FIRST BOOK OF THE CIVIL WAR.--CÆSAR CROSSES THE RUBICON.--FOLLOWS
POMPEY TO BRUNDUSIUM.--AND CONQUERS AFRANIUS IN SPAIN.--B.C. 49.
Cæsar now gives us his history of that civil war in which he and Pompey
contended for the mastery over Rome and the Republic. In his first
Commentary he had recorded his campaigns in Gaul,--campaigns in which he
reduced tribes which were, if not hostile, at any rate foreign, and by
his success in which he carried on and maintained the potency,
traditions, and purport of the Roman Republic. It was the ambition of
the Roman to be master of the known world. In his ideas no more of the
world was really known than had become Roman, and any extension to the
limits of this world could only be made by the addition of so-called
barbarous tribes to the number of Roman subjects. In reducing Gaul,
therefore, and in fighting with the Germans, and in going over to
Britain, Cæsar was doing that which all good Romans wished to see done,
and was rivalling in the West the great deeds which Pompey had
accomplished for the Republic in the East. In this second Commentary he
is forced to deal with a subject which must have been less gratifying to
Roman readers. He relates to us the victories which he won with Roman
legions over other legions equally Roman, and by which he succeeded in
destroying the liberty of the Republic.
It must he acknowledged on Cæsar’s behalf that in truth liberty had
fallen in Rome before Cæsar’s time. Power had produced wealth, and
wealth had produced corruption. The tribes of Rome were bought and sold
at the various elections, and a few great oligarchs, either of this
faction or of that, divided among themselves the places of trust and
honour and power, and did so with hands ever open for the grasping of
public wealth. An honest man with clean hands and a conscience, with
scruples and a love of country, became unfitted for public employment.
Cato in these days was simply ridiculous; and even Cicero, though he was
a trimmer, was too honest for the times. Laws were wrested from their
purposes, and the very Tribunes[11] of the people had become the worst
of tyrants. It was necessary, perhaps, that there should be a
master;--so at least Cæsar thought. He had, no doubt, seen this
necessity during all these years of fighting in Gaul, and had resolved
that he would not be less than First in the new order of things. So he
crossed the Rubicon.
The reader of this second Commentary will find it less alluring than the
first. There is less in it of adventure, less of new strange life, and
less of that sound, healthy, joyous feeling which sprang from a
thorough conviction on Cæsar’s part that in crushing the Gauls he was
doing a thoroughly good thing. To us, and our way of thinking, his
doings in Gaul were stained with terrible cruelty. To him and to his
Romans they were foul with no such stain. How other Roman conquerors
acted to other conquered peoples we may learn from the fact, that Cæsar
obtained a character for great mercy by his forbearance in Gaul. He
always writes as though he were free from any sting of conscience, as he
tells us of the punishments which policy called upon him to inflict. But
as he writes of these civil wars, there is an absence of this feeling of
perfect self-satisfaction, and at the same time he is much less cruel.
Hecatombs of Gauls, whether men or women or children, he could see
burned or drowned or starved, mutilated or tortured, without a shudder.
He could give the command for such operations with less remorse than we
feel when we order the destruction of a litter of undesirable puppies.
But he could not bring himself to slay Roman legionaries, even in fair
fighting, with anything like self-satisfaction. In this he was either
soft-hearted or had a more thorough feeling of country than generals or
soldiers who have fought in civil contests since his time have shown. In
the Wars of the Roses and in those of Cromwell we recognise no such
feeling. The American generals were not so restrained. But Cæsar seems
to have valued a Roman legionary more than a tribe of Gauls.
Nevertheless he crossed the Rubicon. We have all heard of this crossing
of the Rubicon, but Cæsar says nothing about it. The Rubicon was a
little river, now almost if not altogether unknown, running into the
Adriatic between Ravenna and Ariminum,--Rimini,--and dividing the
provinces of so-called Cisalpine Gaul from the territory under the
immediate rule of the magistracy of Rome. Cæsar was, so to say, at home
north of the Rubicon. He was in his own province, and had all things
under his command. But he was forbidden by the laws even to enter the
territory of Rome proper while in the command of a Roman province; and
therefore, in crossing the Rubicon, he disobeyed the laws, and put
himself in opposition to the constituted authorities of the city. It
does not appear, however, that very much was thought of this, or that
the passage of the river was in truth taken as the special sign of
Cæsar’s purpose, or as a deed that was irrevocable in its consequences.
There are various pretty stories of Cæsar’s hesitation as he stood on
the brink of the river, doubting whether he would plunge the world into
civil war. We are told how a spirit appeared to him and led him across
the water with martial music, and how Cæsar, declaring that the die was
cast, went on and crossed the fatal stream. But all this was fable,
invented on Cæsar’s behalf by Romans who came after Cæsar. Cæsar’s
purpose was, no doubt, well understood when he brought one of his
legions down into that corner of his province, but offers to treat with
him on friendly terms were made by Pompey and his party after he had
established himself on the Roman side of the river.
When the civil war began, Cæsar had still, according to the assignment
made to him, two years and a half left of his allotted period of
government in the three provinces; but his victories and his power had
been watched with anxious eyes from Rome, and the Senate had attempted
to decree that he should be recalled. Pompey was no longer Cæsar’s
friend, nor did Cæsar expect his friendship. Pompey, who had lately
played his cards but badly, and must have felt that he had played them
badly, had been freed from his bondage to Cæsar by the death of Crassus,
the third triumvir, by the death of Julia, Cæsar’s daughter, and by the
course of things in Rome. It had been an unnatural alliance arranged by
Cæsar with the view of clipping his rival’s wings. The fortunes of
Pompey had hitherto been so bright, that he also had seemed to be
divine. While still a boy, he had commanded and conquered, women had
adored him, the soldiers had worshipped him. Sulla had called him the
Great; and, as we are told, had raised his hat to him in token of
honour. He had been allowed the glory of a Triumph while yet a youth,
and had triumphed a second time before he had reached middle life. He
had triumphed again a third time, and the three Triumphs had been won in
the three quarters of the globe. In all things he had been successful,
and in all things happy. He had driven the swarming pirates from every
harbour in the Mediterranean, and had filled Rome with corn. He had
returned a conqueror with his legions from the East, and had dared to
disband them, that he might live again as a private citizen. And after
that, when it was thought necessary that the city should be saved, in
her need, from the factions of her own citizens, he had been made sole
consul. It is easier now to understand the character of Pompey than the
position which, by his unvaried successes, he had made for himself in
the minds both of the nobles and of the people. Even up to this time,
even after Cæsar’s wars in Gaul, there was something of divinity hanging
about Pompey, in which the Romans of the city trusted. He had been
imperious, but calm in manner and self-possessed,--allowing no one to be
his equal, but not impatient in making good his claims; grand, handsome,
lavish when policy required it, rapacious when much was needed, never
self-indulgent, heartless, false, cruel, politic, ambitious, very brave,
and a Roman to the backbone. But he had this failing, this
weakness;--when the time for the last struggle came, he did not quite
know what it was that he desired to do; he did not clearly see his
future. The things to be done were so great, that he had not ceased to
doubt concerning them when the moment came in which doubt was fatal.
Cæsar saw it all, and never doubted. That little tale of Cæsar standing
on the bridge over the Rubicon pondering as to his future
course,--divided between obedience and rebellion,--is very pretty. But
there was no such pondering, and no such division. Cæsar knew very well
what he meant and what he wanted.
Cæsar is full of his wrongs as he begins his second narrative. He tells
us how his own friends are silenced in the Senate and in the city; how
his enemies, Scipio, Cato, and Lentulus the consul, prevail; how no one
is allowed to say a word for him. “Pompey himself,” he says, “urged on
by the enemies of Cæsar, and because he was unwilling that any one
should equal himself in honour, had turned himself altogether from
Cæsar’s friendship, and had gone back to the fellowship of their common
enemies,--enemies whom he himself had created for Cæsar during the time
of their alliance. At the same time, conscious of the scandal of those
two legions which he had stopped on their destined road to Asia and
Syria and taken into his own hand, he was anxious that the question
should be referred to arms.” Those two legions are very grievous to
Cæsar. One was the legion, which, as we remember, Pompey had given up to
friendship,--and the Republic. When, in the beginning of these contests
between the two rivals, the Senate had decided on weakening each by
demanding from each a legion, Pompey had asked Cæsar for the restitution
of that which he had so kindly lent. Cæsar, too proud to refuse payment
of the debt, had sent that to his former friend, and had also sent
another legion, as demanded, to the Senate. They were required nominally
for service in the East, and now were in the hands of him who had been
Cæsar’s friend but had become his enemy. It is no wonder that Cæsar
talks of the infamy or scandal of the two legions! He repeats his
complaint as to the two legions again and again.
In the month of January Cæsar was at Ravenna, just north of the Rubicon,
and in his own province. Messages pass between him and the Senate, and
he proposes his terms. The Senate also proposes its terms. He must lay
down his arms, or he will be esteemed an enemy by the Republic. All Rome
is disturbed. The account is Cæsar’s account, but we imagine that Rome
was disturbed. “Soldiers are recruited over all Italy; arms are
demanded, taxes are levied on the municipalities, and money is taken
from the sacred shrines; all laws divine and human are disregarded.”
Then Cæsar explains to his soldiers his wrongs, and the crimes of
Pompey. He tells them how they, under his guidance, have been
victorious, how under him they have “pacified” all Gaul and Germany, and
he calls upon them to defend him who has enabled them to do such great
things. He has but one legion with him, but that legion declares that it
will obey him,--him and the tribunes of the people, some of whom, acting
on Cæsar’s side, have come over from Rome to Ravenna. We can appreciate
the spirit of this allusion to the tribunes, so that there may seem to
be still some link between Cæsar and the civic authorities. When the
soldiers have expressed their goodwill, he goes to Ariminum, and so the
Rubicon is passed.
There are still more messages. Cæsar expresses himself as greatly
grieved that he should be subjected to so much suspense, nevertheless he
is willing to suffer anything for the Republic;--“omnia pati reipublicæ
causâ.” Only let Pompey go to his province, let the legions in and about
Rome be disbanded, let all the old forms of free government be restored,
and panic be abolished, and then,--when that is done,--all difficulties
may be settled in a few minutes’ talking. The consuls and Pompey send
back word that if Cæsar will go back into Gaul and dismiss his army,
Pompey shall go at once to Spain. But Pompey and the consuls with their
troops will not stir till Cæsar shall have given security for his
departure. Each demands that the other shall first abandon his position.
Of course all these messages mean nothing.
Cæsar, complaining bitterly of injustice, sends a portion of his small
army still farther into the Roman territory. Marc Antony goes to Arezzo
with five cohorts, and Cæsar occupies three other cities with a cohort
each. The marvel is that he was not attacked and driven back by Pompey.
We may probably conclude that the soldiers, though under the command of
Pompey, were not trustworthy as against Cæsar. As Cæsar regrets his two
legions, so no doubt do the two legions regret their commander. At any
rate, the consular forces with Pompey and the consuls and a host of
senators retreat southwards to Brundusium,--Brindisi,--intending to
leave Italy by the port which we shall all use before long when we go
eastwards. During this retreat, the first blood in the civil war is
spilt at Corfinium, a town which, if it now stood at all, would stand in
the Abruzzi. Cæsar there is victor in a small engagement, and obtains
possession of the town. The Pompeian officers whom he finds there he
sends away, and allows them even to carry with them money which he
believes to have been taken from the public treasury. Throughout his
route southward the soldiers of Pompey,--who had heretofore been his
soldiers,--return to him. Pompey and the consuls still retreat, and
still Cæsar follows them, though Pompey had boasted, when first warned
to beware of Cæsar, that he had only to stamp upon Italian soil and
legions would arise from the earth ready to obey him. He knows, however,
that away from Rome, in her provinces, in Macedonia and Achaia, in Asia
and Cilicia, in Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa, in Mauritania and the two
Spains, there are Roman legions which as yet know no Cæsar. It may be
better for Pompey that he should stamp his foot somewhere out of Italy.
At any rate he sends the obedient consuls and his attendant senators
over to Dyrrachium in Illyria with a part of his army, and follows with
the remainder as soon as Cæsar is at his heels. Cæsar makes an effort to
intercept him and his fleet, but in that he fails. Thus Pompey deserts
Rome and Italy,--and never again sees the imperial city or the fair
land.
Cæsar explains to us why he does not follow his enemy and endeavour at
once to put an end to the struggle. Pompey is provided with shipping and
he is not; and he is aware that the force of Rome lies in her provinces.
Moreover, Rome may be starved by Pompey, unless he, Cæsar, can take care
that the corn-growing countries, which are the granaries of Rome, are
left free for the use of the city. He must make sure of the two Gauls,
and of Sardinia, and of Sicily, of Africa too, if it may be possible. He
must win to his cause the two Spains, of which at least the northern
province was at present devoted to Pompey. He sends one lieutenant to
Sardinia with a legion, another to Sicily with three legions,--and from
Sicily over into Africa. These provinces had been allotted to partisans
of Pompey; but Cæsar is successful with them all. To Cato, the virtuous
man, had been assigned the government of Sicily; but Cato finds no
Pompeian army ready for his use, and, complaining bitterly that he has
been deceived and betrayed by the head of his faction, runs away, and
leaves his province to Cæsar’s officers. Cæsar determines that he
himself will carry the war into Spain.
But he found it necessary first to go to Rome, and Cæsar, in his account
of what he did there, hardly tells us the whole truth. We quite go along
with him when he explains to us that, having collected what sort of a
Senate he could,--for Pompey had taken away with him such senators as he
could induce to follow him,--and having proposed to this meagre Senate
that ambassadors should be sent to Pompey, the Senate accepted his
suggestion; but that nobody could be induced to go on such an errand.
Pompey had already declared that all who remained at Rome were his
enemies. And it may probably be true that Cæsar, as he says, found a
certain tribune of the people at Rome who opposed him in all that he was
doing, though we should imagine that the opposition was not violent. But
his real object in going to Rome was to lay hand on the treasure of the
Republic,--the sanctius ærarium,--which was kept in the temple of Saturn
for special emergencies of State. That he should have taken this we do
not wonder;--but we do wonder that he should have taken the trouble to
say that he did not do so. He professes that he was so hindered by that
vexatious tribune, that he could not accomplish the purposes for which
he had come. But he certainly did take the money, and we cannot doubt
but that he went to Rome especially to get it.
Cæsar, on his way to Spain, goes to Marseilles, which, under the name of
Massilia, was at this time, as it is now, the most thriving mercantile
port on the Mediterranean. It belonged to the province of Further Gaul,
but it was in fact a colony of Greek traders. Its possession was now
necessary to Cæsar. The magistrates of the town, when called upon for
their adhesion, gave a most sensible answer. They protest that they are
very fond of Cæsar, and very fond of Pompey. They don’t understand all
these affairs of Rome, and regret that two such excellent men should
quarrel. In the mean time they prefer to hold their own town. Cæsar
speaks of this decision as an injury to himself, and is instigated by
such wrongs against him to besiege the city, which he does both by land
and sea, leaving officers there for the purpose, and going on himself to
Spain.
At this time all Spain was held by three officers, devoted to the cause
of Pompey, though, from what has gone before, it is clear that Cæsar
fears nothing from the south. Afranius commanded in the north and east,
holding the southern spurs of the Pyrenees. Petreius, who was stationed
in Lusitania, in the south-west, according to agreement, hurries up to
the assistance of Afranius as soon as Cæsar approaches. The Pompeian and
Cæsarian armies are brought into close quarters in the neighbourhood of
Ilerda (Lerida), on the little river Sicoris, or Segre, which runs into
the Ebro. They are near the mountains here, and the nature of the
fighting is controlled by the rapidity and size of the rivers, and the
inequality of the ground. Cæsar describes the campaign with great
minuteness, imparting to it a wonderful interest by the clearness of his
narrative. Afranius and Petreius hold the town of Ilerda, which is full
of provisions. Cæsar is very much pressed by want, as the corn and grass
have not yet grown, and the country supplies of the former year are
almost exhausted. So great are his difficulties, that tidings reach Rome
that Afranius has conquered him. Hearing this, many who were still
clinging to the city, doubtful as to the side they would take, go away
to Pompey. But Cæsar at last manages to make Ilerda too hot for the
Pompeian generals. He takes his army over one river in coracles, such as
he had seen in Britain; he turns the course of another; fords a third,
breaking the course of the stream by the bulk of his horses; and bridges
a fourth. Afranius and Petreius find that they must leave Ilerda, and
escape over the Ebro among the half-barbarous tribe further south, and
make their way, if possible, among the Celtibri,--getting out of Aragon
into Castile, as the division was made in after-ages. Cæsar gives us as
one reason for this intended march on the part of his enemies, that
Pompey was well known by those tribes, but that the name of Cæsar was a
name as yet obscure to the barbarians. It was not, however, easy for
Afranius to pass over the Ebro without Cæsar’s leave, and Cæsar will by
no means give him leave. He intercepts the Pompeians, and now turns upon
them that terrible engine of want from which he had suffered so much. He
continues so to drive them about, still north of the Ebro, that they can
get at no water; and at last they are compelled to surrender.
During the latter days of this contest the Afranians, as they are
called--Roman legionaries, as are the soldiers of Cæsar--fraternise with
their brethren in Cæsar’s camp, and there is something of free
intercourse between the two Roman armies. The upshot is that the
soldiers of Afranius resolve to give themselves up to Cæsar, bargaining,
however, that their own generals shall be secure. Afranius is willing
enough; but his brother-general, Petreius, with more of the Roman at
heart, will not hear of it. We shall hear hereafter the strange fate of
this Petreius. He stops the conspiracy with energy, and forces from his
own men, and even from Afranius, an oath against surrender. He orders
that all Cæsar’s soldiers found in their camp shall be killed, and, as
Cæsar tells us, brings back the affair to the old form of war. But it is
all of no avail. The Afranians are so driven by the want of water, that
the two generals are at last compelled to capitulate and lay down their
arms.
Five words which are used by Cæsar in the description of this affair
give us a strong instance of his conciseness in the use of words, and of
the capability for conciseness which the Latin language affords.
“Premebantur Afraniani pabulatione, aquabantur ægre.” “The soldiers of
Afranius were much distressed in the matter of forage, and could obtain
water only with great difficulty.” These twenty words translate those
five which Cæsar uses, perhaps with fair accuracy; but many more than
twenty would probably have been used by any English historian in dealing
with the same facts.
Cæsar treats his compatriots with the utmost generosity. So many
conquered Gauls he would have sold as slaves, slaughtering their
leaders, or he would have cut off their hands, or have driven them down
upon the river and have allowed them to perish in the waters. But his
conquered foes are Roman soldiers, and he simply demands that the army
of Afranius shall be disbanded, and that the leaders of it shall
go,--whither they please. He makes them a speech in which he explains
how badly they have treated him. Nevertheless he will hurt no one. He
has borne it all, and will bear it, patiently. Let the generals only
leave the Province, and let the army which they have led be disbanded.
He will not keep a soldier who does not wish to stay with him, and will
even pay those whom Afranius has been unable to pay out of his own
funds. Those who have houses and land in Spain may remain there. Those
who have none he will first feed and afterwards take back, if not to
Italy, at any rate to the borders of Italy. The property which his own
soldiers have taken from them in the chances of war shall be restored,
and he out of his own pocket will compensate his own men. He performs
his promise, and takes all those who do not choose to remain, to the
banks of the Var, which divides the Province from Italy, and there sets
them down, full, no doubt, of gratitude to their conqueror. Never was
there such clemency,--or, we may say, better policy! Cæsar’s whole
campaign in Spain had occupied him only forty days.
In the mean time Decimus Brutus, to whom we remember that Cæsar had
given the command of the ships which he prepared against the Veneti in
the west of Gaul, and who was hereafter to be one of those who slew him
in the Capitol, obtains a naval victory over the much more numerous
fleet of the Massilians. They had prepared seventeen big ships,--“naves
longæ” they are called by Cæsar,--and of these Brutus either destroys or
takes nine. In his next book Cæsar proceeds to tell us how things went
on at Marseilles both by sea and land after this affair.