into the minds of the princes of the barbarians who were near, or
conterminous with his own Satrapies, that they might never venture to
aid by supplies or arms those who revolted from him, he determined to
march against them. And first of all against Artabazanes, who appeared
to be the most formidable and able of all the princes, and who ruled
over a tribe called the Satrapeii, and others on their borders. But
Hermeias was at that time afraid of an expedition further up country,
owing to its danger; and was always yearning for the expedition against
Ptolemy in accordance with his original plan. When news, however,
came that a son had been born to the king, thinking that Antiochus
might possibly fall by the hands of the barbarians in upper Asia, or
give him opportunities of putting him out of the way, he consented
to the expedition; believing that, if he could only effect the death
of Antiochus, he would be guardian to his son and so sole master of
the whole kingdom. This having been decided, the army crossed Mount
Zagrus and entered the territory of Artabazanes, which borders on
Media, and is separated from it by an intervening chain of mountains.
Part of it overlooks the Pontus, near the valley of the Phasis; and
it extends to the Hyrcanian Sea. Its inhabitants are numerous and
warlike and especially strong in horsemen; while the district produces
within itself all other things necessary for war. The dynasty has
lasted from the time of the Persians, having been overlooked at the
period of Alexander’s conquests. But now in great alarm at the king’s
approach, and at his own infirmities, for he was an extremely old man,
Artabazanes yielded to the force of circumstances, and made a treaty
with Antiochus on his own terms.
[Sidenote: Fall and death of Hermeias, B.C. 220.]
+56.+ It was after the settlement of this treaty that Apollophanes,
the physician, who was regarded with great affection by the king,
observing that Hermeias was getting beyond all bounds in his high
place, began to be anxious for the king’s safety, and still more
suspicious and uneasy for his own. He took an opportunity, therefore,
of conveying a suggestion to the king, that he had better not be too
careless or unsuspicious of the audacious character of Hermeias; nor
let things go on until he found himself involved in a disaster like
that of his brother. “The danger,” he said, “is not at all remote.”
And he begged him to be on his guard, and take prompt measures for
the safety of himself and his friends. Antiochus owned to him that
he disliked and feared Hermeias; and thanked him for the care of his
person, which had emboldened him to speak to him on the subject. This
conversation encouraged Apollophanes by convincing him that he had
not been mistaken about the feelings and opinions of the king; and
Antiochus begged him not to confine his assistance to words, but to
take some practical steps to secure the safety of himself and his
friends. Upon Apollophanes replying that he was ready to do anything
in the world, they concerted the following plan. On the pretext of the
king being afflicted with an attack of vertigo, it was given out that
the daily attendance of courtiers and officials was to be discontinued
for a few days: the king and his physician thus getting the opportunity
of conferring with such of his friends as he chose, who came on the
pretext of visiting him. In the course of these visits suitable persons
for carrying out the design were prepared and instructed; and every
one readily responding to the proposal, from hatred of Hermeias, they
proceeded to complete it. The physicians having prescribed walks at
daybreak for Antiochus on account of the coolness, Hermeias came to
the place assigned for the walk, and with him those of the king’s
friends who were privy to the design; while the rest were much too late
on account of the time of the king’s coming out being very different
from what it had usually been. Thus they got Hermeias gradually a
considerable distance from the camp, until they came to a certain
lonely spot, and then, on the king’s going a little off the road, on
the pretence of a necessary purpose, they stabbed him to death. Such
was the end of Hermeias, whose punishment was by no means equal to his
crimes. Thus freed from much fear and embarrassment, the king set out
on his march home amidst universal manifestations from the people of
the country in favour of his measures and policy; but nothing was more
emphatically applauded in the course of his progress than the removal
of Hermeias. In Apameia, at the same time, the women stoned the wife of
Hermeias to death, and the boys his sons.
[Sidenote: Attempted treason of Achaeus.]
+57.+ When he had reached home and had dismissed his troops into
winter quarters, Antiochus sent a message to Achaeus, protesting
against his assumption of the diadem and royal title, and warning him
that he was aware of his dealings with Ptolemy, and of his restless
intrigues generally. For while the king was engaged on his expedition
against Artabazanes, Achaeus, being persuaded that Antiochus would
fall, or that, if he did not fall, would be so far off, that it would
be possible for him to invade Syria before his return, and with the
assistance of the Cyrrhestae, who were in revolt against the king,
seize the kingdom, started from Lydia with his whole army; and on
arriving at Laodiceia, in Phrygia, assumed the diadem, and had the
audacity for the first time to adopt the title of king, and to send
royal despatches to the cities, the exile Garsyeris being his chief
adviser in this measure. But as he advanced farther and farther, and
was now almost at Lycaonia, a mutiny broke out among his forces,
arising from the dissatisfaction of the men at the idea of being led
against their natural king. When Achaeus found that this disturbed
state of feeling existed among them, he desisted from his enterprise;
and wishing to make his men believe that he had never had any intention
of invading Syria, he directed his march into Pisidia, and plundered
the country. By thus securing large booty for his army he conciliated
its affection and confidence, and then returned to his own Satrapy.
[Sidenote: War with Ptolemy, B.C. 219.]
[Sidenote: Apollophanes advises that they begin by taking Seleucia.]
+58.+ Every detail of these transactions was known to the king:
who, while sending frequent threatening messages to Achaeus, was
now concentrating all his efforts on the preparations for the war
against Ptolemy. Having accordingly mustered his forces at Apameia
just before spring, he summoned his friends to advise with him as to
the invasion of Coele-Syria. After many suggestions had been made in
respect to this undertaking, touching the nature of the country, the
military preparation required, and the assistance to be rendered by the
fleet,—Apollophanes of Seleucia, whom I mentioned before, put an abrupt
end to all these suggestions by remarking that “it was folly to desire
Coele-Syria and to march against that, while they allowed Seleucia to
be held by Ptolemy, which was the capital, and so to speak, the very
inner shrine of the king’s realm. Besides the disgrace to the kingdom
which its occupation by the Egyptian monarchs involved, it was a
position of the greatest practical importance, as a most admirable base
of operations. Occupied by the enemy it was of the utmost hindrance
to all the king’s designs; for in whatever direction he might have it
in his mind to move his forces, his own country, owing to the fear
of danger from this place, would need as much care and precaution
as the preparations against his foreign enemies. Once taken, on the
other hand, not only would it perfectly secure the safety of the home
district, but was also capable of rendering effective aid to the king’s
other designs and undertakings, whether by land or sea, owing to its
commanding situation.” His words carried conviction to the minds of
all, and it was resolved that the capture of the town should be their
first step. For Seleucia was still held by a garrison for the Egyptian
kings; and had been so since the time of Ptolemy Euergetes, who took it
when he invaded Syria to revenge the murder of Berenice.
+59.+ In consequence of this decision, orders were sent to Diognetus
the commander of the fleet to sail towards Seleucia: while Antiochus
himself started from Apameia with his army, and encamped near the
Hippodrome, about five stades from the town. He also despatched
Theodotus Hemiolius with an adequate force against Coele-Syria, with
orders to occupy the passes and to keep the road open for him.
[Sidenote: Description of Seleucia.]
The situation of Seleucia and the natural features of the surrounding
country are of this kind. The city stands on the sea coast between
Cilicia and Phoenicia; and has close to it a very great mountain called
Coryphaeus, which on the west is washed by the last waves of the sea
which lies between Cyprus and Phoenicia; while its eastern slopes
overlook the territories of Antioch and Seleucia. It is on the southern
skirt of this mountain that the town of Seleucia lies, separated from
it by a deep and difficult ravine. The town extends down to the sea
in a straggling line broken by irregularities of the soil, and is
surrounded on most parts by cliffs and precipitous rocks. On the side
facing the sea, where the ground is level, stand the market-places, and
the lower town strongly walled. Similarly the whole of the main town
has been fortified by walls of a costly construction, and splendidly
decorated with temples and other elaborate buildings. There is only
one approach to it on the seaward side, which is an artificial ascent
cut in the form of a stair, interrupted by frequently occurring drops
and awkward places. Not far from the town is the mouth of the river
Orontes, which rises in the district of Libanus and Anti-Libanus, and
after traversing the plain of Amyca reaches Antioch; through which it
flows, and carrying off by the force of its current all the sewage
of that town, finally discharges itself into this sea not far from
Seleucia.
[Sidenote: Capture of Seleucia.]
+60.+ Antiochus first tried sending messages to the magistrates of
Seleucia, offering money and other rewards on condition of having the
city surrendered without fighting. And though he failed to persuade the
chief authorities, he corrupted some of the subordinate commanders;
and relying on them, he made preparations to assault the town on the
seaward side with the men of his fleet, and on the land side with
his soldiers. He divided his forces therefore into three parts, and
addressed suitable words of exhortation to them, causing a herald to
proclaim a promise to men and officers alike of great gifts and crowns
that should be bestowed for gallantry in action. To the division under
Zeuxis he entrusted the attack upon the gate leading to Antioch; to
Hermogenes that upon the walls near the temple of Castor and Pollux;
and to Ardys and Diognetus the assault upon the docks and the lower
town: in accordance with his understanding with his partisans in the
town, whereby it had been agreed that, if he could carry the lower
town by assault, the city also should then be put into his hands. When
the signal was given, a vigorous and determined assault was begun
simultaneously at all these points: though that made by Ardys and
Diognetus was by far the most daring; for the other points did not
admit of any assault at all by means of scaling ladders, nor could
be carried except by the men climbing up on their hands and knees;
while at the docks and lower town it was possible to apply scaling
ladders and fix them firmly and safely against the walls. The naval
contingent therefore having fixed their ladders on the docks, and the
division of Ardys theirs upon the lower town, a violent effort was
made to carry the walls: and the garrison of the upper town being
prevented from coming to the assistance of these places, because the
city was being assaulted at every other point at the same time, Ardys
was not long before he captured the lower town. No sooner had this
fallen, than the subordinate officers who had been corrupted hurried
to the commander-in-chief Leontius, and urged that he ought to send
ambassadors to Antiochus, and make terms with him, before the city was
taken by storm. Knowing nothing about the treason of these officers,
but alarmed by their consternation, Leontius sent commissioners to the
king to make terms for the safety of all within the city.
+61.+ The king accepted the proposal and agreed to grant safety to
all in the town who were free, amounting to six thousand souls. And
when he took over the town, he not only spared the free, but also
recalled those of the inhabitants who had been exiled, and restored to
them their citizenship and property; while he secured the harbour and
citadel with garrisons.
[Sidenote: Theodotus turns against Ptolemy. See ch. 46.]
While still engaged in this business, he received a letter from
Theodotus offering to put Coele-Syria into his hands, and inviting
him to come thither with all speed. This letter caused him great
embarrassment and doubt as to what he ought to do, and how best to
take advantage of the offer. This Theodotus was an Aetolian who, as I
have already narrated, had rendered important services to Ptolemy’s
kingdom: for which, far from being reckoned deserving of gratitude, he
had been in imminent danger of his life, just about the time of the
expedition of Antiochus against Molon. Thereupon conceiving a contempt
for Ptolemy, and a distrust of his courtiers, he seized upon Ptolemais
with his own hands, and upon Tyre by the agency of Panaetolus, and made
haste to invite Antiochus. Postponing therefore his expedition against
Achaeus, and regarding everything else as of secondary importance,
Antiochus started with his army by the same route as he had come. After
passing the cañon called Marsyas, he encamped near Gerrha, close to the
lake which lies between the two mountains. Hearing there that Ptolemy’s
general Nicolaus was besieging Theodotus in Ptolemais, he left his
heavy-armed troops behind with orders to their leaders to besiege
Brochi,—the stronghold which commands the road along the lake,—and led
his light-armed troops forward himself, with the intention of raising
the siege of Ptolemais. But Nicolaus had already got intelligence
of the king’s approach; and had accordingly retired from Ptolemais
himself, and sent forward Diogoras the Cretan and Dorymenes the
Aetolian to occupy the passes at Berytus. The king therefore attacked
these men, and having easily routed them took up a position near the
pass.
[Sidenote: Antiochus invades Coele-Syria.]
+62.+ There he awaited the coming up of the remainder of his forces,
and, after addressing them in words befitting the occasion, continued
his advance with his entire army, full of courage and with high
hopes of success. When Theodotus and Panaetolus met him with their
partisans he received them graciously, and took over from them Tyre
and Ptolemais, and the war material which those cities contained. Part
of this consisted of forty vessels, of which twenty were decked and
splendidly equipped, and none with less than four banks of oars; the
other twenty were made up of triremes, biremes, and cutters. These he
handed over to the care of the Navarch Diognetus; and being informed
that Ptolemy had come out against him, and had reached Memphis, and
that all his forces were collected at Pelusium, and were opening the
sluices, and filling up the wells of drinking water, he abandoned the
idea of attacking Pelusium; but making a progress through the several
cities, endeavoured to win them over by force or persuasion to his
authority. Some of the less-fortified cities were overawed at his
approach and made no difficulty about submitting, but others trusting
to their fortifications or the strength of their situations held
out; and to these he was forced to lay regular siege and so wasted a
considerable time.
Though treated with such flagrant perfidy, the character of Ptolemy was
so feeble, and his neglect of all military preparations had been so
great, that the idea of protecting his rights with the sword, which was
his most obvious duty, never occurred to him.
[Sidenote: Active measures of Agathocles and Sosibius.]
+63.+ Agathocles and Sosibius, however, the leading ministers in the
kingdom at that time, took counsel together and did the best they could
with the means at their disposal, in view of the existing crisis.
They resolved to devote themselves to the preparations for war; and,
meanwhile, by embassies to try to retard the advance of Antiochus:
pretending to confirm him in the opinion he originally entertained
about Ptolemy, namely, that he would not venture to fight, but would
trust to negotiations, and the interposition of common friends, to
induce him to evacuate Coele-Syria. Having determined upon this policy,
Agathocles and Sosibius, to whom the whole business was entrusted, lost
no time in sending their ambassadors to Antiochus: and at the same time
they sent messages to Rhodes, Byzantium, and Cyzicus, not omitting the
Aetolians, inviting them to send commissioners to discuss the terms of
a treaty. The commissioners duly arrived, and by occupying the time
with going backwards and forwards between the two kings, abundantly
secured to these statesmen the two things which they wanted,—delay, and
time to make their preparations for war. They fixed their residence
at Memphis and there carried on these negotiations continuously. Nor
were they less attentive to the ambassadors from Antiochus, whom they
received with every mark of courtesy and kindness. But meanwhile they
were calling up and collecting at Alexandria the mercenaries whom
they had on service in towns outside Egypt; were despatching men to
recruit foreign soldiers; and were collecting provisions both for the
troops they already possessed, and for those that were coming in.
No less active were they in every other department of the military
preparations. They took turns in going on rapid and frequent visits to
Alexandria, to see that the supplies should in no point be inadequate
to the undertaking before them. The manufacture of arms, the selection
of men, and their division into companies, they committed to the care
of Echecrates of Thessaly and Phoxidas of Melita. With these they
associated Eurylochus of Magnesia, and Socrates of Boeotia, who were
also joined by Cnopias of Allaria. By the greatest good fortune they
had got hold of these officers, who, while serving with Demetrius and
Antigonus,[264] had acquired some experience of real war and actual
service in the field. Accordingly they took command of the assembled
troops, and made the best of them by giving them the training of
soldiers.
[Sidenote: Reorganisation of the army.]
+64.+ Their first measure was to divide them according to their country
and age, and to assign to each division its appropriate arms, taking
no account of what they had borne before. Next they broke up their
battalions and muster-rolls, which had been formed on the basis of
their old system of pay, and formed them into companies adapted to
the immediate purpose. Having effected this they began to drill the
men; habituating them severally not only to obey the words of command,
but also to the proper management of their weapons.[265] They also
frequently summoned general meetings at headquarters, and delivered
speeches to the men. The most useful in this respect were Andromachus
of Aspendus and Polycrates of Argos; because they had recently crossed
from Greece, and were still thoroughly imbued with the Greek spirit,
and the military ideas prevalent in the several states. Moreover, they
were illustrious on the score of their private wealth, as well as on
that of their respective countries; to which advantages Polycrates
added those of an ancient family, and of the reputation obtained by
his father Mnasiades as an athlete. By private and public exhortations
these officers inspired their men with a zeal and enthusiasm for the
struggle which awaited them.
+65.+ All these officers, too, had commands in the army suited to
their particular accomplishments. Eurylochus of Magnesia commanded
about three thousand men of what were called in the royal armies the
Agema, or Guard; Socrates of Boeotia had two thousand light-armed
troops under him; while the Achaean Phoxidas, and Ptolemy the son of
Thraseas, and Andromachus of Aspendus were associated in the duty of
drilling the phalanx and the mercenary Greek soldiers on the same
ground,—Andromachus and Ptolemy commanding the phalanx, Phoxidas
the mercenaries; of which the numbers were respectively twenty-five
thousand and eight thousand. The cavalry, again, attached to the court,
amounting to seven hundred, as well as that which was obtained from
Lybia or enlisted in the country, were being trained by Polycrates,
and were under his personal command: amounting in all to about three
thousand men. In the actual campaign the most effective service was
performed by Echecrates of Thessaly, by whom the Greek cavalry, which,
with the whole body of mercenary cavalry, amounted to two thousand
men, was splendidly trained. No one took more pains with the men under
his command than Cnopias of Allaria. He commanded all the Cretans, who
numbered three thousand, and among them a thousand Neo-Cretans,[266]
over whom he had set Philo of Cnossus. They also armed three thousand
Libyans in the Macedonian fashion, who were commanded by Ammonius of
Barce. The Egyptians themselves supplied twenty thousand soldiers
to the phalanx, and were under the command of Sosibius. A body of
Thracians and Gauls was also enrolled, four thousand being taken from
settlers in the country and their descendants, while two thousand had
been recently enlisted and brought over: and these were under the
command of Dionysius of Thrace. Such in its numbers, and in the variety
of the elements of which it was composed, was the force which was being
got ready for Ptolemy.
[Sidenote: Negotiations at Memphis, B.C. 219-218.]
+66.+ Meanwhile Antiochus had been engaged in the siege of Dura:[267]
but the strength of the place and the support given it by Nicolaus
prevented him from effecting anything; and as the winter was closing
in, he agreed with the ambassadors of Ptolemy to a suspension of
hostilities for four months, and promised that he would discuss the
whole question at issue in a friendly spirit. But he was as far as
possible from being sincere in this negotiation: his real object was
to avoid being detained any length of time from his own country, and
to be able to place his troops in winter quarters in Seleucia; because
Achaeus was now notoriously plotting against him, and without disguise
co-operating with Ptolemy. So having come to this agreement, Antiochus
dismissed the ambassadors with injunctions to acquaint him as soon as
possible with the decision of Ptolemy, and to meet him at Seleucia. He
then placed the necessary guards in the various strongholds, committed
to Theodotus the command-in-chief over them all, and returned home. On
his arrival at Seleucia he distributed his forces into their winter
quarters; and from that time forth took no pains to keep the mass of
his army under discipline, being persuaded that the business would
not call for any more fighting; because he was already master of some
portions of Coele-Syria and Phoenicia, and expected to secure the rest
by voluntary submission or by diplomacy: for Ptolemy, he believed,
would not venture upon a general engagement. This opinion was shared
also by the ambassadors: because Sosibius fixing his residence at
Memphis conducted his negotiations with them in a friendly manner;
while he prevented those who went backwards and forwards to Antiochus
from ever becoming eye-witnesses of the preparations that were being
carried on at Alexandria. Nay, even by the time that the ambassadors
arrived, Sosibius was already prepared for every eventuality.
[Sidenote: Antiochus’s case.]
[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s case.]
[Sidenote: Ptolemy, son of Lagus, B.C. 323-285.]
+67.+ Meanwhile Antiochus was extremely anxious to have as much the
advantage over the government of Alexandria in diplomatic argument as
he had in arms. Accordingly when the ambassadors arrived at Seleucia,
and both parties began, in accordance with the instructions of
Sosibius, to discuss the clauses of the proposed arrangement in detail,
the king made very light of the loss recently sustained by Ptolemy, and
the injury which had been manifestly inflicted upon him by the existing
occupation of Coele-Syria; and in the pleadings on this subject he
refused to look upon this transaction in the light of an injury at all,
alleging that the places belonged to him of right. He asserted that
the original occupation of the country by Antigonus the One-eyed, and
the royal authority exercised over it by Seleucus,[268] constituted an
absolutely decisive and equitable claim, in virtue of which Coele-Syria
belonged of right to himself and not to Ptolemy; for Ptolemy I. went to
war with Antigonus with the view of annexing this country, not to his
own government, but to that of Seleucus. But, above all, he pressed the
convention entered into by the three kings, Cassander, Lysimachus, and
Seleucus, when, after having conquered Antigonus,[269] they deliberated
in common upon the arrangements to be made, and decided that the whole
of Syria should belong to Seleucus. The commissioners of Ptolemy
endeavoured to establish the opposite case. They magnified the existing
injury, and dilated on its hardship; asserting that the treason of
Theodotus and the invasion of Antiochus amounted to a breach of
treaty-rights. They alleged the possession of these places in the reign
of Ptolemy, son of Lagus; and tried to show that Ptolemy had joined
Seleucus in the war on the understanding that he was to invest Seleucus
with the government of the whole of Asia, but was to take Coele-Syria
and Phoenicia for himself.
Such were the arguments brought forward by the two contracting parties
in the course of the embassies and counter-embassies and conferences.
There was no prospect, however, of arriving at any result, because the
controversy was conducted, not by the principals, but by the common
friends of both; and there was no one to intervene authoritatively to
check and control the caprice of the party which they might decide to
be in the wrong. But what caused the most insuperable difficulty was
the matter of Achaeus. For Ptolemy was eager that the terms of the
treaty should include him: while Antiochus would not allow the subject
to be so much as mentioned; and was indignant that Ptolemy should
venture to protect rebels, or bring such a point into the discussion at
all.
[Sidenote: Renewal of hostilities, B.C. 218.]
+68.+ The approach of spring found both sides weary of negotiations,
and with no prospect of coming to a conclusion. Antiochus therefore
began collecting his forces, with a view of making an invasion by
land and sea, and completing his conquest of Coele-Syria. On his part
Ptolemy gave the supreme management of the war to Nicolaus, sent
abundant provisions to Gaza, and despatched land and sea forces. The
arrival of these reinforcements gave Nicolaus courage to enter upon
the war: the commander of the navy promptly co-operating with him in
carrying out all his orders. This admiral was Perigenes, whom Ptolemy
sent out in command of the fleet, consisting of thirty fully decked
ships and more than four thousand ships of burden. Nicolaus was by
birth an Aetolian, and was the boldest and most experienced officer
in the service of Ptolemy. With one division of his army he hastened
to seize the pass at Platanus; with the rest, which he personally
commanded, he occupied the environs of Porphyrion; and there prepared
to resist the invasion of the king: the fleet being also anchored close
to him.
[Sidenote: Antiochus marches to Beirût.]
Meanwhile Antiochus had advanced as far as Marathus. On his way he had
received a deputation of Aradians, asking for an alliance; and had
not only granted their request, but had put an end to a quarrel which
they had amongst themselves, by reconciling those of them who lived
on the island with those who lived on the mainland. Starting from
Marathus he entered the enemy’s country near the promontory called
Theoprosopon, and advanced to Berytus, having seized Botrys on his way,
and burnt Trieres and Calamus. From Berytus he sent forward Nicarchus
and Theodotus with orders to secure the difficult passes near the river
Lyons; while he himself set his army in motion and encamped near the
river Damuras: Diognetus, the commander of his navy, coasting along
parallel with him all the while. Thence once more, taking with him the
divisions commanded by Theodotus and Nicarchus, which were the light
troops of the army, he set out to reconnoitre the pass occupied already
by Nicolaus. After thoroughly surveying the nature of the ground,
he retired to his camp for that day. But on the next, leaving his
heavy-armed troops in the charge of Nicarchus, he set out with the rest
of his forces to execute his design.
[Sidenote: The pass at Porphyrion.]
[Sidenote: carried by Antiochus.]
+69.+ At this point there is but a small and narrow space between
the foot of Libanus and the sea; and even that is intersected by a
steep and rugged spur, leaving only a narrow and difficult passage
along the very water’s edge. On this pass Nicolaus had taken up his
position; and having occupied some of the points by means of his large
numbers, and secured others by artificial works, he felt certain that
he would be able to prevent Antiochus from effecting an entrance. But
the king divided his army into three parts, of which he entrusted one
to Theodotus with orders to close with the enemy and force their way
along the skirts of Libanus; the second to Menedemus with urgent orders
to attempt the centre of the spur; while the third he put under the
command of Diocles, the military governor of Parapotamia, and ordered
them to keep close to the sea. He himself with his guard occupied a
central position, intending to superintend the whole action and give
help where it was wanted. At the same time Diognetus and Perigenes
made preparations for a sea-fight, coming as close as possible to the
shore, and endeavouring to make the battles at sea and on land present
the appearance of a single contest. A general advance having begun by
sea and land, at the same signal and word of command, the battle on the
sea was undecided, because the number of vessels on either side and
their equipment were about equal: but on land the troops of Nicolaus
got the best of it at first, from the advantage of their position.
But when Theodotus routed the men on the mountain skirts, and then
charged from the higher ground, Nicolaus’s men all turned and fled
precipitately. In this flight two thousand of them fell, and as many
were taken prisoners: the rest retreated towards Sidon. Though he now
had the better prospect of the two in the sea-fight; yet, when he saw
the defeat of the army on land, Perigenes turned his prows and made
good his retreat to the same place.
[Sidenote: The advance of Antiochus continued.]
[Sidenote: Philoteria.]
[Sidenote: Scythopolis.]
[Sidenote: Atabyrium.]
[Sidenote: Defections from Ptolemy.]
[Sidenote: Pella, Camus, Gephrus.]
+70.+ Thereupon Antiochus got his army on the march, and, arriving at
Sidon, encamped under its wall. He did not however venture to attempt
the town, because of the vast stores it contained and the number of
its ordinary inhabitants, as well as of the refugees who had collected
there. He therefore broke up his camp again, and continued his march
towards Philoteria: ordering Diognetus his navarch to sail back with
his ships to Tyre. Now Philoteria is situated right upon the shores
of the lake into which the river Jordan discharges itself, and from
which it issues out again into the plains surrounding Scythopolis. The
surrender of these two cities to him encouraged him to prosecute his
further designs; because the country subject to them was easily able to
supply his whole army with provisions, and everything necessary for the
campaign in abundance. Having therefore secured them by garrisons, he
crossed the mountain chain and arrived at Atabyrium, which is situated
upon a rounded hill, the ascent of which is more than fifteen stades
long. But on this occasion he managed to take it by an ambuscade and
stratagem. He induced the men of the town to come out to a skirmish,
and enticed their leading columns to a considerable distance; then
his troops suddenly turned from their pretended flight, and those who
were concealed rising from their ambush, he attacked and killed a
large number of the enemy; and finally, by pursuing close upon their
heels, and thus creating a panic in the town before he reached it, he
carried it as he had done others by assault. At this juncture Ceraeas,
one of Ptolemy’s officers, deserted to Antiochus, whose distinguished
reception caused great excitement in the minds of many other of the
enemy’s officers. At any rate, not long afterwards, Hippolochus of
Thessaly joined Antiochus with four hundred cavalry of Ptolemy’s army.
Having therefore secured Atabyrium also with a garrison, Antiochus
started once more and took over Pella, Camus, and Gephrus.
[Sidenote: Abila.]
[Sidenote: Gadara.]
[Sidenote: Rabbatamana.]
[Sidenote: Fall of Rabbatamana.]
[Sidenote: Samaria.]
[Sidenote: Antiochus goes into winter quarters, B.C. 218-217.]
+71.+ This unbroken stream of success caused the inhabitants of the
neighbouring Arabia to rouse each other up to take action; and they
unanimously joined Antiochus. With the additional encouragement and
supplies which they afforded he continued his advance; and, arriving
in the district of Galatis, made himself master of Abila, and the
relieving force which had thrown itself into that town, under the
command of Nicias, a friend and kinsman of Menneas. Gadara was the
only town now left, which is thought to be the strongest of any in
those parts. He therefore encamped under its walls and, bringing
siege-works to bear upon it, quickly terrified it into submission.
Then hearing that a strong force of the enemy were concentrated at
Rabbatamana in Arabia, and were pillaging and overrunning the territory
of those Arabians who had joined him, he threw everything else aside
and started thither; and pitched his camp at the foot of the high
ground on which that city stands. After going round and reconnoitring
the hill, and finding that it admitted of being ascended only at two
points, he led his army to them and set up his siege artillery at these
points. He put one set of siege-works under the care of Nicarchus, the
other under that of Theodotus: while he superintended both equally,
and observed the zeal shown by the two respectively. Great exertions
were accordingly made by each, and a continual rivalry kept up as
to which should be the first to make a breach in the wall opposite
their works: and the result was that both breaches were made with
unexpected rapidity; whereupon they kept making assaults night and
day, and trying every means to force an entrance, without an hour’s
intermission. But though they kept up these attempts continuously,
they failed to make any impression; until a prisoner showed them the
underground passage through which the besieged were accustomed to
descend to fetch water. They broke into this and stopped it up with
timber and stones and everything of that sort; and when this was done,
the garrison surrendered for want of water. Having thus got possession
of Rabbatamana, Antiochus left Nicarchus with an adequate garrison in
command of it; and sent the two deserters from Ptolemy, Hippolochus and
Ceraeas, with five thousand infantry, to Samaria: with orders to take
the government of the district and protect all who submitted to him.
He then started with his army for Ptolemais, where he was resolved to
winter.
[Sidenote: Asia Minor,[270]
+72.+ In the course of this same summer, the Pednelissians, being
besieged and reduced to great straits by the Selgians, B.C. 218. Relief
of Pednelissus.] sent messages to Achaeus asking for help: and upon
receiving a ready assent, continued to sustain the siege with great
spirit in reliance upon this hope of relief. Achaeus selected Garsyeris
to conduct the expedition; and sent him out in all haste, with six
thousand infantry and five hundred horse, to relieve the Pednelissians.
But when they heard of the approach of the army of relief, the Selgians
occupied the pass called the Stair with the main body of their own
army; and put a garrison at the entrance into Saperda: breaking up
and spoiling all the paths and tracks leading to it. After entering
Milyades and encamping under the walls of Cretopolis, perceiving that
a farther advance was made impossible by the occupation of these
positions by the enemy, Garsyeris hit upon the following ruse. He broke
up his camp, and began his return march, as though he had abandoned
all thoughts of relieving Pednelissus, owing to the enemy’s occupation
of these positions. The Selgians were readily persuaded that he had
really abandoned the relief of Pednelissus, and departed, some to the
besieging camp and others home to Selge, as it was now close upon
harvest-time. Thereupon Garsyeris faced about, and, marching with great
speed, arrived at the pass over the mountain; and finding it unguarded,
secured it by a garrison, under the command of Phayllus; while he
himself with his main army went to Perga: and thence sent embassies
to the other states in Pisidia and Pamphylia, pointing out that the
power of the Selgians was a standing menace, and urging all to ally
themselves with Achaeus and join in relieving Pednelissus.
+73.+ Meanwhile the Selgians had sent out a general in command of
a force which they hoped would terrify Phallyus by their superior
knowledge of the country, and expel him from his strong position.
But when, far from attaining their object, they lost large numbers
of men in their attacks upon him; though they abandoned the hope
of accomplishing this, they yet persisted with increased ardour in
the siege of Pednelissus. Garsyeris was now reinforced by eight
thousand hoplites from the Etennes, who inhabit the highlands of
Pisidia above Side, and half that number from Aspendus. The people of
Side itself, partly from a wish to curry favour with Antiochus, but
chiefly from hatred to the Aspendians, refused to take part in the
relief of Pednelissus. With these reinforcements, as well as his own
army, Garsyeris advanced towards Pednelissus, feeling certain that he
would be able to raise the siege at the first attack: but when the
Selgians showed no sign of alarm, he entrenched himself at a moderate
distance from them. The Pednelissians were now becoming hard pressed
from want of provisions; and Garsyeris, being anxious to do all he
could, got ready two thousand men, giving each a medimnus of wheat,
and despatched them under cover of night into Pednelissus. But the
Selgians getting intelligence of what was going on, and, coming out
to intercept them, most of those who were carrying in the corn were
killed, and the Selgians got possession of the wheat. Elated with
this success, they now essayed to storm the camp of Garsyeris as well
as the city. An adventurous daring in the presence of the enemy is
indeed characteristic of the Selgians: and on this occasion they left
a barely sufficient number to guard their camp; and, surrounding the
enemy’s entrenchment with the rest, assaulted it at several points at
once. Finding himself unexpectedly attacked on every side, and portions
of his palisade being already torn down, Garsyeris, appreciating the
gravity of the danger, and feeling that there was but little chance
of averting total destruction, sent out some cavalry at a point which
the enemy had left unguarded. These the Selgians imagined to be flying
in a panic and for fear of what was coming: and therefore, instead of
attending to them, they treated them with utter contempt. When these
horsemen, however, had ridden round, so as to get on the rear of the
enemy, they charged and fought with great fierceness. This raised the
spirits of Garsyeris’s infantry, though they had already given way:
and they therefore faced round, and once more offered resistance to
the troops that were storming their camp. The Selgians, accordingly,
being now attacked on front and rear at once, broke and fled. At the
same time the Pednelissians sallied out and attacked the troops left in
charge of the Selgian camp, and drove them out. The pursuit lasted to
so great a distance that no less than ten thousand of the Selgian army
fell: of the survivors all who were allies fled to their own cities;
while the Selgians themselves escaped over the highlands into their
native land.
[Sidenote: Panic at Selge.]
[Sidenote: Logbasis turns traitor.]
+74.+ Garsyeris immediately started in pursuit of the fugitives, being
in haste to get over the narrow pass, and approach Selge, before they
could make a stand, and form any plan for meeting his approach. Thus he
came to Selge with his army. But the inhabitants, having no longer any
hopes in their allies, after the disaster which had affected them all
alike, and themselves dispirited at the misfortune which had befallen
them, became exceedingly anxious for the safety of themselves and their
country. They accordingly determined in public assembly to send one
of their citizens on an embassy to Gassyeris, and selected for the
purpose Logbasis, who had been for a long time on terms of intimacy
and friendship with the Antiochus that lost his life in Thrace.[271]
Laodice,[272] also, who became afterwards the wife of Achaeus, having
been committed to his care, he had brought this young lady up as his
daughter, and had treated her with conspicuous kindness. The Selgians
therefore thought that his character made him eminently fitted for
an ambassador in the circumstances, and accordingly sent him on the
mission. He, however, obtained a private interview with Garsyeris,
and was so far from carrying out the purpose for which he came, by
properly supporting the interests of his country, that on the contrary
he strongly urged Garsyeris to send with all speed for Achaeus, and
undertook to put the city into their hands. Garsyeris, of course,
grasped eagerly at the chance offered to him and sent messengers to
induce Achaeus to come, and to inform him of the position of affairs.
Meanwhile he concluded an armistice with the Selgians, and protracted
the negotiations for a treaty by continually bringing forward
objections and scruples on points of detail, in order to give time for
the arrival of Achaeus, and for Logbasis to conduct his negotiations
and mature his plot.
+75.+ While this was going on frequent meetings for discussion took
place between the camp and the town, and it became quite an ordinary
thing for the soldiers to go into the town to purchase corn. This is
a state of things which has on many occasions proved fatal. And it
appears to me that of all animals the most easily deceived is man,
though he has the credit of being the most cunning. For consider how
many entrenched camps and fortresses, how many and what great cities
have been betrayed by this kind of trick! And yet in spite of such
frequent and conspicuous examples of the many people to whom it has
happened, somehow or another we are always new to such deceit, and
fall into the trap with the inexperience of youth. The reason is that
we do not keep ready for reference in our minds the disasters of those
who have made mistakes before us in this or that particular. But while
preparing with great labour and cost stores of corn and money, and a
provision of walls and weapons to meet unforeseen eventualities, that
which is the easiest of all and the most serviceable in the hour of
danger—that we all neglect; although we might obtain this experience
from history and research, which in themselves add a dignity to leisure
and a charm to existence.
[Sidenote: Failure of the treason of Logbasis.]
Achaeus then duly arrived at the time expected: and after conference
with him, the Selgians had great hopes of experiencing some signal
kindness at his hands. But in the interval Logbasis had little by
little collected in his house some of the soldiers who came into the
town from the camp; and now advised the citizens not to let slip
the opportunity, but to act with the display of Achaeus’s kindly
disposition towards them before their eyes; and to put the finishing
stroke to the treaty, after holding a general assembly of the whole
community to discuss the situation. An assembly was at once convened,
to which even those on guard were all summoned to assist in bringing
the treaty to completion; and the citizens began deliberating on the
state of affairs.
+76.+ Meanwhile Logbasis, who had agreed with the enemy to take that
opportunity, began getting ready those who had congregated at his
house, and prepared and armed himself and his sons also for the fight.
And now Achaeus with half the hostile force was advancing towards the
city itself; while Garsyeris with the remainder was marching towards
the Cesbedium as it is called, or temple of Zeus, which stands in a
position commanding the city and presenting very much the appearance of
a citadel. But a goatherd, having by chance observed what was going on,
brought the news to the assembly; thereupon some of the citizens made a
hurried rush to the Cesbedium, others to their posts on the wall, and
the majority in great anger to the house of Logbasis. His treasonable
practice being thus detected, some of them climbed upon the roof,
others forced their way in by the front door, and murdered Logbasis
and his sons and all the other men which they found there at the same
time. Then they caused a proclamation to be made promising freedom to
all slaves who would join them: and dividing themselves into three
companies, they hastened to defend all the points of vantage. When he
saw that the Cesbedium was already occupied, Garsyeris abandoned his
enterprise; but Achaeus held on his way until he came right up to the
gates: whereupon the Selgians sallied out, killed seven hundred, and
forced the rest to give up the attempt. Upon this conclusion of their
enterprise, Achaeus and Garsyeris retired to the camp. But the Selgians
fearing treason among themselves, and alarmed at the presence of a
hostile camp, sent out some of their elders in the guise of suppliants,
and concluded a peace, on condition of paying four hundred talents on
the spot and restoring the Pednelissians whom they had taken prisoners,
and paying a further sum of three hundred talents at a fixed date. Thus
did the Selgians by their own valour save their country, which they had
been in danger of losing through the infamous treason of Logbasis; and
thus neither disgraced their freedom, nor their relationship to the
Lacedaemonians.[273]
+77.+ But after reducing Milyas, and the greater part of Pamphylia,
Achaeus took his departure, and arriving at Sardis kept up a continuous
warfare with Attalus, and began threatening Prusias, and making himself
an object of terror and alarm to all the inhabitants on this side
Taurus.
[Sidenote: The expedition of Attalus to recover cities which had joined
Achaeus.]
But while Achaeus was engaged on his expedition against Selge, Attalus
with the Aegosagae from Gaul was going through all the cities in
Aeolis, and the neighbourhood, which had before this been terrified
into joining Achaeus; but most of which now voluntarily and even
gratefully gave in their adherence to him, though there were some few
which waited to be forced. Now the cities which transferred their
allegiance to him in the first instance were Cyme, Smyrna, and Phocaea;
after them Aegae and Temnus submitted, in terror at his approach; and
thereupon he was waited upon by ambassadors from Teos and Colophon with
offers to surrender themselves and their cities. He received them also
upon the same terms as they had enjoyed before, taking hostages; but
he treated the ambassadors from Smyrna with special kindness, because
they had been the most constant in their loyalty of all. Continuing his
march without interruption, he crossed the Lycus and arrived at the
hamlets of Mysia, and thence came to Carseae. Overawing the inhabitants
of this town, as well as the garrison of the Two Walls, he got them
surrendered to him by Themistocles, who had been, as it happened, left
by Achaeus in command of this district. Starting thence, and wasting
the plain of Apia, he crossed Mount Pelecas and encamped near the river
Megistus.
[Sidenote: Mutiny of the Gauls.]
+78.+ While he was here an eclipse of the moon occurred: and the
Gauls who had all along been much discontented at the hardships of
the march,—which was rendered the more painful for them by the fact
of their being accompanied by their wives and children, who followed
the host in waggons,—now regarded the eclipse as an evil augury, and
refused to go on. But King Attalus, who got no effective service out
of them, and saw that they straggled during the march and encamped
by themselves, and wholly declined to obey orders and despised all
authority, was in great doubt as to what to do. He was anxious less
they should desert to Achaeus, and join in an attack upon himself:
and was at the same time uneasy at the scandal to which he would give
rise, if he caused his soldiers to surround and kill all these men, who
were believed to have crossed into Asia in reliance on his honour. He
therefore seized the occasion of their refusal to proceed, to promise
them that he would see that they were taken back to the place where
they had crossed into Asia; would assign them suitable lands for a
settlement; and would afterwards do them any service they asked for, if
it was within his power and consistent with justice.
Accordingly Attalus led the Aegosagae back to the Hellespont; and after
negotiations with the people of Lampsacus, Ilium, and Alexandria,
conducted in a friendly spirit because they had preserved their loyalty
to him, he returned with his army to Pergamum.
[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s army: 70,000 infantry, 5000 cavalry, 73 elephants.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Antiochus and Ptolemy recommence hostilities in
the spring.]
[Sidenote: The army of Antiochus: 62,000 infantry, 6000 cavalry, 102
elephants.]
+79.+ At the beginning of the following spring, having all preparations
for war completed, Antiochus and Ptolemy determined to bring their
claims to Coele-Syria to the decision of a battle. Ptolemy accordingly
set out from Alexandria with seventy thousand infantry, five thousand
cavalry, and seventy three elephants. Being informed of his approach,
Antiochus drew his forces together. These consisted of Daae, Carmani,
and Cilicians, equipped as light armed troops to the number of about
five thousand, under the charge and command of Byttacus the Macedonian.
Under Theodotus, the Aetolian, who had deserted from Ptolemy, were ten
thousand picked men from the whole kingdom, armed in the Macedonian
fashion, most of whom had silver shields. The number of the phalanx
was twenty thousand, and they were led by Nicarchus and Theodotus
Hemiolius. In addition to these there were Agrianes and Persians, who
were either bowmen or slingers, to the number of two thousand. With
them were a thousand Thracians, under the command of Menedemus of
Alabanda. There was also a mixed force of Medes, Cissians, Cadusians,
and Carmanians, amounting to five thousand men, who were assigned to
the chief command of Aspasianus the Mede. Certain Arabians also and men
of neighbouring tribes, to the number of ten thousand, were commanded
by Zabdibelus. The mercenaries from Greece amounting to five thousand
were led by Hippolochus of Thessaly. Antiochus had also fifteen hundred
Cretans who came with Eurylochus, and a thousand Neo-Cretans commanded
by Zelys of Gortyna; with whom were five hundred javelin men of Lydia,
and a thousand Cardaces who came with Lysimachus the Gaul. The entire
number of his horse was six thousand; four thousand were commanded by
the king’s nephew Antipater, the rest by Themison; so that the whole
number of Antiochus’s force was sixty-two thousand infantry, six
thousand cavalry, and one hundred and two elephants.
[Sidenote: Ptolemy enters Palestine.]
+80.+ Having marched to Pelusium Ptolemy made his first halt in that
town: and having been there joined by the stragglers, and having given
out their rations of corn to his men, he got the army in motion, and
led them by a line of march which goes through the waterless region
skirting Mount Casius and the Marshes.[274] On the fifth day’s march
he reached his destination, and pitched his camp a distance of fifty
stades from Rhaphia, which is the first city of Coele-Syria towards
Egypt.
[Sidenote: Antiochus goes to meet him.]
While Ptolemy was effecting this movement Antiochus arrived with his
army at Gaza, where he was joined by some reinforcements, and once
more commenced his advance, proceeding at a leisurely pace. He passed
Rhaphia and encamped about ten stades from the enemy. For a while the
two armies preserved this distance, and remained encamped opposite each
other. But after some few days, wishing to remove to more advantageous
ground and to inspire confidence in his troops, Antiochus pushed
forward his camp so much nearer Ptolemy, that the palisades of the two
camps were not more than five stades from each other; and while in this
position, there were frequent struggles at the watering-places and on
forays, as well as infantry and cavalry skirmishes in the space between
the camps.
[Sidenote: Daring attempt of Theodotus to assassinate Ptolemy.]
+81.+ In the course of these proceedings Theodotus conceived and put
into execution an enterprise, very characteristic of an Aetolian, but
undoubtedly requiring great personal courage. Having formerly lived
at Ptolemy’s court he knew the king’s tastes and habits. Accordingly,
accompanied by two others, he entered the enemy’s camp just before
daybreak; where, owing to the dim light, he could not be recognised
by his face, while his dress and other accoutrements did not render
him noticeable, owing to the variety of costume prevailing among
themselves. He had marked the position of the king’s tent during the
preceding days, for the skirmishes took place quite close; and he
now walked boldly up to it, and passed through all the outer ring of
attendants without being observed: but when he came to the tent in
which the king was accustomed to transact business and dine, though he
searched it in every conceivable way, he failed to find the king; for
Ptolemy slept in another tent, separate from the public and official
tent. He however wounded two men who were sleeping there, and killed
Andreas, the king’s physician; and then returned safely to his own
camp, without meeting with any molestation, except just as he was
passing over the vallum of the enemy’s camp. As far as daring went, he
had fulfilled his purpose: but he had failed in prudence by not taking
the precaution to ascertain where Ptolemy was accustomed to sleep.
[Sidenote: Disposition of the two armies for the battle of Rhaphia.]
+82.+ After being encamped opposite each other for five days, the two
kings resolved to bring matters to the decision of battle. And upon
Ptolemy beginning to move his army outside its camp, Antiochus hastened
to do the same. Both formed their front of their phalanx and men armed
in the Macedonian manner. But Ptolemy’s two wings were formed as
follows:—Polycrates, with the cavalry under his command, occupied the
left, and between him and the phalanx were Cretans standing close by
the horsemen; next them came the royal guard;[275] then the peltasts
under Socrates, adjoining the Libyans armed in Macedonian fashion.
On the right wing was Echecrates of Thessaly, with his division of
cavalry; on his left were stationed Gauls and Thracians; next them
Phoxidas and the Greek mercenaries, extending to the Egyptian phalanx.
Of the elephants forty were on the left wing, where Ptolemy was to be
in person during the battle; the other thirty-three had been stationed
in front of the right wing opposite the mercenary cavalry.
Antiochus also placed sixty of his elephants commanded by his
foster-brother Philip in front of his right wing, on which he was to
be present personally, to fight opposite Ptolemy. Behind these he
stationed the two thousand cavalry commanded by Antipater, and two
thousand more at right angles to them.
In line with the cavalry he placed the Cretans, and next them the Greek
mercenaries; with the latter he mixed two thousand of these armed in
the Macedonian fashion under the command of the Macedonian Byttacus.
At the extreme point of the left wing he placed two thousand cavalry
under the command of Themison; by their side Cardacian and Lydian
javelin-men; next them the light-armed division of three thousand,
commanded by Menedemus; then the Cissians, Medes, and Carmanians; and
by their side the Arabians and neighbouring peoples who continued the
line up to the phalanx. The remainder of the elephants he placed in
front of his left wing under the command of Myiscus, one of the boys
about the court.
[Sidenote: Addresses to the two armies before the battle of Rhaphia.]
+83.+ The two armies having been drawn up in the order I have
described; the kings went along their respective lines, and addressed
words of encouragement and exhortation to their officers and friends.
But as they both rested their strongest hopes on their phalanx, they
showed their greatest earnestness and addressed their strongest
exhortations to them; which were re-echoed in Ptolemy’s case by
Andromachus and Sosibius and the king’s sister Arsinoe; in the case
of Antiochus by Theodotus and Nicarchus: these officers being the
commanders of the phalanx in the two armies respectively. The substance
of what was said on both sides was the same: for neither monarch had
any glorious or famous achievement of his own to quote to those whom he
was addressing, seeing that they had but recently succeeded to their
crowns; but they endeavoured to inspire the men of the phalanx with
spirit and boldness, by reminding them of the glory of their ancestors,
and the great deeds performed by them. But they chiefly dwelt upon the
hopes of advancement which the men might expect at their hands in the
future; and they called upon and exhorted the leaders and the whole
body of men, who were about to be engaged, to maintain the fight with a
manly and courageous spirit. So with these or similar words, delivered
by their own lips or by interpreters, they rode along their lines.
[Sidenote: The battle of Rhaphia.]
+84.+ Ptolemy, accompanied by his sister, having arrived at the left
wing of his army, and Antiochus with the royal guard at the right: they
gave the signal for the battle, and opened the fight by a charge of
elephants. Only some few of Ptolemy’s elephants came to close quarters
with the foe: seated on these the soldiers in the howdahs maintained
a brilliant fight, lunging at and striking each other with crossed
pikes.[276] But the elephants themselves fought still more brilliantly,
using all their strength in the encounter, and pushing against each
other, forehead to forehead.
[Sidenote: Fighting elephants.]
[Sidenote: Antiochus’s right wing successful.]
The way in which elephants fight is this: they get their tusks
entangled and jammed, and then push against one another with all their
might, trying to make each other yield ground until one of them proving
superior in strength has pushed aside the other’s trunk; and when once
he can get a side blow at his enemy, he pierces him with his tusks as
a bull would with his horns. Now, most of Ptolemy’s animals, as is the
way with Libyan elephants, were afraid to face the fight: for they
cannot stand the smell or the trumpeting of the Indian elephants, but
are frightened at their size and strength, I suppose, and run away from
them at once without waiting to come near them. This is exactly what
happened on this occasion: and upon their being thrown into confusion
and being driven back upon their own lines, Ptolemy’s guard gave way
before the rush of the animals; while Antiochus, wheeling his men
so as to avoid the elephants, charged the division of cavalry under
Polycrates. At the same time the Greek mercenaries stationed near the
phalanx, and behind the elephants, charged Ptolemy’s peltasts and made
them give ground, the elephants having already thrown their ranks also
into confusion. Thus Ptolemy’s whole left wing began to give way before
the enemy.
[Sidenote: Ptolemy’s right wing also successful.]
[Sidenote: The centre coming into action. Ptolemy is victorious.]
[Sidenote: Final retreat of Antiochus.]
+85.+ Echecrates the commander of the right wing waited at first
to see the result of the struggle between the other wings of the
two armies: but when he saw the dust coming his way, and that the
elephants opposite his division were afraid even to approach the
hostile elephants at all, he ordered Phoxidas to charge the part of the
enemy opposite him with his Greek mercenaries; while he made a flank
movement with the cavalry and the division behind the elephants; and
so getting out of the line of the hostile elephants’ attack, charged
the enemy’s cavalry on the rear or the flank and quickly drove them
from their ground. Phoxidas and his men were similarly successful: for
they charged the Arabians and Medes and forced them into precipitate
flight. Thus Antiochus’s right wing gained a victory, while his left
was defeated. The phalanxes, left without the support of either wing,
remained intact in the centre of the plain, in a state of alternate
hope and fear for the result. Meanwhile Antiochus was assisting in
gaining the victory on his right wing; while Ptolemy, who had retired
behind his phalanx, now came forward in the centre, and showing
himself in the view of both armies struck terror in the hearts of the
enemy, but inspired great spirit and enthusiasm in his own men; and
Andromachus and Sosibius at once ordered them to lower their sarissae
and charge. The picked Syrian troops stood their ground only for a
short time, and the division of Nicarchus quickly broke and fled.
Antiochus presuming, in his youthful inexperience, from the success of
his own division, that he would be equally victorious all along the
line, was pressing on the pursuit; but upon one of the older officers
at length giving him warning, and pointing out that the cloud of dust
raised by the phalanx was moving towards their own camp, he understood
too late what was happening; and endeavoured to gallop back with the
squadron of royal cavalry on to the field. But finding his whole line
in full retreat he was forced to retire to Rhaphia: comforting himself
with the belief that, as far as he was personally concerned, he had won
a victory, but had been defeated in the whole battle by the want of
spirit and courage shown by the rest.
[Sidenote: The losses on either side.]
+86.+ Having secured the final victory by his phalanx, and killed
large numbers of the enemy in the pursuit by means of his cavalry and
mercenaries on his right wing, Ptolemy retired to his own camp and
there spent the night. But next day, after picking up and burying his
own dead, and stripping the bodies of the enemy, he advanced towards
Rhaphia. Antiochus had wished, immediately after the retreat of his
army, to make a camp outside the city; and there rally such of his men
as had fled in compact bodies: but finding that the greater number had
retreated into the town, he was compelled to enter it himself also.
Next morning, however, before daybreak, he led out the relics of his
army and made the best of his way to Gaza. There he pitched a camp: and
having sent an embassy to obtain leave to pick up his dead, he obtained
a truce for performing their obsequies. His loss amounted to nearly ten
thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry killed, and four thousand
taken prisoners. Three elephants were killed on the field, and two died
afterwards of their wounds. On Ptolemy’s side the losses were fifteen
hundred infantry killed and seven hundred cavalry: sixteen of his
elephants were killed, and most of the others captured.
Such was the result of the battle of Rhaphia between kings Ptolemy and
Antiochus for the possession of Coele-Syria.
[Sidenote: The effect of the battle of Rhaphia.]
After picking up his dead Antiochus retired with his army to his own
country: while Ptolemy took over Rhaphia and the other towns without
difficulty, all the states vying with each other as to which should
be first to renew their allegiance and come over to him. And perhaps
it is the way of the world everywhere to accommodate one’s self to
circumstances at such times; but it is eminently true of the race
inhabiting that country, that they have a natural turn and inclination
to worship success. Moreover it was all the more natural in this
case, owing to the existing disposition of the people in favour of
the Alexandrian kings; for the inhabitants of Coele-Syria are somehow
always more loyally disposed to this family than to any other.
Accordingly they now stopped short of no extravagance of adulation,
honouring Ptolemy with crowns, sacrifices, and every possible
compliment of the kind.
[Sidenote: Peace between Ptolemy and Antiochus for a year, B.C. 217.]
+87.+ Meanwhile Antiochus, on arriving at the city which bears his
own name, immediately despatched an embassy to Ptolemy, consisting of
Antipater, his nephew, and Theodotus Hemiolius, to treat of a peace, in
great alarm lest the enemy should advance upon him. For his defeat had
inspired him with distrust of his own forces, and he was afraid that
Achaeus would seize the opportunity to attack him. It did not occur
to Ptolemy to take any of these circumstances into account: but being
thoroughly satisfied with his unexpected success, and generally at his
unlooked for acquisition of Coele-Syria, he was by no means indisposed
to peace; but even more inclined to it than he ought to have been:
influenced in that direction by the habitual effeminacy and corruption
of his manner of life. Accordingly, when Antipater and his colleague
arrived, after some little bluster and vituperation of Antiochus for
what had taken place, he agreed to a truce for a year. He sent Sosibius
back with the ambassadors to ratify the treaty: while he himself, after
remaining three months in Syria and Phoenicia, and settling the towns,
left Andromachus of Aspendus as governor of this district, and started
with his sister and friends for Alexandria: having brought the war to a
conclusion in a way that surprised his subjects, when they contrasted
it with the principles on which he spent the rest of his life.
Antiochus after exchanging ratifications of the treaty with Sosibius,
employed himself in making preparations for attacking Achaeus, as he
had originally begun doing. Such was the political situation in Asia.
[Sidenote: Earthquake at Rhodes. Royal liberality, B.C. 224.]
[Sidenote: Hiero and Gelo.]
+88.+ About the same period the earthquake occurred at Rhodes, which
overthrew the great Colossus and the larger part of the walls and
dockyards. But the adroit policy of the Rhodians converted this
misfortune into an opportunity; and under their skilful management,
instead of adding to their embarrassments, it became the means of
restoring their prosperity. So decisive in human affairs, public or
private, is the difference between incapacity and good sense, between
idle indifference and a close attention to business. Good fortune
only damages the one, while disaster is but a means of recovery to
the other. This was illustrated by the manner in which the Rhodians
turned the misfortune that befel them to account. They enhanced its
magnitude and importance by the prominence which they gave it, and the
serious tone in which they spoke of it, as well by the mouth of their
ambassadors as in the intercourse of private life; and they created
thus such an effect upon other states, and especially upon the feelings
of the kings, that they were not only overwhelmed with presents, but
made the donors feel actually obliged for their acceptance of them.
Hiero and Gelo, for instance, presented them with seventy-five talents
of silver, part at once, and the rest at a very short interval, as
a contribution towards the expenses of the gymnasium; gave them
for religious purposes some silver cauldrons and their stands, and
some water vessels; and in addition to this ten talents for their
sacrifices, and ten more to attract new citizens: their intention
being that the whole present should amount to a hundred talents.[277]
Not only so, but they gave immunity from customs to Rhodian merchants
coming to their ports; and presented them besides with fifty
catapults of three cubits length. In spite too of these large gifts,
they regarded themselves as under an obligation to the Rhodians;
and accordingly erected statues in the _Deigma_ or Mart of Rhodes,
representing the community of Rhodes crowned by that of Syracuse.
[Sidenote: Antigonus.]
+89.+ Then too Ptolemy offered them three hundred talents of silver;
a million medimni[278] of corn; [Sidenote: Ptolemy.] ship timber for
ten quinqueremes and ten triremes, consisting of forty thousand cubits
of squared pine planking; a thousand talents of bronze coinage; three
thousand talents[279] of tow; three thousand pieces of sail cloth;
three thousand talents for the repair of the Colossus; a hundred master
builders with three hundred and fifty workmen, and fourteen talents
yearly to pay their wages. Besides this he gave twelve thousand medimni
of corn for their public games and sacrifices, and twenty thousand
medimni for victualling ten triremes. The greater part of these goods
was delivered at once, as well as a third of the whole of the money
named. In a similar spirit Antigonus offered ten thousand timbers,
varying from sixteen to eight cubits in length, to be used as purlins;
five thousand rafters seven cubits long; three thousand talents of
iron; a thousand talents of pitch; a thousand amphorae of the same
unboiled; and a hundred talents of silver besides. His queen, Chryseis,
also gave a hundred thousand medimni of corn, and three thousand
talents of lead. Again Seleucus,[280] father of Antiochus, besides
granting freedom from imports to Rhodians sailing to his dominions,
and besides giving ten quinqueremes fully equipped, and two hundred
thousand medimni of corn; gave also ten thousand cubits of timber, and
a thousand talents of resin and hair.
[Sidenote: Other princes.]
+90.+ Nor were Prusias and Mithridates far behind these in liberality;
nor the princes Lysanias, Olympichus, and Lymnaeas, who were at that
time in power in different parts of Asia; and as for states that,
according to their several abilities contributed to their assistance,
it would be difficult to reckon their number. In fact, though when we
regard the time which it took the city to recover its populousness,
and the state of desolation from which it started, we cannot fail to
be struck at the rapidity and the extent of its improvement in regard
both to private and public wealth; yet when we contemplate the natural
advantages of its site, and the contributions from outside which served
to raise its fortunes to their original height, this feeling must give
way to a conviction that the advance was somewhat less than might have
been expected.
My object in giving these details is twofold. I wished to exhibit the
brilliant conduct of their public affairs by the Rhodians, for indeed
they deserve both to be commended and imitated: and I wished also to
point out the insignificance of the gifts bestowed by the kings of our
own day, and received by nations and states; that these monarchs may
not imagine that by the expenditure of four or five talents they are
doing anything so very great, or expect to receive at the hands of the
Greeks the honour enjoyed by former kings; and that states when they
see before their eyes the magnitude of the presents formerly bestowed,
may not, nowadays, in return for insignificant and paltry benefactions,
blindly bestow their most ample and splendid honours; but may use that
discrimination in apportioning their favours to desert, in which Greeks
excel the rest of the world.
[Sidenote: B.C. 217. Greece. Return of Lycurgus to Sparta. He projects
an invasion of Messenia.]
[Sidenote: The preparations of Aratus.]
+91.+ Just at the beginning of this summer, while Agetas was Strategus
of the Aetolians, and when Aratus had just become Strategus of the
Achaean league,—at which point we broke off in our history of the
Social war,[281]—Lycurgus of Sparta returned home from Aetolia. The
Ephors had discovered that the charge on which he had been banished
was false; and had accordingly sent for him back, and recalled him
from exile. He at once began making an arrangement with Pyrrhias the
Aetolian, who happened at the time to be commander in Elis, for an
invasion of Messenia. Now, when Aratus came into office, he found the
mercenary army of the league in a state of complete demoralisation, and
the cities very slack to pay the tax for their support, owing to the
bad and spiritless manner in which his predecessor Eperatus had managed
the affairs of the league. He, however, exhorted the members of the
league to reform, and obtained a decree dealing with this matter; and
then threw himself with energy into the preparations for the war. The
decree passed by the Achaeans ordered the maintenance of eight thousand
mercenary infantry and five hundred horse, together with three thousand
Achaean infantry and three hundred horse, enrolled in the usual way;
and that of these latter five hundred foot and fifty horse were to be
brazen-shield men from Megalopolis, and the same number of Argives.
It ordered also that three ships should be manned to cruise off Acte
and in the Argolic gulf, and three off Patrae and Dyme, and in the sea
there.
[Sidenote: The ill-success of Lycurgus.]
+92.+ While Aratus was engaged in these transactions, and in completing
these preparations, Lycurgus and Pyrrhias, after an interchange
of messages to secure their making their expedition at the same
time, marched into Messenia. The Achaean Strategus, aware of their
design, came with the mercenaries and some of the picked Achaeans to
Megalopolis, with the view of supporting the Messenians. After setting
out, Lycurgus got possession of Calamae, a stronghold in Messenia, by
treachery; and pressed hurriedly forward to effect a junction with the
Aetolians. But Pyrrhias had started from Elis with a wholly inadequate
force, and, having been easily stopped at the pass into Messenia by
the Cyparissians, had turned back. Lycurgus therefore being unable
to effect his junction with Pyrrhias, and not being strong enough by
himself, after assaulting Andania for a short time, returned back to
Sparta without having effected anything.
When the plot of the enemy had thus gone to pieces; Aratus, with a
provident regard for the future, arranged with Taurion to provide fifty
horse and five hundred foot, and with the Messenians to send an equal
number; with the view of using these men to protect the territories of
Messenia, Megalopolis, Tegea, and Argos,—for these districts, being
on the frontier of Laconia, have to bear the brunt of Lacedaemonian
invasion for the rest of the Peloponnese; while with the Achaean levies
and mercenaries he planned to guard the parts of Achaia which lay
towards Elis and Aetolia.
[Sidenote: Condition of Megalopolis.]
+93.+ After adjusting these matters, he settled in accordance with the
decree of the league the intestine disputes at Megalopolis. For it
happened that the people of this town having been recently deprived
of their country by Cleomenes,[282] and, to use a common expression,
shaken to their foundations, were in absolute want of many things,
and ill-provided with all: for they persisted in maintaining their
usual scale of living, while their means both public and private were
entirely crippled. The consequence was that the town was filled with
disputes, jealousies, and mutual hatred; which is ever the case,
both with states and individuals, when means fall short of desires.
The first controversy was about the walling of the town,—one party
maintaining that the limits of the city should be contracted to a size
admitting of being completely walled and guarded at a time of danger;
for that in the late occasion it was its size and unguarded state which
had caused their disaster. In addition to this it was maintained by
this party that the landowners should contribute the third part of
their land to provide for the enrolment of new citizens. The other
party rejected the notion of contracting the limits of the city and
would not consent to contribute a third part of their lands. But the
most serious controversy of all was in regard to the laws draughted for
them by Prytanis, an eminent Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus
Doson appointed to draw them up a constitution. In this distracted
state of politics, Aratus intervened with all the earnestness he
could command, and succeeded in pacifying the heated feelings of the
citizens. The terms on which the controversies were settled were
engraved on a column, and set up near the altar of Vesta in the
Homarium.[283]
[Sidenote: Another raid of Aetolians from Elis.]
[Sidenote: The Achaean fleet retaliates on Aetolia.]
+94.+ After arranging this settlement, Aratus broke up his camp; and
going on himself to the congress from of the Achaeans, handed over the
mercenaries to Lycus of Pharae, as the Sub-Strategus of the league. But
the Eleans, being dissatisfied with Pyrrhias, once more induced the
Aetolians to send them Euripidas; who, waiting until the Achaeans were
engaged in their congress, took sixty horse and two thousand foot, and
started on a raid. Having passed through the territory of Pharae, he
overran the country up to the territory of Aegium; and after securing
and driving off a considerable booty, he began a retreat towards
Leontium. But Lycus, learning what had happened, went in all haste to
protect the country; and falling in with the enemy, he attacked them
at once and killed four hundred and took two hundred prisoners, among
whom were the following men of rank: Physsias, Antanor, Clearchus,
Androlochus, Euanoridas, Aristogeiton, Nicasippus, and Aspasius. The
arms and baggage fell entirely into his hands. About the same time
the Navarch of the league having gone on an expedition to Molycria,
returned with nearly a hundred captives. Returning once more to Aetolia
he sailed to Chalceia and captured two war ships, with their crews,
which put out to resist him; and took also a long boat with its men on
the Aetolian Rhium. There being thus an influx of booty both by sea
and land at the same period, and a considerable amount of money and
provisions being obtained from this, the soldiers felt confident of
getting their pay, and the cities of the league were sanguine of not
being likely to be hard pressed by their contributions.
[Sidenote: Scerdilaidas the Illyrian plunders the coast.]
+95.+ While these events were taking place Scerdilaidas, thinking
that he was not being treated fairly, because some of the payments
agreed upon in his treaty with Philip were in arrear, sent out fifteen
galleys, treacherously pretending that their object was to receive
and convoy the money. These galleys sailed to Leucas, where they were
received by all as friendly, owing to their former alliance: but the
only mischief they had time to do was to make a treacherous attack
on the Corinthian Agathinus and Cassander, who had come there on
board Taurion’s ships, and were lying at anchor close to them with
four vessels. These they captured with their vessels and sent to
Scerdilaidas; and then putting out to sea from Leucas, and sailing
towards Malea, they plundered and captured the merchants whom they met.
[Sidenote: More raids.]
Harvest time was now approaching: and as Taurion paid little attention
to the protection of the cities I mentioned above; Aratus in person,
at the head of some picked Achaean troops, protected the getting in
of the harvest round Argos: while Euripidas at the head of a force of
Aetolians set out on a raid, with the object of ravaging the territory
of Tritaea. But when Lycus and Demodocus, the Hipparch of the league,
heard of the expedition of the Aetolians from Elis, they collected
the people of Dymae, Patrae and Pharae, and joining the mercenaries
to these forces made an incursion upon Elis. Arrived at a place
called Phyxium, they allowed their light-armed troops and their horse
to plunder the country, but kept their hoplites concealed near this
place: and when the Eleans had sallied out in full force to attack
the foraging parties, and were pursuing them as they retreated, the
hoplites with Lycus rose from their hiding-place and charged them
as they rushed heedlessly on. The Eleans did not stand against the
attack, but fled at the mere appearance of the hoplites: who killed two
hundred of them and took eighty prisoners, and carried off with them
in safety all the booty that had been driven in from the country. At
the same time the Navarch of the league made numerous descents upon
Calydonia and the territory of Naupactus; and not only overran the
country, but twice annihilated the force sent out to resist him. Among
others he took Cleonicus of Naupactus prisoner: who owing to this being
a proxenus of the Achaeans was not sold on the spot, and after some
little time was set free without ransom.
[Sidenote: Acarnania.]
+96.+ About the same time Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian
league, proclaimed a general levy of Aetolians, and went on a foraging
expedition into the territory of the Acarnanians. He marched through
all Epirus, plundering as he went without let or hindrance; after doing
which he returned home, and dismissed the Aetolian levy to their own
cities. But the Acarnanians, upon making a retaliatory invasion of
the territory of Stratus, were seized with a panic: and returned with
disgrace, though without loss; because the people of Stratus did not
venture to pursue them, believing that their retreat was a ruse to
cover an ambuscade.
[Sidenote: Phanoteus in Phocis. The biter bit.]
An instance of counter-treachery occurred also at Phanoteus. Alexander
who had been appointed governor of Phocis by Philip, entered into a
plot against the Aetolians, through the agency of a certain Jason, who
had been appointed by himself to command the city of Phanoteus. This
man sent a message to Agetas, the Strategus of the Aetolian league,
agreeing to hand over to him the citadel of Phanoteus; and he confirmed
his offer by a regularly sworn treaty. On the appointed day Agetas
came with his Aetolian levy to Phanoteus under cover of night; and
concealing the rest at some little distance, he selected a hundred
of the most active men and sent them towards the citadel. Jason had
Alexander all ready with his soldiers, but duly received the Aetolians
as he had sworn into the citadel. Immediately Alexander and his men
threw themselves into the citadel also: the Aetolian hundred picked
soldiers were made prisoners; and when daylight showed Agetas what had
taken place, he drew off his troops,—baffled by a ruse very like what
he had on many occasions practised himself.
[Sidenote: Philip’s campaign in Upper Macedonia and Thessaly.]
[Sidenote: Meliteia.]
+97.+ About this same period King Philip captured Bylazora, the largest
town of Paeonia, and very favourably situated for commanding the pass
from Dardania to Macedonia: so that by this achievement he was all
but entirely freed from any fear of the Dardani, it being no longer
easy for them to invade Macedonia, as long as this city gave Philip
the command of the pass. Having secured this place, he despatched
Chrysogonus with all speed to summon the upper Macedonians to arms;
while he himself, taking on the men of Bottia and Amphaxitis, arrived
at Edessa. Waiting there until he was joined by the Macedonians under
Chrysogonus, he started with his whole army, and on the sixth day’s
march arrived at Larisa; and thence by a rapid night march he came
before daybreak to Meliteia, and placing scaling ladders against the
walls, attempted to take the town by escalade. The suddenness and
unexpectedness of the attack so dismayed the people of Meliteia, that
he would easily have taken the town; but he was baffled by the fact of
the ladders proving to be far too short.
+98.+ This is the kind of mistake which above all others reflects
discredit on the commanders. For what can be more culpable than to
arrive at a town which they mean to carry, in an entirely unprovided
state, without having taken the precaution of measuring walls, cliffs,
and the like, by which they intend to effect their entrance? Or again,
while satisfying themselves as to these measurements, to entrust
the construction of ladders and all such machinery, which, though
taking little time to make, have to stand the test of a very critical
service, without consideration, and to incompetent persons,—is not
this deserving of censure? For in such actions it is not a question of
succeeding or failing without ill consequences; but failure is followed
by positive damage in manifold respects: danger to the bravest of the
men at the actual time, and still greater danger during their retreat,
when they have once incurred the contempt of the enemy. The examples
of such disasters are numerous; for you will find that of those who
have failed in such attempts, many more have perished, or have been
reduced to the last extremity of danger, than have come off scatheless.
Moreover, no one can deny that they arouse distrust and hatred against
themselves for the future, and give all men warning to be on their
guard. For it is not only the persons attacked, but all who know what
has happened, who are thereby bidden to look out for themselves and be
on the watch. Wherefore it is never right for men in places of trust
to conduct such enterprises inconsiderately. The method also of taking
such measurements, and constructing machines of this kind, is easy and
liable to no mistakes, if they are taken in hand scientifically.
For the present, however, I must resume the thread of my narrative,
but I shall take another fitting opportunity in the course of my work
to speak of these matters, and will endeavour to show how mistakes may
best be avoided in such undertakings.
[Sidenote: Thebae Phthiotides, B.C. 217.]
+99.+ Thus baffled in his attempt upon Meliteia, Philip encamped upon
the bank of the Enipeus, and collected from Larisa and the other
cities the siege train which he had caused to be constructed during
the winter. For the chief object of his campaign was the capture of
the city called Phthiotid Thebes. Now this city lies no long way from
the sea, about thirty stades from Larisa, and is conveniently situated
in regard both to Magnesia and Thessaly; but especially as commanding
the district of Demetrias in Magnesia, and of Pharsalus and Pherae in
Thessaly. From it, at that very time, much damage was being inflicted
upon the Demetrians, Pharsalians, and Larisaeans; as the Aetolians
were in occupation of it, and made continual predatory expeditions,
often as far as to the plain of Amyrus. Philip did not regard the
matter as at all of small importance, but was exceedingly bent on
taking the town. Having therefore got together a hundred and fifty
catapults, and twenty-five stone-throwing ballistae, he sat down before
Thebes. He distributed his forces between three points in the vicinity
of the city; one was encamped near Scopium; a second near a place
called Heliotropium; and the third on the hill overhanging the town.
The spaces between these camps he fortified by a trench and double
palisade, and further secured them by towers of wood, at intervals of a
hundred feet, with an adequate guard. When these works were finished,
he collected all his siege train together and began to move his engines
towards the citadel.
[Sidenote: Thebes is taken, its inhabitants enslaved, and its name
changed to Philippopolis.]
+100.+ For the first three days the king was unable to make any
progress in bringing his machines against the town, owing to the
gallant and even desperate defence which the garrison opposed to him.
But when the continual skirmishing, and the volleys of missiles, had
began to tell upon the defenders, and some of them were killed and
others disabled by wounds; the defence becoming a little slacker, the
Macedonians began sinking mines, and at last after nine days' work
reached the walls. They then carried on the work by relays, so as never
to leave it off day or night: and thus in three days had undermined
and underpinned two hundred feet of the wall. The props, however,
proved too weak to support the weight, and gave way; so that the wall
fell without the Macedonians having the trouble of setting fire to
them. When they had worked energetically at clearing the debris, and
had made every preparation for entering by the breach, and were just
on the point of carrying it, the Thebans in a panic surrendered the
town. The security which this achievement of Philip’s gave to Magnesia
and Thessaly deprived the Aetolians of a rich field for plunder; and
demonstrated to his army that he had been justified in putting Leontius
to death, for his deliberate treachery in the previous siege of Palae.
Having thus become master of Thebes he sold its existing inhabitants
into slavery, and drafting in some Macedonian settlers changed its name
to Philippopolis.
Just as the king had finished the settlement of Thebes, ambassadors
once more came from Chios, Rhodes, Byzantium, and King Ptolemy to
negotiate terms of peace. He answered them in much the same terms as
he had the former,[284] that he was not averse to peace; and bade them
go and find out what the feelings of the Aetolians were. Meanwhile he
himself cared little about making peace, but continued steadily to
prosecute his designs.
[Sidenote: Philip hears of the Battle of Thrasymene, 22d June.]
[Sidenote: Nemean festival. Midsummer of B.C. 217.]
+101.+ Accordingly, when he heard that the galleys of Scerdilaidas
were committing acts of piracy off Malea, and treating all merchants
as open enemies, and had treacherously seized some of his own vessels
which were at anchor at Leucas, he fitted out twelve decked ships,
eight open vessels, and thirty light craft called hemioliae,[285] and
sailed through the Euripus in hot haste to come up with the Illyrians;
exceedingly excited about his plans for carrying on the war against the
Aetolians, as he knew nothing as yet of what had happened in Italy.
For the defeat of the Romans by Hannibal in Etruria took place while
Philip was besieging Thebes, but the report of that occurrence had not
yet reached Greece. Philip arrived too late to capture the galleys:
and therefore, dropping anchor at Cenchreae, he sent away his decked
ships, with orders to sail round Malea in the direction of Aegium and
Patrae; but having caused the rest of his vessels to be dragged across
the Isthmus, he ordered them to anchor at Lechaeum; while he went in
haste with his friends to Argos to attend the Nemean festival. Just as
he was engaged in watching the gymnastic contest, a courier arrived
from Macedonia with news of the Romans having been defeated in a great
battle, and of Hannibal being in possession of the open country.
Philip showed the letter to no one at the moment, except to Demetrius
of Pharos, enjoining him not to say a word. The latter seized the
occasion to advise Philip to throw over the war against the Aetolians
as soon as possible; and to concentrate his efforts upon Illyria,
and an expedition into Italy. “For Greece,” said he, “is already
entirely obedient to you, and will remain so: the Achaeans from genuine
affection; the Aetolians from the terror which their disasters in the
present war have inspired them. Italy, and your crossing into it, is
the first step in the acquirement of universal empire, to which no one
has a better claim than yourself. And now is the moment to act when the
Romans have suffered a reverse.”
+102.+ By using such arguments he found no difficulty in firing
Philip’s ambition: as was natural, I think, considering that he was
but a youthful monarch, who had as yet been successful in all his
undertakings, and was in any case of a singularly daring character;
and considering too that he was sprung from a family which above all
families has somehow a tendency to aim at universal monarchy.
[Sidenote: Zacynthus visited by Philip.]
[Sidenote: A peace congress summoned.]
At the moment then, as I said, Philip communicated the news conveyed
by the letter to Demetrius alone; and afterwards summoning a council
of his friends consulted them on the subject of making peace with the
Aetolians. And when even Aratus professed no disinclination to the
measure, on the ground that they would be making peace as conquerors,
the king without waiting for the ambassadors, who were officially
engaged in negotiating its terms, sent Cleonicus of Naupactus at once
to Aetolia, whom he found still awaiting the meeting of the Achaean
league after his captivity;[286] while he himself, taking his ships and
land force from Corinth, came with it to Aegium. Thence he advanced
as far as Lasion and took the Tower in Perippia, and pretended, in
order to avoid appearing too eager for the conclusion of the war, that
he was meditating an invasion of Elis. By this time Cleonicus had
been backwards and forwards two or three times; and as the Aetolians
begged that he would meet them personally in conference, he assented,
and abandoning all warlike measures, he sent couriers to the allied
cities, bidding their commissioners to sit in the conference with him
and take part in the discussion of the terms of peace: and then crossed
over with his army and encamped near Panormus, which is a harbour of
the Peloponnese, and lies exactly opposite Naupactus. There he waited
for the commissioners from the allies, and employed the time required
for their assembling in sailing to Zacynthus, and settling on his own
authority the affairs of the island; and having done so he sailed back
to Panormus.
[Sidenote: Philip goes to Naupactus.]
+103.+ The commissioners having now assembled, Philip sent Aratus and
Taurion, and some others who had come with them, to the Aetolians. They
found them in full assembly at Naupactus; and after a short conference
with them, and satisfying themselves as to their inclination for peace,
they sailed back to Philip to inform him of the state of the case.
But the Aetolians, being very eager to bring the war to a conclusion,
sent ambassadors with them to Philip urging him to visit them with his
army, that by a personal conference the business might be brought to
a satisfactory conclusion. Moved by these representations, the king
sailed across with his army to what is called the Hollows of Naupactus,
about twenty stades from the town. Having pitched a camp there, and
having caused both it and his ships to be surrounded by a palisade,
he waited for the time fixed for the interview. The Aetolians came
_en masse_ without arms; and keeping at a distance of two stades from
Philip’s camp, interchanged messages and discussions on the subjects
in question. The negotiation was begun by the king sending all the
commissioners of the allies, with instructions to offer the Aetolians
peace, on the condition of both parties retaining what they then held.
This preliminary the Aetolians readily agreed to; and then there began
a continuous interchange of messages between the two, most of which I
shall omit as containing no point of interest: but I shall record the
speech made by Agelaus of Naupactus in the first conference before the
king and the assembled allies. It was this.
[Sidenote: Speech of Agelaus of Naupactus foreshadowing the Roman
conquest.]
+104.+ “The best thing of all is that the Greeks should not go to war
with each other at all, but give the gods hearty thanks if by all
speaking with one voice, and joining hands like people crossing a
stream, they may be able to repel the attacks of barbarians and save
themselves and their cities. But if this is altogether impossible,
in the present juncture at least we ought to be unanimous and on our
guard, when we see the bloated armaments and the vast proportions
assumed by the war in the west. For even now it is evident to any one
who pays even a moderate attention to public affairs, that whether the
Carthaginians conquer the Romans, or the Romans the Carthaginians, it
is in every way improbable that the victors will remain contented with
the empire of Sicily and Italy. They will move forward: and will extend
their forces and their designs farther than we could wish. Wherefore, I
beseech you all to be on your guard against the danger of the crisis,
and above all you, O King. You will do this, if you abandon the policy
of weakening the Greeks, and thus rendering them an easy prey to the
invader; and consult on the contrary for their good as you would for
your own person, and have a care for all parts of Greece alike, as
part and parcel of your own domains. If you act in this spirit, the
Greeks will be your warm friends and faithful coadjutors in all your
undertakings; while foreigners will be less ready to form designs
against you, seeing with dismay the firm loyalty of the Greeks. If you
are eager for action, turn your eyes to the west, and let your thoughts
dwell upon the wars in Italy. Wait with coolness the turn of events
there, and seize the opportunity to strike for universal dominion. Nor
is the present crisis unfavourable for such a hope. But I intreat of
you to postpone your controversies and wars with the Greeks to a time
of greater tranquillity; and make it your supreme aim to retain the
power of making peace or war with them at your own will. For if once
you allow the clouds now gathering in the west to settle upon Greece, I
fear exceedingly that the power of making peace or war, and in a word
all these games which we are now playing against each other, will be so
completely knocked out of the hands of us all, that we shall be praying
heaven to grant us only this power of making war or peace with each
other at our own will and pleasure, and of settling our own disputes.”
[Sidenote: The peace is ratified.]
+105.+ This speech of Agelaus greatly influenced the allies in favour
of peace; and Philip more than any one: as the arguments employed
chimed in with the wishes which the advice of Demetrius had already
roused in him. Both parties therefore came to terms on the details of
the treaty; and after ratifying it, separated to their several cities,
taking peace with them instead of war.
[Sidenote: Olympiad 140, 3. Before July B.C. 217.]
These events all fell in the third year of the 140th Olympiad. I mean
the battle of the Romans in Etruria, that of Antiochus for Coele-Syria,
and lastly the treaty between Philip and the Aetolians.
[Sidenote: The Eastern and Western politics become involved with each
other.]
This then was the first point of time, and the first instance of a
deliberation, which may be said to have regarded the affairs of Greece,
Italy, and Libya as a connected whole: for neither Philip nor the
leading statesmen of the Greek cities made war or peace any longer
with each other with a view to Greek affairs, but were already all
fixing their eyes upon Italy. Nor was it long before the islanders and
inhabitants of Asia were affected in the same way; for those who were
displeased with Philip, or who had quarrels with Attalus, no longer
turned to Antiochus or Ptolemy, to the south or the east, but from this
time forth fixed their eyes on the west, some sending embassies to
Carthage, others to Rome. The Romans similarly began sending legates to
Greece, alarmed at the daring character of Philip, and afraid that he
might join in the attack upon them in their present critical position.
Having thus fulfilled my original promise of showing when, how, and why
Greek politics became involved in those of Italy and Libya, I shall now
bring my account of Greek affairs down to the date of the battle of
Cannae, to which I have already brought the history of Italy, and will
end this book at that point.
[Sidenote: Timoxenus Achaean Strategus, May B.C. 216]
[Sidenote: Isolation of Athens.]
+106.+ Directly the Achaeans had put an end to the war, they elected
Timoxenus Strategus for the next year[287] and departed to take up
once more their regular ways and habits. Along with the Achaeans the
other Peloponnesian communities also set to work to repair the losses
they had sustained; recommenced the cultivation of the land; and
re-established their national sacrifices, games, and other religious
observances peculiar to their several states. For these things had all
but sunk into oblivion in most of the states through the persistent
continuance of the late wars. It has ever somehow been the case that
the Peloponnesians, who of all men are the most inclined to a peaceful
and civilised way of life, have hitherto enjoyed it less than any
other nation in the world; but have been rather as Euripides[288] says
“still worn with toil and war’s unrest.” But to me it seems clear
that they bring this upon themselves in the natural course of events:
for their universal desire of supremacy, and their obstinate love of
freedom, involve them in perpetual wars with each other, all alike
being resolutely set upon occupying the first place. The Athenians
on the contrary had by this time freed themselves from fear of
Macedonia, and considered that they had now permanently secured their
independence. They accordingly adopted Eurycleidas and Micion as their
representatives, and took no part whatever in the politics of the rest
of Greece; but following the lead and instigation of these statesmen,
they laid themselves out to flatter all the kings, and Ptolemy most of
all; nor was there any kind of decree or proclamation too fulsome for
their digestion: any consideration of dignity being little regarded,
under the guidance of these vain and frivolous leaders.
[Sidenote: Revolt in Egypt.]
+107.+ Ptolemy however immediately after these events became involved
in a war with his Egyptian subjects. For in arming them for his
campaign against Antiochus he had taken a step which, while it served
his immediate purpose sufficiently well, proved eventually disastrous.
Elated with their victory at Rhaphia they refused any longer to receive
orders from the king; but looked out for a leader to represent them, on
the ground that they were quite able to maintain their independence.
And this they succeeded in doing before very long.
[Sidenote: Winter of 217-216 B.C. B.C. 216.]
Antiochus spent the winter in extensive preparations for war; and when
the next summer came, he crossed Mount Taurus and after making a treaty
of alliance with King Attalus entered upon the war against Achaeus.
[Sidenote: Discontent of the Aetolians with the peace.]
At the time the Aetolians were delighted at the settlement of peace
with the Achaean league, because the war had not answered to their
wishes; and they accordingly elected Agelaus of Naupactus as their
Strategus, because he was believed to have contributed more largely
than any one to the success of the negotiations. But this was scarcely
arranged before they began to be discontented, and to find fault with
Agelaus for having cut off all their opportunities of plundering
abroad, and all their hopes of gain for the future, since the peace was
not made with certain definite states, but with all Greeks. But this
statesman patiently endured these unreasonable reproaches and succeeded
in checking the popular impulse. The Aetolians therefore were forced to
acquiesce in an inactivity quite alien to their nature.
[Sidenote: Philip’s war against Scerdilaidas of Illyria, autumn of 217
B.C.]
+108.+ King Philip having returned, after the completion of the treaty
of peace, to Macedonia by sea, found that Scerdilaidas on the same
pretext of money owed to him, on which he had treacherously seized
the vessels at Leucas, had now plundered a town in Pelagonia called
Pissaeum; had won over by promises some cities of the Dassaretae,
namely, Phibotides, Antipatria, Chrysondym, and Geston; and had overrun
much of the district of Macedonia bordering on these places. He
therefore at once started with his army in great haste to recover the
revolted cities, and determined to proclaim open war with Scerdilaidas;
for he thought it a matter of the most vital importance to bring
Illyria into a state of good order, with a view to the success of all
his projects, and above all of his passage into Italy. For Demetrius
was so assiduous in keeping hot these hopes and projects in the king’s
mind, that Philip even dreamed of them in his sleep, and thought of
nothing else but this Italian expedition. The motive of Demetrius
in so acting was not a consideration for Philip, for he certainly
did not rank higher than third in the calculations of Demetrius. A
stronger motive than that was his hatred of Rome: but the strongest
of all was the consideration of his own prospects. For he had made
up his mind that it was only in this way that he could ever recover
his principality in Pharos. Be that as it may, Philip went on his
expedition and recovered the cities I have named, and took besides
Creonium and Gerus in Dassaretis; Enchelanae, Cerax, Sation, Boei,
round the Lychnidian Lake; Bantia in the district of the Calicoeni; and
Orgyssus in that of the Pisantini. After completing these operations he
dismissed his troops to their winter quarters.
[Sidenote: B.C. 217-216.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius
Paulus II.]
This was the winter in which Hannibal, after plundering the fairest
districts of Italy, intended to place his winter quarters near Geranium
in Daunia. And it was then that at Rome Caius Terentius and Lucius
Aemilius entered upon their Consulship.
[Sidenote: Philip’s preparation for an invasion of Italy.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 216.]
+109.+ In the course of the winter, Philip, taking into consideration
that he would want ships to carry out his designs, and men for rowing,
not for fighting,—for he could never have even entertained a hope of
fighting the Romans at sea,—but rather for the transport of soldiers,
and to enable him to cross with greater speed to any point to which he
might desire to go, and so surprise the enemy by a sudden appearance,
and thinking that the Illyrian build was the best for the sort of ships
he wanted, determined to have a hundred galleys built; which hardly any
Macedonian king had ever done before. Having had these fitted out, he
collected his forces at the beginning of the summer; and, after a brief
training of the Macedonians in rowing them, put to sea. It was just at
the time that Antiochus crossed Mount Taurus when Philip, after sailing
through the Euripus and rounding Cape Malea, came to Cephallenia and
Leucas, where he dropped anchor, and awaited anxiously the movements of
the Roman fleet. Being informed that it was at anchor off Lilybaeum, he
mustered up courage to put to sea, and steered for Apollonia.
[Sidenote: Panic-stricken at the reported approach of a Roman squadron,
Philip retreats to Cephallenia.]
+110.+ As he neared the mouth of the Aous, which flows past Apollonia,
a panic fell upon his fleet such as happens to land forces. Certain
galleys on the rear of the fleet being anchored at an island called
Sason, which lies at the entrance to the Ionian Sea, came by night
to Philip with a report that some men who had lately come from the
Sicilian Strait had been anchored with them at Sason, who reported
that they left some Roman quinqueremes at Rhegium, which were bound
for Apollonia to support Scerdilaidas. Thinking this fleet must be all
but upon him, Philip, in great alarm, promptly ordered his ships to
weigh anchor and sail back the way they came. They started and got out
to sea in great disorder, and reached Cephallenia, after sailing two
nights and days without intermission. Having now partially recovered
his courage, Philip remained there, covering his flight under the
pretext of having returned for some operations in the Peloponnese. It
turned out that it was a false alarm altogether. The truth was that
Scerdilaidas, hearing in the course of the winter that Philip was
having a number of galleys built, and expecting him to come to attack
him by sea, had sent messages to Rome stating the facts and imploring
help; and the Romans had detached a squadron of ten ships from the
fleet at Lilybaeum, which were what had been seen at Rhegium. But if
Philip had not fled from them in such inconsiderate alarm, he would
have had the best opportunity possible of attaining his objects in
Illyria; because the thoughts and resources of Rome were absorbed in
the war with Hannibal and the battle of Cannae, and it may fairly be
presumed that he would have captured the ten Roman ships. As it was, he
was utterly upset by the news and returned to Macedonia, without loss
indeed, but with considerable dishonour.
[Sidenote: Prusias and the Gauls. See ch. 78.]
+111.+ During this period Prusias also did a thing which deserves to be
recorded. The Gauls, whom King Attalus had brought over from Europe to
assist him against Achaeus on account of their reputation for courage,
had separated from that monarch on account of the jealous suspicions
of which I have before spoken, and were plundering the cities on
the Hellespont with gross licentiousness and violence, and finally
went so far as actually to besiege Ilium. In these circumstances the
inhabitants of the Alexandria in the Troad acted with commendable
spirit. They sent Themistes with four thousand men and forced the
Gauls to raise the siege of Ilium, and drove them entirely out of the
Troad, by cutting off their supplies and frustrating all their designs.
Thereupon the Gauls seized Arisba, in the territory of Abydos, and
thenceforth devoted themselves to forming designs and committing acts
of hostility against the cities built in that district. Against them
Prusias led out an army; and in a pitched battle put the men to the
sword on the field, and slew nearly all their women and children in
the camp, leaving the baggage to be plundered by his soldiers. This
achievement of Prusias delivered the cities on the Hellespont from
great fear and danger, and was a signal warning for future generations
against barbarians from Europe being over-ready to cross into Asia.
[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]
Such was the state of affairs in Greece and Asia. Meanwhile the greater
part of Italy had joined the Carthaginians after the battle of Cannae,
as I have shown before. I will interrupt my narrative at this point,
after having detailed the events in Asia and Greece, embraced by the
140th Olympiad. In my next book after a brief recapitulation of this
narrative, I shall fulfil the promise made at the beginning of my work
by recurring to the discussion of the Roman constitution.