EXTRACT FROM THE PREFACE
[Sidenote: 142d Olympiad, B.C. 212-208.]
+1.+ Such are the most conspicuous transactions of this Olympiad, that
is, of the four years which an Olympiad must be reckoned to contain;
and I shall endeavour to include the history of them in two books.
I am quite aware that my history has an element of austerity in it,
and is adapted to, and will be approved by only one class of readers,
owing to the uniformity of its plan. Nearly all other historians, or at
any rate most, attract a variety of readers by entering upon all the
various branches of history. The curious reader is attracted by the
genealogical style; the antiquarian by the discussion of colonisations,
origins of cities, and ties of blood, such as is found in Ephorus; the
student of polities by the story of tribes, cities, and dynasties. It
is to this last branch of the subject that I have had a single eye, and
have devoted my whole work; and accordingly have, as I said before,
accommodated all my plans to one particular class of narrative. The
result is that I have made my work by no means attractive reading to
the majority. Why I thus neglected other departments of history, and
deliberately resolved to confine myself to chronicling actions, I have
already stated at length; however, there is no reason why I should not
briefly remind my readers of it again in this place, for the sake of
impressing it upon them.
+2.+ Seeing that many writers have discussed in many varieties of style
the question of genealogies, myths, and colonisations, as well as of
the foundations of cities and the consanguinity of peoples, there
was nothing left for a writer at this date but to copy the words of
others and claim them as his own,—than which nothing could be more
dishonourable; or, if he did not choose to do that, to absolutely
waste his labour, being obliged to acknowledge that he is composing a
history and bestowing thought on what has already been sufficiently set
forth and transmitted to posterity by his predecessors. For these and
sundry other reasons I abandoned such themes as these, and determined
on writing a history of actions: first, because they are continually
new and require a new narrative,—as of course one generation cannot
give us the history of the next; and secondly, because such a narrative
is of all others the most instructive. This it has always been: but
it is eminently so now, because the arts and sciences have made such
an advance in our day, that students are able to arrange every event
as it happens according to fixed rules, as it were, of scientific
classification. Therefore, as I did not aim so much at giving pleasure
to my readers, as at profiting those who apply to such studies, I
omitted all other themes and devoted myself wholly to this. But on
these points, those who give a careful attention to my narrative will
be the best witnesses to the truth of what I say....
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR
_In the previous year (212 B.C.) Syracuse had fallen: the two Scipios
had been conquered and killed in Spain: the siege-works had been
constructed round Capua, at the very time of the fall of Syracuse, i.e.
in the autumn, Hannibal being engaged in fruitless attempts upon the
citadel of Tarentum. See Livy, 25, 22._
[Sidenote: Q. Fulvius and Appius Claudius, the Consuls of the previous
year, were continued in command there, with orders not to leave the
place till it fell. Livy, 26, 1. Hannibal tries to raise the siege.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 211. Coss. Gnaeus Fulvius Centumalus, P. Sulpicius
Galba. The Romans were still engaged in the siege of Capua.]
+3.+ Entirely surrounding the position of Appius Claudius, Hannibal
at first skirmished, and tried all he could to tempt him to come out
and give him battle. But as no one attended to him, his attack became
very like an attempt to storm the camp; for his cavalry charged in
their squadrons, and with loud cries hurled their javelins inside the
entrenchments, and the infantry attacked in their regular companies,
and tried to pull down the palisading round the camp. But not even
so could he move the Romans from their purpose: they employed their
light-armed troops to repulse those who were actually attacking the
palisade, but protecting themselves with their heavy shields against
the javelins of the enemy, they remained drawn up near their standards
without moving. Discomfited at being neither able to throw himself into
Capua, nor induce the Romans to leave their camp, Hannibal retired to
consult as to what was best to be done.
[Sidenote: The determination and cautious tactics of the Romans.]
It is no wonder, in my opinion, that the Carthaginians were puzzled. I
think any one who heard the facts would be the same. For who would not
have received with incredulity the statement that the Romans, after
losing so many battles to the Carthaginians, and though they did not
venture to meet them on the field, could not nevertheless be induced
to give up the contest or abandon the command of the country? Up to
this time, moreover, they had contented themselves with hovering in
his neighbourhood, keeping along the skirts of the mountains; but now
they had taken up a position on the plains, and those the fairest in
all Italy, and were besieging the strongest city in it; and that with
an enemy attacking them, whom they could not endure even the thought of
meeting face to face: while the Carthaginians, who beyond all dispute
had won the battles, were sometimes in as great difficulties as the
losers. I think the reason of the strategy adopted by the two sides
respectively was, that they both had seen that Hannibal’s cavalry
was the main cause of the Carthaginian victory and Roman defeat.
Accordingly the plan of the losers after the battles, of following
their enemies at a distance, was the natural one to adopt; for the
country through which they went was such that the enemy’s cavalry would
be unable to do them any damage. Similarly what now happened at Capua
to either side was natural and inevitable.
[Sidenote: Carthaginian difficulties.]
+4.+ For the Roman army did not venture to come out and give battle,
from fear of the enemy’s horse, but remained resolutely within their
entrenchment; well knowing that the cavalry, by which they had
been worsted in the battles, could not hurt them there. While the
Carthaginians, again, naturally could not remain any longer encamped
with their cavalry, because all the pastures in the surrounding country
had been utterly destroyed by the Romans with that very view; and it
was impossible for animals to come from such a distance, carrying on
their backs hay and barley for so large a body of cavalry, and so many
beasts of burden; nor again did they venture, when encamped without
their cavalry, to attack an enemy protected by a palisade and fosse,
with whom a contest, even without these advantages in their favour, was
likely to be a doubtful one if they had not got their cavalry. Besides
this they were much alarmed about the new Consuls, lest they should
come and encamp against them, and reduce them to serious straits by
cutting off their supplies of provisions.
[Sidenote: Hannibal determines on creating a diversion by threatening
Rome.]
These considerations convinced Hannibal that it was impossible to raise
the siege by an open attack, and he therefore changed his tactics. He
imagined that if by a secret march he could suddenly appear in the
neighbourhood of Rome, he might by the alarm which he would inspire in
the inhabitants by his unexpected movement, perhaps do something worth
while against the city itself; or, if he could not do that, would at
least force Appius either to raise the siege of Capua, in order to
hasten to the relief of his native town, or to divide the Roman forces;
which would then be easier for him to conquer in detail.
[Sidenote: Hannibal informs the Capuans of his purpose.]
+5.+ With this purpose in his mind he sent a letter-carrier into
Capua. This he did by persuading one of his Libyans to desert to the
Roman camp, and thence to Capua. He took this trouble to secure the
safe delivery of his letter, because he was very much afraid that the
Capuans, if they saw him departing, would consider that he despaired of
them, and would therefore give up hope and surrender to the Romans. He
wrote therefore an explanation of his design, and sent the Libyan the
day after, in order that the Capuans, being acquainted with the purpose
of his departure, might go on courageously sustaining the siege.
[Sidenote: Excitement and activity at Rome.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal starts.]
When the news had arrived at Rome that Hannibal had encamped over
against their lines, and was actually besieging their forces, there
was universal excitement and terror, from a feeling that the result of
the impending battle would decide the whole war. Consequently, with
one heart and soul, the citizens had all devoted themselves to sending
out reinforcements and making preparations for this struggle. On their
part, the Capuans were encouraged by the receipt of Hannibal’s letter,
and by thus learning the object of the Carthaginian movement, to stand
by their determination, and to await the issue of this new hope. At
the end of the fifth day, therefore, after his arrival on the ground,
Hannibal ordered his men to take their supper as usual, and leave their
watch-fires burning; and started with such secrecy, that none of the
enemy knew what was happening. He took the road through Samnium, and
marched at a great pace and without stopping, his skirmishers always
keeping before him to reconnoitre and occupy all the posts along the
route: and while those in Rome had their thoughts still wholly occupied
with Capua and the campaign there, he crossed the Anio without being
observed; and having arrived at a distance of not more than forty
stades from Rome, there pitched his camp.
[Sidenote: Terror at Rome.]
+6.+ On this being known at Rome, the utmost confusion and terror
prevailed among the inhabitants,—this movement of Hannibal’s being as
unexpected as it was sudden; for he had never been so close to the
city before. At the same time their alarm was increased by the idea
at once occurring to them, that he would not have ventured so near,
if it were not that the armies at Capua were destroyed. Accordingly,
the men at once went to line the walls, and the points of vantage in
the defences of the town; while the women went round to the temples of
the gods and implored their protection, sweeping the pavements of the
temples with their hair: for this is their customary way of behaving
when any serious danger comes upon their country. But just as Hannibal
had encamped, and was intending to attempt the city itself next day,
an extraordinary coincidence occurred which proved fortunate for the
preservation of Rome.
[Sidenote: The Consular levies fortunately being at Rome enable the
Romans to make a counter-demonstration.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal devastates the Campagna.]
For Gnaeus Fulvius and Publius Sulpicius, having already enrolled one
consular army, had bound the men with the usual oath to appear at Rome
armed on that very day; and were also engaged on that day in drawing
out the lists and testing the men for the other army:[325] whereby
it so happened that a large number of men had been collected in Rome
spontaneously in the very nick of time. These troops the Consuls boldly
led outside the walls, and, entrenching themselves there, checked
Hannibal’s intended movement. For the Carthaginians were at first eager
to advance, and were not altogether without hope that they would be
able to take Rome itself by assault. But when they saw the enemy drawn
up in order, and learnt before long from a prisoner what had happened,
they abandoned the idea of attacking the city, and began devastating
the country-side instead, and setting fire to the houses. In these
first raids they collected an innumerable amount of booty, for the
field of plunder upon which they were entered was one into which no one
had ever expected an enemy to set foot.
[Sidenote: Hannibal starts on his return.]
[Sidenote: The passage of the Anio.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal turns upon his pursuers.]
+7.+ But presently, when the Consuls ventured to encamp within ten
stades of him, Hannibal broke up his quarters before daylight. He did
so for three reasons:—first, because he had collected an enormous
booty; secondly, because he had given up all hope of taking Rome; and
lastly, because he reckoned that the time had now come at which he
expected, according to his original idea, that Appius would have learnt
the danger threatening Rome, and would have raised the siege of Capua
and come with his whole force to the relief of the city; or at any rate
would hurry up with the greater part, leaving a detachment to carry on
the siege. Publius had caused the bridges over the Anio to be broken
down, and thus compelled Hannibal to get his army across by a ford;
and he now attacked the Carthaginians as they were engaged in making
the passage of the stream and caused them great distress. They were
not able however to strike an important blow, owing to the number of
Hannibal’s cavalry, and the activity of the Numidians in every part of
the field. But before retiring to their camp they wrested the greater
part of the booty from them, and killed about three hundred men; and
then, being convinced that the Carthaginians were beating a hasty
retreat in a panic, they followed in their rear, keeping along the
line of hills. At first Hannibal continued to march at a rapid pace,
being anxious to meet the force which he expected; but at the end of
the fifth day, being informed that Appius had not left the siege of
Capua, he halted; and waiting for the enemy to come up, made an attack
upon his camp before daylight, killed a large number of them, and drove
the rest out of their camp. But when day broke, and he saw the Romans
in a strong position upon a steep hill, to which they had retired, he
decided not to continue his attack upon them; but marching through
Daunia and Bruttium he appeared at Rhegium, so unexpectedly, that he
was within an ace of capturing the city, and did cut off all who were
out in the country; and during this excursion captured a very large
number of the Rhegini.
+8.+ It seems to me that the courage and determination both of the
Carthaginians and Romans at this crisis were truly remarkable; and
merit quite as much admiration as the conduct of Epaminondas, which I
will describe here for the sake of pointing the comparison.
[Sidenote: The rapid march of Epaminondas to Sparta, and back again to
Mantinea. See Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.]
[Sidenote: Xenophon, _Hell._ 7, 5, 8 _sq._ B.C. 362.]
[Sidenote: A Cretan warns Agesilaus.]
He reached Tegea with the allies, and when he saw that the
Lacedaemonians with their own forces in full were come to Mantinea,
and that their allies had mustered together in the same city, with the
intention of offering the Thebans battle; having given orders to his
men to get their supper early, he led his army out immediately after
nightfall, on the pretext of being anxious to seize certain posts with
a view to the coming battle. But having impressed this idea upon the
common soldiers, he led them along the road to Lacedaemon itself; and
having arrived at the city about the third hour of his march, contrary
to all expectation, and finding Sparta destitute of defenders, he
forced his way right up to the market-place, and occupied the quarters
of the town which slope down to the river. Then however a contretemps
occurred: a deserter made his way into Mantinea and told Agesilaus what
was going on. Assistance accordingly arrived just as the city was on
the point of being taken; and Epaminondas was disappointed of his hope.
But having caused his men to get their breakfast along the bank of the
Eurotas, and recovered them from their fatigue, he started to march
back again by the same road, calculating that, as the Lacedaemonians
and their allies had come to the relief of Sparta, Mantinea would in
its turn be left undefended: which turned out to be the case. So he
exhorted the Thebans to exert themselves; and, after a rapid night
march, arrived at Mantinea about midday, finding it entirely destitute
of defenders.
But the Athenians, who were at that time zealously supporting the
Lacedaemonians in their contest with the Thebans, had arrived in virtue
of their treaty of alliance; and just as the Theban vanguard reached
the temple of Poseidon, seven stades from the town, it happened that
the Athenians showed themselves, by design, as if on the brow of the
hill overhanging Mantinea. And when they saw them, the Mantineans who
had been left behind at last ventured to man the wall and resist the
attack of the Thebans. Therefore historians are justified in speaking
with some dissatisfaction of these events,[326] when they say that
the leader did everything which a good general could, but that, while
conquering his enemies, Epaminondas was conquered by Fortune.
+9.+ Much the same remark applies to Hannibal. For who can refrain
from regarding with respect and admiration a general capable of
doing what he did? First he attempted by harassing the enemy with
skirmishing attacks to raise the siege: having failed in this he
made direct for Rome itself: baffled once more by a turn of fortune
entirely independent of human calculation, he kept his pursuers in
play,[327] and waited till the moment was ripe to see whether the
besiegers of Capua stirred: and finally, without relaxing in his
determination, swept down upon his enemies to their destruction, and
all but depopulated Rhegium. One would be inclined however to judge the
Romans to be superior to the Lacedaemonians at this crisis. For the
Lacedaemonians rushed off _en masse_ at the first message and relieved
Sparta, but, as far as they were concerned, lost Mantinea. The Romans
guarded their own city without breaking up the siege of Capua: on the
contrary, they remained unshaken and firm in their purpose, and in fact
from that time pressed the Capuans with renewed spirit.
I have not said this for the sake of making a panegyric on either the
Romans or Carthaginians, whose great qualities I have already remarked
upon more than once: but for the sake of those who are in office among
the one or the other people, or who are in future times to direct
the affairs of any state whatever; that by the memory, or actual
contemplation, of exploits such as these they may be inspired with
emulation. For in an adventurous and hazardous policy it often turns
out that audacity was the truest safety and the finest sagacity;[328]
and success or failure does not affect the credit and excellence of
the original design, so long as the measures taken are the result of
deliberate thought....
TARENTUM
[Sidenote: The Carthaginian fleet invited from Sicily to relieve
Tarentum does more harm than good, and departs to the joy of the
people, B.C. 211. Livy, 26, 20.]
When the Romans were besieging Tarentum, Bomilcar the admiral of the
Carthaginian fleet came to its relief with a very large force; and
being unable to afford efficient aid to those in the town, owing to the
strict blockade maintained by the Romans, without meaning to do so he
used up more than he brought; and so after having been constrained by
entreaties and large promises to come, he was afterwards forced at the
earnest supplication of the people to depart....
THE SPOILS OF SYRACUSE
+10.+ A city is not really adorned by what is brought from without, but
by the virtue of its own inhabitants....
[Sidenote: Syracuse was taken in the autumn, B.C. 212. “The ornaments
of the city, statues and pictures were taken to Rome.” Livy, 25, 40,
cp. 26, 21.]
The Romans, then, decided to transfer these things to their own city
and to leave nothing behind. Whether they were right in doing so, and
consulted their true interests or the reverse, is a matter admitting
of much discussion; but I think the balance of argument is in favour
of believing it to have been wrong then, and wrong now. If such had
been the works by which they had exalted their country, it is clear
that there would have been some reason in transferring thither the
things by which they had become great. But the fact was that, while
leading lives of the greatest simplicity themselves, as far as possible
removed from the luxury and extravagance which these things imply, they
yet conquered the men who had always possessed them in the greatest
abundance and of the finest quality. Could there have been a greater
mistake than theirs? Surely it would be an incontestable error for a
people to abandon the habits of the conquerors and adopt those of the
conquered; and at the same time involve itself in that jealousy which
is the most dangerous concomitant of excessive prosperity. For the
looker-on never congratulates those who take what belongs to others,
without a feeling of jealousy mingling with his pity for the losers.
But suppose such prosperity to go on increasing, and a people to
accumulate into its own hands all the possessions of the rest of the
world, and moreover to invite in a way the plundered to share in the
spectacle they present, in that case surely the mischief is doubled.
For it is no longer a case of the spectators pitying their neighbours,
but themselves, as they recall the ruin of their own country. Such
a sight produces an outburst, not of jealousy merely, but of rage
against the victors. For the reminder of their own disaster serves
to enhance their hatred of the authors of it. To sweep the gold and
silver, however, into their own coffers was perhaps reasonable; for it
was impossible for them to aim at universal empire without crippling
the means of the rest of the world, and securing the same kind of
resources for themselves. But they might have left in their original
sites things that had nothing to do with material wealth; and thus at
the same time have avoided exciting jealousy, and raised the reputation
of their country: adorning it, not with pictures and statues, but with
dignity of character and greatness of soul. I have spoken thus much as
a warning to those who take upon themselves to rule over others, that
they may not imagine that, when they pillage cities, the misfortunes of
others are an honour to their own country. The Romans, however, when
they transferred these things to Rome, used such of them as belonged to
individuals to increase the splendour of private establishments, and
such as belonged to the state to adorn the city....
SPAIN
[Sidenote: The two Scipios fall in B.C. 212.]
[Sidenote: Hasdrubal Gisconis tertius Carthaginiensium dux. Livy 24,
41, cp. 25, 37.]
+11.+ The leaders of the Carthaginians, though they had conquered their
enemies, could not control themselves: and having made up their minds
that they had put an end to the Roman war, they began quarrelling
with each other, finding continual subjects of dispute through the
innate covetousness and ambition of the Phoenician character; among
whom Hasdrubal, son of Gesco, pushed his authority to such a pitch
of iniquity as to demand a large sum of money from Andobales, the
most faithful of all their Iberian friends, who had some time before
lost his chieftainship for the sake of the Carthaginians, and had but
recently recovered it through his loyalty to them. When Andobales,
trusting to his long fidelity to Carthage, refused this demand,
Hasdrubal got up a false charge against him and compelled him to give
up his daughters as hostages....
ON THE ART OF COMMANDING ARMIES
+12.+ The chances and accidents that attend military expeditions
require great circumspection; and it is possible to provide for all of
them with precision, provided that a man gives his mind to the conduct
of his plan of campaign. Now that fewer operations in war are carried
out openly and by mere force, than by stratagem and the skillful use of
opportunity, any one that chooses may readily learn from the history
of the past. And again that operations depending on the choice of
opportunity oftener fail than succeed is easily proved from experience.
Nor can there be any doubt that the greater part of such failures are
due to the folly or carelessness of the leaders. It is time therefore
to inquire into the rules of this art of strategy.
Such things as occur in campaigns without having been calculated upon
in any way we must not speak of as operations, but as accidents or
casualties. It is the conduct of a campaign in accordance with an exact
plan that I am to set forth: omitting all such things as do not fall
under a scientific rule, and have no fixed design.
[Sidenote: The points of inherent importance in the conduct of a
campaign,—time, place, secrecy, code of signals, agents, and method.]
+13.+ Every operation requires a time fixed for its commencement, a
period and place for its execution, secrecy, definite signals, persons
by whom and with whom it is to be executed, and a settled plan for
conducting it. It is evident that the man who has rightly provided
for each of these details will not fail in the ultimate result, while
he who has neglected any single one of them will fail in the whole.
Such is the order of nature, that one insignificant circumstance will
suffice for failure, while for success rigid perfection of every detail
is barely enough.
Leaders then should neglect no single point in conducting such
expeditions.
[Sidenote: Things necessary. 1. Silence.]
Now the head and front of such precautions is silence; and not to
allow either joy at the appearance of an unexpected hope, or fear, or
familiarity, or natural affection, to induce a man to communicate his
plans to any one unconcerned, but to impart it to those and those alone
without whom it is impossible to complete his plan, and not even to
them a moment sooner than necessary, but only when the exigencies of
the particular service make it inevitable. It is necessary, moreover,
not only to be silent with the tongue, but much more so in the mind.
For it has happened to many generals before now, while preserving an
inviolable silence, to betray their thoughts either by the expression
of their countenances or by their actions.
[Sidenote: 2. Knowledge of the capabilities of the force in moving.]
The second requisite is to know accurately the conditions under which
marches by day or night may be performed, and the distances to which
they can extend, and not only marches on land, but also voyages by sea.
The third and most important is to have some knowledge of the seasons,
and to be able to adapt the design to them.
Nor again is the selection of the ground for the operation to be
regarded as unimportant, since it often happens that it is this
which makes what seems impossible possible, and what seemed possible
impossible.
[Sidenote: 3. Care in concerting signals.]
[Sidenote: 4. Care in selecting men.]
Finally there must be no neglect of the subject of signals and counter
signals; and the choice of persons by whom and with whom the operation
is to be carried out.
[Sidenote: 5. Knowledge of localities.]
+14.+ Of these points some are learnt by experience, some from history,
and others by the study of scientific strategy. It is a most excellent
thing too that the general should have a personal knowledge both of
the roads, and the locality which he has to reach, and its natural
features, as well as of the persons by whom and with whom he is to act.
If that is not possible, the next best thing is that he should make
careful inquiries and not trust just any one: and men who undertake to
act as guides to such places should always deposit security with those
whom they are conducting.
[Sidenote: 6. Accurate knowledge of natural phenomena enabling a
general to make accurate calculation of time.]
These, and other points like them, it is perhaps possible that leaders
may learn sufficiently from the mere study of strategy, whether
practical or in books. But scientific investigation requires scientific
processes and demonstrations, especially in astronomy and geometry; the
working out of which is not much to our present point, though their
results are important, and may contribute largely to the success of
such undertakings.
The most important operation in astronomy is the calculation of the
lengths of the days and nights. If these had been uniform it would not
have been a matter requiring any study, but the knowledge would have
been common to all the world: since however they not only differ with
each other but also with themselves, it is plainly necessary to be
acquainted with the increase and diminution of both the one and the
other. How can a man calculate a march, and the distance practicable in
a day or in a night, if he is unacquainted with the variation of these
periods of time? In fact nothing can be done up to time without this
knowledge,—it is inevitable otherwise that a man should be sometimes
too late and sometimes too soon. And these operations are the only ones
in which being too soon is a worse fault than being too late. For the
general who overstays the proper hour of action only misses his chance,
since he can find out that he has done so before he arrives, and so
get off safely: but he that anticipates the hour is detected when he
comes up; and so not only misses his immediate aim, but runs a risk of
ruining himself altogether.
[Sidenote: The divisions of the day;]
[Sidenote: of the night.]
+15.+ In all human undertakings opportuneness is the most important
thing, but especially in operations of war. Therefore a general must
have at his fingers’ ends the season of the summer and winter solstice,
the equinoxes, and the periods between them in which the days and
nights increase and diminish. For it is by this knowledge alone that
he can compute the distance that can be done whether by sea or land.
Again, he must necessarily understand the subdivisions both of the day
and the night, in order to know at what hour to order the reveillé,
or the march out; for the end cannot be attained unless the beginning
be rightly taken. As for the periods of the day, they may be observed
by the shadows or by the sun’s course, and the quarter of the heaven
in which it has arrived, but it is difficult to do the same for the
night, unless a man is familiar with the phenomenon of the twelve signs
of the Zodiac, and their law and order: and this is easy to those
who have studied astronomy. For since, though the nights are unequal
in length, at least six of the signs of the Zodiac are nevertheless
above the horizon every night, it is plain that in the same portions
of every night equal portions of the twelve signs of the Zodiac rise.
Now as it is known what portion of the sphere is occupied by the sun
during the day, it is evident that when he has set the arc subtended by
the diameter of his arc must rise. Therefore the length of the night
is exactly commensurate with the portion of the Zodiac which appears
above the horizon after sunset. And, given that we know the number and
size of the signs of the Zodiac, the corresponding divisions of the
night are also known. If however the nights be cloudy, the moon must be
watched, since owing to its size its light as a general rule is always
visible, at whatsoever point in the heaven it may be. The hour may be
guessed sometimes by observing the time and place of its rising, or
again of its setting, if you only have sufficient acquaintance with
this phenomenon to be familiar with the daily variation of its rising.
And the law which it too follows admits of being easily observed; for
its revolution is limited by the period of one month, which serves as a
model to which all subsequent revolutions conform.
[Sidenote: The example of Ulysses. See Odyss. 5, 270 _sq._]
+16.+ And here one may mention with admiration that Homer represents
Ulysses, that truest type of a leader of men, taking observations of
the stars, not only to direct his voyages, but his operations on land
also. For such accidents as baffle expectation, and are incapable of
being accurately reckoned upon, are quite sufficient to bring us to
great and frequent distress, for instance, downpours of rain and rise
of torrents, excessive frosts and snows, misty and cloudy weather, and
other things like these;—but if we also neglect to provide for those
which can be foreseen, is it not likely that we shall have ourselves
to thank for frequent failures? None of these means then must be
neglected, if we wish to avoid those errors into which many others are
said to have fallen, as well as the particular generals whom I am about
to mention by way of examples.
[Sidenote: Aratus fails at Cynaetha.]
+17.+ When Aratus, the Strategus of the Achaean league, attempted to
take Cynaetha by treachery, he arranged a day with those in the town
who were co-operating with him, on which he was to arrive on the banks
of the river which flows past Cynaetha, and to remain there quietly
with his forces: while the party inside the town about midday, when
they got an opportunity, were to send out one of their men quietly,
wrapped in a cloak, and order him to take his stand upon a tomb agreed
upon in front of the city; the rest were to attack the officers who
were accustomed to guard the gate while taking their siesta. This
being done, the Achaeans were to rise from their ambush and to make
all haste to occupy the gate. These arrangements made, and the time
having come, Aratus arrived; and having concealed himself down by the
river, waited there for the signal. But about an hour before noon, a
man, whose profession it was to keep a fine kind of sheep near the
town, wishing to ask some business question of the shepherd, came out
of the gate with his cloak on, and standing upon the same tomb looked
round to find the shepherd. Whereupon Aratus, thinking that the signal
had been given, hurried with all his men as fast as he could towards
the gate. But the gate being hurriedly closed by the guard, owing to no
preparations having yet been made by the party in the town, the result
was that Aratus not only failed in his attempt but was the cause of the
worst misfortunes to his partisans. For being thus detected they were
dragged forward and put to death. What is one to say was the cause of
this catastrophe? Surely that the general arranged only for a single
signal, and being then quite young had no experience of the accuracy
secured by double signals and counter-signals. On so small a point in
war does the success or failure of an operation turn.
[Sidenote: Cleomenes. See 2, 55.]
[Sidenote: May 12.]
+18.+ Again the Spartan Cleomenes, when proposing to take Megalopolis
by a stratagem, arranged with the guards of that part of the wall
near what is called the Cavern to come out with all their men in the
third watch, the hour at which his partisans were on duty on the wall;
but not having taken into consideration the fact that at the time of
the rising of the Pleiads the nights are very short, he started his
army from Sparta about sunset. The result was that he was not able
to get there in time, but being overtaken by daybreak, made a rash
and ill-considered attempt to carry the town, and was repulsed with
considerable loss and the danger of a complete overthrow. Now if he
had, in accordance with his arrangement, hit the proper time, and led
in his men while his partisans were in command of the entrance, he
would not have failed in his attempt.
[Sidenote: Philip’s attack on Meliteia. See 5, 97.]
Similarly, once more, King Philip, as I have already stated, when
carrying on an intrigue in the city of Meliteia, made a mistake in two
ways. The ladders which he brought were too short for their purpose,
and he mistook the time. For having arranged to arrive about midnight,
when every one was fast asleep, he started from Larissa and arrived in
the territory of Meliteia too early, and was neither able to halt, for
fear of his arrival being announced in the city, nor to get back again
without being discovered. Being compelled therefore to continue his
advance, he arrived at the city while the inhabitants were still awake.
Consequently he could neither carry the wall by an escalade, because of
the insufficient length of the ladders; nor enter by the gate, because
it was too early for his partisans inside to help him. Finally, he
did nothing but irritate the people of the town, and, after losing a
considerable number of his own men, retired unsuccessful and covered
with disgrace; having only given a warning to the rest of the world to
distrust him and be on their guard against him.
[Sidenote: Nicias, B.C. 413. Thucyd. 7, 50.]
+19.+ Again Nicias, the general of the Athenians, had it in his power
to have saved the army besieging Syracuse, and had selected the proper
time of the night for escaping the observation of the enemy, and
retiring to a place of safety. And then because the moon was eclipsed,
regarding it superstitiously as of evil portent, he stopped the army
from starting. Thanks to this it came about that, when he started the
next day, the enemy had obtained information of his intention, and
army and generals alike fell into the hands of the Syracusans. Yet if
he had asked about this from men acquainted with such phenomena, he
might not only have avoided missing his opportunity for such an absurd
reason, but have also used the occurrence for his own benefit owing
to the ignorance of the enemy. For the ignorance of their neighbours
contributes more than anything else to the success of the instructed.
[Sidenote: The method of judging of the length necessary for scaling
ladders.]
Such then are examples of the necessity of studying celestial
phenomena. But as for securing the proper length of scaling ladders,
the following is the method of making the calculation. Suppose the
height of the wall to be given by one of the conspirators within, the
measurement required for the ladders is evident; for example, if the
height of the wall is ten feet or any other unit, the ladders must be
full twelve; and the interval between the wall and the foot of the
ladder must be half the length of the ladder, that the ladders may
not break under the weight of those mounting if they are set farther
away, nor be too steep to be safe if set nearer the perpendicular. But
supposing it not to be possible to measure or get near the wall: the
height of any object which rises perpendicularly on its base can be
taken by those who choose to study mathematics.
+20.+ Once more, therefore, those who wish to succeed in military
projects and operations must have studied geometry, not with
professional completeness, but far enough to have a comprehension
of proportion and equations. For it is not only in such cases that
these are necessary, but also for raising the scale of the divisions
of a camp. For sometimes the problem is to change the entire form of
the camp, and yet to keep the same proportion between all the parts
included: at other times to keep the same shape in the parts, and to
increase or diminish the whole area on which the camp stands, adding
or subtracting from all proportionally. On which point I have already
spoken in more elaborate detail in my Notes on Military Tactics. For
I do not think that any one will reasonably object to me that I add a
great burden to strategy, in urging on those who endeavour to acquire
it the study of astronomy and geometry: for, while rather rejecting
all that is superfluous in these studies, and brought in for show and
talk, as well as all idea of enjoining their prosecution beyond the
point of practical utility, I am most earnest and eager for so much
as is barely necessary. For it would be strange if those who aim at
the sciences of dancing and flute-playing should study the preparatory
sciences of rhythms and music, (and the like might be said of the
pursuits of the palaestra), from the belief that the final attainment
of each of these sciences requires the assistance of the latter; while
the students of strategy are to feel aggrieved if they find that they
require subsidiary sciences up to a certain point. That would mean that
men practising common and inferior arts are more diligent and energetic
than those who resolve to excel in the best and most dignified subject,
which no man of sense would admit....
THE COMPUTATION OF THE SIZE OF CITIES
+21.+ Most people calculate the area merely from the length of the
circumference [of towns or camps]. [Sidenote: Sparta and Megalopolis.]
Accordingly, when one says that the city of Megalopolis has a circuit
of fifty stades, and that of Sparta forty-eight, but that Sparta
is twice the size of Megalopolis, they look upon the assertion as
incredible. And if one, by way of increasing the difficulty, were
to say that a city or camp may have a circuit of forty stades and
yet be double the size of one having a perimeter of a hundred, the
statement would utterly puzzle them. The reason of this is that we do
not remember the lessons in geometry taught us at school. I was led to
make these remarks because it is not only common people, but actually
some statesmen and military commanders, who have puzzled themselves
sometimes by wondering whether it were possible that Sparta should be
bigger, and that too by a great deal, than Megalopolis, while having a
shorter circuit; and at other times by trying to conjecture the number
of men by considering the mere length of a camp’s circuit. A similar
mistake is also made in pronouncing as to the number of the inhabitants
of cities. For most people imagine that cities in which the ground is
broken and hilly contain more houses than a flat site. But the fact
is not so; because houses are built at right angles not to sloping
foundations but to the plains below, upon which the hills themselves
are excrescences. And this admits of a proof within the intelligence
of a child. For if one would imagine houses on slopes to be raised
until they were of the same height; it is evident that the plane of the
roofs of the houses thus united will be equal and parallel to the plane
underlying the hills and foundations.
So much for those who aspire to be leaders and statesmen and are yet
ignorant and puzzled about such facts as these....
Those who do not enter upon undertakings with good will and zeal cannot
be expected to give real help when the time comes to act....
THE HANNIBALIAN WAR, B.C. 211
Such being the position of the Romans and Carthaginians, Fortune
continually oscillating between the two, we may say with the poet
“Pain hard by joy possessed the souls of each.”[329]...
There is profound truth in the observation which I have often made,
that it is impossible to grasp or get a complete view of the fairest of
all subjects of contemplation, the tendency of history as a whole, from
writers of partial histories....
THE CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL
+22.+ Of all that befell the Romans and Carthaginians, good or bad, the
cause was one man and one mind,—Hannibal.
For it is notorious that he managed the Italian campaigns in person,
and the Spanish by the agency of the elder of his brothers, Hasdrubal,
and subsequently by that of Mago, the leaders who killed the two
Roman generals in Spain about the same time. Again, he conducted the
Sicilian campaign at first through Hippocrates and afterwards through
Myttonus[330] the Libyan. So also in Greece and Illyria: and, by
brandishing before their faces the dangers arising from these latter
places, he was enabled to distract the attention of the Romans, thanks
to his understanding with Philip. So great and wonderful is the
influence of a Man, and a mind duly fitted by original constitution for
any undertaking within the reach of human powers.
[Sidenote: ἀρχὴ ἄνδρα δείξει. Bias, in Aristot. Eth. 5, 1.]
But since the position of affairs has brought us to an inquiry into the
genius of Hannibal, the occasion seems to me to demand that I should
explain in regard to him the peculiarities of his character which have
been especially the subject of controversy. Some regard him as having
been extraordinarily cruel, some exceedingly grasping of money. But to
speak the truth of him, or of any person engaged in public affairs,
is not easy. Some maintain that men’s real natures are brought out
by their circumstances, and that they are detected when in office,
or as some say when in misfortunes, though they have up to that time
completely maintained their secrecy. I, on the contrary, do not regard
this as a sound dictum. For I think that men in these circumstances
are compelled, not only occasionally but frequently, either by the
suggestions of friends or the complexity of affairs, to speak and act
contrary to their real principles.
[Sidenote: Examples to the contrary. 1. Agathocles.]
[Sidenote: 2. Cleomenes.]
[Sidenote: 3. Athens.]
[Sidenote: 4. Sparta.]
[Sidenote: 5. Philip V.]
+23.+ And there are many proofs of this to be found in past history
if any one will give the necessary attention. Is it not universally
stated by the historians that Agathocles, tyrant of Sicily, after
having the reputation of extreme cruelty in his original measures for
the establishment of his dynasty, when he had once become convinced
that his power over the Siceliots was firmly established, is considered
to have become the most humane and mild of rulers? Again, was not
Cleomenes of Sparta a most excellent king, a most cruel tyrant, and
then again as a private individual most obliging and benevolent? And
yet it is not reasonable to suppose the most opposite dispositions
to exist in the same nature. They are compelled to change with the
changes of circumstances: and so some rulers often display to the world
a disposition as opposite as possible to their true nature. Therefore
the natures of men not only are not brought out by such things, but
on the contrary are rather obscured. The same effect is produced also
not only in commanders, despots, and kings, but in states also, by
the suggestions of friends. For instance, you will find the Athenians
responsible for very few tyrannical acts, and of many kindly and noble
ones, while Aristeides and Pericles were at the head of the state:
but quite the reverse when Cleon and Chares were so. And when the
Lacedaemonians were supreme in Greece, all the measures taken by King
Cleombrotus were conceived in the interests of their allies, but those
by Agesilaus not so. The characters of states therefore vary with
the variations of their leaders. King Philip again, when Taurion and
Demetrius were acting with him, was most impious in his conduct, but
when Aratus or Chrysogonus, most humane.
[Sidenote: Hannibal mastered by circumstances.]
[Sidenote: His cruelty.]
+24.+ The case of Hannibal seems to me to be on a par with these. His
circumstances were so extraordinary and shifting, his closest friends
so widely different, that it is exceedingly difficult to estimate his
character from his proceedings in Italy. What those circumstances
suggested to him may easily be understood from what I have already
said, and what is immediately to follow; but it is not right to omit
the suggestions made by his friends either, especially as this matter
may be rendered sufficiently clear by one instance of the advice
offered him. At the time that Hannibal was meditating the march from
Iberia to Italy with his army, he was confronted with the extreme
difficulty of providing food and securing provisions, both because
the journey was thought to be of insuperable length, and because the
barbarians that lived in the intervening country were so numerous and
savage. It appears that at that time this difficulty frequently came
on for discussion at the council; and that one of his friends, called
Hannibal Monomachus, gave it as his opinion that there was one and
only one way by which it was possible to get as far as Italy. Upon
Hannibal bidding him speak out, he said that they must teach the army
to eat human flesh, and make them accustomed to it. Hannibal could
say nothing against the boldness and effectiveness of the idea, but
was unable to persuade himself or his friends to entertain it. It is
this man’s acts in Italy that they say were attributed to Hannibal, to
maintain the accusation of cruelty, as well as such as were the result
of circumstances.
[Sidenote: His avarice.]
+25.+ Fond of money indeed he does seem to have been to a conspicuous
degree, and to have had a friend of the same character—Mago, who
commanded in Bruttium. That account I got from the Carthaginians
themselves; for natives know best not only which way the wind lies, as
the proverb has it, but the characters also of their fellow-countrymen.
But I heard a still more detailed story from Massanissa, who maintained
the charge of money-loving against all Carthaginians generally, but
especially against Hannibal and Mago called the Samnite. Among other
stories, he told me that these two men had arranged a most generous
subdivision of operations between each other from their earliest
youth; and though they had each taken a very large number of cities in
Iberia and Italy by force or fraud, they had never taken part in the
same operation together; but had always schemed against each other,
more than against the enemy, in order to prevent the one being with
the other at the taking of a city: that they might neither quarrel in
consequence of things of this sort, nor have to divide the profit on
the ground of their equality of rank.
[Sidenote: Effect of the fall of Capua, B.C. 211.]
+26.+ The influence of friends then, and still more that of
circumstances, in doing violence to and changing the natural character
of Hannibal, is shown by what I have narrated and will be shown by
what I have to narrate. For as soon as Capua fell into the hands of
the Romans the other cities naturally became restless, and began to
look round for opportunities and pretexts for revolting back again to
Rome. It was then that Hannibal seems to have been at his lowest point
of distress and despair. For neither was he able to keep a watch upon
all the cities so widely removed from each other,—while he remained
entrenched at one spot, and the enemy were manœuvering against him with
several armies,—nor could he divide his force into many parts; for he
would have put an easy victory into the hands of the enemy by becoming
inferior to them in numbers, and finding it impossible to be personally
present at all points. Wherefore he was obliged to completely abandon
some of the cities, and withdraw his garrisons from others: being
afraid lest, in the course of the revolutions which might occur, he
should lose his own soldiers as well. Some cities again he made up his
mind to treat with treacherous violence, removing their inhabitants to
other cities, and giving their property up to plunder; in consequence
of which many were enraged with him, and accused him of impiety or
cruelty. For the fact was that these movements were accompanied by
robberies of money, murders, and violence, on various pretexts at the
hands of the outgoing or incoming soldiers in the cities, because they
always supposed that the inhabitants that were left behind were on the
verge of turning over to the enemy. It is, therefore, very difficult to
express an opinion on the natural character of Hannibal, owing to the
influence exercised on it by the counsel of friends and the force of
circumstances. The prevailing notion about him, however, at Carthage
was that he was greedy of money, at Rome that he was cruel.[331]...
AGRIGENTUM
[Sidenote: Agrigentum taken by Marcus Valerius Laevinus, late in the
year B.C. 210, _jam magna parte anni circumacta_. Livy, 26, 40.]
+27.+ The city of Agrigentum is not only superior to most cities in the
particulars I have mentioned, but above all in beauty and elaborate
ornamentation. It stands within eighteen stades of the sea, so that it
participates in every advantage from that quarter; while its circuit of
fortification is particularly strong both by nature and art. For its
wall is placed on a rock, steep and precipitous, on one side naturally,
on the other made so artificially. And it is enclosed by rivers: for
along the south side runs the river of the same name as the town, and
along the west and south-west side the river called Hypsas. The citadel
overlooks the city exactly at the south-east, girt on the outside by
an impassable ravine, and on the inside with only one approach from
the town. On the top of it is a temple of Athene and of Zeus Atabyrius
as at Rhodes: for as Agrigentum was founded by the Rhodians, it is
natural that this deity should have the same appellation as at Rhodes.
The city is sumptuously adorned in other respects also with temples and
colonnades. The temple of Zeus Olympius is still unfinished, but in its
plan and dimensions it seems to be inferior to no temple whatever in
all Greece....
* * * * *
[Sidenote: The treatment of the refugees and desperadoes who had
collected at Agathyrna in Sicily. See Livy, 26, 40 _fin._]
Marcus Valerius persuaded these refugees, on giving them a pledge
for the security of their lives, to leave Sicily and go to Italy, on
condition that they should receive pay from the people of Rhegium
for plundering Bruttium, and retain all booty obtained from hostile
territory....
GREECE
_Speech of Chlaeneas, the Aetolian, at Sparta. In the autumn of_ B.C.
211 _the Consul-designate, M. Valerius Laevinus, induced the Aetolians,
Scopas being their Strategus, to form an alliance with them against
Philip. The treaty, as finally concluded, embraced also the Eleans,
Lacedaemonians, King Attalus of Pergamum, the Thracian King Pleuratus,
and the Illyrian Scerdilaidas. A mission was sent from Aetolia to
persuade the Lacedaemonians to join. See Livy, 26, 24._
[Sidenote: B.C. 347.]
[Sidenote: Battle of Chaeronea, B.C. 338.]
[Sidenote: Succession of Alexander the Great, B.C. 336.]
[Sidenote: Destruction of Thebes, B.C. 335.]
“That the Macedonian supremacy, men of Sparta, was the beginning of
slavery to the Greeks, I am persuaded that no one will venture to deny;
and you may satisfy yourselves by looking at it thus. There was a
league of Greeks living in the parts towards Thrace who were colonists
from Athens and Chalcis, of which the most conspicuous and powerful was
the city of Olynthus. Having enslaved and made an example of this town,
Philip not only became master of the Thraceward cities, but reduced
Thessaly also to his authority by the terror which he had thus set up.
Not long after this he conquered the Athenians in a pitched battle, and
used his success with magnanimity, not from any wish to benefit the
Athenians—far from it, but in order that his favourable treatment of
them might induce the other states to submit to him voluntarily. The
reputation of your city was still such that it seemed likely, that, if
a proper opportunity arose, it would recover its supremacy in Greece.
Accordingly, without waiting for any but the slightest pretext, Philip
came with his army and cut down everything standing in your fields, and
destroyed the houses with fire. And at last, after destroying towns and
open country alike, he assigned part of your territory to the Argives,
part to Tegea and Megalopolis, and part to the Messenians: determined
to benefit every people in spite of all justice, on the sole condition
of their injuring you. Alexander succeeded Philip on the throne, and
how he destroyed Thebes, because he thought that it contained a spark
of Hellenic life, however small, you all I think know well.
[Sidenote: Battle of Crannon, ending the Lamian war, 7th Aug., B.C.
322.]
[Sidenote: Defeat of Brennus at Delphi, B.C. 279. Pausan. 10, 15;
20-23.]
+29.+ “And why need I speak in detail of how the successors of this
king have treated the Greeks? For surely there is no man living, so
uninterested in public affairs, as not to have heard how Antipater in
his victory at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians, as well as the
other Greeks; and how he went so far in violence and brutality as to
institute man-hunters, and send them to the various cities to catch all
who had ever spoken against, or in any way annoyed, the royal family
of Macedonia: of whom some were dragged by force from the temples,
and others from the very altars, and put to death with torture, and
others who escaped were forced to leave Greece entirely; nor had they
any refuge save the Aetolian nation alone. For the Aetolians were
the only people in Greece who withstood Antipater in behalf of those
unjustly defrauded of safety to their lives: they alone faced the
invasion of Brennus and his barbarian army: and they alone came to your
aid when called upon, with a determination to assist you in regaining
your ancestral supremacy in Greece.[332] Who again is ignorant of the
deeds of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonus Gonatas? For owing to
their recency the knowledge of them still remains distinct. Some of
them by introducing garrisons, and others by implanting despots in the
cities, effectually secured that every state should share the infamous
brand of slavery. But passing by all these I will now come to the last
Antigonus,[333] lest any of you, viewing his policy unsuspiciously,
should consider that you are under an obligation to the Macedonians.
For it was with no purpose of saving the Achaeans that he undertook
the war against you, nor from any dislike of the tyranny of Cleomenes
inducing him to free the Lacedaemonians. If any man among you holds
this opinion, he must be simple indeed. No! It was because he saw
that his own power would not be secure if you got the rule of the
Peloponnese; and because he saw that Cleomenes was of a nature well
calculated to secure this object, and that fortune was splendidly
seconding your efforts, that he came in a tumult of fear and jealousy,
not to help Peloponnesians, but to destroy your hopes and abase your
power. Therefore you do not owe the Macedonians so much gratitude for
not destroying your city when they had taken it, as hostility and
hatred, for having more than once already stood in your way, when you
were strong enough to grasp the supremacy of Greece.
[Sidenote: Philip V.]
+30.+ “Again, what need to speak more on the wickedness of Philip? For
of his impiety towards the gods his outrages on the temples at Thermus
are a sufficient proof; and of his cruelty towards man, his perfidy and
treachery to the Messenians.
“So much for the past. But as to the present resolution before you, it
is in a way necessary to draft it, and vote on it, as though you were
deciding on war, and yet in real truth not to regard it as a war. For
it is impossible for the Achaeans, beaten as they are, to damage your
territory: but I imagine that they will be only too thankful to heaven
if they can but protect their own, when they find themselves surrounded
by war with Eleans and Messenians as allied to us, and with ourselves
at the same time. And Philip, I am persuaded, will soon desist from his
attack, when involved in a war by land with Aetolians, and by sea with
Rome and King Attalus. The future may be easily conjectured from the
past. For if he always failed to subdue Aetolians when they were his
only enemies, can we conceive that he will be able to support the war
if all these combine?
+31.+ “I have said thus much with the deliberate purpose of showing you
that you are not hampered by previous engagements, but are entirely
free in your deliberations as to which you ought to join—Aetolians or
Macedonians. If you are under an earlier engagement, and have already
made up your minds on these points, what room is there for further
argument? For if you had made the alliance now existing between
yourselves and us, previous to the good services done you by Antigonus,
there might perhaps have been some reason for questioning whether it
were right to neglect an old treaty in gratitude for recent favours.
But since it was subsequent to this much vaunted freedom and security
given you by Antigonus, and with which they are perpetually taunting
you, that, after deliberation and frequent consideration as to which of
the two you ought to join, you decided to combine with us Aetolians;
and have actually exchanged pledges of fidelity with us, and have
fought by our side in the late war against Macedonia, how can any one
entertain a doubt on the subject any longer? For the obligations of
kindness between you and Antigonus and Philip were cancelled then. It
now remains for you to point out some subsequent wrong done you by
Aetolians, or subsequent favour by Macedonians: or if neither of these
exist, on what grounds are you now, at the instance of the very men to
whom you justly refused to listen formerly, when no obligation existed,
about to undo treaties and oaths—the strongest bonds of fidelity
existing among mankind.”
Such was the conclusion of what was considered a very cogent speech by
Chlaeneas.
+32.+ After him the ambassador of the Acarnanians, Lyciscus, came
forward: and at first he paused, seeing the multitude talking to each
other about the last speech; but when at last silence was obtained, he
began his speech as follows:—
[Sidenote: Speech of Lyciscus, envoy from Acarnania, which country was
to fall to the Aetolians by the proposed new treaty. See Livy, 26, 24.]
“I and my colleagues, men of Sparta, have been sent to you by the
common league of the Acarnanians; and as we have always shared in
the same prospects as the Macedonians, we consider that this mission
also is common to us and them. For just as on the field of war, owing
to the superiority and magnitude of the Macedonian force, our safety
is involved in their valour; so, in the controversies of diplomacy,
our interests are inseparable from the rights of the Macedonians.
Now Chlaeneas in the peroration of his address gave a summary of the
obligations existing between the Aetolians and yourselves. For he said,
'If subsequent to your making the alliance with them any fresh injury
or offence had been committed by Aetolians, or any kindness done by
Macedonians, the present proposal ought properly to be discussed as
a fresh start; but that if, nothing of the sort having taken place,
we believe that by quoting the services of Antigonus, and your former
decrees, we shall be able to annul existing oaths and treaties, we are
the greatest simpletons in the world.’ To this I reply by acknowledging
that I must indeed be the most foolish of men, and that the arguments
I am about to put forward are indeed futile, if, as he maintains,
nothing fresh has happened, and Greek affairs are in precisely the same
position as before. But if exactly the reverse be the case, as I shall
clearly prove in the course of my speech,—then I imagine that I shall
be shown to give you some salutary advice, and Chlaeneas to be quite in
the wrong. We are come, then, expressly because we are convinced that
it is needful for us to speak on this very point: namely, to point out
to you that it is at once your duty and your interest, after hearing of
the evils threatening Greece, to adopt if possible a policy excellent
and worthy of yourselves by uniting your prospects with ours; or if
that cannot be, at least to abstain from this movement for the present.
+33.+ “But since the last speaker has ventured to go back to ancient
times for his denunciations of the Macedonian royal family, I feel
it incumbent on me also to say a few words first on these points, to
remove the misconception of those who have been carried away by his
words.
[Sidenote: Sacred war, B.C. 357-346. Onomarchus killed near the gulf of
Pagasae, B.C. 352. See Diodor. 16, 32-35.]
[Sidenote: Philip elected generalissimo against Persia in the congress
of allies at Corinth, B.C. 338.]
“Chlaenaes said, then, that Philip son of Amyntas became master of
Thessaly by the ruin of Olynthus. But I conceive that not only the
Thessalians, but the other Greeks also, were preserved by Philip’s
means. For at the time when Onomarchus and Philomelus, in defiance
of religion and law seized Delphi and made themselves masters of the
treasury of the god, who is there among you who does not know that
they collected such a mighty force as no Greek dared any longer face?
Nay, along with this violation of religion, they were within an ace of
becoming lords of all Greece also. At that crisis Philip volunteered
his assistance; destroyed the tyrants, secured the temple, and became
the author of freedom to the Greeks, as is testified even to posterity
by the facts. For Philip was unanimously elected general-in-chief
by land and sea, not, as my opponent ventured to assert, as one who
had wronged Thessaly; but on the ground of his being a benefactor of
Greece: an honour which no one had previously obtained. 'Ay, but,’ he
says, 'Philip came with an armed force into Laconia.' Yes, but it was
not of his own choice, as you know: he reluctantly consented to do so,
after repeated invitations and appeals by the Peloponnesians, under
the name of their friend and ally. And when he did come, pray observe,
Chlaeneas, how he behaved. Though he could have availed himself of
the wishes of the neighbouring states for the destruction of these
men’s territory and the humiliation of their city, and have won much
gratitude too by his act, he by no means lent himself to such a policy;
but, by striking terror into the one and the other alike, he compelled
both parties to accommodate their differences in a congress, to the
common benefit of all: not putting himself forward as arbitrator of the
points in dispute, but appointing a joint board of arbitration selected
from all Greece. Is that a proceeding which deserves to be held up to
reproach and execration?
[Sidenote: Alexander’s services to Greece.]
+34.+ “Again, you bitterly denounced Alexander, because, when he
believed himself to be wronged, he punished Thebes: but of his having
exacted vengeance of the Persians for their outrages on all the Greeks
you made no mention at all, nor of his having released us all in common
from heavy miseries, by enslaving the barbarians, and depriving them
of the supplies which they used for the ruin of the Greeks,—sometimes
pitting the Athenians against the ancestors of these gentlemen here, at
another the Thebans; nor finally of his having subjected Asia to the
Greeks.
[Sidenote: The Diadochi.]
[Sidenote: The Aetolian policy.]
“As for Alexander’s successors how had you the audacity to mention
them? They were indeed, according to the circumstances of the time, on
many occasions the authors of good to some and of harm to others: for
which perhaps others might be allowed to bear them a grudge. But to
_you_ Aetolians it is in no circumstance open to do so,—you who have
never been the authors of anything good to any one, but of mischief
to many and on many occasions! Who was it that called in Antigonus
son of Demetrius to the partition of the Achaean league? Who was it
that made a sworn treaty with Alexander of Epirus for the enslaving
and dismembering of Acarnania? Was it not you? What nation ever sent
out military commanders duly accredited of the sort that you have? Men
that ventured to do violence to the sanctity of asylum itself! Timaeus
violated the sanctuary of Poseidon on Taenarum, and of Artemis at Lusi.
Pharylus and Polycritus plundered, the former the sacred enclosure of
Here in Argos, the latter that of Poseidon at Mantinea. What again
about Lattabus and Nicostratus? Did not they make a treacherous attack
on the assembly of the Pan-boeotians in time of peace, committing
outrages worthy of Scythians and Gauls? You will find no such crimes as
these committed by the Diadochi.
[Sidenote: B.C. 279.]
[Sidenote: Defeat and death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in the battle with the
Gauls, B.C. 280. See Pausan. 10, 19, 7.]
+35.+ “Not being able to say anything in defence of any of these acts,
you talk pompously about your having resisted the invasion of Delphi by
the barbarians, and allege that for this Greece ought to be grateful
to you. But if for this one service some gratitude is owing to the
Aetolians; what high honour do the Macedonians deserve, who throughout
nearly their whole lives are ceaselessly engaged in a struggle with
the barbarians for the safety of the Greeks? For that Greece would
have been continually involved in great dangers, if we had not had
the Macedonians and the ambition of their kings as a barrier, who is
ignorant? And there is a very striking proof of this. For no sooner had
the Gauls conceived a contempt for the Macedonians, by their victory
over Ptolemy Ceraunus, than, thinking the rest of no account, Brennus
promptly marched into the middle of Greece. And this would often have
happened if the Macedonians had not been on our frontiers.
“However, though I have much that I could say on the past, I think
this is enough. Of all the actions of Philip, they have selected his
destruction of the temple, to fasten the charge of impiety upon him.
They did not add a word about their own outrage and crime, which
they perpetrated in regard to the temples in Dium, and Dodona, and
the sacred enclosures of the gods. The speaker should have mentioned
this first. But anything you Aetolians have suffered you recount to
these gentlemen with exaggeration: but the things you have inflicted
unprovoked, though many times as numerous as the others, you pass over
in silence; because you know full well that everybody lays the blame
of acts of injustice and mischief on those who give the provocation by
unjust actions themselves.
+36.+ “Of Antigonus I will only make mention so far, as to avoid
appearing to despise what was done, or to treat as unimportant so great
an undertaking. For my part I think that history does not contain the
record of a more admirable service than that which Antigonus performed
for you: indeed it appears to me to be unsurpassable. And the following
facts will show this. Antigonus went to war with you and conquered
you in a pitched battle. By force of arms he became master of your
territory and city at once. He might have exercised all the rights of
war upon you: but he was so far from inflicting any hardships upon you,
that, besides other benefits, he expelled your tyrant and restored your
laws and ancestral constitution. In return for which, in the national
assemblies, calling the Greeks to witness your words, you proclaimed
Antigonus your benefactor and preserver.
“What then ought to have been your policy? I will speak what I really
think, gentlemen of Sparta: and you will I am sure bear with me. For
I shall do this now from no wish to go out of my way to bring railing
accusations against you, but under the pressure of circumstances, and
for the common good. What then am I to say? This: that both in the late
war you ought to have allied yourselves not with Aetolians but with
Macedonians; and now again, in answer to these invitations, you ought
to join Philip rather than the former people. But, it may be objected,
you will be breaking a treaty. Which will be the graver breach of right
on your part,—to neglect a private arrangement made with Aetolians, or
one that has been inscribed on a column and solemnly consecrated in
the sight of all Greece? On what ground are you so careful of breaking
faith with this people, from whom you have never received any favour,
while you pay no heed to Philip and the Macedonians, to whom you owe
even the very power of deliberating to-day? Do you regard it as a duty
to keep faith with friends? Yet it is not so much a point of conscience
to confirm written pledges of faith, as it is a violation of conscience
to go to war with those who preserved you: and this is what, in the
present instance, the Aetolians are come to demand of you.
+37.+ “Let it, however, be granted that what I have now said may in
the eyes of severe critics be regarded as beside the subject. I will
now return to the main point at issue, as they state it. It was this:
'If the circumstances are the same now as at the time when you made
alliance with the Aetolians, then your policy ought to remain on the
same lines.’ That was their first proposition. 'But if they have been
entirely changed, then it is fair that you should now deliberate on the
demands made to you as on a matter entirely new and unprejudiced.' I
ask you therefore, Cleonicus and Chlaeneas, who were your allies on the
former occasion when you invited this people to join you? Were they not
all the Greeks? But with whom are you now united, or to what kind of
federation are you now inviting this people? Is it not to one with the
foreigner? A mighty similarity exists, no doubt, in your minds, and no
diversity at all! _Then_ you were contending for glory and supremacy
with Achaeans and Macedonians, men of kindred blood with yourselves,
and with Philip their leader; _now_ a war of slavery is threatening
Greece against men of another race, whom you think to bring against
Philip, but have really unconsciously brought against yourselves and
all Greece. For just as men in the stress of war, by introducing into
their cities garrisons superior in strength to their own forces, while
successfully repelling all danger from the enemy, put themselves at the
mercy of their friends,—just so are the Aetolians acting in the present
case. For in their desire to conquer Philip and humble Macedonia, they
have unconsciously brought such a mighty cloud from the west, as for
the present perhaps will overshadow Macedonia first, but which in the
sequel will be the origin of heavy evils to all Greece.
[Sidenote: B.C. 492. Herod. 6, 48; 7, 133.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 480]
+38.+ “All Greeks indeed have need to be on the alert for the crisis
which is coming on: but Lacedaemonians above all. For why was it, do
you suppose, men of Sparta, that your ancestors, when Xerxes sent an
ambassador to your town demanding earth and water, thrust the man into
a well, and, throwing earth upon him, bade him take back word to Xerxes
that he had got from the Lacedaemonians what he had demanded from
them,—earth and water? Why was it again, do you suppose, that Leonidas
and his men started forth to a voluntary and certain death? Was it not
that they might have the glory of being the forlorn hope, not only of
their own freedom, but of that of all Greece also? And it would indeed
be a worthy action for descendants of such heroes as these to make a
league with the barbarians now, and to serve with them; and to war
against Epirotes, Achaeans, Acarnanians, Boeotians, Thessalians, and in
fact against nearly every Greek state except Aetolians! To these last
it is habitual to act thus: and to regard nothing as disgraceful, so
long only as it is accompanied by an opportunity of plunder. It is not
so, however, with you. And what must we expect these people to do, now
that they have obtained the support of the Roman alliance? For when
they obtained an accession of strength and support from the Illyrians,
they at once set about acts of piracy at sea, and treacherously seized
Pylus; while by land they stormed the city of Cleitor, and sold the
Cynethans into slavery. Once before they made a treaty with Antigonus,
as I said just now, for the destruction of the Achaean and Acarnanian
races; and now they have done the same with Rome for the destruction of
all Greece.
[Sidenote: Herod. 7, 132.]
+39.+ “With a knowledge of such transactions before his eyes who could
help suspecting an attack from Rome, and feeling abhorrence at the
abandoned conduct of the Aetolians in daring to make such a treaty?
They have already wrested Oeniadae and Nesus from the Acarnanians,
and recently seized the city of the unfortunate Anticyreans, whom, in
conjunction with the Romans, they have sold into slavery.[334] Their
children and women are led off by the Romans to suffer all the miseries
which those must expect who fall into the hands of aliens; while the
houses of the unhappy inhabitants are allotted among the Aetolians.
Surely a noble alliance this to join deliberately! Especially for
Lacedaemonians: who, after conquering the barbarians, decreed that the
Thebans, for being the only Greeks that resolved to remain neutral
during the Persian invasion, should pay a tenth of their goods to the
gods.