PATROL CRAFT AND MINESWEEPING SERVICES
It is difficult to give an idea of the truly magnificent work achieved
by the patrol and minesweeping services during the year 1917 without
showing how these services expanded after the outbreak of war in 1914.
When war was declared the only vessels immediately available for the
work consisted of seven torpedo gunboats manned by officers and men of
the Royal Navy, and fourteen trawlers manned by fishermen. All these
vessels were fitted for regular minesweeping work, and the crews of the
trawlers formed a part of what was known as the "Trawler Reserve." Other
trawlers, exceeding eighty in number, became, however, almost
immediately available at the outbreak of war under the organized Trawler
Reserve which had been set up a year or two preceding the outbreak of
war. Men belonging to this reserve had been trained in the work of
minesweeping and were paid a small retaining fee.
As soon as the German methods of indiscriminate minelaying and submarine
attacks upon merchant ships commenced, a great expansion of this force
became necessary. The matter was handled energetically by the Admiralty
at the time, and by the end of 1914 over 700 vessels (yachts, trawlers
and drifters) were employed on patrol and minesweeping duties, and the
Admiralty had also commenced to build vessels of the trawler type
specially for this work.
By the commencement of 1917 there were in use some 2,500 yachts,
trawlers and drifters, the great majority of them manned by fishermen or
men of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R. and officered by trawler or drifter
skippers or officers of the R.N.R. or R.N.V.R., many of them having
temporary commissions in these services.
Early in the war the coast of the United Kingdom had been divided into
areas for purposes of patrol and minesweeping, and each area was under
the command of a naval officer on either the active or retired list.
The Chart D shows the respective areas at one period. No very important
changes took place in the delimitation of the areas during the war, and
the chart may therefore be considered generally representative of the
organization. Chart E shows the zones into which the Mediterranean was
divided.
[Transcriber's note: Charts D and E are maps of the waters around the
United Kingdom, and the waters of the Mediterranean, respectively, with
patrol zones marked.]
In December, 1917, the number of vessels of different classes actually
appropriated to various areas is given on the next page in Table A for
the British Isles and Table B for the Mediterranean.
TABLE A: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN HOME WATERS.
------------------------------------------------------------+
Boom Defence Drifters, etc. |
--------------------------------------------------------+ |
Boom Defence Trawlers. | |
----------------------------------------------------+ | |
Patrol Paddlers. | | |
-------------------------------------------------+ | | |
Paddle or Screw Minesweepers. | | | |
----------------------------------------------+ | | | |
Motor Boats. | | | | |
-------------------------------------------+ | | | | |
Motor Drifters. | | | | | |
----------------------------------------+ | | | | | |
Other Drifters. | | | | | | |
------------------------------------+ | | | | | | |
Net Drifters. | | | | | | | |
--------------------------------+ | | | | | | | |
Motor Launches. | | | | | | | | |
----------------------------+ | | | | | | | | |
Whalers. | | | | | | | | | |
------------------------+ | | | | | | | | | |
Trawlers. | | | | | | | | | | |
--------------------+ | | | | | | | | | | |
Yachts. | | | | | | | | | | | |
----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+
Area No. | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | | | | | | | | | |
I | 5| 44| 4| 6| 22| 2|11| | 3| | | 6|
II | 6|119| 7| 15| 72|112| 6| | 8| | 60| 83|
IV | 1| 27| | 12| 10| 3| | | | | 15| 10|
V | 1| 20| | 8| 12| 1| 7| | | | | |
VI | 6| 51| 1| 24| 9| 14|14| |13| | 20| 23|
VIII | 1| 51| | 16| 25| | 4| | 9| | | |
IX | 1| 93| 3| 6| 25| 1| 4| | 8| | 7| 25|
[ | 2| 16| | 6| 27| | | 2| | | | |
X -[ | | 53| | 6| | 19| | | | | | |
- | | 30| | 6| 28| | 2| | 7| | | 5|
- | 1| 29| | 33| 42| | | | 9| | 3| 13|
XI | 2| 70| | 31|101| | | |19| | | 2|
| 1| | | | | 30| | | | | | |
XII | 2| 35| | 26| 22| 10| | | 6| | | 10|
| | 18| | 5| 18| | | | | | | |
| | 14| | 2| 25| 2| | | | | | |
| | 6| | | | | | | | | | |
| | | | 4| 37| | | 1| | | | |
XIII | 1| 27| | 19| 15| | | | 5| | | |
XIIIA | | 54| | 21| 19| | | | | | | 1|
XIV | 2| 44| | 14| 41| | | | | | | 2|
| | 6| | 6| 6| | | | 5| | | |
XV | 3| 46| | 8| 59| 2| | | | | 3| |
XVI | 3| 19| | 12| 13| | | | | | | 1|
| | 9| | 6| 16| | 5| | 5| | | |
XVII | 3| 26| | 12| 68| 1| | | 4| | | 1|
| 1| 10| | 6| 31| | | | | | 4| 2|
XVIII | | 31| | | 11| 4| | | | | 4| |
XIX | | 7| | 8| | | | | | | | |
XX | | 8| | 6| 4| | | | | | | 1|
XXI | 1| 15| | 16| 11| | 6| | 7| | 2| 3|
XXII | 1| 10| | 6| 14| | | | | | | |
----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+
TABLE B: AUXILIARY PATROLS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ZONES
----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+
I | 7| 9| | 19| | | | | | | | |
VI | 1| 12| | 42|116| | | | | | | |
VIII | 2| 61| | 21| 25| | | | | | 2| 2|
V | 1| 51| | 18| | | | | | 5| | |
X | 1| 47| | 17| 6| | | | | 5| | |
| 2| | | 12| | | | | | | | |
| 2| 22| | | 4| | | | | | 2| |
| 1| 4| | 11| | | | 7| | | | |
----------------+---+---+---+---+---+---+--+--+--+--+---+---+
It will be seen that the total number of British patrol and minesweeping
craft, exclusive of the stationary boom defence vessels, was at this
time 3,084. Of this number 473 were in the Mediterranean, 824 were in
the English Channel between The Nore and Falmouth, 557 were in Irish
waters or on the west coast of England, and the remaining 1,230 were on
the east coast of England and the east and west coasts of Scotland and
the Orkneys and Shetlands.
The work of these vessels was almost entirely of an anti-submarine or
minesweeping nature.
The trawlers were engaged in patrol duty, convoy escort service, and
minesweeping. The drifters worked drifting nets fitted with mines as an
anti-submarine weapon, and also in the case of the Dover area they laid
and kept efficient a barrage of mine nets off the Belgian coast. Some
were also fitted with hydrophones and formed hunting flotillas, and some
were engaged in minesweeping duties, or in patrolling swept channels. At
Fleet bases a small number were required to attend on the ships of the
Fleet, and to assist in the work of the base. The whalers, being faster
vessels than the trawlers, were mostly engaged on escort duty or on
patrol. The motor launches were employed for anti-submarine work, fitted
with hydrophones, and worked in company with drifters and torpedo-boat
destroyers, or in minesweeping in areas in which their light draught
rendered it advantageous and safer to employ them instead of heavier
draught vessels to locate minefields, and in the Dover area they were
largely used to work smoke screens for operations on the Belgian coast.
As the convoy system became more general, so the work of the small craft
in certain areas altered from patrol and escort work to convoy duty.
These areas were those on the East Coast and north-west of Scotland
through which the Scandinavian and East Coast trade passed, and those in
the Channel frequented by the vessels employed in the French coal trade.
The majority of these ships were of comparatively slow speed, and
trawlers possessed sufficient speed to accompany them, but a few
destroyers of the older type formed a part of the escorting force, both
for the purpose of protection and also for offensive action against
submarines attacking the convoys, the slow speed of trawlers
handicapping them greatly in this respect.
The difficulty of dealing with submarines may be gauged by the enormous
number of small craft thus employed, but a consideration of the
characteristics of a submarine and of the great volume of traffic
passing up and down our coasts will assist in a realization of the
varied and difficult problems set to the British Navy.
For instance, the total number of vessels passing Lowestoft during the
month of April, 1917, was 1,837 British and Allied and 208 neutral,
giving a _daily_ average of 62 British and Allied and 7 neutral ships;
and as Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has mentioned in his book, "The Dover
Patrol, 1915-17" (page 51), an average of between 80 to 100 merchant
vessels passed Dover daily during 1917. A study of these figures gives
some idea of the number of targets offered daily to ordinary submarines
and minelaying submarines in two of the areas off our coasts. When it is
borne in mind that the Germans had similar chances of inflicting heavy
losses on our mercantile marine all round the coasts of the United
Kingdom, and that it was obviously impossible to tell where an
underwater attack would take place, it will be realized that once
submarines reached our coasts, nothing short of an immense number of
small craft could deal satisfactorily with the situation, and afford any
degree of protection to trade. Minelaying by submarines was a
particularly difficult problem with which to deal; the enemy frequently
changed his methods, and such changes when discovered involved
alterations in our own procedure. Thus for some time after the
commencement of minelaying by submarines, the whole of the mines of one
submarine would be laid in a comparatively small area. It was fairly
easy to deal with this method as a dangerous area was proclaimed round
the spot where a mine was discovered, and experience soon showed the
necessary extent of area to proclaim. Later the submarines laid mines in
groups of about six. This necessitated the proclamation of more than one
area, and was naturally a more difficult problem. At a further stage the
submarines scattered their mines in even smaller numbers, and the task
of ensuring a safe channel was still further increased. The most
difficult artifice to deal with, however, was the introduction by the
Germans of a delay action device in their mines, which caused them to
remain at the bottom for varying periods after being laid. The ordinary
mine-sweep, the function of which was to catch the mooring rope of the
mine and drag the mine clear of the channel, was, of course, ineffective
against the mine on the bottom, and there was no guarantee that mines
might not be released from the bottom and rise to a depth at which they
were dangerous, _after the channel had been swept and reported clear_.
To deal with this danger a chain-sweep to work on the bottom was
introduced, but its use presented many difficulties, especially over a
rocky bottom.
When a regular swept and buoyed channel was in use the enemy had little
difficulty in deciding on the positions in which to lay mines by reason
of the presence of the buoys. This fact constituted the principal
disadvantage in the use of a buoyed channel, but in certain places where
the traffic was heavy the procedure was inevitable, and it greatly
simplified the work of the patrol craft and minesweepers; the only
precautions possible lay in the use of alternative marked channels, and
in the laying of defensive deep minefields outside the channel in which
enemy submarines might compass their own destruction. As rapidly as our
supply of mines admitted, this latter device was adopted in positions
where the minefields could not constitute a danger to our own
submarines. False buoyed channels with mined areas round them could also
be laid in which to catch the submarine. Another device was that of
altering the position of light vessels and buoys with the object of
putting a submarine on to a shoal.
The situation with which our patrol and minesweeping craft had to deal
having now been stated, it remains to speak of the magnificent manner in
which they accomplished their task.
I regret very deeply that, in spite of a strong desire to undertake the
task, I have neither the information nor the literary ability to do
justice to the many deeds of individual gallantry, self-sacrifice and
resource performed by the splendid officers and men who manned the small
craft. No words of mine can adequately convey the intense admiration
which I felt, and which I know was shared by the whole Navy, for the
manner in which their arduous and perilous work was carried out. These
fine seamen, though quite strange to the hazardous work which they were
called upon to undertake, quickly accustomed themselves to their new
duties, and the nation should ever be full of gratitude that it bred
such a race of hardy, skilful and courageous men as those who took so
great a part in defeating the greatest menace with which the Empire has
ever been faced.
There are, however, just two cases in 1917, typical of many others,
which I cannot forbear from mentioning. The first occurred off the East
Coast of England.
On August 15 the armed fishing craft _Nelson_ and _Ethel and Millie_
were attacked by gunfire by a German submarine on the surface at a range
of four to five miles.
The submarine first concentrated her fire on the _Nelson_, which
immediately slipped her trawl and went to action stations. The third
shot from the submarine pierced the trawler's bows, and, having
established the range, the submarine poured a well-directed fire into
the _Nelson_, under which she rapidly began to settle down.
The seventh shot struck the skipper, Thomas Crisp, D.S.C., R.N.R.,
taking off both his legs and partly disembowelling him.
In spite of the terrible nature of his injuries he retained
consciousness and gave instructions to the mate, who was his son, to
send a message by carrier pigeon to the senior officer of his base
reporting that he was engaged with the enemy; he then bade him fight to
the last.
The _Nelson_, armed with one small gun, replied to the enemy's fire
until the heavy heel which she had assumed made it impossible to bring
the gun to bear. As she was then on the point of sinking the mate
decided to abandon her and take to the boat, and begged his father to
give them leave to carry him. This, however, the old man sternly refused
to do, and ordered his son to throw him overboard.
The nature of his wounds being such that he would have died if he had
been moved, they deemed it best, after consultation, to leave him where
he lay. Accordingly, yielding to his reiterated order to abandon the
ship, they left this most gallant seaman lying in his blood, and
embarked in the boat as the _Nelson_ sank.
The submarine in the meanwhile concentrated her fire on the _Ethel and
Millie_, and having eventually sunk her, made the survivors of the crew
prisoners, and steamed away.
The crew of the _Nelson_ were rescued by a man-of-war after being in
their boat for forty-four hours.
The second case occurred in the Adriatic. On the night in question our
drifter patrol in the Straits of Otranto was attacked by a force of
Austrian light cruisers. The drifters were each armed with a 3-pounder
gun, and the light cruisers with 4-inch and 6-inch guns. The drifters
were, of course, quite unable to defend themselves. Nevertheless the
indomitable skipper, I. Watt, of the drifter _Gowan Lea_, when summoned
to surrender by an Austrian light cruiser which was firing at his craft,
shouted defiance, waved his hat to his men, and ordered them to open
fire with the 3-pounder gun. His orders were obeyed, and, surprising to
relate, the light cruiser sheered off, and this fine seaman with his
gallant ship's company brought the _Gowan Lea_ into port in safety.
Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon, in his most interesting narrative of the
work of the Dover Patrol, has brought to light many individual instances
of work gallantly performed; it is much to be hoped that before
recollection fades, those who can speak of the actions of individuals in
other areas will tell their countrymen something of the great deeds
performed.
A feature of the patrol service of much interest was the manner in which
a large number of retired officers, including many of flag rank--who had
reached mature age--volunteered for service in the yachts and other
small craft engaged in the work. The late Admiral Sir Alfred Paget was
one of the first, if not the first, to come forward, and in order to
avoid any difficulty in the matter of rank, this fine veteran proposed
to sink his Naval status and to accept a commission as captain of the
Royal Naval Reserve. Sir Alfred, in common with many other officers who
took up this work, was over sixty, but age did not deter these gallant
seamen from facing the hardship and discomfort of service in small craft
in the North Sea and elsewhere. To name all the officers who undertook
this duty, or who were in charge of patrol areas, would be impossible,
and it may seem invidious to mention names at all; but I cannot forbear
to speak of some of those with whom I came most frequently into contact
during 1917. Sir James Startin, K.C.B., who was the life and soul of the
patrols and minesweepers working from Granton, was frequently at sea in
decoy ships fitted out there, as well as in minesweepers, etc., and
together with his son won the Albert Medal for saving life during the
war; Admiral J.L. Marx, C.B., D.S.O., served also in a decoy ship;
Admiral John Denison, D.S.O., was in charge first at Falmouth and later
at Kingstown; Admiral T.P. Walker, D.S.O., had his yacht sunk under him;
Admiral Sir Charles Dare, K.C.M.G., C.B., won great distinction in
command of the patrols, etc., working from Milford Haven; and
Rear-Admiral C.H. Simpson's Peterhead trawlers, splendidly manned, took
a heavy toll of enemy submarines. A large number of retired Naval
officers below the rank of admiral served in minesweepers and patrol
craft, and in command of various areas, and their work was of the
greatest possible value. A few of those with whom I came into personal
contact during the year 1917 were the late Captain F. Bird, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., who was most conspicuous in command of the drifters of the Dover
Patrol; Captain W. Vansittart Howard, D.S.O., who commanded the Dover
Trawler Patrol with such ability; Commander Sir George Armstrong, Bart.,
who so successfully inspired the minesweeping force working from Havre;
and Commander H.F. Cayley, D.S.O., whose services in the Harwich
minesweeping force, working under his brother, Rear-Admiral C.G. Cayley,
were invaluable.
So much for the patrol craft. The great work carried out by the
minesweepers can be best judged by quoting a few figures for 1917,
during which year the mine menace attained its maximum intensity, owing
to the large increase in the number of German submarine minelayers.
During the year 1916 the average number of mines swept up per month was
178.
Statistics for 1917 show the following numbers of mines swept up per
month:
January 250
February 380
March 473
April 515
May 360
June 470
July 404
August 352
September 418
October 237
November 184
December 188
making the average per month in 1917 355 mines.
It will be noticed how rapidly the figures rose in the early part of the
year, and how great was the diminution in the figures for the later
months. This decrease was due to the fact that the extension of
anti-submarine measures was beginning to take effect, and the
destruction of German submarines, and especially of submarine minelayers
of the U.C. type, was becoming considerable.
The heavy work involved a great strain on the minesweeping service, and
the greatest possible credit is due to the personnel of that service for
the fine response made to the call for additional exertions and heavier
risks.
At the same time the organizing work achieved at Headquarters by the
minesweeping section of the Naval Staff should not be forgotten. At the
head of this section was Captain Lionel G. Preston, C.B.; he had
succeeded to the post of Head of the Minesweeping Service early in 1917,
after two and a half years of strenuous and most successful minesweeping
work in the Grand Fleet flotillas, and he at once grappled with the task
of dealing with the large number of mines then being laid by German
submarines.
Instructions were issued to fit all patrol craft round the coast for
minesweeping work in addition to their patrol duties, and they were used
for sweeping as required. Many drifters were also fitted for
minesweeping in addition to the trawlers hitherto employed; and although
there was some prejudice against these vessels on account of their
slower speed, they proved to be of great assistance. Every available
small craft that could be fitted for the work was pressed into the
service, including a considerable number of motor launches.
There was unfortunately great delay in the building of the "Hunt" class
of minesweeper, which was the type ordered in 1916 and repeated in 1917,
and in spite of very large additional orders for this class of vessel
having been placed early in 1917 (a total of 100 extra vessels being
ordered), the number completed during that year was only sixteen,
together with a single paddle sweeper. Consequently we were dependent
for the largely increased work on improvised craft, and the very
greatest credit is due to all who were concerned in this arduous and
dangerous duty that the waters were kept comparatively clear of mines,
and that our losses from this cause were so small when the immense
number of mines swept up is considered.
Fortunately the enemy lost very heavily in submarines of the U.C., or
minelaying type, largely because they were working of necessity in
waters near our coast, so that our anti-submarine measures had a better
chance, since they were easier to locate and destroy than submarines
working farther afield. By the commencement of 1918 the average number
of mines swept up monthly showed a very remarkable decrease, the average
for the first two months of that year being only 159 per month, eloquent
testimony to the efficiency of the anti-submarine measures in operation
during 1917. I have no information as to the figures for the remaining
months of 1918.
The record of minesweeping work would not be complete without figures
showing the damage caused by mines to minesweeping vessels.
During the last six months of 1916 the average number of these craft
sunk or damaged by mines _per month_ was 5.7, while for the first six
months of 1917 the figures rose to ten per month. For the second six
months of 1917 the figures fell to four per month, a reduction even on
the losses towards the end of 1916, in spite of the fact that more mines
were being dealt with. This reduction may have been due to improvements
effected in organization as the result of experience.
Similarly the total number of merchant ships sunk or damaged by mines,
which during the first six months of 1917 totalled 90, dropped in the
second six months to 49.
By far the greater proportion of mines swept up were laid in Area
10--i.e. the Nore, Harwich and Lowestoft area. This part of the coast
was nearest to the German submarine base at Zeebrugge, and as the
greater part of the east coast traffic passed through the area it
naturally came in for a great deal of minelaying attention. Out of some
2,400 mines swept up in the first half of 1917, over 800 came from Area
10 alone. The greatest number of casualties to merchant ships from mines
during this same period also occurred in Area 10, which in this respect
was, however, rivalled by Area 8--the Tyne. Many ships also struck mines
in Areas 11 and 12 in the English Channel, and in both of these areas a
considerable number of mines were swept up.
In addition to the daily risks of being themselves blown up which were
run by the vessels engaged in this work, many very gallant deeds were
performed by individual officers and men of the minesweeping force, who
were one and all imbued with the idea that their first duty was to keep
a clear channel for traffic regardless of the consequence to themselves.
I must leave to abler pens than mine the task of recording in fitting
phrase some of the courageous actions of our small craft which will be
looked upon as amongst the most glorious episodes of the Naval part of
the Great War, and content myself to mention only one case, that of the
trawler _Grand Duke_, working in the Milford area in May, 1917. In this
instance a flotilla of minesweepers was employed in sweeping when two
mines exploded in the sweep towed by the second pair of minesweeping
trawlers in the flotilla. The wire parted and one of the two trawlers
proceeded to heave in the "kite," the contrivance employed to keep the
sweep at the required depth. When hove short up it was discovered that a
mine was foul of the wire and that it had been hauled up against the
ship's side. Just beneath the surface the circular outline of a second
mine could also be detected entangled in the wire and swirling round in
the current beneath the trawler's counter. In the circumstances, since
any roll of the ship might suffice to strike one of the horns of either
mine and detonate the charges, the officer in charge of the trawler
chose the best course open to him in view of his responsibility for the
lives of those under his command, and ordered the trawler to be
abandoned.
The senior officer of the division of minesweepers thereupon called for
a volunteer, and accompanied by the engineman, boarded the abandoned
trawler, and disregarding the imminent probability of an explosion
caused by the contact of the ship and the mine, cut the sweep and kite
wires. The mines fell clear without detonating, and by means of a rope
passed to another trawler they were towed clear of the spot.
It is appropriate to close this chapter by giving a synopsis of the
losses amongst our patrol escort and minesweeping vessels between the
commencement of the war and the end of 1917 due (1) to enemy action, and
(2) to the increased navigational dangers incidental to service afloat
under war conditions.
Under the first heading--enemy action--the losses were 8 yachts, 6 motor
launches, 3 motor boats, 150 trawlers, 59 drifters, and 10 paddle
minesweepers; and the losses due to navigational risks were 5 yachts, 55
trawlers, 7 motor launches, 3 motor boats, 30 drifters, and 1 paddle
minesweeper, whilst the total loss of life was 197 officers and 1,782
men.