THE DOVER PATROL AND THE HARWICH FORCES
Vice-Admiral Sir Reginald Bacon has given ("The Dover Patrol,
1915-1917," Hutchinson & Co., 1919.) a most valuable record of the
varied work carried out in the Straits of Dover and on the Belgian coast
during the period of his command. There is little to be added to this
great record, but it may be of interest to mention the general Admiralty
policy which governed the Naval operations in southern waters during the
year 1917, and the methods by which that policy was carried out.
The policy which was adopted in southern waters, and especially in the
Straits of Dover, was that, so far as the means at our disposal
admitted, the Straits should be rendered impassable for enemy ships of
all kinds, from battleships to submarines, with a view to protecting the
cross-Channel communications of our Army in France, of affording
protection to trade in the Channel, and preventing a military landing by
the Germans either in the south of England or on the left flank of the
Allied Army in France. So long as the Belgian coast ports remained in
German possession, the Naval force that could be based there constituted
a very serious menace to the cross-Channel traffic. This really applied
more to destroyers than to submarines, and for this reason: submarines
have an infinitely larger radius of action than destroyers, and if the
Belgian coast ports had not been in German occupation, the additional
210 miles from the Ems would not have been a matter of serious moment to
them, and if sighted on the longer passage they could submerge. The case
was quite different with destroyers or other surface vessels; in the
first place they were open to attack by our vessels during the passage
to and from the Ems, and in the second the additional distance to be
traversed was a matter for consideration, since they carried only
limited supplies of fuel.
A fact to which the Admiralty frequently directed attention was that,
although annoyance and even serious inconvenience might be caused to the
enemy by sea and air operations against Ostend and Zeebrugge, no
_permanent_ result could be achieved by the Navy alone unless backed up
by an advance on land. The Admiralty was heart and soul for an audacious
policy, providing the form of attack and the occasion offered a
reasonable prospect of success. Owing to the preoccupations of the Army,
we had to be satisfied with bombardments of the ports by unprotected
monitors, which had necessarily to be carried out at very long ranges,
exceeding 25,000 yards, and necessitating direction of the fire by
aircraft.
Bruges, about eight miles from the sea, was the real base of enemy
submarines and destroyers, Zeebrugge and Ostend being merely exits from
Bruges, and the use of the latter could only be denied to the enemy by
land attack or by effective blocking operations at Ostend and Zeebrugge,
for, if only one port was closed, the other could be used.
Neither Zeebrugge, Ostend, nor Bruges could be rendered untenable to the
enemy with the guns available during 1917, although Ostend in
particular, and Zeebrugge to a lesser extent, could be, and were
frequently, brought under fire when certain conditions prevailed, and
some temporary damage caused. Indeed, the fire against Ostend was so
effective that the harbour fell into disuse as a base towards the end of
1917. We were arranging also in 1917 for mounting naval guns on shore
that would bring Bruges under fire, after the enemy had been driven from
Ostend by the contemplated operation which is mentioned later. When
forced to abandon this operation, in consequence of the military advance
being held up by the weather, these guns were mounted in monitors.
In the matter of blocking the entrance to the ports of Zeebrugge and
Ostend, the fact had to be recognized that effective _permanent_
blocking operations against destroyers and submarines were not
practicable, mainly because of the great rise and fall above low water
at ordinary spring tides, which is 14 feet at Ostend and 13 feet at
Zeebrugge for about half the days in each month. Low water at Ostend
also lasts for one hour. Therefore, even if block-ships were sunk in the
most favourable position the operation of making a passage by cutting
away the upper works of the block-ships was not a difficult matter, and
the Germans are a painstaking people. This passage could be used for
some time on each side of high water by vessels like destroyers drawing
less than 14 feet, or submarines drawing, say, 14 feet. The block would,
therefore, be of a temporary and not a permanent nature, although it
would undoubtedly be a source of considerable inconvenience. At the same
time it was realized that, although permanent blocking was not
practicable, a temporary block would be of use, and that _the moral
effect alone of such an operation would be of great value_. These
considerations, together with the abandonment of the proposed landing on
the Belgian coast, owing to unfavourable military conditions, led to the
decision late in 1917 to undertake blocking operations concurrently with
an attack on the vessels alongside the Mole at Zeebrugge.
In order to carry out the general policy mentioned, the eastern end of
the Straits of Dover had been heavily mined at intervals during the war,
and these mines had proved to be a sufficient deterrent against any
attempt on the part of surface vessels larger than destroyers to pass
through. Owing to the rise of tide enemy destroyers could pass over the
minefields at high water without risk of injury, and they frequently did
so pass. Many attempts had been made to prevent the passage of enemy
submarines by means of obstructions, but without much success; and at
the end of 1916 a "mine net barrage"--i.e. a series of wire nets of wide
mesh carrying mines--was in process of being placed by us right across
the Straits from the South Goodwin Buoy to the West Dyck Bank, a length
of 28 miles, it being arranged that the French would continue the
barrage from this position to the French coast. The construction of the
barrage was much delayed by the difficulty in procuring mooring buoys,
and it was not completed until the late summer of 1917. Even then it was
not an effective barrier owing to the tidal effects, as submarines were
able to pass over it during strong tides, or to dive under the nets as
an alternative; it was not practicable to use nets more than 60 feet
deep, whilst the depth of water in places exceeded 120 feet.
Deep mines were laid to guard the water below the net, but although
these were moored at some considerable distance from the barrage,
trouble was experienced owing to the mines dragging their moorings in
the strong tide-way and fouling the nets. One series had to be entirely
swept up for this reason. Many devices were tried with the object of
improving this barrage, and many clever brains were at work on it. _And
all the time our drifters with their crews of gallant fishermen, with
Captain Bird at their head, worked day after day at the task of keeping
the nets efficient_.
In spite of its deficiencies the barrage was believed to be responsible
for the destruction of a few submarines, and it did certainly render the
passage of the Straits more difficult, and therefore its moral effect
was appreciable. Towards the end of 1917, however, evidence came into
our possession showing that more submarines were actually passing the
Straits of Dover than had been believed to be the case, and it became a
question whether a proportion of the drifters, etc., required for the
maintenance of the nets of the barrage should be utilized instead for
patrol work in the vicinity of the mine barrage then being laid between
Folkestone and Cape Grisnez. This action was taken, drifters being
gradually moved to the new area.
In April, 1916, a net barrage, with lines of deep mines on the Belgian
side of the nets, had also been laid along the Belgian coast covering
the exits from the ports of Ostend and Zeebrugge as well as the coast
between those ports. These nets were laid at a distance of some 24,000
yards from the shore. This plan had proved most successful in preventing
minelaying by submarines in the Straits of Dover, and the barrage was
maintained from May to October, but the weather conditions had prevented
its continuance from that date.
The operation was repeated in 1917, the barrage being kept in position
until December, when the question of withdrawing the craft required for
its maintenance for patrol work in connection with the minefield laid on
the Folkestone-Grisnez line came under discussion.
The Belgian coast barrage being in the nature of a surprise was probably
more useful as a deterrent to submarine activity in 1916 than in 1917.
In both years a strong patrol of monitors, destroyers, minesweepers,
drifters for net repairs, and other vessels was maintained in position
to the westward of the barrage to prevent interference with the nets by
enemy vessels and to keep them effective.
These vessels were patrolling daily within 13 or 14 sea miles of the two
enemy destroyer and submarine bases, and although occasionally attacked,
were not driven off in spite of the superior destroyer force which the
enemy could always bring to bear. In 1917 actions between our vessels
and those of the enemy, and between our own and enemy aircraft, were of
very frequent occurrence. The Germans also introduced a new weapon in
the form of fast motor boats controlled by a cable from the shore and
guided by signals from aircraft, these boats being heavily loaded in the
fore part with explosives which detonated on contact with any vessels
attacked. On only one occasion in four attacks were the boats successful
in hitting their mark, and the monitor _Terror_, which was struck in
this instance, although considerably damaged in her bulge protection,
was successfully brought back to port and repaired.
Whilst our monitors were on patrol near the barrage, as well as on other
occasions, every favourable opportunity was taken of bombarding the
bases at Zeebrugge and Ostend. In the former case the targets fired at
were the lock gates, and in the latter the workshops, to which
considerable damage was frequently occasioned, as well as to vessels
lying in the basin.
These bombardments were carried out in 1917 at distances exceeding
25,000 yards. The long range was necessary on account of the net
barrage, and also because of the rapidity with which the "Knocke" and
"Tirpitz" shore batteries obtained the range of monitors attacking them,
one hit on an unprotected monitor being sufficient to sink her.
They were also invariably carried out under the protection of a smoke
screen; in the autumn of 1917 the enemy commenced to start a smoke
screen himself as soon as we opened fire, thus interfering with our
observation of fire even from aircraft, but in spite of this much damage
resulted from the bombardments. Our observation of fire being
necessarily carried out by aircraft, and the enemy attempting similar
measures in his return gunfire, resulted in aerial combats over the
monitors being a frequent occurrence.
The carefully organized arrangements made by Admiral Bacon for these
coastal bombardments excited my warm admiration. He left nothing to
chance, and everything that ingenuity could devise and patient
preparation could assist was done to ensure success. He received
assistance from a staff which, though small in number, was imbued with
his own spirit, and he brought to great perfection and achieved
wonderful success in methods of warfare of which the Navy had had no
previous experience.
During the year 1917 aerial bombing attacks were persistently carried
out on the German naval bases in Belgium by the Royal Naval Air Force at
Dunkirk, which came within the sphere of the Dover Command. These
attacks had as their main object the destruction of enemy vessels lying
in these bases, and of the means for their maintenance and repair. The
attacks, under the very skilful direction of Captain Lambe, R.N., were
as incessant as our resources and the weather admitted, and our gallant
and splendidly efficient airmen of the R.N.A.S. were veritable thorns in
the sides of the Germans. Our bombing machines as well as our fighting
aircraft were often required to attack military instead of naval
objectives, and several squadrons of our fighting machines were lent to
the military for the operations carried out during the year on the
Western Front; they did most excellent work, and earned the high
commendation of Sir Douglas Haig (now Earl Haig). But we were still able
to work against naval objectives. Zeebrugge, for instance, was bombed on
seven nights during April and five nights during May, and during
September a total weight of 86 tons of bombs was dropped on enemy
objectives by the Dunkirk Naval aircraft, and we had good reason to be
satisfied with the results achieved. During this same month 18 enemy
aircraft were destroyed and 43 driven down. Attacks upon enemy
aerodromes were very frequent, and this form of aerial offensive
undoubtedly exercised a very deterrent influence upon enemy aerial
activity over England. Two submarines also were attacked and were
thought to be destroyed, all by our machines from Dunkirk. To Commodore
Godfrey Paine, the Fifth Sea Lord at the Admiralty, who was in charge of
the R.N.A.S., and to the staff assisting him our thanks were due for the
great work they accomplished in developing new and efficient types of
machines and in overcoming so far as was possible the difficulties of
supply. The amount of bombing work carried out in 1917 cannot, of
course, compare with that accomplished during 1918, when production had
got into its stride and the number of machines available was
consequently so very much larger.
Whether it was due to our aerial attacks on Bruges that the German
destroyers in the autumn months frequently left that base and lay at
Zeebrugge cannot be known, but they did so, and as soon as we discovered
this fact by aerial photographs, plans were laid by Sir Reginald Bacon
for a combined naval and aerial night operation. The idea was for the
aircraft to bomb Zeebrugge heavily in the vicinity of the Mole, as we
ascertained by trial that on such occasions the enemy's destroyers left
the Mole and proceeded outside the harbour. There we had our coastal
motor boats lying off waiting for the destroyers to come out, and on the
first occasion that the operation was carried out one German destroyer
was sunk and another believed to have been damaged, if not also sunk, by
torpedoes fired by the coastal motor boats, to which very great credit
is due for their work, not only on this, but on many other occasions;
these boats were manned by a very gallant and enterprising personnel.
Numerous other operations against enemy destroyers, torpedo boats and
submarines were carried out during the year, as recounted in Sir
Reginald Bacon's book, and in the autumn, when supplies of the new
pattern mines were becoming available, some minelaying destroyers were
sent to Dover; these vessels, as well as coastal motor boats and motor
launches, were continually laying mines in the vicinity of Zeebrugge and
Ostend with excellent results, a considerable number of German
destroyers and torpedo boats working from Zeebrugge being known to have
been mined, and a fair proportion of them sunk by these measures.
In addition to the operations carried out in the vicinity of the Belgian
coast, the Dover force constantly laid traps for the enemy destroyers
and submarines in waters through which they were known to pass.
Lines of mined nets laid across the expected track of enemy vessels was
a device frequently employed; submarines, as has been stated, were used
on the cross-Channel barrage to watch for the passage of enemy
submarines and destroyers, and everything that ingenuity could suggest
was done to catch the German craft if they came out.
Such measures were supplementary to the work of the destroyers engaged
on the regular Dover Patrol, the indomitable Sixth Flotilla.
A great deal depended upon the work of these destroyers. They formed the
principal, indeed practically the only, protection for the vast volume
of trade passing the Straits of Dover as well as for our cross-Channel
communications. When the nearness of Zeebrugge and Ostend to Dover is
considered (a matter of only 72 and 62 miles respectively), and the fact
that one and sometimes two German flotillas, each comprising eleven
large and heavily armed torpedo-boat destroyers, were usually based on
Bruges, together with a force of large modern torpedo boats and a very
considerable number of submarines, it will be realized that the position
was ever one of considerable anxiety. It was further always possible for
the enemy to send reinforcements of additional flotillas from German
ports, or to send heavier craft with minesweepers to sweep a clear
channel, timing their arrival to coincide with an intended attack, and
thus to place the German forces in a position of overwhelming
superiority.
Our own Dover force at the commencement of 1917 consisted of one light
cruiser, three flotilla leaders, eighteen modern destroyers, including
several of the old "Tribal" class, eleven old destroyers of the 30-knot
class (the latter being unfit to engage the German destroyers), and five
"P" boats. Of this total the average number not available at any moment
may be taken as at least one-third. This may seem a high estimate, but
in addition to the ordinary refits and the time required for boiler
cleaning, the vessels of the Dover Patrol working in very dangerous,
foggy and narrow waters suffered heavy casualties from mines and
collisions. The work of the Dover force included the duty of escorting
the heavy traffic between Dover and Folkestone and the French ports,
this being mostly carried on during daylight hours owing to the
prevalence of submarine-laid mines and the necessity for sweeping the
various channels before the traffic--which included a very large troop
traffic--was allowed to cross. An average of more than twenty transports
and hospital ships crossed the Straits daily during 1917, irrespective
of other vessels. The destroyers which were engaged during daylight
hours in this work, and those patrolling the barrages across the Straits
and off the Belgian coast, obviously required some rest at night, and
this fact reduced the number available for duty in the dark hours, the
only time during which enemy destroyer attacks took place.
Up to the spring of 1917 the examination service of all vessels passing
the Straits of Dover had been carried out in the Downs. This led to a
very large number of merchant ships being at anchor in the Downs at
night, and these vessels were obviously open to attack by enemy craft of
every description. It was always a marvel to me that the enemy showed
such a lack of enterprise in failing to take advantage of these
conditions. In order to protect these vessels to some extent, a light
cruiser from Dover, and one usually borrowed from Harwich, together with
a division of destroyers either from Dover, or borrowed also from
Harwich, were anchored off Ramsgate, and backed by a monitor if one was
available, necessitating a division of strength and a weakening of the
force available for work in the Straits of Dover proper.
The result of this conflict of interests in the early part of the year
was that for the patrol of the actual Straits in the darkness of night
on a line some 30 miles in length, the number of vessels available
rarely if ever exceeded six--viz. two flotilla leaders and four
destroyers, with the destroyers resting in Dover (four to six in number)
with steam ready at short notice as a reserve.
An attack had been made on the Dover Patrol in October, 1916, which had
resulted in the loss by us of one destroyer and six drifters, and
serious damage to another destroyer. A consideration of the
circumstances of this attack after my arrival at the Admiralty led me to
discuss with Sir Reginald Bacon the question of keeping such forces as
we had in the Straits at night concentrated as far as possible. This
disposition naturally increased the risk of enemy vessels passing
unobserved, but ensured that they would be encountered in greater,
although not equal, force if sighted.
Steps were also taken to reduce the tempting bait represented by the
presence of so many merchant ships in the Downs at night. Sir Reginald
Bacon proposed that the portion of the examination service which dealt
with south-going ships should be moved to Southend, and the transfer was
effected as rapidly as possible and without difficulty, thereby
assisting to free us from a source of anxiety.
During the early part of 1917 the enemy carried out a few destroyer
raids both on English coast towns in the vicinity of Dover and the
French ports of Dunkirk and Calais. As a result of these raids, which,
though regrettable, were of no military importance, a good deal of
ill-informed criticism was levelled at the Admiralty and the
Vice-Admiral commanding at Dover. To anyone conversant with the
conditions, the wonder was not that the raids took place, but that the
enemy showed so little enterprise in carrying out--with the great
advantages he possessed--operations of real, if not vital, military
value.
The only explanation is that he foresaw the moral effect that his
tip-and-run raids would produce; and he considered that the effect of
the resulting agitation might be of no inconsiderable value to himself;
the actual damage done was almost negligible, apart from the loss of
some eight lives, which we all deplored. It is perhaps natural that
people who have never experienced war at close quarters should be
impatient if its consequences are brought home to them. A visit to
Dunkirk would have shown what war really meant, and the bearing of the
inhabitants of that town would have taught a valuable lesson.
The conditions in the Straits have already been mentioned, but too much
emphasis cannot be laid on them. The enemy who possessed the
incalculable advantage of the initiative, had at his disposal, whenever
he took heart to plan an attack, a force of at least twenty-two very
good destroyers, all unfortunately of higher speed than anything we
could bring against them, and more heavily armed than many of our
destroyers. This force was based within seventy miles of Dover, and as
the Germans had no traffic of any sort to defend, was always available
for offensive operations against our up and down or cross-Channel
traffic. Our Dover force was inferior even at full strength, but owing
to the inevitable absence of vessels under repair or refitting and the
manifold duties imposed upon it, was bound to be in a position of marked
inferiority in any night attack undertaken by the Germans against any
objective in the Straits.
The enemy had a great choice of objectives. These were: first, the
traffic in the Channel or the destroyers watching the Straits (the most
important military objective); second, the merchant ships anchored in
the Downs; third, the British monitors anchored off Dunkirk; fourth, the
French ports, Dunkirk, Boulogne and Calais, and the British port of
Dover; and fifth, the British undefended towns of Ramsgate, Margate,
Lowestoft, etc., which German mentality did not hesitate to attack.
A glance at Chart F [Transcriber's note: Not preserved in book.] will
show how widely separated are these objectives and how impossible it was
for the small Dover force to defend them all simultaneously, especially
during the hours of darkness. Any such attempt would have led to a
dispersion of force which would have been criminal. The distance from
Dunkirk along the French coast to Calais, thence to Dover and along the
English coast to the North Foreland is 60 miles. The distance at which
an enemy destroyer can be seen at night is about a quarter of a mile,
and the enemy could select any point of the 60 miles for attack, or
could vary the scene of operations by bombarding Lowestoft or towns in
the vicinity, which were only 80 miles from Zeebrugge and equally
vulnerable to attack, since the enemy's destroyers could leave their
base before dark, carry out their hurried bombardment, and return before
daylight. In whatever quarter he attacked he could be certain of great
local superiority of force, although, of course, he knew full well that
the first sign of an attack would be a signal to our forces to try to
cut him off from his bases. Therein lay the reason for the tip-and-run
nature of the raids, which lasted for a few minutes only. The enemy
realized that we should endeavour to intercept his force as soon as it
had disclosed its presence. The Germans had naturally to take the risk
of encountering our vessels on the way to his objectives, but at night
this risk was but slight.
As it was obviously impossible to prevent bombardments by stationing
destroyers in adequate force for the protection of each town, the only
possible alternative, unless such bombardments were ignored, was to give
the most vulnerable points protection by artillery mounted on shore.
This was a War Office, not an Admiralty, responsibility; but as the War
Office had not the means available, the Admiralty decided to take the
matter in hand, and in the spring of 1917 some 6-inch naval guns taken
from our reserves were mounted in the vicinity of the North Foreland.
Further, an old monitor, which was of no use for other work owing to her
machinery being unfit, was moored to the southward of Ramsgate, and her
guns commanded the Downs. Searchlights were also mounted on shore, but
more reliance was placed on the use of star shells, of which the
earliest supplies were sent to these guns. The result was immediately
apparent. German destroyers appeared one night later on off the North
Foreland and opened fire, which was returned by the monitor and the
shore guns. The enemy immediately withdrew, and never appeared again in
1917 in this neighbourhood.
Meanwhile efforts had been made to increase the strength of the Dover
force, and by the end of June it stood at 4 flotilla leaders, 29 modern
destroyers (including "Tribal" class), 10 old 30-knotters, and 6 "P"
boats. The increase in strength was rendered possible owing to the
relief of destroyers of the "M" and "L" classes at Harwich by new
vessels recently completed and by the weakening of that force
numerically. The flotilla leaders were a great asset to Dover, as,
although they were coal-burning ships and lacked the speed of the German
destroyers, their powerful armament made it possible for them to engage
successfully a numerically greatly superior force. This was clearly
shown on the occasion of the action between the _Broke_ and _Swift_ and
a German force of destroyers on the night of April 20-21, 1917.
The flotilla leaders on that occasion were, as was customary, patrolling
at the Dover end of the cross-Channel barrage. The enemy's destroyers
were in two detachments. One detachment, consisting apparently of four
boats, passed, it was thought, round the western end of the barrage at
high tide close to the South Goodwin Buoy, and fired a few rounds at
Dover. The other detachment of two boats went towards Calais, and the
whole force seems to have met at a rendezvous prior to its return to its
base.
The _Broke_ and _Swift_ intercepted them on their return, and after a
hot engagement succeeded in sinking two of the enemy vessels, one being
very neatly rammed by the _Broke_ (Captain E.R.G.R. Evans, C.B.), and
the second sunk by torpedoes. Some of the remaining four boats
undoubtedly suffered serious damage. Our flotilla leaders were handled
with conspicuous skill, and the enemy was taught a lesson which resulted
in his displaying even greater caution in laying his plans and evincing
a greater respect for the Dover force for many months.
The success of the _Broke_ and _Swift_ was received with a chorus of
praise, and this praise was undoubtedly most fully deserved, but once
again an example was furnished of the manner in which public attention
becomes riveted upon the dramatic moments of naval warfare whilst the
long and patient labour by which the dramatic moments are brought about
is ignored.
Thus in this case, but little attention was drawn to the years of
arduous work performed by the Sixth Flotilla in the Straits of Dover by
day and by night, in dense fogs, heavy gales and blinding snowstorms, in
waters which were constantly mined, and in the face of an enemy who was
bound to be in greatly superior force whenever he chose to attack.
Little thought was given either to the wonderful and most gallant work
carried out by the drifters of the Patrol, manned largely by fishermen,
and practically defenceless against attack by the German destroyers.
The careful organization which conduced to the successful action was
forgotten. Sir Reginald Bacon has told the story of all this work in his
book, and I need not repeat it. But let it be added that victory depends
less on such enheartening incidents, welcome as they are, than on the
patient and usually monotonous performance of duty at sea by day and by
night in all weathers, and on the skill in organization of the staff
ashore in foreseeing and forestalling enemy activity on a hundred and
one occasions of which the public necessarily knows nothing.
It has been stated that reliable information reached us in the autumn of
1917 that enemy submarines were passing the Straits of Dover in much
greater numbers than we had hitherto believed to be the case, and the
inefficiency of the net barrage in preventing the passage was apparent.
Early in the year (in February) Sir Reginald Bacon had put forward a
proposal for a deep minefield on the line Folkestone--Cape Grisnez, but
confined only to the portion of the line to the southward of the Varne
Shoal.
It was known that enemy submarines as a rule made this portion of their
passage submerged, and the minefield was designed to catch them.
The proposal was approved after personal discussion with Admiral Bacon,
and directions were given that the earliest supplies of the new pattern
mines were to be allocated for this service; these mines commenced to
become available early in the following November, and were immediately
laid.
Admiral Bacon suggested later the extension of the minefield to the
westward of the Varne Shoal, so as to make it a complete barrier across
the Channel. This was also approved and measures were taken to provide
the necessary mines.
The question of illuminating at night the area covered by the deep
minefield was also discussed at length with Sir Reginald Bacon. Various
proposals were considered, such as the use of searchlights on Cape
Grisnez and at Folkestone, together with the provision of small
light-ships fitted with searchlights and moored at intervals across the
Channel, and also the use of flares from patrol craft. Flares had
already been experimented with from kite balloons by the Anti-Submarine
Division of the War Staff, and they were found on trial to be efficient
when used from drifters, and of great use in illuminating the patrol
area so that the patrol craft might have better opportunities for
sighting submarines and the latter be forced to dive into the
minefields.
A committee had been meanwhile appointed by the First Lord to consider
the question of the Dover Barrage in the light of the information we
then possessed as to the passage of enemy submarines through the Straits
of Dover. This committee visited Dover on several occasions, and its
members, some of whom were naval officers and some civilian engineers,
were shown the existing arrangements.
The committee, which considered at first the question of providing an
_obstruction_, ended by reporting that the existing barrage was
inefficient (a fact which had become apparent), and made proposals for
the establishment of the already approved minefield on the
Folkestone-Grisnez line. I do not recollect that any definite new ideas
were evolved as the outcome of the labours of this committee; some ideas
regarding the details of the minefield, particularly as to the best form
of obstruction that would catch submarines or other vessels on the
surface, were put forward, as also some proposals for erecting towers in
certain positions in the Straits. I do not think that these latter ever
matured. The manner in which the minefield should be illuminated at
night was discussed by the committee, and arrangements were made for the
provision of the vessels proposed by Admiral Bacon.
Some disagreement arose on the subject of the provision of the necessary
number of vessels for patrolling the minefield with a view to forcing
the submarines to dive. In my view a question of this nature was one to
be left in the hands of the Vice-Admiral at Dover, with experience on
the spot, after I had emphasized to him the extreme importance attached
to the provision of an ample number of patrol craft at the earliest
possible moment. Interference by the Admiralty in such a detail of a
flag officer's command would in my opinion have been dangerous and
incorrect, for so long as a flag officer retains the confidence of the
Board he must be left to work his command in the manner considered best
by him after having been informed of the approved general policy, since
he is bound to be acquainted with the local situation to a far greater
extent than any officer serving at the Admiralty or elsewhere. I
discussed the matter personally with Sir Reginald Bacon, and was
satisfied that he was aware of the views held by me and of the necessity
for providing the patrol craft even at the expense of other services, as
soon as he could make the requisite arrangements.
Sir Reginald Bacon's three years' experience at Dover was a great asset
in dealing with this matter, as with other questions connected with the
Command, more especially the difficult and embarrassing operations on
the Belgian coast. His ingenuity, originality, patience, power of
organization and his methodical preparations for carrying out operations
were always a great factor in ensuring success. These qualities were
never shown more clearly than during the preparations made for landing a
force of some 14,000 officers and men with tanks, artillery and
transport on the coast of Belgium under the very muzzles of the German
heavy coast artillery. It was estimated that the whole force would be
put on shore in a period of twenty minutes. The scheme is described in
full in Chapter IX. of the first volume of Sir Reginald Bacon's book on
the Dover Patrol. He had put the proposal before Admiral Sir Henry
Jackson, my predecessor, who had expressed his concurrence so far as the
naval portion of the scheme was concerned, and provided that the army
made the necessary advance in Flanders. When the scheme was shown to me
shortly after taking office as First Sea Lord I confess that I had some
doubts as to the possibility of manoeuvring two monitors, with a pontoon
550 feet in length secured ahead of and between the bows of the
monitors, but in view of the immense importance of driving the Germans
from the Belgian coast and the fact that this scheme, if practicable,
promised to facilitate greatly such an operation, approval was given for
the construction of a pontoon, and after witnessing the first trials of
the pontoon secured between two monitors which were themselves lashed
together, I became convinced that this part of the operation was
perfectly feasible. The remaining pontoons were therefore constructed,
and preparations commenced in the greatest secrecy for the whole
operation.
The next matter for trial was the arrangement devised by Sir R. Bacon
for making it possible for tanks to mount the sea wall. These trials
were carried out with great secrecy against a model of the sea wall
built at the Headquarters of the Tank Corps in France, and were quite
successful. It was necessary to see actual photographs of the tanks
mounting the coping at the top of the sea wall to be convinced of the
practicability of the scheme. A matter of great importance was the
necessity for obtaining accurate information of the slope of the beach
at the projected landing places in order that the practicability of
grounding the pontoon could be ascertained. This information Sir R.
Bacon, with his characteristic patience and ingenuity, obtained by means
of aerial photographs taken at various states of tide.
Finally, to gain exact knowledge of the rise and fall of the tide,
Admiral Bacon employed a submarine which submerged in the vicinity of
Nieuport and registered the height of water above her hull for a period
of twenty-four hours under conditions of spring and neap tides.
The preparations for the landing involved much collaboration with the
military authorities, and Sir Reginald Bacon was frequently at G.H.Q.
for the purpose. As soon as it was decided that the 1st Division was to
provide the landing party, conferences took place between Admiral Bacon
and General Sir Henry Rawlinson (now Lord Rawlinson), and I took the
opportunity of a visit paid by Sir H. Rawlinson to London to confer with
him myself. Subsequently a conference took place at the War Office at
which Sir Douglas Haig was present.
There was entire unanimity between the Navy and Army over the proposed
operation, and we greatly admired the manner in which the Sister Service
took up the work of preparing for the landing. Secrecy was absolutely
vital to success, as the whole scheme was dependent on the operation
being a surprise, more particularly in the selection of the landing
place. Admiral Bacon describes in his book the methods by which secrecy
was preserved. As time passed, and the atrocious weather in Flanders
during the summer of 1917 prevented the advance of our Army, it became
more and more difficult to preserve secrecy; but although the fact that
some operation of the kind was in preparation gradually became known to
an increasing number of people, it is safe to say that the enemy never
realized until long after the operation had been abandoned its real
nature or the locality selected for it.
Some officers with experience of the difficulties encountered during the
landings at Gallipoli expressed doubts of the practicability of the
operation in the face of the heavy fire from large guns and from machine
guns which might be expected, but the circumstances were so different
from those at Gallipoli that neither Sir Reginald Bacon nor I shared
these doubts. The heavy bombardment of the coast batteries by our own
shore guns, which had been greatly strengthened for the purpose, the
rapidity of the landing, the use of a dense smoke screen, the fact of
the landing being a complete surprise, the use of tanks for dealing with
hostile machine guns, the interruption to the enemy's shore
communications by heavy artillery fire, and the bombardment by monitors
of the coast well to the eastward of the landing place as a feint, were
all new factors, and all promised to assist towards success.
Of the supreme importance of the operation there could be no question.
Ever since 1914 the Navy had been pressing for the recapture of the
ports on the Belgian coast, and they could only be taken by means of a
combined operation. Sir John French (now Field-Marshal Viscount French)
himself had in the early days of the war pointed, out the great
importance of securing the coast, but circumstances beyond his control
were too powerful for him.
It was in these circumstances that the decision to undertake the
operation was made, and when it became necessary to abandon it owing to
the inability of the Army to co-operate the intense disappointment felt
by all those who had worked so hard to ensure its success can be
realized.
The Harwich force, consisting of the 5th Light Cruiser Squadron and the
flotilla of destroyers, was the only other British force stationed in
south-eastern waters if we except the local craft at the Nore. The 5th
Light Cruiser Squadron and the flotilla were under the command of
Commodore (now Rear-Admiral) Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt, an officer whose
vessels were, if we except the Dover patrol, more frequently in contact
with the enemy than any other British force in Home waters. Sir Reginald
Tyrwhitt had several functions to perform:
(1) It was always hoped that he would be able to join forces with the
Grand Fleet should events foreshadow a meeting with the High Sea Fleet.
(2) We depended very largely on him for reconnaissance work in the
southern part of the North Sea and into the German Bight.
(3) It fell to his lot as a rule to provide the covering force for
aerial operations carried out from seaplane carriers in southern waters.
(4) His force was best placed to cut off any enemy light craft that
might be located in southern waters and to attack Zeppelins at sea on
their return from raids over England.
(5) He was called upon almost weekly to cover the passage of the convoy
of merchant ships between the Thames and Holland known as the "Dutch
Convoy."
(6) He was constantly called upon the provide reinforcements for the
Dover Patrol or to assist in operations carried out by the latter force.
These miscellaneous duties involved a great deal of work for the Harwich
force and particularly for the destroyers.
The necessity for continually providing reinforcements from the Harwich
force for the Dover Patrol was a standing handicap to Sir Reginald
Tyrwhitt's operations; he took the matter philosophically, although I
always realized how difficult it made his work at times, and whenever,
as was frequent, combined operations were carried out by the two forces,
the greatest harmony prevailed between the Commands.
At the commencement of 1917 the Harwich force comprised 8 light
cruisers, 2 flotilla leaders and 45 destroyers. During the year new
vessels were either added to it or replaced older craft which were
withdrawn for other services, and at the end of the year the force
included 9 light cruisers, 4 flotilla leaders and 24 destroyers.
The force was constantly operating in the outer waters of the Heligoland
Bight to seaward of our minefields. The objects of the presence of our
ships in these waters, in addition to reconnaissance work and aerial
operations, were:
(a) To intercept any enemy light forces which might be intending to
operate off our coasts or which might be on passage between German
ports.
(b) To surprise and attack enemy minesweeping vessels.
(c) To destroy Zeppelins either on reconnaissance or raiding work.
(d) To capture enemy merchant ships trading between Dutch and German
ports, or neutrals with contraband trading to Germany.
The opportunities that were given to the force under heading (a) were
exceedingly rare during the year 1917, when even the light forces of the
High Sea Fleet were content to remain almost constantly in port except
when engaged in the operations in the Baltic, and excepting also on the
two occasions on which attacks were made on the Scandinavian convoy; but
a portion of the Harwich force succeeded on one occasion in intercepting
a flotilla of German destroyers _en route_ to Zeebrugge from German
ports with the result that one destroyer was seriously damaged and
forced into the Dutch port of Ymuiden and another either sunk or badly
damaged.
Forces from Harwich also succeeded in capturing or sinking twenty-four
merchant ships trading between Antwerp and Dutch ports and Germany
during the year, but the main result of the operations of this force was
shown in the refusal of the enemy to risk his vessels except under cover
of darkness in the area in which the Harwich force worked.
The duty of protecting the Dutch convoy imposed a heavy strain upon the
Harwich force. During the year 1917, 520 eastbound and 511 westbound
vessels were convoyed between Dutch and British ports with the loss of
only four ships by submarine attack, one by destroyer attack, and one by
mine. The price paid by the force for this success was the loss of four
destroyers by mines, and one by collision, and the damage of three
destroyers by mine or torpedo, and of five destroyers and one light
cruiser by collision. The frequent collisions were due to the conditions
under which the traffic was carried out at night without lights, and to
the prevalence of fogs. The procedure adopted by the force was
frequently changed as it necessarily became known to the Germans.
The extraordinarily small losses in the convoys were a very great
tribute to the handling of the protecting force and to the organization
in Holland for arranging sailings, when it is borne in mind that it was
almost impossible to prevent leakage of information to German agents
once the time of sailing was given out, and that the convoys were open
to attack from destroyers and submarines operating either from Zeebrugge
or from the Ems or other German ports. The orders of course emanated
from the Admiralty, and of all the great work achieved by Vice-Admiral
Sir Henry Oliver, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, during his
service at the Admiralty in the year 1917 and indeed in the two
preceding years, the success attending the work of this convoy was
certainly not the least.
It is difficult to put into words the great admiration which I felt for
Sir Henry Oliver's work throughout the war. Our association commenced
during my command of the Grand Fleet, but became of course much closer
at the Admiralty, and during my service there his assistance was of
immense help to me and of incalculable value to the nation.
It was fortunate indeed for the Allied cause that he held such important
Staff appointments during the most critical periods of the war.