CAPUA AND PETELIA
[Sidenote: Capua and Petelia, the contrast of their fortunes.]
+1.+ The people of Capua, in Campania, becoming wealthy through the
fertility of their soil, degenerated into luxury and extravagance
surpassing even the common report about Croton and Sybaris. Being then
unable to support their burden of prosperity they called in Hannibal;
and were accordingly treated with great severity by Rome. But the
people of Petelia maintained their loyalty to Rome and held out so
obstinately, when besieged by Hannibal, that after having eaten all the
leather in the town, and the bark of all the trees in it, and having
stood the siege for eleven months, as no one came to their relief, they
surrendered with the entire approval of the Romans.... But Capua by its
influence drew over the other cities to the Carthaginians....
HIERONYMUS OF SYRACUSE
[Sidenote: Hieronymus succeeded his grandfather Hiero II. in B.C. 216.
Under the influence of his uncles, Zoippus and Andranodorus, members of
the Council of 15 established by Hiero, Hieronymus opens communications
with Hannibal.]
[Sidenote: Commissioners sent to Carthage to formulate a treaty of
alliance.]
+2.+ After the plot against Hieronymus, King of Syracuse, Thraso having
departed, Zoippus and Andranodorus persuaded Hieronymus to lose no time
in sending ambassadors to Hannibal. He accordingly selected Polycleitus
of Cyrene and Philodemus of Argos for the purpose, and sent them
into Italy, with a commission to discuss the subject of an alliance
with the Carthaginians; and at the same time he sent his brothers to
Alexandria. Hannibal received Polycleitus and Philodemus with warmth;
held out great prospects to the young king; and sent the ambassadors
back without delay, accompanied by the commander of his triremes, a
Carthaginian also named Hannibal, and the Syracusan Hippocrates and
his younger brother Epicydes. These men had been for some time serving
in Hannibal’s army, being domiciled at Carthage, owing to their
grandfather having been banished from Syracuse because he was believed
to have assassinated Agatharchus, one of the sons of Agathocles. On
the arrival of these commissioners at Syracuse, Polycleitus and his
colleague reported the result of their embassy, and the Carthaginian
delivered the message given by Hannibal: whereupon the king without
hesitation expressed his willingness to make a treaty with the
Carthaginians; and, begging the Hannibal who had come to him to go with
all speed to Carthage, promised that he also would send commissioners
from his own court, to settle matters with the Carthaginians.
[Sidenote: The Roman praetor sends to remonstrate. A scene with the
king.]
+3.+ Meanwhile intelligence of this transaction had reached the Roman
praetor at Lilybaeum, who immediately despatched legates to Hieronymus,
to renew the treaty which had been made with his ancestors. Being
thoroughly annoyed with this embassy, Hieronymus said that “He was
sorry for the Romans that they had come to such utter and shameful
grief[315] in the battles in Italy at the hands of the Carthaginians.”
The legates were overpowered by the rudeness of the answer: still they
proceeded to ask him, “Who said such things about them?” Whereupon
the king pointed to the Carthaginian envoys who were there, and said,
“You had better convict them, if they have really been telling me
lies?” The Roman legates answered that it was not their habit to take
the word of enemies: and advised him to do nothing in violation of
the existing treaty; for that would be at once equitable and the best
thing for himself. To this the king answered that he would take time
to consider of it, and tell them his decision another time; but he
proceeded to ask them, “How it came about that before his grandfather’s
death a squadron of fifty Roman ships had sailed as far as Pachynus and
then gone back again.” The fact was that a short time ago the Romans
had heard that Hiero was dead; and being much alarmed lest people in
Syracuse, despising the youth of the grandson whom he left, should stir
up a revolution, they had made this cruise with the intention of being
ready there to assist his youthful weakness, and to help in maintaining
his authority; but being informed that his grandfather was still alive,
they sailed back again. When the ambassadors had stated these facts,
the young king answered again, “Then please to allow me too now, O
Romans, to maintain my authority by ’sailing back’ to see what I can
get from Carthage.” The Roman legates perceiving the warmth with which
the king was engaging in his policy, said nothing at the time; but
returned and informed the praetor who had sent them of what had been
said. From that time forward, therefore, the Romans kept a careful
watch upon him as an enemy.
[Sidenote: The treaty with Carthage.]
[Sidenote: The king’s pretensions rise, and a new arrangement is made
with Carthage.]
+4.+ Hieronymus on his part selected Agatharchus, Onesimus, and
Hipposthenes to send with Hannibal to Carthage, with instructions to
make an alliance on the following terms: “The Carthaginians to assist
him with land and sea forces, in expelling the Romans from Sicily, and
then divide the island with him; so as to have the river Himera, which
divides Sicily almost exactly in half, as the boundary between the
two provinces.” The commissioners arrived in Carthage: and finding,
on coming to a conference, that the Carthaginians were prepared to
meet them in every point, they completed the arrangement. Meanwhile
Hippocrates got the young Hieronymus entirely into his hands: and at
first fired his imagination by telling him of Hannibal’s marches and
pitched battles in Italy; and afterwards by repeating to him that no
one had a better right to the government of all Siceliots than he; in
the first place as the son of Nereis daughter of Pyrrhus, the only
man whom all Siceliots alike had accepted deliberately and with full
assent as their leader and king; and in the second place in virtue of
his grandfather Hiero’s sovereign rights. At last he and his brother
so won upon the young man by their conversation, that he would attend
to no one else at all: partly from the natural feebleness of his
character, but still more from the ambitious feelings which they had
excited in him. And therefore, just when Agatharchus and his colleagues
were completing the business on which they had been sent in Carthage,
he sent fresh ambassadors, saying that all Sicily belonged to him; and
demanding that the Carthaginians should help him to recover Sicily:
while he promised he would assist the Carthaginians in their Italian
campaign. Though the Carthaginians now saw perfectly well the whole
extent of the young man’s fickleness and infatuation: yet thinking it
to be in manifold ways to their interests not to let Sicilian affairs
out of their hands, they assented to his demands; and having already
prepared ships and men, they set about arranging for the transport of
their forces into Sicily.
[Sidenote: The Romans again remonstrate. Another scene at the Council.]
[Sidenote: War with Rome decided upon.]
+5.+ When they heard of this, the Romans sent legates to him again,
protesting against his violation of the treaty made with his
forefathers. Hieronymus thereupon summoned a meeting of his council
consulted them as to what he was to do. The native members of it kept
silent, because they feared the folly of their ruler. Aristomachus
of Corinth, Damippus of Sparta, Autonous of Thessaly advised that
he should abide by the treaty with Rome. Andranodorus alone urged
that he should not let the opportunity slip; and affirmed that the
present was the only chance of establishing his rule over Sicily.
After the delivery of this speech, the king asked Hippocrates and
his brother what they thought, and upon their answering, “The same
as Andranodorus,” the deliberation was concluded in that sense.
Thus, then, war with Rome had been decided upon: but while the king
was anxious to be thought to have given an adroit answer to the
ambassadors, he committed himself to such an utter absurdity as to make
it certain that he would not only fail to conciliate the Romans, but
would inevitably offend them violently. For he said that he would abide
by the treaty, firstly, if the Romans would repay all the gold they had
received from his grandfather Hiero; and secondly, if they would return
the corn and other presents which they had received from him from the
first day of their intercourse with him; and thirdly, if they would
acknowledge all Sicily east of the Himera to be Syracusan territory.
At these propositions of course the ambassadors and council separated;
and from that time forth Hieronymus began pushing on his preparations
for war with energy: collected and armed his forces, and got ready the
other necessary provisions....
[Sidenote: Description of Leontini, where Hieronymus was murdered. See
Livy, 24, 7.]
+6.+ The city of Leontini taken as a whole faces north, and is divided
in half by a valley of level ground, in which are the state buildings,
the court-houses, and market-place. Along each side of this valley run
hills with steep banks all the way; the flat tops of which, reached
after crossing their brows, are covered with houses and temples. The
city has two gates, one on the southern extremity of this valley
leading to Syracuse, the other at the northern leading on to the
“Leontine plains,” and the arable district. Close under the westernmost
of the steep cliffs runs a river called Lissus; parallel to which are
built continuous rows of houses, in great numbers, close under the
cliff, between which and the river runs the road I have mentioned....
[Sidenote: Fall of Hieronymus, B.C. 214.]
+7.+ Some of the historians who have described the fall of Hieronymus
have written at great length and in terms of mysterious solemnity.
They tell us of prodigies preceding his coming to the throne, and of
the misfortunes of Syracuse. They describe in dramatic language the
cruelty of his character and the impiety of his actions; and crown all
with the sudden and terrible nature of the circumstances attending his
fall. One would think from their description that neither Phalaris,
nor Apollodorus, nor any other tyrant was ever fiercer than he. Yet
he was a mere boy when he succeeded to power, and only lived thirteen
months after. In this space of time it is possible that one or two men
may have been put to the rack, or certain of his friends, or other
Syracusan citizens, put to death; but it is improbable that his tyranny
could have been extravagantly wicked, or his impiety outrageous. It
must be confessed that he was reckless and unscrupulous in disposition;
still we cannot compare him with either of the tyrants I have named.
The fact is that those who write the histories of particular episodes,
having undertaken limited and narrow themes, appear to me to be
compelled from poverty of matter to exaggerate insignificant incidents,
and to speak at inordinate length on subjects that scarcely deserve
to be recorded at all. There are some, too, who fall into a similar
mistake from mere want of judgment. With how much more reason might the
space employed on these descriptions,—which they use merely to fill up
and spin out their books,—have been devoted to Hiero and Gelo, without
mentioning Hieronymus at all! It would have given greater pleasure to
readers and more instruction to students.
[Sidenote: Character of Hiero II., King of Syracuse, from B.C. 269 to
B.C. 215.]
+8.+ For, in the first place, Hiero gained the sovereignty of Syracuse
and her allies by his own unaided abilities without inheriting wealth,
or reputation, or any other advantage of fortune. And, in the second
place, was established king of Syracuse without putting to death,
banishing, or harassing any one of the citizens,—which is the most
astonishing circumstance of all. And what is quite as surprising as
the innocence of his acquisition of power is the fact that it did
not change his character. For during a reign of fifty-four years he
preserved peace for the country, maintained his own power free from
all hostile plots, and entirely escaped the envy which generally
follows greatness; for though he tried on several occasions to lay
down his power, he was prevented by the common remonstrances of the
citizens. And having shown himself most beneficent to the Greeks, and
most anxious to earn their good opinion, he left behind him not merely
a great personal reputation but also a universal feeling of goodwill
towards the Syracusans. Again, though he passed his life in the midst
of the greatest wealth, luxury, and abundance, he survived for more
than ninety years, in full possession of his senses and with all parts
of his body unimpaired; which, to my mind, is a decisive proof of a
well-spent life....
[Sidenote: Gelo, son of Hiero II., associated with his father in the
kingdom, B.C. 216. See 5, 88, Livy, 23, 30.]
Gelo, his son, in a life of more than fifty years regarded it as the
most honourable object of ambition to obey his father, and to regard
neither wealth, nor sovereign power, nor anything else as of higher
value than love and loyalty to his parents....
TREATY BETWEEN HANNIBAL AND KING PHILIP V. OF MACEDON
[Sidenote: Gods by whom the oath is taken on either side.]
[Sidenote: Preamble of a treaty made between Philip and Hannibal, by
envoys sent after the battle of Cannae. Ratified subsequently to March
13, B.C. 215. See Livy, 23, 33-39. _Ante_ 3, 2.]
+9.+ This is a sworn treaty made between Hannibal, Mago, Barmocarus,
and such members of the Carthaginian Gerusia as were present, and all
Carthaginians serving in his army, on the one part; and Xenophanes, son
of Cleomachus of Athens, sent to us by King Philip, as his ambassador,
on behalf of himself, the Macedonians, and their allies, on the other
part.
The oath is taken in the presence of Zeus, Hera, and Apollo: of the god
of the Carthaginians, Hercules, and Iolaus: of Ares, Triton, Poseidon:
of the gods that accompany the army, and of the sun, moon, and earth:
of rivers, harbours, waters: of all the gods who rule Carthage: of all
the gods who rule Macedonia and the rest of Greece: of all the gods of
war that are witnesses to this oath.
[Sidenote: Declaration on the part of Hannibal of the objects of the
treaty.]
Hannibal, general, and all the Carthaginian senators with him, and
all Carthaginians serving in his army, subject to our mutual consent,
proposes to make this sworn treaty of friendship and honourable
goodwill. Let us be friends, close allies, and brethren, on the
conditions herein following:—
[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Philip’s representative.]
(1) Let the Carthaginians, as supreme, Hannibal their chief general
and those serving with him, all members of the Carthaginian dominion
living under the same laws, as well as the people of Utica, and the
cities and tribes subject to Carthage, and their soldiers and allies,
and all cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria, with whom
we have a compact of friendship, and with whomsoever in this country we
may hereafter form such compact, be supported by King Philip and the
Macedonians, and all other Greeks in alliance with them.
[Sidenote: 1st article sworn to by Hannibal and the Carthaginians.]
(2) On their parts also King Philip and the Macedonians, and such
other Greeks as are his allies, shall be supported and protected by
the Carthaginians now in this army, and by the people of Utica, and by
all cities and tribes subject to Carthage, both soldiers and allies,
and by all allied cities and tribes in Italy, Celt-land, and Liguria,
and by all others in Italy as shall hereafter become allies of the
Carthaginians.
[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Phillip’s representative.]
(3) We will not make plots against, nor lie in ambush for, each
other; but in all sincerity and goodwill, without reserve or secret
design, will be enemies to the enemies of the Carthaginians, saving
and excepting those kings, cities, and ports with which we have sworn
agreements and friendships.
[Sidenote: 2d article sworn to by Hannibal.]
(4) And we, too, will be enemies to the enemies of King Philip, saving
and excepting those kings, cities, and tribes, with which we have sworn
agreements and friendships.
[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Philip’s representative.]
(5) Ye shall be friends to us in the war in which we now are engaged
against the Romans, till such time as the gods give us and you the
victory: and ye shall assist us in all ways that be needful, and in
whatsoever way we may mutually determine.
[Sidenote: 3d article sworn to by Hannibal.]
(6) And when the gods have given us victory in our war with the Romans
and their allies, if Hannibal shall deem it right to make terms with
the Romans, these terms shall include the same friendship with you,
made on these conditions: (1) the Romans not to be allowed to make
war on you; (2) not to have power over Corcyra, Apollonia, Epidamnum,
Pharos, Dimale, Parthini, nor Atitania; (3) to restore to Demetrius of
Pharos all those of his friends now in the dominion of Rome.
[Sidenote: 1st joint article.]
(7) If the Romans ever make war on you or on us we will aid each other
in such war, according to the need of either.
[Sidenote: 2d joint article.]
(8) So also if any other nation whatever does so, always excepting
kings, cities, and tribes, with whom we have sworn agreements and
friendships.
[Sidenote: 3d joint article. Mutual consent required for an alteration.]
(9) If we decide to take away from, or add to this sworn treaty,
we will so take away, or add thereto, only as we both may agree....
MESSENE AND PHILIP V. IN B.C. 215
[Sidenote: Political state of Messene.]
+10.+ Democracy being established at Messene, and the men of rank
having been banished, while those who had received allotments on their
lands obtained the chief influence in the government, those of the old
citizens who remained found it very hard to put up with the equality
which these men had obtained....
[Sidenote: The character of the Messenian athlete and statesman Gorgus.
See _ante_, 5, 5.]
Gorgus of Messene, in wealth and extraction, was inferior to no one in
the town; and had been a famous athlete in his time, far surpassing all
rivals in that pursuit. In fact he was not behind any man of his day
in physical beauty, or the general dignity of his manner of life, or
the number of prizes he had won. Again, when he gave up athletics and
devoted himself to politics and the service of his country, he gained
no less reputation in this department than in his former pursuit.
For he was removed from the Philistinism that usually characterises
athletes, and was looked upon as in the highest degree an able and
clear-headed politician....
[Sidenote: Philip V. of Macedon at Messene, B.C. 215. See Plutarch,
_Arat._ 49-50.]
+11.+ Philip, king of the Macedonians, being desirous of seizing the
acropolis of Messene, told the leaders of the city that he wished to
see it and to sacrifice to Zeus, and accordingly walked up thither with
his attendants and joined in the sacrifice. When, according to custom,
the entrails of the slaughtered victims were brought to him, he took
them in his hands, and, turning round a little to one side, held them
out to Aratus and asked him “what he thought the sacrifices indicated?
To quit the citadel or hold it?” Thereupon Demetrius struck in on the
spur of the moment by saying, “If you have the heart of an augur,—to
quit it as quick as you can: but if of a gallant and wise king, to keep
it, lest if you quit it now you may never have so good an opportunity
again: for it is by thus holding the two horns that you can alone keep
the ox under your control.” By the “two horns” he meant Ithome and
the Acrocorinthus, and by the “ox” the Peloponnese. Thereupon Philip
turned to Aratus and said, “And do you give the same advice?” Aratus
not making any answer at once, he urged him to speak his real opinion.
After some hesitation he said, “If you can get possession of this place
without treachery to the Messenians, I advise you to do so; but if, by
the act of occupying this citadel with a guard, you shall ruin all the
citadels, and the guard wherewith the allies were protected when they
came into your hands from Antigonus” (meaning by that, _confidence_),
“consider whether it is not better to take your men away and leave
the confidence there, and with it guard the Messenians, and the other
allies as well.” As far as his own inclination was concerned, Philip
was ready enough to commit an act of treachery, as his own subsequent
conduct proved: but having been sharply rebuked a little while before
by the younger Aratus for his destruction of human life; and seeing
that, on the present occasion, the elder spoke with boldness and
authority, and begged him not to neglect his advice, he gave in from
sheer shame, and taking the latter by his right hand, said, “Then let
us go back the same way we came.”
[Sidenote: Deterioration in the character of Philip V. See 4, 77.]
+12.+ I wish here to stop in my narrative in order to speak briefly of
the character of Philip, because this was the beginning of the change
and deterioration in it. For I think that no more telling example can
be proposed to practical statesmen who wish to correct their ideas by
a study of history. For the splendour of his early career, and the
brilliancy of his genius, have caused the dispositions for good and
evil displayed by this king to be more conspicuous and widely known
throughout Greece than is the case with any other man; as well as the
contrast between the results accompanying the display of those opposite
tendencies.
Now that, upon his accession to the throne, Thessaly, Macedonia, and in
fact all parts of his own kingdom were more thoroughly loyal and well
disposed to him, young as he was on his succeeding to the government
of Macedonia, than they had ever been to any of his predecessors, may
be without difficulty inferred from the following fact. Though he
was with extreme frequency forced to leave Macedonia by the Aetolian
and Lacedaemonian wars, not only was there no disturbance in these
countries, but not a single one of the neighbouring barbarians
ventured to touch Macedonia. It would be impossible, again, to speak
in strong enough terms of the affection of Alexander, Chrysogonus, and
his other friends towards him; or that of the Epirotes, Acarnanians,
and all those on whom he had within a short time conferred great
benefits. On the whole, if one may use a somewhat hyperbolical phrase,
I think it has been said of Philip with very great propriety, that
his beneficent policy had made him “The darling of all Greece.” And
it is a conspicuous and striking proof of the advantage of lofty
principle and strict integrity, that the Cretans, having at length
come to an understanding with each other and made a national alliance,
selected Philip to arbitrate between them; and that this settlement
was completed without an appeal to arms and without danger,—a thing
for which it would be difficult to find a precedent in similar
circumstances. From the time of his exploits at Messene all this was
utterly changed. And it was natural that it should be so. For his
purposes being now entirely reversed, it inevitably followed that men’s
opinions of him should be reversed also, as well as the success of
his various undertakings. This actually was the case, as will become
evident to attentive students from what I am now about to relate....
+13.+ Aratus seeing that Philip was now openly engaging in war with
Rome, and entirely changed in his policy toward his allies, with
difficulty diverted him from his intention by suggesting numerous
difficulties and scruples.
[Sidenote: 5, 12.]
[Sidenote: Recapitulation of the substance of book 7, viz. the
treacherous dealings of Philip with the Messenians, B.C. 215.]
[Sidenote: Plato, _Rep._ 565 D.]
I wish now to remind my readers of what, in my fifth Book, I put
forward merely as a promise and unsupported statement, but which
has now been confirmed by facts; in order that I may not leave any
proposition of mine unproved or open to question. In the course of
my history of the Aetolian war, where I had to relate the violent
proceedings of Philip in destroying the colonnades and other sacred
objects at Thermus; and added that, in consideration of his youth, the
blame of these measures ought not to be referred to Philip so much as
to his advisers; I then remarked that the life of Aratus sufficiently
proved that he would not have committed such an act of wickedness,
but that such principles exactly suited Demetrius of Pharos; and I
promised to make this clear from what I was next to narrate. I thereby
designedly postponed the demonstration of the truth of my assertion,
till I had come to the period of which I have just been speaking; which
with the presence of Demetrius, and in the absence of Aratus, who
arrived a day too late, Philip made the first step in his career of
crime; and, as though from the first taste of human blood and murder
and treason to his allies, was changed not into a wolf from a man, as
in the Arcadian fable mentioned by Plato, but from a king into a savage
tyrant. But a still more decisive proof of the sentiments of these two
men is furnished by the plot against the citadel of Messene, and may
help us to make up our minds which of the two were responsible for the
proceedings in the Aetolian war; and, when we are satisfied on that
point, it will be easy to form a judgment on the differences of their
principles.
+14.+ For as in this instance, under the influence of Aratus, Philip
refrained from actually breaking faith with the Messenians in regard
to the citadel; and thus, to use a common expression, poured a little
balm into the wide wound which his slaughters had caused: so in the
Aetolian war, when under the influence of Demetrius, he sinned against
the gods by destroying the objects consecrated to them, and against man
by transgressing the laws of war; and entirely deserted his original
principles, by showing himself an implacable and bitter foe to all
who opposed him. The same remark applies to the Cretan business.[316]
As long as he employed Aratus as his chief director, not only without
doing injustice to a single islander, but without even causing them
any vexation, he kept the whole Cretan people under control; and led
all the Greeks to regard him with favour, owing to the greatness of
character which he displayed. So again, when under the guidance of
Demetrius, he became the cause of the misfortunes I have described to
the Messenians, he at once lost the goodwill of the allies and his
credit with the rest of Greece. Such a decisive influence for good or
evil in the security of their government has the choice by youthful
sovereigns of the friends who are to surround them; though it is a
subject on which by some unaccountable carelessness they take not the
smallest care....
THE WAR OF ANTIOCHUS WITH ACHAEUS
(See 5, 107)
[Sidenote: Siege of Sardis from the end of B.C. 216 to autumn of B.C.
215.]
+15.+ Round Sardis ceaseless and protracted skirmishes were taking
place and fighting by night and day, both armies inventing every
possible kind of plot and counterplot against each other: to describe
which in detail would be as useless as it would be in the last degree
wearisome. At last, when the siege had already entered upon its second
year, Lagoras the Cretan came forward. He had had a considerable
experience in war, and had learnt that as a rule cities fall into the
hands of their enemies most easily from some neglect on the part of
their inhabitants, when, trusting to the natural or artificial strength
of their defences, they neglect to keep proper guard and become
thoroughly careless. He had observed too, that in such fortified cities
captures were effected at the points of greatest strength, which were
believed to have been despaired of by the enemy. So in the present
instance, when he saw that the prevailing notion of the strength of
Sardis caused the whole army to despair of taking it by storm, and
to believe that the one hope of getting it was by starving it out,
he gave all the closer attention to the subject; and eagerly scanned
every possible method of making an attempt to capture the town. Having
observed therefore that a portion of the wall was unguarded, near a
place called the Saw, which unites the citadel and city, he conceived
the hope and idea of performing this exploit. He had discovered
the carelessness of the men guarding this wall from the following
circumstance. The place was extremely precipitous: and there was a deep
gully below, into which dead bodies from the city, and the offal of
horses and beasts of burden that died, were accustomed to be thrown;
and in this place therefore there was always a great number of vultures
and other birds collected. Having observed, then, that when these
creatures were gorged, they always sat undisturbed upon the cliffs and
the wall, he concluded that the wall must necessarily be left unguarded
and deserted for the larger part of the day. Accordingly, under cover
of night, he went to the spot and carefully examined the possibilities
of approaching it and setting ladders; and finding that this was
possible at one particular rock, he communicated the facts to the king.
+16.+ Antiochus encouraged the attempt and urged Lagoras to carry it
out. The latter promised to do his best, and desired the king to join
with him Theodotus the Aetolian, and Dionysius the commander of his
bodyguard, with orders to devote them to assist him in carrying out
the intended enterprise. The king at once granted his request, and
these officers agreed to undertake it: and having held a consultation
on the whole subject, they waited for a night on which there should be
no moon just before daybreak. Such a night having arrived, on the day
on which they intended to act, an hour before sunset, they selected
from the whole army fifteen of the strongest and most courageous men to
carry the ladders, and also to mount with them and share in the daring
attempt. After these they selected thirty others, to remain in reserve
at a certain distance; that, as soon as they had themselves climbed
over the walls, and come to the nearest gate, the thirty might come up
to it from the outside and try to knock off the hinges and fastenings,
while they on the inside cut the cross bar and bolt pins.[317] They
also selected two thousand men to follow behind the thirty, who were to
rush into the town with them and seize the area of the theatre, which
was a favourable position to hold against those on the citadel, as
well as those in the town. To prevent suspicion of the truth getting
about, owing to the picking out of the men, the king gave out that
the Aetolians were about to throw themselves into the town through a
certain gully, and that it was necessary, in view of that information,
to take energetic measures to prevent them.
[Sidenote: The town of Sardis entered and sacked.]
+17.+ When Lagoras and his party had made all their preparations, as
soon as the moon set, they came stealthily to the foot of the cliffs
with their scaling ladders, and ensconced themselves under a certain
overhanging rock. When day broke, and the picket as usual broke up
from that spot; and the king in the ordinary way told off some men to
take their usual posts, and led the main body on to the hippodrome and
drew them up; at first no one suspected what was going on. But when
two ladders were fixed, and Dionysius led the way up one, and Lagoras
up the other, there was excitement and a stir throughout the camp. For
while the climbing party were not visible to the people in the town,
or to Achaeus in the citadel, because of the beetling brow of the
rock, their bold and adventurous ascent was in full view of the camp;
which accordingly was divided in feeling between astonishment at the
strangeness of the spectacle, and a nervous horror of what was going
to happen next, all standing dumb with exulting wonder. Observing the
excitement in the camp, and wishing to divert the attention both of
his own men and of those in the city from what was going on, the king
ordered an advance; and delivered an attack upon the gates on the other
side of the town, called the Persian gates. Seeing from the citadel
the unwonted stir in the camp, Achaeus was for some time at a loss to
know what to do, being puzzled to account for it, and quite unable to
see what was taking place. However he despatched a force to oppose the
enemy at the gate; whose assistance was slow in arriving, because they
had to descend from the citadel by a narrow and precipitous path. But
Aribazus, the commandant of the town, went unsuspiciously to the gates
on which he saw Antiochus advancing; and caused some of his men to
mount the wall, and sent others out through the gate, with orders to
hinder the approaching enemies, and come to close quarters with them.
+18.+ Meanwhile Lagoras, Theodotus, Dionysius, and their men had
climbed the rocks and had arrived at the gate nearest them; and some
of them were engaged in fighting the troops sent from the citadel to
oppose them, while others were cutting through the bars; and at the
same time the party outside told off for that service were doing the
same. The gates having thus been quickly forced open, the two thousand
entered and occupied the area round the theatre. On this all the men
from the walls, and from the Persian gate, to which Aribazus had
already led a relieving force, rushed in hot haste to pass the word to
attack the enemy within the gates. The result was that, the gate having
been opened as they retreated, some of the king’s army rushed in along
with the retiring garrison; and, when they had thus taken possession of
the gate, they were followed by an unbroken stream of their comrades;
some of whom poured through the gate, while others employed themselves
in bursting open other gates in the vicinity. Aribazus and all the men
in the city, after a brief struggle against the enemy who had thus
got within the walls, fled with all speed to the citadel. After that,
Theodotus and Lagoras and their party remained on the ground near the
theatre, determining with great good sense and soldier-like prudence
to form a reserve until the whole operation was completed; while the
main body rushed in on every side and occupied the town. And now by
dint of some putting all they met to the sword, others setting fire to
the houses, others devoting themselves to plunder and taking booty, the
destruction and sacking of the town was completed. Thus did Antiochus
become master of Sardis....