BOOK VI

PREFACE

+1.+ I am aware that some will be at a loss to account for my

interrupting the course of my narrative for the sake of entering upon

the following disquisition on the Roman constitution. But I think

that I have already in many passages made it fully evident that this

particular branch of my work was one of the necessities imposed on

me by the nature of my original design; and I pointed this out with

special clearness in the preface which explained the scope of my

history. I there stated that the feature of my work which was at once

the best in itself, and the most instructive to the students of it, was

that it would enable them to know and fully realise in what manner, and

under what kind of constitution, it came about that nearly the whole

world fell under the power of Rome in somewhat less than fifty-three

years,—an event certainly without precedent. This being my settled

purpose, I could see no more fitting period than the present for making

a pause, and examining the truth of the remarks about to be made on

this constitution. In private life if you wish to satisfy yourself as

to the badness or goodness of particular persons, you would not, if

you wish to get a genuine test, examine their conduct at a time of

uneventful repose, but in the hour of brilliant success or conspicuous

reverse. For the true test of a perfect man is the power of bearing

with spirit and dignity violent changes of fortune. An examination

of a constitution should be conducted in the same way: and therefore

being unable to find in our day a more rapid or more signal change

than that which has happened to Rome, I reserved my disquistion on its

constitution for this place....

What is really educational and beneficial to students of history is

the clear view of the causes of events, and the consequent power of

choosing the better policy in a particular case. Now in every practical

undertaking by a state we must regard as the most powerful agent for

success or failure the form of its constitution; for from this as from

a fountain-head all conceptions and plans of action not only proceed,

but attain their consummation.[289]...

* * * * *

+3.+ Of the Greek republics, which have again and again risen to

greatness and fallen into insignificance, it is not difficult to speak,

whether we recount their past history or venture an opinion on their

future. For to report what is already known is an easy task, nor is it

hard to guess what is to come from our knowledge of what has been. But

in regard to the Romans it is neither an easy matter to describe their

present state, owing to the complexity of their constitution; nor to

speak with confidence of their future, from our inadequate acquaintance

with their peculiar institutions in the past whether affecting their

public or their private life. It will require then no ordinary

attention and study to get a clear and comprehensive conception of the

distinctive features of this constitution.

[Sidenote: Classification of polities.]

Now, it is undoubtedly the case that most of those who profess to give

us authoritative instruction on this subject distinguish three kinds

of constitutions, which they designate _kingship_, _aristocracy_,

_democracy_. But in my opinion the question might fairly be put to

them, whether they name these as being the _only_ ones, or as the

_best_. In either case I think they are wrong. For it is plain that

we must regard as the _best_ constitution that which partakes of all

these three elements. And this is no mere assertion, but has been

proved by the example of Lycurgus, who was the first to construct a

constitution—that of Sparta—on this principle. Nor can we admit that

these are the _only_ forms: for we have had before now examples of

absolute and tyrannical forms of government, which, while differing as

widely as possible from kingship, yet appear to have some points of

resemblance to it; on which account all absolute rulers falsely assume

and use, as far as they can, the title of king. Again there have been

many instances of oligarchical governments having in appearance some

analogy to aristocracies, which are, if I may say so, as different from

them as it is possible to be. The same also holds good about democracy.

[Sidenote: Six forms of polity, and their natural cycle.]

+4.+ I will illustrate the truth of what I say. We cannot hold every

absolute government to be a kingship, but only that which is accepted

voluntarily, and is directed by an appeal to reason rather than to

fear and force. Nor again is every oligarchy to be regarded as an

aristocracy; the latter exists only where the power is wielded by the

justest and wisest men selected on their merits. Similarly, it is not

enough to constitute a democracy that the whole crowd of citizens

should have the right to do whatever they wish or propose. But where

reverence to the gods, succour of parents, respect to elders, obedience

to laws, are traditional and habitual, in such communities, if the

will of the majority prevail, we may speak of the form of government

as a democracy. So then we enumerate six forms of government,—the

three commonly spoken of which I have just mentioned, and three more

allied forms, I mean _despotism_, _oligarchy_ and _mob-rule_. The

first of these arises without artificial aid and in the natural order

of events. Next to this, and produced from it by the aid of art and

adjustment, comes _kingship_; which degenerating into the evil form

allied to it, by which I mean _tyranny_, both are once more destroyed

and _aristocracy_ produced. Again the latter being in the course of

nature perverted to _oligarchy_, and the people passionately avenging

the unjust acts of their rulers, _democracy_ comes into existence;

which again by its violence and contempt of law becomes sheer

_mob-rule_.[290] No clearer proof of the truth of what I say could be

obtained than by a careful observation of the natural origin, genesis,

and decadence of these several forms of government. For it is only by

seeing distinctly how each of them is produced that a distinct view

can also be obtained of its growth, zenith, and decadence, and the

time, circumstance, and place in which each of these may be expected to

recur. This method I have assumed to be especially applicable to the

Roman constitution, because its origin and growth have from the first

followed natural causes.

+5.+ Now the natural laws which regulate the merging of one form of

government into another are perhaps discussed with greater accuracy

by Plato and some other philosophers. But their treatment, from its

intricacy and exhaustiveness, is only within the capacity of a few. I

will therefore endeavour to give a summary of the subject, just so far

as I suppose it to fall within the scope of a practical history and the

intelligence of ordinary people. For if my exposition appear in any way

inadequate, owing to the general terms in which it is expressed, the

details contained in what is immediately to follow will amply atone for

what is left for the present unsolved.

[Sidenote: The origin of the social compact.]

What is the origin then of a constitution, and whence is it produced?

Suppose that from floods, pestilences, failure of crops, or some such

causes the race of man is reduced almost to extinction. Such things

we are told have happened, and it is reasonable to think will happen

again. Suppose accordingly all knowledge of social habits and arts

to have been lost. Suppose that from the survivors, as from seeds,

the race of man to have again multiplied. In that case I presume they

would, like the animals, herd together; for it is but reasonable to

suppose that bodily weakness would induce them to seek those of their

own kind to herd with. And in that case too, as with the animals,

he who was superior to the rest in strength of body or courage of

soul would lead and rule them. For what we see happen in the case of

animals that are without the faculty of reason, such as bulls, goats,

and cocks,—among whom there can be no dispute that the strongest take

the lead,—that we must regard as in the truest sense the teaching of

nature. Originally then it is probable that the condition of life among

men was this,—herding together like animals and following the strongest

and bravest as leaders. The limit of this authority would be physical

strength, and the name we should give it would be despotism. But as

soon as the idea of family ties and social relation has arisen amongst

such agglomerations of men, then is born also the idea of kingship, and

then for the first time mankind conceives the notion of goodness and

justice and their reverse.

[Sidenote: Origin of morality.]

[Sidenote: which transmutes despotism into kingship,]

+6.+ The way in which such conceptions originate and come into

existence is this. The intercourse of the sexes is an instinct of

nature, and the result is the birth of children. Now, if any one of

these children who have been brought up, when arrived at maturity,

is ungrateful and makes no return to those by whom he was nurtured,

but on the contrary presumes to injure them by word and deed, it is

plain that he will probably offend and annoy such as are present, and

have seen the care and trouble bestowed by the parents on the nurture

and bringing up of their children. For seeing that men differ from

the other animals in being the only creatures possessed of reasoning

powers, it is clear that such a difference of conduct is not likely

to escape their observation; but that they will remark it when it

occurs, and express their displeasure on the spot: because they will

have an eye to the future, and will reason on the likelihood of the

same occurring to each of themselves. Again, if a man has been rescued

or helped in an hour of danger, and, instead of showing gratitude to

his preserver, seeks to do him harm, it is clearly probable that the

rest will be displeased and offended with him, when they know it:

sympathising with their neighbour and imagining themselves in his case.

Hence arises a notion in every breast of the meaning and theory of

duty, which is in fact the beginning and end of justice. Similarly,

again, when any one man stands out as the champion of all in a time of

danger, and braves with firm courage the onslaught of the most powerful

wild beasts, it is probable that such a man would meet with marks of

favour and pre-eminence from the common people; while he who acted in

a contrary way would fall under their contempt and dislike. From this,

once more, it is reasonable to suppose that there would arise in the

minds of the multitude a theory of the disgraceful and the honourable,

and of the difference between them; and that one should be sought and

imitated for its advantages, the other shunned. When, therefore, the

leading and most powerful man among his people ever encourages such

persons in accordance with the popular sentiment, and thereby assumes

in the eyes of his subject the appearance of being the distributor to

each man according to his deserts, they no longer obey him and support

his rule from fear of violence, but rather from conviction of its

utility, however old he may be, rallying round him with one heart and

soul, and fighting against all who form designs against his government.

In this way he becomes a _king_ instead of a _despot_ by imperceptible

degrees, reason having ousted brute courage and bodily strength from

their supremacy.

[Sidenote: which in its turn degenerates into tyranny.]

+7.+ This then is the natural process of formation among mankind of the

notion of goodness and justice, and their opposites; and this is the

origin and genesis of genuine kingship; for people do not only keep up

the government of such men personally, but for their descendants also

for many generations; from the conviction that those who are born from

and educated by men of this kind will have principles also like theirs.

But if they subsequently become displeased with their descendants, they

do not any longer decide their choice of rulers and kings by their

physical strength or brute courage; but by the differences of their

intellectual and reasoning faculties, from practical experience of the

decisive importance of such a distinction. In old times, then, those

who were once thus selected, and obtained this office, grew old in

their royal functions, making magnificent strongholds and surrounding

them with walls and extending their frontiers, partly for the security

of their subjects, and partly to provide them with abundance of the

necessaries of life; and while engaged in these works they were exempt

from all vituperation or jealousy; because they did not make their

distinctive dress, food, or drink, at all conspicuous, but lived very

much like the rest, and joined in the everyday employments of the

common people. But when their royal power became hereditary in their

family, and they found every necessary for security ready to their

hands, as well as more than was necessary for their personal support,

then they gave the rein to their appetites; imagined that rulers must

needs wear different clothes from those of subjects; have different and

elaborate luxuries of the table; and must even seek sensual indulgence,

however unlawful the source, without fear of denial. These things

having given rise in the one case to jealousy and offence, in the other

to outburst of hatred and passionate resentment, the kingship became a

tyranny; the first step in disintegration was taken; and plots began to

be formed against the government, which did not now proceed from the

worst men but from the noblest, most high-minded, and most courageous,

because these are the men who can least submit to the tyrannical acts

of their rulers.

[Sidenote: Tyranny is then displaced by aristocracy,]

[Sidenote: which degenerates into oligarchy,]

+8.+ But as soon as the people got leaders, they co-operated with

them against the dynasty for the reasons I have mentioned; and

then _kingship_ and _despotism_ were alike entirely abolished, and

_aristocracy_ once more began to revive and start afresh. For in

their immediate gratitude to those who had deposed the despots, the

people employed them as leaders, and entrusted their interests to

them; who, looking upon this charge at first as a great privilege,

made the public advantage their chief concern, and conducted all kinds

of business, public or private, with diligence and caution. But when

the sons of these men received the same position of authority from

their fathers,—having had no experience of misfortunes, and none at

all of civil equality and freedom of speech, but having been bred up

from the first under the shadow of their fathers’ authority and lofty

position,—some of them gave themselves up with passion to avarice

and unscrupulous love of money, others to drinking and the boundless

debaucheries which accompanies it, and others to the violation of

women or the forcible appropriation of boys; and so they turned an

_aristocracy_ into an _oligarchy_. But it was not long before they

roused in the minds of the people the same feelings as before; and

their fall therefore was very like the disaster which befell the

tyrants.

[Sidenote: which is replaced by democracy,]

[Sidenote: which degenerates into rule of corruption and violence, only

to be stopped by a return to despotism.]

+9.+ For no sooner had the knowledge of the jealousy and hatred

existing in the citizens against them emboldened some one to oppose

the government by word or deed, than he was sure to find the whole

people ready and prepared to take his side. Having then got rid of

these rulers by assassination or exile, they do not venture to set up

a king again, being still in terror of the injustice to which this led

before; nor dare they intrust the common interests again to more than

one, considering the recent example of their misconduct: and therefore,

as the only sound hope left them is that which depends upon themselves,

they are driven to take refuge in that; and so changed the constitution

from an oligarchy to a _democracy_, and took upon themselves the

superintendence and charge of the state. And as long as any survive

who have had experience of oligarchical supremacy and domination, they

regard their present constitution as a blessing, and hold equality and

freedom as of the utmost value. But as soon as a new generation has

arisen, and the democracy has descended to their children’s children,

long association weakens their value for equality and freedom, and

some seek to become more powerful than the ordinary citizens; and the

most liable to this temptation are the rich. So when they begin to

be fond of office, and find themselves unable to obtain it by their

own unassisted efforts and their own merits, they ruin their estates,

while enticing and corrupting the common people in every possible way.

By which means when, in their senseless mania for reputation, they

have made the populace ready and greedy to receive bribes, the virtue

of democracy is destroyed, and it is transformed into a government

of violence and the strong hand. For the mob, habituated to feed at

the expense of others, and to have its hopes of a livelihood in the

property of its neighbours, as soon as it has got a leader sufficiently

ambitious and daring, being excluded by poverty from the sweets of

civil honours, produces a reign of mere violence. Then come tumultuous

assemblies, massacres, banishments, redivisions of land; until, after

losing all trace of civilisation, it has once more found a master and a

despot.

This is the regular cycle of constitutional revolutions, and the

natural order in which constitutions change, are transformed, and

return again to their original stage. If a man have a clear grasp of

these principles he may perhaps make a mistake as to the dates at

which this or that will happen to a particular constitution; but he

will rarely be entirely mistaken as to the stage of growth or decay

at which it has arrived, or as to the point at which it will undergo

some revolutionary change. However, it is in the case of the Roman

constitution that this method of inquiry will most fully teach us its

formation, its growth, and zenith, as well as the changes awaiting it

in the future; for this, if any constitution ever did, owed, as I said

just now, its original foundation and growth to natural causes, and to

natural causes will owe its decay. My subsequent narrative will be the

best illustration of what I say.

[Sidenote: Lycurgus recognized these truths, and legislated

accordingly.]

+10.+ For the present I will make a brief reference to the legislation

of Lycurgus: for such a discussion is not at all alien to my subject.

That statesman was fully aware that all those changes which I have

enumerated come about by an undeviating law of nature; and reflected

that every form of government that was unmixed, and rested on one

species of power, was unstable; because it was swiftly perverted

into that particular form of evil peculiar to it and inherent in

its nature. For just as rust is the natural dissolvent of iron,

wood-worms and grubs to timber, by which they are destroyed without

any external injury, but by that which is engendered in themselves;

so in each constitution there is naturally engendered a particular

vice inseparable from it: in kingship it is absolutism; aristocracy

it is oligarchy; in democracy lawless ferocity and violence; and to

these vicious states all these forms of government are, as I have

lately shown, inevitably transformed. Lycurgus, I say, saw all this,

and accordingly combined together all the excellences and distinctive

features of the best constitutions, that no part should become unduly

predominant, and be perverted into its kindred vice; and that, each

power being checked by the others, no one part should turn the scale

or decisively out-balance the others; but that, by being accurately

adjusted and in exact equilibrium, the whole might remain long steady

like a ship sailing close to the wind. The royal power was prevented

from growing insolent by fear of the people, which had also assigned to

it an adequate share in the constitution. The people in their turn were

restrained from a bold contempt of the kings by fear of the Gerusia:

the members of which, being selected on grounds of merit, were certain

to throw their influence on the side of justice in every question that

arose; and thus the party placed at a disadvantage by its conservative

tendency was always strengthened and supported by the weight and

influence of the Gerusia. The result of this combination has been that

the Lacedaemonians retained their freedom for the longest period of any

people with which we are acquainted.

Lycurgus however established his constitution without the discipline of

adversity, because he was able to foresee by the light of reason the

course which events naturally take and the source from which they come.

But though the Romans have arrived at the same result in framing their

commonwealth, they have not done so by means of abstract reasoning, but

through many struggles and difficulties, and by continually adopting

reforms from knowledge gained in disaster. The result has been a

constitution like that of Lycurgus, and the best of any existing in my

time....

* * * * *

+11.+ I have given an account of the constitution of Lycurgus, I

will now endeavour to describe that of Rome at the period of their

disastrous defeat at Cannae.

[Sidenote: The Roman constitution at the epoch of Cannae, B.C. 216.]

I am fully conscious that to those who actually live under this

constitution I shall appear to give an inadequate account of it by

the omission of certain details. Knowing accurately every portion

of it from personal experience, and from having been bred up in its

customs and laws from childhood, they will not be struck so much by

the accuracy of the description, as annoyed by its omissions; nor will

they believe that the historian has purposely omitted unimportant

distinctions, but will attribute his silence upon the origin of

existing institutions or other important facts to ignorance. What is

told they depreciate as insignificant or beside the purpose; what is

omitted they desiderate as vital to the question: their object being

to appear to know more than the writers. But a good critic should not

judge a writer by what he leaves unsaid, but from what he says: if

he detects misstatement in the latter, he may then feel certain that

ignorance accounts for the former; but if what he says is accurate,

his omissions ought to be attributed to deliberate judgment and not to

ignorance. So much for those whose criticisms are prompted by personal

ambition rather than by justice....

Another requisite for obtaining a judicious approval for an historical

disquisition, is that it should be germane to the matter in hand; if

this is not observed, though its style may be excellent and its matter

irreproachable, it will seem out of place, and disgust rather than

please....

[Sidenote: Triple element in the Roman Constitution.]

As for the Roman constitution, it had three elements, each of them

possessing sovereign powers: and their respective share of power in

the whole state had been regulated with such a scrupulous regard to

equality and equilibrium, that no one could say for certain, not even

a native, whether the constitution as a whole were an aristocracy

or democracy or despotism. And no wonder: for if we confine our

observation to the power of the Consuls we should be inclined to regard

it as despotic; if on that of the Senate, as aristocratic; and if

finally one looks at the power possessed by the people it would seem a

clear case of a democracy. What the exact powers of these several parts

were, and still, with slight modifications, are, I will now state.

[Sidenote: The Consuls.]

+12.+ The Consuls, before leading out the legions, remain in Rome and

are supreme masters of the administration. All other magistrates,

except the Tribunes, are under them and take their orders. They

introduce foreign ambassadors to the Senate; bring matters requiring

deliberation before it; and see to the execution of its decrees. If,

again, there are any matters of state which require the authorisation

of the people, it is their business to see to them, to summon the

popular meetings, to bring the proposals before them, and to carry out

the decrees of the majority. In the preparations for war also, and in

a word in the entire administration of a campaign, they have all but

absolute power. It is competent to them to impose on the allies such

levies as they think good, to appoint the Military Tribunes, to make

up the roll for soldiers and select those that are suitable. Besides

they have absolute power of inflicting punishment on all who are under

their command while on active service and they have authority to expend

as much of the public money as they choose, being accompanied by a

quaestor who is entirely at their orders. A survey of these powers

would in fact justify our describing the constitution as despotic,—a

clear case of royal government. Nor will it affect the truth of my

description, if any of the institutions I have described are changed in

our time, or in that of our posterity: and the same remarks apply to

what follows.

[Sidenote: The Senate.]

+13.+ The Senate has first of all the control of the treasury, and

regulates the receipts and disbursements alike. For the Quaestors

cannot issue any public money for the various departments of the state

without a decree of the Senate, except for the service of the Consuls.

The Senate controls also what is by far the largest and most important

expenditure, that, namely, which is made by the censors every _lustrum_

for the repair or construction of public buildings; this money cannot

be obtained by the censors except by the grant of the Senate. Similarly

all crimes committed in Italy requiring a public investigation, such

as treason, conspiracy, poisoning, or wilful murder, are in the hands

of the Senate. Besides, if any individual or state among the Italian

allies requires a controversy to be settled, a penalty to be assessed,

help or protection to be afforded,—all this is the province of the

Senate. Or again, outside Italy, if it is necessary to send an embassy

to reconcile warring communities, or to remind them of their duty,

or sometimes to impose requisitions upon them, or to receive their

submission, or finally to proclaim war against them,—this too is the

business of the Senate. In like manner the reception to be given to

foreign ambassadors in Rome, and the answers to be returned to them,

are decided by the Senate. With such business the people have nothing

to do. Consequently, if one were staying at Rome when the Consuls

were not in town, one would imagine the constitution to be a complete

aristocracy: and this has been the idea entertained by many Greeks, and

by many kings as well, from the fact that nearly all the business they

had with Rome was settled by the Senate.

[Sidenote: The people.]

+14.+ After this one would naturally be inclined to ask what part

is left for the people in the constitution, when the Senate has

these various functions, especially the control of the receipts and

expenditure of the exchequer; and when the Consuls, again, have

absolute power over the details of military preparation, and an

absolute authority in the field? There is, however, a part left the

people, and it is a most important one. For the people is the sole

fountain of honour and of punishment; and it is by these two things

and these alone that dynasties and constitutions and, in a word, human

society are held together: for where the distinction between them is

not sharply drawn both in theory and practice, there no undertaking

can be properly administered,—as indeed we might expect when good and

bad are held in exactly the same honour. The people then are the only

court to decide matters of life and death; and even in cases where the

penalty is money, if the sum to be assessed is sufficiently serious,

and especially when the accused have held the higher magistracies. And

in regard to this arrangement there is one point deserving especial

commendation and record. Men who are on trial for their lives at

Rome, while sentence is in process of being voted,—if even only one

of the tribes whose votes are needed to ratify the sentence has not

voted,—have the privilege at Rome of openly departing and condemning

themselves to a voluntary exile. Such men are safe at Naples or

Praeneste or at Tibur, and at other towns with which this arrangement

has been duly ratified on oath.

Again, it is the people who bestow offices on the deserving, which

are the most honourable rewards of virtue. It has also the absolute

power of passing or repealing laws; and, most important of all, it is

the people who deliberate on the question of peace or war. And when

provisional terms are made for alliance, suspension of hostilities, or

treaties, it is the people who ratify them or the reverse.

These considerations again would lead one to say that the chief

power in the state was the people’s, and that the constitution was a

democracy.

[Sidenote: The mutual relation of the three.]

+15.+ Such, then, is the distribution of power between the several

parts of the state. I must now show how each of these several parts

can, when they choose, oppose or support each other.

[Sidenote: The Consul dependent on the Senate,]

The Consul, then, when he has started on an expedition with the powers

I have described, is to all appearance absolute in the administration

of the business in hand; still he has need of the support both of

people and Senate, and, without them, is quite unable to bring the

matter to a successful conclusion. For it is plain that he must have

supplies sent to his legions from time to time; but without a decree

of the Senate they can be supplied neither with corn, nor clothes,

nor pay, so that all the plans of a commander must be futile, if the

Senate is resolved either to shrink from danger or hamper his plans.

And again, whether a Consul shall bring any undertaking to a conclusion

or no depends entirely upon the Senate: for it has absolute authority

at the end of a year to send another Consul to supersede him, or to

continue the existing one in his command. Again, even to the successes

of the generals the Senate has the power to add distinction and glory,

and on the other hand to obscure their merits and lower their credit.

For these high achievements are brought in tangible form before the

eyes of the citizens by what are called “triumphs.”

[Sidenote: and on the people.]

But these triumphs the commanders cannot celebrate with proper pomp, or

in some cases celebrate at all, unless the Senate concurs and grants

the necessary money. As for the people, the Consuls are pre-eminently

obliged to court their favour, however distant from home may be the

field of their operations; for it is the people, as I have said before,

that ratifies, or refuses to ratify, terms of peace and treaties; but

most of all because when laying down their office they have to give an

account[291] of their administration before it. Therefore in no case is

it safe for the Consuls to neglect either the Senate or the goodwill of

the people.

[Sidenote: The Senate controlled by the people.]

+16.+ As for the Senate, which possesses the immense power I have

described, in the first place it is obliged in public affairs to take

the multitude into account, and respect the wishes of the people; and

it cannot put into execution the penalty for offences against the

republic, which are punishable with death, unless the people first

ratify its decrees. Similarly even in matters which directly affect the

senators,—for instance, in the case of a law diminishing the Senate’s

traditional authority, or depriving senators of certain dignities and

offices, or even actually cutting down their property,—even in such

cases the people have the sole power of passing or rejecting the law.

But most important of all is the fact that, if the Tribunes interpose

their veto, the Senate not only are unable to pass a decree, but cannot

even hold a meeting at all, whether formal or informal. Now, the

Tribunes are always bound to carry out the decree of the people, and

above all things to have regard to their wishes: therefore, for all

these reasons the Senate stands in awe of the multitude, and cannot

neglect the feelings of the people.

[Sidenote: The people dependent on the Senate]

[Sidenote: and Consul.]

+17.+ In like manner the people on its part is far from being

independent of the Senate, and is bound to take its wishes into account

both collectively and individually. For contracts, too numerous

to count, are given out by the censors in all parts of Italy for

the repairs or construction of public buildings; there is also the

collection of revenue from many rivers, harbours, gardens, mines, and

land—everything, in a word, that comes under the control of the Roman

government: and in all these the people at large are engaged; so that

there is scarcely a man, so to speak, who is not interested either as

a contractor or as being employed in the works. For some purchase the

contracts from the censors for themselves; and others go partners with

them; while others again go security for these contractors, or actually

pledge their property to the treasury for them. Now over all these

transactions the Senate has absolute control. It can grant an extension

of time; and in case of unforeseen accident can relieve the contractors

from a portion of their obligation, or release them from it altogether,

if they are absolutely unable to fulfil it. And there are many details

in which the Senate can inflict great hardships, or, on the other hand,

grant great indulgences to the contractors: for in every case the

appeal is to it. But the most important point of all is that the judges

are taken from its members in the majority of trials, whether public

or private, in which the charges are heavy.[292] Consequently, all

citizens are much at its mercy; and being alarmed at the uncertainty as

to when they may need its aid, are cautious about resisting or actively

opposing its will. And for a similar reason men do not rashly resist

the wishes of the Consuls, because one and all may become subject to

their absolute authority on a campaign.

+18.+ The result of this power of the several estates for mutual

help or harm is a union sufficiently firm for all emergencies, and a

constitution than which it is impossible to find a better. For whenever

any danger from without compels them to unite and work together,

the strength which is developed by the State is so extraordinary,

that everything required is unfailingly carried out by the eager

rivalry shown by all classes to devote their whole minds to the need

of the hour, and to secure that any determination come to should

not fail for want of promptitude; while each individual works,

privately and publicly alike, for the accomplishment of the business

in hand. Accordingly, the peculiar constitution of the State makes

it irresistible, and certain of obtaining whatever it determines to

attempt. Nay, even when these external alarms are past, and the people

are enjoying their good fortune and the fruits of their victories, and,

as usually happens, growing corrupted by flattery and idleness, show

a tendency to violence and arrogance,—it is in these circumstances,

more than ever, that the constitution is seen to possess within itself

the power of correcting abuses. For when any one of the three classes

becomes puffed up, and manifests an inclination to be contentious

and unduly encroaching, the mutual interdependency of all the three,

and the possibility of the pretensions of any one being checked and

thwarted by the others, must plainly check this tendency: and so the

proper equilibrium is maintained by the impulsiveness of the one part

being checked by its fear of the other....

ON THE ROMAN ARMY

+19.+ After electing the Consuls they proceed to elect military

tribunes,—fourteen from those who had five years', and ten from those

who had ten years', service. All citizens must serve ten years in the

cavalry or twenty years in the infantry before the forty-sixth year of

their age, except those rated below four hundred asses. The latter are

employed in the navy; but if any great public necessity arises they

are obliged to serve as infantry also for twenty campaigns: and no one

can hold an office in the state until he has completed ten years of

military service....

[Sidenote: The levy.]

When the Consuls are about to enrol the army they give public notice

of the day on which all Roman citizens of military age must appear.

This is done every year. When the day has arrived, and the citizens fit

for service are come to Rome and have assembled on the Capitoline, the

fourteen junior tribunes divide themselves, in the order in which they

were appointed by the people or by the Imperators, into four divisions,

because the primary division of the forces thus raised is into four

legions. The four tribunes first appointed are assigned to the legion

called the 1st; the next three to the 2d; the next four to the 3d; and

the three last to the 4th. Of the ten senior tribunes, the two first

are assigned to the 1st legion; the next three to the 2d; the two next

to the 3d; and the three last to the 4th.

+20.+ This division and assignment of the tribunes having been settled

in such a way that all four legions have an equal number of officers,

the tribunes of the several legions take up a separate position and

draw lots for the tribes one by one; and summon the tribe on whom it

from time to time falls. From this tribe they select four young men

as nearly like each other in age and physical strength as possible.

These four are brought forward, and the tribunes of the first legion

picks out one of them, those of the second another, those of the third

another, and the fourth has to take the last. When the next four are

selected the tribunes of the second legion have the first choice, and

those of the first the last. With the next four the tribunes of the

third legion have the first choice, those of the second the last; and

so on in regular rotation: of which the result is that each legion

gets men of much the same standard. But when they have selected the

number prescribed,—which is four thousand two hundred infantry for each

legion, or at times of special danger five thousand,—they next used to

pass men for the cavalry, in old times _after_ the four thousand two

hundred infantry; but now they do it before them, the selection having

been made by the censor on the basis of wealth; and they enrol three

hundred for each legion.[293]

+21.+ The roll having been completed in this manner, the tribunes

belonging to the several legions muster their men; and selecting one

of the whole body that they think most suitable for the purpose, they

cause him to take an oath that he will obey his officers and do their

orders to the best of his ability. And all the others come up and take

the oath separately, merely affirming that they will do the same as the

first man.

At the same time the Consuls send orders to the magistrates of the

allied cities in Italy, from which they determine that allied troops

are to serve: declaring the number required, and the day and place at

which the men selected must appear. The cities then enrol their troops

with much the same ceremonies as to selection and administration of the

oath, and appoint a commander and a paymaster.[294]

[Sidenote: Fourfold division of the Legionaries.]

The Military Tribunes at Rome, after the administering of the oath

to their men, and giving out the day and place at which they are to

appear without arms, for the present dismiss them. When they arrive on

the appointed day, they first select the youngest and poorest to form

the _Velites_, the next to them the _Hastati_, while those who are in

the prime of life they select as _Principes_, and the oldest of all as

_Triarii_. For in the Roman army these divisions, distinct not only

as to their ages and nomenclature, but also as to the manner in which

they are armed, exist in each legion. The division is made in such

proportions that the senior men, called _Triarii_, should number six

hundred, the _Principes_ twelve hundred, the _Hastati_ twelve hundred,

and that all the rest as the youngest should be reckoned among the

_Velites_. And if the whole number of the legion is more than four

thousand, they vary the numbers of these divisions proportionally,

except those of the _Triarii_, which is always the same.

[Sidenote: 1. Arms of the _Velites_.]

+22.+ The youngest soldiers or _Velites_ are ordered to carry a sword,

spears, and target (_parma_). The target is strongly made, and large

enough to protect the man; being round, with a diameter of three feet.

Each man also wears a head-piece without a crest (_galea_); which he

sometimes covers with a piece of wolf’s skin or something of that kind,

for the sake both of protection and identification; that the officers

of his company may be able to observe whether he shows courage or the

reverse on confronting dangers. The spear of the velites has a wooden

haft of about two cubits, and about a finger’s breadth in thickness;

its head is a span long, hammered fine, and sharpened to such an extent

that it becomes bent the first time it strikes, and cannot be used by

the enemy to hurl back; otherwise the weapon would be available for

both sides alike.

[Sidenote: 2. Arms of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and _Triarii_.]

The second rank, the _Hastati_, are ordered to have the complete

panoply. This to a Roman means, first, a large shield (_scutum_), the

surface of which is curved outwards, its breadth two and a half feet,

its length four feet,—though there is also an extra sized shield in

which these measures are increased by a palm’s breadth. It consists

of two layers of wood fastened together with bull’s-hide glue; the

outer surface of which is first covered with canvas, then with calf’s

skin, on the upper and lower edges it is bound with iron to resist

the downward strokes of the sword, and the wear of resting upon the

ground. Upon it also is fixed an iron boss (_umbo_), to resist the more

formidable blows of stones and pikes, and of heavy missiles generally.

With the shield they also carry a sword (_gladius_) hanging down by

their right thigh, which is called a Spanish sword.[295] It has an

excellent point, and can deal a formidable blow with either edge,

because its blade is stout and unbending. In addition to these they

have two _pila_, a brass helmet, and greaves (_ocreae_). Some of the

_pila_ are thick, some fine. Of the thicker, some are round with the

diameter of a palm’s length, others are a palm square. The fine pila

are like moderate sized hunting spears, and they are carried along with

the former sort. The wooden haft of them all is about three cubits

long; and the iron head fixed to each half is barbed, and of the same

length as the haft. They take extraordinary pains to attach the head

to the haft firmly; they make the fastening of the one to the other

so secure for use by binding it half way up the wood, and riveting

it with a series of clasps, that the iron breaks sooner than this

fastening comes loose, although its thickness at the socket and where

it is fastened to the wood is a finger and a half’s breadth. Besides

these each man is decorated with a plume of feathers, with three purple

or black feathers standing upright, about a cubit long. The effect of

these being placed on the helmet, combined with the rest of the armour,

is to give the man the appearance of being twice his real height, and

to give him a noble aspect calculated to strike terror into the enemy.

The common soldiers also receive a brass plate, a span square, which

they put upon their breast and call a breastpiece (_pectorale_), and so

complete their panoply. Those who are rated above a hundred thousand

asses, instead of these breastpieces wear, with the rest of their

armour, coats of mail (_loricae_). The Principes and Triarii are armed

in the same way as the _Hastati_, except that instead of _pila_ they

carry long spears (_hastae_).

[Sidenote: Election of Centurions.]

+24.+ The _Principes_, _Hastati_, and _Triarii_, each elect ten

centurions according to merit, and then a second ten each. All these

sixty have the title of centurion alike, of whom the first man chosen

is a member of the council of war. And they in their turn select a

rear-rank officer each who is called _optio_. Next, in conjunction with

the centurions, they divide the several orders (omitting the _Velites_)

into ten companies each, and appoint to each company two centurions

and two _optiones_; the _Velites_ are divided equally among all the

companies; these companies are called orders (_ordines_) or maniples

(_manipuli_), or vexilla, and their officers are called centurions or

_ordinum ductores_.[296] Each maniple selects two of their strongest

and best born men as standard-bearers (_vexillarii_). And that each

maniple should have two commanding officers is only reasonable; for

it being impossible to know what a commander may be doing or what

may happen to him, and necessities of war admitting of no parleying,

they are anxious that the maniple may never be without a leader and

commander.

When the two centurions are both on the field, the first elected

commands the right of the maniple, the second the left: if both are not

there, the one who is commands the whole. And they wish the centurions

not to be so much bold and adventurous, as men with a faculty for

command, steady, and of a profound rather than a showy spirit; not

prone to engage wantonly or be unnecessarily forward in giving battle;

but such as in the face of superior numbers and overwhelming pressure

will die in defence of their post.

[Sidenote: Officers and arms of the equites.]

+25.+ Similarly they divide the cavalry into ten squadrons (_turmae_),

and from each they select three officers (_decuriones_), who each

select a subaltern (_optio_). The decurio first elected commands the

squadron, the other two have the rank of _decuriones_: a name indeed

which applies to all alike. If the first _decurio_ is not on the

field, the second takes command of the squadron. The armour of the

cavalry is very like that in Greece. In old times they did not wear

the lorica, but fought in their tunics (_campestria_); the result of

which was that they were prompt and nimble at dismounting and mounting

again with despatch, but were in great danger at close quarters from

the unprotected state of their bodies. And their lances too were

useless in two ways: first because they were thin, and prevented

their taking a good aim; and before they could get the head fixed in

the enemy, the lances were so shaken by the mere motion of the horse

that they generally broke. Secondly, because, having no spike at the

butt end of their lance, they only had one stroke, namely that with

the spear-head; and if the lance broke, what was left in their hands

was entirely useless. Again they used to have shields of bull’s hide,

just like those round cakes, with a knob in the middle which are used

at sacrifices, which were useless at close quarters because they were

flexible rather than firm; and, when their leather shrunk and rotted

from the rain, unserviceable as they were before, they then became

entirely so. Wherefore, as experience showed them the uselessness of

these, they lost no time in changing to the Greek fashion of arms: the

advantages of which were, first, that men were able to deliver the

first stroke of their lance-head with a good aim and effect, because

the shaft from the nature of its construction was steady and not

quivering; and, secondly, that they were able, by reversing the lance,

to use the spike at the butt-end for a steady and effective blow. And

the same may be said about the Greek shields: for, whether used to

ward off a blow or to thrust against the enemy, they neither give nor

bend. When the Romans learnt these facts about the Greek arms they were

not long in copying them; for no nation has ever surpassed them in

readiness to adopt new fashions from other people, and to imitate what

they see is better in others than themselves.

[Sidenote: Assembly of the legions.]

[Sidenote: The Socii.]

+26.+ Having made this distribution of their men and given orders

for their being armed, as I have described, the military tribunes

dismiss them to their homes. But when the day has arrived on which

they were all bound by their oath to appear at the place named by the

Consuls (for each Consul generally appoints a separate place for his

own legions, each having assigned to him two legions and a moiety of

the allies), all whose names were placed on the roll appear without

fail: no excuse being accepted in the case of those who have taken the

oath, except a prohibitory omen or absolute impossibility. The allies

muster along with the citizens, and are distributed and managed by the

officers appointed by the Consuls, who have the title of _Praefecti

sociis_ and are twelve in number. These officers select for the Consuls

from the whole infantry and cavalry of the allies such as are most

fitted for actual service, and these are called _extraordinarii_ (which

in Greek is ἐπίλεκτοι.) The whole number of the infantry of the socii

generally equals that of the legions, but the cavalry is treble that of

the citizens. Of these they select a third of the cavalry, and a fifth

of the infantry to serve as _extraordinarii_. The rest they divide into

two parts, one of which is called the right, the other the left wing

(_alae_).

These arrangements made, the military tribunes take over the citizens

and allies and proceed to form a camp. Now the principle on which they

construct their camps, no matter when or where, is the same; I think

therefore that it will be in place here to try and make my readers

understand, as far as words can do so, the Roman tactics in regard to

the march (_agmen_), the camp (_castrorum metatio_), and the line of

battle (_acies_). I cannot imagine any one so indifferent to things

noble and great, as to refuse to take some little extra trouble to

understand things like these; for if he has once heard them, he will

be acquainted with one of those things genuinely worth observation and

knowledge.

[Sidenote: _Castrorum metatio._]

+27.+ Their method of laying out a camp is as follows. The place for

the camp having been selected, the spot in it best calculated to

give a view of the whole, and most convenient for issuing orders, is

appropriated for the general’s tent (_Praetorium_).

Having placed a standard on the spot on which they intend to put the

Praetorium, they measure off a square round this standard, in such

a way that each of its sides is a hundred feet from the standard,

and the area of the square is four plethra.[297] Along one side of

this square—whichever aspect appears most convenient for watering

and foraging—the legions are stationed as follows. I have said that

there were six Tribuni in each legion, and that each Consul had two

legions,—it follows that there are twelve _Tribuni_ in a Consular army.

Well, they pitch the tents of these Tribuni all in one straight line,

parallel to the side of the square selected, at a distance of fifty

feet from it (there is a place too selected for the horses, beasts of

burden, and other baggage of the Tribuni); these tents face the outer

side of the camp and away from the square described above,—a direction

which will henceforth be called “the front” by me. The tents of the

Tribuni stand at equal distances from each other, so that they extend

along the whole breadth of the space occupied by the legions.

[Sidenote: The principia.]

[Sidenote: The quarters.]

+28.+ From the line described by the front of these tents they measure

another distance of a hundred feet towards the front. At that distance

another parallel straight line is drawn, and it is from this last that

they begin arranging the quarters of the legions, which they do as

follows:—they bisect the last mentioned straight line and from that

point draw another straight line at right angles to it; along this

line, on either side of it facing each other, the cavalry of the two

legions are quartered with a space of fifty feet between them, which

space is exactly bisected by the line last mentioned. The manner of

encamping the infantry is similar to that of the cavalry. The whole

area of each space occupied by the maniples and squadrons is a square,

and faces the _via_;[298] the length facing the _via_ is one hundred

feet, and they generally try to make the depth the same, except in

the case of the socii; and when they are employing legions of an

extra number, they increase the length and depth of these squares

proportionally.

+29.+ The spaces assigned to the cavalry are opposite the space between

the two groups of tents belonging to the Tribuni of the two legions,

at right angles to the line along which they stand, like a cross-road;

and indeed the whole arrangement of the _viae_ is like a system of

cross-roads, running on either side of the blocks of tents, those of

the cavalry on one side and those of the infantry on the other. The

spaces assigned to the cavalry and the Triarii in each legion are back

to back, with no _via_ between them, but touching each other, looking

opposite ways; and the depth of the spaces assigned to the Triarii is

only half that assigned to other maniples, because their numbers are

generally only half; but though the number of the men is different,

the length of the space is always the same owing to the lesser depth.

Next, parallel with these spaces, at a distance of fifty feet, they

place the _Principes_ facing the Triarii; and as they face the space

between themselves and the _Triarii_, we have two more roads formed

at right angles to the hundred-foot area in front of the tents of the

Tribunes, and running down from it to the outer agger of the camp on

the side opposite to that of the Principia, which we agreed to call

the front of the camp. Behind the spaces for the _Triarii_ and looking

in the opposite direction, and touching each other, are the spaces

for the _Hastati_. These several branches of the service (_Triarii_,

_Principes_, _Hastati_), being each divided into ten maniples, the

cross-roads between the blocks are all the same length and terminate in

the front agger of the camp; towards which they cause the last maniples

in the rows to face.

[Sidenote: Via Quintana.]

+30.+ Beyond the _Hastati_ they again leave a space of fifty feet,

and there, beginning from the same base (the Principia), and going in

a parallel direction, and to the same distance as the other blocks,

they place the cavalry of the allies facing the _Hastati_. Now the

number of the allies, as I have stated above, is equal to that of the

legions in regard to the infantry, though it falls below that if we

omit the _extraordinarii_; but that of the cavalry is double, when

the third part is deducted for service among the _extraordinarii_.

Therefore in marking out the camp the spaces assigned to the latter

are made proportionally deeper, so that their length remains the same

as those occupied by the legions. Thus five viae are formed:[299] and

back to back with these cavalry are the spaces for the infantry of the

allies, the depth being proportionally increased according to their

numbers;[300] and these maniples face the outer sides of the camp and

the agger. In each maniple the first tent at either end is occupied

by the centurions. Between the fifth and sixth squadrons of cavalry,

and the fifth and sixth maniple of infantry, there is a space of fifty

left, so that another road is made across the camp at right angles to

the others and parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, and this they call

the _Via Quintana_, as it runs along the fifth squadrons and maniples.

[Sidenote: The space between the Principia and the agger.]

[Sidenote: The Staff, or Praetoria cohors.]

+31.+ The space behind the tents of the Tribuni is thus used. On one

side of the square of the Praetorium is the market, on the other the

office of the Quaestor and the supplies which he has charge of. Then

behind the last tent of the Tribuni on either side, arranged at right

angles to those tents, are the quarters of the cavalry picked out of

the _extraordinarii_, as well as of some of those who are serving as

volunteers from personal friendship to Consuls. All these are arranged

parallel to the side aggers, facing on the one side the Quaestorium, on

the other the market-place. And, generally speaking, it falls to the

lot of these men not only to be near the Consul in the camp, but to be

wholly employed about the persons of the Consul and the Quaestor on the

march and all other occasions. Back to back with these again, facing

the agger, are placed the infantry who serve in the same way as these

cavalry.[301]

Beyond these there is another empty space or road left, one hundred

feet broad, parallel to the tents of the Tribuni, skirting the

market-place, Praetorium, and Quaestorium, from agger to agger. On the

further side of this road the rest of the _equites extraordinarii_

are placed facing the market-place and Quaestorium: and between the

quarters of these cavalry of the two legions a passage is left of

fifty feet, exactly opposite and at right angles to the square of the

Praetorium, leading to the rearward agger.

Back to back with the _equites extraordinarii_ are the infantry of the

same, facing the agger at the rear of the whole camp. And the space

left empty on either side of these, facing the agger on each side of

the camp, is given up to foreigners and such allies as chance to come

to the camp.

[Sidenote: The space round the quarters.]

The result of these arrangements is that the whole camp is a square,

with streets and other constructions regularly planned like a town.

Between the line of the tents and the agger there is an empty space

of two hundred feet on every side of the square, which is turned to

a great variety of uses. To begin with, it is exceedingly convenient

for the marching in and out of the legions. For each division descends

into this space by the _via_ which passes its own quarters, and so

avoids crowding and hustling each other, as they would if they were all

collected on one road. Again, all cattle brought into the camp, as well

as booty of all sorts taken from the enemy, are deposited in this space

and securely guarded during the night-watches. But the most important

use of this space is that, in night assaults, it secures the tents from

the danger of being set on fire, and keeps the soldiers out of the

range of the enemy’s missiles; or, if a few of them do carry so far,

they are spent and cannot penetrate the tents.

[Sidenote: Provision for extra numbers,]

[Sidenote: and for two consular armies.]

+32.+ The number then of foot-soldiers and cavalry being given (at

the rate, that is to say, of four thousand or of five thousand for

each legion), and the length, depth, and number of the maniples being

likewise known, as well as the breadth of the passages and roads, it

becomes possible to calculate the area occupied by the camp and the

length of the aggers. If on any occasion the number of allies, either

those originally enrolled or those who joined subsequently, exceeds

their due proportion, the difficulty is provided for in this way. To

the overplus of allies who joined subsequent to the enrolment of the

army are assigned the spaces on either side of the Praetorium, the

market-place and Quaestorium being proportionally contracted. For the

extra numbers of allies who joined originally an extra line of tents

(forming thus another _via_) is put up parallel with the other tents

of the socii, facing the agger on either side of the camp. But if all

four legions and both Consuls are in the same camp, all we have to do

is to imagine a second army, arranged back to back to the one already

placed, in exactly the same spaces as the former, but side by side

with it at the part where the picked men from the _extraordinarii_ are

stationed facing the rearward agger. In this case the shape of the

camp becomes an oblong, the area double, and the length of the entire

agger half as much again. This is the arrangement when both Consuls are

within the same agger; but if they occupy two separate camps, the above

arrangements hold good, except that the market-place is placed half way

between the two camps.

[Sidenote: Guard duty.]

+33.+ The camp having thus been laid out, the Tribuni next administer

an oath to all in it separately, whether free or slave, that they will

steal nothing within the agger, and in case they find anything will

bring it to the Tribuni. They next select for their several duties the

maniples of the Principes and Hastati in each legion. Two are told

off to guard the space in front of the quarters of the Tribuni. For

in this space, which is called the Principia, most of the Romans in

the camp transact all the business of the day; and are therefore very

particular about its being kept well watered and properly swept. Of the

other eighteen maniples, three are assigned to each of the six Tribuni,

that being the respective numbers in each legion; and of these three

maniples each takes its turn of duty in waiting upon the Tribune. The

services they render him are such as these: they pitch his tent for

him when a place is selected for encampment, and level the ground all

round it; and if any extra precaution is required for the protection of

his baggage, it is their duty to see to it. They also supply him with

two relays of guards. A guard consists of four men, two of whom act

as sentries in front of his tent, and two on the rear of it near the

horses. Seeing that each Tribune has three maniples, and each maniple

has a hundred men, without counting _Triarii_ and _Velites_ who are

not liable for this service, the duty is a light one, coming round

to each maniple only once in three days; while by this arrangement

ample provision is made for the convenience as well as the dignity of

the Tribuni. The maniples of Triarii are exempted from this personal

service to the Tribuni, but they each supply a watch of four men to the

squadron of cavalry nearest them. These watches have to keep a general

look out; but their chief duty is to keep an eye upon the horses, to

prevent their hurting themselves by getting entangled in their tethers,

and so becoming unfit for use; or from getting loose, and making a

confusion and disturbance in the camp by running against other horses.

Finally, all the maniples take turns to mount guard for a day each at

the Consul’s tent, to protect him from plots, and maintain the dignity

of his office.

[Sidenote: Orders of the day.]

[Sidenote: Construction of the _fossa_ and _agger_.]

+34.+ As to the construction of the foss and vallum,[302] two sides

fall to the lot of the socii, each division taking that side along

which it is quartered; the other two are left to the Romans, one to

each legion. Each side is divided into portions according to the number

of maniples, and the centurions stand by and superintend the work of

each maniple; while two of the Tribunes superintend the construction

of the whole side and see that it is adequate. In the same way the

Tribunes superintend all other operations in the camp. They divide

themselves in twos, and each pair is on duty for two months out of six;

they draw lots for their turns, and the pair on whom the lot falls

takes the superintendence of all active operations. The prefects of

the socii divide their duty in the same way. At daybreak the officers

of the cavalry and the centurions muster at the tents of the Tribunes,

while the Tribunes go to that of the Consul. He gives the necessary

orders to the Tribunes, they to the cavalry officers and centurions,

and these last pass them on to the rank and file as occasion may demand.

[Sidenote: The watchword.]

To secure the passing round of the watchword for the night the

following course is followed. One man is selected from the tenth

maniple, which, in the case both of cavalry and infantry, is quartered

at the ends of the road between the tents; this man is relieved from

guard-duty and appears each day about sunset at the tent of the Tribune

on duty, takes the _tessera_ or wooden tablet on which the watchword

is inscribed, and returns to his own maniple and delivers the wooden

tablet and watchword in the presence of witnesses to the chief officer

of the maniple next his own; he in the same way to the officer of the

next, and so on, until it arrives at the first maniple stationed next

the Tribunes. These men are obliged to deliver the tablet (_tessera_)

to the Tribunes before dark. If they are all handed in, the Tribune

knows that the watchword has been delivered to all, and has passed

through all the ranks back to his hands: but if any one is missing,

he at once investigates the matter; for he knows by the marks on the

tablets from which division of the army the tablet has not appeared;

and the man who is discovered to be responsible for its non-appearance

is visited with condign punishment.

[Sidenote: Night watches.]

+35.+ Next as to the keeping guard at night. The Consul’s tent is

guarded by the maniple on duty: those of the Tribuni and praefects of

the cavalry by the pickets formed as described above from the several

maniples. And in the same way each maniple and squadron posts guards of

their own men. The other pickets are posted by the Consul. Generally

speaking there are three pickets at the Quaestorium, and two at the

tent of each of the legati or members of council. The vallum is lined

by the _velites_, who are on guard all along it from day to day. That

is their special duty; while they also guard all the entrances to the

camp, telling off ten sentinels to take their turn at each of them. Of

the men told off for duty at the several _stationes_, the man who in

each maniple is to take the first watch is brought by the rear-rank man

of his company to the Tribune at eventide. The latter hands over to

them severally small wooden tablets (_tesserae_), one for each watch,

inscribed with small marks; on receiving which they go off to the

places indicated.

[Sidenote: Visiting rounds.]

The duty of going the rounds is intrusted to the cavalry. The first

Praefect of cavalry in each legion, early in the morning, orders one

of his rear-rank men to give notice before breakfast to four young men

of his squadron who are to go the rounds. At evening this same man’s

duty is to give notice to the Praefect of the next squadron that it

is his turn to provide for going the rounds until next morning. This

officer thereupon takes measures similar to the preceding one until

the next day; and so on throughout the cavalry squadrons. The four

men thus selected by the rear-rank men from the first squadron, after

drawing lots for the watch they are to take, proceed to the tent of the

Tribune on duty, and receive from him a writing stating the order[303]

and the number of the watches they are to visit. The four then take

up their quarters for the night alongside of the first maniple of

Triarii; for it is the duty of the centurion of this maniple to see

that a bugle is blown at the beginning of every watch. When the time

has arrived, the man to whose lot the first watch has fallen goes his

rounds, taking some of his friends as witnesses. He walks through the

posts assigned, which are not only those along the vallum and gates,

but also the pickets set by the several maniples and squadrons. If he

find the men of the first watch awake he takes from them their tessera;

but if he find any one of them asleep or absent from his post, he calls

those with him to witness the fact and passes on. The same process

is repeated by those who go the rounds during the other watches. The

charge of seeing that the bugle is blown at the beginning of each

watch, so that the right man might visit the right pickets, is as I

have said, laid upon the centurions of the first maniple of Triarii,

each one taking the duty for a day.

Each of these men who have gone the rounds (_tessarii_) at daybreak

conveys the tesserae to the Tribune on duty. If the whole number are

given in they are dismissed without question; but if any of them brings

a number less than that of the pickets, an investigation is made by

means of the mark on the tessera, as to which picket he has omitted.

Upon this being ascertained the centurion is summoned; he brings the

men who were on duty, and they are confronted with the patrol. If the

fault is with the men on guard, the patrol clears himself by producing

the witnesses whom he took with him; for he cannot do so without. If

nothing of that sort happened, the blame recoils upon the patrol.

[Sidenote: Military punishments: the _fustuarium_.]

+37.+ Then the Tribunes at once hold a court-martial, and the man who

is found guilty is punished by the _fustuarium_; the nature of which

is this. The Tribune takes a cudgel and merely touches the condemned

man; whereupon all the soldiers fall upon him with cudgels and stones.

Generally speaking men thus punished are killed on the spot; but if by

any chance, after running the gauntlet, they manage to escape from the

camp, they have no hope of ultimately surviving even so. They may not

return to their own country, nor would any one venture to receive such

an one into his house. Therefore those who have once fallen into this

misfortune are utterly and finally ruined. The same fate awaits the

praefect of the squadron, as well as his rear-rank man, if they fail to

give the necessary order at the proper time, the latter to the patrols,

and the former to the praefect of the next squadron. The result of the

severity and inevitableness of this punishment is that in the Roman

army the night watches are faultlessly kept. The common soldiers are

amenable to the Tribunes; the Tribunes to the Consuls. The Tribune is

competent to punish a soldier by inflicting a fine, distraining his

goods, or ordering him to be flogged; so too the praefects in the case

of the socii. The punishment of the _fustuarium_ is assigned also to

any one committing theft in the camp, or bearing false witness: as also

to any one who in full manhood is detected in shameful immorality: or

to any one who has been thrice punished for the same offence. All these

things are punished as crimes. But such as the following are reckoned

as cowardly and dishonourable in a soldier:—for a man to make a false

report to the Tribunes of his valour in order to get reward; or for

men who have been told off to an ambuscade to quit the place assigned

them from fear; and also for a man to throw away any of his arms from

fear, on the actual field of battle. Consequently it sometimes happens

that men confront certain death at their stations, because, from their

fear of the punishment awaiting them at home, they refuse to quit their

post: while others, who have lost shield or spear or any other arm on

the field, throw themselves upon the foe, in hopes of recovering what

they have lost, or of escaping by death from certain disgrace and the

insults of their relations.[304]

[Sidenote: Decimatio.]

+38.+ But if it ever happens that a number of men are involved in these

same acts: if, for instance, some entire maniples have quitted their

ground in the presence of the enemy, it is deemed impossible to subject

all to the _fustuarium_ or to military execution; but a solution of

the difficulty has been found at once adequate to the maintenance of

discipline and calculated to strike terror. The Tribune assembles the

legion, calls the defaulters to the front, and, after administering

a sharp rebuke, selects five or eight or twenty out of them by lot,

so that those selected should be about a tenth of those who have been

guilty of the act of cowardice. These selected are punished with the

_fustuarium_ without mercy; the rest are put on rations of barley

instead of wheat, and are ordered to take up their quarters outside the

vallum and the protection of the camp. As all are equally in danger of

having the lot fall on them, and as all alike who escape that, are made

a conspicuous example of by having their rations of barley, the best

possible means are thus taken to inspire fear for the future, and to

correct the mischief which has actually occurred.

[Sidenote: Military decorations.]

[Sidenote: Mural crown.]

[Sidenote: Civic crown.]

+39.+ A very excellent plan also is adopted for inducing young soldiers

to brave danger. When an engagement has taken place and any of them

have showed conspicuous gallantry, the Consul summons an assembly of

the legion, puts forward those whom he considers to have distinguished

themselves in any way, and first compliments each of them individually

on his gallantry, and mentions any other distinction he may have

earned in the course of his life, and then presents them with gifts:

to the man who has wounded an enemy, a spear; to the man who has

killed one and stripped his armour, a cup, if he be in the infantry,

horse-trappings if in the cavalry: though originally the only present

made was a spear. This does not take place in the event of their

having wounded or stripped any of the enemy in a set engagement or

the storming of a town; but in skirmishes or other occasions of that

sort, in which, without there being any positive necessity for them to

expose themselves singly to danger, they have done so voluntarily and

deliberately. In the capture of a town those who are first to mount the

walls are presented with a gold crown. So too those who have covered

and saved any citizens or allies are distinguished by the Consul with

certain presents; and those whom they have preserved present them

voluntarily with a crown, or if not, they are compelled to do so by

the Tribunes. The man thus preserved, too, reverences his preserver

throughout his life as a father, and is bound to act towards him as

a father in every respect. By such incentives those who stay at home

are stirred up to a noble rivalry and emulation in confronting danger,

no less than those who actually hear and see what takes place. For

the recipients of such rewards not only enjoy great glory among their

comrades in the army, and an immediate reputation at home, but after

their return they are marked men in all solemn festivals; for they

alone, who have been thus distinguished by the Consuls for bravery,

are allowed to wear robes of honour on those occasions: and moreover

they place the spoils they have taken in the most conspicuous places in

their houses, as visible tokens and proofs of their valour. No wonder

that a people, whose rewards and punishments are allotted with such

care and received with such feelings, should be brilliantly successful

in war.

The pay of the foot soldier is 5⅓ asses a day; of the centurion 10⅔; of

the cavalry 16. The infantry receive a ration of wheat equal to about ⅔

of an Attic medimnus a month, and the cavalry 7 medimni of barley, and

2 of wheat; of the allies the infantry receive the same, the cavalry 1⅓

medimnus of wheat, and 5 of barley. This is a free gift to the allies;

but in the cases of the Romans, the Quaestor stops out of their pay

the price of their corn and clothes, or any additional arms they may

require at a fixed rate.

+40.+ The following is their manner of moving camp. At the first

bugle the men all strike their tents and collect their baggage; but

no soldier may strike his tent, or set it up either, till the same

is done to that of the Tribuni and the Consul. At the second bugle

they load the beasts of burden with their baggage: at the third

the first maniples must advance and set the whole camp in motion.

Generally speaking, the men appointed to make this start are the

_extraordinarii_: next comes the right wing of the socii; and behind

them their beasts of burden. These are followed by the first legion

with its own baggage immediately on its rear; then comes the second

legion, followed by its own beasts of burden, and the baggage of those

socii who have to bring up the rear of the march, that is to say, the

left wing of the socii. The cavalry sometimes ride on the rear of their

respective divisions, sometimes on either side of the beasts of burden,

to keep them together and secure them. If an attack is expected on the

rear, the _extraordinarii_ themselves occupy the rear instead of the

van. Of the two legions and wings each takes the lead in the march on

alternate days, that by this interchange of position all may have an

equal share in the advantage of being first at the water and forage.

The order of march, however, is different at times of unusual danger,

if they have open ground enough. For in that case they advance in

three parallel columns, consisting of the _Hastati_, _Principes_, and

_Triarii_: the beasts of burden belonging to the maniples in the van

are placed in front of all, those belonging to the second behind the

leading maniples, and those belonging to the third behind the second

maniples, thus having the baggage and the maniples in alternate lines.

With this order of march, on an alarm being given, the columns face to

the right or left according to the quarter on which the enemy appears,

and get clear of the baggage. So that in a short space of time, and by

one movement, the whole of the hoplites are in line of battle—except

that sometimes it is necessary to half-wheel the _Hastati_ also—and the

baggage and the rest of the army are in their proper place for safety,

namely, in the rear of the line of combatants.

[Sidenote: Encampment on the march.]

+41.+ When the army on the march is approaching the place of

encampment, a Tribune, and those of the centurions who have been from

time to time selected for that duty, are sent forward to survey the

place of encampment. Having done this they proceed first of all to fix

upon the place for the Consul’s tent (as I have described above), and

to determine on which side of the Praetorium to quarter the legions.

Having decided these points they measure out the Praetorium, then they

draw the straight line along which the tents of the Tribunes are to be

pitched, and then the line parallel to this, beyond which the quarters

of the legions are to begin. In the same way they draw the lines on

the other sides of the Praetorium in accordance with the plan which I

have already detailed at length. This does not take long, nor is the

marking out of the camp a matter of difficulty, because the dimensions

are all regularly laid down, and are in accordance with precedent. Then

they fix one flag in the ground where the Consul’s tent is to stand,

and another on the base of the square containing it, and a third on the

line of the Tribunes’ tents; the two latter are scarlet, that which

marks the Consul’s tent is white; the lines on the other sides of the

Praetorium are marked sometimes with plain spears and sometimes by

flags of other colours. After this they lay out the _viae_ between the

quarters, fixing spears at each _via_. Consequently when the legions

in the course of their march have come near enough to get a clear view

of the place of encampment, they can all make out exactly the whole

plan of it, taking as their base the Consul’s flag and calculating from

that. Moreover as each soldier knows precisely on which _via_, and at

what point of it, his quarters are to be, because all occupy the same

position in the camp wherever it may be, it is exactly like a legion

entering its own city; when breaking off at the gates each man makes

straight for his own residence without hesitation, because he knows

the direction and the quarter of the town in which home lies. It is

precisely the same in a Roman camp.

+42.+ It is because the first object of the Romans in the matter of

encampment is facility, that they seem to me to differ diametrically

from Greek military men in this respect. Greeks, in choosing a place

for a camp, think primarily of security from the natural strength of

the position: first, because they are averse from the toil of digging a

foss, and, secondly, because they think that no artificial defences are

comparable to those afforded by the nature of the ground. Accordingly,

they not only have to vary the whole configuration of the camp to suit

the nature of the ground, but to change the arrangement of details in

all kinds of irregular ways; so that neither soldier nor company has

a fixed place in it. The Romans, on the other hand, prefer to undergo

the fatigue of digging, and of the other labours of circumvallation,

for the sake of the facility in arrangement, and to secure a plan of

encampment which shall be one and the same and familiar to all.

Such are the most important facts in regard to the legions and the

method of encamping them....

THE ROMAN REPUBLIC COMPARED WITH OTHERS

[Sidenote: The Theban constitution may be put aside,]

+43.+ Nearly all historians have recorded as constitutions of eminent

excellence those of Lacedaemonia, Crete, Mantinea, and Carthage. Some

have also mentioned those of Athens and Thebes. The former I may allow

to pass; but I am convinced that little need be said of the Athenian

and Theban constitutions: their growth was abnormal, the period of

their zenith brief, and the changes they experienced unusually violent.

Their glory was a sudden and fortuitous flash, so to speak; and while

they still thought themselves prosperous, and likely to remain so, they

found themselves involved in circumstances completely the reverse. The

Thebans got their reputation for valour among the Greeks, by taking

advantage of the senseless policy of the Lacedaemonians, and the

hatred of the allies towards them, owing to the valour of one, or at

most two, men who were wise enough to appreciate the situation. Since

fortune quickly made it evident that it was not the peculiarity of

their constitution, but the valour of their leaders, which gave the

Thebans their success. For the great power of Thebes notoriously took

its rise, attained its zenith, and fell to the ground with the lives of

Epaminondas and Pelopidas. We must therefore conclude that it was not

its constitution, but its men, that caused the high fortune which it

then enjoyed.

[Sidenote: as also the Athenian.]

+44.+ A somewhat similar remark applies to the Athenian constitution

also. For though it perhaps had more frequent interludes of excellence,

yet its highest perfection was attained during the brilliant career

of Themistocles; and having reached that point it quickly declined,

owing to its essential instability. For the Athenian demus is always

in the position of a ship without a commander. In such a ship, if

fear of the enemy, or the occurrence of a storm induce the crew to be

of one mind and to obey the helmsman, everything goes well; but if

they recover from this fear, and begin to treat their officers with

contempt, and to quarrel with each other because they are no longer

all of one mind,—one party wishing to continue the voyage, and the

other urging the steersman to bring the ship to anchor; some letting

out the sheets, and others hauling them in, and ordering the sails to

be furled,—their discord and quarrels make a sorry show to lookers on;

and the position of affairs is full of risk to those on board engaged

on the same voyage: and the result has often been that, after escaping

the dangers of the widest seas, and the most violent storms, they wreck

their ship in harbour and close to shore. And this is what has often

happened to the Athenian constitution. For, after repelling, on various

occasions, the greatest and most formidable dangers by the valour of

its people and their leaders, there have been times when, in periods

of secure tranquillity, it has gratuitously and recklessly encountered

disaster.[305] Therefore I need say no more about either it, or the

Theban constitution: in both of which a mob manages everything on its

own unfettered impulse—a mob in the one city distinguished for headlong

outbursts of fiery temper, in the other trained in long habits of

violence and ferocity.

[Sidenote: The Spartan polity unlike that of Crete.]

+45.+ Passing to the Cretan polity there are two points which

deserve our consideration. The first is how such writers as Ephorus,

Xenophon, Callisthenes and Plato[306]—who are the most learned of the

ancients—could assert that it was like that of Sparta; and secondly

how they came to assert that it was at all admirable. I can agree with

neither assertion; and I will explain why I say so. And first as to its

dissimilarity with the Spartan constitution. The peculiar merit of the

latter is said to be its land laws, by which no one possesses more than

another, but all citizens have an equal share in the public land.[307]

The next distinctive feature regards the possession of money: for as it

is utterly discredited among them, the jealous competition which arises

from inequality of wealth is entirely removed from the city. A third

peculiarity of the Lacedaemonian polity is that, of the officials by

whose hands and with whose advice the whole government is conducted,

the kings hold an hereditary office, while the members of the Gerusia

are elected for life.

+46.+ Among the Cretans the exact reverse of all these arrangements

obtains. The laws allow them to possess as much land as they can get

with no limitation whatever. Money is so highly valued among them,

that its possession is not only thought to be necessary but in the

highest degree creditable. And in fact greed and avarice are so native

to the soil in Crete, that they are the only people in the world among

whom no stigma attaches to any sort of gain whatever. Again all their

offices are annual and on a democratical footing. I have therefore

often felt at a loss to account for these writers speaking of the two

constitutions, which are radically different, as though they were

closely united and allied. But, besides overlooking these important

differences, these writers have gone out of their way to comment at

length on the legislation of Lycurgus: “He was the only legislator,”

they say, “who saw the important points. For there being two things

on which the safety of a commonwealth depends,—courage in the face of

the enemy and concord at home,—by abolishing covetousness, he with

it removed all motive for civil broil and contest: whence it has

been brought about that the Lacedaemonians are the best governed and

most united people in Greece.” Yet while giving utterance to these

sentiments, and though they see that, in contrast to this, the Cretans

by their ingrained avarice are engaged in countless public and private

seditions, murders and civil wars, they yet regard these facts as

not affecting their contention, but are bold enough to speak of the

two constitutions as alike. Ephorus, indeed, putting aside names,

employs expressions so precisely the same, when discoursing on the

two constitutions, that, unless one noticed the proper names, there

would be no means whatever of distinguishing which of the two he was

describing.

+47.+ In what the difference between them consists I have already

stated. I will now address myself to showing that the Cretan

constitution deserves neither praise nor imitation.

[Sidenote: Tests of a good polity.]

To my mind, then, there are two things fundamental to every state,

in virtue of which its powers and constitution become desirable or

objectionable. These are customs and laws. Of these the desirable are

those which make men’s private lives holy and pure, and the public

character of the state civilised and just. The objectionable are those

whose effect is the reverse. As, then, when we see good customs and

good laws prevailing among certain people, we confidently assume that,

in consequence of them, the men and their civil constitution will be

good also, so when we see private life full of covetousness, and public

policy of injustice, plainly we have reason for asserting their laws,

particular customs, and general constitution to be bad. Now, with few

exceptions, you could find no habits prevailing in private life more

steeped in treachery than those in Crete, and no public policy more

inequitable. Holding, then, the Cretan constitution to be neither like

the Spartan, nor worthy of choice or imitation, I reject it from the

comparison which I have instituted.

[Sidenote: Ideal polities may be omitted.]

Nor again would it be fair to introduce the Republic of Plato, which

is also spoken of in high terms by some Philosophers. For just as we

refuse admission to the athletic contests to those actors or athletes

who have not acquired a recognised position[308] or trained for them,

so we ought not to admit this Platonic constitution to the contest

for the prize of merit unless it can first point to some genuine and

practical achievement. Up to this time the notion of bringing it into

comparison with the constitutions of Sparta, Rome, and Carthage would

be like putting up a statue to compare with living and breathing men.

Even if such a statue were faultless in point of art, the comparison

of the lifeless with the living would naturally leave an impression of

imperfection and incongruity upon the minds of the spectators.

[Sidenote: The aims of Lycurgus.]

[Sidenote: Their partial failure.]

+48.+ I shall therefore omit these, and proceed with my description

of the Laconian constitution. Now it seems to me that for securing

unity among the citizens, for safe-guarding the Laconian territory,

and preserving the liberty of Sparta inviolate, the legislation

and provisions of Lycurgus were so excellent, that I am forced to

regard his wisdom as something superhuman. For the equality of landed

possessions, the simplicity in their food, and the practice of taking

it in common, which he established, were well calculated to secure

morality in private life and to prevent civil broils in the State; as

also their training in the endurance of labours and dangers to make

men brave and noble minded: but when both these virtues, courage and

high morality, are combined in one soul or in one state, vice will

not readily spring from such a soil, nor will such men easily be

overcome by their enemies. By constructing his constitution therefore

in this spirit, and of these elements, he secured two blessings to

the Spartans,—safety for their territory, and a lasting freedom for

themselves long after he was gone. He appears however to have made no

one provision whatever, particular or general, for the acquisition

of the territory of their neighbours; or for the assertion of their

supremacy; or, in a word, for any policy of aggrandisement at all. What

he had still to do was to impose such a necessity, or create such a

spirit among the citizens, that, as he had succeeded in making their

individual lives independent and simple, the public character of the

state should also become independent and moral. But the actual fact

is, that, though he made them the most disinterested and sober-minded

men in the world, as far as their own ways of life and their national

institutions were concerned, he left them in regard to the rest of

Greece ambitious, eager for supremacy, and encroaching in the highest

degree.

[Sidenote: First and second Messenian wars, B.C. 745-724 (?), 685-668.]

[Sidenote: Battle of Plataea, B.C. 479.]

[Sidenote: Peace of Antalcidas, B.C. 387.]

[Sidenote: The causes of this failure.]

+49.+ For in the first place is it not notorious that they were nearly

the first Greeks to cast a covetous eye upon the territory of their

neighbours, and that accordingly they waged a war of subjugation on

the Messenians? In the next place is it not related in all histories

that in their dogged obstinacy they bound themselves with an oath

never to desist from the siege of Messene until they had taken it?

And lastly it is known to all that in their efforts for supremacy in

Greece they submitted to do the bidding of those whom they had once

conquered in war. For when the Persians invaded Greece, they conquered

them, as champions of the liberty of the Greeks; yet when the invaders

had retired and fled, they betrayed the cities of Greece into their

hands by the peace of Antalcidas, for the sake of getting money to

secure their supremacy over the Greeks. It was then that the defect

in their constitution was rendered apparent. For as long as their

ambition was confined to governing their immediate neighbours, or even

the Peloponnesians only, they were content with the resources and

supplies provided by Laconia itself, having all material of war ready

to hand, and being able without much expenditure of time to return

home or convey provisions with them. But directly they took in hand to

despatch naval expeditions, or to go on campaigns by land outside the

Peloponnese, it was evident that neither their iron currency, nor their

use of crops for payment in kind, would be able to supply them with

what they lacked if they abided by the legislation of Lycurgus; for

such undertakings required money universally current, and goods from

foreign countries. Thus they were compelled to wait humbly at Persian

doors, impose tribute on the islanders, and exact contributions from

all the Greeks: knowing that, if they abided by the laws of Lycurgus,

it was impossible to advance any claims upon any outside power at all,

much less upon the supremacy in Greece.

[Sidenote: Sparta fails where Rome succeeds.]

+50.+ My object, then, in this digression is to make it manifest by

actual facts that, for guarding their own country with absolute safety,

and for preserving their own freedom, the legislation of Lycurgus was

entirely sufficient; and for those who are content with these objects

we must concede that there neither exists, nor ever has existed, a

constitution and civil order preferable to that of Sparta. But if any

one is seeking aggrandisement, and believes that to be a leader and

ruler and despot of numerous subjects, and to have all looking and

turning to him, is a finer thing than that,—in this point of view we

must acknowledge that the Spartan constitution is deficient, and that

of Rome superior and better constituted for obtaining power. And this

has been proved by actual facts. For when the Lacedaemonians strove

to possess themselves of the supremacy in Greece, it was not long

before they brought their own freedom itself into danger. Whereas the

Romans, after obtaining supreme power over the Italians themselves,

soon brought the whole world under their rule,—in which achievement the

abundance and availability of their supplies largely contributed to

their success.

[Sidenote: Rome fresher than Carthage;]

+51.+ Now the Carthaginian constitution seems to me originally to

have been well contrived in these most distinctively important

particulars. For they had kings,[309] and the Gerusia had the powers

of an aristocracy, and the multitude were supreme in such things as

affected them; and on the whole the adjustment of its several parts

was very like that of Rome and Sparta. But about the period of its

entering on the Hannibalian war the political state of Carthage was

on the decline,[310] that of Rome improving. For whereas there is in

every body, or polity, or business a natural stage of growth, zenith,

and decay; and whereas everything in them is at its best at the zenith;

we may thereby judge of the difference between these two constitutions

as they existed at that period. For exactly so far as the strength and

prosperity of Carthage preceded that of Rome in point of time, by so

much was Carthage then past its prime, while Rome was exactly at its

zenith, as far as its political constitution was concerned. In Carthage

therefore the influence of the people in the policy of the state had

already risen to be supreme, while at Rome the Senate was at the height

of its power: and so, as in the one measures were deliberated upon by

the many, in the other by the best men, the policy of the Romans in all

public undertakings proved the stronger; on which account, though they

met with capital disasters, by force of prudent counsels they finally

conquered the Carthaginians in the war.

[Sidenote: and its citizen levies superior to Carthaginian mercenaries.]

+52.+ If we look however at separate details, for instance at the

provisions for carrying on a war, we shall find that whereas for

a naval expedition the Carthaginians are the better trained and

prepared,—as it is only natural with a people with whom it has been

hereditary for many generations to practise this craft, and to follow

the seaman’s trade above all nations in the world,—yet, in regard to

military service on land, the Romans train themselves to a much higher

pitch than the Carthaginians. The former bestow their whole attention

upon this department: whereas the Carthaginians wholly neglect their

infantry, though they do take some slight interest in the cavalry. The

reason of this is that they employ foreign mercenaries, the Romans

native and citizen levies. It is in this point that the latter polity

is preferable to the former. They have their hopes of freedom ever

resting on the courage of mercenary troops: the Romans on the valour

of their own citizens and the aid of their allies. The result is that

even if the Romans have suffered a defeat at first, they renew the

war with undiminished forces, which the Carthaginians cannot do. For,

as the Romans are fighting for country and children, it is impossible

for them to relax the fury of their struggle; but they persist with

obstinate resolution until they have overcome their enemies. What has

happened in regard to their navy is an instance in point. In skill the

Romans are much behind the Carthaginians, as I have already said; yet

the upshot of the whole naval war has been a decided triumph for the

Romans, owing to the valour of their men. For although nautical science

contributes largely to success in sea-fights, still it is the courage

of the marines that turns the scale most decisively in favour of

victory. The fact is that Italians as a nation are by nature superior

to Phoenicians and Libyans both in physical strength and courage; but

still their habits also do much to inspire the youth with enthusiasm

for such exploits. One example will be sufficient of the pains taken

by the Roman state to turn out men ready to endure anything to win a

reputation in their country for valour.

[Sidenote: Laudations at funerals.]

[Sidenote: Imagines.]

[Sidenote: Toga praetexta, purpurea, picta.]

[Sidenote: Sellae curules.]

+53.+ Whenever one of their illustrious men dies, in the course of his

funeral, the body with all its paraphernalia is carried into the forum

to the Rostra, as a raised platform there is called, and sometimes

is propped upright upon it so as to be conspicuous, or, more rarely,

is laid upon it. Then with all the people standing round, his son,

if he has left one of full age and he is there, or, failing him, one

of his relations, mounts the Rostra and delivers a speech concerning

the virtues of the deceased, and the successful exploits performed

by him in his lifetime. By these means the people are reminded of

what has been done, and made to see it with their own eyes,—not

only such as were engaged in the actual transactions but those also

who were not;—and their sympathies are so deeply moved, that the

loss appears not to be confined to the actual mourners, but to be a

public one affecting the whole people. After the burial and all the

usual ceremonies have been performed, they place the likeness of the

deceased in the most conspicuous spot in his house, surmounted by a

wooden canopy or shrine. This likeness consists of a mask made to

represent the deceased with extraordinary fidelity both in shape and

colour. These likenesses they display at public sacrifices adorned

with much care. And when any illustrious member of the family dies,

they carry these masks to the funeral, putting them on men whom they

thought as like the originals as possible in height and other personal

peculiarities. And these substitutes assume clothes according to the

rank of the person represented: if he was a consul or praetor, a toga

with purple stripes; if a censor, whole purple;[311] if he had also

celebrated a triumph or performed any exploit of that kind, a toga

embroidered with gold. These representatives also ride themselves

in chariots, while the fasces and axes, and all the other customary

insignia of the particular offices, lead the way, according to the

dignity of the rank in the state enjoyed by the deceased in his

lifetime; and on arriving at the Rostra they all take their seats on

ivory chairs in their order.

There could not easily be a more inspiring spectacle than this for

a young man of noble ambitions and virtuous aspirations. For can we

conceive any one to be unmoved at the sight of all the likenesses

collected together of the men who have earned glory, all as it were

living and breathing? Or what could be a more glorious spectacle?

[Sidenote: Devotion of the citizens.]

+54.+ Besides the speaker over the body about to be buried, after

having finished the panegyric of this particular person, starts upon

the others whose representatives are present, beginning with the most

ancient, and recounts the successes and achievements of each. By this

means the glorious memory of brave men is continually renewed; the fame

of those who have performed any noble deed is never allowed to die;

and the renown of those who have done good service to their country

becomes a matter of common knowledge to the multitude, and part of the

heritage of posterity. But the chief benefit of the ceremony is that it

inspires young men to shrink from no exertion for the general welfare,

in the hope of obtaining the glory which awaits the brave. And what I

say is confirmed by this fact. Many Romans have volunteered to decide

a whole battle by single combat; not a few have deliberately accepted

certain death, some in time of war to secure the safety of the rest,

some in time of peace to preserve the safety of the commonwealth. There

have also been instances of men in office putting their own sons to

death, in defiance of every custom and law, because they rated the

interests of their country higher than those of natural ties even with

their nearest and dearest. There are many stories of this kind, related

of many men in Roman history; but one will be enough for our present

purpose; and I will give the name as an instance to prove the truth of

my words.

[Sidenote: Horatius Cocles.]

+55.+ The story goes that Horatius Cocles, while fighting with two

enemies at the head of the bridge over the Tiber, which is the entrance

to the city on the north, seeing a large body of men advancing to

support his enemies, and fearing that they would force their way into

the city, turned round, and shouted to those behind him to hasten

back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him:

and whilst they were breaking the bridge, he remained at his post

receiving numerous wounds, and checked the progress of the enemy: his

opponents being panic stricken, not so much by his strength as by

the audacity with which he held his ground. When the bridge had been

broken down, the attack of the enemy was stopped; and Cocles then threw

himself into the river with his armour on and deliberately sacrificed

his life, because he valued the safety of his country and his own

future reputation more highly than his present life, and the years

of existence that remained to him.[312] Such is the enthusiasm and

emulation for noble deeds that are engendered among the Romans by their

customs.

[Sidenote: Purity of election.]

[Sidenote: Cf. ch. 14.]

+56.+ Again the Roman customs and principles regarding money

transactions are better than those of the Carthaginians. In the view

of the latter nothing is disgraceful that makes for gain; with the

former nothing is more disgraceful than to receive bribes and to make

profit by improper means. For they regard wealth obtained from unlawful

transactions to be as much a subject of reproach, as a fair profit from

the most unquestioned source is of commendation. A proof of the fact is

this. The Carthaginians obtain office by open bribery, but among the

Romans the penalty for it is death. With such a radical difference,

therefore, between the rewards offered to virtue among the two peoples,

it is natural that the ways adopted for obtaining them should be

different also.

[Sidenote: Regard to religion.]

But the most important difference for the better which the Roman

commonwealth appears to me to display is in their religious beliefs.

For I conceive that what in other nations is looked upon as a reproach,

I mean a scrupulous fear of the gods, is the very thing which keeps

the Roman commonwealth together. To such an extraordinary height is

this carried among them, both in private and public business, that

nothing could exceed it. Many people might think this unaccountable;

but in my opinion their object is to use it as a check upon the common

people. If it were possible to form a state wholly of philosophers,

such a custom would perhaps be unnecessary. But seeing that every

multitude is fickle, and full of lawless desires, unreasoning anger,

and violent passion, the only resource is to keep them in check by

mysterious terrors and scenic effects of this sort. Wherefore, to my

mind, the ancients were not acting without purpose or at random, when

they brought in among the vulgar those opinions about the gods, and the

belief in the punishments in Hades: much rather do I think that men

nowadays are acting rashly and foolishly in rejecting them. This is the

reason why, apart from anything else, Greek statesmen, if entrusted

with a single talent, though protected by ten checking-clerks, as many

seals, and twice as many witnesses, yet cannot be induced to keep

faith: whereas among the Romans, in their magistracies and embassies,

men have the handling of a great amount of money, and yet from pure

respect to their oath keep their faith intact. And, again, in other

nations it is a rare thing to find a man who keeps his hands out of

the public purse, and is entirely pure in such matters: but among the

Romans it is a rare thing to detect a man in the act of committing such

a crime.[313]...

RECAPITULATION AND CONCLUSION

+57.+ That to all things, then, which exist there is ordained decay

and change I think requires no further arguments to show: for the

inexorable course of nature is sufficient to convince us of it.

But in all polities we observe two sources of decay existing from

natural causes, the one external, the other internal and self-produced.

The external admits of no certain or fixed definition, but the internal

follows a definite order. What kind of polity, then, comes naturally

first, and what second, I have already stated in such a way, that

those who are capable of taking in the whole drift of my argument can

henceforth draw their own conclusions as to the future of the Roman

polity. For it is quite clear, in my opinion. When a commonwealth,

after warding off many great dangers, has arrived at a high pitch of

prosperity and undisputed power, it is evident that, by the lengthened

continuance of great wealth within it, the manner of life of its

citizens will become more extravagant; and that the rivalry for

office, and in other spheres of activity, will become fiercer than it

ought to be. And as this state of things goes on more and more, the

desire of office and the shame of losing reputation, as well as the

ostentation and extravagance of living, will prove the beginning of

a deterioration. And of this change the people will be credited with

being the authors, when they become convinced that they are being

cheated by some from avarice, and are puffed up with flattery by others

from love of office. For when that comes about, in their passionate

resentment and acting under the dictates of anger, they will refuse to

obey any longer, or to be content with having equal powers with their

leaders, but will demand to have all or far the greatest themselves.

And when that comes to pass the constitution will receive a new name,

which sounds better than any other in the world, liberty or democracy;

but, in fact, it will become that worst of all governments, mob-rule.

With this description of the formation, growth, zenith, and present

state of the Roman polity, and having discussed also its difference,

for better and worse, from other polities, I will now at length bring

my essay on it to an end.

+58.+ Resuming my history from the point at which I started on this

digression I will briefly refer to one transaction, that I may give

a practical illustration of the perfection and power of the Roman

polity at that period, as though I were producing one of his works as a

specimen of the skill of a good artist.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Hannibal offers to put the prisoners at Cannae to

ransom.]

When Hannibal, after conquering the Romans in the battle at Cannae,

got possession of the eight thousand who were guarding the Roman camp,

he made them all prisoners of war, and granted them permission to send

messages to their relations that they might be ransomed and return

home. They accordingly selected ten of their chief men, whom Hannibal

allowed to depart after binding them with an oath to return. But one

of them, just as he had got outside the palisade of the camp, saying

that he had forgotten something, went back; and, having got what he

had left behind, once more set out, under the belief that by means of

this return he had kept his promise and discharged his oath. Upon the

arrival of the envoys at Rome, imploring and beseeching the Senate not

to grudge the captured troops their return home, but to allow them to

rejoin their friends by paying three minae each for them,—for these

were the terms, they said, granted by Hannibal,—and declaring that

the men deserved redemption, for they had neither played the coward

in the field, nor done anything unworthy of Rome, but had been left

behind to guard the camp; and that, when all the rest had perished,

they had yielded to absolute necessity in surrendering to Hannibal:

though the Romans had been severely defeated in the battles, and

though they were at the time deprived of, roughly speaking, all their

allies, they neither yielded so far to misfortune as to disregard

what was becoming to themselves, nor omitted to take into account any

necessary consideration. They saw through Hannibal’s purpose in thus

acting,—which was at once to get a large supply of money, and at the

same time to take away all enthusiasm from the troops opposed to him,

by showing that even the conquered had a hope of getting safe home

again. Therefore the Senate, far from acceding to the request, refused

all pity even to their own relations, and disregarded the services

to be expected from these men in the future: and thus frustrated

Hannibal’s calculations, and the hopes which he had founded on these

prisoners, by refusing to ransom them; and at the same time established

the rule for their own men, that they must either conquer or die on

the field, as there was no other hope of safety for them if they were

beaten. With this answer they dismissed the nine envoys who returned

of their own accord; but the tenth who had put the cunning trick in

practice for discharging himself of his oath they put in chains and

delivered to the enemy. So that Hannibal was not so much rejoiced at

his victory in the battle, as struck with astonishment at the unshaken

firmness and lofty spirit displayed in the resolutions of these

senators.[314]