BOOK IV

[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]

+1.+ In my former book I explained the causes of the second war between

Rome and Carthage; and described Hannibal’s invasion of Italy, and the

engagements which took place between them up to the battle of Cannae,

on the banks of the Aufidus. I shall now take up the history of Greece

during the same period, ending at the same date, and commencing from

the 140th Olympiad. But I shall first recall to the recollection of my

readers what I stated in my second book on the subject of the Greeks,

and especially of the Achaeans; for the league of the latter has made

extraordinary progress up to our own age and the generation immediately

preceding.

[Sidenote: Recapitulation of Achaean history, before B.C. 220,

contained in Book II., cc. 41-71.]

[Sidenote: Ending with the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus

Ceraunus, and Ptolemy Euergetes, before the 140th Olympiad, B.C.

220-216.]

I started, then, from Tisamenus, one of the sons of Orestes, and

stated that the dynasty existed from his time to that of Ogygus: that

then there was an excellent form of democratical federal government

established: and that then the league was broken up by the kings of

Sparta into separate towns and villages. Then I tried to describe how

these towns began to form a league once more: which were the first to

join; and the policy subsequently pursued, which led to their inducing

all the Peloponnesians to adopt the general title of Achaeans, and to

be united under one federal government. Descending to particulars,

I brought my story up to the flight of Cleomenes, King of Sparta:

then briefly summarising the events included in my prefatory sketch

up to the deaths of Antigonus Doson, Seleucus Ceraunus, and Ptolemy

Euergetes, who all three died at about the same time, I announced that

my main history was to begin from that point.

[Sidenote: Reasons for starting from this point. (1.) The fact that the

history of Aratus ends at that point. (2.) The possibility of getting

good evidence. (3.) The changes in the various governments in the 139th

Olympiad. B.C. 224-220.]

+2.+ I thought this was the best point; first, because it is there that

Aratus leaves off, and I meant my work, as far as it was Greek history,

to be a continuation of his; and, secondly, because the period thus

embraced in my history would fall partly in the life of my father, and

partly in my own; and thus I should be able to speak as eye-witness

of some of the events, and from the information of eye-witnesses of

others. To go further back and write the report of a report, traditions

at second or third hand, seemed to me unsatisfactory either with a

view to giving clear impressions or making sound statements. But,

above all, I began at this period because it was then that the history

of the whole world entered on a new phase. Philip, son of Demetrius,

had just become the boy king of Macedonia; Achaeus, prince of Asia on

this side of Taurus, had converted his show of power into a reality;

Antiochus the Great had, a short time before, by the death of his

brother Seleucus, succeeded while quite a young man to the throne of

Syria; Ariarathes to that of Cappadocia; and Ptolemy Philopator to that

of Egypt. Not long afterwards Lycurgus became King of Sparta, and the

Carthaginians had recently elected Hannibal general to carry on the

war lately described. Every government therefore being changed about

this time, there seemed every likelihood of a new departure in policy:

which is but natural and usual, and in fact did at this time occur. For

the Romans and Carthaginians entered upon the war I have described;

Antiochus and Ptolemy on one for the possession of Coele-Syria; and the

Achaeans and Philip one against the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians. The

causes of this last war must now be stated.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians.]

+3.+ The Aetolians had long been discontented with a state of peace and

tired at living at their own charges; for they were accustomed to live

on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant

means to support it. Enslaved by this passion they live a life as

predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and

regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered.

[Sidenote: B.C. 222.]

Hitherto, however, as long as Antigonus Doson was alive, their fear

of the Macedonians had kept them quiet. But when he was succeeded at

his death by the boy Philip, they conceived a contempt for the royal

power, and at once began to look out for a pretext and opportunity

for interfering in the Peloponnese: induced partly by an old habit of

getting plunder from that country, and partly by the belief that, now

the Achaeans were unsupported by Macedonia, they would be a match for

them. While their thoughts were fixed on this, chance to a certain

extent contributed to give them the opportunity which they desired.

[Sidenote: The raids of Dorimachus in Messenia.]

There was a certain man of Trichonium[201] named Dorimachus, son of

that Nicostratus who made the treacherous attack on the Pan-Boeotian

congress.[202] This Dorimachus, being young and inspired with the

true spirit of Aetolian violence and aggressiveness, was sent by the

state to Phigalea in the Peloponnese, which, being on the borders of

Arcadia and Messenia, happened at that time to be in political union

with the Aetolian league. His mission was nominally to guard the city

and territory of Phigalea, but in fact to act as a spy on the politics

of the Peloponnese. A crowd of pirates flocked to him at Phigalea;

and being unable to get them any booty by fair means, because the

peace between all Greeks which Antigonus had concluded was still in

force, he was finally reduced to allowing the pirates to drive off the

cattle of the Messenians, though they were friends and allies of the

Aetolians. These injurious acts were at first confined to the sheep on

the border lands; but becoming more and more reckless and audacious,

they even ventured to break into the farm-houses by sudden attacks at

night. The Messenians were naturally indignant, and sent embassies to

Dorimachus; which he at first disregarded, because he wanted not only

to benefit the men under him, but himself also, by getting a share

in their spoils. But when the arrival of such embassies became more

and more frequent, owing to the perpetual recurrence of these acts of

depredation, he said at last that he would come in person to Messene,

and decide on the claims they had to make against the Aetolians.

When he came, however, and the sufferers appeared, he laughed at

some, threatened to strike others, and drove others away with abusive

language.

[Sidenote: Dorimachus leaves Messene.]

+4.+ Even while he was actually in Messene, the pirates came close to

the city walls in the night, and by means of scaling-ladders broke

into a country-house called Chiron’s villa; killed all the slaves who

resisted them; and having bound the others, took them and the cattle

away with them. The Messenian Ephors had long been much annoyed by

what was going on, and by the presence of Dorimachus in their town;

but this they thought was too insolent: and they accordingly summoned

him to appear before the assembled magistrates. There Sciron, who

happened to be an Ephor at the time, and enjoyed a high reputation for

integrity among his fellow-citizens, advised that they should not allow

Dorimachus to leave the city, until he had made good all the losses

sustained by the Messenians, and had given up the guilty persons to

be punished for the murders committed. This suggestion being received

with unanimous approval, as but just, Dorimachus passionately exclaimed

that “they were fools if they imagined that they were now insulting

only Dorimachus, and not the Aetolian league.” In fact he expressed the

greatest indignation at the whole affair, and said that “they would

meet with a public punishment, which would serve them well right.” Now

there was at that time in Messene a man of disgraceful and effeminate

character named Babyrtas, who was so exactly like Dorimachus in voice

and person, that, when he was dressed in Dorimachus’s sun-hat and

cloak, it was impossible to tell them apart; and of this Dorimachus was

perfectly aware. When therefore he was speaking in these threatening

and insolent tones to the Messenian magistrates, Sciron lost his temper

and said “Do you think we care for you or your threats, _Babyrtas_?”

After this Dorimachus was compelled for the present to yield to

circumstances, and to give satisfaction for the injuries inflicted

upon the Messenians: but when he returned to Aetolia, he nursed such a

bitter and furious feeling of anger at this taunt, that, without any

other reasonable pretext, but for this cause and this alone, he got up

a war against the Messenians.

[Sidenote: Dorimachus becomes practically Strategus of Aetolia, B.C.

221.]

[Sidenote: He induces Scopas to go to war with Messenia, Epirus,

Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.]

+5.+ The Strategus of the Aetolians at that time was Ariston; but

being from physical infirmities unable to serve in the field, and

being a kinsman of Dorimachus and Scopas, he had somehow or another

surrendered his whole authority to the former. In his public capacity

Dorimachus could not venture to urge the Aetolians to undertake the

Messenian war, because he had no reasonable pretext for so doing:

the origin of his wish being, as everybody well knew, the wrongs

committed by himself and the bitter gibe which they had brought upon

him. He therefore gave up the idea of publicly advocating the war, but

tried privately to induce Scopas to join in the intrigue against the

Messenians: He pointed out that there was now no danger from the side

of Macedonia owing to the youth of the king (Philip being then only

seventeen years old); that the Lacedaemonians were alienated from the

Messenians; and that they possessed the affection and alliance of the

Eleans; and these circumstances taken together would make an invasion

of Messenia perfectly safe. But the argument most truly Aetolian which

he used was to put before him that a great booty was to be got from

Messenia, because it was entirely unguarded, and had alone, of all the

Peloponnesian districts, remained unravaged throughout the Cleomenic

war. And, to sum up all, he argued that such a move would secure them

great popularity with the Aetolians generally. And if the Achaeans were

to try to hinder their march through the country, they would not be

able to complain if they retaliated: and if, on the other hand, they

did not stir, would be no hindrance to their enterprise. Besides, he

affirmed that they would have plenty of pretext against the Messenians;

for they had long been in the position of aggressors by promising the

Achaeans and Macedonians to join their alliance.

By these, and similar arguments to the same effect, he roused such

a strong feeling in the minds of Scopas and his friends, that,

without waiting for a meeting of the Aetolian federal assembly, and

without communicating with the Apocleti or taking any of the proper

constitutional steps, of their own mere impulse and opinion they

committed acts of hostility simultaneously against Messenia, Epirus,

Achaia, Acarnania, and Macedonia.

[Sidenote: Acts of hostility against Macedonia,]

[Sidenote: Epirus, and Acarnania.]

+6.+ By sea they immediately sent out privateers, who, falling in

with a royal vessel of Macedonia near Cythera, brought it with all

its crew to Aetolia, and sold ship-owners, sailors, and marines, and

finally the ship itself. Then they began sacking the seaboard of

Epirus, employing the aid of some Cephallenian ships for carrying out

this act of violence. They tried also to capture Thyrium in Acarnania.

At the same time they secretly sent some men to seize a strong place

called Clarium, in the centre of the territory of Megalopolis; which

they used thenceforth as a place of sale for their spoils, and a

starting place for their marauding expeditions. However Timoxenus, the

Achaean Strategus, with the assistance of Taurion, who had been left

by Antigonus in charge of the Macedonian interests in the Peloponnese,

took the place after a siege of a very few days. For Antigonus retained

Corinth, in accordance with his convention with the Achaeans, made at

the time of the Cleomenic war;[203] and had never restored Orchomenus

to the Achaeans after he had taken it by force, but claimed and

retained it in his own hands; with the view, as I suppose, not only of

commanding the entrance of the Peloponnese, but of guarding also its

interior by means of his garrison and warlike apparatus in Orchomenus.

[Sidenote: Before midsummer B.C. 220. Invasion of Messenia by

Dorimachus and Scopas.]

Dorimachus and Scopas waited until Timoxenus had a very short time of

office left, and when Aratus, though elected by the Achaeans for the

coming year, would not yet be in office;[204] and then collecting a

general levy of Aetolians at Rhium, and preparing means of transport,

with some Cephallenian ships ready to convoy them, they got their

men across to the Peloponnese, and led them against Messenia. While

marching through the territories of Patrae, Pharae, and Tritaea they

pretended that they did not wish to do any injury to the Achaeans;

but their forces, from their inveterate passion for plunder, could

not be restrained from robbing the country; and consequently they

committed outrages and acts of violence all along their line of march,

till they arrived at Phigalea. Thence, by a bold and sudden movement,

they entered Messenia; and without any regard for their ancient

friendship and alliance with the Messenians, or for the principles

of international justice common to all mankind, subordinating every

consideration to their selfish greed, they set about plundering the

country without resistance, the Messenians being absolutely afraid to

come out to attack them.

[Sidenote: The Achaean league decide to assist the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 222-221.]

[Sidenote: Aratus becomes Strategus of the Achaean league, B.C. 220

(May-June).]

+7.+ This being the time, according to their laws, for the meeting

of the Achaean federal assembly, the members arrived at Aegium. When

the assembly met, the deputies from Patrae and Pharae made a formal

statement of the injuries inflicted upon their territories during the

passage of the Aetolians: an embassy from Messenia also appeared,

begging for their assistance on the ground that the treatment from

which they were suffering was unjust and in defiance of treaty.

When these statements were heard, great indignation was felt at the

wrongs of Patrae and Pharae, and great sympathy for the misfortunes

of the Messenians. But it was regarded as especially outrageous that

the Aetolians should have ventured to enter Achaia with an army,

contrary to treaty, without obtaining or even asking for permission

from any one to pass through the country. Roused to indignation by

all these considerations, the assembly voted to give assistance to

the Messenians: that the Strategus should summon a general levy of

the Achaean arms: and that whatever was decided by this levy, when it

met, should be done. Now Timoxenus, the existing Strategus, was just

on the point of quitting office, and felt besides small confidence

in the Achaeans, because martial exercise had been allowed to fall

into neglect among them; he therefore shrank from undertaking the

expedition, or from even summoning the popular levy. The fact was that,

after the expulsion of Cleomenes, King of Sparta, the Peloponnesians,

weary of the wars that had taken place, and trusting to the peaceful

arrangement that had been come to, neglected all warlike preparations.

Aratus, however, indignant and incensed at the audacity of the

Aetolians, was not inclined to take things so calmly, for he had in

fact a grudge of long standing against these people. Wherefore he

was for instantly summoning the Achaeans to an armed levy, and was

all eagerness to attack the Aetolians. Eventually he took over from

Timoxenus the seal of the league, five days before the proper time,

and wrote to the various cities summoning a meeting in arms of all

those who were of the military age, at Megalopolis. But the peculiar

character of this man, I think, makes it proper for me to give a brief

preliminary sketch of him.

[Sidenote: Character of Aratus.]

+8.+ Aratus had many of the qualities of a great ruler. He could

speak, and contrive, and conceal his purpose: no one surpassed him

in the moderation which he showed in political contests, or in his

power of attaching friends and gaining allies: in intrigue, stratagem,

and laying plots against a foe, and in bringing them to a successful

termination by personal endurance and courage, he was pre-eminent.

Many clear instances of these qualities may be found; but none more

convincing than the episodes of the capture of Sicyon and Mantinea,

of the expulsion of the Aetolians from Pellene, and especially of the

surprise of the Acrocorinthus.[205] On the other hand whenever he

attempted a campaign in the field, he was slow in conception and timid

in execution, and without personal gallantry in the presence of danger.

The result was that the Peloponnese was full of trophies which marked

reverses sustained by him; and that in this particular department he

was always easily defeated. So true is it that men’s minds, no less

than their bodies, have many aspects. Not only is it the case that

the same man has an aptitude for one class of activities and not

for another; it often happens that in things closely analogous, the

same man will be exceedingly acute and exceedingly dull, exceedingly

courageous and exceedingly timid. Nor is this a paradox: it is a very

ordinary fact, well known to all attentive observers. For instance you

may find men who in hunting show the greatest daring in grappling with

wild beasts, and yet are utter cowards in the presence of an armed

enemy. Or again, in actual war some are active and skilful in single

combats, who are yet quite ineffective in the ranks. For example, the

Thessalian cavalry in squadron and column are irresistible, but when

their order is once broken up, they have not the skill in skirmishing

by which each man does whatever the time and place suggests: while,

on the other hand, exactly the reverse of this is the case with the

Aetolians. The Cretans, again, either by land or sea, in ambushes and

piratical excursions, in deceiving the enemy, in making night attacks,

and in fact in every service which involves craft and separate action,

are irresistible; but for a regular front to front charge in line they

have neither the courage nor firmness; and the reverse again is the

case with the Achaeans and Macedonians.

I have said thus much, that my readers may not refuse me credit if I

have at times to make contradictory statements about the same men and

in regard to analogous employments. To return to my narrative.

[Sidenote: The armed levy of Achaeans summoned.]

[Sidenote: Dorimachus ordered to quit Messenia without passing through

Achaia.]

[Sidenote: Scopas and Dorimachus prepare to obey.]

+9.+ The men of military age having assembled in arms at Megalopolis,

in accordance with the decree of the federal assembly, the Messenian

envoys once more came forward, and entreated the people not to

disregard the flagrant breach of treaty from which they were suffering;

and expressed their willingness to become allies of the league, and

their anxiety to be enrolled among its members. The Achaean magistrates

declined the offered alliance, on the ground that it was impossible

to admit a new member without the concurrence of Philip and the other

allies,—for the sworn alliance negotiated by Antigonus during the

Cleomenic war was still in force, and included Achaia, Epirus, Phocis,

Macedonia, Boeotia, Acarnania, and Thessaly;—but they said that they

would march out to their relief, if the envoys there present would

place their sons in Sparta, as hostages for their promise not to make

terms with the Aetolians without the consent of the Achaeans. The

Spartans among the rest were encamped on the frontier of Megalopolis,

having marched out in accordance with the terms of their alliance;

but they were acting rather as reserves and spectators than as active

allies. Having thus settled the terms of the arrangement with the

Messenians, Aratus sent a messenger to the Aetolians to inform them

of the decree of the Achaean federation, and to order them to quit

the territory of Messenia without entering that of Achaia, on pain of

being treated as enemies if they set foot in it. When they heard the

message and knew that the Achaeans were mustered in force, Scopas and

Dorimachus thought it best for the present to obey. They therefore at

once sent despatches to Cyllene and to the Aetolian Strategus, Ariston,

begging that the transports should be sent to a place on the coast of

Elis called the island of Pheia;[206] and they themselves two days

later struck camp, and laden with booty marched towards Elis. For the

Aetolians always maintained a friendship with the Eleans that they

might have through them an entrance for their plundering and piratical

expeditions into the Peloponnese.

[Sidenote: Aratus dismisses the Achaean levy, with the exception of

3000 foot and 300 horse.]

[Sidenote: Dorimachus turns upon Aratus.]

+10.+ Aratus waited two days: and then, foolishly believing that the

Aetolians would return by the route they had indicated, he dismissed

all the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to their homes, except three

thousand foot and three hundred horse and the division under Taurion,

which he led to Patrae, with the view of keeping on the flank of the

Aetolians. But when Dorimachus learnt that Aratus was thus watching his

march, and was still under arms; partly from fear of being attacked

when his forces were engaged on the embarkation, and partly with a

view to confuse the enemy, he sent his booty on to the transports

with a sufficient number of men to secure their passage, under orders

to meet him at Rhium where he intended to embark; while he himself,

after remaining for a time to superintend and protect the shipment of

the booty, changed the direction of his march and advanced towards

Olympia. But hearing that Taurion, with the rest of the army, was

near Cleitoria; and feeling sure that in these circumstances he would

not be able to effect the crossing from Rhium without danger and a

struggle with the enemy; he made up his mind that it would be best for

his interests to bring on an engagement with the army of Aratus as

soon as possible, since it was weak in numbers and wholly unprepared

for the attack. He calculated that if he could defeat this force, he

could then plunder the country, and effect his crossing from Rhium in

safety, while Aratus was waiting and deliberating about again convoking

the Achaean levy; but if on the other hand Aratus were terrified and

declined the engagement, he would then effect his departure unmolested,

whenever he thought it advisable. With these views, therefore, he

advanced, and pitched his camp at Methydrium in the territory of

Megalopolis.

[Sidenote: The Battle of Caphyae, B.C. 220.]

+11.+ But the leaders of the Achaeans, on learning the arrival of the

Aetolians, adopted a course of proceeding quite unsurpassable for

folly. They left the territory of Cleitor and encamped at Caphyae; but

the Aetolians marching from Methydrium past the city of Orchomenus,

they led the Achaean troops into the plain of Caphyae, and there drew

them up for battle, with the river which flows through that plain

protecting their front. The difficulty of the ground between them and

their enemy, for there were besides the river a number of ditches

not easily crossed,[207] and the show of readiness on the part of

the Achaeans for the engagement, caused the Aetolians to shrink from

attacking according to their original purpose; but they retreated in

good order to the high ground of Oligyrtus, content if only they were

not attacked and forced to give battle. But Aratus, when the van of

the Aetolians was already making the ascent, while the cavalry were

bringing up the rear along the plain, and were approaching a place

called Propus at the foot of the hills, sent out his cavalry and

light-armed troops, under the command of Epistratus of Acarnania, with

orders to attack and harass the enemy’s rear. Now if an engagement was

necessary at all, they ought not to have attempted it with the enemy’s

rear, when they had already accomplished the march through the plain,

but with his van directly it had debouched upon the plain: for in this

way the battle would have been wholly confined to the plain and level

ground, where the peculiar nature of the Aetolian arms and general

tactics would have been least effective; while the Achaeans, from

precisely opposite reasons, would have been most effective and able to

act. As it was, they surrendered the advantages of time and place which

were in their favour, and deliberately accepted the conditions which

were in favour of the enemy.

[Sidenote: The Achaeans defeated.]

+12.+ Naturally the result of the engagement was in harmony with such

a beginning. For when the light-armed troops approached, the Aetolian

cavalry retired in good order up the hill, being anxious to effect

a junction with their own infantry. But Aratus, having an imperfect

view of what was going on, and making a bad conjecture of what would

happen next, no sooner saw the cavalry retiring, than, hoping that they

were in absolute flight, he sent forward the heavy-armed troops of

his two wings, with orders to join and support the advanced guard of

their light-armed troops; while he himself, with his remaining forces,

executed a flank movement, and led his men on at the double. But the

Aetolian cavalry had now cleared the plain, and, having effected the

junction with their infantry, drew up under cover of the hill; massed

the infantry on their flanks; and called to them to stand by them:

the infantry themselves showing great promptness in answering to

their shouts, and in coming to their relief, as the several companies

arrived. Thinking themselves now sufficiently strong in numbers, they

closed their ranks, and charged the advanced guard of Achaean cavalry

and light armed troops; and being superior in number, and having the

advantage of charging from higher ground, after a long struggle, they

finally turned their opponents to flight: whose flight involved that

of the heavy-armed troops also which were coming to their relief. For

the latter were advancing in separate detachments in loose order, and,

either in dismay at what was happening, or upon meeting their flying

comrades on their retreat, were compelled to follow their example: the

result being that, whereas the number of those actually defeated on the

field was less than five hundred, the number that fled was more than

two thousand. Taught by experience what to do, the Aetolians followed

behind them with round after round of loud and boisterous shouts. The

Achaeans at first retreated in good order and without danger, because

they were retiring upon their heavy-armed troops, whom they imagined

to be in a place of safety on their original ground; but when they

saw that these too had abandoned their position of safety, and were

marching in a long straggling line, some of them immediately broke

off from the main body and sought refuge in various towns in the

neighbourhood; while others, meeting the phalanx as it was coming up to

their relief, proved to be quite sufficient, without the presence of an

enemy, to strike fear into it and force it into headlong flight. They

directed their flight, as I said, to the towns of the neighbourhood.

Orchomenus and Caphyae, which were close by, saved large numbers of

them: and if this had not been the case, they would in all probability

have been annihilated by this unlooked-for catastrophe. Such was the

result of the engagement at Caphyae.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians retire at their leisure.]

+13.+ When the people of Megalopolis learnt that the Aetolians were

at Methydrium, they came to the rescue _en masse_, at the summons

of a trumpet, on the very day after the battle of Caphyae; and were

compelled to bury the very men with whose assistance they had expected

to fight the Aetolians. Having therefore dug a trench in the territory

of Caphyae, and collected the corpses, they performed the funeral rites

of these unhappy men with all imaginable honour. But the Aetolians,

after this unlooked-for success gained by the cavalry and light-armed

troops, traversed the Peloponnese from that time in complete security.

In the course of their march they made an attack upon the town of

Pellene, and, after ravaging the territory of Sicyon, finally quitted

the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus.

This then, was the cause and occasion of the Social war: its formal

beginning was the decree passed by all the allies after these events,

which was confirmed by a general meeting held at Corinth, on the

proposal of King Philip, who presided at the assembly.

[Sidenote: Midsummer, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Attacked at the Achaean Congress, Aratus successfully

defends himself.]

+14.+ A few days after the events just narrated the ordinary meeting

of the Achaean federal assembly took place, and Aratus was bitterly

denounced, publicly as well as privately, as indisputably responsible

for this disaster; and the anger of the general public was still

further roused and embittered by the invectives of his political

opponents. It was shown to every one’s satisfaction that Aratus had

been guilty of four flagrant errors. His first was that, having taken

office before his predecessor’s time was legally at an end, he had

availed himself of a time properly belonging to another to engage

in the sort of enterprise in which he was conscious of having often

failed. His second and graver error was the disbanding the Achaeans,

while the Aetolians were still in the middle of the Peloponnese;

especially as he had been well aware beforehand that Scopas and

Dorimachus were anxious to disturb the existing settlement, and to stir

up war. His third error was to engage the enemy, as he did, with such a

small force, without any strong necessity; when he might have retired

to the neighbouring towns and have summoned a levy of the Achaeans, and

then have engaged, if he had thought that measure absolutely necessary.

But his last and gravest error was that, having determined to fight,

he did so in such an ill-considered manner, and managed the business

with so little circumspection, as to deprive himself of the advantages

of the plain and the support of his heavy-armed troops, and allow

the battle to be settled by light-armed troops, and to take place on

the slopes, than which nothing could have been more advantageous or

convenient to the Aetolians. Such were the allegations against Aratus.

He, however, came forward and reminded the assembly of his former

political services and achievements; and urged in his defence that,

in the matters alleged, his was not the blame for what had occurred.

He begged their indulgence if he had been guilty of any oversight

in the battle, and claimed that they should at any rate look at the

facts without prejudice or passion. These words created such a rapid

and generous change in the popular feeling, that great indignation

was roused against the political opponents who attacked him; and the

resolutions as to the measures to be taken in the future were passed

wholly in accordance with the views of Aratus.

[Sidenote: The Achaean league determine upon war with the Aetolians,

and send round to their allies for assistance.]

[Sidenote: 139th Olympiad, B.C. 224-220; 140th Olympiad, B.C. 220-216.]

+15.+ These events occurred in the previous Olympiad,[208] what I am

now going to relate belong to the 140th. The resolutions passed by the

Achaean federal assembly were these. That embassies should be sent to

Epirus, Boeotia, Phocis, Acarnania, and Philip, to declare how the

Aetolians, in defiance of treaty, had twice entered Achaia with arms,

and to call upon them for assistance in virtue of their agreement,

and for their consent to the admission of the Messenians into the

alliance. Next, that the Strategus of the Achaeans should enrol five

thousand foot and five hundred horse, and support the Messenians in

case the Aetolians were to invade their territory; and to arrange

with the Lacedaemonians and Messenians how many horse and foot were

to be supplied by them severally for the service of the league. These

decrees showed a noble spirit on the part of the Achaeans in the

presence of defeat, which prevented them from abandoning either the

cause of the Messenians or their own purpose. Those who were appointed

to serve on these embassies to the allies proceeded to carry them out;

while the Strategus at once, in accordance with the decree, set about

enrolling the troops from Achaia, and arranged with the Lacedaemonians

and Messenians to supply each two thousand five hundred infantry and

two hundred and fifty cavalry, so that the whole army for the coming

campaign should amount to ten thousand foot and a thousand horse.

On the day of their regular assembly the Aetolians also met and decided

to maintain peace with the Spartans and Messenians; hoping by that

crafty measure to tamper with the loyalty of the Achaean allies and

sow disunion among them. With the Achaeans themselves they voted to

maintain peace, on condition that they withdrew from alliance with

Messenia, and to proclaim war if they refused,—than which nothing could

have been more unreasonable. For being themselves in alliance, both

with Achaeans and Messenians, they proclaimed war against the former,

unless the two ceased to be in alliance and friendly relationship

with each other; while if the Achaeans chose to be at enmity with the

Messenians, they offered them a separate peace. Their proposition was

too iniquitous and unreasonable to admit of being even considered.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Spartans.]

+16.+ The Epirotes and King Philip on hearing the ambassadors consented

to admit the Messenians to alliance; but though the conduct of the

Aetolians caused them momentary indignation, they were not excessively

moved by it, because it was no more than what the Aetolians habitually

did. Their anger, therefore, was short-lived, and they presently

voted against going to war with them. So true is it that an habitual

course of wrong-doing finds readier pardon than when it is spasmodic

or isolated. The former, at any rate, was the case with the Aetolians:

they perpetually plundered Greece, and levied unprovoked war upon many

of its people: they did not deign either to make any defence to those

who complained, but answered only by additional insults if any one

challenged them to arbitration for injuries which they had inflicted,

or indeed which they meditated inflicting. And yet the Lacedaemonians,

who had but recently been liberated by means of Antigonus and the

generous zeal of the Achaeans, and though they were bound not to

commit any act of hostility towards the Macedonians and Philip, sent

clandestine messages to the Aetolians, and arranged a secret treaty of

alliance and friendship with them.

[Sidenote: Invasion of Achaia by the Aetolians and Illyrians.]

The army had already been enrolled from the Achaeans of military age,

and had been assigned to the duty of assisting the Lacedaemonians and

Messenians, when Scerdilaidas and Demetrius of Pharos sailed with

ninety galleys beyond Lissus, contrary to the terms of their treaty

with Rome. These men first touched at Pylos, and failing in an attack

upon it, they separated: Demetrius making for the Cyclades, from some

of which he exacted money and plundered others; while Scerdilaidas,

directing his course homewards, put in at Naupactus with forty galleys

at the instigation of Amynas, king of the Athamanes, who happened to be

his brother-in-law; and after making an agreement with the Aetolians,

by the agency of Agelaus, for a division of spoils, he promised to

join them in their invasion of Achaia. With this agreement made with

Scerdilaidas, and with the co-operation of the city of Cynaetha,

Agelaus, Dorimachus, and Scopas, collected a general levy of the

Aetolians, and invaded Achaia in conjunction with the Illyrians.

+17.+ But the Aetolian Strategus Ariston, ignoring everything that was

going on, remained quietly at home, asserting that he was not at war

with the Achaeans, but was maintaining peace: a foolish and childish

mode of acting,—for what better epithets could be applied to a man who

supposed that he could cloak notorious facts by mere words? Meanwhile

Dorimachus and his colleague had marched through the Achaean territory

and suddenly appeared at Cynaetha.

[Sidenote: The previous history of Cynaetha.]

Cynaetha was an Arcadian city[209] which, for many years past, had

been afflicted with implacable and violent political factions. The

two parties had frequently retaliated on each other with massacres,

banishments, confiscations, and redivisions of lands; but finally the

party which affected the Achaean connexion prevailed and got possession

of the city, securing themselves by a city-guard and commandant from

Achaia. This was the state of affairs when, shortly before the Aetolian

invasion, the exiled party sent to the party in possession intreating

that they would be reconciled and allow them to return to their own

city; whereupon the latter were persuaded, and sent an embassy to the

Achaeans with the view of obtaining their consent to the pacification.

The Achaeans readily consented, in the belief that both parties would

regard them with goodwill: since the party in possession had all

their hopes centred in the Achaeans, while those who were about to be

restored would owe that restoration to the consent of the same people.

Accordingly the Cynaethans dismissed the city guard and commandant,

and restored the exiles, to the number of nearly three hundred, after

taking such pledges from them as are reckoned the most inviolable among

all mankind. But no sooner had they secured their return, than, without

any cause or pretext arising which might give a colour to the renewal

of the quarrel, but on the contrary, at the very first moment of their

restoration, they began plotting against their country, and against

those who had been their preservers. I even believe that at the very

sacrifices, which consecrated the oaths and pledges which they gave

each other, they were already, even at such a solemn moment, revolving

in their minds this offence against religion and those who had trusted

them. For, as soon as they were restored to their civil rights they

called in the Aetolians, and betrayed the city into their hands, eager

to effect the utter ruin both of the people who had preserved, and the

city which had nourished, them.

+18.+ The bold stroke by which they actually consummated this treason

was as follows. Of the restored exiles certain officers had been

appointed called Polemarchs, whose duty it was to lock the city-gates,

and keep the keys while they remained closed, and also to be on guard

during the day at the gate-houses. The Aetolians accordingly waited

for this period of closing the gates, ready to make the attempt, and

provided with ladders; while the Polemarchs of the exiles, having

assassinated their colleagues on guard at the gate-house, opened the

gate. Some of the Aetolians, therefore, got into the town by it, while

others applied their ladders to the walls, and mounting by their

means, took forcible possession of them. The inhabitants of the town,

panic-stricken at the occurrence, could not tell which way to turn.

They could not give their undivided energies to opposing the party

which was forcing its way through the gate, because of those who were

attacking them at the walls; nor could they defend the walls owing to

the enemies that were pouring through the gate. The Aetolians having

thus become rapidly masters of the town, in spite of the injustice of

the whole proceeding, did one act of supreme justice. For the very men

who had invited them, and betrayed the town to them, they massacred

before any one else, and plundered their property. They then treated

all the others of the party in the same way; and, finally, taking

up their quarters in the houses, they systematically robbed them

of all valuables, and in many cases put Cynaethans to the rack, if

they suspected them of having anything concealed, whether money, or

furniture, or anything else of unusual value.

After inflicting this ruin on the Cynaethans they departed, leaving a

garrison to guard the walls, and marched towards Lusi. Arrived at the

temple of Artemis, which lies between Cleitor and Cynaetha, and is

regarded as inviolable by the Greeks, they threatened to plunder the

cattle of the goddess and the other property round the temple. But the

people of Lusi acted with great prudence: they gave the Aetolians some

of the sacred furniture, and appealed to them not to commit the impiety

of inflicting any outrage. The gift was accepted, and the Aetolians at

once removed to Cleitor and pitched their camp under its walls.

[Sidenote: Measures taken by Aratus.]

+19.+ Meanwhile Aratus, the Achaean Strategus, had despatched an appeal

for help to Philip; was collecting the men selected for service; and

was sending for the troops, arranged for by virtue of the treaty, from

Sparta and Messenia.

[Sidenote: The Aetolians at the temple of Artemis. They fail at

Cleitor.]

[Sidenote: They burn Cynaetha and return home.]

[Sidenote: Demetrius of Pharos.]

The Aetolians at first urged the people of Cleitor to abandon their

alliance with the Achaeans and adopt one with themselves; and upon

the Cleitorians absolutely refusing, they began an assault upon the

town, and endeavoured to take it by an escalade. But meeting with a

bold and determined resistance from the inhabitants, they desisted

from the attempt; and breaking up their camp marched back to Cynaetha,

driving off with them on their route the cattle of the goddess. They

at first offered the city to the Eleans, but upon their refusing to

accept it, they determined to keep the town in their own hands, and

appointed Euripides to command it: but subsequently, on the alarm of

an army of relief coming from Macedonia, they set fire to the town and

abandoned it, directing their march to Rhium with the purpose of there

taking ship and crossing home. But when Taurion heard of the Aetolian

invasion, and what had taken place at Cynaetha, and saw that Demetrius

of Pharos had sailed into Cenchreae from his island expedition, he

urged the latter to assist the Achaeans, and dragging his galleys

across the Isthmus to attack the Aetolians as they crossed the gulf.

Now though Demetrius had enriched himself by his island expedition,

he had had to beat an ignominious retreat, owing to the Rhodians

putting out to sea to attack him: he was therefore glad to accede to

the request of Taurion, as the latter undertook the expense of having

his galleys dragged across the Isthmus.[210] He accordingly got them

across, and arriving two days after the passage of the Aetolians,

plundered some places on the seaboard of Aetolia and then returned to

Corinth.

[Sidenote: Treason of the Spartans.]

The Lacedaemonians had dishonourably failed to send the full complement

of men to which they were bound by their engagement, but had despatched

a small contingent only of horse and foot, to save appearances.

[Sidenote: Inactivity of Aratus.]

Aratus however, having his Achaean troops, behaved in this instance

also with the caution of a statesman, rather than the promptness of a

general: for remembering his previous failure he remained inactively

watching events, until Scopas and Dorimachus had accomplished all they

wanted and were safe home again; although they had marched through a

line of country which was quite open to attack, full of defiles, and

wanting only a trumpeter[211] to sound a call to arms. But the great

disaster and misfortunes endured by the Cynaethans at the hands of the

Aetolians were looked upon as most richly deserved by them.

[Sidenote: The reasons of the barbarity of the Cynaethans. Their

neglect of the refining influences of music, which is carefully

encouraged in the rest of Arcadia.]

+20.+ Now, seeing that the Arcadians as a whole have a reputation for

virtue throughout Greece, not only in respect of their hospitality and

humanity, but especially for their scrupulous piety, it seems worth

while to investigate briefly the barbarous character of the Cynaethans:

and inquire how it came about that, though indisputably Arcadians in

race, they at that time so far surpassed the rest of Greece in cruelty

and contempt of law.

They seem then to me to be the first, and indeed the only, Arcadians

who have abandoned institutions nobly conceived by their ancestors and

admirably adapted to the character of all the inhabitants of Arcadia.

For music, and I mean by that _true_ music, which it is advantageous

to every one to practise, is obligatory with the Arcadians. For we

must not think, as Ephorus in a hasty sentence of his preface, wholly

unworthy of him, says, that music was introduced among mankind for the

purpose of deception and jugglery; nor must the ancients Cretans and

Spartans be supposed to have introduced the pipe and rhythmic movement

in war, instead of the trumpet, without some reason; nor the early

Arcadians to have given music such a high place in their constitution,

that not only boys, but young men up to the age of thirty, are

compelled to practise it, though in other respects most simple and

primitive in their manner of life. Every one is familiarly acquainted

with the fact that the Arcadians are the only people among whom boys

are by the laws trained from infancy to sing hymns and paeans, in which

they celebrate in the traditional fashion the heroes and gods of their

particular towns. They next learn the airs of Philoxenus and Timotheus,

and dance with great spirit to the pipers at the yearly Dionysia in the

theatres, the boys at the boys’ festival, and the young men at what

is called the men’s festival. Similarly it is their universal custom,

at all festal gatherings and banquets, not to have strangers to make

the music, but to produce it themselves, calling on each other in turn

for a song. They do not look upon it as a disgrace to disclaim the

possession of any other accomplishment: but no one can disclaim the

knowledge of how to sing, because all are forced to learn, nor can they

confess the knowledge, and yet excuse themselves from practising it,

because that too among them is looked upon as disgraceful. Their young

men again practise a military step to the music of the pipe and in

regular order of battle, producing elaborate dances, which they display

to their fellow-citizens every year in the theatres, at the public

charge and expense.

[Sidenote: The object of the musical training of the Arcadians.]

+21.+ Now the object of the ancient Arcadians in introducing these

customs was not, as I think, the gratification of luxury and

extravagance. They saw that Arcadia was a nation of workers; that the

life of the people was laborious and hard; and that, as a natural

consequence of the coldness and gloom which were the prevailing

features of a great part of the country, the general character of the

people was austere. For we mortals have an irresistible tendency to

yield to climatic influences: and to this cause, and no other, may be

traced the great distinctions which prevail amongst us in character,

physical formation, and complexion, as well as in most of our habits,

varying with nationality or wide local separation. And it was with a

view of softening and tempering this natural ruggedness and rusticity,

that they not only introduced the things which I have mentioned,

but also the custom of holding assemblies and frequently offering

sacrifices, in both of which women took part equally with men; and

having mixed dances of girls and boys and in fact did everything they

could to humanise their souls by the civilising and softening influence

of such culture. The people of Cynaetha entirely neglected these

things, although they needed them more than any one else, because their

climate and country is by far the most unfavourable in all Arcadia;

and on the contrary gave their whole minds to mutual animosities and

contentions. They in consequence became finally so brutalised, that no

Greek city has ever witnessed a longer series of the most atrocious

crimes. I will give one instance of the ill fortune of Cynaetha in this

respect, and of the disapproval of such proceedings on the part of the

Arcadians at large. When the Cynaethans, after their great massacre,

sent an embassy to Sparta, every city which the ambassadors entered

on their road at once ordered them by a herald to depart; while the

Mantineans not only did that, but after their departure regularly

purified their city and territory from the taint of blood, by carrying

victims round them both.

I have had three objects in saying thus much on this subject. First,

that the character of the Arcadians should not suffer from the crimes

of one city: secondly, that other nations should not neglect music,

from an idea that certain Arcadians give an excessive and extravagant

attention to it: and, lastly, I speak for the sake of the Cynaethans

themselves, that, if ever God gives them better fortune, they may

humanise themselves by turning their attention to education, and

especially to music.

[Sidenote: Philip V. comes to Corinth. B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Advances toward Sparta.]

[Sidenote: Adeimantus assassinated.]

+22.+ To return from this digression. When the Aetolians had reached

their homes in safety after this raid upon the Peloponnese, Philip,

coming to the aid of the Achaeans with an army, arrived at Corinth.

Finding that he was too late, he sent despatches to all the allies

urging them to send deputies at once to Corinth, to consult on the

measures required for the common safety. Meanwhile he himself marched

towards Tegea, being informed that the Lacedaemonians were in a

state of revolution, and were fallen to mutual slaughter. For being

accustomed to have a king over them, and to be entirely submissive to

their rulers, their sudden enfranchisement by means of Antigonus, and

the absence of a king, produced a state of civil war; because they all

imagined themselves to be on a footing of complete political equality.

At first two of the five Ephors kept their views to themselves; while

the other three threw in their lot with the Aetolians, because they

were convinced that the youth of Philip would prevent him as yet from

having a decisive influence in the Peloponnese. But when, contrary to

their expectations, the Aetolians retired quickly from the Peloponnese,

and Philip arrived still more quickly from Macedonia, the three Ephors

became distrustful of Adeimantus, one of the other two, because he was

privy to and disapproved of their plans; and were in a great state of

anxiety lest he should tell Philip everything as soon as that monarch

approached. After some consultation therefore with certain young men,

they published a proclamation ordering all citizens of military age to

assemble in arms in the sacred enclosure of Athene of the Brazen-house,

on the pretext that the Macedonians were advancing against the town.

This startling announcement caused a rapid muster: when Adeimantus, who

disapproved of the measure, came forward and endeavoured to show that

“the proclamation and summons to assemble in arms should have been made

some time before, when they were told that their enemies the Aetolians

were approaching the frontier: not then, when they learnt that their

benefactors and preservers the Macedonians were coming with their

king.” In the middle of this dissuasive speech the young men whose

co-operation had been secured struck him dead, and with him Sthenelaus,

Alcamenes, Thyestes, Bionidas, and several other citizens; whereupon

Polyphontes and certain of his party, seeing clearly what was going to

happen, went off to join Philip.

[Sidenote: Philip summons Spartan deputies to Tegea.]

+23.+ Immediately after the commission of this crime, the Ephors who

were then in power sent men to Philip, to accuse the victims of this

massacre; and to beg him to delay his approach, until the affairs of

the city had returned to their normal state after this commotion;

and to be assured meanwhile that it was their purpose to be loyal

and friendly to the Macedonians in every respect. These ambassadors

found Philip near Mount Parthenius,[212] and communicated to him their

commission. Having listened, he bade the ambassadors make all haste

home, and inform the Ephors that he was going to continue his march to

Tegea, and expected that they would as quickly as possible send him

men of credit to consult with him on the present position of affairs.

After hearing this message from the king, the Lacedaemonian officers

despatched ten commissioners headed by Omias to meet Philip; who, on

arriving at Tegea, and entering the king’s council chamber, accused

Adeimantus of being the cause of the late commotion; and promised that

they would perform all their obligations as allies to Philip, and

show that they were second to none of those whom he looked upon as

his most loyal friends, in their affection for his person. With these

and similar asseverations the Lacedaemonian commissioners left the

council chamber. The members of the council were divided in opinion:

one party knowing the secret treachery of the Spartan magistrates, and

feeling certain that Adeimantus had lost his life from his loyalty

to Macedonia, while the Lacedaemonians had really determined upon an

alliance with the Aetolians, advised Philip to make an example of the

Lacedaemonians, by treating them precisely as Alexander had treated

the Thebans, immediately after his assumption of his sovereignty. But

another party, consisting of the older counsellors, sought to show

that such severity was too great for the occasion, and that all that

ought to be done was to rebuke the offenders, depose them, and put the

management of the state and the chief offices in the hands of his own

friends.

[Sidenote: The king decides not to chastise Sparta.]

+24.+ The king gave the final decision, if that decision may be

called the king’s: for it is not reasonable to suppose that a mere

boy should be able to come to a decision on matters of such moment.

Historians, however, must attribute to the highest official present

the final decisions arrived at: it being thoroughly understood among

their readers that propositions and opinions, such as these, in all

probability proceed from the members of the council, and particularly

from those highest in his confidence. In this case the decision of

the king ought most probably to be attributed to Aratus. It was to

this effect: the king said that “in the case of injuries inflicted by

the allies upon each other separately, his intervention ought to be

confined to a remonstrance by word of mouth or letter; but that it was

only injuries affecting the whole body of the allies which demanded

joint intervention and redress: and seeing that the Lacedaemonians had

plainly committed no such injury against the whole body of allies,

but professed their readiness to satisfy every claim that could with

justice be made upon them, he held that he ought not to decree any

measure of excessive severity against them. For it would be very

inconsistent for him to take severe measures against them for so

insignificant a cause; while his father inflicted no punishment at

all upon them, though when he conquered them they were not allies

but professed enemies.” It having, therefore, been formally decided

to overlook the incident, the king immediately sent Petraeus, one of

his most trusted friends, with Omias, to exhort the people to remain

faithful to their friendship with him and Macedonia, and to interchange

oaths of alliance; while he himself started once more with his army and

returned towards Corinth, having in his conduct to the Lacedaemonians

given an excellent specimen of his policy towards the allies.

[Sidenote: The congress of allies at Corinth declare war against the

Aetolians.]

+25.+ When he arrived at Corinth he found the envoys from the allied

cities already there; and in consultation with them he discussed the

measures to be taken in regard to the Aetolians. The complaints against

them were stated by the various envoys. The Boeotians accused them

of plundering the temple of Athene at Itone[213] in time of peace:

the Phocians of having attacked and attempted to seize the cities of

Ambrysus and Daulium: the Epirotes of having committed depredations in

their territory. The Acarnanians showed how they had contrived a plot

for the betrayal of Thyrium into their hands, and had gone so far as to

actually assault it under cover of night. The Achaeans made a statement

showing that they had seized Clarium in the territory of Megalopolis;

traversed the territories of Patrae and Pharae, pillaging the country

as they went; completely sacked Cynaetha; plundered the temple of

Artemis in Lusi; laid siege to Cleitor; attempted Pylus by sea, and

Megalopolis by land, doing all they could by aid of the Illyrians to

lay waste the latter after its recent restoration. After listening

to these depositions, the congress of allies unanimously decided to

go to war with the Aetolians. A decree was, therefore, formulated in

which the aforesaid causes for war were stated as a preamble, and a

declaration sub-joined of their intention of restoring to the several

allies any portion of their territory seized by the Aetolians since the

death of Demetrius, father of Philip; and similarly of restoring to

their ancestral forms of government all states that had been compelled

against their will to join the Aetolian league; with full possession

of their own territory and cities; subject to no foreign garrison

or tribute; in complete independence; and in enjoyment of their own

constitutions and laws. Finally a clause in the decree declared their

intention of assisting the Amphictyonic council to restore the laws,

and to recover its control of the Delphic temple, wrested from it by

the Aetolians, who were determined to keep in their own hands all that

belonged to that temple.

[Sidenote: B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 220.]

+26.+ This decree was made in the first year of the 140th Olympiad,

and with it began the so-called Social war, the commencement of which

was thoroughly justifiable and a natural consequence of the injurious

acts of the Aetolians. The first step of the congress was to send

commissioners at once to the several allies, that the decree having

been confirmed by as many as possible, all might join in this national

war. Philip also sent a declaratory letter to the Aetolians, in order

that, if they had any justification to put forward on the points

alleged against them, they might even at that late hour meet and settle

the controversy by conference: “but if they supposed that they were,

with no public declaration of war, to sack and plunder, without the

injured parties retaliating, on pain of being considered, if they did

so, to have commenced hostilities, they were the most simple people in

the world.” On the receipt of this letter the Aetolian magistrates,

thinking that Philip would never come, named a day on which they would

meet him at Rhium. When they were informed, however, that he had

actually arrived there, they sent a despatch informing him that they

were not competent, before the meeting of the Aetolian assembly, to

settle any public matter on their own authority. But when the Achaeans

met at the usual federal assembly, they ratified the decree, and

published a proclamation authorising reprisals upon the Aetolians. And

when King Philip appeared before the council at Aegium, and informed

them at length of all that had taken place, they received his speech

with warmth, and formally renewed with him personally the friendship

which had existed between his ancestors and themselves.

[Sidenote: Scopas elected Aetolian Strategus.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 385.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 387.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 382.]

+27.+ Meanwhile, the time of the annual election having come round, the

Aetolians elected Scopas as their Strategus, the man who had been the

moving spirit in all these acts of violence. I am at a loss for fitting

terms to describe such a public policy. To pass a decree against going

to war,[214] and yet to go on an actual expedition in force and pillage

their neighbours' territories: not to punish one of those responsible

for this: but on the contrary to elect as Strategi and bestow honours

on the leaders in these transactions,—this seems to me to involve the

grossest disingenuousness. I can find no word which better describes

such a treacherous policy; and I will quote two instances to show what

I mean by it. When Phoebidas treacherously seized the Cadmeia, the

Lacedaemonians fined the guilty general but declined to withdraw the

garrison, on the ground that the wrong was fully atoned for by the

punishment of the perpetrator of it: though their plain duty was to

have done the reverse, for it was the latter which was of importance to

the Thebans. Again this same people published a proclamation giving the

various cities freedom and autonomy in accordance with the terms of the

peace of Antalcidas, and yet did not withdraw their Harmosts from the

cities. Again, having driven the Mantineans from their home, who were

at the time their friends and allies, they denied that they were doing

any wrong, inasmuch as they removed them from one city and settled

them in several. But indeed a man is a fool, as much as a knave, if he

imagines that, because he shuts his own eyes, his neighbours cannot

see. Their fondness for such tortuous policy proved however, both to

the Lacedaemonians and Aetolians, the source of the greatest disasters;

and it is not one which should commend itself to the imitation either

of individuals or states, if they are well advised.

King Philip, then, after his interview with the Achaean assembly,

started with his army on the way to Macedonia, in all haste to make

preparations for war; leaving a pleasant impression in the minds of all

the Greeks: for the nature of the decree, which I have mentioned as

having been passed by him,[215] gave them good hopes of finding him a

man of moderate temper and royal magnanimity.

[Sidenote: B.C. 118.]

+28.+ These transactions were contemporaneous with Hannibal’s

expedition against Saguntum, after his conquest of all Iberia south

of the Iber. Now, had the first attempts of Hannibal been from the

beginning involved with the transactions in Greece, it would have been

plainly my proper course to have narrated the latter side by side with

those in Iberia in my previous book, with an eye solely to dates.

But seeing that the wars in Italy, Greece, and Asia were at their

commencements entirely distinct, and yet became finally involved with

each other, I decided that my history of them must also be distinct,

until I came to the point at which they became inseparably interlaced,

and began to tend towards a common conclusion. Thus both will be made

clear,—the account of their several commencements: and the time,

manner, and causes which led to the complication and amalgamation, of

which I spoke in my introduction. This point having been reached, I

must thenceforth embrace them all in one uninterrupted narrative. This

amalgamation began towards the end of the war, in the third year of

the 140th Olympiad. From that year, therefore, my history will, with a

due regard to dates, become a general one. Before that year it must be

divided into distinct narratives, with a mere recapitulation in each

case of the events detailed in the preceding book, introduced for the

sake of facilitating the comprehension, and rousing the admiration, of

my readers.

[Sidenote: Philip secures the support of Scerdilaidas.]

+29.+ Philip then passed the winter in Macedonia, in an energetic

enlistment of troops for the coming campaign, and in securing his

frontier on the side of the Barbarians. And having accomplished these

objects, he met Scerdilaidas and put himself fearlessly in his power,

and discussed with him the terms of friendship and alliance; and partly

by promising to help him in securing his power in Illyria, and partly

by bringing against the Aetolians the charges to which they were only

too open, persuaded him without difficulty to assent to his proposals.

The fact is that public crimes do not differ from private, except in

quantity and extent; and just as in the case of petty thieves, what

brings them to ruin more than anything else is that they cheat and are

unfaithful to each other, so was it in the case of the Aetolians. They

had agreed with Scerdilaidas to give him half the booty, if he would

join them in their attack upon Achaea; but when, on his consenting

to do so, and actually carrying out his engagement, they had sacked

Cynaetha and carried off a large booty in slaves and cattle, they gave

him no share in the spoil at all. He was therefore already enraged

with them; and required very little persuasion on Philip’s part to

induce him to accept the proposal, and agree to join the alliance, on

condition of receiving a yearly subsidy of twenty talents; and, in

return, putting to sea with thirty galleys and carrying on a naval war

with the Aetolians.

[Sidenote: The Acarnanians, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Duplicity of the Epirotes.]

+30.+ While Philip was thus engaged, the commissioners sent out to the

allies were performing their mission. The first place they came to was

Acarnania; and the Acarnanians, with a noble promptitude, confirmed the

decree and undertook to join the war against the Aetolians with their

full forces. And yet they, if any one, might have been excused if they

had put the matter off, and hesitated, and shown fear of entering upon

a war with their neighbours; both because they lived upon the frontiers

of Aetolia, and still more because they were peculiarly open to attack,

and, most of all, because they had a short time before experienced

the most dreadful disasters from the enmity of the Aetolians. But I

imagine that men of noble nature, whether in private or public affairs,

look upon duty as the highest consideration; and in adherence to this

principle no people in Greece have been more frequently conspicuous

than the Acarnanians, although the forces at their command were but

slender. With them, above all others in Greece, an alliance should be

sought at a crisis, without any misgiving; for they have, individually

and collectively, an element of stability and a spirit of liberality.

The conduct of the Epirotes was in strong contrast. When they heard

what the commissioners had to say, indeed, they, like the Acarnanians,

joined in confirming the decree, and voted to go to war with the

Aetolians at such time as Philip also did the same; but with ignoble

duplicity they told the Aetolian envoys that they had determined to

maintain peace with them.

[Sidenote: Ptolemy Philopator.]

Ambassadors were despatched also to King Ptolemy, to urge him not to

send money to the Aetolians, nor to supply them with any aid against

Philip and the allies.

[Sidenote: Timidity of the Messenians.]

[Sidenote: B.C. 480-479. Pindar fr.]

+31.+ The Messenians again, on whose account the war began, answered

the commissioners sent to them that, seeing Phigalia was on their

frontier and was in the power of the Aetolians, they would not

undertake the war until that city was wrested from them. This decision

was forcibly carried, much against the will of the people at large,

by the Ephors Oenis and Nicippus, and some others of the oligarchical

party: wherein they showed, to my thinking, great ignorance of their

true interests. I admit, indeed, that war is a terrible thing; but it

is less terrible than to submit to anything whatever in order to avoid

it. For what is the meaning of our fine talk about equality of rights,

freedom of speech, and liberty, if the one important thing is peace? We

have no good word for the Thebans, because they shrunk from fighting

for Greece and chose from fear to side with the Persians,—nor indeed

for Pindar who supported their inaction in the verses—[216]

A quiet haven for the ship of state

Should be the patriot’s aim,

And smiling peace, to small and great

That brings no shame.

For though his advice was for the moment acceptable, it was not long

before it became manifest that his opinion was as mischievous as it was

dishonourable. For peace, with justice and honour, is the noblest and

most advantageous thing in the world; when joined with disgrace and

contemptible cowardice, it is the basest and most disastrous.[217]

+32.+ The Messenian leaders, then, being of oligarchical tendencies,

and aiming at their own immediate advantage, were always too much

inclined to peace. On many critical occasions indeed they managed to

elude fear and danger: but all the while this policy of theirs was

accumulating a heavy retribution for themselves; and they finally

involved their country in the gravest misfortunes. And the reason in

my opinion was this, that being neighbours to two of the most powerful

nations in the Peloponnese, or I might almost say in Greece, I mean

the Arcadians and Lacedaemonians,—one of which had been irreconcilably

hostile to them from the moment they occupied the country, and the

other disposed to be friendly and protect them,—they never frankly

accepted hostility to the Spartans, or friendship with the Arcadians.

Accordingly when the attention of the former was distracted by domestic

or foreign war, the Messenians were secure; for they always enjoyed

peace and tranquillity from the fact of their country lying out of

the road: but when the Lacedaemonians, having nothing else on hand to

distract their attention, took to inflicting injuries on them, they

were unable to withstand the superior strength of the Lacedaemonians

by their own power; and, having failed to secure the support of their

true friends, who were ready to do anything for their protection, they

were reduced to the alternatives of becoming the slaves of Sparta and

enduring her heavy exactions; or of leaving their homes to escape from

this servitude, abandoning their country with wives and children. And

this has repeatedly happened to them within comparatively recent times.

That the present settlement of the Peloponnese may prove a lasting

one, so that no measure such as I am about to describe may be ever

necessary, is indeed my earnest wish: but if anything does happen

to disturb it, and threaten revolutionary changes, the only hope

for the Messenians and Megalopolitans of continuing to occupy their

present territory, that I can see, is a recurrence to the policy of

Epaminondas. They must resolve, that is to say, upon a cordial and

sincere partnership with each other in every danger and labour.

+33.+ And perhaps my observation may receive some support from

ancient history. For, among many other indications, it is a fact

that the Messenians did set up a pillar close to the altar of Zeus

Lycaeus in the time of Aristomenes,[218] according to the evidence of

Callisthenes, in which they inscribed the following verses:

A faithless king will perish soon or late!

Messene tracked him down right easily,

The traitor:—perjury must meet its fate;

Glory to Zeus, and life to Arcady!

[Sidenote: B.C. 362.]

The point of this is, that, having lost their own country, they pray

the gods to save Arcadia as their second country.[219] And it was

very natural that they should do so; for not only did the Arcadians

receive them when driven from their own land, at the time of the

Aristomenic war, and make them welcome to their homes and free of their

civic rights; but they also passed a vote bestowing their daughters

in marriage upon those of the Messenians who were of proper age; and

besides all this, investigated the treason of their king Aristocrates

in the battle of the Trench; and, finding him guilty, put him to death

and utterly destroyed his whole family. But setting aside these ancient

events, what has happened recently after the restoration of Megalopolis

and Messene will be sufficient to support what I have said. For when,

upon the death of Epaminondas leaving the result of the battle of

Mantinea doubtful, the Lacedaemonians endeavoured to prevent the

Messenians from being included in the truce, hoping even then to get

Messenia into their own hands, the Megalopolitans, and all the other

Arcadians who were allied with the Messenians, made such a point of

their being admitted to the benefits of the new confederacy, that they

were accepted by the allies and allowed to take the oaths and share in

the provisions of the peace; while the Lacedaemonians were the only

Greeks excluded from the treaty. With such facts before him, could any

one doubt the soundness of the suggestion I lately made?

I have said thus much for the sake of the Arcadians and Messenians

themselves; that, remembering all the misfortunes which have befallen

their countries at the hands of the Lacedaemonians, they may cling

close to the policy of mutual affection and fidelity; and let no fear

of war, or desire of peace, induce them to abandon each other in what

affects the highest interests of both.

[Sidenote: Division of opinion in Sparta, B.C. 220.]

+34.+ In the matter of the commissioners from the allies, to go back to

my story, the behaviour of the Lacedaemonians was very characteristic.

For their own ill-considered and tortuous policy had placed them in

such a difficulty, that they finally dismissed them without an answer:

thus illustrating, as it seems to me, the truth of the saying, that,

“boldness pushed to extremes amounts to want of sense, and comes to

nothing.” Subsequently, however, on the appointment of new Ephors, the

party who had originally promoted the outbreak, and had been the causes

of the massacre, sent to the Aetolians to induce them to despatch an

ambassador to Sparta. The Aetolians gladly consented, and in a short

time Machatas arrived there in that capacity. Pressure was at once

put upon the Ephors to allow Machatas to address the people,[220] and

to re-establish royalty in accordance with the ancient constitution,

and not to allow the Heraclid dynasty to be any longer suppressed,

contrary to the laws. The Ephors were annoyed at the proposal, but

were unable to withstand the pressure, and afraid of a rising of the

younger men: they therefore answered that the question of restoring the

kings must be reserved for future consideration; but they consented to

grant Machatas an opportunity of addressing a public assembly. When

the people accordingly were met, Machatas came forward, and in a long

speech urged them to embrace the alliance with Aetolia; inveighing in

reckless and audacious terms against the Macedonians, while he went

beyond all reason and truth in his commendations of the Aetolians. Upon

his retirement, there was a long and animated debate between those who

supported the Aetolians and advised the adoption of their alliance, and

those who took the opposite side. When, however, some of the elders

reminded the people of the good services rendered them by Antigonus

and the Macedonians, and the injuries inflicted on them by Charixenus

and Timaeus,—when the Aetolians invaded them with their full force

and ravaged their territory, enslaved the neighbouring villages, and

laid a plot for attacking Sparta itself by a fraudulent and forcible

restoration of exiles,—these words produced a great revulsion of

feeling, and the people finally decided to maintain the alliance with

Philip and the Macedonians. Machatas accordingly had to go home without

attaining the object of his mission.

[Sidenote: Murder of the Ephors, B.C. 220.]

[Sidenote: Agesipolis appointed king,]

[Sidenote: B.C. 242.]

+35.+ The party, however, at Sparta who were the original of the

instigators of the outbreak could not make up their minds to give way.

They once more therefore determined to commit a crime of the most

impious description, having first corrupted some of the younger men.

It was an ancestral custom that, at a certain sacrifice, all citizens

of military age should join fully armed in a procession to the temple

of Athene of the Brazen-house, while the Ephors remained in the sacred

precinct and completed the sacrifice. As the young men therefore were

conducting the procession, some of them suddenly fell upon the Ephors,

while they were engaged with the sacrifice, and slew them. The enormity

of this crime will be made apparent by remembering that the sanctity

of this temple was such, that it gave a safe asylum even to criminals

condemned to death; whereas its privileges were now by the cruelty of

these audacious men treated with such contempt, that the whole of the

Ephors were butchered round the altar and the table of the goddess. In

pursuance of their purpose they next killed one of the elders, Gyridas,

and drove into exile those who had spoken against the Aetolians. They

then chose some of their own body as Ephors, and made an alliance

with the Aetolians. Their motives for doing all this, for incurring

the enmity of the Achaeans, for their ingratitude to the Macedonians,

and generally for their unjustifiable conduct towards all, was before

everything else their devotion to Cleomenes, and the hopes and

expectations they continued to cherish that he would return to Sparta

in safety. So true it is that men who have the tact to ingratiate

themselves with those who surround them can, even when far removed,

leave in their hearts very effective materials for kindling the flame

of a renewed popularity. This people for instance, to say nothing of

other examples, after nearly three years of constitutional government,

following the banishment of Cleomenes, without once thinking of

appointing kings at Sparta, no sooner heard of the death of Cleomenes

than they were eager—populace and Ephors alike—to restore kingly rule.

Accordingly the Ephors who were in sympathy with the conspirators, and

who had made the alliance with Aetolia which I just now mentioned, did

so. One of these kings so restored they appointed in accordance with

the regular and legal succession, namely Agesipolis. He was a child

at the time, a son of Agesipolis, and grandson of that Cleombrotus

who had become king, as the next of kin to this family, when Leonidas

was driven from office. As guardian of the young king they elected

Cleomenes, son of Cleombrotus and brother of Agesipolis.

[Sidenote: and Lycurgas.]

Of the other royal house there were surviving two sons of Archidamus,

son of Eudamidas, by the daughter of Hippodemon; as well as Hippodemon

himself, the son of Agesilaus, and several other members of the same

branch, though somewhat less closely connected than those I have

mentioned. But these were all passed over, and Lycurgus was appointed

king, none of whose ancestors had ever enjoyed that title. A present

of a talent to each of the Ephors made him “descendant of Hercules”

and king of Sparta. So true is it all the world over that such

nobility[221] is a mere question of a little money.

The result was that the penalty for their folly had to be paid, not

by the third generation, but by the very authors of this royalist

restoration.

[Sidenote: Spartans attack Argos, and proclaim war with the Achaeans.]

+36.+ When Machatas heard what had happened at Sparta, he returned

thither and urged the Ephors and kings to go to war with the Achaeans;

arguing that that was the only way of stopping the ambition of the

party in Sparta who were doing all they could to break up the alliance

with the Aetolians, or of the party in Aetolia who were co-operating

with them. Having obtained the consent of the Ephors and kings,

Machatas returned home with a success secured him by the blindness

of his partisans in Sparta; while Lycurgus with the army and certain

others of the citizens invaded the Argive territory, the inhabitants

being quite unprepared for an attack, owing to the existing settlement.

By a sudden assault he seized Polichna, Prasiae, Leucae, and Cyphanta,

but was repulsed at Glympes and Zarax. After these achievements of

their king, the Lacedaemonians proclaimed a licence of reprisal

against the Achaeans. With the Eleans also Machatas was successful in

persuading them, by the same arguments as he had used at Sparta, to go

to war with the Achaeans.

The unexpected success of these intrigues caused the Aetolians to enter

upon the war with high spirits. But it was quite the contrary with the

Achaeans: for Philip, on whom their hopes rested, was still busy with

his preparations; the Epirotes were hesitating about going to war, and

the Messenians were entirely passive; and meantime the Aetolians, aided

by the blind policy of the Eleans and Lacedaemonians, were threatening

them with actual war on every side.

[Sidenote: Aratus succeeded by his son as Strategus of the Achaeans,

May B.C. 219.]

[Sidenote: June-September. B.C. 219.]

+37.+ The year of Aratus’s office was just expiring, and his son Aratus

the younger had been elected to succeed him as Strategus, and was on

the point of taking over the office. Scopas was still Strategus of

the Aetolians, and in fact it was just about the middle of his year.

For the Aetolians hold their elections immediately after the autumn

equinox, while the Achaeans hold theirs about the time of the rising of

the Pleiads. As soon therefore as summer had well set in, and Aratus

the younger had taken over his office, all these wars at once began

simultaneously. Hannibal began besieging Saguntum; the Romans sent

Lucius Aemilius with an army to Illyria against Demetrius of Pharos,—of

both which I spoke in the last book; Antiochus, having had Ptolemais

and Tyre betrayed to him by Theodotus, meditated attacking Coele-Syria;

and Ptolemy was engaged in preparing for the war with Antiochus. While

Lycurgus, wishing to make a beginning after the pattern of Cleomenes,

pitched his camp near the Athenaeum of Megalopolis and was laying

siege to it: the Achaeans were collecting mercenary horse and foot for

the war which was upon them: and Philip, finally, was starting from

Macedonia with an army consisting of ten thousand heavy-armed soldiers

of the phalanx, five thousand light-armed, and eight hundred cavalry.

Such was the universal state of war or preparation for war.

[Sidenote: Rhodian and Byzantium war, 220-219 B.C.]

+38.+ At the same time the Rhodians went to war with the Byzantines,

for reasons which I must now describe.

[Sidenote: Advantages of the situation of Byzantium.]

As far as the sea is concerned, Byzantium occupies a position the

most secure and in every way the most advantageous of any town in our

quarter of the world: while in regard to the land, its situation is in

both respects the most unfavourable. By sea it so completely commands

the entrance to the Pontus, that no merchant can sail in or out against

its will. The Pontus therefore being rich in what the rest of the

world requires for the support of life, the Byzantines are absolute

masters of all such things. For those commodities which are the first

necessaries of existence, cattle and slaves, are confessedly supplied

by the districts round the Pontus in greater profusion, and of better

quality, than by any others: and for luxuries, they supply us with

honey, wax, and salt-fish in great abundance; while they take our

superfluous stock of olive oil and every kind of wine. In the matter

of corn there is a mutual interchange, they supplying or taking it as

it happens to be convenient. Now the Greeks would necessarily have

been excluded entirely from traffic in these articles, or at least

would have had to carry it on at a loss, if the Byzantines had adopted

a hostile attitude, and made common cause formerly with the Gauls, or

still more at this time with the Thracians, or had abandoned the place

altogether: for owing to the narrowness of the strait, and the number

of the barbarians along its shores, it would have become entirely

impassable to our ships. The Byzantines themselves probably feel the

advantages of the situation, in the supplies of the necessaries of

life, more than any one else; for their superfluity finds a ready

means of export, and what they lack is readily imported, with profit

to themselves, and without difficulty or danger: but other people too,

as I have said, get a great many commodities by their means. As common

benefactors therefore of all Greece they might justly expect, not only

gratitude, but the united assistance of Greeks, when threatened by the

barbarians.

But since the peculiar natural advantages of this site are generally

unknown, because it lies somewhat outside the parts of the world

ordinarily visited; and since it is an universal wish to be acquainted

with things of this sort, by ocular inspection, if possible, of such

places as have any unusual or remarkable features; or, if that is

impossible, by having in our minds some ideas or images of them as like

the truth as may be, I must now state the facts of the case, and what

it is that makes this city so eminently rich and prosperous.

[Sidenote: The Pontus.]

+39.+ The sea called “The Pontus” has a circumference of twenty-two

thousand stades, and two mouths diametrically opposite to each other,

the one opening into the Propontis and the other into the Maeotic Lake;

which latter also has itself a circumference of eight thousand stades.

Into these two basins many great rivers discharge themselves on the

Asiatic side, and still larger and more numerous on the European; and

so the Maeotic lake, as it gets filled up, flows into the Pontus, and

the Pontus into the Propontis. The mouth of the Maeotic lake is called

the Cimmerian Bosporus, about thirty stades broad and sixty long, and

shallow all over; that of the Pontus is called the Thracian Bosporus,

and is a hundred and twenty stades long, and of a varying breadth.

Between Calchedon and Byzantium the channel is fourteen stades broad,

and this is the entrance at the end nearest the Propontis. Coming from

the Pontus, it begins at a place called Hieron, at which they say

that Jason on his return voyage from Colchis first sacrificed to the

twelve gods. This place is on the Asiatic side, and its distance from

the European coast is twelve stades, measuring to Sarapieium, which

lies exactly opposite in Thrace. There are two causes which account

for the fact that the waters, both of the Maeotic lake and the Pontus,

continually flow outwards. One is patent at once to every observer,

namely, that by the continual discharge of many streams into basins

which are of definite circumference and content, the water necessarily

is continually increasing in bulk, and, had there been no outlet,

would inevitably have encroached more and more, and occupied an ever

enlarging area in the depression: but as outlets do exist, the surplus

water is carried off by a natural process, and runs perpetually through

the channels that are there to receive it. The second cause is the

alluvial soil brought down, in immense quantities of every description,

by the rivers swollen from heavy rains, which forms shelving banks and

continually forces the water to take a higher level, which is thus also

carried through these outlets. Now as this process of alluvial deposit

and influx of water is unceasing and continuous, so also the discharge

through the channels is necessarily unceasing and continuous.

These are the true causes of the outflow of the Pontus, which do

not depend for their credit on the stories of merchants, but upon

the actual observation of nature, which is the most accurate method

discoverable.

+40.+ As I have started this topic I must not, as most historians do,

leave any point undiscussed, or only barely stated. My object is rather

to give information, and to clear up doubtful points for my readers.

This is the peculiarity of the present day, in which every sea and land

has been thrown open to travellers; and in which, therefore, one can no

longer employ the evidence of poets and fabulists, as my predecessors

have done on very many points, “offering,” as Heraclitus says, “tainted

witnesses to disputed facts,”—but I must try to make my narrative in

itself carry conviction to my readers.

I say then the Pontus has long been in process of being filled up with

mud, and that this process is actually going on now: and further, that

in process of time both it and the Propontis, assuming the same local

conditions to be maintained, and the causes of the alluvial deposit to

continue active, will be entirely filled up. For time being infinite,

and the depressions most undoubtedly finite, it is plain that, even

though the amount of deposit be small, they must in course of time

be filled. For a finite process, whether of accretion or decrease,

must, if we presuppose infinite time, be eventually completed, however

infinitesimal its progressive stages may be. In the present instance

the amount of soil deposited being not small, but exceedingly large,

it is plain that the result I mentioned will not be remote but rapid.

And, in fact, it is evident that it is already taking place. The

Maeotic lake is already so much choked up, that the greater part of it

is only from seven to five fathoms deep, and accordingly cannot any

longer be passed by large ships without a pilot. And having moreover

been originally a sea precisely on a level with the Pontus, it is now a

freshwater lake: the sea-water has been expelled by the silting up of

the bottom, and the discharge of the rivers has entirely overpowered

it. The same will happen to the Pontus, and indeed is taking place at

this moment; and though it is not evident to ordinary observers, owing

to the vastness of its basin, yet a moderately attentive study will

discover even now what is going on.