[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.]
+1.+ The year of office as Strategus of the younger Aratus had now
come to an end with the rising of the Pleiades; for that was the
arrangement of time then observed by the Achaeans.[245] Accordingly he
laid down his office and was succeeded in the command of the Achaeans
by Eperatus; Dorimachus being still Strategus of the Aetolians.
It was at the beginning of this summer that Hannibal entered upon
open war with Rome; started from New Carthage; and crossing the Iber,
definitely began his expedition and march into Italy; while the Romans
despatched Tiberius Sempronius to Libya with an army, and Publius
Cornelius to Iberia.
This year, too, Antiochus and Ptolemy, abandoning diplomacy, and the
support of their mutual claims upon Coele-Syria by negotiation, began
actual war with each other.
[Sidenote: Recognition of Philip’s services by the assembly of the
Achaean league.]
As for Philip, being in need of corn and money for his army, he
summoned the Achaeans to a general assembly by means of their
magistrates. When the assembly had met, according to the federal law,
at Aegium,[246] the king saw that Aratus and his son were indisposed
to act for him, because of the intrigues against them in the matter of
the election, which had been carried on by Apelles; and that Eperatus
was naturally inefficient, and an object of general contempt. These
facts convinced the king of the folly of Apelles and Leontius, and
he once more decided to stand by Aratus. He therefore persuaded the
magistrates to transfer the assembly to Sicyon; and there inviting both
the elder and younger Aratus to an interview, he laid the blame of
all that had happened upon Apelles, and urged them to maintain their
original policy. Receiving a ready consent from them, he then entered
the Achaean assembly, and being energetically supported by these two
statesmen, earned all the measures that he desired. For the Achaeans
passed a vote decreeing “that five hundred talents should be paid to
the king at once for his last campaign, that three months’ pay should
be given to his army, and ten thousand medimni of corn; and that, for
the future, so long as the king should remain in the Peloponnese as
their ally in the war, he should receive seventeen talents a month from
the Achaeans.
[Sidenote: The king prepares to carry on the war by sea.]
+2.+ Having passed this decree, the Achaeans dispersed to their various
cities. And now the king’s forces mustered again from their winter
quarters; and after deliberations with his friends, Philip decided to
transfer the war to the sea. For he had become convinced that it was
only by so doing that he would himself be able to surprise the enemy
at all points at once, and would best deprive them of the opportunity
of coming to each others' relief; as they were widely scattered, and
each would be in alarm for their own safety, because the approach of
an enemy by sea is so silent and rapid. For he was at war with three
separate nations,—Aetolians, Lacedaemonians, and Eleans.
Having arrived at this decision, he ordered the ships of the Achaeans
as well as his own to muster at Lechaeum; and there he made continual
experiments in practising the soldiers of the phalanx to the use of
the oar. The Macedonians answered to his instructions with ready
enthusiasm: for they are in fact the most gallant soldiers on the field
of battle, the promptest to undertake service at sea if need be, and
the most laborious workers at digging trenches, making palisades, and
all such engineering work, in the world: just such as Hesiod describes
the Aeacidae to be
“Joying in war as in a feast.”
[Sidenote: Fresh intrigue of Apelles.]
[Sidenote: Philip starts on his naval expedition, B.C. 218.]
The king, then, and the main body of the Macedonian army, remained in
Corinth, busied with these practisings and preparations for taking
the sea. But Apelles, being neither able to retain an ascendency over
Philip, nor to submit to the loss of influence which resulted from
this disregard, entered into a conspiracy with Leontius and Megaleas,
by which it was agreed that these two men should stay on the spot and
damage the king’s service by deliberate neglect; while he went to
Chalcis, and contrived that no supplies should be brought the king from
thence for the promotion of his designs. Having made this arrangement
and mischievous stipulation with these two men, Apelles set out for
Chalcis, having found some false pretexts to satisfy the king as to
his departure. And while protracting his stay there, he carried out
his sworn agreement with such determination, that, as all men obeyed
him because of this former credit, the king was at last reduced by
want of money to pawn some of the silver-plate used at his own table,
to carry on his affairs. However, when the ships were all collected,
and the Macedonian soldiers already well trained to the oar; the king,
giving out rations of corn and pay to the army, put to sea, and arrived
at Patrae on the second day, with six thousand Macedonians and twelve
hundred mercenaries.
[Sidenote: The siege of Palus.]
+3.+ Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus Dorimachus sent Agelaus
and Scopas with five hundred Neo-Cretans[247] into Elis; while the
Eleans, in fear of Philip’s attempting the siege of Cyllene, were
collecting mercenaries, preparing their own citizens, and carefully
strengthening the defences of Cyllene. When Philip saw what was
going on, he stationed a force at Dyme, consisting of the Achaean
mercenaries, some of the Cretans serving with him, and some of the
Gallic horse, together with two thousand picked Achaean infantry.
These he left there as a reserve, as well as an advance guard to
prevent the danger of an attack from Elis; while he himself, having
first written to the Acarnanians and Scerdilaidas, that each of their
towns should man such vessels as they had and meet him at Cephallenia,
put to sea from Patrae at the time arranged, and arrived off Pronni
in Cephallenia. But when he saw that this fortress was difficult to
besiege, and its position a contracted one, he coasted past it with
his fleet and came to anchor at Palus. Finding that the country there
was full of corn and capable of supporting an army, he disembarked
his troops and encamped close to the city: and having beached his
ships close together, secured them with a trench and palisade, and
sent out his Macedonian soldiers to forage. He himself made a personal
inspection of the town, to see how he could bring his siege-works and
artillery to bear upon the wall. He wished to be able to use the place
as a rendezvous for his allies; but he was also desirous of taking it:
first, because he would thereby deprive the Aetolians of their most
useful support,—for it was by means of Cephallenian ships that they
made their descents upon the Peloponnese, and ravaged the seaboards of
Epirus and Acarnania,—and, secondly, that he might secure for himself
and his allies a convenient base of operations against the enemy’s
territory. For Cephallenia lies exactly opposite the Corinthian Gulf,
in the direction of the Sicilian Sea, and commands the north-western
district of the Peloponnese, and especially Elis; as well as the
south-western parts of Epirus, Aetolia, and Acarnania.
+4.+ The excellent position, therefore, of the island, both as a
rendezvous for the allies and as a base of attack against the hostile,
or of defence for the friendly, territory, made the king very anxious
to get it into his power. His survey of the town showed him that it
was entirely defended by the sea and steep hills, except for a short
distance in the direction of Zacynthus, where the ground was flat; and
he accordingly resolved to erect his works and concentrate his attack
at that spot.
[Sidenote: Arrival of the allies at Palus.]
[Sidenote: The walls are undermined and a breach made. Leontius plays
the traitor.]
While the king was engaged in these operations fifty galleys arrived
from Scerdilaidas, who had been prevented from sending more by the
plots and civil broils throughout Illyria, caused by the despots of
the various cities. There arrived also the appointed contingents of
allies from Epirus, Acarnania, and even Messenia; for the Messenians
had ceased to excuse themselves from taking part in the war ever since
the capture of Phigalia. Having now made his arrangements for the
siege, and having got his catapults and ballistae in position to annoy
the defenders on the walls, the king harangued his Macedonian troops,
and, bringing his siege-machines up to the walls, began under their
protection to sink mines. The Macedonians worked with such enthusiastic
eagerness that in a short time two hundred feet of the wall were
undermined and underpinned: and the king then approached the walls and
invited the citizens to come to terms. Upon their refusal, he set fire
to the props, and thus brought down the whole part of the wall that
rested upon them simultaneously. Into this breach he first sent his
peltasts under the command of Leontius, divided into cohorts, and with
orders to force their way over the ruin. But Leontius, in fulfilment of
his compact with Apelles, three times running prevented the soldiers,
even after they had carried the breach, from effecting the capture of
the town. He had corrupted beforehand the most important officers of
the several cohorts; and he himself deliberately affected fear, and
shrunk from every service of danger; and finally they were ejected from
the town with considerable loss, although they could have mastered the
enemy with ease. When the king saw that the officers were behaving with
cowardice, and that a considerable number of the Macedonian soldiers
were wounded, he abandoned the siege, and deliberated with his friends
on the next step to be taken.
[Sidenote: Ambassadors from Acarnania urge Philip to invade Aetolia;
others from Messenia beg him to come there.]
[Sidenote: Philip decides on the invasion of Aetolia.]
+5.+ Meanwhile Lycurgus had invaded Messenia; and Dorimachus had
started for Thessaly with half the Aetolian army,—both with the
idea that they would thus draw off Philip from the siege of Palus.
Presently ambassadors arrived at the court to make representations on
these subjects from Acarnania and Messenia: the former urging Philip
to prevent Dorimachus’s invasion of Macedonia by himself invading
Aetolia, and traversing and plundering the whole country while there
was no one to resist him; the latter begged him to come to their
assistance, representing that in the existing state of the Etesian
winds the passage from Cephallenia to Messenia could be effected
in a single day, whereby, so Gorgus of Messenia and his colleagues
argued, a sudden and effective attack would be made upon Lycurgus.
In pursuance of his policy Leontius eagerly supported Gorgus, seeing
that by this means Philip would absolutely waste the summer. For it
was easy enough to sail to Messenia; but to sail back again, while
the Etesian winds prevailed, was impossible. It was plain therefore
that Philip would get shut up in Messenia with his army, and remain
inactive for what remained of the summer; while the Aetolians would
traverse Thessaly and Epirus and plunder them at their pleasure. Such
was the insidious nature of the advice given by Gorgus and Leontius.
But Aratus, who was present, advocated an exactly opposite policy,
urging the king to sail to Aetolia and devote himself to that part of
the campaign: for as the Aetolians had gone on an expedition across
the frontier under Dorimachus, it was a most excellent opportunity
for invading and plundering Aetolia. The king had begun to entertain
distrust of Leontius since his exhibition of cowardice in the siege;
and had detected his dishonesty in the course of the discussions held
about Palus: he therefore decided to act in the present instance in
accordance with the opinion of Aratus. Accordingly he wrote to the
Achaean Strategus Eperatus, bidding him take the Achaean levies, and
go to the aid of the Messenians; while he himself put to sea from
Cephallenia, and arrived at night after a two days’ voyage at Leucas:
and having managed by proper contrivances to get his ships through the
channel of Dioryctus,[248] he sailed up the Ambracian Gulf, which, as
I have already stated,[249] stretches from the Sicilian Sea a long
distance into the interior of Aetolia. Having made the whole length of
this gulf, and anchored a short time before daybreak at Limnaea, he
ordered his men to get their breakfast, and leaving the greater part of
their baggage behind them, to make themselves ready in light equipment
for a march; while he himself collected the guides, and made careful
inquiries of them about the country and neighbouring towns.
[Sidenote: Philip is joined by the Acarnanians, and marches to the
Achelous.]
+6.+ Before they started, Aristophanes the Acarnanian Strategus arrived
with the full levy of his people. For having in former times suffered
many severe injuries at the hands of the Aetolians, they were now
inspired with a fierce determination to be revenged upon them and
damage them in every possible way: they gladly therefore seized this
opportunity of getting the help of the Macedonians; and the men who now
appeared in arms were not confined to those forced by law to serve, but
were in some cases past the military age. The Epirotes were quite as
eager to join, and for the same motives; but owing to the wide extent
of their country, and the suddenness of the Macedonian arrival, they
had not been able to muster their forces in time. As to the Aetolians,
Dorimachus had taken half their army with him, as I have said, while
the the other half he had left at home, thinking that it would be an
adequate reserve to defend the towns and district against unforeseen
contingencies. The king, leaving a sufficient guard for his baggage,
started from Limnaea in the evening, and after a march of sixty stades
pitched his camp: but, having dined and given his men a short rest,
he started again; and marching right through the night, arrived just
as the day was breaking at the river Achelous, between the towns of
Stratus and Conope, being anxious that his entrance into the district
of Thermus should be sudden and unexpected.
[Sidenote: Leontius tries to hinder the march.]
+7.+ Leontius saw that it was likely that the king would attain his
object, and the Aetolians be unable to resist him, for the double
reason of the speed and unexpectedness of the Macedonian attack, and
of his having gone to Thermus; for the Aetolians would never suppose
him likely to venture to expose himself so rashly, seeing the strongly
fortified nature of the country, and would therefore be sure to be
caught off their guard and wholly unprepared for the danger. Clinging
still to his purpose, therefore, he advised the king to encamp on the
Achelous, and rest his army after their night’s march; being anxious
to give the Aetolians a short respite to make preparations for their
defence. But Aratus, seeing clearly that the opportunity for action was
fleeting, and that Leontius was plainly trying to hinder their success,
conjured Philip not to let slip the opportunity by delaying.
[Sidenote: The king crosses the Achelous and advances against Thermus.]
The king was now thoroughly annoyed with Leontius: and accepting the
advice of Aratus, continued his march without interruption; and, after
crossing the Achelous, advanced rapidly upon Thermus, plundering and
devastating the country as he went, and marching so as to keep Stratus,
Agrinium, and Thestia on his left, Conope, Lysimachia, Trichonium, and
Phytaeum on his right. Arrived at the town of Metapa, which is on the
borders of the Trichonian Lake, and close to the narrow pass along
it, about sixty stades from Thermus, he found it abandoned by the
Aetolians, and occupied it with a detachment of five hundred men, with
a view of its serving as a fortress to secure both ends of the pass:
for the whole shore of the lake is mountainous and rugged, closely
fringed with forest, and therefore affording but a narrow and difficult
path. He now arranged his order of march, putting the mercenaries in
the van, next them the Illyrians, and then the peltasts and the men of
the phalanx, and thus advanced through the pass; his rear protected
by the Cretans: while the Thracians and light-armed troops took a
different line of country, parallel to his own, and kept up with him on
his right: his left being secured by the lake for nearly thirty stades.
[Sidenote: The plundering of Thermus.]
+8.+ At the end of this distance he arrived at the village of Pamphia;
and having, as in the case of Panapa, secured it by a guard, he
continued his advance towards Thermus: the road now being not only
steep and exceedingly rough, but with deep precipices also on either
side, so as to make the path in places very dangerous and narrow; and
the whole ascent being nearly thirty stades. But having accomplished
this also in a short time, thanks to the energy with which the
Macedonians conducted the march, he arrived late in the day at Thermus.
There he pitched a camp, and allowed his men to go off plundering the
neighbouring villages and scouring the plain of Thermus, as well as
to sack the dwelling-houses in Thermus itself, which were full, not
only of corn and such like provisions, but of all the most valuable
property which the Aetolians possessed. For as the annual fair and most
famous games, as well as the elections, were held there, everybody
kept their most costly possessions in store at Thermus, to enable
them to entertain their friends, and to celebrate the festivals with
proper magnificence. But besides this occasion for the employment
of their property, they expected to find the most complete security
for it there, because no enemy had ever yet ventured to penetrate to
that place; while its natural strength was so great as to serve as an
acropolis to the whole of Aetolia. The place therefore having been
in the enjoyment of peace from time immemorial, not only were the
buildings immediately round the temple filled with a great variety of
property, but the homesteads on the outskirts also. For that night the
army bivouacked on the spot laden with booty of every description; but
the next morning they selected the most valuable and portable part of
it, and making the rest into a heap in front of their tents, set fire
to it. So also in regard to the dedicated arms which were hanging up
in the porticoes,—those of them which were valuable they took down and
carried off, some they exchanged for their own, while the rest they
collected together and burnt. The number of these was more than fifteen
thousand.
[Sidenote: Sacrilege committed at Thermus. Was it justifiable?]
+9.+ Up to this point everything was right and fair by the laws of
war; but I do not know how to characterise their next proceedings. For
remembering what the Aetolians had done at Dium[250] and Dodona,[251]
they burnt the colonnades, and destroyed what were left of the
dedicated offerings, some of which were of costly material, and had
been elaborated with great skill and expense. And they were not
content with destroying the roofs of these buildings with fire, they
levelled them to their foundations; and threw down all the statues,
which numbered no less than two thousand; and many of them they broke
to pieces, sparing only those that were inscribed with the names or
figures of gods. Such they did abstain from injuring. On the walls
also they wrote the celebrated line composed by Samus, the son of
Chrysogonus, a foster-brother of the king, whose genius was then
beginning to manifest itself. The line was this—
“Seest thou the path the bolt divine has sped?”
And in fact the king and his staff were fully convinced that, in
thus acting, they were obeying the dictates of right and justice,
by retaliating upon the Aetolians with the same impious outrages as
they had themselves committed at Dium.[252] But I am clearly of an
opposite opinion. And the readiest argument, to prove the correctness
of my view, may be drawn from the history of this same royal family of
Macedonia.
For when Antigonus, by his victory in a pitched battle over Cleomenes
the King of the Lacedaemonians, had become master of Sparta, and had
it absolutely in his own power to treat the town and its citizens as
he chose, he was so far from doing any injury to those who had thus
fallen into his hands, that he did not return to his own country until
he had bestowed upon the Lacedaemonians, collectively and individually,
some benefits of the utmost importance. The consequence was that he
was honoured at the time with the title of “Benefactor,” and after his
death with that of “Preserver”; and not only among the Lacedaemonians,
but among the Greeks generally, has obtained undying honour and
glory.[253]
[Sidenote: B.C. 338.]
+10.+ Take again the case of Philip, the founder of the family
splendour, and the first of the race to establish the greatness of the
kingdom. The success which he obtained, after his victory over the
Athenians at Chaeronea, was not due so much to his superiority in arms,
as to his justice and humanity. His victory in the field gave him the
mastery only over those immediately engaged against him; while his
equity and moderation secured his hold upon the entire Athenian people
and their city. For he did not allow his measures to be dictated by
vindictive passion; but laid aside his arms and warlike measures, as
soon as he found himself in a position to display the mildness of his
temper and the uprightness of his motives. With this view he dismissed
his Athenian prisoners without ransom, and took measures for the burial
of those who had fallen, and, by the agency of Antipater, caused their
bones to be conveyed home; and presented most of those whom he released
with suits of clothes. And thus, at small expense, his prudence gained
him a most important advantage. The pride of the Athenians was not
proof against such magnanimity; and they became his zealous supporters,
instead of antagonists, in all his schemes.
[Sidenote: B.C. 335.]
[Sidenote: The subsequent decline in Philip’s character.]
Again in the case of Alexander the Great. He was so enraged with the
Thebans that he sold all the inhabitants of the town into slavery, and
levelled the city itself with the ground; yet in making its capture he
was careful not to outrage religion, and took the utmost precautions
against even involuntary damage being done to the temples, or any part
of their sacred enclosures. Once more, when he crossed into Asia, to
avenge on the Persians the impious outrages which they had inflicted
on the Greeks, he did his best to exact the full penalty from men,
but refrained from injuring places dedicated to the gods; though it
was in precisely such that the injuries of the Persians in Greece had
been most conspicuous. These were the precedents which Philip should
have called to mind on this occasion; and so have shown himself the
successor and heir of these men,—not so much of their power, as of
their principles and magnanimity. But throughout his life he was
exceedingly anxious to establish his relationship to Alexander and
Philip, and yet took not the least pains to imitate them. The result
was that, as he advanced in years, as his conduct differed from theirs,
so his general reputation came to be different also.
+11.+ The present affair was an instance of this. He imagined
that he was doing nothing wrong in giving the rein to his anger,
and retaliating upon the impious acts of the Aetolians by similar
impieties, and “curing ill by ill”; and while he was always reproaching
Scopas and Dorimachus with depravity and abandoned wickedness, on
the grounds of their acts of impiety at Dodona and Dium, he imagined
that, while emulating their crimes, he would leave quite a different
impression of his character in the minds of those to whom he spoke.
But the fact is, that whereas the taking and demolishing an enemy’s
forts, harbours, cities, men, ships and crops, and other such things,
by which our enemy is weakened, and our own interests and tactics
supported, are necessary acts according to the laws and rights of war;
to deface temples, statues, and such like erections in pure wantonness,
and without any prospect of strengthening oneself or weakening the
enemy, must be regarded as an act of blind passion and insanity. For
the purpose with which good men wage war is not the destruction and
annihilation of the wrongdoers, but the reformation and alteration of
the wrongful acts. Nor is it their object to involve the innocent in
the destruction of the guilty, but rather to see that those who are
held to be guilty should share in the preservation and elevation of
the guiltless. It is the act of a tyrant to inflict injury, and so to
maintain his power over unwilling subjects by terror,—hated, and hating
those under him: but it is the glory of a king to secure, by doing good
to all, that he should rule over willing subjects, whose love he has
earned by humanity and beneficence.
[Sidenote: The error of such sacrilege as a matter of policy.]
But the best way of appreciating the gravity of Philip’s mistake is
to put before our eyes the idea which the Aetolians would probably
have conceived of him, had he acted in an opposite way, and destroyed
neither colonnades nor statutes, nor done injury to any of the sacred
offerings. For my part I think it would have been one of the greatest
goodness and humanity. For they would have had on their consciences
their own acts at Dium and Dodona; and would have seen unmistakably
that, whereas Philip was absolutely master of the situation, and could
do what he chose, and would have been held fully justified as far as
their deserts went in taking the severest measures, yet deliberately,
from mere gentleness and magnanimity, he refused to copy their conduct
in any respect.
+12.+ Clearly these considerations would most probably have led them
to condemn themselves, and to view Philip with respect and admiration
for his kingly and high minded qualities, shown by his respect for
religion and by the moderation of his anger against themselves. For in
truth to conquer one’s enemies in integrity and equity is not of less,
but of greater, practical advantage than victories in the field. In the
one case the defeated party yields under compulsion; in the other with
cheerful assent. In the one case the victor effects his reformation at
the cost of great losses; in the other he recalls the erring to better
courses without any damage to himself. But above all, in the one case
the chief credit of the victory belongs to the soldiers, in the other
it falls wholly and solely to the part of the leaders.
[Sidenote: The blame chiefly belongs to Demetrius of Pharos.]
Perhaps, however, one ought not to lay all the blame for what was
done on that occasion on Philip, taking his age into consideration;
but chiefly on his friends, who were in attendance upon him and
co-operating with him, among whom were Aratus and Demetrius of Pharos.
In regard to them it would not be difficult to assert, even without
being there, from which of the two a counsel of this sort proceeded.
For apart from the general principles animating the whole course of
his life, in which nothing savouring of rashness and want of judgment
can be alleged of Aratus, while the exact contrary may be said of
Demetrius, we have an undisputed instance of the principles actuating
both the one and the other in analogous circumstances, on which I shall
speak in its proper place.
[Sidenote: The return of Philip from Thermus.]
[Sidenote: Matape.]
[Sidenote: Acrae.]
[Sidenote: Stratus.]
+13.+ To return then to Philip. Taking with him as much booty living
and dead as he could, he started from Thermus, returning by the same
road as that by which he had come; putting the booty and heavy-armed
infantry in the van, and reserving the Acarnanians and mercenaries
to bring up the rear. He was in great haste to get through the
difficult passes, because he expected that the Aetolians, relying
on the security of their strongholds, would harass his rear. And
this in fact promptly took place: for a body of Aetolians, that had
collected to the number of nearly three thousand for the defence of
the country, under the command of Alexander of Trichonium, hovered
about, concealing themselves in certain secret hiding-places, and not
venturing to approach as long as Philip was on the high ground; but as
soon as he got his rear-guard in motion they promptly threw themselves
into Thermus and began harassing the hindermost of the enemy’s column.
The rear being thus thrown into confusion, the attacks and charges of
the Aetolians became more and more furious, encouraged by the nature
of the ground. But Philip had foreseen this danger, and had provided
for it, by stationing his Illyrians and his best peltasts under cover
of a certain hill on the descent. These men suddenly fell upon the
advanced bodies of the enemy as they were charging; whereupon the rest
of the Aetolian army fled in headlong haste over a wild and trackless
country, with a loss of a hundred and thirty killed, and about the
same number taken prisoners. This success relieved his rear; which,
after burning Pamphium, accomplished the passage of the narrow gorge
with rapidity and safety, and effected a junction with the Macedonians
near Matape, at which place Philip had pitched a camp and was waiting
for his rear-guard to come up. Next day, after levelling Metape to
the ground, he advanced to the city called Acrae; next day to Conope,
ravaging the country as he passed, and there encamped for the night.
On the next he marched along the Achelous as far as Stratus; there he
crossed the river, and, having halted his men out of range, endeavoured
to tempt the garrison outside the walls; for he had been informed that
two thousand Aetolian infantry and about four hundred horse, with five
hundred Cretans, had collected into Stratus. But when no one ventured
out, he renewed his march, and ordered his van to advance towards
Limnaea and the ships.
[Sidenote: Philip victorious in a skirmish with the garrison of
Stratus.]
[Sidenote: Arrival at Limnaea.]
+14.+ But no sooner had his rear passed the town than, first, a small
body of Aetolian cavalry sallied out and began harassing the hindmost
men; and then, the whole of the Cretans and some Aetolian troops having
joined their cavalry, the conflict became more severe, and the rear of
Philip’s army were forced to face about and engage the enemy. At first
the conflict was undecided; but on Philip’s mercenaries being supported
by the arrival of the Illyrians, the Aetolian cavalry and mercenaries
gave way and fled in disorder. The royal troops pursued most of them
to the entrance of the gates, or up to the walls, and killed about a
hundred of them. After this skirmish the garrison remained inactive,
and the rear of the royal army reached the camp and the ships in safety.
Philip pitched his camp early in the day, and proceeded to make a thank
offering to the gods for the successful issue of his undertaking; and
to invite the officers to a banquet, at which it was his intention to
entertain them all. His view was that he had ventured upon a dangerous
country, and such as no one had ever ventured to enter with an army
before; while he had not only entered it with an army, but had returned
in safety, after accomplishing all that he had intended. But while he
was thus intent on entertaining his officers in great elation of mind,
Megaleas and Leontius were nursing feelings of great annoyance at the
success of the king. They had arranged with Apelles to hamper all his
plans, but had been unable to do so; and now saw everything turning out
exactly contrary to their views.
[Sidenote: Megaleas and Leontius betray their chagrin at the king’s
success.]
[Sidenote: They assault Aratus.]
[Sidenote: Megaleas and Crinon held to bail.]
+15.+ Still they came to the banquet, where they from the first excited
the suspicions of the king and the rest of the company, by showing
less joy at the events than the others present. But as the drinking
went on, and grew less and less moderate, being forced to do just as
the others did, they soon showed themselves in their true colours.
For as soon as the company broke up, losing control over themselves
under the influence of wine, they roamed about looking for Aratus;
and having fallen in with him on his way home, they first attacked
him with abusive language, and then threw stones at him; and a number
of people coming to the assistance of both parties, there was a noise
and disturbance in the camp. But the king hearing the noise sent some
officers to ascertain the cause, and to put an end to the disturbance.
On their coming upon the scene, Aratus stated what had occurred, called
those present to witness the truth of his words, and retired to his own
tent; but Leontius by some unexplained means slipped away in the crowd.
When informed of what had taken place, the king sent for Megaleas and
Crinon and rebuked them sharply: and when they not only expressed no
submission, but actually retorted with a declaration that they would
never desist until they had paid Aratus out, the king, enraged at their
words, at once required them to give security for the payment of a fine
of twenty talents, and ordered them to be placed under arrest.
[Sidenote: Arrival at Leucas. Megaleas fined twenty talents.]
+16.+ Next morning, too, he sent for Aratus and bade him have no
fears, for that he would see that the business was properly settled.
When Leontius learned what had happened to Megaleas, he came to the
king’s tent with some peltasts, believing that, owing to his youth,
he should overawe the king, and quickly induce him to repent of his
purpose. Coming into the royal presence he demanded who had ventured
to lay hands on Megaleas, and lead him to confinement? But when the
king answered with firmness that he had given the order, Leontius was
dismayed; and, with an exclamation of indignant sorrow, departed in
high wrath.
Immediately after getting the fleet across the gulf, and anchoring
at Leucas, the king first gave orders to the officers appointed to
distribute the spoils to carry out that business with all despatch; and
then summoned his friends to council, and tried the case of Megaleas.
In his speech as accuser Aratus went over the crimes of Leontius
and his party from beginning to end; detailed the massacre in Argos
perpetrated by them after the departure of Antigonus; their arrangement
made with Apelles; and finally their contrivance to prevent success at
Palus. Of all these accusations he gave distinct proof, and brought
forward witnesses: and Megaleas and Crinon being entirely unable to
refute any of them, were unanimously condemned by the king’s friends.
Crinon remained under arrest, but Leontius went bail for the payment of
the Megaleas’s fine. Thus the intrigue of Apelles and Leontius turned
out quite contrary to their original hopes: for they had expected, by
terrifying Aratus and isolating Philip, to do whatever seemed to suit
their interests; whereas the result had been exactly the reverse.
[Sidenote: Lycurgus of Sparta attacks Tegea.]
+17.+ About the same time Lycurgus returned from Messenia without
having accomplished anything of importance. Afterwards he started again
and seized Tegea. The inhabitants having retreated into the citadel,
he determined to besiege it; but finding himself unable to make any
impression upon it he returned once more to Sparta.
[Sidenote: Elis.]
The Eleans after overrunning Dymaea, gained an easy victory over some
cavalry that had come out to resist them, by decoying them into an
ambush. They killed a considerable number of the Gallic mercenaries,
and among the natives whom they took prisoners were Polymedes of
Aegium, and Agesipolis, and Diocles of Dyme.
[Sidenote: Dorimachus recalled from Thessaly by Philip’s invasion of
Aetolia.]
Dorimachus had made his expedition originally, as I have already
mentioned, under the conviction that he would be able to devastate
Thessaly without danger to himself, and would force Philip to raise the
siege of Palus. But when he found Chrysogonus and Petraeus ready in
Thessaly to engage him, he did not venture to descend into the plain,
but kept close upon the skirts of the mountains; and when news reached
him of the Macedonian invasion of Aetolia, he abandoned his attempt
upon Thessaly, and hurried home to resist the invaders, whom he found
however already departed from Aetolia: and so was too late for the
campaign at all points.
[Sidenote: Philip arrives at Corinth.]
Meanwhile the king set sail from Leucas; and after ravaging the
territory of Oeanthe as he coasted along, arrived with his whole fleet
at Corinth, and dropping anchor in the harbour of Lechaeum, disembarked
his troops, and sent his letter-bearers to the allied cities in the
Peloponnese, naming a day on which he wished all to be at Tegea by
bedtime.
[Sidenote: Tegea.]
[Sidenote: Amyclae and Sparta.]
[Sidenote: Dismay at Sparta.]
+18.+ Then, without making any stay in Corinth, he gave the Macedonians
marching orders; and came at the end of a two days’ march by way of
Argos to Tegea. There he took on the Achaean troops that had assembled,
and advanced by the mountain road, being very desirous to effect an
entrance into the territory of the Lacedaemonians before they became
aware of it. Thus after a circuitous route through an uninhabited
district he came out upon the hills facing the town, and continued his
advance right upon Amyclae, keeping the Menelaïum on his right. The
Lacedaemonians were dismayed and terrified at seeing from the town the
army passing along the hills, and wondered what was happening. For
they were still in a state of excitement at the news of Philip which
had arrived,—his destruction of Thermus, and his whole campaign in
Aetolia; and there was even some talk among them of sending Lycurgus
to the assistance of the Aetolians. But no one had so much as thought
of danger coming so quickly to their own gates from such a distance,
especially as the youth of the king still gave room for a certain
feeling of contempt. The event therefore being totally contrary to
their expectations, they were naturally in a state of great dismay.
For the courage and energy beyond his years, with which Philip acted,
reduced all his enemies to a state of the utmost difficulty and terror.
For setting out, as I have shown, from the centre of Aetolia, and
crossing the Ambracian gulf by night, he passed over to Leucas; and
after a two days’ halt there, on the third he renewed his voyage before
daybreak, and after a two days' sail, during which he ravaged the
seaboard of the Aetolians, he dropped anchor in Lechaeum; thence, after
seven days' continuous march, he arrived on the heights above Sparta in
the neighbourhood of the Menelaïum,—a feat which most of those even who
saw it done could scarcely believe.
[Sidenote: Helos.]
[Sidenote: Gythium.]
[Sidenote: Carnium.]
+19.+ While the Lacedaemonians were thus thoroughly terrified at the
unexpected danger, and at a loss what to do to meet it, Philip encamped
on the first day at Amyclae: a place in Laconia about twenty stades
from Lacedaemon, exceedingly rich in forest and corn, and containing a
temple of Apollo, which is about the most splendid of all the temples
in Laconia, situated in that quarter of the city which slopes down
towards the sea. Next day the king descended to a place called the Camp
of Pyrrhus,[254] wasting the country as he went. After devastating
the neighbouring districts for the two following days, he encamped
near Carnium; thence he started for Asine, and after some fruitless
assaults upon it, he started again, and thenceforth devoted himself
to plundering all the country bordering on the Cretan Sea as far as
Taenarum. Then, once more changing the direction of his march, he
advanced to Gythium, the naval arsenal of Sparta, which possesses a
safe harbour, and is about thirty stades from the city. Then leaving
this on the right, he pitched his camp in the territory of Helos,
which of all the districts of Laconia is the most extensive and most
beautiful. Thence he sent out foraging parties and wasted the country
with fire and sword, and destroyed the crops in it: pushing his
devastation as far as Acriae and Leucae, and even to the district of
Boeae.
[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of the Messenians to join Philip.]
[Sidenote: Lycurgus resolves to intercept Philip on his return at the
pass opposite Sparta.]
+20.+ On the receipt of the despatch from Philip commanding the
levy, the Messenians were no less forward than the other allies to
undertake it. They showed indeed great zeal in making the expedition,
sending out the flower of their troops, two thousand infantry and two
hundred cavalry. Owing, however, to their distance from the seat of
war, they arrived at Tegea after Philip had left, and at first were
at a loss what to do; but being very anxious not to appear lukewarm
in the campaign, because of the suspicions which had attached to them
before, they pressed forward through Argolis into Laconia, with a view
of effecting a junction with Philip; and having reached a fort called
Glympes, which is situated on the frontiers of Argolis and Laconia,
they encamped there in an unskilful and careless manner: for they
neither entrenched themselves with ditch nor rampart, nor selected an
advantageous spot; but trusting to the friendly disposition of the
natives, bivouacked there unsuspiciously outside the walls of the
fortress. But on news being brought to Lycurgus of the arrival of the
Messenians, he took his mercenaries and some Lacedaemonians with him,
and reaching the place before daybreak, boldly attacked the camp. Ill
advised as the proceedings of the Messenians had been, and especially
in advancing from Tegea with inadequate numbers and without the
direction of experts, in the actual hour of danger, when the enemy was
upon them, they did all that circumstances admitted of to secure their
safety. For as soon as they saw the enemy appearing they abandoned
everything and took refuge within the fort. Accordingly, though
Lycurgus captured most of the horses and the baggage, he did not take
a single prisoner, and only succeeded in killing eight of the cavalry.
After this reverse, the Messenians returned home through Argolis: but
elated with success Lycurgus went to Sparta, and set about preparations
for war; and took secret counsel with his friends to prevent Philip
from getting safe out of the country without an engagement. Meanwhile
the king had started from the district of Helos, and was on his return
march, wasting the country as he came; and on the fourth day, about
noon, arrived once more with his whole army at Amyclae.
+21.+ Leaving directions with his officers and friends as to the coming
engagement, Lycurgus himself left Sparta and occupied the ground
near the Menelaïum, with as many as two thousand men. He agreed with
the officers in the town that they should watch carefully, in order
that, whenever he raised the signal, they might lead out their troops
from the town at several points at once, and draw them up facing the
Eurotas, at the spot where it is nearest the town. Such were the
measures and designs of Lycurgus and the Lacedaemonians.
[Sidenote: Value of local knowledge.]
But lest ignorance of the locality should render my story
unintelligible and vague, I must describe its natural features and
general position: following my practice throughout this work of drawing
out the analogies and likenesses between places which are unknown and
those already known and described. For seeing that in war, whether
by sea or land, it is the difference of position which generally is
the cause of failure; and since I wish all to know, not so much what
happened, as how it happened, I must not pass over local description in
detailing events of any sort, least of all in such as relate to war:
and I must not shrink from using as landmarks, at one time harbours and
seas and islands, at another temples, mountains, or local names; or,
finally, variations in the aspect of the heaven, these being of the
most universal application throughout the world. For it is thus, and
thus only, that it is possible, as I have said, to bring my readers to
a conception of an unknown scene.
[Sidenote: The position of Sparta and the neighbouring heights.]
[Sidenote: The dispositions of Lycurgus.]
+22.+ These then are the features of the country in question. Sparta,
as a whole, is in the shape of a circle; and is situated on level
ground, broken at certain points by irregularities and hills. The river
Eurotas flows past it on the east, and for the greater part of the year
is too large to be forded; and the hills on which the Menelaïum stands
are on the other side of the river, to the south-east of the town,
rugged and difficult of access and exceedingly lofty; they exactly
command the space between the town and the Eurotas, which flows at the
very foot of the hill, the whole valley being at this point no more
than a stade and a half wide. Through this Philip was obliged to pass
on his return march, with the city, and the Lacedaemonians ready and
drawn up for battle, on his left hand, and on his right the river, and
the division of Lycurgus posted upon the hills. In addition to these
arrangements the Lacedaemonians had had recourse to the following
device: They had dammed up the river above the town, and turned the
stream upon the space between the town and the hills; with the result
that the ground became so wet that men could not keep their feet, to
say nothing of horses. The only course, therefore, left to the king was
to lead his men close under the skirts of the hills, thus presenting to
the attack of the enemy a long line of march, in which it was difficult
for one part to relieve another.
[Sidenote: Philip succeeds in baffling Lycurgus.]
Philip perceived these difficulties, and after consultation with
his friends decided that the matter of most urgent necessity was to
dislodge the division of Lycurgus, first of all, from the position
near the Menelaïum. He took therefore his mercenaries, peltasts, and
Illyrians, and advanced across the river in the direction of the hills.
Perceiving Philip’s design, Lycurgus began getting his men ready, and
exhorted them to face the battle, and at the same time displayed the
signal to the forces in the town: whereupon those whose duty it was
immediately led out the troops from the town, as had been arranged, and
drew them up outside the wall, with the cavalry on their right wing.
+23.+ When he had got within distance of Lycurgus, Philip at first
ordered the mercenaries to charge alone: and, accordingly, their
superiority in arms and position contributed not a little to give the
Lacedaemonians the upper hand at the beginning of the engagement. But
when Philip supported his men by sending his reserve of peltasts on to
the field, and caused the Illyrians to charge the enemy on the flanks,
the king’s mercenaries were encouraged by the appearance of these
reserves to renew the battle with much more vigour than ever; while
Lycurgus’s men, terrified at the approach of the heavy-armed soldiers,
gave way and fled, leaving a hundred killed and rather more prisoners,
while the rest escaped into the town. Lycurgus himself, with a few
followers going by a deserted and pathless route, made his way into the
town under cover of night. Philip secured the hills by means of the
Illyrians; and, accompanied by his light-armed troops and peltasts,
rejoined his main forces. Just at the same time Aratus, leading the
phalanx from Amyclae, had come close to the town. So the king, after
recrossing the Eurotas, halted with his light-armed peltasts and
cavalry until the heavy-armed got safely through the narrow part of the
road at the foot of the hills. Then the troops in the city ventured to
attack the covering force of cavalry. There was a serious engagement,
in which the peltasts fought with conspicuous valour; and the success
of Philip being now beyond dispute, he chased the Lacedaemonians to
their very gates, and then, having got his army safely across the
Eurotas he brought up the rear of his phalanx.
[Sidenote: Philip’s strong position.]
[Sidenote: Sellasia, B.C. 222.]
[Sidenote: Philip proceeds to Tegea, where he is visited by ambassadors
from Rhodes and Chios seeking to end the Aetolian war.]
+24.+ But it was now getting late: and being obliged to encamp, he
availed himself for that purpose of a place at the very mouth of the
pass, his officers having chanced already to have selected that very
place; than which it would be impossible to find one more advantageous
for making an invasion of Laconia by way of Sparta itself. For it is
at the very commencement of this pass, just where a man coming from
Tegea, or, indeed, from any point in the interior, approaches Sparta;
being about two stades from the town and right upon the river. The
side of it which looks towards the town and river is entirely covered
by a steep, lofty, and entirely inaccessible rock; while the top of
this rock is a table-land of good soil and well supplied with water,
and very conveniently situated for the exit and entrance of troops.
A general, therefore, who was encamped there, and who had command of
the height overhanging it, would evidently be in a place of safety as
regards the neighbouring town, and in a most advantageous situation as
commanding the entrance and exit of the narrow pass. Having accordingly
encamped himself on this spot in safety, next day Philip sent forward
his baggage; but drew out his army on the table-land in full view of
the citizens, and remained thus for a short time. Then he wheeled to
the left and marched in the direction of Tegea; and when he reached
the site of the battle of Antigonus and Cleomenes, he encamped there.
Next day, having made an inspection of the ground and sacrificed to
the gods on both the eminences, Olympus and Evas, he advanced with his
rear-guard strengthened. On arriving at Tegea he caused all the booty
to be sold; and then, marching through Argos, arrived with his whole
force at Corinth. There ambassadors appeared from Rhodes and Chios to
negotiate a suspension of hostilities; to whom the king gave audience,
and feigning that he was, and always had been, quite ready to come to
terms with the Aetolians, sent them away to negotiate with the latter
also; while he himself went down to Lechaeum, and made preparations
for an embarkation, as he had an important undertaking to complete in
Phocis.
[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas and Ptolemy.]
+25.+ Leontius, Megaleas, and Ptolemy, being still persuaded that they
could frighten Philip, and thus neutralise their former failures,
took this opportunity of tampering with the peltasts, and what the
Macedonians call the _Agema_,[255] by suggesting to them that they were
risking their all, and getting none of their just rights, nor receiving
the booty which, according to custom, properly fell to their share. By
these words they incited the young men to collect together, and attempt
to plunder the tents of the most prominent of the king’s friends,
and to pull down the doors, and break through the roof of the royal
headquarters.
The whole city being thereby in a state of confusion and uproar, the
king heard of it and immediately came hastily running to the town
from Lechaeum; and having summoned the Macedonians to the theatre he
addressed them in terms of mingled exhortation and rebuke for what had
happened. A scene of great uproar and confusion followed: and while
some advised him to arrest and call to account the guilty, others
to come to terms and declare an indemnity, for the moment the king
dissembled his feelings, and pretended to be satisfied; and so with
some words of exhortation addressed to all, retired: and though he
knew quite well who were the ringleaders in the disturbance, he made a
politic pretence of not doing so.
[Sidenote: Apelles sent for by Leontius.]
[Sidenote: Apelles rebuffed by the king.]
[Sidenote: Courtiers.]
+26.+ After this outbreak the king’s schemes in Phocis met with
certain impediments which prevented their present execution. Meanwhile
Leontius, despairing of success by his own efforts, had recourse to
Apelles, urging him by frequent messages to come from Chalcis, and
setting forth his own difficulties and the awkwardness of his position
owing to his quarrel with the king. Now Apelles had been acting in
Chalcis with an unwarrantable assumption of authority. He gave out
that the king was still a mere boy, and for the most part under his
control, and without independent power over anything; the management
of affairs and the supreme authority in the kingdom he asserted to
belong to himself. Accordingly, the magistrates and commissioners of
Macedonia and Thessaly reported to him; and the cities in Greece in
their decrees and votes of honours and rewards made brief reference to
the king, while Apelles was all in all to them. Philip had been kept
informed of this, and had for some time past been feeling annoyed and
offended at it,—Aratus being at his side, and using skilful means to
further his own views; still he kept his own counsel, and did not let
any one see what he intended to do, or what he had in his mind. In
ignorance, therefore, of his own position, and persuaded that, if he
could only come into Philip’s presence, he would manage everything as
he chose, Apelles set out from Chalcis to the assistance of Leontius.
On his arrival at Corinth, Leontius, Ptolemy and Megaleas, being
commanders of the peltasts and the other chief divisions of the army,
took great pains to incite the young men to go to meet him. He entered
the town, therefore, with great pomp, owing to the number of officers
and soldiers who went to meet him, and proceeded straight to the royal
quarters. But when he would have entered, according to his former
custom, one of the ushers prevented him, saying that the king was
engaged. Troubled at this unusual repulse, and hesitating for a long
while what to do, Apelles at last turned round and retired. Thereupon
all those who were escorting him began at once openly to fall off from
him and disperse, so that at last he entered his own lodging, with
his children, absolutely alone. So true it is all the world over that
a moment exalts and abases us; but most especially is this true of
courtiers. They indeed are exactly like counters on a board, which,
according to the pleasure of the calculator, are one moment worth a
farthing, the next a talent. Even so courtiers at the king’s nod are
one moment at the summit of prosperity, at another the objects of
pity. When Megaleas saw that the help he had looked for from Apelles
was failing him, he was exceedingly frightened, and made preparations
for flight. Apelles meanwhile was admitted to the king’s banquets
and honours of that sort, but had no share in his council or daily
social employments; and when, some days afterwards, the king resumed
his voyage from Lechaeum, to complete his designs in Phocis, he took
Apelles with him.
[Sidenote: Flight of Megaleas.]
[Sidenote: Leontius put to death.]
+27.+ The expedition to Phocis proving a failure, the king was retiring
from Elatea; and while this was going on, Megaleas removed to Athens,
leaving Leontius behind him as his security for his twenty talents
fine. The Athenian Strategi however refused to admit him, and he
therefore resumed his journey and went to Thebes. Meanwhile the king
put to sea from the coast of Cirrha and sailed with his guards[256]
to the harbour of Sicyon, whence he went up to the city and, excusing
himself to the magistrates, took up his quarters with Aratus, and
spent the whole of his time with him, ordering Apelles to sail back
to Corinth. But upon news being brought him of the proceedings of
Megaleas, he despatched the peltasts, whose regular commander was
Leontius, in the charge of Taurion to Triphylia, on the pretext of some
service of pressing need; and, when they had departed, he gave orders
to arrest Leontius to answer his bail. When the peltasts heard what had
happened from a messenger sent to them by Leontius, they despatched
ambassadors to the king, begging him that, “if he had arrested Leontius
on any other score, not to have him tried on the charges alleged
against him without their presence: for otherwise they should consider
themselves treated with signal contempt, and to be one and all involved
in the condemnation.” Such was the freedom of speech towards their king
which the Macedonians always enjoyed. They added, that “if the arrest
was on account of his bail for Megaleas, they would themselves pay the
money by a common subscription.” The king however was so enraged, that
he put Leontius to death sooner than he had intended, owing to the zeal
displayed by the peltasts.
[Sidenote: A thirty days' truce offered by the Aetolians through the
Rhodian and Chian ambassadors.]
[Sidenote: Treason of Megaleas detected. His arrest and suicide.]
[Sidenote: Death of Appelles.]
+28.+ Presently the ambassadors of Rhodes and Chios returned from
Aetolia. They had agreed to a truce of thirty days, and asserted that
the Aetolians were ready to make peace: they had also arranged for
a stated day on which they claimed that Philip should meet them at
Rhium; undertaking that the Aetolians would be ready to do anything on
condition of making peace. Philip accepted the truce and wrote letters
to the allies, bidding them send assessors and commissioners to discuss
the terms with the Aetolians; while he himself sailed from Lechaeum and
arrived on the second day at Patrae. Just then certain letters were
sent to him from Phocis, which Megaleas had written to the Aetolians,
exhorting them not to be frightened, but to persist in the war, because
Philip was in extremities through a lack of provisions. Besides this
the letters contained some offensive and bitter abuse of the king. As
soon as he had read these, the king feeling no doubt that Apelles was
the ringleader of the mischief, placed him under a guard and despatched
him in all haste to Corinth, with his son and favourite boy; while
he sent Alexander to Thebes to arrest Megaleas, with orders to bring
him before the magistrates to answer to his bail. When Alexander had
fulfilled his commission, Megaleas, not daring to await the issue,
committed suicide: and about the same time Apelles, his son and
favourite boy, ended their lives also. Such was the end of these men,
thoroughly deserved in every way, and especially for their outrageous
conduct to Aratus.
[Sidenote: Failure of the negotiations with the Aetolians.]
+29.+ Now the Aetolians were at first very anxious for the ratification
of a peace, because they found the war burdensome, and because things
had not gone as they expected. For, looking to his tender years and
lack of experience, they had expected to have a mere child to deal with
in Philip; but had found him a full-grown man both in his designs and
his manner of executing them: while they had themselves made a display
of imbecility and childishness alike in the general conduct, and the
particular actions, of the campaign. But as soon as they heard of the
outbreak of the disturbance among the peltasts, and of the deaths of
Apelles and Leontius, hoping that there was a serious and formidable
disaffection at the court, they procrastinated until they had outstayed
the day appointed for the meeting at Rhium. But Philip was delighted
to seize the pretext: for he felt confident of success in the war,
and had already resolved to avoid coming to terms. He therefore at
once exhorted such of the allies as had come to meet him to make
preparations, not for the peace, but for war; and putting to sea again
sailed back to Corinth. He then dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to go
home through Thessaly for the winter: while he himself putting to sea
from Cenchreae, and coasting along Attica, sailed through the Euripus
to Demetrias, and there before a jury of Macedonians had Ptolemy tried
and put to death, who was the last survivor of the conspiracy of
Leontius.
[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Review of the events of the year in Italy, Asia,
Sparta.]
It was in this season that Hannibal, having succeeded in entering
Italy, was lying encamped in presence of the Roman army in the
valley of the Padus. Antiochus, after subduing the greater part of
Coele-Syria, had once more dismissed his army into winter quarters.
The Spartan king Lycurgus fled to Aetolia in fear of the Ephors: for
acting on a false charge that he was meditating a _coup d'état_, they
had collected the young men and come to his house at night. But getting
previous intimation of what was impending, he had quitted the town
accompanied by the members of his household.
[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 218-217.]
[Sidenote: Disorder in Achaia owing to the incompetence of the
Strategus Eperatus.]
[Sidenote: May, B.C. 217. Aratus the elder elected Strategus.]
+30.+ When the next winter came, Philip having departed to Macedonia,
and the Achaean Strategus Eperatus having incurred the contempt of the
Achaean soldiers and the complete disregard of the mercenaries, no one
would obey his orders, and no preparation was made for the defence of
the country. This was observed by Pyrrhias, who had been sent by the
Aetolians to command the Eleans. He had under him a force of thirteen
hundred Aetolians, and the mercenaries hired by the Eleans, as well as
a thousand Elean infantry and two hundred Elean cavalry, amounting in
all to three thousand: and he now began committing frequent raids, not
only upon the territories of Dyme and Pharae, but upon that of Patrae
also. Finally he pitched his camp on what is called the Panachaean
Mountain, which commands the town of Patrae, and began wasting the
whole district towards Rhium and Aegium. The result was that the
cities, being exposed to much suffering, and unable to obtain any
assistance, began to make difficulties about paying their contribution
to the league; and the soldiers finding their pay always in arrear
and never paid at the right time acted in the same way about going to
the relief of the towns. Both parties thus mutually retaliating on
each other, affairs went from bad to worse, and at last the foreign
contingent broke up altogether. And all this was the result of the
incompetence of the chief magistrate. The time for the next election
finding Achaean affairs in this state, Eperatus laid down his office,
and just at the beginning of summer Aratus the elder was elected
Strategus.[257]
[Sidenote: 140th Olympiad, Asia.]
Such was the position of affairs in Europe. We have now arrived at a
proper juncture, both of events and of time, to transfer our narrative
to the history of Asia. I will therefore resume my story of the
transactions which occurred there during the same Olympiad.
+31.+ I will first endeavour, in accordance with my original plan,
to give an account of the war between Antiochus and Ptolemy for the
possession of Coele-Syria. Though I am fully aware that at the period,
at which I have stopped in my Greek history, this war was all but
decided and concluded, I have yet deliberately chosen this particular
break and division in my narrative; believing that I shall effectually
provide against the possibility of mistakes on the part of my readers
in regard to dates, if I indicate in the course of my narrative the
years in this Olympiad in which the events in the several parts of the
world, as well as in Greece, began and ended. For I think nothing more
essential to the clearness of my history of this Olympiad than to avoid
confusing the several narratives. Our object should be to distinguish
and keep them separate as much as possible, until we come to the next
Olympiad, and begin setting down the contemporary events in the several
countries under each year. For since I have undertaken to write, not a
particular, but a universal history, and have ventured upon a plan on
a greater scale, as I have already shown, than any of my predecessors,
it will be necessary also for me to take greater care than they, as
to my method of treatment and arrangement; so as to secure clearness,
both in the details, and in the general view adopted in my history. I
will accordingly go back a short way in the history of the kingdoms
of Antiochus and Ptolemy, and try to fix upon a starting-point for my
narrative which shall be accepted and recognised by all: for this is a
matter of the first importance.
+32.+ For the old saying, “Well begun is half done,” was meant by its
inventors to urge the importance of taking the greater pains to make a
good beginning than anything else. And though some may consider this an
exaggeration, in my opinion it comes short of the truth; for one might
say with confidence, not that “the beginning was half the business,”
but rather that it was near being the whole. For how can one make a
good beginning without having first grasped in thought the complete
plan, or without knowing where, with what object, and with what purpose
he is undertaking the business? Or how can a man sum up a series
of events satisfactorily without a reference to their origin, and
without showing his point of departure, or why and how he has arrived
at the particular crisis at which he finds himself? Therefore both
historian and reader alike should be exceedingly careful to mark the
beginnings of events, with a conviction that their influence does not
stop half-way, but is paramount to the end. And this is what I shall
endeavour to do.
+33.+ I am aware, however, that a similar profession has been made by
many other historians of an intention to write a universal history,
and of undertaking a work on a larger scale than their predecessors.
About these writers, putting out of the question Ephorus, the first
and only man who has really attempted a universal history, I will
not mention any name or say more about them than this,—that several
of my contemporaries, while professing to write a universal history
have imagined that they could tell the story of the war of Rome and
Carthage in three or four pages. Yet every one knows that events more
numerous or important were never accomplished in Iberia, Libya, Sicily,
and Italy than in that war; and that the Hannibalian war was the most
famous and lasting of any that has taken place except the Sicilian.
So momentous was it, that all the rest of the world were compelled to
watch it in terrified expectation of what would follow from its final
catastrophe. Yet some of these writers, without even giving as many
details of it as those who, after the manner of the vulgar, inscribe
rude records of events on house walls, pretend to have embraced the
whole of Greek and foreign history. The truth of the matter is, that
it is a very easy matter to profess to undertake works of the greatest
importance; but by no means so simple a matter in practice to attain
to any excellence. The former is open to every one with the requisite
audacity: the latter is rare, and is given to few. So much for those
who use pompous language about themselves and their historical works. I
will now return to my narrative.
[Sidenote: Death of Ptolemy Euergetes, B.C. 222.]
+34.+ Immediately after his father’s death, Ptolemy Philopator put his
brother Magas and his partisans to death, and took possession of the
throne of Egypt. He thought that he had now freed himself by this act
from domestic danger; and that by the deaths of Antigonus and Seleucus,
and their being respectively succeeded by mere children like Antiochus
and Philip, fortune had released him from danger abroad. He therefore
felt secure of his position and began conducting his reign as though it
were a perpetual festival. He would attend to no business, and would
hardly grant an interview to the officials about the court, or at the
head of the administrative departments in Egypt. Even his agents abroad
found him entirely careless and indifferent; though his predecessors,
far from taking less interest in foreign affairs, had generally given
them precedence over those of Egypt itself. For being masters of
Coele-Syria and Cyprus, they maintained a threatening attitude towards
the kings of Syria, both by land and sea; and were also in a commanding
position in regard to the princes of Asia, as well as the islands,
through their possession of the most splendid cities, strongholds, and
harbours all along the sea-coast from Pamphylia to the Hellespont and
the district round Lysimachia. Moreover they were favourably placed for
an attack upon Thrace and Macedonia from their possession of Aenus,
Maroneia, and more distant cities still. And having thus stretched
forth their hands to remote regions, and long ago strengthened their
position by a ring of princedoms, these kings had never been anxious
about their rule in Egypt; and had naturally, therefore, given great
attention to foreign politics. But when Philopator, absorbed in
unworthy intrigues, and senseless and continuous drunkenness, treated
these several branches of government with equal indifference, it was
naturally not long before more than one was found to lay plots against
his life as well as his power: of whom the first was Cleomenes, the
Spartan.[258]
[Sidenote: Cleomenes endeavours to get assistance from the Egyptian
court.]
+35.+ As long as Euergetes was alive, with whom he had agreed to make
an alliance and confederacy, Cleomenes took no steps. But upon that
monarch’s death, seeing that the time was slipping away, and that the
peculiar position of affairs in Greece seemed almost to cry aloud
for Cleomenes,—for Antigonus was dead, the Achaeans involved in war,
and the Lacedaemonians were at one with the Aetolians in hostility
to the Achaeans and Macedonians, which was the policy originally
adopted by Cleomenes,—then, indeed, he was actually compelled to use
some expedition, and to bestir himself to secure his departure from
Alexandria. First therefore, in interviews with the king, he urged him
to send him out with the needful amount of supplies and troops; but
not being listened to in this request, he next begged him earnestly
to let him go alone with his own servants; for he affirmed that the
state of affairs was such as to show him sufficient opportunities for
recovering his ancestral throne. The king, however, for the reasons
I have mentioned, taking absolutely no interest in such matters, nor
exercising any foresight whatever, continued with extraordinary folly
and blindness to neglect the petitions of Cleomenes. But the party of
Sosibius, the leading statesman at the time, took counsel together,
and agreed on the following course of action in regard to him. They
decided not to send him out with a fleet and supplies; for, owing to
the death of Antigonus, they took little account of foreign affairs,
and thought money spent on such things would be thrown away. Besides,
they were afraid that since Antigonus was dead, and no one was left
who could balance him, Cleomenes might, if he got Greece into his
power quickly and without trouble, prove a serious and formidable
rival to themselves; especially as he had had a clear view of Egyptian
affairs, had learnt to despise the king; and had discovered that the
kingdom had many parts loosely attached, and widely removed from the
centre, and presenting many facilities for revolutionary movements:
for not a few of their ships were at Samos, and a considerable force
of soldiers at Ephesus. These considerations induced them to reject
the idea of sending Cleomenes out with supplies; for they thought it
by no means conducive to their interests to carelessly let a man go,
who was certain to be their opponent and enemy. The other proposal was
to keep him there against his will; but this they all rejected at once
without discussion, on the principle that the lion and the flock could
not safely share the same stall. Sosibius himself took the lead in
regarding this idea with aversion, and his reason was this.
[Sidenote: The reason of the opposition of Sosibius.]
+36.+ While engaged in effecting the destruction of Magas and Berenice,
his anxiety at the possible failure of his attempt, especially through
the courageous character of Berenice, had forced him to flatter the
courtiers, and give them all hopes of advantage in case his intrigue
succeeded. It was at this juncture that, observing Cleomenes to
stand in need of the king’s help, and to be possessed of a clear
understanding and a genuine grasp of the situation, he admitted him to
a knowledge of his design, holding out to him hopes of great advantage.
And when Cleomenes saw that Sosibius was in a state of great anxiety,
and above all afraid of the foreign soldiers and mercenaries, he bade
him not be alarmed; and undertook that the foreign soldiers should do
him no harm, but should rather be of assistance to him. And on Sosibius
expressing surprise rather than conviction at this promise, he said,
“Don't you see that there are three thousand foreign soldiers here from
the Peloponnese, and a thousand from Crete? I have only to nod to these
men, and every man of them will at once do what I want. With these all
ready to hand, whom do you fear? Surely not mere Syrians and Carians.”
Sosibius was much pleased at the remark at the time, and doubly
encouraged in his intrigue against Berenice; but ever afterwards, when
observing the indifference of the king, he repeated it to himself, and
put before his eyes the boldness of Cleomenes, and the goodwill of the
foreign contingent towards him.
[Sidenote: The intrigue of Sosibius against Cleomenes.]
+37.+ These feelings now moved him to advise the king and his friends
above all things to arrest and incarcerate Cleomenes: and to carry
out this policy he availed himself of the following circumstance,
which happened conveniently for him. There was a certain Messenian
called Nicagoras, an ancestral guest-friend of the Lacedaemonian
king Archidamus. They had not previously had much intercourse; but
when Archidamus fled from Sparta, for fear of Cleomenes, and came to
Messenia, not only did Nicagoras show great kindness in receiving
him under his roof and furnishing him with other necessaries, but
from the close association that followed a very warm friendship and
intimacy sprang up between them: and accordingly when Cleomenes
subsequently gave Archidamus some expectation of being restored to
his city, and composing their quarrels, Nicagoras devoted himself to
conducting the negotiation and settling the terms of their compact.
These being ratified, Archidamus returned to Sparta relying on the
treaty made by the agency of Nicagoras. But as soon as he met him,
Cleomenes assassinated Archidamus,[259] sparing however Nicagoras
and his companions. To the outside world Nicagoras pretended to be
under an obligation to Cleomenes for saving his life; but in heart
he was exceedingly incensed at what had happened, because he had the
discredit of having been the cause of the king’s death. Now it happened
that this same Nicagoras had, a short time before the events of which
we are speaking, come to Alexandria with a cargo of horses. Just as
he was disembarking he came upon Cleomenes, Panterus, and Hippitas
walking together along the quay. When Cleomenes saw him, he came up
and welcomed him warmly, and asked him on what business he was come.
Upon his replying that he had brought a cargo of horses, “You had
better,” said he, “have brought a cargo of catamites and sakbut girls;
for that is what the present king is fond of.” Nicagoras laughed, and
said nothing at the time: but some days afterwards, when he had, in the
course of his horse-sales, become more intimate with Sosibius, he did
Cleomenes the ill turn of repeating his recent sarcasm; and seeing that
Sosibius heard it with satisfaction, he related to him the whole story
of his grievance against Cleomenes.
[Sidenote: Cleomenes put under arrest.]
+38.+ Finding then that he was hostile in feeling to Cleomenes,
Sosibius persuaded Nicagoras, partly by presents given on the spot
and partly by promises for the future, to write a letter accusing
Cleomenes, and leave it sealed; that as soon as he had sailed, as he
would do in a few days, his servant might bring it to him as though
sent by Nicagoras. Nicagoras performed his part in the plot; and after
he had sailed, the letter was brought by the servant to Sosibius,
who at once took the servant and the letter to the king. The servant
stated that Nicagoras had left the letter with orders to deliver it
to Sosibius; and the letter declared that it was the intention of
Cleomenes, if he failed to secure his despatch from the country with
suitable escort and provisions, to stir up a rebellion against the
king. Sosibius at once seized the opportunity of urging on the king and
his friends to take prompt precautions against Cleomenes and to put him
in ward. This was at once done, and a very large house was assigned to
him in which he lived under guard, differing from other prisoners only
in the superior size of his prison. Finding himself in this distressing
plight, and with fear of worse for the future, Cleomenes determined to
make the most desperate attempts for freedom: not so much because he
felt confident of success,—for he had none of the elements of success
in such an enterprise on his side,—but rather because he was eager to
die nobly, and endure nothing unworthy of the gallantry which he had
previously displayed. He must, I think, as is usually the case with men
of high courage, have recalled and reflected upon as his model those
words of the hero:[260]—
“Yea, let me die,—but not a coward’s death,
Nor all inglorious: let me do one deed,
That children yet unborn may hear and mark!”
[Sidenote: Bold attempt of Cleomenes to recover his liberty. His
failure and death, B.C. 220.]
+39.+ He therefore waited for the time at which the king left
Alexandria for Canopus, and then spread a report among his guards
that he was going to be released by the king; and on this pretext
entertained his own attendants at a banquet, and sent out some flesh
of the sacrificial victims, some garlands, and some wine to his
guards. The latter indulged in these good things unsuspiciously, and
became completely drunk; whereupon Cleomenes walked out about noon,
accompanied by his friends and servants armed with daggers, without
being noticed by his guard. As the party advanced they met Ptolemy in
the street, who had been left by the king in charge of the city; and
overawing his attendants by the audacity of his proceeding, dragged
Ptolemy himself from his chariot and put him in a place of security,
while they loudly called upon the crowds of citizens to assert their
freedom. But every one was unprepared for the movement, and therefore
no one obeyed their summons or joined them; and they accordingly turned
their steps to the citadel, with the intention of bursting open the
doors and obtaining the help of the prisoners confined there. But the
commanders of the citadel were on the alert, and learning what was
going to take place had secured the entrance gate: having therefore
failed in this design they killed themselves like brave men and
Spartans.
Such was the end of Cleomenes: a man of brilliant social qualities,
with a natural aptitude for affairs, and, in a word, endued with all
the qualifications of a general and a king.
[Sidenote: B.C. 220-219. The origin of the war in Coele-Syria.]
+40.+ Shortly after the catastrophe of Cleomenes, the governor of
Coele-Syria, who was an Aetolian by birth, resolved to hold treasonable
parley with Antiochus and put the cities of that province into his
hands. He was induced to take this step partly by the contempt with
which Ptolemy’s shameful debauchery and general conduct had inspired
him; and partly by distrust of the king’s ministers, which he had
learned to entertain in the course of the recent attempt of Antiochus
upon Coele-Syria: for in that campaign he had rendered signal service
to Ptolemy, and yet, far from receiving any thanks for it, he had been
summoned to Alexandria and barely escaped losing his life. The advances
which he now made to Antiochus were gladly received, and the affair was
soon in the course of being rapidly completed.
But I must make my readers acquainted with the position of the royal
family of Syria as I have already done with that of Egypt; and in order
to do so, I will go back to the succession of Antiochus to the throne,
and give a summary of events from that point to the beginning of the
war of which I am to speak.
[Sidenote: B.C. 226.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 223. See 4, 48.]
Antiochus was the younger son of Seleucus Callinicus; and on the
death of his father, and the succession in right of seniority of his
brother Seleucus to the throne, he at first removed to upper Asia
and lived there. But Seleucus having been treacherously assassinated
after crossing Mount Taurus with his army, as I have already related,
he succeeded to the throne himself; and made Achaeus governor of Asia
on this side Taurus, Molon and his brother Alexander guardians of his
dominions in upper Asia,—Molon acting as Satrap of Media, his brother
of Persia.
[Sidenote: Revolt of Molon.]
+41.+ These two brothers despising the king for his youth, and hoping
that Achaeus would join in their treason, but most of all because
they dreaded the cruel character and malign influence of Hermeias,
who was at that time the chief minister of the entire kingdom, formed
the design of revolting themselves and causing the upper Satrapies to
revolt also.
[Sidenote: Intrigues of Hermeias.]
This Hermeias was a Carian and had obtained his power by the
appointment of the king’s brother Seleucus, who had entrusted it to him
when he was setting out on his expedition to the Taurus. Invested with
this authority he at once began to display jealousy of all those about
the court who were in any way prominent; and being cruel by nature he
inflicted punishment on some for acts of ignorance, on which he always
managed to place the worst interpretation; while against others he
brought trumped-up and lying charges, and then acted towards them the
part of an inflexible and harsh judge. But his chief end and object was
to secure the destruction of Epigenes who had brought home the forces
which had accompanied Seleucus; because he saw that he was a man of
eloquence and practical ability, and highly acceptable to the army.
With this design he was ever on the watch to lay hold of some handle
or pretext against him. Accordingly when a council was summoned on
the subject of Molon’s revolt, and when the king bade each councillor
deliver his opinion on the measures to be taken against the rebels,
Epigenes spoke first and urged that “there ought to be no delay,
but the matter should be taken in hand at once; and that, first and
foremost, the king should go in person to the district, and be ready
to seize the right moments for action. For the actual presence of the
king, and his appearance at the head of an army before the eyes of the
common people, would prevent the party of Molon from venturing upon
revolutionary measures at all; or if they had the audacity to do so,
and persisted in their design, they would be quickly arrested by the
populace and handed over into the king’s power.”
+42.+ While Epigenes was still speaking in this strain, Hermeias, in
a burst of rage, exclaimed, “That Epigenes had long been secretly
plotting treason against the king; but that now he had happily shown
his real sentiments by the advice which he had given, proving how eager
he was to expose the king’s person to the rebels with an insignificant
guard.” For the present he was content with making this insinuation as
fuel for a future outburst of slander, and without further reference
to Epigenes, after what was rather an ill-timed ebullition of temper
than serious hostility, he delivered his own opinion; which, from his
fear of the danger and his inexperience in war, was against undertaking
the expedition against Molon personally, but was warmly in favour of
an attack upon Ptolemy, because he was of opinion that this latter war
would involve no danger, owing to that monarch’s cowardly character.
For the present he overawed the rest of the council into agreement
with him and he thereupon sent Xenon and Theodotus Hemiolius with an
army against Molon; while he employed himself in continually inciting
Antiochus to undertake the expedition into Coele-Syria: thinking that
it was only by involving the young king in war on every side that he
could escape punishment for his past misdeeds, and avoid being deprived
of his position of authority, for the king would have need of his
services when he found himself surrounded by struggles and dangers.
With this object in view, he finally hit on the device of forging a
letter, which he presented to the king as having been sent by Achaeus.
In it Achaeus was made to state that “Ptolemy had urged him to assert
his right to the government and promised to supply him with ships and
money for all his attempts, if he would only take the crown, and come
forward in the sight of all the world as a claimant of the sovereign
power; which he already possessed, in fact, though he grudged himself
the title, and rejected the crown which fortune gave him.”
This letter successfully imposed on the king, who became ready and
eager to go on the expedition against Coele-Syria.
[Sidenote: Marriage of Antiochus III.]
+43.+ While this was going on, Antiochus happened to be at Seleucia,
on the Zeugma, when the Navarchus Diognetus arrived from Cappadocia,
on the Euxine, bringing Laodice, the daughter of king Mithridates,
an unmarried girl, destined to be the king’s wife. This Mithridates
boasted of being a descendant of one of the seven Persians who killed
the Magus,[261] and he had maintained the sovereignty handed down from
his ancestors, as it had been originally given to them by Darius along
the shore of the Euxine. Having gone to meet the princess with all
due pomp and splendour, Antiochus immediately celebrated his nuptials
with royal magnificence. The marriage having been completed, he went
to Antioch, and after proclaiming Laodice queen, devoted himself
thenceforth to making preparation for the war.
[Sidenote: Molon.]
Meanwhile Molon had prepared the people of his own Satrapy to go all
lengths, partly by holding out to them hopes of advantages to be
gained, and partly by working on the fears of their chief men, by
means of forged letters purporting to be from the king, and couched
in threatening terms. He had also a ready coadjutor in his brother
Alexander; and had secured the co-operation of the neighbouring
Satrapies, by winning the goodwill of their leading men with bribes.
It was, therefore, at the head of a large force that he took the
field against the royal generals. Terrified at his approach Xenon
and Theodotus retired into the cities; and Molon, having secured the
territory of Apollonia, had now a superabundance of supplies.
[Sidenote: Description of Media.]
+44.+ But, indeed, even before that he was a formidable enemy owing to
the importance of his province. For the whole of the royal horses out
at grass are entrusted to the Medes;[262] and they have an incalculable
quantity of corn and cattle. Of the natural strength and extent of
the district it would be impossible to speak highly enough. For Media
lies nearly in the centre of Asia and in its size, and in the height
of its steppes compares favourably with every other district of Asia.
And again it overlooks some of the most warlike and powerful tribes. On
the east lie the plains of the desert which intervenes between Persia
and Parthia; and, moreover, it borders on and commands the “Caspian
Gates,” and touches the mountains of the Tapyri, which are not far from
the Hyrcanian Sea. On the south it slopes down to Mesopotamia and the
territory of Apollonia. It is protected from Persia by the barrier of
Mount Zagrus, which has an ascent of a hundred stades, and containing
in its range many separate peaks and defiles is subdivided by deep
valleys, and at certain points by cañons, inhabited by Cosseans,
Corbrenians, Carchi, and several other barbarous tribes who have
the reputation of being excellent warriors. Again on the west it is
coterminous with the tribe called Satrapeii, who are not far from the
tribes which extend as far as the Euxine. Its northern frontier is
fringed by Elymaeans, Aniaracae, Cadusii, and Matiani, and overlooks
that part of the Pontus which adjoins the Maeotis. Media itself is
subdivided by several mountain chains running from east to west,
between which are plains thickly studded with cities and villages.
[Sidenote: Molon takes up arms.]
+45.+ Being masters, then, of a territory of proportions worthy of a
kingdom, his great power had made Molon from the first a formidable
enemy: but when the royal generals appeared to have abandoned the
country to him, and his own forces were elated at the successful issue
of their first hopes, the terror which he inspired became absolute, and
he was believed by the Asiatics to be irresistible. Taking advantage
of this, he first of all resolved to cross the Tigris and lay siege to
Seleucia; but when his passage across the river was stopped by Zeuxis
seizing the river boats, he retired to the camp at Ctesiphon, and set
about preparing winter quarters for his army.
[Sidenote: Xenoetas sent against Molon, B.C. 221.]
[Sidenote: King Antiochus in Coele-Syria.]
When King Antiochus heard of Molon’s advance and the retreat of his
own generals, he was once more for giving up the expedition against
Ptolemy, and going in person on the campaign against Molon, and not
letting slip the proper time for action. But Hermeias persisted in his
original plan, and despatched the Achaean Xenoetas against Molon, in
command of an army, with full powers; asserting that against rebels it
was fitting that generals should have the command; but that the king
ought to confine himself to directing plans and conducting national
wars against monarchs. Having therefore the young king entirely in
his power, owing to his age, he set out; and having mustered the army
at Apameia he started thence and arrived at Laodiceia. Advancing from
that time with his whole army, the king crossed the desert and entered
the cañon called Marsyas, which lies between the skirts of Libanus
and Anti-Libanus, and is contracted into a narrow gorge by those two
mountains. Just where the valley is narrowest it is divided by marshes
and lakes, from which the scented reed is cut.
+46.+ On one side of the entrance to this pass lies a place called
Brochi, on the other Gerrha, which leave but a narrow space between
them. After a march of several days through this cañon, and subduing
the towns that lay along it, Antiochus arrived at Gerrha. Finding that
Theodotus the Aetolian had already occupied Gerrha and Brochi, and had
secured the narrow road by the lakes with ditches and palisades and a
proper disposition of guards, the king at first tried to carry the pass
by force; but after sustaining more loss than he inflicted, and finding
that Theodotus remained still stanch, he gave up the attempt. In the
midst of these difficulties news was brought that Xenoetas had suffered
a total defeat and that Molon was in possession of all the upper
country: he therefore abandoned his foreign expedition and started to
relieve his own dominions.
[Sidenote: Xenoetas at first successful.]
The fact was that when the general Xenoetas had been despatched with
absolute powers, as I have before stated, his unexpected elevation
caused him to treat his friends with haughtiness and his enemies with
overweening temerity. His first move however was sufficiently prudent.
He marched to Seleucia, and after sending for Diogenes the governor of
Susiana, and Pythiades the commander in the Persian Gulf, he led out
his forces and encamped with the river Tigris protecting his front. But
there he was visited by many men from Molon’s camp, who swam across
the river and assured him that, if he would only cross the Tigris, the
whole of Molon’s army would declare for him; for the common soldiers
were jealous of Molon and warmly disposed towards the king. Xenoetas
was encouraged by these statements to attempt the passage of the
Tigris. He made a feint of bridging the river at a spot where it is
divided by an island; but as he was getting nothing ready for such an
operation, Molon took no notice of his pretended move; while he was
really occupied in collecting boats and getting them ready with every
possible care. Then having selected the most courageous men, horse and
foot, from his entire army, he left Zeuxis and Pythiades in charge of
his camp, and marched up stream at night about eighty stades above
Molon’s camp; and having got his force safely over in boats, encamped
them before daybreak in an excellent position, nearly surrounded by the
river, and covered where there was no river by marshes and swamps.
+47.+ When Molon learnt what had taken place, he sent his cavalry,
under the idea that they would easily stop those who were actually
crossing, and ride down those who had already crossed. But as soon as
they got near Xenoetas’s force, their ignorance of the ground proved
fatal to them without any enemy to attack them; for they got immersed
by their own weight, and sinking in the lakes were all rendered
useless, while many of them actually lost their lives. Xenoetas,
however, feeling sure that if he only approached, Molon’s forces would
all desert to him, advanced along the bank of the river and pitched
a camp close to the enemy. Thereupon Molon, either as a stratagem,
or because he really felt some doubt of the fidelity of his men, and
was afraid that some of Xenoetas’s expectations might be fulfilled,
left his baggage in his camp and started under cover of night in the
direction of Media. Xenoetas, imagining that Molon had fled in terror
at his approach, and because he distrusted the fidelity of his own
troops, first attacked and took the enemy’s camp, and then sent for
his own cavalry and their baggage from the camp of Zeuxis. He next
summoned the soldiers to a meeting, and told them that they should feel
encouraged and hopeful now that Molon had fled. With this preface,
he ordered them all to attend to their bodily wants and refresh
themselves; as he intended without delay to go in pursuit of the enemy
early next morning.
[Sidenote: Molon returns to his camp.]
+48.+ But the soldiers, filled with confidence, and enriched with
every kind of provisions, eagerly turned to feasting and wine and the
demoralisation which always accompanies such excesses. But Molon,
after marching a considerable distance, caused his army to get their
dinner, and then wheeling round reappeared at the camp. He found all
the enemy scattered about and drunk, and attacked their palisade just
before daybreak. Dismayed by this unexpected danger, and unable to
awake his men from their drunken slumber, Xenoetas and his staff rushed
furiously upon the enemy and were killed. Of the sleeping soldiers most
were killed in their beds, while the rest threw themselves into the
river and endeavoured to cross to the opposite camp. The greater part
however even of these perished; for in the blind hurry and confusion
which prevailed, and in the universal panic and dismay, seeing the camp
on the other side divided by so narrow a space, they all forgot the
violence of the stream, and the difficulty of crossing it, in their
eagerness to reach a place of safety. In wild excitement therefore,
and with a blind instinct of self-preservation, they not only hurled
themselves into the river, but threw their beasts of burden in also,
with their packs, as though they thought that the river by some
providential instinct would take their part and convey them safely to
the opposite camp. The result was that the stream presented a truly
pitiable and extraordinary spectacle,—horses, beasts of burden, arms,
corpses, and every kind of baggage being carried down the current along
with the swimmers.
[Sidenote: Molon’s successful campaign. B.C. 221.]
Having secured the camp of Xenoetas, Molon crossed the river in perfect
safety and without any resistance, as Zeuxis also now fled at his
approach; took possession of the latter’s camp, and then advanced with
his whole army to Seleucia; carried it at the first assault, Zeuxis and
Diomedon the governor of the place both abandoning it and flying; and
advancing from this place reduced the upper Satrapies to submission
without a blow. That of Babylon fell next, and then the Satrapy which
lay along the Persian Gulf. This brought him to Susa, which he also
carried without a blow; though his assaults upon the citadel proved
unavailing, because Diogenes the general had thrown himself into it
before he could get there. He therefore abandoned the idea of carrying
it by storm, and leaving a detachment to lay siege to it, hurried back
with his main army to Seleucia on the Tigris. There he took great pains
to refresh his army, and after addressing his men in encouraging terms
he started once more to complete his designs, and occupied Parapotamia
as far as the city Europus, and Mesopotamia as far as Dura.
[Sidenote: Epigenes put to death by the intrigues of Hermeias.]
+49.+ When news of these events was brought to Antiochus, as I have
said before, he gave up all idea of the Coele-Syrian campaign, and
turned all his attention to this war. Another meeting of his council
was thereupon summoned: and on the king ordering the members of it to
deliver their opinions as to the tactics to be employed against Molon,
the first to speak on the business was again Epigenes: who said that
“his advice should have been followed all along, and measures have been
promptly taken before the enemy had obtained such important successes:
still even at this late hour they ought to take it in hand resolutely.”
Thereupon Hermeias broke out again into an unreasonable and violent fit
of anger and began to heap abuse upon Epigenes; and while belauding
himself in a fulsome manner, brought accusations against Epigenes that
were absurd as well as false. He ended by adjuring the king not to be
diverted from his purpose without better reason, nor to abandon his
hopes in Coele-Syria. This advice was ill-received by the majority of
the council, and displeasing to Antiochus himself; and, accordingly,
as the king showed great anxiety to reconcile the two men, Hermeias
was at length induced to put an end to his invectives. The council
decided by a majority that the course recommended by Epigenes was the
most practical and advantageous, and a resolution was come to that the
king should go on the campaign against Molon, and devote his attention
to that. Thereupon Hermeias promptly made a hypocritical pretence of
having changed his mind and remarking that it was the duty of all to
acquiesce loyally in the decision, made a great show of readiness and
activity in pushing on the preparations.
+50.+ The forces, however, having been mustered at Apameia, upon a kind
of mutiny arising among the common soldiers, on account of some arrears
of pay, Hermeias, observing the king to be in a state of anxiety, and
to be alarmed at the disturbance at so critical a moment, offered to
discharge all arrears, if the king would only consent to Epigenes
not accompanying the expedition; on the ground that nothing could be
properly managed in the army when such angry feelings, and such party
spirit, had been excited. The proposal was very displeasing to the
king, who was exceedingly anxious that Epigenes should accompany him on
the campaign, owing to his experience in the field; but he was bound
so completely hand and foot, and entangled by the craft of Hermeias,
his skilful finance, constant watchfulness, and designing flattery,
that he was not his own master; and accordingly he yielded to the
necessity of the moment and consented to his demand. When Epigenes
thereupon retired, as he was bidden, the members of the council were
too much afraid of incurring displeasure to remonstrate; while the
army generally, by a revulsion of feeling, turned with gratitude to
the man to whom they owed the settlement of their claims for pay. The
Cyrrhestae were the only ones that stood out: and they broke out into
open mutiny, and for some time occasioned much trouble; but, being
at last conquered by one of the king’s generals, most of them were
killed, and the rest submitted to the king’s mercy. Hermeias having
thus secured the allegiance of his friends by fear, and of the troops
by being of service to them, started on the expedition in company with
the king; while in regard to Epigenes he elaborated the following plot,
with the assistance of Alexis, the commander of the citadel of Apameia.
He wrote a letter purporting to have been sent from Molon to Epigenes,
and persuaded one of the latter’s servants, by holding out the hope of
great rewards, to take it to the house of Epigenes, and mix it with his
other papers. Immediately after this had been done, Alexis came to the
house and asked Epigenes whether he had not received certain letters
from Molon; and, upon his denial, demanded in menacing terms to be
allowed to search. Having entered, he quickly discovered the letter,
which he availed himself of as a pretext for putting Epigenes to death
on the spot. By this means the king was persuaded to believe that
Epigenes had justly forfeited his life; and though the courtiers had
their suspicions, they were afraid to say anything.
[Sidenote: B.C. 221-220. Antiochus advances through Mesopotamia.]
+51.+ When Antiochus had reached the Euphrates, and had taken over the
force stationed there, he once more started on his march and got as far
as Antioch, in Mygdonia, about mid-winter, and there remained until the
worst of the winter should be over. Thence after a stay of forty days
he advanced to Libba. Molon was now in the neighbourhood of Babylon:
and Antiochus consulted his council as to the route to be pursued,
the tactics to be adopted, and the source from which provisions could
best be obtained for his army on the march in their expedition against
Molon. The proposal of Hermeias was to march along the Tigris, with
this river, and the Lycus and Caprus, on their flank. Zeuxis, having
the fate of Epigenes before his eyes, was in a state of painful doubt
whether to speak his real opinion or no; but as the mistake involved
in the advice of Hermeias was flagrant, he at last mustered courage
to advise that the Tigris should be crossed; alleging as a reason the
general difficulty of the road along the river: especially from the
fact that, after a considerable march, the last six days of which
would be through a desert, they would reach what was called the
“King’s Dyke,” which it would be impossible to cross if they found it
invested by the enemy; while a retirement by a second march through
the wilderness would be manifestly dangerous, especially as their
provisions would be sure to be running short. On the other hand he
showed that if they crossed the Tigris it was evident the Apolloniates
would repent of their treason and join the king; for even as it was
they had submitted to Molon, not from choice, but under compulsion
and terror; and the fertility of their soil promised abundance of
provisions for the troops. But his most weighty argument was that by
their thus acting Molon would be cut off from a return to Media, and
from drawing supplies from that country, and would thereby be compelled
to risk a general action: or, if he refused to do so, his troops would
promptly fix their hopes upon the king.
[Sidenote: Antiochus crosses the Tigris.]
+52.+ The suggestion of Zeuxis being approved, the army was immediately
arranged in three divisions, and got across with the baggage at three
points in the river. Thence they marched in the direction of Dura,
where they quickly caused the siege of the citadel to be raised, which
was being invested at the time by some of Molon’s officers; and thence,
after a march of eight successive days, they crossed the mountain
called Oreicum and arrived at Apollonia.
[Sidenote: Molon also crosses the Tigris.]
[Sidenote: Abortive attempt of Molon to make a night attack on the
king.]
Meanwhile Molon had heard of the king’s arrival, and not feeling
confidence in the inhabitants of Susiana and Babylonia, because he
had conquered them so recently and by surprise, fearing also to be
cut off from a retreat to Media, he determined to throw a bridge over
the Tigris and get his army across; being eager if it were possible
to secure the mountain district of Apollonia, because he had great
confidence in his corps of slingers called Cyrtii. He carried out his
resolution, and was pushing forward in an unbroken series of forced
marches. Thus it came about that, just as he was entering the district
of Apollonia, the king at the head of his whole army was marching out.
The advanced guard of skirmishers of the two armies fell in with each
other on some high ground, and at first engaged and made trial of each
other’s strength; but upon the main armies on either side coming on
to the ground, they separated. For the present both retired to their
respective entrenchments, and encamped at a distance of forty stades
from each other. When night had fallen, Molon reflected that there
was some risk and disadvantage in a battle by broad daylight and in
the open field between rebels and their sovereign, and he determined
therefore to attack Antiochus by night. Selecting the best and most
vigorous of his soldiers, he made a considerable détour, with the
object of making his attack from higher ground. But having learnt
during his march that ten young men had deserted in a body to the king,
he gave up his design, and facing right about returned in haste to his
own entrenchment where he arrived about daybreak. His arrival caused a
panic in the army; for the troops in the camp, startled out of their
sleep by the arrival of the returning men, were very near rushing out
of the lines.
[Sidenote: Disposition of the king’s army.]
+53.+ But while Molon was doing his best to calm the panic, the king,
fully prepared for the engagement, was marching his whole army out of
their lines at daybreak. On his right wing he stationed his lancers
under the command of Ardys, a man of proved ability in the field; next
to them the Cretan allies, and next the Gallic Rhigosages. Next these
he placed the foreign contingent and mercenary soldiers from Greece,
and next to them he stationed his phalanx: the left wing he assigned to
the cavalry called the “Companions.”[263] His elephants, which were ten
in number, he placed at intervals in front of the line. His reserves of
infantry and cavalry he divided between the two wings, with orders to
outflank the enemy as soon as the battle had begun. He then went along
the line and addressed a few words of exhortation to the men suitable
to the occasion; and put Hermeias and Zeuxis in command of the left
wing, taking that of the right himself.
[Sidenote: Molon’s disposition.]
On the other side, owing to the panic caused by his rash movement of
the previous night, Molon was unable to get his men out of camp, or
into position without difficulty and confusion. He did however divide
his cavalry between his two wings, guessing what the disposition of the
enemy would be; and stationed the scutati and Gauls, and in short all
his heavy-armed men in the space between the two bodies of cavalry. His
archers, slingers, and all such kind of troops he placed on the outer
flank of the cavalry on either wing; while his scythed chariots he
placed at intervals in front of his line. He gave his brother Neolaus
command of the left wing, taking that of the right himself.
[Sidenote: Death of Molon and his fellow-conspirators.]
+54.+ When the two armies advanced to the battle, Molon’s right wing
remained faithful to him, and vigorously engaged the division of
Zeuxis; but the left wing no sooner came within sight of the king than
it deserted to the enemy: the result of which was that Molon’s army was
thrown into consternation, while the king’s troops were inspired with
redoubled confidence. When Molon comprehended what had taken place,
and found himself surrounded on every side, reflecting on the tortures
which would be inflicted upon him if he were taken alive, he put an
end to his own life. So too all who had taken part in the plot fled
severally to their own homes, and terminated their lives in the same
way. Neolaus escaped from the field and found his way into Persis, to
the house of Molon’s brother Alexander; and there first killed his
mother and Molon’s children and afterwards himself, having previously
persuaded Alexander to do the same to himself. After plundering the
enemy’s camp, the king ordered the body of Molon to be impaled on the
most conspicuous spot in Media: which the men appointed to the work
immediately did; for they took it to Callonitis and impaled it close
to the pass over Mount Zagrus. The king, after plundering the enemy’s
camp, rebuked the rebel army in a long speech; and finally receiving
them back into favour by holding out his right hand to them, appointed
certain officers to lead them back to Media and settle the affairs
of that district; while he himself went down to Seleucia and made
arrangements for the government of the Satrapies round it, treating
all with equal clemency and prudence. But Hermeias acted with his
usual harshness: he got up charges against the people of Seleucia,
and imposed a fine of a thousand talents upon the city; drove their
magistrates, called Adeiganes, into exile; and put many Seleucians to
death with various tortures, by mutilation, the sword and the rack.
With great difficulty, sometimes by dissuading Hermeias, and sometimes
by interposing his own authority, the king did at length put an end
to these severities; and, exacting only a fine of a hundred and fifty
talents from the citizens for the error they had committed, restored
the city to a state of order. This being done, he left Diogenes in
command of Media, and Apollodorus of Susiana; and sent Tychon, his
chief military secretary, to command the district along the Persian
Gulf.
Thus was the rebellion of Molon and the rising in the upper Satrapies
suppressed and quieted.
[Sidenote: Extension of the expedition. The treasonable designs of
Hermeias.]
[Sidenote: Artabazanes.]