was bounded by the Beresina, and there were a number of
observation posts, so that our soldiers could examine the
contents of the Russian carts in safety. It appeared that the
officers of Tchitchakoff's army treated themselves well, for
there was a profusion of hams, pastries, sausages, dried fish,
smoked meat and wines of all sorts, plus an immense quantity of
ships' biscuits, rice, cheese, etc. Our men also took furs and
strong footwear, which saved the lives of many of them. The
Russian drivers had fled without taking their horses, almost all
of which were of good quality. We took the best to replace those
of which the troopers complained, and officers used some as
pack-horses to carry the foodstuff which they had acquired.
The brigade spent another day in Borisoff, and as in spite of the
precautions which had been taken, the news of the destruction of
the bridge had spread throughout 2nd Corps, Marshal Oudinot, in
order to allow all his troops to take advantage of the goods
contained in the enemy vehicles, arranged that successive
detachments from all the regiments might enter the town, to take
their share of the plunder. Notwithstanding the quantity of
goods of all kinds taken by Oudinot's men, there remained enough
for the numerous stragglers returning from Moscow on the
following day.
The supreme command ,and indeed all officers who were able to
appreciate the situation, were extremely worried. We had before
us the Beresina, on the opposite bank of which were gathered
Tchitchakoff's forces, our flanks were threatened by
Wittgenstein, Koutousoff was on our tail, and except for the
debris of the Guard and Oudinot's and Victors' corps, reduced now
to a few thousand combatants, the rest of the Grande Armee,
recently so splendid, was composed of sick men and soldiers
without weapons, whom starvation had deprived of their former
energy. Everything conspired against us; for although, owing to a
drop in the temperature, Ney had been able, a few days
previously, to escape across the frozen Nieman, we found the
Beresina unfrozen, despite the bitter cold, and we had no
pontoons with which to make a bridge.
On the 25th of November, the Emperor entered Borisoff, where
Marshal Oudinot awaited him with the 6000 men he had left.
Napoleon, and the officers of his staff were astonished at the
good order and discipline which obtained in 2nd Corps, whose
bearing contrasted so markedly with that of the wretched groups
of men whom they were leading back from Moscow. Our troops were
certainly not so smart as they would have been in barracks, but
every man had his weapons and was quite prepared to use them. The
Emperor was so impressed by their turn-out that he summoned all
the colonels and told them to inform their regiments of his
satisfaction with the way they had conducted themselves in the
many savage actions which had been fought in the province of
Polotsk.
Chap. 18.
You will recall that when the Bavarian General Comte de Wrede
made his unauthorised departure from 2nd Corps, he took with him
Corbineau's cavalry brigade, after assuring General Corbineau
that he had orders to do so, which was not true. Well, this piece
of trickery resulted in the saving of the Emperor and the remains
of his Grande Armee.
General Corbineau, dragged unwillingly away from 2nd Corps, of
which he was a part, had followed General Wrede as far as
Gloubokoye, but there he had declared that he would go no further
unless the Bavarian general showed him the order, which he
claimed to have, instructing him to keep Corbineau with him.
General Wrede was unable to do this, so Corbineau left him and
headed for Dokshitsy and the headwater of the Beresina, then,
going down the right bank of the river, he intended to reach
Borisoff, cross the bridge and take the road to Orscha to look
for Oudinot's Corps, which he thought was in the region of Bobr.
The Emperor, who had available the services of several thousand
Poles belonging to the Duchy of Warsaw, has been blamed for not
attaching, from the beginning of the campaign, some of them to
every general or even every colonel to act as interpreters, for
this would have avoided many mistakes. This was proved during the
dangerous journey of several days which the Corbineau brigade had
to undertake through unknown country, the language of whose
inhabitants none of the Frenchmen could understand, for it so
happened that among the three regiments which the General
commanded was the 8th Polish Lancers, whose officers extracted
from the local people all the necessary information. This was a
tremendous help to Corbineau.
When he was about half a day's journey from Borisoff, some
peasants told the Polish Lancers that Tchitchakoff's troops were
occupying the town, information which dashed his hopes of
crossing the Beresina; however these same peasants having
persuaded him to turn round, led him to the village of Studianka,
not far from Weselovo, four leagues above Borisoff, where there
is a ford. The three regiments crossed the ford without loss and
the General, going across country and avoiding some of
Wittgenstein's troops who were moving towards Borisoff,
eventually rejoined Oudinot on the 23rd of November at a place
called Natscha.
This daring march undertaken by Corbineau was much to his credit,
but more than that, it was a stroke of remarkable good fortune
for the army, for the Emperor, realising the impossibility of
re-building the bridge at Borisoff in the near future, resolved,
after discussing the matter with Corbineau, to cross the Beresina
at Studianka. Tchitchakoff, who had been told of the crossing at
this point effected by Corbineau's brigade, had placed a strong
division and many guns opposite Studianka, so Napoleon, to
deceive him, employed a stratagem, which although very old, is
almost always successful. He pretended that he was not interested
in Studianka and that he intended to use one of two other fords
which were below Borisoff, the most practicable of which was at
the village of Oukolada. To this end he sent ostentatiously to
the spot one of the still armed battalions, followed by a horde
of stragglers, which the enemy might take for a full-strength
division of infantry. At the tail of this column were numerous
wagons, a few guns and the division of Cuirassiers. Having
arrived at Oukolada these troops placed the guns in position, and
did all they could to look as if they were about to build a
bridge.
Told of these preparations, Tchitchakoff had no doubt that it was
Napoleon's intention to cross the river at this point so as to
reach the road to Minsk, which ran nearby. He therefore hurriedly
sent down the right bank, to face Oukoloda, the entire garrison
of Borisoff. Not only that, for some extraordinary reason, the
Russian general, who had sufficient troops to protect both the
upper and lower parts of the river, removed all of those which he
had placed previously in a position to oppose a crossing at
Studianka and sent them too down to Oukoloda. He had now
abandoned the place where the Emperor intended to build a bridge,
and had concentrated his force, uselessly, six leagues
downstream.
In addition to the error of massing all his army below Borisoff,
Tchitchakoff made a mistake which a sergeant would not have made,
and one for which his government never forgave him. The town of
Zembin, which is opposite to the ford at Studianka, is built on a
vast marsh, through which runs the road to Wilna. The road goes
over twenty-two wooden bridges which the Russian general could
have easily reduced to cinders before leaving the district, as
they were surrounded by many stacks of dry reeds. If Tchitchakoff
had done this, the French army would have been left without hope.
It would have served it nothing to have crossed the river, for it
would have been halted by the deep marshland surrounding Zembin;
but the Russian general left the bridges intact, and foolishly
went down the Beresina with all his men, leaving only about fifty
Cossacks to keep an eye on the ford.
While the Russians, taken in by Napoleon's subterfuge, were
deserting the real point of attack, Napoleon gave his orders.
Oudinot and his army Corps were to go by night to Studianka, and
there arrange for the building of two bridges, before crossing to
the right bank and occupying the area between the town of Zembin
and the river. Marshal Victor, leaving Natscha, was to form the
rear-guard. He was to drive before him all the stragglers, and
was to try to hold Borisoff for a few hours before going to
Studianka and crossing the bridges. Those were the Emperor's
orders, the execution of which in detail was frustrated by
events.
On the evening of the 25th, Corbineau's brigade, whose commander
knew the area well, proceeded up the left bank of the Beresina
towards Studianka, followed by Castex's brigade and several
battalions of light infantry; after which came the bulk of 2nd
Corps.
We were sorry to leave Borisoff where we had spent two happy
days.
We had perhaps a presentiment of the bad times which were to
come.
At daybreak on the 26th of November we arrived at Studianka,
where there were no signs of any preparation for defence on the
opposite bank, so that, had the Emperor not burned the bridging
equipment a few days previously at Orscha, the army could have
crossed immediately. The river, which some have described as
huge, is more or less as wide as the Rue Royale in Paris where it
passes the Ministry of Marine. As for its depth, it is enough to
say that the three regiments of Corbineau's brigade had forded it
seventy-two hours previously without accident, and did so again
on the day of which I write. Their horses never lost their
footing and had to swim only at two or three places. At this time
the crossing presented only a few minor inconveniences to the
cavalry, the artillery and the carts, one of which was that the
riders and carters were wet up to their knees, which was not
insupportable because, regrettably the cold was not sufficiently
severe to freeze the river, which would have been better for us.
The second inconvenience which arose from the lack of frost was
that the marshy ground which bordered the opposite bank of the
river was so muddy that the saddle-horses had difficulty in
crossing it and the carts could sink in to their axles.
Esprit de corps is certainly very praiseworthy, but it should be
moderated or forgotten in difficult circumstances. This did not
happen at the Beresina, where the commanders of the artillery and
the engineers both demanded sole responsibility for building the
bridges, and as neither would give way, nothing was being done.
When the Emperor arrived on the 26th, he ended this quarrel by
ordering that two bridges should be built, one by the artillery
and one by the engineers. Immediately beams and battens were
seized from the hovels of the village and the sappers and the
gunners got to work. Those gallant men showed a devotion to duty
which has not been sufficiently recognised. They went naked into
the freezing water and worked for six or seven hours at a
stretch, although there was not a drop of "eau de vie" to offer
them, and they would be sleeping in a field covered by snow.
Almost all of them died later, when the severe frosts came.
While the bridges were being built and while my regiment and all
the troops of 2nd Corps were waiting on the left bank for the
order to cross the river, the Emperor, walking rapidly, went from
regiment to regiment, speaking to the men and officers. He was
accompanied by Murat. This brave and dashing officer who had so
distinguished himself as the victorious French were advancing on
Moscow, the proud Murat had been, so to speak, eclipsed since we
had left that city and during the retreat he had taken part in
none of the fighting. One saw him following the Emperor in
silence, as if he had nothing to do with what was going on in the
army. He seemed to shed some of his torpor at the Beresina at the
sight of the only troops who were still in good order, and who
constituted the last hope of safety.
As Murat was very fond of the cavalry, and as of the many
squadrons which had crossed the Nieman there remained none except
those in Oudinot's corps, he urged the Emperor's footsteps in
their direction.
Napoleon was delighted with the state of these units and of my
regiment in particular, for it was now stronger than several of
the brigades. I had more than 500 men on horseback, whereas the
other colonels in the corps had scarcely 200, so I received some
flattering comments from the Emperor, a great share of which was
due to my officers and men.
It was at this time that I had the good fortune to be joined by
Jean Dupont, my brother's servant, a man of exemplary loyalty,
devotion and courage. Left on his own after the capture of my
brother early in the campaign, he had followed the 16th Chasseurs
to Moscow and taken part in the retreat, while caring for my
brother Adolphe's three horses, of which he had refused to sell a
single one in spite of many offers. He reached me after five
months of hunger and hardship, still carrying all my brother's
effects, though he told me, with tears in his eyes, that having
worn out his shoes and been reduced to walking barefoot in the
snow, he had dared to take a pair of boots belonging to his
master. I kept this admirable man in my service, and he was a
great help to me when, some time later, I was wounded once more,
in the midst of the most horrible days of the great retreat.
To return to the crossing of the Beresina. Not only did our
horses cross the river without difficulty, but our "cantiniers"
or sutlers, drove their carts across. This made me think that it
might be possible, if one unharnessed some of the many carts
which followed the army, to fix them in the river in a line, one
after the other, to make a sort of causeway for the infantrymen,
something which would greatly ease the flow of the mass of
stragglers who the next day would be crowding round the entries
to the bridges. This seemed to me to be such a good idea, that
although I was wet to the waist, I recrossed the ford to offer it
to the generals of the Imperial staff.
They accepted my suggestion, but made no attempt to pass it on to
the Emperor. Eventually, General Lauristan, one of his
aides-de-camp, said to me, "I suggest that you yourself undertake
the building of this footbridge, the usefulness of which you have
so well explained." I replied to this wholly unacceptable
proposition that I had at my disposal neither sappers nor
infantrymen, nor tools, nor stakes, nor rope, and that in any
case I could not leave my regiment, which being on the right
bank, could be attacked at any time. I had offered him an idea
which I thought was a good one, I could do no more and would now
go back to my normal duties. Having said this I went back into
the water and returned to the 23rd.
When the sappers and the gunners had finally completed the
trestle bridges, they were crossed by the infantry and the
artillery of Oudinot's corps, who, having reached the right bank,
went to set up their bivouacs in a large wood, where the cavalry
were ordered to join them. We could from there watch the main
road from Minsk, down which Admiral Tchitchakoff had led his
troops to the lower Beresina, and up which he would have to come
to reach us, once he heard that we had crossed the river at
Studianka.
On the evening of the 27th, the Emperor crossed the bridge with
his guard and went to settle at a hamlet named Zawniski, where
the cavalry were ordered to join him. The enemy had not appeared.
There has been much discussion about the disasters which occurred
at the Beresina; but what no one has yet said is that the greater
part of them could have been avoided if the general staff had
paid more attention to their duty and had made use of the night
27th-28th to send over the bridge not only the baggage, but the
thousands of stragglers who would be obstructing the passage the
next day. It so happened that, after seeing my regiment well
settled in their bivouac, I noticed the absence of the pack
horse, which, as it carried the strong-box and the accounts of
the regiment, could not be risked in the ford. I expected that
its leader and the troopers of its escort had waited until the
bridges were ready, but they had been so for some hours and yet
these men had not arrived. Being somewhat worried about them, and
the precious burden committed to their charge, I thought I would
go in person and expedite their crossing, for I imagined that the
bridges would be crowded. I hurried to the river where, to my
great surprise, I found the bridges completely deserted. There
was no one crossing them, although, by the bright moonlight, I
could see not a hundred paces away, more than 50,000 stragglers
or men cut off from their regiments, whom we called "rotisseurs."
These men, seated calmly before huge fires, were grilling pieces
of horseflesh, little thinking that they were beside a river, the
passage of which would, the next day, cost many of them their
lives, whereas at present they could cross it unhindered, in a
few minutes, and prepare their supper on the other side.
Furthermore, not one officer of the imperial household, not an
aide-de-camp of the army general staff, or that of a marshal was
there to warn these unfortunate men and to drive them, if need
be, to the bridges.
It was in this disorganised camp that I saw for the first time
the soldiers returning from Moscow. It was a most distressing
spectacle. All ranks were mixed together, no weapons, no military
bearing! Soldiers, officers and even generals, clad only in rags
and having on their feet strips of leather or cloth roughly bound
together with string. An immense throng in which were thrown
together thousands of men of different nationalities gabbling all
the languages of the European continent without any mutual
understanding.
However, if one had used one of the regiments from Oudinot's
corps or the Guard, which were still in good order, it would have
been easy to herd this mass of men across the bridges, for, as I
was returning to Zawniski, having with me only a few orderlies, I
was able by persuasion and a bit of force to make several
thousand of these wretched men cross to the right bank; but I had
other duties to perform, and had to return to the regiment.
When I was passing by the general staff, and that of Marshal
Oudinot, I reported the deserted state of the bridges and pointed
out how easy it would be to bring the unarmed men across while
there was no enemy opposition; all I got were evasive answers,
each one claiming that it was a colleague's responsibility to see
to such an operation.
On returning to the regimental bivouac, I was pleasantly
surprised to see the corporal and the eight troopers who during
the campaign had been in charge of our herd of cattle. These good
fellows were desolate that the crowd of "rotisseurs" had set on
their cattle, butchered and eaten them before their eyes without
their being able to stop them. It was some consolation to the
regiment that each trooper had taken from Borisoff enough food to
last for twenty-five days.
My adjutant, M. Verdier, thought it his duty to go across the
bridge to try to find the guardians of our accounts, but he got
swallowed up in the crowd and was unable to get back. He was
taken prisoner during the struggle on the next day , and I did
not see him again for two years.
Chap. 19.
We now come to the most terrible event in the disastrous Russian
campaign... to the crossing of the Beresina; which took place
mainly on the 28th of November.
At dawn on this ill-fated day, the position of the two
belligerents was as follows. On the left bank, Marshal Victor,
having evacuated Borisoff during the night, had arrived at
Studianka with 9th Corps, driving in front of him a mass of
stragglers. He had left, to form his rear-guard, the infantry
division of General Partouneaux, who had been told not to leave
the town until two hours after him, and who should, in
consequence, have sent out a small detachment of men, who could
follow the main body and leave guides to signpost the route. He
should also have sent an aide-de-camp to Studianka to reconnoitre
the road and return to the division: but Partouneaux neglected
all these precautions and simply marched off at the prescribed
time. He came to a fork in the road, and he did not know which
way to go. He must have been aware, since he had come from
Borisoff, that the Beresina was on his left, and he should have
concluded that to reach Studianka, at the side of this
watercourse, it was the road on the left which he should take...
but he did not do so, and following blindly some light infantry
which had been ahead of him, he took the right hand road and
landed in the middle of a large force of Wittgenstein's Russian
troops.
Soon Partouneaux's division, completely surrounded, was forced,
after a brave defence, to surrender. Meanwhile a simple battalion
commander who was in charge of the divisional rear-guard, had the
good sense to take the road to the left, by means of which he
joined Marshal Victor at Studianka. The Marshal was greatly
surprised to see the arrival of this battalion instead of the
division of which it was the rear-guard, but his astonishment
turned to dismay when he was attacked by Wittgenstein's Russians,
whom he thought had been intercepted by Partouneaux. He could not
then doubt that the General and all his regiments had been
defeated and taken prisoner.
Fresh misfortunes awaited him, for the Russian General
Koutousoff, who had been following Partouneaux from Borisoff with
a strong body of troops, once he heard of his defeat, speeded up
his march and came to join Wittgenstein in his attack on Marshal
Victor. The Marshal, whose army corps had been reduced to 10,000
men, put up a stout resistance. His troops, even the Germans who
were included among them, fought heroically though they were
attacked by two armies, had their backs to the Beresina, and had
their movements hampered by the swarm of carts driven by
undisciplined stragglers who were endeavouring, in a mob, to
reach the river. Regardless of these circumstances they held off
Koutousoff and Wittgenstein for the whole day.
While this confusion and fighting were going on at Studianka, the
enemy, who aimed to gain control of both ends of the bridges,
attacked Oudinet's Corps, which was in position before Zawniski,
on the right bank. Some thirty thousand Russians, shouting
loudly, advanced towards 2nd Corps, which was by now reduced to
no more than eight thousand combatants. However, our men had not
yet been in contact with those returning from Moscow, and had no
idea of the disorder which ruled amongst them, so that their
morale was excellent and Tchitchakoff was driven back before the
very eyes of the Emperor, who arrived at that moment with a
reserve of 3000 infantry and 1000 cavalry from the old and the
Young Guard. The Russians renewed their attack, and overran the
Poles of the Legion of the Vistula. Marshal Oudinot was seriously
wounded, and Napoleon sent Ney to replace him. General Condras,
one of our best infantry officers, was killed. The gallant
General Legrand received a dangerous wound.
The action took place in a wood of enormous pine trees. The enemy
artillery could not, therefore, see our troops clearly, so that,
although they kept up a vigourous bombardment, their cannon-balls
did not hit us, but going over our heads, they broke off
branches, some as thick as a man's body, which in their fall
killed or injured a good number of our men and horses. As the
trees were widely spaced, mounted men could move through them,
although with some difficulty, despite which, Marshal Ney, on the
approach of a strong Russian column, launched a charge against it
with what remained of our division of Cuirassiers. This charge,
carried out under such unusual conditions, was nevertheless one
of the most brilliant which I have seen. Colonel Dubois, at the
head of the 7th Cuirassiers, split the enemy column in two and
took 2000 prisoners. The Russians, thrown into disarray, were
pursued by the Light Cavalry and driven back to the village of
Stakovo with great loss.