BOOK VIII

THE NECESSITY OF CAUTION IN DEALING WITH AN ENEMY

[Sidenote: Fall of Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus [Cons. B.C. 215 and 213]

+1.+ Tiberius a Roman Proconsul fell into an ambuscade, and, after

offering with his attendants a gallant as he was advancing from Lucania

to Capua, by the treachery of the Lucanian Flavius, B.C. 212. Livy, 25,

16.] resistance to the enemy, was killed.

[Sidenote: Fall of Archidamus, B.C. 226-225.]

[Sidenote: Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio Asina with his fleet surprised and

captured at Lipara, B.C. 260. See 1, 21.]

[Sidenote: Fall of Pelopidas in Thessaly, B.C. 363.]

Now in regard to such catastrophes, whether it is right to blame or

pardon the sufferers is by no means a safe matter on which to pronounce

an opinion; because it has happened to several men, who have been

perfectly correct in all their actions, to fall into these misfortunes,

equally with those who do not scruple to transgress principles of right

confirmed by the consent of mankind. We should not however idly refrain

from pronouncing an opinion: but should blame or condone this or that

general, after a review of the necessities of the moment and the

circumstances of the case. And my observation will be rendered evident

by the following instances. Archidamus, king of the Lacedaemonians,

alarmed at the love of power which he observed in Cleomenes, fled

from Sparta; but being not long afterwards persuaded to return, put

himself in the power of the latter. The consequence was that he lost

his kingdom and his life together,[318] and left a character not to be

defended before posterity on the score of prudence; for while affairs

remained in the same state, and the ambition and power of Cleomenes

remained in exactly the same position, how could he expect to meet any

other fate than he did, if he put himself in the hands of the very men

from whom he had before barely escaped destruction by flight? Again

Pelopidas of Thebes, though acquainted with the unprincipled character

of the tyrant Alexander, and though he knew thoroughly well that

every tyrant regards the leaders of liberty as his bitterest enemies,

first took upon himself to persuade Epaminondas to stand forth as the

champion of democracy, not only in Thebes, but in all Greece also; and

then, being in Thessaly in arms, for the express purpose of destroying

the absolute rule of Alexander, he yet twice ventured to undertake a

mission to him. The consequence was that he fell into the hands of his

enemies, did great damage to Thebes, and ruined the reputation he had

acquired before; and all by putting a rash and ill advised confidence

in the very last person in whom he ought to have done so. Very similar

to these cases is that of the Roman Consul Gnaeus Cornelius who fell

in the Sicilian war by imprudently putting himself in the power of the

enemy. And many parallel cases might be quoted.

[Sidenote: Betrayal of Achaeus by Bolis. See _infra_, ch. 17-23.]

+2.+ The conclusion, then, is that those who put themselves in the

power of the enemy from want of proper precaution deserve blame;

but those who use every practicable precaution not so: for to trust

absolutely no one is to make all action impossible; but reasonable

action, taken after receiving adequate security, cannot be censured.

Adequate securities are oaths, children, wives, and, strongest of all,

a blameless past. To be betrayed and entrapped by such a security as

any of these is a slur, not on the deceived, but on the deceiver. The

first object then should be to seek such securities as it is impossible

for the recipient of the confidence to evade; but since such are rare,

the next best thing will be to take every reasonable precaution one’s

self: and then, if we meet with any disaster, we shall at least be

acquitted of wrong conduct by the lookers on. And this has been the

case with many before now: of which the most conspicuous example, and

the one nearest to the times on which we are engaged, will be the fate

of Achaeus. He omitted no possible precaution for securing his safety,

but thought of everything that it was possible for human ingenuity

to conceive: and yet he fell into the power of his enemies. In this

instance his misfortune procured the pity and pardon of the outside

world for the victim, and nothing but disparagement and loathing for

the successful perpetrators....

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Sardinia reduced by T. Manlius Torquatus, B.C. 215.

Marcellus took Leontini, B.C. 214 (autumn). Livy, 24, 30.]

[Sidenote: Marcus Valerius Laevinus commands a fleet off Greece, B.C.

215-214. Livy, 24, 10. Publius Sulpicius Galba Cos. (B.C. 211.) sent to

Macedonia. Livy, 26, 22; 27, 31. Appius Claudius Pulcher, Praetor, sent

to Sicily, B.C. 215. Livy, 23, 31, Propraetor, B.C. 214. Livy 24, 33.]

[Sidenote: Marcus Claudius Marcellus, Cos. III., B.C. 214.]

+3.+ It appears to me not to be alien to my general purpose, and the

plan which I originally laid down, to recall the attention of my

readers to the magnitude of the events, and the persistency of purpose

displayed by the two States of Rome and Carthage. For who could think

it otherwise than remarkable that these two powers, while engaged in so

serious a war for the possession of Italy, and one no less serious for

that of Iberia; and being still both of them equally balanced between

uncertain hopes and fears for the future of these wars, and confronted

at the very time with battles equally formidable to either, should

yet not be content with their existing undertakings: but should raise

another controversy as to the possession of Sardinia and Sicily; and

not content with merely hoping for all these things, should grasp at

them with all the resources of their wealth and warlike forces? Indeed

the more we examine into details the greater becomes our astonishment.

The Romans had two complete armies under the two Consuls on active

service in Italy; two in Iberia in which Gnaeus Cornelius commanded the

land, Publius Cornelius the naval forces; and naturally the same was

the case with the Carthaginians. But besides this, a Roman fleet was

anchored off Greece, watching it and the movements of Philip, of which

first Marcus Valerius, and afterward Publius Sulpicius was in command.

Along with all these undertakings Appius with a hundred quinqueremes,

and Marcus Claudius with an army, were threatening Sicily; while

Hamilcar was doing the same on the side of the Carthaginians.

+4.+ By means of these facts I presume that what I more than once

asserted at the beginning of my work is now shown by actual experience

to deserve unmixed credit. I mean my assertion, that it is impossible

for historians of particular places to get a view of universal history.

For how is it possible for a man who has only read a separate history

of Sicilian or Spanish affairs to understand and grasp the greatness of

the events? Or, what is still more important, in what manner and under

what form of polity fortune brought to pass that most surprising of

all revolutions that have happened in our time, I mean the reduction

of all known parts of the world under one rule and governance, a

thing unprecedented in the history of mankind. In what manner the

Romans took Syracuse or Iberia may be possibly learned to a certain

extent by means of such particular histories; but how they arrived at

universal supremacy, and what opposition their grand designs met with

in particular places, or what on the other hand contributed to their

success, and at what epochs, this it is difficult to take in without

the aid of universal history. Nor, again, is it easy to appreciate the

greatness of their achievements except by the latter method. For the

fact of the Romans having sought to gain Iberia, or at another time

Sicily; or having gone on a campaign with military and naval forces,

told by itself, would not be anything very wonderful. But if we learn

that these were all done at once, and that many more undertakings were

in course of accomplishment at the same time,—all at the cost of one

government and commonwealth; and if we see what dangers and wars in

their own territory were, at the very time, encumbering the men who had

all these things on hand: thus, and only thus, will the astonishing

nature of the events fully dawn upon us, and obtain the attention which

they deserve. So much for those who suppose that by studying an episode

they have become acquainted with universal history....

THE SIEGE OF SYRACUSE

_Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather, Hiero, in B.C. 216, and was

assassinated in Leontini thirteen months afterwards, in B.C. 215. His

death, however, did not bring more peaceful relations between Syracuse

and Rome, but only gave the Syracusans more able leaders (Livy, 24,

21). After the slaughter of Themistius and Andramodorus, who had been

elected on the board of Generals, and the cruel murder of all the

royal family, Epicydes and Hippocrates,—Syracusans by descent, but

born and brought up at Carthage, and who had been sent to Syracuse on

a special mission by Hannibal,—were elected into the vacant places in

the board of Generals. They became the leading spirits in the Syracusan

government, and for a time kept up an appearance of wishing to come

to terms with Rome; and legates were actually sent to Marcellus, at

Morgantia (near Catana). But when the Carthaginian fleet arrived at

Pachynus, Hippocrates and Epicydes threw off their mask, and declared

that the other magistrates were betraying the town to the Romans. This

accusation was rendered more specious by the appearance of Appius with

a Roman fleet at the mouth of the harbour. A rush was made to the

shore by the inhabitants to prevent the Romans landing; and the tumult

was with difficulty composed by the wisdom of one of the magistrates,

Apollonides, who persuaded the people to vote for the peace with Rome

(B.C. 215. Livy, 24, 21-28). But Hippocrates and Epicydes determined

not to acknowledge the peace: they therefore provoked the Romans by

plundering in or near the Roman pale,[319] and then took refuge in

Leontini. Marcellus complained at Syracuse, but was told that Leontini

was not within Syracusan jurisdiction. Marcellus, therefore, took

Leontini. Hippocrates and Epicydes managed to escape, and by a mixture

of force and fraud contrived soon afterwards to force their way into

Syracuse, seize and put to death most of the generals, and induce the

excited mob, whom they had inspired with the utmost dread of being

betrayed to Rome, to elect them sole generals (Livy, 24, 29-32). The

Romans at once ordered Syracuse to be besieged, giving out that they

were coming not to wage war with the inhabitants, but to deliver them._

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Siege of Syracuse, B.C. 215-214.]

[Sidenote: Archimedes.]

+5.+ When Epicydes and Hippocrates had occupied Syracuse, and had

alienated the rest of the citizens with themselves from the friendship

of Rome, the Romans who had already been informed of the murder of

Hieronymus, tyrant of Syracuse, appointed Appius Claudius as Propraetor

to command a land force, while Marcus Claudius Marcellus commanded

the fleet. These officers took up a position not far from Syracuse,

and determined to assault the town from the land at Hexapylus, and by

sea at what was called Stoa Scytice in Achradina, where the wall has

its foundation close down to the sea. Having prepared their wicker

pent-houses, and darts, and other siege material, they felt confident

that, with so many hands employed, they would in five days get their

works in such an advanced state as to give them the advantage over the

enemy. But in this they did not take into account the abilities of

Archimedes; nor calculate on the truth that, in certain circumstances,

the genius of one man is more effective than any numbers whatever.[320]

However they now learnt it by experience. The city was strong from

the fact of its encircling wall lying along a chain of hills with

overhanging brows, the ascent of which was no easy task, even with no

one to hinder it, except at certain definite points. Taking advantage

of this, Archimedes had constructed such defences both in the town, and

at the places where an attack might be made by sea, that the garrison

would have everything at hand which they might require at any moment,

and be ready to meet without delay whatever the enemy might attempt

against them.

[Sidenote: Sambucae or Harps.]

+6.+ The attack was begun by Appius bringing his pent-houses, and

scaling ladders, and attempting to fix the latter against that part of

the wall which abuts on Hexapylus towards the east. At the same time

Marcus Claudius Marcellus with sixty quinqueremes was making a descent

upon Achradina. Each of these vessels were full of men armed with bows

and slings and javelins, with which to dislodge those who fought on

the battlements. As well as these vessels he had eight quinqueremes

in pairs. Each pair had had their oars removed, one on the larboard

and the other on the starboard side, and then had been lashed together

on the sides thus left bare. On these double vessels, rowed by the

outer oars of each of the pair, they brought up under the walls some

engines called “Sambucae,” the construction of which was as follows:—A

ladder was made four feet broad, and of a height to reach the top of

the wall from the place where its foot had to rest; each side of the

ladder was protected by a railing, and a covering or pent-house was

added overhead. It was then placed so that its foot rested across the

sides of the lashed-together vessels, which touched each other with its

other extremity protruding a considerable way beyond the prows. On the

tops of the masts pulleys were fixed with ropes: and when the engines

were about to be used, men standing on the sterns of the vessels drew

the ropes tied to the head of the ladder, while others standing on

the prows assisted the raising of the machine and kept it steady with

long poles. Having then brought the ships close in shore by using the

outer oars of both vessels they tried to let the machine down upon the

wall. At the head of the ladder was fixed a wooden stage secured on

three sides by wicker-shields, upon which stood four men who fought

and struggled with those who tried to prevent the Sambuca from being

made to rest on the battlements. But when they have fixed it and so

got above the level of the top of the wall, the four men unfasten the

wicker-shields from either side of the stage, and walk out upon the

battlements or towers as the case may be; they are followed by their

comrades coming up by the Sambuca, since the ladder’s foot is safely

secured with ropes and stands upon both the ships. This construction

has got the name of “Sambuca,” or “Harp,” for the natural reason, that

when it is raised the combination of the ship and ladder has very much

the appearance of such an instrument.

[Sidenote: The engines invented by Archimedes. Cf. Plut. _Marcellus_,

15.]

[Sidenote: 570 lbs. av.]

+7.+ With such contrivances and preparations were the Romans intending

to assault the towers. But Archimedes had constructed catapults to suit

every range; and as the ships sailing up were still at a considerable

distance, he so wounded the enemy with stones and darts, from the

tighter wound and longer engines, as to harass and perplex them to the

last degree; and when these began to carry over their heads, he used

smaller engines graduated according to the range required from time

to time, and by this means caused so much confusion among them as to

altogether check their advance and attack; and finally Marcellus was

reduced in despair to bringing up his ships under cover of night. But

when they had come close to land, and so too near to be hit by the

catapults, they found that Archimedes had prepared another contrivance

against the soldiers who fought from the decks. He had pierced the wall

as high as a man’s stature with numerous loop-holes, which, on the

outside, were about as big as the palm of the hand. Inside the wall he

stationed archers and cross-bows, or scorpions,[321] and by the volleys

discharged through these he made the marines useless. By these means he

not only baffled the enemy, whether at a distance or close at hand, but

also killed the greater number of them. As often, too, as they tried

to work their Sambucae, he had engines ready all along the walls, not

visible at other times, but which suddenly reared themselves above the

wall from inside, when the moment for their use had come, and stretched

their beams far over the battlements, some of them carrying stones

weighing as much as ten talents, and others great masses of lead. So

whenever the Sambucae were approaching, these beams swung round on

their pivot the required distance, and by means of a rope running

through a pulley dropped the stone upon the Sambucae, with the result

that it not only smashed the machine itself to pieces, but put the ship

also and all on board into the most serious danger.

+8.+ Other machines which he invented were directed against storming

parties, who, advancing under the protection of pent-houses, were

secured by them from being hurt by missiles shot through the walls.

Against these he either shot stones big enough to drive the marines

from the prow; or let down an iron hand swung on a chain, by which the

man who guided the crane, having fastened on some part of the prow

where he could get a hold, pressed down the lever of the machine inside

the wall; and when he had thus lifted the prow and made the vessel rest

upright on its stern, he fastened the lever of his machine so that it

could not be moved; and then suddenly slackened the hand and chain by

means of a rope and pulley. The result was that many of the vessels

heeled over and fell on their sides: some completely capsized; while

the greater number, by their prows coming down suddenly from a height,

dipped low in the sea, shipped a great quantity of water, and became

a scene of the utmost confusion. Though reduced almost to despair by

these baffling inventions of Archimedes, and though he saw that all his

attempts were repulsed by the garrison with mockery on their part and

loss to himself, Marcellus could not yet refrain from making a joke at

his own expense, saying that “Archimedes was using his ships to ladle

out the sea-water, but that his 'harps’ not having been invited to the

party were buffeted and turned out with disgrace.” Such was the end of

the attempt at storming Syracuse by sea.

[Sidenote: The assault by land repulsed.]

[Sidenote: The siege turned into a blockade, B.C. 214. Coss. Q. Fabius

Maximus IV. M. Claudius Marcellus III.]

+9.+ Nor was Appius Claudius more successful. He, too, was compelled

by similar difficulties to desist from the attempt; for while his

men were still at a considerable distance from the wall, they began

falling by the stones and shots from the engines and catapults. The

volleys of missiles, indeed, were extraordinarily rapid and sharp,

for their construction had been provided for by all the liberality

of a Hiero, and had been planned and engineered by the skill of an

Archimedes. Moreover, when they did at length get near the walls, they

were prevented from making an assault by the unceasing fire through

the loop-holes, which I mentioned before; or if they tried to carry

the place under cover of pent-houses, they were killed by the stones

and beams let down upon their heads. The garrison also did them no

little damage with those hands at the end of their engines; for they

used to lift the men, armour, and all, into the air, and then throw

them down. At last Appius retired into the camp, and summoning the

Tribunes to a council of war, decided to try every possible means of

taking Syracuse except a storm. And this decision they carried out; for

during the eight months of siege which followed, though there was no

stratagem or measure of daring which they did not attempt, they never

again ventured to attempt a storm. So true it is that one man and one

intellect, properly qualified for the particular undertaking, is a

host in itself and of extraordinary efficacy. In this instance, at any

rate, we find the Romans confident that their forces by land and sea

would enable them to become masters of the town, if only one old man

could be got rid of; while as long as he remained there, they did not

venture even to think of making the attempt, at least by any method

which made it possible for Archimedes to oppose them. They believed,

however, that their best chance of reducing the garrison was by a

failure of provisions sufficient for so large a number as were within

the town; they therefore relied upon this hope, and with their ships

tried to cut off their supplies by sea, and with their army by land.

But desiring that the time during which they were blockading Syracuse

should not be entirely wasted, but that some addition should be made to

their power in other parts of the country, the two commanders separated

and divided the troops between them: Appius Claudius keeping two-thirds

and continuing the blockade, while Marcus Marcellus with the remaining

third went to attack the cities that sided with the Carthaginians....

* * * * *

[Sidenote: Philip’s second devastation of Messene, B.C. 214.]

[Sidenote: See Plutarch, _Aratus_, ch. 51. Cp. _supra_, 7, 10-14.]

+10.+ Upon arriving in Messenia Philip began devastating the country,

like an open enemy, with more passion than reason; for while pursuing

this continuous course of injurious actions, he expected, it appears to

me, that the sufferers would feel no anger or hatred towards him. I was

induced to speak of these proceedings in somewhat full detail in the

present as well as in the last book, not alone by the same motives as

those which I have assigned for other parts of my work, but also by the

fact that of our historians, some have entirely omitted this Messenian

episode; while others from love or fear of kings have maintained that,

so far from the outrages committed by Philip in defiance of religion

and law upon the Messenians being a subject of blame, his actions were

on the contrary matters for praise and gratulation. But it is not

only in regard to the Messenians that we may notice the historians of

Philip acting thus; they have done much the same in other cases also.

And the result is that their compositions have the appearance of a

panegyric rather than of a history. I however hold that an historian

ought neither to blame or praise kings untruly, as has often been done;

but to make what we say consistent with what has been written before,

and tally with the characters of the several persons in question. But

it may be urged perhaps that this is easy to say, but very difficult

to carry out; because situations and circumstances are so many and

various, to which men have to give way in the course of their life,

and which prevent them from speaking out their real opinions. This may

excuse some, but not others.

[Sidenote: The extravagance of Theopompus’s account of Philip II.]

+11.+ I do not know any one who deserves more blame in this particular

than Theopompus. In the beginning of his history of Philip he said

that what chiefly induced him to undertake it was the fact that

Europe had never produced such a man as Philip son of Amyntas; and

then immediately afterwards, both in his preface and in the whole

course of his history, he represents this king as so madly addicted to

women, that he did all that in him lay to ruin his own family by this

inordinate passion; as having behaved with the grossest unfairness and

perfidy to his friends and allies, as having enslaved and treacherously

seized a vast number of towns by force or fraud; and as having been

besides so violently addicted to strong drink, that he was often

seen by his friends drunk in open day. But if any one will take the

trouble to read the opening passage of his forty-ninth book, he would

be indeed astonished at this writer’s extravagance. Besides his other

strange statements he has ventured to write as follows—for I here

subjoin his actual words:—“If there was any one in all Greece, or among

the Barbarians, whose character was lascivious and shameless, he was

invariably attracted to Philip’s court in Macedonia and got the title

of 'the king’s companion.’ For it was Philip’s constant habit to reject

those who lived respectably and were careful of their property; but to

honour and promote those who were extravagant, and passed their lives

in drinking and dicing. His influence accordingly tended not only to

confirm them in these vices, but to make them proficients in every kind

of rascality and lewdness. What vice or infamy did they not possess?

What was there virtuous or of good report that they did not lack? Some

of them, men as they were, were ever clean shaven and smooth-skinned;

and even bearded men did not shrink from mutual defilement. They took

about with them two or three slaves of their lust, while submitting

to the same shameful service themselves. The men whom they called

companions deserved a grosser name, and the title of soldier was but

a cover to mercenary vice; for, though bloodthirsty by nature, they

were lascivious by habit. In a word, to make a long story short,

especially as I have such a mass of matter to deal with, I believe that

the so-called 'friends’ and 'companions’ of Philip were more bestial

in nature and character than the Centaurs who lived on Pelion, or the

Laestrygones who inhabited the Leontine plain, or in fact any other

monsters whatever.”[322]

+12.+ Who would not disapprove of such bitterness and intemperance of

language in an historian? It is not only because his words contradict

his opening statement that he deserves stricture; but also because

he has libelled the king and his friends; and still more because his

falsehood is expressed in disgusting and unbecoming words. If he had

been speaking of Sardanapalus, or one of his associates, he could

hardly have ventured to use such foul language; and what that monarch’s

principles and debauchery were in his lifetime we gather from the

inscription on his tomb, which runs thus:

“The joys I had from love or wine

Or dainty meats—those now are mine.”

[Sidenote: The vigorous characters of the Diadochi.]

But when speaking of Philip and his friends, a man ought to be on

his guard, not so much of accusing them of effeminacy and want of

courage, or still more of shameless immorality, but on the contrary

lest he should prove unequal to express their praises in a manner

worthy of their manliness, indefatigable energy, and the general

virtue of their character. It is notorious that by their energy and

boldness they raised the Macedonian Empire from a most insignificant

monarchy to the first rank in reputation and extent. And, putting aside

the achievements of Philip, what was accomplished by them after his

death, under the rule of Alexander, has secured for them a reputation

for valour with posterity universally acknowledged. For although a

large share of the credit must perhaps be given to Alexander, as the

presiding genius of the whole, though so young a man; yet no less is

due to his coadjutors and friends, who won many wonderful victories

over the enemy; endured numerous desperate labours, dangers and

sufferings; and, though put into possession of the most ample wealth,

and the most abundant means of gratifying all their desires, never

lost their bodily vigour by these means, or contracted tastes for

violence or debauchery. On the contrary, all those who were associated

with Philip, and afterwards with Alexander, became truly royal in

greatness of soul, temperance of life, and courage. Nor is it necessary

to mention any names: but after Alexander’s death, in their mutual

rivalries for the possession of various parts of nearly all the world,

they filled a very large number of histories with the record of their

glorious deeds. We may admit then that the bitter invective of the

historian Timaeus against Agathocles, despot of Sicily, though it seems

unmeasured, has yet some reason in it,—for it is directed against a

personal enemy, a bad man, and a tyrant; but that of Theopompus is too

scurrilous to be taken seriously.

+13.+ For, after premising that he is going to write about a king most

richly endowed by nature with virtue, he has raked up against him every

shameful and atrocious charge that he could find. There are therefore

but two alternatives: either this writer in the preface to his work has

shown himself a liar and a flatterer; or in the body of that history a

fool and utter simpleton, if he imagined that by senseless and improper

invective he would either increase his own credit, or gain great

acceptance for his laudatory expressions about Philip.

[Sidenote: Thucydides breaks off in B.C. 411. Battle of Leuctra B.C.

371.]

But the fact is that the general plan of this writer is one also which

can meet with no one’s approval. For having undertaken to write a

Greek History from the point at which Thucydides left off, when he

got near the period of the battle of Leuctra, and the most splendid

exploits of the Greeks, he threw aside Greece and its achievements in

the middle of his story, and, changing his purpose, undertook to write

the history of Philip. And yet it would have been far more telling and

fair to have included the actions of Philip in the general history

of Greece, than the history of Greece in that of Philip. For one

cannot conceive of any one, who had been preoccupied by the study of a

royal government, hesitating, if he got the power and opportunity, to

transfer his attention to the great name and splendid personality of a

nation like Greece; but no one in his senses, after beginning with the

latter, would have exchanged it for the showy biography of a tyrant.

Now what could it have been that compelled Theopompus to overlook

such inconsistencies? Nothing surely but this, that whereas the aim

of his original history was honour, that of his history of Philip was

expediency. As to this deviation from the right path however, which

made him change the theme of his history, he might perhaps have had

something to say, if any one had questioned him about it; but as to

his abominable language about the king’s friends, I do not think that

he could have said a word of defence, but must have owned to a serious

breach of propriety....

[Sidenote: Death of Aratus, B.C. 213.]

+14.+ Though regarding the Messenians as open enemies, Philip was

unable to inflict serious damage upon them, in spite of his setting

to work to devastate their territory; but he was guilty of abominable

conduct of the worst description to men who had been his most intimate

friends. For on the elder Aratus showing disapproval of his proceedings

at Messene, he caused him not long afterwards to be made away with by

poison, through the agency of Taurion who had charge of his interests

in the Peloponnese. The crime was not known at the time by other

people; for the drug was not one of those which kill on the spot, but

was a slow poison producing a morbid state of the body. Aratus himself

however was fully aware of the cause of his illness; and showed that he

was so by the following circumstance. Though he kept the secret from

the rest of the world, he did not conceal it from one of his servants

named Cepholon, with whom he was on terms of great affection. This man

waited on him during his illness with great assiduity, and having one

day pointed out some spittle on the wall which was stained with blood,

Aratus remarked, “That is the reward I have got for my friendship to

Philip.” Such a grand and noble thing is disinterested virtue, that

the sufferer was more ashamed, than the inflicter of the injury, of

having it known, that, after so many splendid services performed in

the interests of Philip, he had got such a return as that for his

loyalty.[323]

[Sidenote: Seventeen times Strategus. Plutarch, _Aratus_, 53.]

In consequence of having been so often elected Strategus of the Achaean

league, and of having performed so many splendid services for that

people, Aratus after his death met with the honours he deserved, both

in his own native city and from the league as a body. They voted him

sacrifices and the honours of heroship, and in a word every thing

calculated to perpetuate his memory; so that, if the departed have any

consciousness, it is but reasonable to think that he feels pleasure at

the gratitude of the Achaeans, and at the thought of the hardships and

dangers he endured in his life....

PHILIP TAKES LISSUS IN ILLYRIA, B.C. 213

[Sidenote: Lissus founded by Dionysius of Syracuse, B.C. 385. See Diod.

Sic. 15, 13.]

+15.+ Philip had long had his thoughts fixed upon Lissus and its

citadel; and, being anxious to become master of those places, he

started with his army, and after two days’ march got through the pass

and pitched his camp on the bank of the river Ardaxanus, not far from

the town. He found on surveying the place that the fortifications of

Lissus, both on the side of the sea and of the land, were exceedingly

strong both by nature and art; and that the citadel, which was near it,

from its extraordinary height and its other sources of strength, looked

more than any one could hope to carry by storm. He therefore gave up

all hope of the latter, but did not entirely despair of taking the

town. He observed that there was a space between Lissus and the foot of

the Acrolissus which was fairly well suited for making an attempt upon

the town. He conceived the idea therefore of bringing on a skirmish in

this space, and then employing a strategem suited to the circumstances

of the case. Having given his men a day for rest; and having in the

course of it addressed them in suitable words of exhortation; he hid

the greater and most effective part of his light-armed troops during

the night in some woody gulleys, close to this space on the land side;

and next morning marched to the other side of the town next the sea,

with his peltasts and the rest of his light-armed. Having thus marched

round the town, and arrived at this spot, he made a show of intending

to assault it at that point. Now as Philip’s advent had been no secret,

a large body of men from the surrounding country of Illyria had flocked

into Lissus; but feeling confidence in the strength of the citadel,

they had assigned a very moderate number of men to garrison it.

[Sidenote: The Acrolissus taken by a feint, and Lissus afterwards.]

+16.+ As soon therefore as the Macedonians approached, they began

pouring out of the town, confident in their numbers and in the strength

of the places. The king stationed his peltasts on the level ground,

and ordered the light-armed troops to advance towards the hills and

energetically engage the enemy. These orders being obeyed, the fight

remained doubtful for a time; but presently Philip’s men yielded to the

inequality of the ground, and the superior number of the enemy, and

gave way. Upon their retreating within the ranks of the peltasts, the

sallying party advanced with feelings of contempt, and having descended

to the same level as the peltasts joined battle with them. But the

garrison of the citadel seeing Philip moving his divisions one after

the other slowly to the rear, and believing that he was abandoning

the field, allowed themselves to be insensibly decoyed out, in their

confidence in the strength of their fortifications; and thus, leaving

the citadel by degrees, kept pouring down by bye-ways into the lower

plain, under the belief that they would have an opportunity of getting

booty and completing the enemy’s discomfiture. Meanwhile the division,

which had been lying concealed on the side of the mainland, rose

without being observed, and advanced at a rapid pace. At their approach

the peltasts also wheeled round and charged the enemy. On this the

troops from Lissus were thrown into confusion, and, after a straggling

retreat, got safely back into the town; while the garrison which had

abandoned the citadel got cut off from it by the rising of the troops

which had been lying in ambush. The result accordingly was that what

seemed hopeless, namely the capture of the citadel, was effected

at once and without any fighting; while Lissus did not fall until

next day, and then only after desperate struggles, the Macedonians

assaulting with vigour and even terrific fury. Thus Philip having,

beyond all expectation, made himself master of these places, reduced

by this exploit all the neighbouring populations to obedience; so much

so that the greater number of the Illyrians voluntarily surrendered

their cities to his protection; for it had come to be believed that,

after the storming of such strongholds as these, no fortification and

no provision for security could be of any avail against the might of

Philip.

THE CAPTURE OF ACHAEUS AT SARDIS

(See 7, 15-18)

[Sidenote: B.C. 214. Sosibius secures the help of Bolis to rescue

Achaeus.]

+17.+ Bolis was by birth a Cretan, who had long enjoyed the honours of

high military rank at King Ptolemy’s court, and the reputation of being

second to none in natural ability, adventurous daring, and experience

in war. By repeated arguments Sosibius secured this man’s fidelity;

and when he felt sure of his zeal and affection he communicated the

business in hand to him. He told him that he could not do the king

a more acceptable service at the present crisis than by contriving

some way of saving Achaeus. At the moment Bolis listened, and retired

without saying more than that he would consider the suggestion. But

after two or three days’ reflection, he came to Sosibius and said that

he would undertake the business; remarking that, having spent some

considerable time at Sardis, he knew its topography, and that Cambylus,

the commander of the Cretan contingent of the army of Antiochus, was

not only a fellow citizen of his but a kinsmen and friend. It chanced

moreover that Cambylus and his men had in charge one of the outposts on

the rear of the acropolis, where the nature of the ground did not admit

of siege-works, but was guarded by the permanent cantonment of troops

under Cambylus. Sosibius caught at the suggestion, convinced that, if

Achaeus could be saved at all from his dangerous situation, it could be

better accomplished by the agency of Bolis than of any one else; and,

this conviction being backed by great zeal on the part of Bolis, the

undertaking was pushed on with despatch. Sosibius at once supplied the

money necessary for the attempt, and promised a large sum besides in

case of its success; at the same time raising the hopes of Bolis to the

utmost by dilating upon the favours he might look for from the king, as

well as from the rescued prince himself.

Full of eagerness therefore for success, Bolis set sail without delay,

taking with him a letter in cipher and other credentials addressed

to Nicomachus at Rhodes, who was believed to entertain a fatherly

affection and devotion for Achaeus, and also to Melancomas at Ephesus;

for these were the men formerly employed by Achaeus in his negotiations

with Ptolemy, and in all other foreign affairs.

[Sidenote: Bolis turns traitor.]

+18.+ Bolis went to Rhodes, and thence to Ephesus; communicated his

purpose to Nicomachus and Melancomas; and found them ready to do what

they were asked. He then despatched one of his staff, named Arianus,

to Cambylus, with a message to the effect that he had been sent from

Alexandria on a recruiting tour, and that he wished for an interview

with Cambylus on some matters of importance; he thought it therefore

necessary to have a time and place arranged for them to meet without

the privity of a third person. Arianus quickly obtained an interview

with Cambylus and delivered his message; nor was the latter at all

unwilling to listen to the proposal. Having appointed a day, and a

place known to both himself and Bolis, at which he would be after

nightfall, he dismissed Arianus. Now Bolis had all the subtlety of a

Cretan, and he accordingly weighed carefully in his own mind every

possible line of action, and patiently examined every idea which

presented itself to him. Finally he met Cambylus according to the

arrangement made with Arianus, and delivered his letter. This was

now made the subject of discussion between them in a truly Cretan

spirit. They never took into consideration the means of saving the

person in danger, or their obligations of honour to those who had

entrusted them with the undertaking, but confined their discussions

entirely to the question of their own safety and their own advantage.

As they were both Cretans they were not long in coming to an unanimous

agreement: which was, first of all, to divide the ten talents supplied

by Sosibius between themselves in equal shares; and, secondly, to

discover the whole affair to Antiochus, and to offer with his support

to put Achaeus into his hands, on condition of receiving a sum of

money and promises for the future, on a scale commensurate with the

greatness of the undertaking. Having settled upon this plan of action:

Cambylus undertook the negotiation with Antiochus, while to Bolis

was assigned the duty of sending Arianus within the next few days to

Achaeus, bearing letters in cipher from Nicomachus and Melancomas: he

bade Cambylus however take upon himself to consider how Arianus was

to make his way into the acropolis and return with safety. “If,” said

Bolis, “Achaeus consents to make the attempt, and sends an answer to

Nicomachus and Melancomas, I will be ready to act and will communicate

with you.” Having thus arranged the parts which each was to take in the

plot, they separated and set about their several tasks.

[Sidenote: The intended treason against Achaeus communicated to

Antiochus.]

[Sidenote: Achaeus is deceived.]

+19.+ At the first opportunity Cambylus laid the proposal before the

king. It was as acceptable to Antiochus as it was unexpected: in the

first flush of his exultation he promised everything they asked; but

presently feeling some distrust, he questioned Cambylus on every detail

of their plan, and their means of carrying it out. Being eventually

satisfied on these points, and believing that the undertaking was under

the special favour of Providence, he repeatedly begged and prayed

Cambylus to bring it to a conclusion. Bolis was equally successful with

Nicomachus and Melancomas. They entertained no doubt of his sincerity,

and joined him in the composition of letters to Achaeus,—composed in

a cipher which they had been accustomed to use,—to prevent any one

who got hold of the letter from making out its contents, exhorting

him to trust Bolis and Cambylus. So Arianus, having by the aid of

Cambylus made his way into the acropolis, delivered the letters to

Achaeus; and having had personal acquaintance with the whole business

from its commencement, he was able to give an account of every detail

when questioned and cross-questioned again and again by Achaeus

about Sosibius and Bolis, about Nicomachus and Melancomas, and most

particularly about the part which Cambylus was taking in the affair. He

could of course stand this cross-examination with some air of sincerity

and candour, because, in point of fact, he was not acquainted with the

most important part of the plan which Cambylus and Bolis had adopted.

Achaeus was convinced by the answers returned by Arianus, and still

more by the cipher of Nicomachus and Melancomas; gave his answer; and

sent Arianus back with it without delay. This kind of communication

was repeated more than once: and at last Achaeus entrusted himself

without reserve to Nicomachus, there being absolutely no other hope of

saving himself left remaining, and bade him send Bolis with Arianus

on a certain moonless night, promising to place himself in their

hands. The idea of Achaeus was, first of all, to escape his immediate

danger; and then by a circuitous route to make his way into Syria.

For he entertained very great hopes that, if he appeared suddenly

and unexpectedly to the Syrians, while Antiochus was still lingering

about Sardis, he would be able to stir up a great movement, and meet

with a cordial reception from the people of Antioch, Coele-Syria, and

Phoenicia.

With such expectations and calculations Achaeus was waiting for the

appearance of Bolis.

+20.+ Meanwhile Arianus had reached Melancomas, who, on reading the

letter which he brought, immediately despatched Bolis with many words

of exhortation and great promises of profit if he succeeded in his

enterprise. Bolis sent Arianus in advance to signify his arrival to

Cambylus, and went after nightfall to their usual place of meeting.

There they spent a whole day together settling every detail of their

plan of operations; and having done this they went into the camp under

cover of night. The arrangement made between them was this. If it

turned out that Achaeus came from the acropolis alone with Bolis and

Arianus, or with only one attendant, he would give them no cause for

anxiety at all, but would be easily captured by the ambuscade set for

him. If, on the other hand, he should be accompanied by a considerable

number, the business would be one of some difficulty to those on whose

good faith he relied; especially as they were anxious to capture him

alive, that being what would most gratify Antiochus. In that case,

therefore, Arianus, while conducting Achaeus, was to go in front,

because he knew the path by which he had on several occasions effected

his entrance and return; Bolis was to bring up the rear, in order that,

when they arrived at the spot where Cambylus was to have his ambuscade

ready, he might lay hold on Achaeus, and prevent his getting away

through wooded ground, in the confusion and darkness of the night, or

throwing himself in his terror from some precipice; thus they would

secure that he fell, as they intended, into his enemies’ hands alive.

These arrangements having been agreed upon, Bolis was taken by Cambylus

on the very night of his arrival, without any one else, and introduced

to Antiochus. The king was alone and received them graciously; he

pledged himself to the performance of his promises, and urged them both

again and again not to postpone any longer the performance of their

purpose. Thereupon they returned for the present to their own camp;

but towards morning Bolis, accompanied by Arianus, ascended to the

acropolis, and entered it before daybreak.

[Sidenote: Achaeus takes vain precautions.]

+21.+ Achaeus received them with warmth and cordiality, and questioned

Bolis at great length on every detail. From the expression of his

face, and his conversation, he judged Bolis to be a man of a character

weighty enough for so serious an undertaking; but while at one time he

exulted in the prospect of his release, at another, he grew painfully

excited, and was torn with an agony of anxiety at the gravity of the

issues at stake. But no one had a clearer head or greater experience in

affairs than he; and in spite of the good opinion he had formed of him,

he still determined that his safety should not depend entirely on the

good faith of Bolis. He accordingly told him that it was impossible for

him to leave the acropolis at the moment: but that he would send some

two or three of his friends with him, and by the time that they had

joined Melancomas he would be prepared to depart. So Achaeus did all

he could for his security; but he did not know that he was trying to

do what the proverb declares to be impossible—out-cretan a Cretan. For

there was no trick likely to be tried that Bolis had not anticipated.

However when the night came, in which Achaeus said that he would send

his friends with them, he sent on Arianus and Bolis to the entrance of

the acropolis, with instructions to wait there until those who were

to go with them arrived. They did as he bade them. Achaeus then, at

the very moment of his departure, communicated his plan to his wife

Laodice; and she was so terrified at his sudden resolve, that he had to

spend some time in entreating her to be calm, in soothing her feelings,

and encouraging her by pointing out the hopes which he entertained.

This done he started with four companions, whom he dressed in ordinary

clothes, while he himself put on a mean and common dress and disguised

his rank as much as possible. He selected one of his four companions to

be always prepared to answer anything said by Arianus, and to ask any

necessary question of him, and bade him say that the other four did not

speak Greek.

[Sidenote: Achaeus made prisoner.]

+22.+ The five then joined Arianus, and they all started together on

their journey. Arianus went in front, as being acquainted with the

way; while Bolis took up his position behind in accordance with the

original plan, puzzled and annoyed at the way things were turning out.

For, Cretan as he was, and ready to suspect every one he came near, he

yet could not make out which of the five was Achaeus, or whether he

was there at all. But the path was for the most part precipitous and

difficult, and in some places there were abrupt descents which were

slippery and dangerous; and whenever they came to one of these, some

of the four gave Achaeus a hand down, and the others caught him at the

bottom, for they could not entirely conceal their habitual respect

for him; and Bolis was quick to detect, by observing this, which of

them was Achaeus. When therefore they arrived at the spot at which it

had been arranged that Cambylus was to be, Bolis gave the signal by

a whistle, and the men sprang from their places of concealment and

seized the other four, while Bolis himself caught hold of Achaeus, at

the same time grasping his mantle, as his hands were inside it; for

he was afraid that having a sword concealed about his person he would

attempt to kill himself when he understood what was happening. Being

thus quickly surrounded on every side, Achaeus fell into the hands of

his enemies, and along with his four friends was taken straight off to

Antiochus.

[Sidenote: Achaeus brought to Antiochus, sentenced and executed.]

The king was in his tent in a state of extreme anxiety awaiting the

result. He had dismissed his usual court, and, with the exception

of two or three of the bodyguard, was alone and sleepless. But when

Cambylus and his men entered, and placed Achaeus in chains on the

ground, he fell into a state of speechless astonishment: and for a

considerable time could not utter a word, and finally overcome by a

feeling of pity burst into tears; caused, I have no doubt, by this

exhibition of the capriciousness of Fortune, which defies precaution

and calculation alike. For here was Achaeus, a son of Andromachus, the

brother of Seleucus’s queen Laodice, and married to Laodice, a daughter

of King Mithridates, and who had made himself master of all Asia this

side of Taurus, and who at that very moment was believed by his own

army, as well as by that of his enemy, to be safely ensconced in the

strongest position in the world,—sitting chained upon the ground, in

the hands of his enemies, before a single person knew of it except

those who had effected the capture.

[Sidenote: The citadel of Sardis surrendered.]

+23.+ And, indeed, when at daybreak the king’s friends assembled as

usual at his tent, and saw this strange spectacle, they too felt

emotions very like those of the king; while extreme astonishment

made them almost disbelieve the evidence of their senses. However

the council met, and a long debate ensued as to what punishment they

were to inflict upon Achaeus. Finally, it was resolved that his

extremities should be cut off, his head severed from his body and sewn

up in the skin of an ass, and his body impaled. When this sentence

had been carried out, and the army learnt what had happened, there

was such excitement in the ranks and such a rush of the soldiers to

the spectacle, that Laodice on the acropolis, who alone knew that her

husband had left it, guessed what had happened from the commotion and

stir in the camp. And before long a herald arrived, told Laodice what

had happened to Achaeus, and ordered her to resign the command and

quit the acropolis. At first any answer was prevented by an outburst

of sorrow and overpowering lamentation on the part of the occupants of

the acropolis; not so much from affection towards Achaeus, as from the

suddenness and utter unexpectedness of the catastrophe. But this was

succeeded by a feeling of hesitation and dismay; and Antiochus, having

got rid of Achaeus, never ceased putting pressure on the garrison of

the acropolis, feeling confident that a means of taking it would be put

into his hands by those who occupied it, and most probably by the rank

and file of the garrison. And this is just what did finally happen:

for the soldiers split up into factions, one joining Ariobazus, the

other Laodice. This produced mutual distrust, and before long both

parties surrendered themselves and the acropolis. Thus Achaeus, in

spite of having taken every reasonable precaution, lost his life by

the perfidy of those in whom he trusted. His fate may teach posterity

two useful lessons,—not to put faith in any one lightly; and not to

be over-confident in the hour of prosperity, knowing that, in human

affairs, there is no accident which we may not expect....

THE GALLIC KING, CAUARUS

[Sidenote: Cauarus, king of the Gauls, settled on the Hellespont. See

4, 46 and 52.]

+24.+ Cauarus, king of the Gauls in Thrace, was of a truly royal and

high-minded disposition, and gave the merchants sailing into the Pontus

great protection, and rendered the Byzantines important services in

their wars with the Thracians and Bithynians....

This king, so excellent in other respects, was corrupted by a flatterer

named Sostratus, who was a Chalchedonian by birth....

ANTIOCHUS THE GREAT AT ARMOSATA

[Sidenote: In the course of his campaigns for the recovering of the

eastern provinces (B.C. 212-205), Antiochus makes a demonstration

before the city of Armosata, in Armenia, to recover the arrears of

tribute owed by the late king, B.C. 212.]

+25.+ In the reign of Xerxes, prince of the city of Armosata, situated

on the “Fair Plain,” between the Tigris and Euphrates, King Antiochus

encamped under its walls and prepared to attack it. When he saw the

king’s forces, Xerxes at first conveyed himself away; but feeling

afterwards that, if his palace were seized by his enemies, his whole

kingdom would be overthrown, he changed his mind, and sent a message

to Antiochus declaring his wish for a conference. The most loyal of

the friends of Antiochus were against letting the young prince go when

they once got him into their hands, and advised Antiochus to take

possession of the town, and hand over the principality to Mithridates,

his own sister’s son. The king, however, would not listen to any of

these suggestions; but sent for the young prince and accommodated

their differences, forgiving him the larger part of the money which

he allowed to be owing from his father under the head of tribute,

and accepting a present payment from him of three hundred talents, a

thousand horses, and a thousand mules with their trappings. He then

settled the government of the city, and gave the prince his sister

Antiochis as a wife. By these proceedings, in which he was thought

to have acted with true royal magnanimity, he won the affection and

support of all the inhabitants of that part of the country.

THE HANNIBALIAN WAR—TARENTUM

+26.+ It was in the wantonness of excessive prosperity that the

Tarentines invited Pyrrhus of Epirus; for democratic liberty that has

enjoyed a long and unchecked career comes naturally to experience a

satiety of its blessings, and then it looks out for a master; and when

it has got one, it is not long before it hates him, because it is seen

that the change is for the worse. This is just what happened to the

Tarentines on that occasion....

On this news being brought to Tarentum and Thurii there was great

popular indignation....

[Sidenote: Hannibal marched south early in B.C. 212 to renew his

attempt upon Tarentum, on which he had wasted much of the previous

summer (Livy, 25, 1). The severity of the punishment of the Tarentine

hostages who tried to escape from Rome caused a conspiracy of

Tarentines to betray the town to Hannibal. Livy, 25, 7-8.]

The conspirators left the town at first under the pretext of a

foray, and got near Hannibal’s camp before daybreak. Then, while

the rest crouched down on a certain wooded spot by the side of the

road, Philemenus and Nicon went up to the camp. They were seized by

the sentries and taken off to Hannibal, without saying a word as to

where they came from or who they were, but simply stating that they

wished for an interview with the general. Being taken without delay to

Hannibal they said that they wished to speak with him privately. He

assented with the utmost readiness; whereupon they explained to him

their own position and that of their native city, charging the Romans

with many various acts of oppression, that they might not seem to be

entering on their present undertaking without good reason. For the

present Hannibal dismissed them with thanks and a cordial acceptance

of their proposed movement, and charging them to come back very soon

and have another interview with him. “This time,” he added, “when you

get at a sufficient distance from the camp, take possession of the

first cattle you find being driven out to pasture in the early morning,

and go off boldly with them and their herdsmen; for I will take care

that you are unmolested.” His object in doing this was to give himself

time to inquire into the tale of the young men; and also to confirm

their credit with their fellow-citizens, by making it appear that

their expedition had really been for the purpose of foraging. Nicon

and his companions did as they were bidden, and left Hannibal in great

exultation at having at last got an opportunity of completing his

enterprise: while they themselves were made all the more eager to carry

out their plot by having been able to accomplish their interview with

Hannibal without danger, and by having found him warmly disposed to

their undertaking, and by having besides gained the confidence of their

own people by the considerable amount of booty which they had brought

home. This they partly sold and partly used in splendid entertainments,

and thus not only were believed in by the Tarentines, but excited a

considerable number to emulate their exploit.

[Sidenote: Bargain made with Hannibal.]

+27.+ On their next expedition, which they conducted in the same way

as the first, they interchanged pledges of fidelity with Hannibal on

the following conditions: “He was to set the Tarentines free; and the

Carthaginians were neither to exact tribute of any sort from them,

nor impose any burden upon them; but the houses and lodgings occupied

by Romans should, on their taking possession of the town, be given up

to the Carthaginians to plunder.” They also arranged on a watchword

at which the sentries were to admit them without delay into the

camp whenever they came. After making these arrangements, they got

the opportunity of often having interviews with Hannibal: sometimes

pretending to be going out of the town on a foray, and sometimes on

a hunting expedition. Everything having thus been put in train, the

greater part of the conspirators waited for the proper occasions

for acting, while they assigned to Philemenus the part of leader of

their hunting excursions; for, owing to his excessive taste for that

amusement, he had the reputation of thinking hunting the most important

thing in life. Accordingly they left it to him, first to win the favour

of Gaius Livius the commander of the town by presents of game, and then

that of the guards of the gate-tower which protected what were called

the Temenid gates. Philemenus undertook the task: and partly by what he

caught himself, and partly with what Hannibal supplied, always managed

to bring in some game; which he divided between Livius and the guards

of the gate, to induce them to be always ready to open the wicket to

him. For he generally went and returned from his expeditions after

nightfall, under the pretext of being afraid of the enemy, but really

with a view of preparing for the plot. When Philemenus then had managed

to make it a regular arranged thing with the picket at the gate, that

the guards should have no hesitation; but that, whenever he came under

the wall and whistled, they should open the wicket to him; he waited

for a day on which the Roman commander of the town was engaged to be

present at a large party, meeting early in the Musaeum, which is near

the agora, and agreed with Hannibal to carry out their plot on that day.

[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares to act.]

+28.+ For some time before this, Hannibal had given out that he was

ill, to prevent the Romans wondering when they were told of his staying

so long on the same ground; and he now made a greater pretence than

ever of ill-health, and remained encamped three days’ march from

Tarentum. But when the time was come, he got ready the most conspicuous

for their speed and daring in his cavalry and infantry, to the number

of about ten thousand, and gave orders that they should take provisions

for four days. He started just before daybreak, and marched at full

speed; having told off eighty Numidian horsemen to keep thirty stades

ahead, and to scour the country on both sides of the road; so that

no one might get a sight of the main body, but might either be taken

prisoners by this advanced guard, or, if he escaped, might carry a

report of it into the city as if it were merely a raid of Numidian

horsemen. When the Numidians were about a hundred and twenty stades

from the town, Hannibal halted his men for supper by the side of a

river flowing through a deep gully, and offering excellent cover; and

having summoned his officers, did not indeed tell them outright what

the service was on which they were going, but simply exhorted them,

first to show themselves brave men, as the prize awaiting them was the

greatest they had ever had; and, secondly, that each should keep the

men of his own company well together, and rebuke sharply all who left

their own division on any pretext whatever; and, thirdly, to attend

strictly to orders, and not attempt anything on their own account

outside them. Dismissing the officers with these words, he got his

troops on the march just after dark, being very anxious to reach the

wall about midnight; having Philemenus to act as guide, and having got

ready for him a wild-boar to enable him to sustain the part which he

was to perform.

[Sidenote: Gaius Livius thrown off the scent.]

+29.+ About sunset news was brought to Gaius Livius, who had been

with his friends in the Musaeum since early in the day, just when

the drinking was at its height, that the Numidians were scouring

the country. He therefore took measures for that and nothing more,

calling some of his officers and bidding them take half the cavalry,

and sally out to stop the progress of the enemy, who were devastating

the country: but this only made him still more unsuspicious of the

whole extent of the movement. Nicon, Tragiscus, and their confederates

collected together at nightfall in the town and waited for the return

of Livius and his friends. As these last rose from table somewhat

early, because the banquet had begun before the usual time, the

greater number of the conspirators retired to a certain spot and there

remained; but some of the younger men went to meet Gaius, imitating by

their disorderly procession and mutual jests a company returning from

a carouse. As Livius and his company were even more flustered with

drink, as soon as they met laughter and joking were readily excited

on both sides. Finally, they turned and conducted Gaius to his house;

where he went to bed full of wine, as might be expected after a party

beginning so early in the day, without any anxiety or trouble in

his thoughts, but full of cheerfulness and idle content. Then Nicon

and Tragiscus rejoined their companions, and, dividing themselves

into three companies, took up their positions at the most favourable

points in the market-place, to keep themselves fully acquainted with

everything reported from outside the walls, or that happened within

the city itself. They posted some also close to the house of Livius:

being well aware that, if any suspicion of what was coming arose, it

would be to him that the news would be first brought, and that from him

every measure taken would originate. So when the noise of the returning

guests, and every disturbance of the sort, had subsided, and the great

bulk of the citizens was asleep; and now the night was advancing, and

nothing had happened to dash their hopes, they collected together and

proceeded to perform their part of the undertaking.

[Sidenote: Why the Tarentines bury within the walls.]

+30.+ The arrangements between these young men and Hannibal were these.

Hannibal was to arrive at the town by the inland road and on the

eastern side near the Temenid gates; and when there, was to light a

fire on the tomb, which some called the tomb of Hyacinthus, and others

of Apollo: Tragiscus and his confederates, when they saw this, were to

light an answering fire from within the walls. This done, Hannibal was

to put out his fire and advance slowly towards the gate. In pursuance

of these arrangements, the young men marched through the inhabited part

of the town and came to the tombs. For the eastern quarter of Tarentum

is full of monuments, because those who die there are to this day all

buried within the walls, in obedience to an ancient oracle. For it is

said that the god delivered this answer to the Tarentines, “That it

were better and more profitable for them if they made their dwelling

with the majority”; and they thought therefore that they would be

living in accordance with the oracle if they kept the departed within

the walls. That is why to this day they bury inside the gates.

[Sidenote: Hannibal arrives and gets into the town.]

The young men, then, having gone as far as the tomb of Pythionicus,

waited to see what would happen. Presently Hannibal arrived and did

as arranged: whereupon Nicon and Tragiscus with renewed courage

displayed their beacon also; and, as soon as they saw the fire of the

Carthaginians being put out, they ran to the gates as fast as they

could go, wishing to get the picket at the gate tower killed before

the Carthaginians arrived; as it had been agreed that they should

advance leisurely and at a foot’s pace. Everything went smoothly: the

guards were overpowered; and while some of the young men were engaged

in killing them, others were cutting the bolts. The gates having been

quickly thrown open, Hannibal arrived at the right moment, having so

timed his march that he never had to stop on the way to the town at all.

[Sidenote: Philemenus also gets in.]

+31.+ Having thus effected their intended entrance, without danger or

any disturbance whatever, and thinking that the most important part

of their undertaking was accomplished, the Carthaginians now began

advancing boldly along the street leading up from what is called the

Batheia or Deep Road. They left the cavalry however outside the walls,

numbering as many as two thousand, intending them to act as a reserve

both in case of any appearance of the enemy from without, and of any of

those unforeseen casualties which do occur in such operations. But when

they had come to the immediate neighbourhood of the market-place, they

halted, and waited to see how the attempt of Philemenus would turn out:

being anxious as to the success of this part of their plan as well as

the other. For at the same moment that he lighted his fire, and was on

the point of starting for the gates, Hannibal had despatched Philemenus

also, with his boar on a litter, and a thousand Libyans, to the next

gate; wishing, in accordance with his original design, not to depend

solely on one chance, but to have several. When Philemenus, then,

arrived at the wall and gave his customary signal by whistling, the

sentry immediately appeared coming down to open the wicket; and when

Philemenus told him from outside to open quickly because they had a

great weight to carry, as they were bringing a wild boar, he made haste

to open the wicket, expecting that some of the game which Philemenus

was conveying would come his way, as he had always had a share of what

was brought in.

Thereupon Philemenus himself, being at the head of the litter, entered

first; and with him another dressed like a shepherd, as though he

were one of the country folk of those parts; and after him two others

besides who were carrying the dead beast behind. But when the four had

got inside the wicket, they struck and killed the man who opened it,

as he was unsuspiciously examining and feeling the boar, and then let

the men who were just behind them, and were in advance of the main body

of Libyan horsemen, to the number of thirty, leisurely and quietly

through. This having been accomplished without a hitch, some set about

cutting the bolts, others were engaged in killing the picket on duty at

the gate, and others in giving the signal to the Libyans still outside

to come in. These having also effected their entrance in safety, they

began making their way towards the market-place according to the

arrangement. As soon as he was joined by this division also, in great

delight at the successful progress of the operation, Hannibal proceeded

to carry out the next step.

+32.+ He told off two thousand of his Celts: and, having divided them

into three companies, he assigned two of the young men who had managed

the plot to each company; and sent with them also certain of his own

officers, with orders to close up the several most convenient streets

that led to the market-place. And when he had done this, he bade the

young men of the town pick out and save those of their fellow-citizens

whom they might chance to meet, by shouting out before they came up

with them, “That Tarentines should remain where they were, as they were

in no danger”; but he ordered both Carthaginian and Celtic officers to

kill all the Romans they met.

[Sidenote: Escape of Livius into the Citadel.]

[Sidenote: Massacre of Roman soldiers.]

So these companies separated and proceeded to carry out their orders.

But when the entrance of the enemy became known to the Tarentines, the

city began to be full of shouting and extraordinary confusion. As for

Gaius, when the enemy’s entrance was announced to him, being fully

aware that his drunkenness had incapacitated him, he rushed straight

out of the house with his servants, and having come to the gate leading

to the harbour, and the sentinel having opened the wicket for him,

he got through that way; and having seized one of the boats lying at

anchor there, went on board it with his servants and arrived safely at

the citadel. Meanwhile Philemenus had provided himself with some Roman

bugles, and some men who were able to blow them, from being used to

do so; and they stood in the theatre and sounded a call to arms. The

Romans promptly rallying in arms, as was their custom at this sound,

and directing their steps towards the citadel, everything happened

exactly as the Carthaginians intended; for as the Roman soldiers came

into the streets, without any order and in scattered groups, some of

them came upon the Carthaginians and others upon the Celts; and by

their being in this way put to the sword in detail, a very considerable

number of them perished.

But when day began to break, the Tarentines kept quietly in their

houses, not yet being able to comprehend what was happening. For thanks

to the bugle, and the absence of all outrage or plundering in the town,

they thought that the movement arose from the Romans themselves. But

the sight of many of the latter lying killed in the streets, and the

spectacle of some Gauls openly stripping the Roman corpses, suggested a

suspicion of the presence of the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: Roman houses sacked, Tarentines spared.]

+33.+ Presently when Hannibal had marched his forces into the

market-place, and the Romans had retired into the citadel, as having

been previously secured by them with a garrison, and it had become

broad daylight, the Carthaginian general caused a proclamation to be

made to the Tarentines to assemble in full number in the market-place;

while the young conspirators went meanwhile round the town talking

loudly about liberty, and bidding everybody not to be afraid, for the

Carthaginians had come to save them. Such of the Tarentines as held

to their loyalty to Rome, upon learning the state of the case, went

off to the citadel; but the rest came to the meeting, in obedience to

the proclamation, without their arms: and to them Hannibal addressed

a cordial speech. The Tarentines heartily cheered everything he said

from joy at their unexpected safety; and he dismissed the crowd with

an injunction to each man, to go with all speed to his own house, and

write over the door, “A Tarentine’s”; but if any one wrote the same

word on a house where a Roman was living, he declared the penalty to

be death. He then personally told off the best men he had for the

service, and sent them to plunder the houses of the Romans; giving them

as their instructions to consider all houses which had no inscription

as belonging to the enemy: the rest of his men he kept drawn up as a

reserve.

[Sidenote: Fortifications raised to preserve the town from attack from

the citadel.]

+34.+ A vast quantity of miscellaneous property having been got

together by this plundering, and a booty fully answering the

expectations of the Carthaginians, they bivouacked for that night

under arms. But the next day, after consulting with the Tarentines,

Hannibal decided to cut off the city from the citadel by a wall, that

the Tarentines might not any longer be under continual alarm from the

Romans in possession of the citadel. His first measure was to throw

up a palisade, parallel to the wall of the citadel and to the trench

in front of it. But as he very well knew that the enemy would not

allow this tamely, but would make a demonstration of their power in

that direction, he got ready for the work a number of his best hands,

thinking that the first thing necessary was to overawe the Romans and

give confidence to the Tarentines. But as soon as the first palisade

was begun, the Romans began a bold and determined attack; whereupon

Hannibal, offering just enough resistance to induce the rest to come

out, as soon as the greater part of them had crossed the trench, gave

the word of command to his men and charged the enemy. A desperate

struggle ensued; for the fight took place in a narrow space surrounded

by walls; but at last the Romans were forced to turn and fly. Many of

them fell in the actual fighting, but the larger number were forced

over the edge of the trench and were killed by the fall over its steep

bank.

[Sidenote: Further works of security.]

+35.+ For the present Hannibal, after completing the palisade

unmolested, was content to remain quiet, as his plan had succeeded to

his wish; for he had shut in the enemy and compelled them to remain

inside their wall, in terror for the safety of the citadel as well

as for their own; while he had raised the courage of the citizens of

Tarentum to such an extent, that they now imagined themselves to be a

match for the Romans, even without the Carthaginians. A little later

he made at a short distance from the palisade, in the direction of the

town, a trench parallel to the palisade and the wall of the citadel;

and the earth dug out from it having been piled up on the other side

along the edge nearest the town, he erected another palisade on the

top, thus making a fortification no less secure than the wall itself.

Once more, at a moderate distance, nearer the city, he commenced

building a wall, starting from the street called Soteira up to that

called Batheia; so that, even without a garrison, the Tarentines were

adequately protected by the mere constructions themselves. Then leaving

a sufficient garrison, and enough cavalry to serve on outpost duty for

the protection of the wall, he encamped along the bank of the river

which is called by some the Galaesus, but by most people the Eurotas,

after the river which flows past Sparta. The Tarentines have many such

derived names, both in town and country, from the acknowledged fact

of their being a colony from Sparta and connected by blood with the

Lacedaemonians. As the wall quickly approached completion, owing to

the activity and zeal of the Tarentines, and the vigorous co-operation

of the Carthaginians, Hannibal next conceived the idea of taking the

citadel also.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s arrangements for storming the citadel frustrated.]

[Sidenote: Romans reinforced.]

[Sidenote: New plans for cutting off the Roman supplies by sea.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 212-211.]

+36.+ But when he had already completed the preparation of the

necessary engines for the assault, the Romans received some slight

encouragement on a reinforcement throwing itself into the citadel

by sea from Metapontium; and consequently they sallied out by night

and attacked the works, and destroyed all Hannibal’s apparatus and

engines. After this Hannibal abandoned the idea of a storm: but as the

new wall was now completed, he summoned a meeting of the Tarentines

and pointed out to them that the most imperative necessity, in view

of the present state of things, was to get command of the sea. For

as the citadel commanded the entrance to the harbour, the Tarentines

could not use their ships nor sail out of it; while the Romans could

get supplies conveyed to them by sea without danger: and as long as

that was the case, it was impossible that the city should have any

security for its freedom. Hannibal saw this clearly, and explained to

the Tarentines that, if the enemy on the citadel were deprived of hope

of succour by sea, they would at once give way, and abandon it of their

own accord, without attempting to defend the place. The Tarentines

were fully convinced by his words: but how it was to be brought about

in the present state of affairs they could form no idea, unless a

fleet should appear from Carthage; which at that time of the year was

impossible. They therefore said that they could not understand what

Hannibal was aiming at in these remarks to them. When he replied that

it was plain that, even without the Carthaginians, they were all but in

command of the sea, they were still more puzzled, and could not guess

his meaning. The truth was that Hannibal had noticed that the broad

street, which was at once within the wall separating the town from the

citadel, and led from the harbour into the open sea, was well suited

for the purpose; and he had conceived the idea of dragging the ships

out of the harbour to the sea on the southern side of the town. Upon

his disclosing his idea to the Tarentines, they not only expressed

their agreement with the proposal, but the greatest admiration for

himself; and made up their minds that there was nothing which his

acuteness and daring could not accomplish. Trucks on wheels were

quickly constructed: and it was scarcely sooner said than done, owing

to the zeal of the people and the numbers who helped to work at it. In

this way the Tarentines dragged their ships across into the open sea,

and were enabled without danger to themselves to blockade the Romans

on the citadel, having deprived them of their supplies from without.

But Hannibal himself, leaving a garrison for the city, started with his

army, and returned in a three days’ march to his original camp; and

there remained without further movements for the rest of the winter....

FALL OF SYRACUSE, B.C. 212

[Sidenote: The method taken by a Roman to estimate the height of the

wall of Syracuse. Livy, 25, 23.] +37.+ He counted the layers; for as

the tower had been built of regular layers of stone, it was very easy

to reckon the height of the battlements from the ground....

[Sidenote: Fall of Syracuse by an escalade, autumn B.C. 212. Livy, 24,

23-31.]

Some days afterwards on information being given by a deserter that

the Syracusans had been engaged in a public sacrifice to Artemis for

the last three days; and that they were using very scanty food in the

festival though plenty of wine, both Epicydes and certain Syracusans

having given a large supply; Marcus Marcellus selected a part of the

wall somewhat lower than the rest, and thinking it probable that the

men were drunk, owing to the license of the hour, and the short supply

of food with their wine, he determined to attempt an escalade. Two

ladders of the proper height for the wall having been quickly made,

he pressed on the undertaking. He spoke openly to those who were fit

to make the ascent and to face the first and most conspicuous risk,

holding out to them brilliant prospects of reward. He also picked

out some men to give them necessary help and bring ladders, without

telling them anything except to bid them be ready to obey orders.

His directions having been accurately obeyed, at the proper time in

the night he put the first men in motion, sending with them the men

with the ladders together with a maniple and a tribune, and having

first reminded them of the rewards awaiting them if they behaved with

gallantry. After this he got his whole force ready to start; and

despatching the vanguard by maniples at intervals, when a thousand had

been massed in this way, after a short pause, he marched himself with

the main body. The men carrying the ladders having succeeded in safely

placing them against the wall, those who had been told off to make the

ascent mounted at once without hesitation. Having accomplished this

without being observed, and having got a firm footing on the top of the

wall, the rest began to mount by the ladders also, not in any fixed

order, but as best they could. At first as they made their way upon the

wall they found no one to oppose them, for the guards of the several

towers, owing to it being a time of public sacrifice, were either

still drinking or were gone to sleep again in a state of drunkenness.

Consequently of the first and second companies of guards, which they

came upon, they killed the greater number before they knew that they

were being attacked. And when they came near Hexapyli, they descended

from the wall, and forced open the first postern they came to which was

let into the wall, through which they admitted the general and the rest

of the army. This is the way in which the Romans took Syracuse....

[Sidenote: Livy, 25, 24.] None of the citizens knew what was happening

because of the distance; for the town is a very large one....

[Sidenote: The first quarter occupied. Livy, 25, 24.] But the Romans

were rendered very confident by their conquest of Epipolae....

* * * * *

+38.+ He gave orders that the infantry should take the beasts of burden

along with the baggage tied upon them from the rear and range them in

front of themselves. This produced a defence of greater security than

any palisade.[324]...

* * * * *

So entirely unable are the majority of mankind to submit to that

lightest of all burdens—silence....

* * * * *

Anything in the future seems preferable to what exists in the

present....