mouths, we find opposite it a bank formed by the mud discharged from
these mouths extending for nearly a thousand stades, at a distance of
a day’s sail from the shore as it now exists; upon which ships sailing
to the Pontus run, while apparently still in deep water, and find
themselves unexpectedly stranded on the sandbanks which the sailors
call the Breasts. That this deposit is not close to the shore, but
projected to some distance, must be accounted for thus: exactly as far
as the currents of the rivers retain their force from the strength of
the descending stream, and overpower that of the sea, it must of course
follow that to that distance the earth, and whatever else is carried
down by the rivers, would be projected, and neither settle nor become
fixed until it is reached. But when the force of the currents has
become quite spent by the depth and bulk of the sea, it is but natural
that the soil held in solution should settle down and assume a fixed
position. This is the explanation of the fact, that, in the case of
large and rapid rivers, such embankments are at considerable distances,
and the sea close in shore deep; while in the case of smaller and more
sluggish streams, these sandbanks are at their mouths. The strongest
proof of this is furnished by the case of heavy rains; for when they
occur, rivers of inferior size, overpowering the waves at their mouths,
project the alluvial deposit out to sea, to a distance exactly in
proportion to the force of the streams thus discharging themselves.
It would be mere foolish scepticism to disbelieve in the enormous
size of this sandbank, and in the mass of stones, timber, and earth
carried down by the rivers; when we often see with our own eyes an
insignificant stream suddenly swell into a torrent, and force its way
over lofty rocks, sweeping along with it every kind of timber, soil,
and stones, and making such huge moraines, that at times the appearance
of a locality becomes in a brief period difficult to recognise.[222]
+42.+ This should prevent any surprise that rivers of such magnitude
and rapidity, flowing perpetually instead of intermittently, should
produce these effects and end by filling up the Pontus. For it is not
a mere probability, but a logical certainty, that this must happen.
And a proof of what is going to take place is this, that in the same
proportion as the Maeotic lake is less salt than the Pontus, the
Pontus is less so than the Mediterranean. From which it is manifest
that, when the time which it has taken for the Maeotic lake to fill
up shall have been extended in proportion to the excess of the Pontic
over the Maeotic basin, then the Pontus will also become like a marsh
and lake, and filled with fresh water like the Maeotic lake: nay, we
must suppose that the process will be somewhat more rapid, insomuch
as the rivers falling into it are more numerous and more rapid. I
have said thus much in answer to the incredulity of those who cannot
believe that the Pontus is actually being silted up, and will some day
be filled; and that so vast a sea will ever become a lake or marsh.
But I have another and higher object also in thus speaking: which is
to prevent our ignorance from forcing us to give a childish credence
to every traveller’s tale and marvel related by voyagers; and that,
by possessing certain indications of the truth, we may be enabled by
them to test the truth or falsehood of anything alleged by this or that
person.
[Sidenote: Site of Byzantium.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 512.]
+43.+ I must now return to the discussion of the excellence of the
site of Byzantium. The length of the channel connecting the Pontus
and Propontis being, as I have said, a hundred and twenty stades, and
Hieron marking its termination towards the Pontus, and the Strait
of Byzantium that towards the Propontis,—half-way between these, on
the European side, stands Hermaeum, on a headland jutting out into
the channel, about five stades from the Asiatic coast, just at the
narrowest point of the whole channel; where Darius is said to have
made his bridge of ships across the strait, when he crossed to invade
Scythia. In the rest of the channel the running of the current from the
Pontus is much the same, owing to the similarity of the coast formation
on either side of it; but when it reaches Hermaeum on the European
side, which I said was the narrowest point, the stream flowing from the
Pontus, and being thus confined, strikes the European coast with great
violence, and then, as though by a rebound from a blow, dashes against
the opposite Asiatic coast, and thence again sweeps back and strikes
the European shore near some headlands called the Hearths: thence it
runs rapidly once more to the spot on the Asiatic side called the Cow,
the place on which the myth declares Io to have first stood after
swimming the channel. Finally the current runs from the Cow right up to
Byzantium, and dividing into two streams on either side of the city,
the lesser part of it forms the gulf called the Horn, while the greater
part swerves once more across. But it has no longer sufficient way on
it to reach the opposite shore on which Calchedon stands: for after
its several counter-blows the current, finding at this point a wider
channel, slackens; and no longer makes short rebounds at right angles
from one shore to the other, but more and more at an obtuse angle, and
accordingly, falling short of Calchedon, runs down the middle of the
channel.
[Sidenote: B.C. 410.]
+44.+ What then makes Byzantium a most excellent site, and Calchedon
the reverse, is just this: and although at first sight both positions
seem equally convenient, the practical fact is that it is difficult to
sail up to the latter, even if you wish to do so; while the current
carries you to the former, whether you will or no, as I have just
now shown. And a proof of my assertion is this: those who want to
cross from Calchedon to Byzantium cannot sail straight across the
channel, but coast up to the Cow and Chrysopolis,—which the Athenians
formerly seized, by the advice of Alcibiades, when they for the first
time levied customs on ships sailing into the Pontus,[223]—and then
drift down the current, which carries them as a matter of course to
Byzantium. And the same is the case with a voyage on either side
of Byzantium. For if a man is running before a south wind from the
Hellespont, or to the Hellespont from the Pontus before the Etesian
winds, if he keeps to the European shore, he has a direct and easy
course to the narrow part of the Hellespont between Abydos and Sestos,
and thence also back again to Byzantium: but if he goes from Calchedon
along the Asiatic coast, the case is exactly the reverse, from the fact
that the coast is broken up by deep bays, and that the territory of
Cyzicus projects to a considerable distance. Nor can a man coming from
the Hellespont to Calchedon obviate this by keeping to the European
coast as far as Byzantium, and then striking across to Calchedon;
for the current and other circumstances which I have mentioned make
it difficult. Similarly, for one sailing out from Calchedon it is
absolutely impossible to make straight for Thrace, owing to the
intervening current, and to the fact that both winds are unfavourable
to both voyages; for as the south wind blows into the Pontus, and the
north wind from it, the one or the other of these must be encountered
in both these voyages. These, then, are the advantages enjoyed by
Byzantium in regard to the sea: I must now describe its disadvantages
on shore.
[Sidenote: Disadvantages of Byzantium.]
+45.+ They consist in the fact that its territory is so completely
hemmed in by Thrace from shore to shore, that the Byzantines have a
perpetual and dangerous war continually on hand with the Thracians. For
they are unable once for all to arm and repel them by a single decisive
battle, owing to the number of their people and chiefs. For if they
conquer one chief, three others still more formidable invade their
territory. Nor again do they gain anything by consenting to pay tribute
and make terms; for a concession of any sort to one brings at once five
times as many enemies upon them. Therefore, as I say, they are burdened
by a perpetual and dangerous war: for what can be more hazardous or
more formidable than a war with barbarians living on your borders? Nay,
it is not only this perpetual struggle with danger on land, but, apart
from the evils that always accompany war, they have to endure a misery
like that ascribed by the poets to Tantalus: for being in possession
of an extremely fertile district, no sooner have they expended their
labour upon it and been rewarded by crops of the finest quality, than
the barbarians sweep down, and either destroy them, or collect and
carry them off; and then, to say nothing of the loss of their labour
and expense, the very excellence of the crops enhances the misery and
distress of seeing them destroyed before their eyes. Still, habit
making them able to endure the war with the Thracians, they maintained
their original connexions with the other Greeks; but when to their
other misfortunes was added the attack of the Gauls under Comontorius,
they were reduced to a sad state of distress indeed.
[Sidenote: The Gauls, B.C. 279.]
+46.+ These Gauls had left their country with Brennus, and having
survived the battle at Delphi and made their way to the Hellespont,
instead of crossing to Asia, were captivated by the beauty of the
district round Byzantium, and settled there. Then, having conquered
the Thracians and erected Tyle[224] into a capital, they placed the
Byzantines in extreme danger. In their earlier attacks, made under the
command of Comontorius their first king, the Byzantines always bought
them off by presents amounting to three, or five, or sometimes even
ten thousand gold pieces, on condition of their not devastating their
territory: and at last were compelled to agree to pay them a yearly
tribute of eighty talents, until the time of Cavarus, in whose reign
their kingdom came to an end; and their whole tribe, being in their
turn conquered by the Thracians, were entirely annihilated. It was in
these times, then, that being hard pressed by the payment of these
exactions, the Byzantines first sent embassies to the Greek states with
a prayer for aid and support in their dangerous situation: but being
disregarded by the greater number, they, under pressure of necessity,
attempted to levy dues upon ships sailing into the Pontus.
[Sidenote: The Byzantines levy a toll.]
+47.+ Now this exaction by the Byzantines of a duty upon goods brought
from the Pontus, being a heavy loss and burden to everybody, was
universally regarded as a grievance; and accordingly an appeal from all
those engaged in the trade was made to the Rhodians, as acknowledged
masters of the sea: and it was from this circumstance that the war
originated of which I am about to speak.
[Sidenote: The Rhodians declare war, B.C. 220.]
For the Rhodians, roused to action by the loss incurred by themselves,
as well as that of their neighbours, at first joined their allies in
an embassy to Byzantium, and demanded the abolition of the impost. The
Byzantines refused compliance, being persuaded that they were in the
right by the arguments advanced by their chief magistrates, Hecatorus
and Olympidorus, in their interview with the ambassadors. The Rhodian
envoys accordingly departed without effecting their object. But upon
their return home, war was at once voted against Byzantium on these
grounds; and messengers were immediately despatched to Prusias inviting
his co-operation in the war: for they knew that Prusias was from
various causes incensed with the Byzantines.
[Sidenote: Achaeus.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 226.]
+48.+ The Byzantines took steps of a similar nature, by sending to
Attalus and Achaeus begging for their assistance. For his part Attalus
was ready enough to give it: but his importance was small, because
he had been reduced within the limits of his ancestral dominions by
Achaeus. But Achaeus who exercised dominion throughout Asia on this
side Taurus, and had recently established his regal power, promised
assistance; and his attitude roused high hopes in the minds of the
Byzantines, and corresponding depression in those of the Rhodians and
Prusias. Achaeus was a relation of the Antiochus who had just succeeded
to the kingdom of Syria; and he became possessed of the dominion I
have mentioned through the following circumstances. After the death of
Seleucus, father of the above-named Antiochus, and the succession of
his eldest son Seleucus to the throne, Achaeus accompanied the latter
in an expedition over Mount Taurus, about two years before the period
of which we are speaking.[225] For as soon as Seleucus the younger had
succeeded to the kingdom he learnt that Attalus had already reduced
all Asia on this side of Taurus under his power; and being accordingly
eager to support his own rights, he crossed Taurus with a large army.
There he was treacherously assassinated by Apaturius the Gaul, and
Nicanor. Achaeus, in right of his relationship, promptly revenged his
murder by killing Nicanor and Apaturius; and taking supreme command of
the army and administration, conducted it with wisdom and integrity.
For the opportunity was a convenient one, and the feeling of the common
soldiers was all in favour of his assuming the crown; yet he refused to
do so, and preserving the royal title for Antiochus the younger, son of
Seleucus, went on energetically with the expedition, and the recovery
of the whole of the territory this side Taurus. Meeting however with
unexpected success,—for he shut up Attalus within the walls of Pergamus
and became master of all the rest of the country,—he was puffed up by
his good fortune, and at once swerved from his straightforward course
of policy. He assumed the diadem, adopted the title of king, and was at
this time the most powerful and formidable of all the kings and princes
this side Taurus. This was the man on whose help the Byzantines relied
when they undertook the war against the Rhodians and Prusias.
[Sidenote: Prusias.]
+49.+ As to the provocations given before this to Prusias by the
Byzantines they were various. In the first place he complained that,
having voted to put up certain statues of him, they had not done so,
but had delayed or forgotten it. In the second place he was annoyed
with them for taking great pains to compose the hostility, and put an
end to the war, between Achaeus and Attalus; because he looked upon a
friendship between these two as in many ways detrimental to his own
interests. He was provoked also because it appeared that when Attalus
was keeping the festival of Athene, the Byzantines had sent a mission
to join in the celebration; but had sent no one to him when he was
celebrating the Soteria. Nursing therefore a secret resentment for
these various offences, he gladly snatched at the pretext offered him
by the Rhodians; and arranged with their ambassadors that they were to
carry on the war by sea, while he would undertake to inflict no less
damage on the enemy by land.
Such were the causes and origin of the war between Rhodes and Byzantium.
[Sidenote: Hostilities commence, B.C. 220.]
+50.+ At first the Byzantines entered upon the war with energy, in full
confidence of receiving the assistance of Achaeus; and of being able
to cause Prusias as much alarm and danger by fetching Tiboetes from
Macedonia as he had done to them. For Prusias, entering upon the war
with all the animosity which I have described, had seized the place
called Hieron at the entrance of the channel, which the Byzantines not
long before had purchased for a considerable sum of money, because of
its convenient situation; and because they did not wish to leave in
any one else’s hands a point of vantage to be used against merchants
sailing into the Pontus, or one which commanded the slave trade, or the
fishing. Besides this, Prusias had seized in Asia a district of Mysia,
which had been in the possession of Byzantium for many years past.
Meanwhile the Rhodians manned six ships and received four from their
allies; and, having elected Xenophantus to command them, they sailed
with this squadron of ten ships to the Hellespont. Nine of them dropped
anchor near Sestos, and stopped ships sailing into the Pontus; with
the tenth the admiral sailed to Byzantium, to test the spirit of the
people, and see whether they were already sufficiently alarmed to
change their minds about the war. Finding them resolved not to listen
he sailed away, and, taking up his other nine ships, returned to Rhodes
with the whole squadron.
Meanwhile the Byzantines sent a message to Achaeus asking for aid, and
an escort to conduct Tiboetes from Macedonia. For it was believed that
Tiboetes had as good a claim to the kingdom of Bithynia as Prusias, who
was his nephew.
[Sidenote: The Rhodians secure the friendship of Achaeus.]
+51.+ But seeing the confident spirit of the Byzantines, the Rhodians
adopted an exceedingly able plan to obtain their object. They perceived
that the resolution of the Byzantines in venturing on the war rested
mainly on their hopes of the support of Achaeus. Now they knew that
the father of Achaeus was detained at Alexandria, and that Achaeus was
exceedingly anxious for his father’s safety: they therefore hit upon
the idea of sending an embassy to Ptolemy, and asking him to deliver
this Andromachus to them. This request, indeed, they had before made,
but without laying any great stress upon it: now, however, they were
genuinely anxious for it; that, by doing this favour to Achaeus,
they might lay him under such an obligation to them, that he would
be unable to refuse any request they might make to him. When the
ambassadors arrived, Ptolemy at first deliberated as to detaining
Andromachus; because there still remained some points of dispute
between himself and Antiochus unsettled; and Achaeus, who had recently
declared himself king, could exercise a decisive influence in several
important particulars. For Andromachus was not only father of Achaeus,
but brother also of Laodice, the wife of Seleucus.[226] However, on a
review of the whole situation, Ptolemy inclined to the Rhodians; and
being anxious to show them every favour, he yielded to their request,
and handed over Andromachus to them to conduct to his son. Having
accordingly done this, and having conferred some additional marks of
honour on Achaeus, they deprived the Byzantines of their most important
hope. And this was not the only disappointment which the Byzantines
had to encounter; for as Tiboetes was being escorted from Macedonia,
he entirely defeated their plans by dying. This misfortune damped the
ardour of the Byzantines, while it encouraged Prusias to push on the
war. On the Asiatic side he carried it on in person, and with great
energy; while on the European side he hired Thracians who prevented the
Byzantines from leaving their gates. For their party being thus baulked
of their hopes, and surrounded on every side by enemies, the Byzantines
began to look about then for some decent pretext for withdrawing from
the war.
[Sidenote: The Gallic king, Cavarus, negotiates a peace, B.C. 220.]
+52.+ So when the Gallic king, Cavarus, came to Byzantium, and showed
himself eager to put an end to the war, and earnestly offered his
friendly intervention, both Prusias and the Byzantines consented to his
proposals. And when the Rhodians were informed of the interference of
Cavarus and the consent of Prusias, being very anxious to secure their
own object also, they elected Aridices as ambassador to Byzantium, and
sent Polemocles with him in command of three triremes, wishing, as the
saying is, to send the Byzantines “spear and herald’s staff at once.”
Upon their appearance a pacification was arranged, in the year of
Cothon, son of Callisthenes, Hieromnemon in Byzantium.[227] The treaty
with the Rhodians was simple: “The Byzantines will not collect toll
from any ship sailing into the Pontus; and in that case the Rhodians
and their allies are at peace with the Byzantines.” But that with
Prusias contained the following provisions: “There shall be peace and
amity for ever between Prusias and the Byzantines; the Byzantines shall
in no way attack Prusias, nor Prusias the Byzantines. Prusias shall
restore to Byzantines all lands, forts, populations, and prisoners
of war, without ransom; and besides these things, the ships taken at
the beginning of the war, and the arms seized in the fortresses; and
also the timbers, stone-work, and roofing belonging to the fort called
Hieron” (for Prusias, in his terror of the approach of Tiboetes, had
pulled down every fort which seemed to lie conveniently for him):
“finally, Prusias shall compel such of the Bithynians as have any
property taken from the Byzantine district of Mysia to restore it to
the farmers.”
Such were the beginning and end of the war of Rhodes and Prusias with
Byzantium.
[Sidenote: War between Rhodes and Crete.]
+53.+ At the same time the Cnossians sent an embassy to the Rhodians,
and persuaded them to send them the ships that were under the command
of Polemocles, and to launch three undecked vessels besides and send
them also to Crete. The Rhodians having complied, and the vessels
having arrived at Crete, the people of Eleutherna suspecting that one
of their citizens named Timarchus had been put to death by Polemocles
to please the Cnossians, first proclaimed a right of reprisal against
the Rhodians, and then went to open war with them.
[Sidenote: The destruction of Lyttos.]
The people of Lyttos,[228] too, a short time before this, met with an
irretrievable disaster. At that time the political state of Crete as
a whole was this. The Cnossians, in league with the people of Gortyn,
had a short time previously reduced the whole island under their power,
with the exception of the city of Lyttos; and this being the only city
which refused obedience, they resolved to go to war with it, being
bent upon removing its inhabitants from their homes, as an example and
terror to the rest of Crete. Accordingly at first the whole of the
other Cretan cities were united in war against Lyttos: but presently
when some jealousy arose from certain trifling causes, as is the way
with the Cretans, they separated into hostile parties, the peoples of
Polyrrhen, Cere, and Lappa, along with the Horii and Arcades,[229]
forming one party and separating themselves from connexion with the
Cnossians, resolved to make common cause with the Lyttians. Among the
people of Gortyn, again, the elder men espoused the side of Cnossus,
the younger that of Lyttos, and so were in opposition to each other.
Taken by surprise by this disintegration of their allies, the Cnossians
fetched over a thousand men from Aetolia in virtue of their alliance:
upon which the party of the elders in Gortyn immediately seized the
citadel; introduced the Cnossians and Aetolians; and either expelled
or put to death the young men, and delivered the city into the hands
of the Cnossians. And at the same time, the Lyttians having gone out
with their full forces on an expedition into the enemy’s territory, the
Cnossians got information of the fact, and seized Lyttos while thus
denuded of its defenders. The children and women they sent to Cnossus;
and having set fire to the town, thrown down its buildings, and damaged
it in every possible way, returned. When the Lyttians reached home from
their expedition, and saw what had happened, they were struck with
such violent grief that not a man of the whole host had the heart to
enter his native city; but one and all having marched round its walls,
with frequent cries and lamentations over their misfortune and that of
their country, turned back again towards the city of Lappa. The people
of Lappa gave them a kind and entirely cordial reception; and having
thus in one day become cityless and aliens, they joined these allies in
their war against the Cnossians. Thus at one fell swoop was Lyttos, a
colony of Sparta and allied with the Lacedaemonians in blood, the most
ancient of the cities in Crete, and by common consent the mother of the
bravest men in the island, utterly cut off.
[Sidenote: Appeal to the Achaeans and Philip.]
+55.+ But the peoples of Polyrrhen and Lappa and all their allies,
seeing that the Cnossians clung to the alliance of the Aetolians, and
that the Aetolians were at war with King Philip and the Achaeans,
sent ambassadors to the two latter asking for their help and to be
admitted to alliance with them. Both requests were granted: they
were admitted into the roll of allies, and assistance was sent to
them, consisting of four hundred Illyrians under Plator, two hundred
Achaeans, and a hundred Phocians; whose arrival was of the utmost
advantage to the interest of Polyrrhenia and her allies: for in a brief
space of time they shut the Eleuthernaeans and Cydonians within their
walls, and compelled the people of Aptera to forsake the alliance of
the Cnossians and share their fortunes. When these results had been
obtained, the Polyrrhenians and their allies joined in sending to the
aid of Philip and the Achaeans five hundred Cretans, the Cnossians
having sent a thousand to the Aetolians a short time before; both of
which contingents took part in the existing war on their respective
sides. Nay more, the exiled party of Gortyn seized the harbour of
Phaestus,[230] and also by a sudden and bold attack occupied the port
of Gortyn itself; and from these two places as bases of operation they
carried on the war with the party in the town. Such was the state of
Crete.
[Sidenote: Mithridates IV., king of Pontus, declares war against
Sinope.]
+56.+ About the same time Mithridates also declared war against the
people of Sinope; which proved to be the beginning and occasion of the
disaster which ultimately befell the Sinopeans. Upon their sending
an embassy with a view to this war to beg for assistance from the
Rhodians, the latter decided to elect three men, and to grant them a
hundred and forty thousand drachmae with which to procure supplies
needed by the Sinopeans. The men so appointed got ready ten thousand
jars of wine, three hundred talents[231] of prepared hair, a hundred
talents of made-up bowstring, a thousand suits of armour, three
thousand gold pieces, and four catapults with engineers to work them.
The Sinopean envoys took these presents and departed; for the people
of Sinope, being in great anxiety lest Mithridates should attempt
to besiege them both by land and sea, were making all manner of
preparations with this view. Sinope lies on the right-hand shore of the
Pontus as one sails to Phasis, and is built upon a peninsula jutting
out into the sea: it is on the neck of this peninsula, connecting it
with Asia, which is not more than two stades wide, that the city is
so placed as to entirely close it up from sea to sea; the rest of
the peninsula stretches out into the open sea,—a piece of flat land
from which the town is easily accessible, but surrounded by a steep
coast offering very bad harbourage, and having exceedingly few spots
admitting of disembarkation. The Sinopeans then were dreadfully alarmed
lest Mithridates should blockade them, by throwing up works against
their town on the side towards Asia, and by making a descent on the
opposite side upon the low ground in front of the town: and they
accordingly determined to strengthen the line of the peninsula, where
it was washed by the sea, by putting up wooden defences and erecting
palisades round the places accessible from the sea; and at the same
time by storing weapons and stationing guards at all points open to
attack: for the whole area is not large, but is capable of being easily
defended and by a moderate force.
Such was the situation at Sinope at the time of the commencement of the
Social war,—to which I must now return.
[Sidenote: The History of the Social war resumed from ch. 37. Philip
starts for Aetolia, B.C. 219. Night surprise of Aegira.]
+57.+ King Philip started from Macedonia with his army for Thessaly and
Epirus, being bent on taking that route in his invasion of Aetolia.
And at the same time Alexander and Dorimachus, having succeeded in
establishing an intrigue for the betrayal of Aegira, had collected
about twelve hundred Aetolians into Oeanthe, which is in Aetolia,
exactly opposite the above-named town; and, having prepared vessels
to convey them across the gulf, were waiting for favourable weather
for making the voyage in fulfilment of their design. For a deserter
from Aetolia, who had spent a long time at Aegira, and had had full
opportunity of observing that the guards of the gate towards Aegium
were in the habit of getting drunk, and keeping their watch with great
slackness, had again and again crossed over to Dorimachus; and, laying
this fact before him, had invited him to make the attempt, well knowing
that he was thoroughly accustomed to such practices. The city of Aegira
lies on the Peloponnesian coast of the Corinthian gulf, between the
cities of Aegium and Sicyon, upon some strong and inaccessible heights,
facing towards Parnassus and that district of the opposite coast, and
standing about seven stades back from the sea. At the mouth of the
river which flows past this town Dorimachus dropped anchor under cover
of night, having at length obtained favourable weather for crossing.
He and Alexander, accompanied by Archidamus the son of Pantaleon and
the main body of the Aetolians, then advanced towards the city along
the road leading from Aegium. But the deserter, with twenty of the
most active men, having made his way by a shorter cut than the others
over the cliffs where there was no road, owing to his knowledge of the
locality, got into the city through a certain water-course and found
the guards of the gate still asleep. Having killed them while actually
in their beds, and cut the bolts of the gates with their axes, they
opened them to the Aetolians. Having thus surprised the town, they
behaved with a conspicuous want of caution, which eventually saved
the people of Aegira, and proved the destruction of the Aetolians
themselves. They seemed to imagine that to get within the gates was all
there was to do in occupying an enemy’s town; and accordingly acted as
I shall now describe.
[Sidenote: Alexander killed.]
+58.+ They kept together for a very brief space of time near the
market-place, and then scattering in every direction, in their passion
for plunder, rushed into the houses and began carrying off the wealth
they contained. But it was now broad daylight: and the attack being
wholly unexpected and sudden, those of the Aegiratans whose houses
were actually entered by the enemy, in the utmost terror and alarm,
all took to flight and made their way out of the town, believing it
to be completely in the power of the enemy; but those of them whose
houses were untouched, and who, hearing the shouting, sallied out to
the rescue, all rushed with one accord to the citadel. These last
continually increased in number and confidence; while the Aetolians on
the contrary kept continually becoming less closely united, and less
subject to discipline, from the causes above mentioned. But Dorimachus,
becoming conscious of his danger, rallied his men and charged the
citizens who were occupying the citadel: imagining that, by acting
with decision and boldness, he would terrify and turn to flight those
who had rallied to defend the town. But the Aegiratans, cheering each
other on, offered a strenuous resistance, and grappled gallantly with
the Aetolians. The citadel being unwalled, and the struggle being at
close quarters and man to man, the battle was at first as desperate
as might be expected between two sides, of which one was fighting for
country and children, the other for bare life. Finally the invading
Aetolians were repulsed: and the Aegiratans, taking advantage of their
higher position, made a fierce and vigorous charge down the slope upon
the enemy; which struck such terror in them, that in the confusion
that followed the fugitives trampled each other to death at the gates.
Alexander himself fell fighting in the actual battle; but Archidamus
was killed in the struggle and crush at the gates. Of the main body of
Aetolians, some were trampled to death; others flying over the pathless
hills fell over precipices and broke their necks; while such as escaped
in safety to the ships managed, after shamefully throwing away their
arms, to sail away and escape from what seemed a desperate danger.
Thus it came about that the Aegiratans having lost their city by their
carelessness, unexpectedly regained it by their valour and gallantry.
[Sidenote: Euripidas.]
+59.+ About the same time Euripidas, who had been sent out to act
as general to the Eleans, after overrunning the districts of Dyme,
Pharae, and Tritaea, and collecting a considerable amount of booty, was
marching back to Elis. But Miccus of Dyme, who happened at the time to
be Sub-strategus of the Achaean league, went out to the rescue with a
body of Dymaeans, Pharaeans, and Tritaeans, and attacked him as he was
returning. But proceeding too precipitately, he fell into an ambush
and lost a large number of his men: for forty of his infantry were
killed and about two hundred taken prisoners. Elated by this success,
Euripidas a few days afterwards made another expedition, and seized
a fort belonging to the Dymaeans on the river Araxus, standing in an
excellent situation, and called the Wall, which the myths affirm to
have been anciently built by Hercules, when at war with the Eleans, as
a base of operations against them.
[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus. Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea separate
from the league.]
+60.+ The peoples of Dyme, Pharae, and Tritaea having been worsted in
their attempt to relieve the country, and afraid of what would happen
from this capture of the fort, first sent messengers to the Strategus,
Aratus, to inform him of what had happened and to ask for aid, and
afterwards a formal embassy with the same request. But Aratus was
unable to get the mercenaries together, because in the Cleomenic war
the Achaeans had failed to pay some of the wages of the hired troops:
and his entire policy and management of the whole war was in a word
without spirit or nerve. Accordingly Lycurgus seized the Athenaeum of
Megalopolis, and Euripidas followed up his former successes by taking
Gortyna[232] in the territory of Telphusa. But the people of Dyme,
Pharae, and Tritaea, despairing of assistance from the Strategus,
came to a mutual agreement to cease paying the common contribution
to the Achaean league, and to collect a mercenary army on their own
account, three hundred infantry and fifty horse; and to secure the
country by their means. In this action they were considered to have
shown a prudent regard for their own interests, but not for those of
the community at large; for they were thought to have set an evil
example, and supplied a precedent to those whose wish it was to break
up the league. But in fact the chief blame for their proceeding must
rightfully be assigned to the Strategus, who pursued such a dilatory
policy, and slighted or wholly rejected the prayers for help which
reached him from time to time. For as long as he has any hope, from
relations and allies, any man who is in danger will cling to them; but
when in his distress he has to give up that hope, he is forced to help
himself the best way he can. Wherefore we must not find fault with the
people of Tritaea, Pharae, and Dyme for having mercenaries on their own
account, when the chief magistrate of the league hesitated to act: but
some blame does attach to them for renouncing the joint contribution.
They certainly were not bound to neglect to secure their own safety by
every opportunity and means in their power; but they were bound at the
same time to keep up their just dues to the league: especially as the
recovery of such payment was perfectly secured to them by the common
laws; and most of all because they had been the originators of the
Achaean confederacy.[233]
[Sidenote: Philip V. at Ambracia, B.C. 219.]
+61.+ Such was the state of things in the Peloponnese when King
Philip, after crossing Thessaly, arrived in Epirus. Reinforcing his
Macedonians by a full levy of Epirotes, and being joined by three
hundred slingers from Achaia, and the five hundred Cretans sent him by
the Polyrrhenians, he continued his march through Epirus and arrived
in the territory of the Ambracians. Now, if he had continued his march
without interruption, and thrown himself into the interior of Aetolia,
by the sudden and unlooked-for attack of so formidable an army he
would have put an end to the whole campaign: but as it was, he was
over-persuaded by the Epirotes to take Ambracus first; and so gave the
Aetolians an interval in which to make a stand, to take precautionary
measures, and to prepare for the future. For the Epirotes, thinking
more of their own advantage than of that of the confederacy, and being
very anxious to get Ambracus[234] into their power, begged Philip to
invest the town and take it before doing anything else: the fact being
that they regarded it as a matter of the utmost importance to recover
Ambracia from the Aetolians; and thought that the only way of doing
this was to become masters of this place, Ambracus, and besiege the
town of Ambracia from it. For Ambracus is a place strongly fortified by
walls and out-works, standing in the midst of marshes, and approached
from the land by only one narrow raised causeway; and commanding by its
situation both the district and town of Ambracia.
[Sidenote: Scopas tries to effect a diversion by invading Macedonia. On
his return he destroys Dium.]
+62.+ While Philip, then, by the persuasion of the Epirotes, pitching
his camp near Ambracus, was engaged in making his preparations for
the siege, Scopas raised a general levy of Aetolians, and marching
through Thessaly crossed the frontiers of Macedonia; traversed the
plain of Plena, and laid it waste; and after securing considerable
booty, returned by the road leading to Dium. The inhabitants of that
town abandoning the place, he entered it and threw down its walls,
houses, and gymnasium; set fire to the covered walks round the sacred
enclosure, and destroyed all the other offerings which had been placed
in it, either for ornament, or for the use of visitors to the public
assemblies, and threw down all the statues of the kings. And this
man, who, at the very beginning and first action of the war, had thus
turned his arms against the gods as well as men, was not treated on his
return to Aetolia as guilty of impiety, but was honoured and looked
up to. For he had indeed filled the Aetolians with empty hopes and
irrational conceit. From this time they indulged the idea that no one
would venture to set foot in Aetolia, while they would be able without
resistance not only to plunder the Peloponnese, which they were quite
accustomed to do, but Thessaly and Macedonia also.
[Sidenote: Ambracus taken.]
[Sidenote: Philip enters Aetolia; takes Phoeteiae.]
+63.+ When he heard what had happened in Macedonia, and had thus paid
on the spot for the selfishness and folly of the Epirotes, Philip
proceeded to besiege Ambracus. By an energetic use of earthworks,
and other siege operations, he quickly terrified the people into
submission, and the place surrendered after a delay of forty days in
all. He let the garrison, consisting of five hundred Aetolians, depart
on fixed conditions, and gratified the cupidity of the Epirotes by
handing over Ambracus to them, while he himself set his army in motion,
and marched by way of Charadra, being anxious to cross the Ambracian
gulf where it is narrowest, that is to say, near the Acarnanian temple
called Actium. For this gulf is a branch of the Sicilian sea between
Epirus and Acarnania, with a very narrow opening of less than five
stades, but expanding as it extends inland to a breadth of a hundred
stades; while the length of the whole arm from the open sea is about
three hundred stades. It forms the boundary between Epirus on the north
and Acarnania on the south. Philip, therefore, having got his army
across this entrance of the gulf, and advanced through Acarnania, came
to the city of Phoeteiae, which belonged to the Aetolians;[235] having,
during his march, been joined by an Acarnanian force of two thousand
foot and two hundred horse. Encamping under the walls of this town,
and making energetic and formidable assaults upon it during two days,
it was surrendered to him on terms, and the Aetolian garrison were
dismissed on parole. Next night, however, five hundred other Aetolians,
believing the town still untaken, came to its relief; whose arrival
being ascertained beforehand by the king, he stationed some men in
ambush at certain convenient spots, and slew most of the new-comers
and captured all but a very few of the rest. After these events, he
distributed a month’s rations of corn among his men from what had been
captured, for a large store was found collected at Phoeteiae, and
then continued his advance into the territory of Stratus. At about
ten stades from that town he pitched his camp on the banks of the
river Achelous; and from that began laying waste the country without
resistance, none of the enemy venturing out to attack him.
[Sidenote: Metropolis and Conope.]
[Sidenote: Skirmish on the Achelous.]
[Sidenote: Ithoria.]
+64.+ Meanwhile the Achaeans, being hard pressed by the war, and
ascertaining that the king was not far off, sent ambassadors to him
begging for help. They found Philip still in his camp near Stratus,
and there delivered their commission: and besides the message with
which they were charged, they pointed out to him the richness of the
booty which his army would get from the enemy’s country, and tried to
persuade him to cross to Rhium and invade Elis. The king listened to
what they had to say, and kept the ambassadors with him, alleging that
he must consider of their request; and meanwhile broke up his camp,
and marched in the direction of Metropolis and Conope. The Aetolians
kept possession of the citadel of Metropolis but abandoned the town:
whereupon Philip set fire to Metropolis, and continued his advance
against Conope. But when the Aetolian horse rallied and ventured to
meet him at the ford of the Achelous, which is about twenty stades
before you reach the town, believing that they would either stop his
advance altogether, or inflict much damage on the Macedonians while
crossing the river; the king, fully understanding their tactics,
ordered his light-armed troops to enter the river first and to cross it
in close order, keeping to their regular companies, and with shields
interlocked. His orders were obeyed: and as soon as the first company
had effected the crossing, the Aetolian cavalry attacked it; but
they could make no impression upon it, standing as it did in close
order, and being joined in similar close order, shield to shield, by
a second and a third company as they crossed. Therefore they wheeled
off discomfited and retired to the city. From this time forth the
proud gallantry of the Aetolians was fain to confine itself to the
protection of the towns, and keep quiet; while Philip crossed with his
army, and after wasting this district also without resistance, arrived
at Ithoria. This is a position completely commanding the road, and of
extraordinary strength, natural as well as artificial. On his approach,
however, the garrison occupying the place abandoned it in a panic; and
the king, taking possession, levelled it to the ground: and gave orders
to his skirmishing parties to treat all forts in the district in the
same way.
[Sidenote: Paeanium.]
[Sidenote: Fortifies Oeniadae.]
+65.+ Having thus passed the narrow part of the road, he proceeded
at a slow and deliberate pace, giving his army time to collect booty
from the country; and by the time he reached Oeniadae his army was
richly provided with every kind of goods. But he resolved first to
take Paeanium: and having pitched his camp under its walls, by a
series of assaults carried the place by force,—a town not large in
circumference, for that was less than seven stades, but second to none
in the construction of its houses, walls, and towers. The wall of this
town he levelled with its foundation, and, breaking down its houses,
he packed their timbers and tiles with great care upon rafts, and sent
them down the river to Oeniadae. At first the Aetolians resolved to
hold the citadel in Oeniadae, which they had strengthened with walls
and other fortifications; but upon Philip’s approach they evacuated it
in a panic. The king therefore having taken this city also, advanced
from it and encamped on a certain secure position in Calydonia, called
Elaeus, which had been rendered extraordinarily strong with walls
and other fortifications by Attalus, who undertook the work for the
Aetolians. Having carried this also by assault, and plundered the whole
of Calydonia, the Macedonians returned to Oeniadae. And observing the
convenient position of this place for all purposes, and especially as
providing a place of embarkation for the Peloponnese, Philip resolved
to build a wall round the town. For Oeniadae lies on the sea-coast,
at the juncture of the Acarnanian and Aetolian frontiers, just at the
entrance of the Corinthian gulf; and the town faces the sea-coast of
Dyme in the Peloponnesus, and is the nearest point to the promontory of
Araxus in it; for the intervening sea is not more than a hundred stades
across. Looking to these facts he fortified the citadel by itself;
and, building a wall round the harbour and dockyards, was intending
to connect them with the citadel, employing for the construction the
materials brought from Paeanium.
[Sidenote: Philip recalled to Macedonia by a threatened invasion of
Dardani.]
[Sidenote: Late summer of B.C. 219.]
+66.+ But whilst he was still engaged on this work, news was brought
to the king that the Dardani, suspecting his intention of invading
the Peloponnese, were collecting forces and making great preparations
with the determination of invading Macedonia. When he heard this,
Philip made up his mind that he was bound to go with all speed to the
protection of Macedonia: and accordingly he dismissed the Achaean
envoys with the answer, which he now gave them, that when he had taken
effectual measures with regard to the circumstances that had just been
announced to him, he would look upon it as his first business to bring
them aid to the best of his ability. Thereupon he broke up his camp,
and began his return march with all speed, by the same route as that by
which he had come. When he was on the point of recrossing the Ambracian
gulf from Acarnania into Epirus, Demetrius of Pharos presented himself,
sailing with a single galley, having just been banished from Illyria by
the Romans,—as I have stated in the previous book.[236] Philip received
him with kindness and bade him sail to Corinth, and go thence through
Thessaly to Macedonia; while he himself crossed into Epirus and pushed
on without a halt. When he had reached Pella in Macedonia, the Dardani
learnt from some Thracian deserters that he was in the country, and
they at once in a panic broke up their army, though they were close to
the Macedonian frontier. And Philip, being informed of their change of
purpose, dismissed his Macedonian soldiers to gather in their harvest:
while he himself went to Thessaly, and spent the rest of the summer at
Larisa.
[Sidenote: Contemporary events in Spain and Italy.]
It was at this season that Aemilius celebrated a splendid triumph at
Rome for his Illyrian victories; and Hannibal after the capture of
Saguntum dismissed his troops into winter quarters; while the Romans,
on hearing of the capture of Saguntum, were sending ambassadors to
Carthage to demand the surrender of Hannibal, and at the same time were
making preparations for the war after electing Publius Cornelius Scipio
and Tiberius Sempronius Longus Consuls for the following year, as I
have stated in detail in the previous book. My object in recalling the
facts here is to carry out my original plan of showing what events in
various parts of the world were contemporaneous.
[Sidenote: Midsummer B.C. 217. Dorimachus Aetolian Strategus, Sept.
B.C. 119.]
[Sidenote: Destroys Dodona.]
+67.+ And so the first year of this Olympiad was drawing to a close.
In Aetolia, the time of the elections having come round, Dorimachus
was elected Strategus. He was no sooner invested with his office,
than, summoning the Aetolian forces, he made an armed foray upon
the highlands of Epirus, and began wasting the country with an even
stronger passion for destruction than usual; for his object in
everything he did was not so much to secure booty for himself, as
to damage the Epirotes. And having come to Dodona[237] he burnt the
colonnades, destroyed the sacred offerings, and even demolished the
sacred building; so that we may say that the Aetolians had no regard
for the laws of peace or war, but in the one as well as in the other,
acted in defiance of the customs and principles of mankind. After
those, and other similar achievements, Dorimachus returned home.
[Sidenote: Philip starts again.]
[Sidenote: Dec. B.C. 219.]
But the winter being now considerably advanced, and all idea of the
king coming being given up owing to the time of the year, Philip
suddenly started from Larisa with an army of three thousand hoplites
armed with brass shields, two thousand light-armed, three hundred
Cretans, and four hundred horse of the royal guard; and having
transported them into Euboea and thence to Cynos he came through
Boeotia and the Megarid to Corinth, about the time of the winter
solstice; having conducted his arrival with such promptitude and
secrecy, that not a single Peloponnesian suspected it. He at once
closed the gates of Corinth and secured the roads by guards; and on the
very next day sent for Aratus the elder to come to him from Sicyon,
and issued despatches to the Strategus of the Achaean league and the
cities, in which he named a time and place for them all to meet him in
arms. Having made these arrangements, he again started, and pitched his
camp near the temple of the Dioscuri in Phliasia.
[Sidenote: B.C. 218, Jan.-Feb. Destruction of a marauding army of
Eleans under Euripidas.]
+68.+ Meanwhile Euripidas, with two companies of Eleans,—who combined
with the pirates and mercenaries made up an army of two thousand two
hundred men, besides a hundred horse,—started from Psophis and began
marching by way of Pheneus and Stymphalus, knowing nothing about
Philip’s arrival, with the purpose of wasting the territory of Sicyon.
The very night in which it chanced that Philip had pitched his camp
near the temple of the Dioscuri, he passed the royal quarters, and
succeeded in entering the territory of Sicyon, about the time of the
morning watch. But some Cretans of Philip’s army who had left their
ranks, and were prowling about on the track of prey, fell into the
hands of Euripidas, and being questioned by him informed him of the
arrival of the Macedonians. Without saying a word of his discovery to
any one, he at once caused his army to face about, and marched back
by the same road as that by which he had come; with the intention and
hope of getting through Stymphalia, and reaching the difficult ground
beyond it, before the Macedonians could catch him. But the king knowing
nothing at all about the proceedings of the enemy, at daybreak broke
up his camp and began his advance in pursuance of his original plan,
determining to march by way of Stymphalus itself to Caphyae: for it was
at that town that he had written to the Achaeans to meet him.
[Sidenote: The Eleans come across the Macedonians at the junction of
the two roads above Stymphalus.]
+69.+ Now it happened that, just as the Macedonian advanced guard
came to the top of the hill, near a place called Apelaurus, about
ten stades before you come to Stymphalus, the advanced guard of
the Eleans converged upon it also. Understanding from his previous
information what had happened, Euripidas took some horsemen with him
and avoided the danger by flight, making his way across country to
Psophis. The rest of the Eleans being thus deserted by their leader,
and panic-struck at what had happened, remained stationary on the
road, not knowing what to do, or which way to turn. For at first their
officers imagined that the troops they saw were some Achaeans come
out to resist them. What favoured this mistake more than anything
else were the brass shields of the hoplites: for they imagined that
they were Megalopolitans, because the soldiers of that town had borne
shields of that sort at the battle of Sellasia against Cleomenes, King
Antigonus having furnished them for the occasion. Under this idea, they
retired in good order to some rising ground, by no means despairing of
getting off safely: but as soon as the Macedonians had advanced close
up to them, grasping the true state of the case, they threw down their
shields and fled. About twelve hundred of them were taken prisoners;
but the rest perished utterly, some at the hands of the Macedonians,
and others by falling down precipices: and finally not more than a
hundred altogether escaped. Having despatched the spoils and the
prisoners to Corinth, Philip continued his expedition. But a great
impression was made upon the Peloponnesians: for they had not heard of
the king’s arrival until they heard of his victory.
[Sidenote: Philip advances to Psophis.]
[Sidenote: A description of Psophis.]
+70.+ Continuing his march through Arcadia, and encountering heavy snow
storms and much fatigue in the pass over Mount Oligyrtus, he arrived on
the third day at Caphyae. There he rested his army for two days, and
was joined by Aratus the younger, and the Achaean soldiers whom he had
collected; so that, with an army now amounting to ten thousand men,
he advanced by way of Clitoria towards Psophis, collecting missiles
and scaling ladders from the towns through which he passed. Psophis is
a place of acknowledged antiquity, and a colony of the Arcadian town
of Azanis. Taking the Peloponnesus as a whole, it occupies a central
position in the country; but in regard to Arcadia it is on its western
frontier, and is close also to the western borderland of Achaia: its
position also commands the territory of the Eleans, with whom at that
time it was politically united. Philip reached this town on the third
day after leaving Caphyae, and pitched his camp on some rising ground
overhanging the city, from which he could in perfect security command
a view both of the whole town and the country round it. But when the
king saw the great strength of the place, he was at a loss what to do.
Along the left side of it rushes a violent winter torrent, which for
the greater part of the winter is impassable, and in any case renders
the city secure and difficult of approach, owing to the size of the
bed which its waters have worn out for themselves by slow degrees, in
the course of ages, as it comes rushing down from the higher ground.
On the east again there is a broad and rapid river, the Erymanthus,
about which so many tales are told. This river is joined by the
winter torrent at a point south of the town, which is thus defended
on three sides by these streams; while the fourth, or northern, side
is commanded by a hill, which has been fortified, and serves as a
convenient and efficient citadel. The town has walls also of unusual
size and construction; and besides all this, a reinforcement of Eleans
happened to have just come in, and Euripidas himself was in the town
after his escape from Stymphalus.
[Sidenote: Capture of Psophis.]
+71.+ The sight of these things caused Philip much anxious thought.
Sometimes he was for giving up his plan of attacking and besieging
the place: at others the excellence of its situation made him eager
to accomplish this. For just as it was then a source of danger to the
Achaeans and Arcadians, and a safe place of arms for the Eleans; so
would it on the other hand, if captured, become a source of safety
to the Arcadians, and a most convenient base of operations for the
allies against the Eleans. These considerations finally decided him to
make the attempt: and he therefore issued orders to the Macedonians
to get their breakfasts at daybreak, and be ready for service with
all preparations completed. Everything being done as he ordered, the
king led his army over the bridge across the Erymanthus; and no one
having offered him resistance, owing to the unexpectedness of the
movement, he arrived under the walls of the town in gallant style and
with formidable show. Euripidas and the garrison were overpowered
with astonishment; because they had felt certain that the enemy would
not venture on an assault, or try to carry a town of such strength;
and that a siege could not last long either, owing to the severity of
the season. This calculation of chances made them begin to entertain
suspicions of each other, from a misgiving that Philip must have
established a secret intrigue with some persons in the town against
it. But finding that nothing of the sort existed among themselves, the
greater number hurried to the walls to defend them, while the mercenary
Elean soldiers sallied out of a gate in the upper part of the town
to attack the enemy. The king stationed his men who had ladders at
three different spots, and divided the other Macedonians among these
three parties; this being arranged, he gave the signal by the sound
of trumpet, and began the assault on the walls at once. At first the
garrison offered a spirited resistance and hurled many of the enemy
from their ladders; but when the supply of weapons inside the town, as
well as other necessary materials, began to run short,—as was to be
expected from the hasty nature of the preparations for defence,—and the
Macedonians showed no sign of terror, the next man filling up the place
of each who was hurled from the scaling-ladder, the garrison at length
turned to flight, and made their escape one and all into the citadel.
In the king’s army the Macedonians then made good their footing on
the wall, while the Cretans went against the party of mercenaries who
had sallied from the upper gate, and forced them to throw away their
shields and fly in disorder. Following the fugitives with slaughter,
they forced their way along with them through the gate: so that the
town was captured at all points at once. The Psophidians with their
wives and children retreated into the citadel, and Euripidas with them,
as well as all the soldiers who had escaped destruction.
[Sidenote: Surrender of the citadel of Psophis.]
+72.+ Having thus carried the place, the Macedonians at once plundered
all the furniture of the houses; and then, setting up their quarters
in the houses, took regular possession of the town. But the people
who had taken refuge in a body in the citadel, having no provisions
with them, and well foreseeing what must happen, made up their minds
to give themselves up to Philip. They accordingly sent a herald to
the king; and having received a safe-conduct for an embassy, they
despatched their magistrates and Euripidas with them on this mission,
who made terms with the king by which the lives and liberties of all
who were on the citadel, whether citizens or foreigners, were secured.
The ambassadors then returned whence they came, carrying an order to
the people to remain where they were until the army had marched out,
for fear any of the soldiers should disobey orders and plunder them. A
fall of snow however compelled the king to remain where he was for some
days; in the course of which he summoned a meeting of such Achaeans
as were in the army, and after pointing out to them the strength and
excellent position of the town for the purposes of the present war,
he spoke also of his own friendly disposition towards their nation:
and ended by saying, “We hereby yield up and present this town to
the Achaeans; for it is our purpose to show them all the favour in
our power, and to omit nothing that may testify to our zeal.” After
receiving the thanks of Aratus and the meeting, Philip dismissed the
assembly, and getting his army in motion, marched towards Lasion. The
Psophidians descending from the citadel received back the possession of
the town, each man recovering his own house; while Euripidas departed
to Corinth, and thence to Aetolia. Those of the Achaean magistrates who
were present put Prolaus of Sicyon in command of the citadel, with an
adequate garrison; and Pythias of Pallene in command of the town. Such
was the end of the incident of Psophis.
[Sidenote: Lasion and Stratus.]
[Sidenote: Philip at Olympia.]
[Sidenote: Prosperity of Elis.]
+73.+ But when the Elean garrison of Lasion heard of the coming of the
Macedonians, and were informed of what had taken place at Psophis, they
at once abandoned the town; so that upon his arrival the king took it
immediately, and by way of enhancing his favours to the Achaeans handed
Lasion also over to them; and in a similar spirit restored Stratus
to the Telphusians, which was also evacuated by the Eleans. On the
fifth day after settling these matters he arrived at Olympia. There he
offered a sacrifice to Zeus and entertained his officers at a banquet;
and, having given his army three days’ rest, commenced his return
march. After advancing some way into Elis, he allowed foraging parties
to scour the country while he himself lay encamped near Artemisium, as
it is called; and after receiving the booty there, he removed to the
Dioscurium.[238] In the course of this devastation of the country the
number of the captives was indeed great, but a still greater number
made their escape to the neighbouring villages and strongholds. For
Elis is more populous, as well as more richly furnished with slaves
and other property, than the rest of the Peloponnese: and some of the
Eleans are so enamoured of a country life, that there are cases of
families who, being in enjoyment of considerable wealth, have for two
or three generations never entered a public law-court at all.[239]
And this result is brought about by the great care and attention
bestowed upon the agricultural class by the government, to see that
their law-suits should be settled on the spot, and every necessary of
life abundantly supplied them. To me it seems that they owed these
laws and customs originally to the wide extent of their arable land,
and still more to the fact that their lives were under the protection
of religion; for, owing to the Olympic assembly, their territory
was especially exempted by the Greeks from pillage; and they had
accordingly been free from all injury and hostile invasion.
[Sidenote: The ancient privileges of Elis lost.]
+74.+ But in the course of time, when the Arcadians advanced a claim
for Lasion and the whole district of Pisa, being forced to defend
their territory and change their habits of life, they no longer
troubled themselves in the least about recovering from the Greeks
their ancient and ancestral immunity from pillage, but were content to
remain exactly as they were. This in my opinion was a short-sighted
policy. For peace is a thing we all desire, and are willing to submit
to anything to obtain: it is the only one of our so-called blessings
that no one questions. If then there are people who, having the
opportunity of obtaining it, with justice and honour, from the Greeks,
without question and for perpetuity, neglect to do so, or regard other
objects as of superior importance to it, must we not look upon them
as undoubtedly blind to their true interests? But if it be objected
that, by adopting such a mode of life, they would become easily open
to attack and exposed to treachery: I answer that such an event would
be rare, and if it did happen, would be a claim on the aid of united
Greece; but that for minor injuries, having all the wealth which
unbroken peace would be sure to bring them, they would never have
been at a loss for foreign soldiers or mercenaries to protect them at
certain places and times. As it is, from dread of what is occasional
and unlikely, they involve their country and property in perpetual wars
and losses.
My object in thus speaking is to admonish the Eleans: for they have
never had a more favourable time than the present to get back their
ancient privilege of exemption from pillage, which is universally
acknowledged to belong to them. Even now, some sparks, so to speak, of
their old habit remaining, Elis is more thickly populated than other
districts.
[Sidenote: Capture of Thalamae.]
+75.+ And therefore during Philip’s occupation of the country the
number of prisoners taken was immense; and the number of those who
escaped by flight still greater. An enormous amount of movable
property, and an enormous crowd of slaves and cattle, were collected at
a place called Thalamae; which was selected for the purpose, because
the approach to it was narrow and difficult, and the place itself
was retired and not easy to enter. But when the king was informed
of the number of those who had taken refuge in this place, resolved
to leave nothing unattempted or incomplete, he occupied certain
spots which commanded the approach to it, with his mercenaries:
while leaving his baggage and main army in his entrenched camp, he
himself led his peltasts and light-armed troops through the gorge,
and, without meeting with any resistance, came directly under the
fortress. The fugitives were panic-stricken at his approach: for
they were utterly inexperienced in war and unprovided with means of
defence,—a mere rabble hurriedly collected together; they therefore
at once surrendered, and among them two hundred mercenary soldiers,
of various nationalities, who had been brought there by Amphidamas
the Elean Strategus. Having thus become master of an immense booty in
goods, and of more than five thousand slaves, and having in addition
to these driven off an incalculable number of cattle, Philip now
returned to his camp; but finding his army overburdened with spoils of
every description, and rendered by that means cumbrous and useless for
service, he retraced his steps, and once more marched to Olympia.
[Sidenote: Oppressive conduct of Apelles to the Achaeans.]
+76.+ But now a difficulty arose which was created by Apelles. Apelles
was one of those who had been left by Antigonus as guardians of his
son, and had, as it happened, more influence than any one else with
the king. He conceived the wish to bring the Achaeans into the same
position as the Thessalians; and adopted for that purpose a very
offensive line of conduct. The Thessalians were supposed to enjoy
their own constitution, and to have quite a different status to the
Macedonians; but in fact they had exactly the same, and obeyed every
order of the royal ministers. It was with the purpose of bringing about
the same state of things, that this officer now set himself to test the
subservience of the Achaean contingent. At first he confined himself
to giving the Macedonian soldiers leave to eject Achaeans from their
quarters, who on any occasion had taken possession of them first, as
well as to wrest from them any booty they might have taken; but he
afterwards treated them with actual violence, through the agency of
his subordinates, on any trifling pretext; while such as complained of
this treatment, or took the part of those who were being beaten, he
personally arrested and put into confinement: being convinced that by
this method he would gradually and imperceptibly bring them into the
habit of submitting, without remonstrance, to any thing which the king
might choose to inflict. And this opinion he deduced from his previous
experience in the army of Antigonus, when he had seen the Achaeans
willing to endure any hardship, on the one condition of escaping from
the yoke of Cleomenes. However, certain young Achaeans held a meeting,
and going to Aratus explained to him the policy which was being pursued
by Apelles: whereupon Aratus at once went to Philip, feeling that a
stand must be made on this point at once and without delay. He made his
statement to the king; who, being informed of the facts, first of all
encouraged the young men by a promise that nothing of the sort should
happen to them again; and then commanded Apelles not to impose any
orders upon the Achaeans without consulting their own Strategus.
[Sidenote: Character of Philip V.]
+77.+ Philip, then, was acquiring a great reputation, not only among
those actually in his army, but among the other Peloponnesians also,
for his behaviour to the allies serving with him, as well as for his
ability and courage in the field. Indeed it would not be easy to find a
king endowed with more natural qualities requisite for the acquisition
of power. He had in an eminent degree a quick understanding, a
retentive memory, and a winning grace of manner, joined to a look of
royal dignity and authority; and most important of all, ability and
courage as a general. What neutralised all these excellent qualities,
and made a cruel tyrant of a naturally well-disposed king, it is not
easy to say in a few words: and therefore that inquiry must be reserved
for a more suitable time than the present.
[Sidenote: Philip continues his campaign.]
Starting from Olympia by the road leading to Pharae, Philip came first
to Telphusa, and thence to Heraea. There he had the booty sold by
auction, and repaired the bridge over the Alpheus, with the view of
passing over it to the invasion of Triphylia.
[Sidenote: Arrival of Aetolian troops under Phillidas, B.C. 218.]
[Sidenote: Triphylia.]
Just at that time the Aetolian Strategus, Dorimachus, in answer to
a request of the Eleans for protection against the devastation they
were enduring, despatched six hundred Aetolians, under the command
of Phillidas, to their aid. Having arrived in Elis, and taken over
the Elean mercenaries, who were five hundred in number, as well as a
thousand citizen soldiers and the Tarentine cavalry,[240] he marched to
the relief of Triphylia. This district is so called from Triphylus, one
of the sons of Arcas, and lies on the coast of the Peloponnese between
Elis and Messenia, facing the Libyan Sea, and touching the south-west
frontier of Arcadia. It contains the following towns, Samicum, Lepreum,
Hypana, Typaneae, Pyrgos, Aepium, Bolax, Stylangium, Phrixa; all of
which, shortly before this, the Eleans had conquered and annexed, as
well as the city of Alipheira, which had originally been subject to
Arcadia and Megalopolis, but had been exchanged with the Eleans, for
some private object of his own, by Lydiadas when tyrant of Megalopolis.
+78.+ Phillidas, then, sent his Elean troops to Lepreum, and his
mercenaries to Aliphera; while he himself went with the Aetolian troops
to Typaneae, and waited to see what would happen. Meanwhile the king,
having got rid of his heavy baggage, and crossed the bridge over the
river Alpheus, which flows right under Heraea, came to Alipheira, which
lies on a hill precipitous on every side, and the ascent of which is
more than ten stades. The citadel is on the very summit of this hill,
adorned with a colossal statue of Athene, of extraordinary size and
beauty. The origin and purpose of this statue, and at whose expense it
was set up, are doubtful questions even among the natives; for it has
never been clearly discovered why or by whom it was dedicated: yet it
is universally allowed that its skilful workmanship classes it among
the most splendid and artistic productions of Hecatodorus[241] and
Sostratus.
[Sidenote: Capture of Alipheira.]
The next morning being fine and bright, the king made his dispositions
at daybreak. He placed parties of men with scaling ladders at several
points, and supported each of them with bodies of mercenaries, and
detachments of Macedonian hoplites, on the rear of these several
parties. His orders being fulfilled with enthusiasm and a formidable
display of power, the garrison of Alipheira were kept continually
rushing and rallying to the particular spots to which they saw the
Macedonians approaching: and while this was going on, the king himself
took some picked men, and mounted unobserved over some steep hills up
to the suburb of the citadel; and then, at a given signal, all at once
put the scaling ladders to the walls and began attempting the town.
The king was the first to take the suburb of the acropolis, which had
been abandoned by the garrison; and when this was set on fire, those
who were defending the town walls, foreseeing what must happen, and
afraid that by the fall of the citadel they would be deprived of their
last hope, abandoned the town walls, and fled into it: whereupon the
Macedonians at once took the walls and the town. Subsequently the
garrison on the citadel sent an embassy to Philip, who granted them
their lives, and received possession of it also by formal surrender.
[Sidenote: Typanae and Phigalia surrender to Philip.]
+79.+ These achievements of the king alarmed the whole people of
Triphylia, and made them take counsel severally for the safety of
themselves and their respective cities: while Phillidas left Typaneae,
after plundering some of the houses there, and retired to Lepreum.
This was the reward which the allies of the Aetolians at that time
usually got: not only to be deserted at the hour of utmost need in the
most barefaced way, but, by being plundered as well as betrayed, to
suffer at the hands of their allies exactly what they had a right to
expect from a victorious enemy. But the people of Typaneae surrendered
their city to Philip; as also did the inhabitants of Hypana. And the
people of Phigalia, hearing of what had taken place in Triphylia, and
disliking the alliance with the Aetolians, rose in arms and seized
the space round the Polemarchium.[242] The Aetolian pirates who were
residing in this city, for the purpose of plundering Messene, were
able at first to keep down and overawe the people; but when they saw
that the whole town was mustering to the rescue, they desisted from
the attempt. Having made terms with them, they took their baggage
and evacuated the town; whereupon the inhabitants sent an embassy to
Philip, and delivered themselves and their town into his hands.
[Sidenote: Lepreum.]
[Sidenote: Samicum,]
[Sidenote: and other towns.]
+80.+ While these things were going on, the people of Lepreum, having
seized a certain quarter of their town, demanded that the Elean,
Aetolian, and Lacedaemonian garrisons (for a reinforcement had come
from Sparta also) should all alike evacuate the citadel and city.
At first Phillidas refused, and stayed on, hoping to overawe the
citizens; but when the king, despatching Taurion with a guard of
soldiers to Phigalia, advanced in person towards Lepreum, and was
now close to the town, Phillidas lowered his tone, and the Lepreates
were encouraged in their determination. It was indeed a glorious act
of gallantry on their part. Though there was a garrison within their
walls of a thousand Eleans, a thousand Aetolians with the pirates,
five hundred mercenaries, and two hundred Lacedaemonians, and though
too their citadel was in the occupation of these troops, yet they
ventured to make a stand for the freedom of their native city, and
would not give up hope of deliverance. Phillidas therefore, seeing
that the Lepreates were prepared to offer a stout resistance, and that
the Macedonians were approaching, evacuated the town with the Eleans
and Lacedaemonians. The Cretans, who had been sent by the Spartans,
made their way home through Messenia; but Phillidas departed for
Samicum. The people of Lepreum, having thus got control of their own
town, sent ambassadors to place it in the power of Philip. Hearing the
news, Philip sent all his army, except the peltasts and light-armed
troops, to Lepreum; and taking the latter with him, he made all the
haste he could to catch Phillidas. He succeeded so far as to capture
all his baggage; but Phillidas himself managed to outstrip him and
throw himself into Samicum. The king therefore sat down before this
place: and having sent for the rest of his army from Lepreum, made the
garrison believe that he meant to besiege the town. But the Aetolians
and Eleans within it, having nothing ready for sustaining a siege
beyond their bare hands, alarmed at their situation, held a parley
with Philip to secure their lives; and having obtained leave from
him to march out with their arms, they departed into Elis. Thus the
king became master of Samicum on the spot: and this was followed by
deputations from other towns to him, with entreaties for protection;
in virtue of which he took over Phrixa, Stylangium, Aepium, Bolax,
Pyrgos, and Epitalium. Having settled these things, and reduced all
Triphylia into his power in six days, he returned to Lepreum; and
having addressed the necessary warnings to the Lepreates, and put a
garrison into the citadel, he departed with his army towards Heraea,
leaving Ladicus of Acarnania in command of Triphylia. When he arrived
at Heraea, he made a distribution of all the booty; and taking up again
his baggage from Heraea, arrived about the middle of the winter at
Megalopolis.
[Sidenote: Chilon tries to seize the crown of Sparta, B.C. 218.]
+81.+ While Philip was thus engaged in Triphylia, Chilon the
Lacedaemonian, holding that the kingship belonged to him in virtue
of birth, and annoyed at the neglect of his claims by the Ephors in
selecting Lycurgus, determined to stir up a revolution: and believing
that if he took the same course as Cleomenes had done, and gave the
common people hopes of land allotments and redivision of property,
the masses would quickly follow him, he addressed himself to carrying
out this policy. Having therefore agreed with his friends on this
subject, and got as many as two hundred people to join his conspiracy,
he entered upon the execution of his project. But perceiving that the
chief obstacles in the way of the accomplishment of his design were
Lycurgus, and those Ephors who had invested him with the crown, he
directed his first efforts against them. The Ephors he seized while at
dinner, and put them all to death on the spot,—chance thus inflicting
upon them the punishment they deserved: for whether we regard the
person at whose hands, or the person for whose sake they were thus
destroyed, we cannot but say that they richly merited their fate.
After the successful accomplishment of this deed, Chilon went to the
house of Lycurgus, whom he found at home, but failed to seize. Assisted
by slaves and neighbours Lycurgus was smuggled out of the house, and
effected a secret escape; and thence got away by a cross-country route
to the town of Pellene in Tripolis. Thus baffled in the most important
point of his enterprise, Chilon was greatly discouraged; but was forced
all the same to go on with what he had begun. Accordingly he made
a descent upon the market-place, and laid violent hands upon those
opposed to him; tried to rouse his relations and friends; and declared
to the rest of the people there what hopes of success he had. But when
nobody seemed inclined to join him, but on the contrary a mob began to
collect with threatening looks, he saw how it was, and found a secret
way of leaving the town; and, making his way across Laconia, arrived
in Achaia alone and an exile. But the Lacedaemonians who were in the
territory of Megalopolis, terrified by the arrival of Philip, stowed
away all the goods they had got from the country, and first demolished
and then abandoned the Athenaeum.
[Sidenote: Decline of Sparta.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 800(?)-B.C. 371.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 236-222.]
The fact is that the Lacedaemonians enjoyed a most excellent
constitution, and had a most extensive power, from the time of the
legislation of Lycurgus to that of the battle of Leuctra. But after
that event their fortune took an unfavourable turn; and their political
state continued ever growing worse and worse, until they finally
suffered from a long succession of internal struggles and partisan
warfare; were repeatedly agitated by schemes for the redivision of
lands and the banishment of one party or another; and were subjected to
the severest possible slavery, culminating in the tyrannical government
of Nabis: though the word “tyrant” was one which they had in old times
scarcely endured to hear mentioned. However, the ancient history of
Sparta as well as the great part of it since, has been recorded by
many in terms of eulogy or the reverse; but the part of that history
which admits of the least controversy is that which followed the entire
destruction of the ancient constitution by Cleomenes;[243] and that
shall be narrated by me in the order of events as they occur.
[Sidenote: Apelles opposes Aratus, Jan.-May, B.C. 218.]
[Sidenote: May, B.C. 218.]
[Sidenote: Election of Eperatus as Achaean Strategus.]
+82.+ Meanwhile Philip left Megalopolis, and marching by way of Tegea
arrived at Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter, having gained
in this campaign an admiration beyond his years for his general conduct
and his brilliant achievements. But, in spite of all that had happened,
Apelles was by no means inclined to desist from the policy on which he
had entered; but was resolved little by little to bring the Achaeans
under the yoke. He saw that the most determined opponents of his
scheme were the elder and younger Aratus; and that Philip was inclined
to listen to them, and especially to the elder, both on account of
his former intimacy with Antigonus, and his pre-eminent influence in
Achaia, and, most of all, because of his readiness of resource and
practical ability: he therefore determined to devote his attention to
them, and enter upon the intrigue against them which I shall proceed to
describe. He sought out in the several cities all such as were opposed
to Aratus, and invited them to visit him: and having got them into his
hands he tried all he could to win their affections, encouraged them to
look upon him as a friend, and introduced them to Philip. To the king
he was always pointing out that, if he listened to Aratus, he would
have to treat the Achaeans according to the letter of the treaty of
alliance; but that, if he would listen to him, and take men like those
which he had introduced to him into favour, he would have the whole of
the Peloponnese at his own unfettered disposal. But what he was most
anxious about was the election; being desirous to secure the office
of Strategus for one of this party, and to oust Aratus in accordance
with his settled plan. With this purpose, he persuaded Philip to be at
Aegium at the time of the Achaean election, on the pretext of being on
his way to Elis. The king’s consent to this enabled Apelles himself
to be there at the right time; and though he found great difficulty,
in spite of entreaties and threats, in carrying his point; yet he did
eventually succeed in getting Eperatus of Pharae elected Strategus, and
Timoxenus, the candidate proposed by Aratus, rejected.
[Sidenote: Capture of the Wall, and expedition into Elis.]
+83.+ This over, the king departed by way of Patrae and Dyme, and
arrived with his army before the fortress called the Wall, which is
situated on the frontier of the territory of Dyme, and had a short
time before, as I mentioned above,[244] been occupied by Euripidas.
The king, being anxious at all hazards to recover this place for the
Dymaeans, encamped under its walls with his full force: and thereupon
the Elean garrison in alarm surrendered the place to Philip, which,
though not large, had been fortified with extraordinary care. For
though the circumference of its walls was not more than a stade and a
half, its height was nowhere less than thirty cubits. Having handed the
place over to the Dymaeans, Philip continued his advance, plundering
the territory of Elis: and when he had thoroughly devastated it, and
acquired a large booty, he returned with his army to Dyme.
[Sidenote: The intrigue of Apelles.]
+84.+ Meanwhile Apelles, thinking that, by the election of the Achaean
Strategus through his influence, he had partly succeeded in his policy,
began once more attacking Aratus, with the view of entirely detaching
Philip from his friendship: and he accordingly determined to make up
an accusation against him grounded on the following circumstance: When
Amphidamus, the Elean Strategus, had been, with the other refugees,
made prisoner at Thalamae, and had been brought among other captives to
Olympia, he made earnest efforts by the agency of certain individuals
to be allowed an interview with the king. This favour having been
accorded him, he made a statement to the effect that it was in his
power to bring over the Eleans to the king’s side, and induce them to
enter into alliance with him. Philip believed him; and accordingly
dismissed Amphidamus without ransom, with instructions to promise the
Eleans, that, if they would join the king, he would restore their
captive citizens without ransom, and would himself secure their
territory safely from all outside attacks: and besides this would
maintain them in freedom, without impost or foreign garrison, and in
enjoyment of their several constitutions.
But the Eleans refused to listen to the proposal, although the offer
was thought attractive and substantial. Apelles therefore used this
circumstance to found the false accusation which he now brought before
Philip, alleging that Aratus was not a loyal friend to the Macedonians,
nor sincere in his feelings towards them: “He was responsible for this
alienation of the Eleans; for when the king despatched Amphidamus from
Olympia into Elis, Aratus took him aside and talked to him, asserting
that it was by no means to the interest of the Peloponnesians that
Philip should become supreme in Elis: and this was the reason of the
Eleans despising the king’s offers, and clinging to the friendship of
the Aetolians, and persisting in war against the Macedonians.”
[Sidenote: The king investigates the charge against Aratus.]
+85.+ Regarding the matter as important, the first step the king took
was to summon the elder and younger Aratus, and order Apelles to repeat
these assertions in their presence: which he thereupon did in a bold
and threatening tone. And upon the king still not saying a word, he
added: “Since his Majesty finds you, Aratus, so ungrateful and so
exceedingly adverse to his interests, he is determined to summon a
meeting of the Achaeans, and, after making a statement of his reasons,
forthwith to return to Macedonia.” Aratus the elder answered him with a
general exhortation to Philip, never to give a hasty or inconsiderate
credit to any thing which might be alleged before him against his
friends and allies: but when any such allegation were made, to test
its truth before accepting it; for that was the conduct which became
a king, and was in every way to his interest. Wherefore he said, “I
claim that you should, in the present instance of these accusations of
Apelles, summon those who heard my words; and openly produce the man
that informed Apelles of them, and omit no means of ascertaining the
real truth, before making any statement in regard to these matters to
the Achaeans.”
[Sidenote: Aratus is cleared.]
+86.+ The king approved of this speech, and said that he would not
neglect the matter, but would thoroughly investigate it. And so for
the present the audience was dissolved. But during the following days,
while Apelles failed to bring any proof of his allegations, Aratus was
favoured by the following combination of circumstances. While Philip
was laying waste their territory, the Eleans, suspecting Amphidamus of
treachery, determined to arrest him and send him in chains to Aetolia.
But getting intelligence of their purpose, he escaped first to Olympia;
and there, hearing that Philip was at Dyme engaged in the division
of his spoils, he followed him to that town in great haste. When
Aratus heard that Amphidamus had been driven from Elis and was come to
Dyme, he was delighted, because his conscience was quite clear in the
matter; and going to the king demanded that he should summon Amphidamus
to his presence; on the ground that the man to whom the words were
alleged to have been spoken would best know about the accusations,
and would declare the truth; for he had become an exile from his home
from Philip’s sake, and had now no hope of safety except in him.
These arguments satisfied the king, who thereupon sent for Amphidamus
and ascertained that the accusation was false. The result was that
from that day forward his liking and respect for Aratus continually
increased, while he began to regard Apelles with suspicion; though
being still under the influence of his old ascendency, he was compelled
to connive at many of his actions.
+87.+ Apelles however by no means abandoned his policy. He began
undermining the position of Taurion also, who had been placed in
command of the Peloponnese by Antigonus, not indeed openly attacking
him, but rather praising his character, and asserting that he was a
proper person to be with the king on a campaign; his object being
to get some one else appointed to conduct the government of the
Peloponnese. This was indeed a novel method of defamation,—to damage
one’s neighbours, not by attacking, but by praising their characters;
and this method of wreaking one’s malice, envy, and treachery may be
regarded as primarily and specially the invention of the jealousy and
selfish ambition of courtiers. In the same spirit he began making
covert attacks upon Alexander, the captain of the bodyguard, whenever
he got an opportunity; being bent on reconstituting by his own
authority even the personal attendants of the king, and on making a
clean sweep of all arrangements left existing by Antigonus. For as in
his life Antigonus had managed his kingdom and his son with wisdom, so
at his death he made wise provisions for every department of the State.
For in his will he explained to the Macedonians the nature of these
arrangements; and also gave definite instructions for the future, how
and by whom each of these arrangements was to be carried out: being
desirous of leaving no vantage-ground to the courtiers for mutual
rivalry and strife. Among these arrangements was one selecting Apelles
from among his companions in arms to be one of the guardians of his
son; Leontius to command the peltasts; Megaleas to be chief secretary;
Taurion to be governor of the Peloponnese; and Alexander to be captain
of the bodyguard. Apelles had already got Leontius and Megaleas
completely under his influence: and he was now desirous to remove
Alexander and Taurion from their offices, and so to control these, as
well as all other departments of the government, by the agency of his
own friends. And he would have easily succeeded in doing so, had he not
raised up an opponent in the person of Aratus. As it was, he quickly
reaped the fruits of his own blind selfishness and ambition; for
that which he purposed inflicting on his neighbours he had to endure
himself, and that within a very brief space. How and by what means this
was brought about, I must forbear to tell for the present, and must
bring this book to an end: but in subsequent parts of my work I will
endeavour to make every detail of these transactions clear.
For the present, after concluding the business which I have described,
Philip returned to Argos, and there spent the rest of the winter season
with his friends, while he sent back his forces to Macedonia.