NEBY SAMWIL
Our advance had hitherto been northwards along the low country, and had
already reached a point on the Maritime Plain some miles north of the
parallel of Jerusalem. It now wheeled to the right and struck into the
Hills, with the object of getting astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road and
of thus capturing the Holy City.
It will be remembered, from our survey of the geography of Palestine,
that the ridge of the Judæan Hills runs approximately north and south,
and that along the top of this ridge runs a first-class metalled road
connecting Nablus with Jerusalem. From this ridge spurs run east and
west down towards the Maritime Plain. These spurs are steep, bare and
stony, and in places, precipitous, and are separated from one another by
narrow valleys. Between such spurs, a few miles to the north-west of
Jerusalem, sweeps down the Valley of Ajalon, with the villages of
Beit-ur el-Foka (Beth-horon the Upper) and Beit-ur el-Tahta (Beth-horon
the Lower), where Joshua won his memorable victory over the five kings
of the Amorites. It was here that the routed hosts of the Amorites were
pursued in panic, and near here that the sun and moon "stood still" at
the bidding of Joshua. Further to the south, another gorge, or pass,
roughly parallel to the Valley of Ajalon, leads down to the Plain, and
along this pass runs the metalled road through Kurzet-el-Enab
(Kirjath-Jearim), Saris and Bab-el-Wad, to Ramleh and Jaffa; this is the
road followed by the Pilgrims. Other paths were shown upon the map, but
these were found to be mere tracks on the hillside or up the stony beds
of wadis, and, without considerable improvement, were impracticable for
wheeled guns or transport. The only routes along which guns, other than
mountain artillery, could be moved, were the two first-class roads
running northwards and westwards out of Jerusalem.
Ten miles north of Jerusalem, along the Nablus road, at a height of
nearly 3,000 feet above sea level, is the village of Bireh. This
commanding position overlooks the Jordan Valley and all the surrounding
country. This was the point which General Allenby decided to make his
next objective. Reports had indicated that it was the probable intention
of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem, and in the known or suspected state
of the demoralisation of the enemy, it was felt that considerable risks
could be taken. Thus a bold and immediate dash for Bireh seemed to be
indicated. Furthermore, an advance on this objective would take our
forces well clear of Jerusalem itself. And so this plan best conformed
with the determination that had previously been arrived at, that
fighting should be within five miles of the Holy City.
The general idea of the operation was, that our troops should move up
into the hills, some going by the Valley of Ajalon, and some by the main
Jaffa-Jerusalem road as far as Enab, and thence by the "Roman road"
running north-east. Although it was thought likely that the Turks,
reinforced from Damascus, and perhaps from Aleppo, would come down and
attack our new line, yet it was hoped that Bireh would be reached before
serious opposition was encountered. The enemy, however, changed his
mind. Having, early in November, decided to withdraw from Jerusalem, he
now determined to hold it till the bitter end. Turkish resistance
stiffened immensely. Pushed far into the hills, as were our advanced
troops, and without much artillery support, it was found impossible for
them to reach Bireh in the first stride; and further operations upon a
more elaborate scale had to be undertaken before Jerusalem could be
captured.
But we anticipate. Let us, then, return to the middle of November, at
which time our forces had captured, and were holding, positions covering
Jaffa, Ramleh and Junction Station. On the 17th November, the yeomanry
commenced to move from Ramleh through the hills direct on Bireh, viâ the
valley of Ajalon and Lower Beth-horon; and, by the evening of the 18th,
one portion of the yeomanry had reached Lower Beth-horon, while another
portion had occupied Shilta.
On the 19th, the infantry commenced its advance. Latron and Anwas were
captured in the morning. For nearly 4 miles, between Bab el Wad (2-1/2
miles east of Latron) and Saris, the Jaffa-Jerusalem road passes through
a narrow gorge or defile. The remainder of the day was spent in clearing
this defile up to Saris. "These narrow passes from the plain to the
plateau of the Judæan range have seldom been forced, and have been fatal
to many invading armies." The natural facilities for defence in this
pass were undoubtedly very strong. "Had the attempt not been made at
once, or had it been pressed with less determination, the enemy would
have had time to reorganize his defences here, and the conquest of the
plateau would then have been slow, costly and precarious."
The character of the fighting now changed, and more nearly resembled the
mountain warfare of the north-west frontier of India. The bulk of this
hill fighting fell upon the 75th Division, whose Indian experience
proved invaluable. It was interesting to note the points of resemblance
and of distinction between hill fighting here and on the Indian
frontier.
In India, frontier warfare is usually conducted against ill-organized
semi-savages, unarmed with artillery or machine guns, but furnished with
the instincts and cunning of beasts of prey. Here the conditions were
reversed. The enemy were well provided with artillery and machine guns,
both of which they had had abundant opportunity to post advantageously
and use effectually; whereas we had difficulties in getting forward our
guns and bringing them into action, and were at times without artillery
assistance. On the other hand, our troops surpassed the enemy in their
familiarity with mountain fighting.
Here, as in all mountain fighting, the cardinal principle was piquetting
the heights--that is to say, the necessity of sending up piquets from
the advanced-guard, who deny to the enemy all commanding eminences,
before the main body and transport move up the defile which those
eminences command. Our piquets had frequently to fight their way up to
the heights, and to be prepared, on reaching the summit, to withstand a
shelling or repulse a counter-attack. They had, therefore, to be
stronger than is usually necessary in India, but had to be particularly
careful not to concentrate too much upon the summit. In India, where the
enemy generally fight a guerilla warfare, hanging on to rearguards and
cutting off stragglers, the stiffest part of the fighting is to be
expected during the subsequent withdrawal of the piquets from the
heights. Here, the fighting was done by the advanced-guard, and during
the taking of the heights, subsequent withdrawal being generally
unmolested. Quickness in the attack was found to be of great value. In
some cases the garrisons of heights were surprised and captured before
they could get away; more than once the advanced-guard, pushing rapidly
up the road, were able to cut off such garrisons as they were coming
down the reverse slopes of their hills.
With regard to armament, our field artillery were able to assist with
their 4.2 inch howitzers, but the 18-pounder field guns, with their flat
projectory, were, at this stage, found to be of little use. During later
stages of this mountain warfare, the 18-pounder came again into its own;
but that was when suitable positions could be chosen deliberately, and
when, through the length of the range or the use of reduced charges,
they were able to drop their shells with a steep angle of descent. A
high velocity gun, with a flat projectory, like our 18-pounder, has two
disadvantages in mountain warfare. When the gun is firing from behind a
steep hill, the shell, on leaving the gun, is liable to strike the hill
in front instead of clearing the crest. When the projectile reaches the
distant ridge (behind which the enemy are presumably taking cover), the
angle of descent is not sufficiently steep to cause damage. More
satisfactory results were obtainable with howitzers, whose high angle
fire could both clear the forward crests and search the reverse slopes.
Unfortunately, at this time, we had little or no mountain artillery up
forward, while the wheeled guns were often badly handicapped for want of
good roads. We had marched away from Gaza well enough supplied with
artillery for normal or plain country fighting, but scarcely so for this
very different fighting in the mountains.
Another disadvantage under which we laboured, through this abrupt
merging from trench into mountain warfare, was the overloading of the
men. For the latter class of warfare men must be lightly equipped; in
India, even the men's great-coats are carried for them on pack-mules.
Here, the men were, of necessity, loaded up as for trench fighting, and
were carrying gas masks and extra bandoliers (50 rounds) of ammunition,
making a total of 170 rounds per man.
The key to success in modern mountain fighting proved to be the rapidity
with which roads could be constructed for bringing forward artillery.
The defile up to Saris having been piquetted and cleared on the 19th,
Enab was captured on the 20th in the face of organized opposition. Other
infantry had moved from the plain along the more northern track (the
Ajalon Valley route) by Berfilja and Beit Likia, and, on this same 20th,
they captured Beit Dukka. On the same day the yeomanry got to within 4
miles of the Nablus-Jerusalem road, but were stopped by strong
opposition about Beihesnia, 3 or 4 miles west-south-west of Bireh.
In this night it rained, as only in tropical and semi-tropical
countries it knows how. The men, clad in their Indian drill, were soaked
immediately, and lay down on the road or in the streets of Enab, or
slept where they stood, the picture of misery. An isolated Turk rushed
down the road, determined to sell his life dearly. But he could find
nobody enthusiastic enough to fight, or even to take sufficient interest
in him to accept his surrender; until at last he found a military
policeman, who, this being his job, had no alternative but to take him
prisoner. At length dawn broke; and it then became clear that Enab was
under Turkish observation. So a cold night of rain was followed by a hot
morn of fire.
From Enab, a "Roman road" leaves the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road and
strikes away north-east to Biddu, and thence towards Bireh. In Roman
days, this may have been an important road, but now it was found to be a
mere rocky track, impassable for wheels, or for anything except infantry
and pack animals. On the morning of the 21st, a portion of the 75th
Division moved forward by this track, while another portion of the
Division was left at Enab to cover the flank and demonstrate along the
main Jerusalem road. The latter body drove hostile parties from Kushel,
2-1/2 miles east of Enab, and secured this ridge. Meanwhile, progress
along the "Roman road" was slow. The track was under hostile shell-fire,
and it was found impossible to bring up guns to support the advance of
the infantry. The advanced guard, pushing on towards Bireh, had got as
far as Biddu, when it was held up there by intensive hostile shelling.
The remainder of the leading brigade thereupon captured a commanding
position about a couple of miles to the east of Biddu, and 2-1/2 miles
short of the Jerusalem-Nablus road. This commanding position was Neby
Samwil.
Neby Samwil, one of the most prominent heights round Jerusalem, must
always have been a place of considerable importance. It is identified
with Mizpeh, one of the cities built by King Asa. Ecclesiastical
tradition connects this place with Ramah, the birth and burial place of
the prophet Samuel, whose tomb is said to lie under the Crusading
Church, the ruins of which still exist here. To the honour of this
prophet, the Moslems had erected a fine mosque upon this spot, which was
a landmark for miles round. As subsequent events proved, Neby Samwil was
the key to Jerusalem.
The question has been often asked: Who was the first to capture Neby
Samwil? The honour has sometimes been claimed for the 60th Division. No
doubt that Division fought here, and fought well. But at least two other
divisions, the 52nd and the 75th, had been fighting on this hill for a
day or so before the arrival of the 60th. As a matter of fact, this
hill, the "key" to Jerusalem, was first captured by a brigade of the
75th Division, in honour of which a "key" was thereafter adopted as the
proud distinguishing mark of this Division.
On Neby Samwil occurred some of the bitterest fighting in the Palestine
campaign. Both sides realized the vital importance of the position. All
the first night the hill was distinctly unhealthy. The trees were
infested with snipers who picked off our men in the bright moonlight.
Some refuge from the sniping was procurable inside the Mosque, but the
Turkish artillery had no compunction in shelling the building and
bringing it down in ruins. As the night progressed, more troops were
poured on to the hill. The snipers were hunted down and summarily dealt
with. Machine guns were established in the ruined Mosque and other
appropriate positions, and preparations made to hold the hill at all
costs. Towards the morning the Turks delivered a determined
counter-attack. During the 22nd, the enemy made two counter-attacks on
the Neby Samwil Ridge, which we repulsed. In one case, the Ghurkhas,
having run out of ammunition, hurled down rocks and boulders upon the
heads of the ascending enemy. At one time the Mosque was deserted by all
except one machine-gun officer, who continued to work his gun
single-handed. By this time the 52nd Division had come up and were, in
some cases relieving, in some fighting side by side with, the 75th.
On the 23rd and on the 24th, determined and gallant attacks were made on
the strong positions to the west of the Nablus road held by the enemy,
who had brought up reinforcements and numerous machine guns, and could
support his infantry by artillery fire from guns placed in position
along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could not be
brought up to give adequate support to our infantry, and both attacks
failed. The yeomanry, who by the afternoon of the 21st had got to within
a couple of miles of the Nablus road, were heavily counter-attacked, and
fell back, after bitter fighting, on Beit-ur el-Foka (Upper Beth-horon).
This fighting had been taking place over classical and sacred ground.
Troops fighting on Neby Samwil looked down upon the Holy City, still in
the hands of the Turk. Our advanced dressing station was established in
the beautiful monastery on the traditional site of Emmaus; here the men
were dying on the very spot that the risen Christ had been made known to
His disciples in the breaking of bread.
"The positions reached on the evening of the 21st practically marked the
limit of the progress in this first attempt to gain the Nablus road.
Positions had been won from which our final attack could be prepared and
delivered with good prospects of success. Nevertheless, it was evident
that a period of preparation and organization would be necessary before
an attack could be delivered in sufficient strength to drive the enemy
from his positions."
Orders were accordingly issued to consolidate the position gained and
prepare for relief. The 60th Division had been lent to the 21st Corps,
and had already taken their place in the fighting on Neby Samwil. Now
the 21st Corps were gradually relieved and moved over to the left; while
the operations about Jerusalem were taken over by the 20th Corps.
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