GAZA AND BEERSHEBA
The plan by which General Allenby defeated the Turks and captured their
Gaza-Beersheba line, involved three distinct operations. It will be
remembered that the enemy defences consisted of a substantially
continuous line from the sea at Gaza to Arab el Teeaha, where the left
flank was bent back or "refused" at or about Sheria. Some 4-1/2 miles
farther on were the detached works covering Beersheba, which thus
constituted a strong outwork protecting the left flank of the main
position. The decisive blow was to be struck against the left flank of
the main Turkish position at Hareira and Sheria. Before this blow could
be struck, it was necessary to clear away the obstacle presented by
Beersheba. It was also necessary to keep the enemy in doubt as to where
the decisive blow was to fall; so another operation, on as large a scale
as the available force would permit, and calculated both to mystify the
enemy and to draw off a portion of his reserves, was undertaken on the
immediate sea front at Gaza. Thus we get, firstly, the capture of
Beersheba; secondly, the attack on the Gaza coastal defences; and,
thirdly, the main attack delivered against Sheria.
"This plan of operations was chosen for the following reasons. The
enemy's works in the Hareira-Sheria sector were less formidable than
elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the
enemy's defences. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary
to the main operation, in order to secure the water supply at that
place, and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on
the high ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which
direction the main attack was to be developed. When Beersheba was in our
hands, we should have an open flank against which to operate, and full
use could be made of our superiority in mounted troops. Moreover, a
success here offered prospects of pursuing our advantage, and forcing
the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no other
line of attack would afford."
The difficulties to be overcome in the operations against Beersheba and
the Hareira-Sheria line were considerable. Foremost among them were our
old friend, the shortage of water, and, scarcely less formidable, the
difficulty of transport.
With regard to water, no supply existed in the area over which
operations were to take place. "An ample supply of water was known to
exist at Beersheba, but it was uncertain how quickly it could be
developed or to what extent the enemy would have damaged the wells
before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large
supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been
captured. Arrangements had therefore to be made to ensure that the
troops could be kept supplied with water, while operating at
considerable distances from their original water base, for a period
which might amount to a week or more." This was to some extent met by
developing the water supplies at Ecani, Khalassa and Asluj, all places
in No Man's Land some miles beyond our right flank.
The transport problem was no less difficult. Beersheba, itself some
thousand feet above the sea level, lies in a recess on the western
slopes of the Judæan Hills. In the bed of this recess runs the Wadi Es
Saba. Towards the north-east a good metalled road leads gradually to the
summit of the hills and on through Hebron to Jerusalem. North-west a
good road led along the enemy's front to Gaza. The railway line,
avoiding the heights, for the first ten or twelve miles follows
approximately the direction of the Gaza road, and then turns northwards
along the Plain or Foothills. But south of the Gaza-Beersheba line there
were no good roads, "and no reliance could therefore be placed on the
use of motor transport." Owing to the steep banks of many of the wadis
which intersected the area of operations, the routes passable by wheeled
transport were limited, and, in many places, the going was heavy and
difficult.
Practically the whole of the transport available in the force, including
30,000 pack camels, had to be allotted to one portion of the eastern
force, to enable it to be kept supplied with food, water and ammunition,
at a distance of 15 to 20 miles in advance of railhead.
There already existed a branch from the Kantara military railway; which
branch, leaving the main line at Rafa, ran to Shellal and Gamli,
supplying the right of our line. Arrangements were made for this
railhead to be pushed forward as rapidly as possible from Shellal
towards Karm (some 7 miles to the east-south-east of Shellal), and for a
line to be laid from Gamli towards Beersheba for the transport of
ammunition. No Man's Land being some 10 or 12 miles wide in this sector,
railway construction was carried on in front of our front line under
cover of yeomanry outposts.
This line of outposts was attacked on the morning of the 27th October by
a strong reconnoitring party that the Turks sent out from the direction
of Kauwukah to make a reconnaissance towards Karm. On a Division of our
infantry coming up, the Turks withdrew.
By the end of October all our preparations were ready. The bombardment
of the Gaza defences commenced on the 27th and continued nightly. On the
30th, warships of the Royal Navy, assisted by a French battleship, began
co-operating in this bombardment. The actual infantry attack on Gaza was
not intended to take place, however, until after the capture of
Beersheba, and was delayed accordingly.
The date fixed for the attack on Beersheba was the 31st October. The
plan was to attack with two divisions the hostile works between the
Khalassa Road and the Wadi Saba, that is, the sector to the south-west
of the town. The works north of the Wadi Saba were to be masked with the
Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry, while a portion of the 53rd
Division further north covered the left of the Corps. The right of the
attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted troops
took up a line opposite the southern defences of Beersheba. A mounted
force, starting from Khalassa and Asluj, beyond our original right
flank, were detailed to make a wide flanking movement and attack
Beersheba from the east and north-east.
The units detailed for the attack moved by a night march, and were in
their appointed positions by dawn of the 31st. As a preliminary to the
main attack, in order to enable field guns to be brought within
effective range for wire-cutting, an attack was made upon the enemy's
advanced works on the high ground about a couple of miles south-west of
the town, at Hill 1070. This had been successfully accomplished by 8.45
a.m., and the cutting of the wire proceeded satisfactorily, though
pauses had to be made to allow the dust to clear. The assault was
ordered for 12.15 p.m., and proved successful. By about 10 p.m., the
whole of the works between the Khalassa Road and the Wadi Saba were in
our hands.
"Meanwhile the mounted troops, after a night march of, for a portion of
the force, some 35 miles, arrived early on this same morning, the 31st,
at about Khasim Zanna, in the hills, some 5 miles east of Beersheba.
From the hills, the advance into Beersheba from the east and north-east
lies over an open and almost flat plain, commanded by the rising ground
north of the town and flanked by an underfeature in the Wadi Saba,
called Tel el Saba.
"A force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaly, on the Hebron Road, and
protect the right flank. This force met with some opposition, and was
engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaly and to the north during
the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not
captured till late in the afternoon.
"Meanwhile, attempts to advance in small parties across the plain
towards the town made slow progress. In the evening, however, a mounted
attack by Australian Light Horse, who rode straight at the town from the
East, proved completely successful. They galloped over two deep trenches
held by the enemy just outside the town, and entered the town at about 7
p.m., capturing numerous prisoners.
"A very strong position was thus taken with slight loss, and the Turkish
detachment at Beersheba almost completely put out of action. This
success laid open the left flank of the main Turkish position for a
decisive blow."
The actual date of the attack at Gaza had been left open till the result
of the attack at Beersheba was known, as it was intended that the attack
on Gaza, which was designed to draw hostile reserves towards that
sector, should take place a day or two before the attack on the Sheria
position. After the complete success of the Beersheba operations, it was
decided that the attack on Gaza should take place on the morning of the
2nd November.
"The objectives of this attack were the hostile works from Umbrella Hill
(2,000 yards south-west of the town) to Sheikh Hasan, on the sea (about
2,500 yards north-west of the town). The front of the attack was about
6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the farthest objective, was over 3,000
yards from our front line. The ground over which the attack took place
consisted of sand dunes, rising in places up to 150 feet in height. This
sand is very deep and heavy going. The enemy's defences consisted of
several lines of strongly built trenches and redoubts.
"As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works farther
west, it was decided to capture it by a preliminary operation, to take
place four hours previous to the main attack. It was accordingly
attacked and captured at 11.0 p.m. on the 1st November by a portion of
the 52nd Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment of Umbrella Hill
itself and our front lines, which lasted for two hours, but ceased in
time to allow the main attack, which was timed for 3.0 a.m., to form up
without interference."
This attack partook of the nature of a modern trench to trench advance,
as seen on the battlefields of France, with the co-operation of tanks
and the accompaniment of other products of modern science. It was
successful in reaching most of its objectives. The enemy losses were
heavy, especially from the preliminary bombardment.
"Subsequent reports from prisoners stated that one of the Divisions
holding the Gaza Sector was withdrawn on account of casualties, a
Division from the general reserve being drawn into this Sector to
replace it. The attack thus succeeded in its primary object, which was
to prevent any units being withdrawn from the Gaza defences to meet the
threat to the Turkish left flank and to draw into Gaza as large a
proportion as possible of the available Turkish reserves. Further, the
capture of Sheikh Hasan and the south-western defences constituted a
very direct threat to the whole of the Gaza position, which could be
developed on any sign of a withdrawal on the part of the enemy."
Here the force attacking Gaza stayed its hand, merely holding on to the
positions already captured, while the main attack was being developed on
the right.
Having captured Beersheba on the 31st October, a force was pushed out
early on the following day, the 1st November, into the hills north of
Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of the attack on
Sheria, while mounted troops were sent north along the Hebron road.
Accordingly, the 53rd Division took up a position from Towal Abu Jerwal
(6 miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (3-1/2 miles farther west) and
the 10th Division occupied Abu Irgeig, on the railway, 6 miles from
Beersheba.
Next day, the 2nd, our mounted troops found and engaged considerable
enemy forces to the north of Towal Abu Jerwal. Accordingly, on the 3rd,
we advanced in that direction towards Ain Kohleh and Khuweilfeh, where
the enemy were found to be holding a strong position with considerable
and increasing forces. It will be borne in mind that this was only the
right flank-guard; our main attack, which was to be delivered against
Sheria, was not timed to commence until two or three days later.
However, the enemy elected to employ the whole of his available reserves
in an immediate counter-attack. During the 4th and 5th he made several
determined attacks on the mounted troops in this locality. These attacks
were repulsed; and the enemy's action was not allowed to make any
essential modification to the original plan, which it had been decided
to carry out at dawn on November 6th. It was this exhausting of the
Turkish reserves, so early in the operations and so far away to the East
as Khuweilfeh, that paved the way for the success of our attack on
Sheria.
At dawn, on the 6th, the force detailed for the main attack had taken up
positions of readiness to the south-east of the Kauwukah system of
trenches. The yeomanry opened the ball by assaulting the group of works
forming the extreme left of the enemy's defensive system, following this
up by an advance due west up the railway, capturing the line of detached
works which lay east of the railway line. Meanwhile, London and Irish
troops moved towards the Kauwukah system, bringing forward their guns to
within wire-cutting range. Soon after noon, these troops commenced their
attack upon the south-eastern face of the Kauwukah system. This was
completely successful in capturing all its objectives. Sheria station
was also reported as captured before dark. On this same day the right
flank-guard, the 53rd Division, had successfully attacked Khuweilfeh.
The position at nightfall, then, was that our right flank-guard were at
Kauweilfeh, the yeomanry had reached the line of the Sheria to Wadi
Union, and the troops on the left were close to Hareira Redoubt which
was still occupied by the enemy.
Next day, the 7th, the situation remained practically unchanged on our
extreme right, the enemy maintaining his positions opposite our right
flank-guard. In the Sheria-Hareira locality, the Hareira Tepe Redoubt
was captured at dawn. Tel el Sheria was captured at 4.0 a.m. and the
line was pushed forward about a mile to the north of Tel el Sheria. That
night the enemy withdrew.
Meanwhile, on our extreme left, the bombardment of Gaza had continued.
Another attack was ordered to take place on the night of the 6th/7th. An
attack was made at 11.30 p.m. that night against Outpost Hill and
Middlesex Hill, south of the town, which met with little opposition. "As
soon, after they had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward, the
enemy was found to be gone. Early in the morning, the main enemy force
occupied the northern and eastern defences of Gaza. Rearguards were
still occupying Beit Hanun and the Atawinah and Tank System (part of the
Sihan group of works), from whence Turkish artillery continued to fire
on Gaza and Ali Muntar until dusk."
"As soon as it was seen that the Turks had evacuated Gaza, on the
morning of the 7th, a part of the force pushed along the coast to the
mouth of the Wadi Hesi, some 8 miles north of Gaza, so as to turn the
Wadi Hesi line and prevent the enemy making any stand there. This force
reached the Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishing itself
on the north bank in the face of considerable opposition from a Turkish
rearguard. Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of Gaza and
become engaged at Beit Hanun with an enemy rearguard which maintained
its position till night-fall." This brings our history down to the night
of November 7th/8th. By the morning of the 8th the enemy were in
retreat all along the line.
Meanwhile, what had been happening to our own party in the Apex? The
general plan of attack did not contemplate any advance from here.
Nevertheless, it was necessary that this portion of the line should be
firmly held, and it was more than likely that the enemy would try to
create a diversion by raiding this inviting salient. By the end of
October "liveliness" was increasing all round, and mutual bombardments
were growing more intense. Fortunately, a large number of the shells
fired by the enemy were "duds." We were puzzled at the time to know why
duds figured so largely in this and following bombardments; subsequent
inspection of the enemy trenches afforded an explanation. Great dumps of
ammunition had been formed by the enemy close to the guns, and these,
for safety and concealment, had been placed in deep dug-outs. On the
evening of the 27th October, a great thunderstorm burst over Gaza,
causing the enemy considerable damage, flooding the dug-outs, and
presumably damping the fuses and ruining their ammunition.
On the evening of the 3rd November, the enemy tried to create a
diversion by raiding the Apex. On this evening we were sitting quietly
having dinner in our headquarters dug-out, when sharp rifle fire was
heard from the front line of the battalion on our right. We walked out,
and saw a veritable Brock's Benefit display of Verey lights. A telephone
message from our front line informed us that a considerable party of the
enemy had crept quietly up, and were now prowling round our wire and
trying to pick a way through. A hot fire from rifles, Lewis guns and
machine guns, soon convinced the enemy of the uselessness of attempting,
without artillery preparation, a raid against an alert enemy well
entrenched with wire intact. They were beaten off, and withdrew to a
fold in the ground a couple of hundred yards out in No Man's Land, where
they were fired upon by our trench mortars. Nevertheless they managed
to rally, and came forward again to the attack. This time their
reception was no more encouraging than before; our artillery got into
them with a barrage and they withdrew. Now they sent up a red Verey
light signal, whereupon a hostile barrage came down upon our trenches,
under cover of which they not only withdrew themselves, but also removed
their killed and wounded. It is a part of their religion to spare no
pains in removing their dead and giving them a decent burial. A couple
of deserters crept into our lines towards the morning, from whom we were
able to gather something about their side of the operations. Desertion
was fairly common among the Turks about this time, partly because
rations were poor, but mainly because they had no stomach for the fight
that they knew to be imminent. In so far as this raid affected us, our
trenches were badly smashed by the artillery, but our casualties were
insignificant.
The next evening we sent a small patrol across No Man's Land, which,
being boldly and pluckily led, crept right up to the enemy's trenches.
Here they heard the sound of much traffic on the Gaza-Beersheba road,
token doubtless of the impending withdrawal. More important from our
immediate point of view, the patrol heard sounds of an enemy
concentration in their front trenches, in apparent preparation for
another raid on the Apex. Our artillery put salvoes at once upon those
trenches; and the raid of that night proved a damp squib. About midnight
we were wakened from our slumbers by a thunderstorm, the thunder,
lightning and hail being provided by a deluge of bursting shells,
splinters and shrapnel bullets. When the barrage lifted, glimpses were
caught of the enemy moving along our front wire; but this raid never
succeeded in forcing an entrance to our trenches.
We had every reason to "remember the fifth of November." It came in with
a display of fireworks; it went out like an inferno. Profiting by his
previous experience, the enemy shelled a portion of our front
deliberately from early evening until dark, with the obvious intention
of cutting the wire on a portion of our sector. At ten o'clock that
night, down came another intensive bombardment, which lasted for an
hour. Under cover of the darkness, the enemy even brought trench mortars
on camels up to our wire to assist in the bombardment. Next morning the
ground looked like a veritable sea beach after a wreck; the litter
consisted of splinters and duds of all sizes and descriptions, largely
5.9" H.Es. This hostile barrage made a really satisfactory job of the
wire cutting. As soon as it lifted, the enemy's infantry made a
determined effort to penetrate our line. During the bombardment our
fellows had taken shelter in the narrow passage ways behind the
traverses, and so lost no time, immediately the barrage lifted, in
manning the fire-step. They at once got busy with rifles, Lewis guns and
machine-guns, and gave the Turk, as he crossed the ruins of our wire, a
distinctly warm reception. This proved more than enough for most of the
enemy; but a few brave spirits succeeded in entering our trench and
throwing bombs. They were not supported by their fellows, and were soon
disposed of. At length, up went the now familiar red light, down came
the closing barrage, the enemy drew off and we were left in peace.
After these three abortive raids the Apex was left unmolested, except
for occasional shelling on the 6th and 7th. On the 8th, we were relieved
at the Apex by Lines of Communication troops, in order that we might
take part in the pursuit of the enemy who were now in full retreat.
The quotations in this and the three following chapters, are from
General Allenby's Despatch, dated the 16th December, 1917.