FULL CRY
We have seen that during the night of the 7th/8th November, the enemy
had retreated all along the line. The enemy opposite our right
flank-guard withdrew towards Hebron, that is, north-east into the Judæan
Hills. He was pursued for a short distance by the yeomanry, and some
prisoners and camels were captured. The yeomanry were then recalled to
rejoin the main body of the mounted troops for the more important work
of the pursuit of the enemy's main body. The enemy force that thus
escaped into the hills there reorganized, and later descended to the
Plain on the flank of our pursuing force with a view to creating a
diversion; but of this, more anon.
On the afternoon of the 7th, when it was seen that our Sheria operations
in the centre had been successful, the cavalry were ordered to push
forward from there in the direction of Huj, which was the terminus of
the enemy's branch railway line from Deir Sineid. Had this force of
cavalry been able to push forward and join up with the cavalry that had
worked round by the sea and were engaging the enemy rearguard at Beit
Hanun, the bulk of the Turkish force engaged upon this front might have
been surrounded and captured. The mounted troops on the right moved
towards Huj, but met with considerable opposition from hostile
rearguards. On this account, and through difficulty in watering horses,
the consummation devoutly to be desired was not attained.
It will be remembered that the Gaza operations had the effect of almost
turning the enemy's right flank as long ago as November 2nd, and that,
by the evening of the 7th, the force advancing along the coast had
already established itself on the north bank of the Wadi Hesi, some 6
miles or so behind the enemy's defensive line.
Throughout the 7th, Turkish rearguards clung to Beit Hanun and to the
Atawineh and Tank systems to the east of Ali Muntar. The effect of this
was, that, when our troops eventually got under way in pursuit of the
retreating Turks, those near the sea had several miles' start of those
further inland. This feature, a pursuit in echelon with the left flank
advanced, continued throughout these operations. And so we shall see
that Jaffa fell into our hands some weeks before the capture of
Jerusalem had even been attempted.
The bulk of the Turkish army retreated northwards along the Coastal
Plain. Here ran their railway, their main line of communications, and
also an excellent road from Gaza to Jerusalem. Little or no opportunity
was afforded of catching the disorganized enemy in narrow defiles, as
happened in the rout of the following autumn, but the open Plain offered
ample opportunities for a hasty retreat, of which the enemy fully
availed themselves.
"During the 8th, then, the advance was continued, and interest was
chiefly centred in an attempt to cut off, if possible, the Turkish
rearguard which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. Considerable
captures of prisoners, guns, ammunition and other stores were made,
especially at Huj and Deir Sineid, but no large formed body of the enemy
was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered
considerable opposition." At this time the brunt of the work was being
borne by the cavalry and the Royal Flying Corps, the infantry not having
yet been ordered forward. "Near Huj, a fine charge by some squadrons of
the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry captured twelve guns, and broke the
resistance of a hostile rearguard."
"It soon became obvious from the reports of the Royal Flying Corps, who
throughout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns with bombs
and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was
retiring in considerable disorganization, and could offer no very
serious resistance if pressed with determination.
"Instructions were accordingly issued on the morning of the 9th to the
mounted troops, directing them on to the line El Tine-Beit Duras, that
is, on to a line a little to the south-west of Junction Station, with
orders to press the enemy relentlessly. A portion of the infantry was
ordered forward in support.
"By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct
pursuit by as many troops as could be supplied so far in front of the
railhead."
The 54th Division had hitherto been principally engaged between Gaza and
the sea. The 52nd Division, therefore, passed through the 54th and took
up the pursuit along the coast, the pursuit along the Gaza-Jerusalem
road falling to the lot of the 75th.
On the night of the 8th, our regiment was relieved in the trenches at
the Apex, and, on the 9th, the 75th Division concentrated behind the
line, ready to take its part in the pursuit. Next day we all went
forward in column of route. We crossed No Man's Land along the enemy's
old front line trenches by Ali Muntar. Having looked out upon this scene
for months through glasses, telescopes and periscopes, it was
interesting now to obtain a close view of these fortress defences.
But there were other sights that met our eyes, sad and gruesome, that
can be better imagined than described. Portions of the enemy's wire, and
of the gentle slopes in front, were littered with the remains of brave
lads that had fallen in the sad days of March and April. It was strange
that, in their own interests, the Turks had not buried these bodies.
Instead they had left them lying there for months, beneath an almost
tropical sun, and had actually fixed up their new wire entanglements
over the unburied bodies. In some cases death had evidently been
instantaneous. In others, where death had come more slowly, lads were to
be found grasping open testaments or letters from home. It seemed so sad
that these poor fellows, who had endured the hardships of the Desert and
marched victoriously across Sinai, should, like Moses, have been
privileged to see, but not to enter, the Promised Land.
After crossing No Man's Land, we marched along past pleasanter sights,
great stacks of ammunition, gas cylinders, and other interesting
captures. We enjoyed glimpses of how the enemy here had made himself
comfortable; still more did we enjoy glimpses of how we here had made
the enemy uncomfortable. Huge craters there were, made by naval guns
shelling from the sea. These guns had bombarded the enemy communications
behind his front line, and had obtained direct hits on the track and
rolling stock, causing a train or two, valuable booty, to fall into our
possession. Bomb holes were to be seen, made by our aircraft in their
efforts to destroy the bridges on the enemy's line of retreat.
We bivouacked on the night of the 10th at Deir Sineid. For the next two
days we marched forward, close upon the heels of the pursuing cavalry,
but not close enough yet to come into action or to deploy from column of
route. All along our route lay evidences of the enemy's rout. At one
time, we were passing a convoy of prisoners being shepherded along by a
few cavalry; at another, a party of refugees hurrying back with their
worldly possessions to those homes to which they knew they could now
return in safety. Here and there lay the body of some unfortunate Turk;
while all along the line lay the wreckage of vehicles and the carcases
of transport animals.
Throughout these days the troops suffered considerably from thirst. A
hot exhausting wind was blowing, and the men were heavily laden for
long-distance route marching in a semi-tropical country. Water was the
ever-recurring trouble. A little for the men to carry on with was
generally procurable, but the difficulty of watering the animals at
times became acute. The usual tidings were, that there was plenty of
water at the next village. When the next village was reached the tidings
proved to be true, but so long was the queue of animals already waiting
to be watered, that fresh arrivals stood but little chance. At many
places the water was insufficient; and "even when water was found in
sufficient quantities, it was usually in wells and not on the surface;
consequently, if the machinery for working the wells was damaged, or a
sufficient supply of troughs was not available, the process of watering
a large quantity of animals was slow and difficult."
Meanwhile, how were our cavalry progressing? A glance at the map will
show that, after the fall of Gaza, the next point of tactical importance
in Palestine was Junction Station. With this in our hands, Jerusalem
would be cut off from railway communication with the outer world, and
quantities of rolling stock, supplies, war material and possibly
prisoners, should fall into our hands. While still pursuing the
retreating enemy, therefore, the cavalry had been directed to make
Junction Station their next objective.
The portion of the enemy's force that had withdrawn into the hills
towards Hebron now made a descent from the hills to the Plain. Their
object was to threaten the flank of our pursuing cavalry, create a
diversion, and thus relieve the pressure from their main body. From
Hebron, a couple of difficult tracks wind down the mountains to the
village of Beit Jibrin, where they join a road coming from Bethlehem and
Jerusalem. This latter road reaches the Plain and Beersheba railway at
Arak el Menshiyeh. This was the spot, then, towards which the
counter-attack, or demonstration from the hills, was organized.
"It was obvious that the Hebron force, which was believed to be short
of transport and ammunition, to have lost heavily, and to be in a
generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and
that this threat could practically be disregarded. The Imperial Camel
Corps, however, was ordered to move to the neighbourhood of Tel el
Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any counterstroke from the
hills; while orders were issued for the main pursuit to be pressed so
that Junction Station might be reached with all speed. The Hebron group
made an ineffective demonstration in the direction of Arak el Menshiyeh
on the 10th, and then retired north-east so as to prolong the enemy's
line towards Beit Jibrin."
Close to the sea, the advance-guard of the 52nd Division pushed on as
far as Burkah on the 11th, and, on the 12th, the yeomanry pushed north
and seized Tel el Murreh, on the right or northern bank of the Nahr
Sukereir and close to its mouth.
"The operations of these days showed a stiffening of the enemy's
resistance on the general line of the Wadi Sukereir, with centre about
El Kustineh. Reports from the R.F.C. indicated the total hostile forces
opposed to us on this line at about 15,000; and this increased
resistance, coupled with the capture of prisoners from almost every unit
of the Turkish force, tended to show that we were no longer opposed to
rearguards, but that all the remainder of the Turkish Army, which could
be induced to fight, was making a last effort to arrest our pursuit
south of the important Junction Station.
"On the morning of the 13th November, the situation was, that the enemy
had strung out his force on a front of 20 miles from El Kubeibeh on the
north to about Beit Jibrin to the south. The right half of his line ran
roughly parallel to, and only about five miles in front of, the railway
to the north of Junction Station, which was the main line of supply from
the north."
We have seen that our pursuit along the sea coast had a considerable
start of that further to the right, and the rapidity of this pursuit had
dictated to the enemy this rather unsatisfactory position which he was
forced to take up. His right flank was already almost turned. In so far
as he could do so, he held a strong position on the line of heights
running north and south near the right flank of his position, on which
heights stand the villages of Katrah and El Mughar.
The 12th was a day of preparation. On the 13th, an attack was delivered
against the enemy's position by the 75th Division on the right and the
52nd on the left, the extreme right of the attack being protected by the
Australian Mounted Troops, who had pressed forward towards Balin
Berkussie and Tel es Safi. The country over which the attack took place
is open and rolling. It is dotted with small villages surrounded by mud
walls, with plantations of trees and thick cactus hedges outside the
walls. These hedges afforded admirable opportunities for the concealment
of machine guns. In spite of heavy machine gun fire, the 75th attacked
and captured the village of El Mesmiye. A turning movement was directed
against the enemy's right flank. There was a dashing charge of mounted
troops, who galloped across the Plain under heavy fire and turned the
enemy's position from the north. The Kahan El Mughar position,
protecting the enemy's right flank, fell to the 52nd Division. After
this, the enemy resistance weakened, and by the evening his forces were
in retreat. Early the following morning we occupied Junction Station.
The enemy's flight from Junction Station was precipitate. Two trains
escaped shortly before our occupation, one of which was believed to have
contained Von Kressenstein himself. Nevertheless our captures of rolling
stock and material were considerable. The enemy's army had now been
broken into two separate parts, which retired eastwards towards
Jerusalem and northwards through Ramleh towards Tul Keram.
Throughout the 14th our mounted troops pressed on toward Ramleh and
Ludd. On the right, Naaneh, on the railway to Ramleh, was attacked and
captured in the morning. On the left, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had
a smart engagement at Ayun Kara, 6 miles south of Jaffa, where the Turks
made a determined counter-attack, and were only repulsed at the point of
the bayonet.
On the morning of the 15th our mounted troops dislodged a hostile
rearguard, which had taken up a position on the high ground, flanking
the railway north of Junction Station, and covering the main road from
Jaffa to Jerusalem. This is the site of Gezer, one of the most ancient
of the Canaanitish cities in Palestine, and one of the first objects of
interest sought by the eye of the tourist on his journey up from Jaffa
to Jerusalem. Thus, commanding both the railway and the main Jerusalem
road, this position might have considerably delayed our advance had it
been held with determination. As it was, our mounted troops were able to
occupy Ramleh and Ludd that evening and to push forward patrols to
within a short distance of Jaffa.
Jaffa, the ancient port of Jerusalem, was occupied without further
opposition on the evening of the 16th.
"The situation was now as follows. The enemy's army, cut in two by our
capture of Junction Station, had retired partly east into the mountains
towards Jerusalem, and partly north along the Plain. The nearest line on
which these two portions could reunite was the line Tul Keram-Nablus."
Although Jerusalem itself could still be supplied along the road
connecting it with Nablus, or along the road across the Jordan to Ammam
Station on the Hejaz Railway, yet "reports from the R.F.C. indicated
that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem
and withdraw to organize on the line Tul Keram-Nablus.
"On our side, the mounted troops had been marching and fighting
continuously since October 31st, and had advanced a distance of 75 miles
measured in a straight line from Asluj to Jaffa. The infantry, after
their last fighting at Gaza, had advanced, in nine days, distances of
from 40 to 70 miles, with two severe engagements and continual
advanced-guard fighting. The railway was being pushed forward as rapidly
as possible, and every opportunity was taken of landing stores at points
along the coast; but the landing of stores was dependent on a
continuance of favourable weather, and might at any moment be stopped
for several days together.
"A pause was therefore necessary to await the progress of railway
construction. But before our position in the Plain could be considered
secure, it was essential to push forward into the hills, and to obtain a
hold of the one good road which traverses the Judæan range from north to
south, from Nablus to Jerusalem."