gave rise to much debate. Some maintained that Major Curely
should have killed Wittgenstein as soon as his escort returned to
fight for his rescue, others thought that having accepted his
surrender, Curely was not entitled to do so. Others again,
thought that, having once surrendered, Wittgenstein should not
have tried to escape. Whatever the rights or wrongs of these
arguments may be, when Curely was presented to the Emperor during
the crossing of the Beresina, where General Wittgenstein caused
us many losses, Napoleon said to him, "This would probably not
have happened if you had used your right to kill Wittgenstein at
Polotsk, when the Russians were trying to take him from you." In
spite of this reproach, merited or not, Curely became a colonel
shortly after, and a general in 1814.
To return now to Polotsk where the enemy, repelled on the 17th,
returned to the attack on the 18th, in so much greater numbers
that, after suffering very heavy losses, Wittgenstein's men
captured the entrenched camp. Saint-Cyr, at the head of Legrand's
and Maison's divisions, drove them out at bayonet point. Seven
times the Russians returned to the attack, and seven times the
French and the Croats drove them off, to remain finally in
control of all their positions.
Although now wounded, Saint-Cyr continued to direct his troops.
His efforts were crowned with success, for the enemy left the
field and retired into the nearby forest. 50,000 Russians had
been defeated by 15,000 of our men. There was rejoicing in the
French camp, but on the morning of the 19th we heard that General
Steinghel with 14,000 Russians had just crossed the Dvina above
Disna and was moving up the left bank to get behind Polotsk,
seize the bridges and trap Saint-Cyr's force between his own and
Wittgenstein's. And indeed it was not long before Steinghel's
advance-guard appeared, heading for Ekimania, where there were
the division of Cuirassiers and the regiments of Light Cavalry
from each of which the Marshal had retained only one squadron at
Polotsk.
At once we were all on horseback and we drove off the enemy, who
would in the end have gained the upper hand, for they were being
strongly reinforced, while we had no infantry support until
Saint-Cyr sent us three regiments taken from the divisions who
were protecting Polotsk. However, at this point Steinghel, who
had only to make a little effort to reach the bridges, stopped
short, while on the other side of the river, Wittgenstein did the
same. It seemed that the two Russian generals, after combining to
draw up an excellent plan of attack, were unwilling to put it
into operation, each one leaving it to the other to overcome the
French.
The French position was now highly critical, for on the right
bank they were pressed back by an army three time their strength
towards a town built entirely of wood and a sizeable river, with
no means of retreat except the bridges which were threatened by
Steinghel's troops on the left bank.
All the generals urged Saint-Cyr to order the evacuation of
Polotsk, but he wanted to wait for nightfall, because he felt
sure that the 50,000 Russians who faced him were waiting only for
his first backward move to throw themselves on his weakened army
and create a state of disorder in the ranks. So he stayed where
he was, and took advantage of the extraordinary inactivity of the
enemy generals to wait for the onset of the dark, which was
hastened, luckily, by a thick fog which prevented the three
armies from seeing one another. The Marshal seized this
favourable opportunity to effect his withdrawal.
The large number of guns and some cavalry squadrons who had
remained on the right bank, had already crossed the bridges in
silence, and the infantry were about to follow, their movement
invisible to the enemy, when the men of Legrand's division,
unwilling to leave their huts for the benefit of the Russians,
set them on fire. The two other divisions, believing that this
was an agreed signal, did the same and in an instant the whole
line was aflame. This great conflagration having alerted the
Russians to our retreat, all their guns opened up; their mortars
set fire to the suburbs and the town itself, toward which their
columns charged. However, the French, mainly Maison's division,
disputed every foot of ground, for the fires lit the place as if
it were day.
Polotsk was burned to the ground. The losses on both sides were
considerable. Nevertheless our retreat was carried out in an
orderly fashion: we took with us those of our wounded whom it was
possible to carry; the rest, together with a great many Russians,
perished in the flames.
It seemed that there was a complete lack of co-operation between
the leaders of the two enemy armies, for during this night of
fighting Steinghel stayed peacefully in his camp, and made no
more effort to support Wittgenstein than the latter had made to
support him on the previous day. It was only when Saint-Cyr,
after evacuating the place, had put himself beyond the reach of
Wittgenstein by burning the bridges, that Steinghel, on the
morning of the 20th, deployed his troops to attack us. But the
French force was now united on the left bank, and Saint-Cyr
mounted an assault against Steinghel, who was overcome with the
loss of more than 2000 men killed or captured.
In the course of these fierce engagements, over four days and a
night, the Russians had six generals and 10,000 men killed or
wounded, while the losses of the French and their allies did not
amount to more than 5,000, a huge difference which can be
attributed to the superior firepower of our troops, particularly
the artillery. The advantage which we had in respect of numbers
was in part compensated for by the fact that the wounds which
Marshal Saint-Cyr had suffered would deprive the army of a leader
in whom it had entire confidence. It was necessary to replace
him. The Comte de Wrede claimed that his position as commander in
chief of the Bavarian Corps entitled him to command the French
divisional generals, but they refused to obey a foreigner. So
Saint-Cyr, although in much pain, agreed to remain in control of
the two army corps, and ordered a retreat towards Oula, in order
to reach Smoliany and thus protect on one side the road from
Orscha to Borisoff by which the Emperor was returning from
Moscow.
This retreat was so well organised that Wittgenstein and
Steinghel, who, after repairing the bridges across the Dvina,
were following our trail with 50,000 men, did not dare to attack
us, although we had no more than 12,000 combatants; and they
advanced only fifteen leagues in eight days. As for the Comte de
Wrede, his injured pride led him to refuse to accept
instructions, so he marched off on his own, with the thousand
Bavarians which he had left and a brigade of French cavalry which
he had acquired by subterfuge, having told General Corbineau that
he had received orders to this effect, which was not the case.
His presumption was soon punished: he was attacked and defeated
by a Russian division. He then retired without authorisation to
Wilna, from where he reached the Nieman. The Corbineau brigade
refused to go with him and returned to join the French army, for
whom its return was a piece of good fortune, as you will see when
we come to the crossing of the Beresena.
Ordered by the Emperor, Marshal Victor, Duc de Bellune, at the
head of the 9th Army Corps consisting of 25,000 men, half of whom
came from the Confederation of the Rhine, hurried from Smolensk
to join Saint-Cyr for the purpose of driving Wittgenstein back
across the Dvina. This project would have certainly been carried
out if Saint-Cyr had been in overall command; but Victor was the
more senior of the two marshals and Saint-Cyr was unwilling to
serve under his orders, so the evening before their union which
took place at Smoliany on the 31st of October, he declared that
he could no longer continue the campaign and handing over the
command to General Legrand, he set off to return to France. The
departure of Saint-Cyr was regretted by the troops who, although
they disliked him personally, gave him credit for his courage and
his outstanding military talent. Saint-Cyr could have been a
first class army commander if he had been less egoistic and if he
had taken the trouble to gain the affection of officers and men
by caring for their welfare. No man, however, is perfect.
Marshal Victor had no sooner gathered 9th and 2nd Corps under his
command than chance offered him the opportunity of achieving a
major victory. Wittgenstein, who was unaware of this union,
relying on his superiority in numbers, had decided to attack us
at a place where his line of retreat would be through some narrow
defiles. It would only have required a combined effort from the
two corps to destroy him, for our troops were now as numerous as
his, were inspired by a better spirit and were keen for action;
but Victor, doubtful perhaps of success on terrain which he was
seeing for the first time, retreated during the night, and having
reached Sienno he put the two units into cantonment in the
district. The Russians also withdrew leaving only some Cossacks
to keep an eye on us. This state of affairs which lasted for the
first fortnight of November did the troops much good, for they
lived well, as the country offered many resources.
One day, Marshal Victor having been told that there was a
considerable enemy force in the area of a certain village,
ordered General Castex to send one of his units to reconnoitre
the place. It was for me to go. We left at dusk and reached the
village without any difficulty. It was situated in a hollow, in
the middle of a huge dried marshland and was entirely peaceful,
the inhabitants whom I interrogated with the aid of Lorentz said
that they had not seen a Russian soldier in the past month, so I
prepared to return to my base. However our return was not as
trouble-free as our journey there had been.
Although there was no mist, the night was extremely dark and I
was afraid of leading the regiment astray on the many embankments
of the marsh, which I had to cross once more; so I took as a
guide one of the villagers who seemed to me to be the least
stupid. My column had been going along in good order for half an
hour, when suddenly I saw camp fires on the slopes overlooking
the marsh. I halted the column and sent two sous-officiers to
have a look. They reported that there was a large force barring
our advance and another in our rear. I could now see fires
between me and the village which I had just left and it appeared
that I had landed, without knowing it, in the middle of an army
corps which was making ready to bivouac for the night. The
number of fires grew, and I estimated that there was a force of
about 50,000 men present and I was in the middle of it, with 700
troopers. The odds were too great, and there seemed only one
thing to do, and that was to gallop along the main embankment, on
which we were, and taking the enemy by surprise, cut a path for
ourselves with our sabres. Once free from the light of the fires,
the darkness would prevent the enemy from following us. I made
sure that all my troops knew what I proposed to do, and I have to
admit that I was very uneasy, for the enemy infantry could take
up their arms at the first cry of warning, and cause us many
casualties.
I was in this state of anxiety when the peasant who was our guide
burst into loud laughter, seconded by Lorentz. I asked them what
they were about, but they did not know enough French to explain
fully. Eventually, however, we understood that these were not
camp fires but marsh fires, or will-of-the-wisp; something none
of us had ever seen before; and so, relieved of one of the
nastiest frights I have ever had, I returned to my camp.
Chap. 17.
After several days I was given a new mission, in which we would
face not marsh fires but the muskets of the Russian dragoons. It
happened that General Castex had gone to visit Marshal Victor,
and the 24th was out on patrol, so that my regiment was alone in
the camp when there arrived two peasants, one of whom I
recognised as Captain Bourgoing, Oudinot's aide-de-camp.
The Marshal, who had gone to Wilna after he had been wounded at
Polotsk on the 18th of August, having heard that Saint-Cyr had
been wounded in his turn on the 18th of October, and had left the
army, decided to rejoin 2nd Corps and take up its command.
Oudinot knew that his troops were somewhere in the region of
Sienno and was heading for that town when, on arriving at Rasna,
he was warned by a Polish priest that a body of Russian dragoons
and some Cossacks was roaming the area. The Marshal knew that
there was a French cavalry unit at Zapole, so he wrote to the
commander of this unit to request a strong escort, and sent the
letter by Captain Bourgoing, who for additional safety disguised
himself as a peasant. It was as well that he did so, for he had
scarcely covered a league when he encountered a large detachment
of enemy cavalry, who, thinking that he was a local inhabitant,
took no notice of him. Soon after this, Captain Bourgoing heard
the sound of gunfire, and increased his pace towards Zapole.
As soon as I heard of the serious position in which the Marshal
found himself, I left with my regiment at the trot to bring him
help. It was a good thing that we arrived when we did, for
although the Marshal, joined by his aides-de-camp and some dozen
French soldiers, was barricaded in a stone house, he was on the
point of being captured by the dragoons when we arrived. When
they saw us, the enemy mounted their horses and fled. My troopers
went after them and managed to kill about twenty of them and take
some prisoners; I had two men wounded. The marshal, glad to have
escaped from the Russians, expressed his thanks, and I escorted
him back to the French cantonments where he was out of danger.
At this period in time, it seemed that none of the marshals was
prepared to recognise the right of seniority amongst themselves,
for not one of them was willing to serve under the orders of his
comrade, no matter how serious the situation. So as soon as
Oudinot took command of the 2nd Corps, Victor, rather than
remaining under his authority to join in combating Wittgenstein,
took himself off with his 25,000 men to Kokhanov. Marshal
Oudinot, left on his own, marched his men for several days round
various parts of the province before setting up his headquarters
at Tschereia, with his advance-guard at Loucoulm. It was here,
during a minor action involving Castex's brigade that I received
my promotion to colonel. If you recall that I had suffered, in
the rank of major, a wound at Znaim in Moravia, two at Miranda de
Corvo in Portugal, one at Jakoubowo, that I had fought in four
campaigns in the same rank and that finally I had been in command
of a regiment since the French entry into Russia, you may think
that I had earned my new epaulets. I was grateful to the Emperor
when I learned that he intended to keep me with the 23rd
Chasseurs, for whom I had great affection, and where I was liked
and valued. In fact this decision was welcomed by all ranks, and
the troops whom I had so often led into battle came, both
officers and men, to tell me of their satisfaction at my
remaining their commander. The good General Castex, who had
always treated me as a brother, welcomed me in front of the
regiment, and even the Colonel of the 24th, with whom I had few
dealings, came to congratulate me with all his officers, whose
respect I had acquired.
However, the situation of the French army grew worse by the day.
General Schwartzenberg, the Austrian commander-in-chief whom
Napoleon had placed on the right wing of his army, had, by an act
of low treachery, allowed the troops belonging to Admiral
Tchitchakoff to pass, and they had seized control of Minsk, from
where they threatened our rear. The Emperor must now have much
regretted that he had given the command of Lithuania to the
Dutchman Hogendorf, his aide-de-camp, who, having never been in
action, did not know what to do to save Minsk, where he could
have easily have combined the 30,000 men of the Durette, Loison,
and Dombrowski divisions which had been placed at his disposal.
The fall of Minsk, although a serious matter, was one to which
the Emperor attached little importance, for he relied on crossing
the Beresina at Borisoff, where there was a bridge protected by a
fort, in good condition and manned by a Polish regiment. The
Emperor was so confident about this that, in order to speed the
march of his army he burned all his bridging equipment at Orscha.
This was a disastrous mistake, for these pontoons would have
assured us a quick crossing of the Beresina which, in the event,
we had to effect at the cost of so much blood.
Despite his confidence in relation to the crossing, Napoleon,
when he heard of the Russian occupation of Minsk, ordered Oudinot
to proceed by forced marches to Borisoff. But we arrived there
too late, because General Bronikovski, who was in command of the
fort, seeing himself surrounded by a numerous enemy, thought it
would be a praiseworthy act to save his garrison. So instead of
putting up a determined resistance, which would have given
Oudinot the time to come to his help, he abandoned the fort,
crossed the bridge to the left bank with all his men, and set out
for Orscha to join Oudinot's corps, which he met on the road. The
Marshal gave him a very rough reception and ordered him to return
with us to Borisoff.
Not only were the town, the bridge across the Beresina, and the
fort which dominates it in the hands of Tchitchakoff, but the
Admiral, carried away by this success and anxious to challenge
the French, had marched from the town with the bulk of his army,
the vanguard of which, consisting of a strong cavalry division,
was led by General Lambert, the most competent of his
lieutenants.
As the country was open, Oudinot put ahead of his infantry the
division of Cuirassiers, and ahead of them Castex's brigade of
light cavalry.
It was about three leagues from Borisoff that the Russian
advance-guard, going in the opposite direction to us, came up
against our Cuirassiers, who having done little fighting during
the campaign, had asked to be in the front line. At the sight of
this fine regiment, still strong in numbers and well-mounted,
with their cuirasses gleaming in the sunlight, the Russian
cavalry pulled up short; then, gathering their courage, they
moved forward again, at which point our Cuirassiers, in a furious
charge, overran them, killing or capturing about a thousand.
Tchitchakoff, who had been assured that Napoleon's army was no
more than a disorganised mass of men without arms, had not
expected this display of vitality, and he beat a hurried retreat
towards Berisoff.
It is well known that after putting in a charge, the big horses
of the heavy cavalry, and above all those of the Cuirassiers,
cannot continue to gallop for very long. So it was the 23rd and
the 24th Chasseurs who took up the pursuit of the enemy, while
the Cuirassiers followed in the second line, at a slower pace.
Tchitchakoff had not only made a mistake in attacking Oudinot but
he had also brought with him all the baggage of his army, which
filled more than fifteen hundred vehicles, so that the rapid
retreat of the Russians caused such confusion that the two
regiments of Castex's brigade often found themselves hindered by
the carts which had been abandoned by the enemy. This confusion
became even worse when we entered the town, where the streets
were cluttered with baggage and draught horses, through which
obstructions Russian soldiers, who had thrown away their arms,
wove their way as they sought to rejoin their units. We managed
to reach the centre of the town, but only after losing precious
time, which allowed the Russians to cross the river.
Our orders were to reach the bridge and try to cross it at the
same time as the fleeing Russians; but to do this one had to know
where the bridge was, and none of us knew the town. My troopers
brought me a Jew whom I questioned in German, but he either did
not know, or pretended not to know the language, and I could get
no information from him. I would have given a great deal to have
had with me my Polish servant, Lorentz, to act as interpreter,
but the coward had remained behind as soon as there was any
fighting. So we had to comb the town until we eventually came to
the Beresina. The river was not yet sufficiently frozen to permit
one to cross on the ice, so it was necessary to use the bridge,
but to take the bridge would require infantry, and our infantry
was still three leagues from Borisoff. To take their place,
Marshal Oudinot, who had arrived on the scene, ordered General
Castex to dismount three quarters of the troopers of the two
regiments, who armed with muskets could attack the bridge on
foot. We left the horses in the nearby streets guarded by one or
two men, and headed for the river behind General Castex, who on
this perilous enterprise wished to be at the head of his brigade.
The defeat suffered by the advance-guard had produced
consternation in Tchitchakoff's army, the utmost disorder ruled
on the side of the river which it occupied, where we could see a
mass of fugitives disappearing into the distance; so although it
had at first seemed to me that it would be extremely difficult
for dismounted troopers, without bayonets, to force a passage
over the bridge, and keep possession of it, I began to hope for a
successful outcome, for the opposition was no more than a few
musket shots. I therefore ordered that as soon as the first
platoon reached the right bank it should occupy houses adjoining
the bridge so that being in control of both ends we could defend
it until the arrival of our infantry. Suddenly, however, the
cannons of the fort thundered into action, covering the bridge
with a hail of grape-shot, which forced our little group to fall
back. A body of Russian sappers used this breathing space to set
fire to the bridge, but as their presence prevented the gunners
from firing, we took the opportunity to attack them, killing or
throwing into the river the greater part of them. Our Chasseurs
had already extinguished the fire when they were charged by a
battalion of Russian Grenadiers, and driven at bayonet point off
the bridge, which was soon set alight in many places and became a
huge bonfire whose intense heat made both sides move away.
The French had now to give up hope of crossing the Beresina at
this point, and their line of retreat was cut!...This was for us
a fatal calamity, and contributed largely to changing the face of
Europe, by shaking the Emperor on his throne.
Marshal Oudinot, once he saw that it was impossible to force a
passage over the river at Borisoff, considered that it would be
dangerous to have the town choked by the rest of his troops, so
he ordered them to halt and set up camp while they were still
some distance away. Castex's brigade stayed on its own in
Borisoff and was forbidden to communicate with the other units,
from which it was hoped to conceal for as long as possible the
disastrous news of the burning of the bridge, which they did not
hear about until forty-eight hours later.
Under the conventions of war, the enemy's baggage belongs to the
captors. General Castex therefore authorised the troopers of my
regiment and those of the 24th to help themselves to the booty
contained in the 1500 wagons and carts abandoned by the Russians
in their flight to the other side of the bridge. The quantity of
goods was immense, but as it was a hundred times more than the
brigade could carry, I called together all the men of my regiment
and told them that as we were to make a long retreat, during
which I would probably be unable to make the distributions of
rations which I had done during all the campaign, I would advise
them to provide themselves mainly with foodstuff, and think also
about protection from the cold, I reminded them that an
overloaded horse will not last for long, and that they should not
weigh theirs down with articles of no use in war. "What is more,"
I told them, "I shall hold an inspection, and anything which is
not food, clothing, or footwear will be rejected without
exception." General Castex, to avoid all argument, had planted
markers, which divided the mass of vehicles into two parts, so
that each regiment had its own area.