miners and
workmen to go back to their homes. They hastened to comply, and
the elegant young men who were the best mounted, jumped on their
fine horses and went out through all the city gates to meet the
mob which they sent back to their villages without any
opposition.
This passive obedience confirmed me in my opinion that the
disturbance had powerful backers, and that my garrison and I
would have been held prisoner, had I not frightened the leaders
by threatening to use all means, even fire, rather than hand over
to rioters the town confided to my charge.
The Belgians are very fond of music, and it so happened that
there was a concert to be given that evening, to which I and my
officers had been invited, as was M. de Laussat, the prefect of
the department.
We agreed that we should go there as usual, which was the right
decision, for we were received with cordiality, at least on the
surface. While talking to the nobles, who had been behind the
disturbance, we put it to them that it was not for the populace
to decide by rebellion the fate of Belgium, but rather for the
contending armies; and it would be folly on their part to incite
the workmen and peasants to shed their blood, in order to hasten
by a few days a solution which would presently become evident.
An elderly Austrian general, who had retired to Mons, his
birthplace, then said to his compatriots that they had been wrong
to plot the seizure of the garrison, for that would have resulted
in much damage to the town, as no soldiers would lay down their
arms without a fight. They all agreed that this assessment was
correct, and from that day forward the garrison and the townsfolk
lived peacefully together as in the past. The people of Mons even
gave us a few days later a striking demonstration of their
support.
As the allied armies advanced, a crowd of partisans, mainly
Prussians, disguised themselves as Cossacks, and driven by the
desire for plunder they grabbed anything which had belonged to
the French administration, and had no hesitation in seizing the
goods of even non-military French citizens.