+79.+ But after a careful inquiry as to what part of the road was

firm or boggy, Hannibal broke up his camp and marched out. He placed

the Libyans and Iberians and all his best soldiers in the van,

and the baggage within their lines, that there might be plenty of

provisions for their immediate needs. Provisions for the future he

entirely neglected. Because he calculated that on reaching the enemy’s

territory, if he were beaten he should not require them, and if he were

victorious he would find abundance in the open country. Behind this

vanguard he placed the Celts, and in the rear of all the cavalry. He

entrusted the command of the rear-guard to his brother Mago, that he

might see to the security of all, and especially to guard against the

cowardice and impatience of hard labour which characterised the Celts;

in order that, if the difficulty of the route should induce them to

turn back, he might intercept them by means of the cavalry and force

them to proceed. In point of fact, the Iberians and Libyans, having

great powers of endurance and being habituated to such fatigues, and

also because when they marched through them the marshes[186] were

fresh and untrodden, accomplished their march with a moderate amount

of distress: but the Celts advanced with great difficulty, because the

marshes were now disturbed and trodden into a deep morass: and being

quite unaccustomed to such painful labours, they bore the fatigue

with anger and impatience; but were hindered from turning back by the

cavalry in their rear. All however suffered grievously, especially

from the impossibility of getting sleep on a continuous march of four

days and three nights through a route which was under water: but none

suffered so much, or lost so many men, as the Celts. Most of his

beasts of burden also slipping in the mud fell and perished, and could

then only do the men one service: they sat upon their dead bodies,

and piling up baggage upon them so as to stand out above the water,

they managed to get a snatch of sleep[187] for a short portion of the

night. Another misfortune was that a considerable number of the horses

lost their hoofs by the prolonged march through bog. Hannibal himself

was with difficulty and much suffering got across riding on the only

elephant left alive, enduring great agony from a severe attack of

ophthalmia, by which he eventually lost the sight of one eye, because

the time and the difficulties of the situation did not admit of his

waiting or applying any treatment to it.

[Sidenote: Hannibal in the valley of the Arno.]

+80.+ Having crossed the marshes in this unexpected manner, Hannibal

found Flaminius in Etruria encamped under the walls of Arretium. For

the present he pitched his camp close to the marshes, to refresh his

army, and to investigate the plans of his enemies and the lie of the

country in his front. And being informed that the country before him

abounded in wealth, and that Flaminius was a mere mob-orator and

demagogue, with no ability for the actual conduct of military affairs,

and was moreover unreasonably confident in his resources; he calculated

that, if he passed his camp and made a descent into the district

beyond, partly for fear of popular reproach and partly from a personal

feeling of irritation, Flaminius would be unable to endure to watch

passively the devastation of the country, and would spontaneously

follow him wherever he went; and being eager to secure the credit of a

victory for himself, without waiting for the arrival of his colleague,

would give him many opportunities for an attack.

[Sidenote: Hannibal correctly judges the character of Flaminius.]

+81.+ And in making these calculations Hannibal showed his consummate

prudence and strategical ability. For it is mere blind ignorance to

believe that there can be anything of more vital importance to a

general than the knowledge of his opponent’s character and disposition.

As in combats between individuals or ranks, he who would conquer must

observe carefully how it is possible to attain his object, and what

part of his enemy appears unguarded or insufficiently armed,—so must

a commander of an army look out for the weak place, not in the body,

but in the mind of the leader of the hostile force. For it has often

happened before now that from mere idleness and lack of energy, men

have let not only the welfare of the state, but even their private

fortunes fall to ruin: some are so addicted to wine that they cannot

sleep without bemusing their intellects with drink; and others so

infatuated in their pursuit of sensual pleasures, that they have not

only been the ruin of their cities and fortunes, but have forfeited

life itself with disgrace. In the case of individuals, however,

cowardice and sloth bring shame only on themselves; but when it is a

commander-in-chief that is concerned, the disaster affects all alike

and is of the most fatal consequence. It not only infects the men under

him with an inactivity like his own; but it often brings absolute

dangers of the most serious description upon those who trust such a

general. For rashness, temerity, and uncalculating impetuosity, as well

as foolish ambition and vanity, give an easy victory to the enemy.

And are the source of numerous dangers to one’s friends: for a man

who is the prey of such weaknesses falls the easiest victim to every

stratagem, ambush or ruse. The general then who can gain a clear idea

of his opponent’s weaknesses, and direct his attack on the point where

he is most open to it, will very soon be the victor in the campaign.

For as a ship, if you deprive it of its steerer, falls with all its

crew into the hands of the enemy; so, in the case of an army in war, if

you outwit or out-manœuvre its general, the whole will often fall into

your hands.

[Sidenote: Flaminius is drawn out of camp.]

+82.+ Nor was Hannibal mistaken in his calculations in regard to

Flaminius. For no sooner had he left the neighbourhood of Faesulae,

and, advancing a short way beyond the Roman camp, made a raid upon

the neighbouring country, than Flaminius became excited, and enraged

at the idea that he was despised by the enemy: and as the devastation

of the country went on, and he saw from the smoke that rose in every

direction that the work of destruction was proceeding, he could not

patiently endure the sight. Some of his officers advised that they

should not follow the enemy at once nor engage him, but should act

on the defensive, in view of his great superiority in cavalry; and

especially that they should wait for the other Consul, and not give

battle until the two armies were combined. But Flaminius, far from

listening to their advice, was indignant at those who offered it; and

bade them consider what the people at home would say at the country

being laid waste almost up to the walls of Rome itself, while they

remained encamped in Etruria on the enemy’s rear. Finally, with these

words, he set his army in motion, without any settled plan of time or

place; but bent only on falling in with the enemy, as though certain

victory awaited him. For he had managed to inspire the people with such

confident expectations, that the unarmed citizens who followed his camp

in hope of booty, bringing chains and fetters and all such gear, were

more numerous than the soldiers themselves.

Meanwhile Hannibal was advancing on his way to Rome through Etruria,

keeping the city of Cortona and its hills on his left, and the

Thrasymene lake on his right; and as he marched, he burned and

wasted the country with a view of rousing the wrath of the enemy and

tempting him to come out. And when he saw Flaminius get well within

distance, and observed that the ground he then occupied was suited to

his purpose, he bent his whole energies on preparing for a general

engagement.

[Sidenote: The ambuscade at Lake Thrasymene.]

+83.+ The route which he was following led through a low valley

enclosed on both sides by long lines of lofty hills. Of its two ends,

that in front was blocked by an abrupt and inaccessible hill, and that

on the rear by the lake, between which and the foot of the cliff there

is only a very narrow defile leading into this valley. Making his way

to the end of the valley along the bank of the lake, Hannibal posted

himself with the Spanish and Libyan troops on the hill immediately in

front of him as he marched, and pitched a camp on it; but sent his

Balearic slingers and light-armed troops by a détour, and stationed

them in extended order under the cover of the hills to the right of the

valley; and by a similar détour placed the Gauls and cavalry under the

cover of hills to the left, causing them also to extend their line so

far as to cover the entrance of the defile running between the cliff

and lake into the valley.[188]

Having made these preparations during the night, and having thus

enclosed the valley with ambuscades, Hannibal remained quiet. In

pursuit of him came Flaminius, in hot haste to close with the enemy. It

was late in the evening before he pitched his camp on the border of the

lake; and at daybreak next morning, just before the morning watch, he

led his front maniples forward along the borders of the lake into the

valley with a view of engaging the enemy.

[Sidenote: The battle, 22d June.]

+84.+ The day was exceedingly misty: and as soon as the greater part

of the Roman line was in the valley, and the leading maniples were

getting close to him, Hannibal gave the signal for attack; and at the

same time sent orders to the troops lying in ambush on the hills to do

the same, and thus delivered an assault upon the enemy at every point

at once. Flaminius was taken completely by surprise: the mist was so

thick, and the enemy were charging down from the upper ground at so

many points at once, that not only were the Centurions and Tribunes

unable to relieve any part of the line that was in difficulties, but

were not even able to get any clear idea of what was going on: for

they were attacked simultaneously on front, rear, and both flanks.

The result was that most of them were cut down in the order of march,

without being able to defend themselves: exactly as though they had

been actually given up to slaughter by the folly of their leader.

Flaminius himself, in a state of the utmost distress and despair,

was attacked and killed by a company of Celts. As many as fifteen

thousand Romans fell in the valley, who could neither yield nor defend

themselves, being habituated to regard it as their supreme duty not

to fly or quit their ranks. But those who were caught in the defile

between the lake and the cliff perished in a shameful, or rather a

most miserable, manner: for being thrust into the lake, some in their

frantic terror endeavoured to swim with their armour on, and presently

sank and were drowned; while the greater number, wading as far as they

could into the lake, remained there with their heads above water; and

when the cavalry rode in after them, and certain death stared them in

the face, they raised their hands and begged for quarter, offering to

surrender, and using every imaginary appeal for mercy; but were finally

despatched by the enemy, or, in some cases, begged the favour of the

fatal blow from their friends, or inflicted it on themselves. A number

of men, however, amounting perhaps to six thousand, who were in the

valley, defeated the enemy immediately in front of them; but though

they might have done much to retrieve the fortune of the day, they

were unable to go to the relief of their comrades, or get to the rear

of their opponents, because they could not see what was going on. They

accordingly pushed on continually to the front, always expecting to

find themselves engaged with some of the enemy: until they discovered

that, without noticing it, they were issuing upon the higher ground.

But when they were on the crest of the hills, the mist broke and they

saw clearly the disaster which had befallen them; and being no longer

able to do any good, since the enemy was victorious all along the line,

and in complete possession of the ground, they closed their ranks and

made for a certain Etrurian village. After the battle Maharbal was sent

by Hannibal with the Iberians and light-armed troops to besiege the

village; and seeing themselves surrounded by a complication of dangers,

they laid down their arms and surrendered on condition of their lives

being spared. Such was the end of the final engagement between the

Romans and Carthaginians in Etruria.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s treatment of prisoners.]

+85.+ When the prisoners who had surrendered on terms were with the

other prisoners brought to Hannibal, he had them all collected together

to the number of more than fifteen thousand, and began by saying that

Maharbal had no authority to grant them their lives without consulting

him. He then launched out into an invective against Rome: and when he

had finished that, he distributed all the prisoners who were Romans

among the companies of his army to be held in safe keeping; but allowed

all the allies to depart without ransom to their own country, with

the same remark as he had made before, that “he was not come to fight

against Italians, but in behalf of Italians against Rome.” He then gave

his army time to refresh themselves after their fatigue, and buried

those of highest rank who had fallen in his army, amounting to about

thirty; the total number of his loss being fifteen hundred, most of

whom were Celts. He then began considering, in conjunction with his

brother and friends, where and how he should continue his attack, for

he now felt confident of ultimate success.

[Sidenote: Dismay at Rome.]

When the news of this disaster reached Rome, the chief men of the state

could not, in view of the gravity of the blow, conceal its extent or

soften it down, but were forced to assemble the people and tell them

the truth. When the Praetor, therefore, from the Rostra said, “We have

been beaten in a great battle,” there was such a consternation, that

those who had been present at the battle as well as at this meeting,

felt the disaster to be graver than when they were on the field of

battle itself. And this feeling of the people was not to be wondered

at. For many years they had been unaccustomed to the word or the fact

of defeat, and they could not now endure reverse with patience or

dignity. The Senate, however, rose to the occasion, and held protracted

debates and consultations as to the future, anxiously considering what

it was the duty of all classes to do, and how they were to do it.

[Sidenote: Servilius’s advanced guard cut to pieces.]

+86.+ About the same time as the battle of Thrasymene, the Consul

Gnaeus Servilius, who had been stationed on duty at Ariminum,—which is

on the coast of the Adriatic, where the plains of Cis-Alpine Gaul join

the rest of Italy, not far from the mouths of the Padus,—having heard

that Hannibal had entered Etruria and was encamped near Flaminius,

designed to join the latter with his whole army. But finding himself

hampered by the difficulty of transporting so heavy a force, he sent

Gaius Centenius forward in haste with four thousand horse, intending

that he should be there before himself in case of need. But Hannibal,

getting early intelligence after the battle of Thrasymene of this

reinforcement of the enemy, sent Maharbal with his light-armed troops,

and a detachment of cavalry, who falling in with Gaius, killed nearly

half his men at the first encounter; and having pursued the remainder

to a certain hill, on the very next day took them all prisoners. The

news of the battle of Thrasymene was three days’ old at Rome, and

the sorrow caused by it was, so to speak, at its hottest, when this

further disaster was announced. The consternation caused by it was no

longer confined to the people. The Senate now fully shared in it; and

it was resolved that the usual annual arrangements for the election of

magistrates should be suspended, and a more radical remedy be sought

for the present dangers; for they came to the conclusion that their

affairs were in such a state, as to require a commander with absolute

powers.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s advance after the battle.]

Feeling now entirely confident of success, Hannibal rejected the

idea of approaching Rome for the present; but traversed the country

plundering it without resistance, and directing his march towards the

coast of the Adriatic. Having passed through Umbria and Picenum, he

came upon the coast after a ten days’ march with such enormous booty,

that the army could neither drive nor carry all the wealth which they

had taken, and after killing a large number of people on his road.

For the order was given, usual in the storming of cities, to kill all

adults who came in their way: an order which Hannibal was prompted to

give now by his deep-seated hatred of Rome.[189]

+87.+ Pitching his camp on the shore of the Adriatic, in a district

extraordinarily rich in every kind of produce, he took great pains to

refresh his men and restore their health, and no less so that of the

horses. For the cold and squalor of a winter spent in Gallia Cis-Alpina

without the protection of a roof, and then the painful march through

the marshes, had brought upon most of the horses, and the men as well,

an attack of scurvy and all its consequences. Having therefore now got

possession of a rich country, he got his horses into condition again,

and restored the bodies and spirits of his soldiers; and made the

Libyans change their own for Roman arms selected for the purpose, which

he could easily do from being possessed of so many sets stripped from

the bodies of the enemy. He now sent messengers, too, to Carthage by

sea, to report what had taken place, for this was the first time he had

reached the sea since he entered Italy. The Carthaginians were greatly

rejoiced at the news: and took measures with enthusiasm for forwarding

supplies to their armies, both in Iberia and Italy.

[Sidenote: Q. Fabius Maximus Dictator.]

Meanwhile the Romans had appointed Quintus Fabius Dictator,[190] a

man distinguished no less for his wisdom than his high birth; as is

still commemorated by the fact that the members of his family are even

now called _Maximi_, that is “Greatest,” in honour of his successful

achievements. A Dictator differs from the Consuls in this, that each

Consul is followed by twelve lictors, the Dictator by twenty-four.

Again, the Consuls have frequently to refer to the Senate to enable

them to carry out their proposed plans, but the Dictator is absolute,

and when he is appointed all other magistrates in Rome are at once

deprived of power, except the Tribunes of the People.[191] I shall,

however, take another opportunity of speaking in more detail about

these officers. With the Dictator they appointed Marcus Minucius master

of the horse; this is an officer under the Dictator, and takes his

place when engaged elsewhere.

+88.+ Though Hannibal shifted his quarters from time to time for short

distances in one direction or another, he remained in the neighbourhood

of the Adriatic; and by bathing his horses with old wine, of which he

had a great store, cured them of the scab and got them into condition

again. By a similar treatment he cured his men of their wounds, and got

the others into a sound state of health and spirits for the service

before them. After traversing with fire and sword the territories

of Praetutia,[192] Hadriana, Marrucina, and Frentana, he started on

his road to Iapygia. This district is divided among three peoples,

each with a district name, Daunii [Peucetii], and Messapii. Hannibal

first invaded the territory of the Daunii, beginning from Luceria, a

Roman colony, and laid the country waste. He next encamped near Vibo,

and overran the territory of Arpi, and plundered all Daunia without

resistance.

[Sidenote: Fabius takes the command.]

Meanwhile Fabius, after offering the usual sacrifice to the gods

upon his appointment, started with his master of the horse and four

legions which had been enrolled for the purpose; and having effected a

junction near Daunia with the troops that had come to the rescue from

Ariminum, he relieved Gnaeus of his command on shore and sent him with

an escort to Rome, with orders to be ready with help for any emergency,

in case the Carthaginians made any movement by sea. Fabius himself,

with his master of the horse, took over the command of the whole army

and pitched his camp opposite the Carthaginians, near a place called

Aecae,[193] about six miles from the enemy.

[Sidenote: Cunctator.]

+89.+ When Hannibal learnt that Fabius had arrived, he determined to

terrify the enemy by promptly attacking. He therefore led out his

army, approached the Roman camp, and there drew up his men in order of

battle; but when he had waited some time, and nobody came out to attack

him, he drew off and retired to his own camp. For Fabius, having made

up his mind to incur no danger and not to risk a battle, but to make

the safety of his men his first and greatest object, kept resolutely

to this purpose. At first he was despised for it, and gave rise to

scandalous insinuations that he was an utter coward and dared not face

an engagement: but in course of time he compelled everybody to confess

and allow that it was impossible for any one to have acted, in the

existing circumstances, with greater discretion and prudence. And it

was not long before facts testified to the wisdom of his policy. Nor

was it wonderful that it was so. For the forces of his opponents had

been trained from their earliest youth without intermission in war;

had a general who had grown up with them and from childhood had been

instructed in the arts of the camp; had won many battles in Iberia,

and twice running had beaten the Romans and their allies: and, what

was more than all, had thoroughly made up their minds that their one

hope of safety was in victory. In every respect the circumstances of

the Roman army were the exact opposite of these; and therefore, their

manifest inferiority making it impossible for Fabius to offer the enemy

battle, he fell back upon those resources in which the Romans had the

advantage of the enemy; clung to them; and conducted the war by their

means: and they were—an inexhaustible supply of provisions and of men.

[Sidenote: Minucius discontented.]

+90.+ He, then, during the following months, kept his army continually

hovering in the neighbourhood of the enemy, his superior knowledge

of the country enabling him to occupy beforehand all the posts of

vantage; and having supplies in abundance on his rear, he never allowed

his soldiers to go on foraging expeditions, or get separated, on any

pretence, from the camp; but keeping them continually massed together

and in close union, he watched for favourable opportunities of time

and place; and by this method of proceeding captured and killed a

large number of the enemy, who in their contempt of him straggled from

their camp in search of plunder. His object in these manœuvres was

twofold,—to gradually diminish the limited numbers of the enemy: and

to strengthen and renew by such successes in detail the spirits of his

own men, which had been depressed, to begin with, by the general defeat

of their armies. But nothing would induce him to agree to give his

enemy a set battle. This policy however was by no means approved of by

his master of the horse, Marcus. He joined in the general verdict, and

decried Fabius in every one’s hearing, as conducting his command in a

cowardly and unenterprising spirit; and was himself eager to venture

upon a decisive engagement.

[Sidenote: Hannibal in Samnium and Apulia.]

Meanwhile the Carthaginians, after wasting these districts, crossed

the Apennines; and descending upon Samnium, which was rich and had

been free from war for many years past, found themselves in possession

of such an abundance of provisions, that they could get rid of

them neither by use nor waste. They overran also the territory of

Beneventum, which was a Roman colony; and took the town of Venusia,

which was unwalled and richly furnished with every kind of property.

All this time the Romans were following on his rear, keeping one or

two days’ march behind him, but never venturing to approach or engage

the enemy. Accordingly, when Hannibal saw that Fabius plainly meant to

decline a battle, but yet would not abandon the country altogether, he

formed the bold resolution of penetrating to the plains round Capua;

and actually did so as far as Falernum, convinced that thereby he

should do one of two things,—force the enemy to give him battle, or

make it evident to all that the victory was his, and that the Romans

had abandoned the country to him. This he hoped would strike terror

into the various cities, and cause them to be eager to revolt from

Rome. For up to that time, though the Romans had been beaten in two

battles, not a single city in Italy had revolted to the Carthaginians;

but all maintained their fidelity, although some of them were suffering

severely;—a fact which may show us the awe and respect which the

Republic had inspired in its allies.

+91.+ Hannibal, however, had not adopted this plan without good reason.

For the plains about Capua are the best in Italy for fertility and

beauty and proximity to the sea, and for the commercial harbours, into

which merchants run who are sailing to Italy from nearly all parts of

the world. They contain, moreover, the most famous and beautiful cities

of Italy. On its seaboard are Sinuessa, Cumae, Puteoli, Naples, and

Nuceria; and inland to the north there are Cales and Teanum, to the

east and south [Caudium[194]] and Nola. In the centre of these plains

lies the richest of all the cities, that of Capua. No tale in all

mythology wears a greater appearance of probability than that which

is told of these, which, like others remarkable for their beauty, are

called the Phlegraean plains; for surely none are more likely for

beauty and fertility to have been contended for by gods. In addition to

these advantages, they are strongly protected by nature and difficult

of approach; for one side is protected by the sea, and the rest by a

long and high chain of mountains, through which there are but three

passes from the interior, narrow and difficult, one from Samnium [a

second from Latium[195]] and a third from Hirpini. So that if the

Carthaginians succeeded in fixing their quarters in these plains, they

would have the advantage of a kind of theatre, in which to display

the terrors of their power before the gaze of all Italy; and would

make a spectacle also of the cowardice of their enemies in shrinking

from giving them battle, while they themselves would be proved beyond

dispute to be masters of the country.

[Sidenote: Hannibal descends into the Falernian plain.]

+92.+ With this view Hannibal crossed from Samnium by the pass of the

hill called Eribianus,[196] and encamped on the bank of the river

Vulturnus, which almost divides these plains in half. His camp was on

the side of the river towards Rome, but he overran the whole plain with

foraging parties. Though utterly aghast at the audacity of the enemy’s

proceedings, Fabius stuck all the more firmly to the policy upon which

he had determined. But his colleague Minucius, and all the centurions

and tribunes of the army, thinking that they had caught the enemy in an

excellent trap, were of opinion that they should make all haste into

the plains, and not allow the most splendid part of the country to be

devastated. Until they reached the spot, Fabius hurried on, and feigned

to share their eager and adventurous spirit; and, when he was near

the ager Falernus, he showed himself on the mountain skirts and kept

in a line with the enemy, that he might not be thought by the allies

to abandon the country: but he would not let his army descend into

the plain, being still unwilling to risk a general engagement, partly

for the same reasons as before, and partly because the enemy were

conspicuously superior in cavalry.

[Sidenote: Fabius lies in wait.]

After trying to provoke his enemies, and collecting an unlimited

amount of booty by laying waste the whole plain, Hannibal began taking

measures for removing: wishing not to waste his booty, but to stow it

in some safe place, which he might also make his winter quarters; that

the army might not only be well off for the present, but might have

abundant supplies all through the winter. Fabius, learning that he

meditated returning the same way as he came, and seeing that the pass

was a narrow one, and extremely well suited for an attack by ambush,

placed about four thousand men at the exact spot that he would have to

pass; while he, with the main body of his troops, encamped on a hill

which commanded the entrance of the pass.

[Sidenote: Hannibal eludes him.]

+93.+ Fabius hoped when the Carthaginians came thither, and encamped on

the plain immediately under the foot of the hill, that he would be able

to snatch away their plunder without any risk to himself; and, most of

all, might even put an end to the whole war by means of the excellent

situation for an attack in which he now was. He was accordingly wholly

intent on forming plans for this purpose, anxiously considering in what

direction and in what manner he should avail himself of the advantages

of the ground, and which of his men were to be the first to attack

the enemy. Whilst his enemies were making these preparations for the

next day, Hannibal, guessing the truth, took care to give them no time

or leisure for executing their design; but summoning Hasdrubal, the

captain of his pioneers, ordered him, with all speed, to make as many

fagots of dry wood of all sorts as possible, and selecting two thousand

of the strongest of the working oxen from the booty, to collect them

outside the camp. When this was done, he summoned the pioneers, and

pointed out to them a certain ridge lying between the camp and the

gorge by which he meant to march. To this ridge they were to drive the

oxen, when the order was given, as actively and energetically as they

could, until they came to the top. Having given these instructions, he

bade them take their supper and go to rest betimes. Towards the end

of the third watch of the night he led the pioneers out of the camp,

and ordered them to tie the fagots to the horns of the oxen. The men

being numerous, this did not take long to do; and he then ordered them

to set the fagots all alight, and to drive the oxen off and force them

to mount the ridge; and placing his light-armed troops behind them he

ordered them to assist the drivers up to a certain distance: but, as

soon as the beasts had got well started, to take open order and pass

them at the double, and, with as much noise as possible, make for the

top of the ridge; that, if they found any of the enemy there, they

might close with and attack them at once. At the same time he himself

led the main army towards the narrow gorge of the pass,—his heavy-armed

men in front, next to them the cavalry, then the booty, and the

Iberians and Celts bringing up the rear.

+94.+ The Romans who were guarding the gorge, no sooner saw these

fiery fagots advancing to the heights, than, quitting the narrow part

of the pass, they made for the ridge to meet the enemy. But when they

got near the oxen, they were puzzled by the lights, imagining them

to be something more dangerous than they really were; and when the

Carthaginian light-armed troops came on to the ground, after some

slight skirmishing between the two parties, upon the oxen rushing in

among them, they separated and took up their positions on different

heights and waited for daybreak, not being able to comprehend what was

taking place.

[Sidenote: Hannibal gets through the pass. Autumn, B.C. 217.]

Partly because he was at a loss to understand what was happening, and,

in the words of the poet, “some deep design suspecting;”[197] and

partly that, in accordance with his original plan, he was determined

not to risk a general engagement, Fabius remained quietly within his

camp: while Hannibal, finding everything going as he designed, led his

army and booty in safety through the gorge, the men who had been set to

guard the narrow road having abandoned their post. At daybreak, seeing

the two troops fronting each other on the heights, he sent some Iberian

companies to the light-armed troops, who engaged the Romans, and,

killing a thousand of them, easily relieved his own light-armed troops

and brought them down to the main body.

[Sidenote: Fabius goes to Rome, leaving the command to M. Minucius.]

Having thus effected his departure from the Falernian plain, Hannibal

thenceforth busied himself in looking out for a place in which to

winter, and in making the necessary preparations, after having inspired

the utmost alarm and uncertainty in the cities and inhabitants of Italy.

Though Fabius meanwhile was in great disrepute among the common people,

for having let his enemy escape from such a trap, he nevertheless

refused to abandon his policy; and being shortly afterwards obliged to

go to Rome to perform certain sacrifices, he handed over the command of

his legions to his master of the horse, with many parting injunctions,

not to be so anxious to inflict a blow upon the enemy, as to avoid

receiving one himself. Marcus, however, paid no heed to the advice,

and, even while Fabius was speaking, had wholly resolved to risk a

general engagement.

[Sidenote: Spain, B.C. 217.]

+95.+ While these things were going on in Italy, Hasdrubal, who was in

command in Iberia, having during the winter repaired the thirty ships

left him by his brother, and manned ten additional ones, got a fleet of

forty decked vessels to sea, at the beginning of the summer, from New

Carthage, under the command of Hamilcar; and at the same time collected

his land forces, and led them out of their winter quarters. The fleet

coasted up the country, and the troops marched along the shore towards

the Iber. Suspecting their design, Gnaeus Scipio was for issuing from

his winter quarters and meeting them both by land and sea. But hearing

of the number of their troops, and the great scale on which their

preparations had been made, he gave up the idea of meeting them by

land; and manning thirty-five ships, and taking on board the best men

he could get from his land forces to serve as marines, he put to sea,

and arrived on the second day near the mouth of the Iber. Here he came

to anchor, at a distance of about ten miles from the enemy, and sent

two swift-sailing Massilian vessels to reconnoitre. For the sailors of

Marseilles were the first in every service of difficulty and danger,

and ready at the shortest notice to do whatever was required of them;

and, in fact, Marseilles has distinguished itself above all other

places, before and since, in fidelity to Rome, and never more so than

in the Hannibalian war. The ships sent to reconnoitre having reported

that the enemy’s fleet was lying off the mouth of the Iber, Scipio put

to sea with all speed, wishing to surprise them.

[Sidenote: Roman success at sea.]

+96.+ But being informed in good time by his look-out men that the

enemy were bearing down upon him, Hasdrubal drew up his troops on the

beach, and ordered his crews to go on board; and, when the Romans hove

in sight, gave the signal for the attack, determined to fight the

enemy at sea. But, after engaging, the Carthaginians made but a short

struggle for victory, and very soon gave way. For the support of the

troops on the beach did less service in encouraging them to attack,

than harm in offering them a safe place of retreat. Accordingly,

after losing two ships with their crews, and the oars and marines of

four others, they gave way and made for the land; and when the Romans

pressed on with spirit in pursuit, they ran their ships ashore, and

leaping from the vessels fled for refuge to the troops. The Romans

came boldly close to land, towed off such of the vessels as could be

got afloat, and sailed away in great exultation at having beaten the

enemy at the first blow, secured the mastery of the sea, and taken

twenty-five of the enemy’s ships.

In Iberia therefore, after this victory, the Roman prospects had begun

to brighten. But when news of this reverse arrived at Carthage, the

Carthaginians at once despatched a fleet of seventy ships, judging it

to be essential to their whole design that they should command the

sea. These ships touched first at Sardinia and then at Pisae in Italy,

the commanders believing that they should find Hannibal there. But

the Romans at once put to sea to attack them from Rome itself, with

a fleet of a hundred and twenty quinqueremes; and hearing of this

expedition against them, the Carthaginians sailed back to Sardinia, and

thence returned to Carthage. Gnaeus Servilius, who was in command of

this Roman fleet, followed the Carthaginians for a certain distance,

believing that he should fall in with them; but, finding that he was

far behind, he gave up the attempt. He first put in at Lilybaeum, and

afterwards sailed to the Libyan island of Cercina; and after receiving

a sum of money from the inhabitants on condition of not laying waste

the country, he departed. On his return voyage he took the island of

Cossyrus, and having put a garrison into its small capital, returned to

Lilybaeum. There he placed the fleet, and shortly afterwards went off

himself to join the land army.

[Sidenote: Publius Scipio, whose imperium is prolonged after his

Consulship of the previous year, with Spain assigned as his province,

is sent to join his brother there with 20 ships: early in B.C. 217.]

+97.+ When the Senate heard of Gnaeus Scipio’s naval success, believing

it to be advantageous or rather essential not to relax their hold on

Iberia, but to press on the war there against Carthage with redoubled

vigour, they prepared a fleet of twenty ships, and put them under the

command of Publius Scipio; and in accordance with arrangements already

made, despatched him with all speed to join his brother Gnaeus, and

carry on the Iberian campaign in conjunction with him. Their great

anxiety was lest the Carthaginians should get the upper hand in Iberia,

and thus possessing themselves of abundant supplies and recruits,

should get a more complete mastery of the sea, and assist the invasion

of Italy, by sending troops and money to Hannibal. Regarding therefore

the Iberian war as of the utmost importance, they sent these ships

and Publius Scipio to that country; who, when he arrived in Iberia,

effected a junction with his brother and did most substantial service

to the State. For up to that time the Romans had not ventured to cross

the Iber; but had thought themselves fortunate if they could secure the

friendship and allies of the tribes up to that river. They now however

did cross it, and for the first time had the courage to attempt a

movement on the other side: their designs being greatly favoured also

by an accidental circumstance.

When the two brothers, after overawing the Iberian tribes that lived

near the passage of the Iber, had arrived before the city of Saguntum,

they pitched their camp about forty stades from it, near the temple of

Aphrodite, selecting the position as offering at once security from the

attacks of the enemy, and a means of getting supplies by sea: for their

fleet was coasting down parallel with them.

[Sidenote: Treason of Abilyx.]

+98.+ Here an event occurred which produced a decisive change in their

favour. When Hannibal was about to start for Italy, from the Iberian

towns whose loyalty he suspected he took the sons of their leading men

as hostages, and placed them all in Saguntum, because of the strength

of that town and his confidence in the fidelity of those who were left

in charge of it. Now there was a certain Iberian there named Abilyx,

who enjoyed the highest character and reputation with his countrymen,

and was believed to be especially well disposed and loyal to the

Carthaginians. Seeing how affairs were going, and believing that the

fortune of the Romans was in the ascendant, he formed in his own mind a

scheme, worthy of an Iberian and barbarian, for giving up the hostages.

Convinced that he might obtain a high place in the favour of Rome, if

he gave a proof of his fidelity at a critical moment, he made up his

mind to turn traitor to Carthage and put the hostages in the hands

of the Romans. He began his machinations by addressing himself to

Bostar, the Carthaginian general who had been despatched by Hasdrubal

to prevent the Romans from crossing the river, but, not venturing to

do this, had retreated, and was now encamped in the region of Saguntum

next the sea. To this man, who was of a guileless and gentle character,

and quite disposed to trust him, Abilyx now introduced the subject of

the hostages. He argued that “the Romans having now crossed the Iber,

the Carthaginians could no longer hold Iberia by terror, but stood

now in need of the good feeling of their subjects: seeing then that

the Romans had actually approached Saguntum and were besieging it,

and that the city was in danger,—if he were to take the hostages and

restore them to their parents and cities, he would not only frustrate

the ambitious scheme of the Romans, who wished above all things by

getting possession of the hostages to have the credit of doing this;

but would also rouse a feeling of goodwill towards Carthage in all

the cities, for having taken thought for the future and provided for

the safety of the hostages. He would, too, much enhance the favour by

personally managing this business: for if he restored these boys to

their homes, he would provoke the gratitude, not only of their parents,

but of the people at large also, by giving a striking instance of

the magnanimous policy of Carthage towards her allies. He might even

expect large rewards for himself from the families that recovered their

children; for all those, who thus unexpectedly got into their hands

the dearest objects of their affection, would vie with each other in

heaping favours on the author of such a service.” By these and similar

arguments he persuaded Bostar to fall in with his proposals.

+99.+ Abilyx then went away, after arranging a fixed day on which he

would appear with everything necessary for conveying the boys. At

night he made his way to the Roman lines, and, having fallen in with

some Iberians serving in the Roman army, was by them conducted to

the generals; to whom he discoursed at great length on the revulsion

of feeling of the Iberians in their favour, which would be caused

if they got possession of the hostages: and finally offered to put

the boys in their hands. Publius Scipio received the proposal with

extreme eagerness: and, promising him large rewards, he agreed with

him on a day, hour, and place at which a party were to be waiting to

receive him. After returning home, Abilyx next went with a band of

chosen friends to Bostar; and, after receiving the boys, left the camp

at night, as though he wished not to be seen by the Roman camp as he

passed it, and came at the appointed time to the place arranged, and

there handed over all the boys to the Roman officers. Publius treated

Abilyx with special honour, and employed him in restoring the boys

to their native cities, along with certain of his own friends. He

accordingly went from city to city, giving them a visible proof by

the restoration of the boys of the Roman mildness and magnanimity, in

contrast to the Carthaginian suspiciousness and harshness; and bidding

them also observe that he had found it necessary to change sides, he

induced many Iberians to join the Roman alliance. Bostar was thought,

in thus surrendering the hostages to the enemy, to have behaved more

like a child than became a man of his age, and was in serious danger

of his life. For the present, however, as it was getting late in the

season, both sides began dispersing into winter quarters; the Romans

having made an important step towards success in the matter of the boys.

[Sidenote: Hannibal takes Geronium.]

+100.+ Such was the position of affairs in Iberia. To return to

Hannibal, whom we left having just effected the passage from the

Falernian plain. Hearing from his scouts that there was abundance of

corn in the district round Luceria and Geronium, and that Geronium

was an excellent place to store it in, he determined to make his

winter quarters there; and accordingly marched thither by way of Mount

Liburnum. And having come to Geronium, which is about two hundred

stades from Luceria, he first endeavoured to win over the inhabitants

by promises, offering them pledges of his good faith; but when no one

would listen to him, he determined to lay siege to the town. Having

taken it without much delay, he put the inhabitants to the sword;

but preserved most of the houses and walls, because he wished to use

them as granaries for his winter camp: and having encamped his army

in front of it, he fortified his position with trench and palisade.

Having finished these labours, he sent out two-thirds of the army to

collect corn, with orders to bring home every day, each division for

the use of its own men, as much as the regular heads of this department

would usually supply: while with the remaining third of his army he

kept watch over his camp, and occupied certain places with a view

of protecting the foraging parties in case they were attacked. The

district being mostly very accessible and flat, and the harvesting

party being almost innumerable, and the season moreover being at the

very best stage for such operations, the amount of corn collected every

day was very great.

[Sidenote: Minucius obtains a slight success. Autumn B.C. 217.]

+101.+ When Minucius took over the command from Fabius, he at first

kept along the line of hills, feeling certain that he would sooner

or later fall in with the Carthaginians; but when he heard that

Hannibal had already taken Geronium, and was collecting the corn of

the country, and had pitched his camp in front of the town, he changed

the direction of his march, and descended from the top of the hills by

way of a ridge leading down into the plains. Arriving at the height

which lies in the territory of Larinum, and is called Calena, he

encamped round its foot, being eager on any terms whatever to engage

the enemy. When Hannibal saw the enemy approaching, he sent a third of

his army foraging for corn, but took the other two-thirds with him,

and, advancing sixteen stades from Geronium towards the enemy, pitched

a camp upon a piece of rising ground, with a view at once of overawing

his opponents, and affording safety to his foraging parties: and there

being another elevation between him and the two armies, which was near,

and conveniently placed for an attack upon the enemy’s lines, he sent

out about two thousand light-armed troops in the night and seized it.

At daybreak when Minucius saw these men, he took his own light-armed

troops and assaulted the hill. After a gallant skirmish the Romans

prevailed; and subsequently their whole camp was transferred to this

place. For a certain time Hannibal kept his men for the most part

within their lines, because the camps were so close to each other; but,

after the lapse of some days, he was obliged to divide them into two

parties, one for pasturing the animals, and one for gathering corn:

being very anxious to carry out his design of avoiding the destruction

of his booty, and of collecting as much corn as possible, that his men

might have abundant food during the winter, and his horses and beasts

of burden as much so; for the chief hope of his army rested on his

cavalry.

[Sidenote: Carthaginian foragers cut off.]

+102.+ It was then that Minucius, seeing the great part of the enemy

scattered about the country on these services, selected the exact hour

of the day when they would be away to lead out his army. Having come

close to the Carthaginian lines he drew out his heavy-armed troops

there; and then, dividing his cavalry and light-armed into detachments,

sent them in search of the foragers, ordering them to give no quarter.

This put Hannibal into a great difficulty: for he was not strong

enough to accept battle with the enemy drawn up outside his lines, or

to relieve those of his men who were scattered about the country. The

Romans meanwhile who had been sent to take the foragers found a great

number of them scattered about, and killed them; while the troops

drawn up in front of the camp grew so contemptuous of the enemy, that

they even began to pull down their palisade, and all but assaulted

the Carthaginians. Hannibal was in a very dangerous position: but in

spite of the storm that had suddenly fallen on him, he held his ground,

repulsing the enemy when they approached and defending, though with

difficulty, the rampart; until Hasdrubal came to his relief with about

four thousand of the foraging parties, who had fled for refuge from the

country and collected within the lines near Geronium. This encouraged

Hannibal to make a sally: and having got into order of battle a short

distance from the camp, he just managed with difficulty to avert the

threatened danger. After killing large numbers of the enemy in the

struggle at the camp, and still more in the open country, Minucius for

the present retired, but with great hopes for the future; and on the

morrow, the Carthaginians having abandoned their lines on the hill, he

went up and occupied their position. For Hannibal being alarmed lest

the Romans should go by night and find the camp at Geronium undefended,

and become masters of his baggage and stores, determined to retire

thither himself and again fix his quarters there. After this the

Carthaginians were more timid and cautious in their manner of foraging;

while the Romans on the other hand acted with greater boldness and

recklessness.

[Sidenote: Minucius invested with co-equal powers with Fabius.]

+103.+ An exaggerated account of this success reached Rome, and caused

excessive exultation: first, because in their gloomy prospects some

sort of change for the better had at last shown itself; and, secondly,

because the people could now believe that the ill success and want of

nerve, which had hitherto attended the legions, had not arisen from

the cowardice of the men, but the timidity of their leader. Wherefore

everybody began finding fault with and depreciating Fabius, as failing

to seize his opportunities with spirit; while they extolled Minucius

to such a degree for what had happened, that a thing was done for

which there was no precedent. They gave him absolute power as well as

Fabius, believing that he would quickly put an end to the campaign; and

so there were two Dictators made for carrying on the same war, which

had never happened at Rome before. When Minucius was informed of his

popularity with the people, and of the office bestowed upon him by the

citizens, he felt doubly incited to run all risks and act with daring

boldness against the enemy. Fabius rejoined the army with sentiments

not in the least changed by what had happened, but rather fixed

still more immovably on his original policy. Seeing, however, that

Minucius was puffed up with pride, and inclined to offer him a jealous

opposition at every turn, and was wholly bent on risking an engagement,

he offered him the choice of two alternatives: either to command the

whole army on alternate days with him; or that they should separate

their two armies, and each command their respective part in their own

way. Minucius joyfully accepting the second alternative, they divided

the men and encamped separately about twelve stades apart.

[Sidenote: Hannibal draws on Minucius.]

+104.+ Partly from observing what was taking place, and partly from the

information of prisoners, Hannibal knew of the mutual jealousy of the

two generals, and the impetuosity and ambition of Minucius. Looking

upon what was happening in the enemy’s camp as rather in his favour

than otherwise, he set himself to deal with Minucius; being anxious

to put an end to his bold methods and check in time his adventurous

spirit. There being then an elevation between his camp and that of

Minucius, which might prove dangerous to either, he resolved to occupy

it; and, knowing full well that, elated by his previous success,

Minucius would be certain to move out at once to oppose his design, he

concerted the following plan. The country round the hill being bare of

trees, but having much broken ground and hollows of every description,

he despatched some men during the night, in bodies of two and three

hundred, to occupy the most favourable positions, numbering in all five

hundred horse and five thousand light-armed and other infantry: and in

order that they might not be observed in the morning by the enemy’s

foraging parties, he seized the hill at daybreak with his light-armed

troops. When Marcus saw what was taking place, he looked upon it as

an excellent opportunity; and immediately despatched his light-armed

troops, with orders to engage the enemy and contest the possession of

the position; after these he sent his cavalry, and close behind them

he led his heavy-armed troops in person, as on the former occasion,

intending to repeat exactly the same manœuvres.

[Sidenote: Fabius comes to the rescue.]

+105.+ As the day broke, and the thoughts and eyes of all were

engrossed in observing the combatants on the hill, the Romans had no

suspicion of the troops lying in ambush. But as Hannibal kept pouring

in reinforcements for his men on the hill, and followed close behind

them himself with his cavalry and main body, it was not long before

the cavalry also of both sides were engaged. The result was that the

Roman light-armed troops, finding themselves hard pressed by the

numbers of the cavalry, caused great confusion among the heavy-armed

troops by retreating into their lines; and the signal being given at

the same time to those who were in ambush, these latter suddenly showed

themselves and charged: whereby not only the Roman light-armed troops,

but their whole army, were in the greatest danger. At that moment

Fabius, seeing what was taking place, and being alarmed lest they

should sustain a complete defeat, led out his forces with all speed

and came to the relief of his imperilled comrades. At his approach

the Romans quickly recovered their courage; and though their lines

were entirely broken up, they rallied again round their standards,

and retired under cover of the army of Fabius, with a severe loss in

the light-armed division, and a still heavier one in the ranks of the

legions, and that too of the bravest men. Alarmed at the freshness and

perfect order of the relieving army, Hannibal retired from the pursuit

and ceased fighting. To those who were actually engaged it was quite

clear that an utter defeat had been brought about by the rashness of

Minucius, and that their safety on this and previous occasions had been

secured by the caution of Fabius; while those at home had a clear and

indisputable demonstration of the difference between the rashness and

bravado of a soldier, and the far-seeing prudence and cool calculation

of a general. Taught by experience the Romans joined camps once more,

and for the future listened to Fabius and obeyed his orders: while the

Carthaginians dug a trench across the space between the knoll and their

own lines, and threw up a palisade round the crest of the captured

hill; and, having placed a guard upon it, proceeded thenceforth with

their preparations for the winter unmolested.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216. Coss. G. Terentius Varro and L. Aemilius Paulus.]

+106.+ The Consular elections being now come, the Romans elected Lucius

Aemilius and Gaius Terentius. On their appointment the Dictators laid

down their offices, and the Consuls of the previous year, Gnaeus

Servilius and Marcus Regulus—who had been appointed after the death

of Flaminius,—were invested with proconsular authority by Aemilius;

and, taking the command at the seat of war, administered the affairs

of the army independently. Meanwhile Aemilius, in consultation with

the Senate, set at once to work to levy new soldiers, to fill up the

numbers of the legions required for the campaign, and despatched them

to headquarters; enjoining at the same time upon Servilius that he

should by no means hazard a general engagement, but contrive detailed

skirmishes, as sharp and as frequent as he could, for the sake of

practising the raw recruits, and giving them courage for a pitched

battle: for they held the opinion that their former defeats were owing,

as much as anything else, to the fact that they were employing troops

newly levied and entirely untrained. The Senate also sent the Praetor

Lucius Postumius into Gaul, to affect a diversion there, and induce the

Celts who were with Hannibal to return home. They also took measures

for recalling the fleet that had wintered at Lilybaeum, and for sending

to the commanders in Iberia such supplies as were necessary for the

service. Thus the Consul and Senate were busied with these and other

preparations for the campaign; and Servilius, having received his

instructions from the Consuls, carried them out in every particular.

The details of this part of the campaign, therefore, I shall omit to

record; for nothing of importance or worth remembering occurred, partly

in consequence of these instructions, and partly from circumstances;

but there were a considerable number of skirmishes and petty

engagements, in which the Roman commanders gained a high reputation for

courage and prudence.

[Sidenote: Autumn, B.C. 216.]

[Sidenote: The Senate order a battle.]

+107.+ Thus through all that winter and spring the two armies remained

encamped facing each other. But when the season for the new harvest was

come, Hannibal began to move from the camp at Geronium; and making up

his mind that it would be to his advantage to force the enemy by any

possible means to give him battle, he occupied the citadel of a town

called Cannae, into which the corn and other supplies from the district

round Canusium were collected by the Romans, and conveyed thence to the

camp as occasion required. The town itself, indeed, had been reduced to

ruins the year before: but the capture of its citadel and the material

of war contained in it, caused great commotion in the Roman army;

for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that

distressed them, but the fact also that it commanded the surrounding

district. They therefore sent frequent messages to Rome asking for

instructions: for if they approached the enemy they would not be able

to avoid an engagement, in view of the fact that the country was being

plundered, and the allies all in a state of excitement. The Senate

passed a resolution that they should give the enemy battle: they,

however, bade Gnaeus Servilius wait, and despatched the Consuls to the

seat of war. It was to Aemilius that all eyes turned, and on him the

most confident hopes were fixed; for his life had been a noble one, and

he was thought to have managed the recent Illyrian war with advantage

to the State. The Senate determined to bring eight legions into the

field, which had never been done at Rome before, each legion consisting

of five thousand men besides allies. For the Romans, as I have stated

before,[198] habitually enrol four legions each year, each consisting

of about four thousand foot and two hundred horse; and when any unusual

necessity arises, they raise the number of foot to five thousand and of

the horse to three hundred. Of allies, the number in each legion is the

same as that of the citizens, but of the horse three times as great. Of

the four legions thus composed, they assign two to each of the Consuls

for whatever service is going on. Most of their wars are decided by one

Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely

employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion,

so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved

to bring not only four but eight legions into the field.

[Sidenote: The Consuls Aemilius Paulus, and Terentius Varro go to the

seat of war.]

[Sidenote: Speech of Aemilius.]

+108.+ With earnest words of exhortation, therefore, to Aemilius,

putting before him the gravity in every point of view of the result of

the battle, they despatched him with instructions to seek a favourable

opportunity to fight a decisive battle with a courage worthy of Rome.

Having arrived at the camp and united their forces, they made known

the will of the Senate to the soldiers, and Aemilius exhorted them

to do their duty in terms which evidently came from his heart. He

addressed himself especially to explain and excuse the reverses which

they had lately experienced; for it was on this point particularly

that the soldiers were depressed and stood in need of encouragement.

“The causes,” he argued, “of their defeats in former battles were

many, and could not be reduced to one or two. But those causes were at

an end; and no excuse existed now, if they only showed themselves to

be men of courage, for not conquering their enemies. Up to that time

both Consuls had never been engaged together, or employed thoroughly

trained soldiers: the combatants on the contrary had been raw levies,

entirely unexperienced in danger; and what was most important of all,

they had been so entirely ignorant of their opponents, that they had

been brought into the field, and engaged in a pitched battle with an

enemy that they had never once set eyes on. Those who had been defeated

on the Trebia were drawn up on the field at daybreak, on the very next

morning after their arrival from Sicily; while those who had fought in

Etruria, not only had never seen the enemy before, but did not do so

even during the very battle itself, owing to the unfortunate state of

the atmosphere.

+109.+ But now the conditions were quite different. For in the first

place both Consuls were with the army: and were not only prepared to

share the danger themselves, but had also induced the Consuls of the

previous year to remain and take part in the struggle. While the men

had not only seen the arms, order, and numbers of the enemy, but had

been engaged in almost daily fights with them for the last two years.

The conditions therefore under which the two former battles were fought

being quite different, it was but natural that the result of the coming

struggle should be different too. For it would be strange or rather

impossible that those who in various skirmishes, where the numbers of

either side were equal, had for the most part come off victorious,

should, when drawn up all together, and nearly double of the enemy in

number, be defeated.”

“Wherefore, men of the army,” he continued, “seeing that we have every

advantage on our side for securing a victory, there is only one thing

necessary—your determination, your zeal! And I do not think I need say

more to you on that point. To men serving others for pay, or to those

who fight as allies on behalf of others, who have no greater danger to

expect than meets them on the field, and for whom the issues at stake

are of little importance,—such men may need words of exhortation. But

men who, like you, are fighting not for others, but themselves,—for

country, wives, and children; and for whom the issue is of far more

momentous consequence than the mere danger of the hour, need only to

be reminded: require no exhortation. For who is there among you who

would not wish if possible to be victorious; and next, if that may not

be, to die with arms in his hands, rather than to live and see the

outrage and death of those dear objects which I have named? Wherefore,

men of the army, apart from any words of mine, place before your eyes

the momentous difference to you between victory and defeat, and all

their consequences. Enter upon this battle with the full conviction,

that in it your country is not risking a certain number of legions,

but her bare existence. For she has nothing to add to such an army as

this, to give her victory, if the day now goes against us. All she

has of confidence and strength rests on you; all her hopes of safety

are in your hands. Do not frustrate those hopes: but pay back to your

country the gratitude you owe her; and make it clear to all the world

that the former reverses occurred, not because the Romans are worse men

than the Carthaginians, but from the lack of experience on the part

of those who were then fighting, and through a combination of adverse

circumstances.” With such words Aemilius dismissed the troops.

[Sidenote: The Roman army approaches Cannae.]

[Sidenote: Terentius Varro orders an advance.]

[Sidenote: The Romans are successful.]

+110.+ Next morning the two Consuls broke up their camp, and advanced

to where they heard that the enemy were entrenched. On the second day

they arrived within sight of them, and pitched their camp at about

fifty stades’ distance. But when Aemilius observed that the ground

was flat and bare for some distance round, he said that they must not

engage there with an enemy superior to them in cavalry; but that they

must rather try to draw him off, and lead him to ground on which the

battle would be more in the hands of the infantry. But Gaius Terentius

being, from inexperience, of a contrary opinion, there was a dispute

and misunderstanding between the leaders, which of all things is the

most dangerous. It is the custom, when the two Consuls are present,

that they should take the chief command on alternate days; and the next

day happening to be the turn of Terentius, he ordered an advance with

a view of approaching the enemy, in spite of the protests and active

opposition of his colleague. Hannibal set his light-armed troops and

cavalry in motion to meet him, and charging the Romans while they were

still marching, took them by surprise and caused a great confusion in

their ranks. The Romans repulsed the first charge by putting some of

their heavy-armed in front; and then sending forward their light-armed

and cavalry, began to get the best of the fight all along the line:

the Carthaginians having no reserves of any importance, while certain

companies of the legionaries were mixed with the Roman light-armed,

and helped to sustain the battle. Nightfall for the present put an

end to a struggle which had not at all answered to the hopes of the

Carthaginians. But next day Aemilius, not thinking it right to engage,

and yet being unable any longer to lead off his army, encamped with

two-thirds of it on the banks of the Aufidus, the only river which

flows right through the Apennines,—that chain of mountains which forms

the watershed of all the Italian rivers, which flow either west to the

Tuscan sea, or east to the Hadriatic. This chain is, I say, pierced by

the Aufidus, which rises on the side of Italy nearest the Tuscan Sea,

and is discharged into the Hadriatic. For the other third of his army

he caused a camp to be made across the river, to the east of the ford,

about ten stades from his own lines, and a little more from those of

the enemy; that these men, being on the other side of the river, might

protect his own foraging parties, and threaten those of the enemy.

[Sidenote: Hannibal harangues his troops.]

+111.+ Then Hannibal, seeing that his circumstances called for a battle

with the enemy, being anxious lest his troops should be depressed by

their previous reverse, and believing that it was an occasion which

required some encouraging words, summoned a general meeting of his

soldiers. When they were assembled, he bid them all look round upon

the country, and asked them, “What better fortune they could have

asked from the gods, if they had had the choice, than to fight in such

ground as they saw there, with the vast superiority of cavalry on their

side?” And when all signified their acquiescence in such an evident

truth, he added: “First, then, give thanks to the gods: for they have

brought the enemy into this country, because they designed the victory

for us. And, next to me, for having compelled the enemy to fight,—for

they cannot avoid it any longer,—and to fight in a place so full of

advantages for us. But I do not think it becoming in me now to use many

words in exhorting you to be brave and forward in this battle. When

you had had no experience of fighting the Romans this was necessary,

and I did then suggest many arguments and examples to you. But now

seeing that you have undeniably beaten the Romans in three successive

battles of such magnitude, what arguments could have greater influence

with you in confirming your courage than the actual facts? Now, by

your previous battles you have got possession of the country and all

its wealth; in accordance with my promises: for I have been absolutely

true in everything I have ever said to you. But the present contest is

for the cities and the wealth in them: and if you win it, all Italy

will at once be in your power; and freed from your present hard toils,

and masters of the wealth of Rome, you will by this battle become the

leaders and lords of the world. This, then, is a time for deeds, not

words: for by God’s blessing I am persuaded that I shall carry out my

promises to you forthwith.” His words were received with approving

shouts, which he acknowledged with gratitude for their zeal; and having

dismissed the assembly, he at once formed a camp on the same bank of

the river as that on which was the larger camp of the Romans.

[Sidenote: Hannibal irritates the enemy.]

+112.+ Next day he gave orders that all should employ themselves in

making preparations and getting themselves into a fit state of body.

On the day after that he drew out his men along the bank of the river,

and showed that he was eager to give the enemy battle. But Aemilius,

dissatisfied with his position, and seeing that the Carthaginians would

soon be obliged to shift their quarters for the sake of supplies, kept

quiet in his camps, strengthening both with extra guards. After waiting

a considerable time, when no one came out to attack him, Hannibal

put the rest of the army into camp again, but sent out his Numidian

horse to attack the enemy’s water parties from the lesser camp. These

horsemen riding right up to the lines and preventing the watering,

Gaius Terentius became more than ever inflamed with the desire of

fighting, and the soldiers were eager for a battle, and chafed at the

delay. For there is nothing more intolerable to mankind than suspense;

when a thing is once decided, men can but endure whatever out of the

catalogue of evils it is their misfortune to undergo.

[Sidenote: Anxiety at Rome.]

But when the news arrived at Rome that the two armies were face to

face, and that skirmishes between advanced parties of both sides were

daily taking place, the city was in a state of high excitement and

uneasiness; the people dreading the result owing to the disasters

which had now befallen them on more than one occasion; and foreseeing

and anticipating in their imaginations what would happen if they were

utterly defeated. All the oracles preserved at Rome were in everybody’s

mouth; and every temple and house was full of prodigies and miracles:

in consequence of which the city was one scene of vows, sacrifices,

supplicatory processions, and prayers. For the Romans in times of

danger take extraordinary pains to appease gods and men, and look upon

no ceremony of that kind in such times as unbecoming or beneath their

dignity.

[Sidenote: Dispositions for the battle of Cannae.]

+113.+ When he took over the command on the following day, as soon as

the sun was above the horizon, Gaius Terentius got the army in motion

from both the camps. Those from the larger camp he drew up in order

of battle, as soon as he had got them across the river, and bringing

up those of the smaller camp he placed them all in the same line,

selecting the south as the aspect of the whole. The Roman horse he

stationed on the right wing along the river, and their foot next them

in the same line, placing the maniples, however, closer together than

usual, and making the depth of each maniple several times greater than

its front. The cavalry of the allies he stationed on the left wing,

and the light-armed troops he placed slightly in advance of the whole

army, which amounted with its allies to eighty thousand infantry and a

little more than six thousand horse. At the same time Hannibal brought

his Balearic slingers and spearmen across the river, and stationed

them in advance of his main body; which he led out of their camp, and,

getting them across the river at two spots, drew them up opposite the

enemy. On his left wing, close to the river, he stationed the Iberian

and Celtic horse opposite the Roman cavalry; and next to them half

the Libyan heavy-armed foot; and next to them the Iberian and Celtic

foot; next, the other half of the Libyans, and, on the right wing, the

Numidian horse. Having now got them all into line he advanced with

the central companies of the Iberians and Celts; and so arranged the

other companies next these in regular gradations, that the whole line

became crescent-shaped, diminishing in depth towards its extremities:

his object being to have his Libyans as a reserve in the battle, and to

commence the action with his Iberians and Celts.

+114.+ The armour of the Libyans was Roman, for Hannibal had armed

them with a selection of the spoils taken in previous battles. The

shield of the Iberians and Celts was about the same size, but their

swords were quite different. For that of the Roman can thrust with as

deadly effects as it can cut, while the Gallic sword can only cut, and

that requires some room. And the companies coming alternately,—the

naked Celts, and the Iberians with their short linen tunics bordered

with purple stripes, the whole appearance of the line was strange and

terrifying. The whole strength of the Carthaginian cavalry was ten

thousand, but that of their foot was not more than forty thousand,

including the Celts. Aemilius commanded on the Roman right, Gaius

Terentius on the left, Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls

of the previous year, on the centre. The left of the Carthaginians was

commanded by Hasdrubal, the right by Hanno, the centre by Hannibal in

person, attended by his brother Mago. And as the Roman line faced the

south, as I said before, and the Carthaginian the north, the rays of

the rising sun did not inconvenience either of them.

[Sidenote: The Battle, 2d August, B.C. 216.]

[Sidenote: The Romans outflanked by the cavalry.]

+115.+ The battle was begun by an engagement between the advanced guard

of the two armies; and at first the affair between these light-armed

troops was indecisive. But as soon as the Iberian and Celtic cavalry

got at the Romans, the battle began in earnest, and in the true

barbaric fashion: for there was none of the usual formal advance and

retreat; but when they once got to close quarters, they grappled man to

man, and, dismounting from their horses, fought on foot. But when the

Carthaginians had got the upper hand in this encounter and killed most

of their opponents on the ground,— because the Romans all maintained

the fight with spirit and determination,—and began chasing the

remainder along the river, slaying as they went and giving no quarter;

then the legionaries took the place of the light-armed and closed with

the enemy. For a short time the Iberian and Celtic lines stood their

ground and fought gallantly; but, presently overpowered by the weight

of the heavy-armed lines, they gave way and retired to the rear, thus

breaking up the crescent. The Roman maniples followed with spirit, and

easily cut their way through the enemy’s line; since the Celts had been

drawn up in a thin line, while the Romans had closed up from the wings

towards the centre and the point of danger. For the two wings did not

come into action at the same time as the centre: but the centre was

first engaged, because the Gauls, having been stationed on the arc of

the crescent, had come into contact with the enemy long before the

wings, the convex of the crescent being towards the enemy. The Romans,

however, going in pursuit of these troops, and hastily closing in

towards the centre and the part of the enemy which was giving ground,

advanced so far, that the Libyan heavy-armed troops on either wing got

on their flanks. Those on the right, facing to the left, charged from

the right upon the Roman flank; while those who were on the left wing

faced to the right, and, dressing by the left, charged their right

flank,[199] the exigency of the moment suggesting to them what they

ought to do. Thus it came about, as Hannibal had planned, that the

Romans were caught between two hostile lines of Libyans—thanks to their

impetuous pursuit of the Celts. Still they fought, though no longer in

line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who

charged them on the flanks.

[Sidenote: Fall of Aemilius Paulus.]

+116.+ Though he had been from the first on the right wing, and had

taken part in the cavalry engagement, Lucius Aemilius still survived.

Determined to act up to his own exhortatory speech, and seeing that

the decision of the battle rested mainly on the legionaries, riding up

to the centre of the line he led the charge himself, and personally

grappled with the enemy, at the same time cheering on and exhorting

his soldiers to the charge. Hannibal, on the other side, did the same,

for he too had taken his place on the centre from the commencement.

The Numidian horse on the Carthaginian right were meanwhile charging

the cavalry on the Roman left; and though, from the peculiar nature

of their mode of fighting, they neither inflicted nor received much

harm, they yet rendered the enemy’s horse useless by keeping them

occupied, and charging them first on one side and then on another. But

when Hasdrubal, after all but annihilating the cavalry by the river,

came from the left to the support of the Numidians, the Roman allied

cavalry, seeing his charge approaching, broke and fled. At that point

Hasdrubal appears to have acted with great skill and discretion.

Seeing the Numidians to be strong in numbers, and more effective and

formidable to troops that had once been forced from their ground, he

left the pursuit to them; while he himself hastened to the part of

the field where the infantry were engaged, and brought his men up to

support the Libyans. Then, by charging the Roman legions on the rear,

and harassing them by hurling squadron after squadron upon them at many

points at once, he raised the spirits of the Libyans, and dismayed

and depressed those of the Romans. It was at this point that Lucius

Aemilius fell, in the thick of the fight, covered with wounds: a man

who did his duty to his country at that last hour of his life, as he

had throughout its previous years, if any man ever did.[200] As long as

the Romans could keep an unbroken front, to turn first in one direction

and then in another to meet the assaults of the enemy, they held out;

but the outer files of the circle continually falling, and the circle

becoming more and more contracted, they at last were all killed on the

field, and among them Marcus Atilius and Gnaeus Servilius, the Consuls

of the previous year, who had shown themselves brave men and worthy of

Rome in the battle. While this struggle and carnage were going on, the

Numidian horse were pursuing the fugitives, most of whom they cut down

or hurled from their horses; but some few escaped into Venusia, among

whom was Gaius Terentius, the Consul, who thus sought a flight, as

disgraceful to himself, as his conduct in office had been disastrous to

his country.

+117.+ Such was the end of the battle of Cannae, in which both sides

fought with the most conspicuous gallantry, the conquered no less

than the conquerors. This is proved by the fact that, out of six

thousand horse, only seventy escaped with Gaius Terentius to Venusia,

and about three hundred of the allied cavalry to various towns in

the neighbourhood. Of the infantry ten thousand were taken prisoners

in fair fight, but were not actually engaged in the battle: of those

who were actually engaged only about three thousand perhaps escaped

to the towns of the surrounding district, all the rest died nobly,

to the number of seventy thousand, the Carthaginians being on this

occasion, as on previous ones, mainly indebted for their victory to

their superiority in cavalry: a lesson to posterity that in actual war

it is better to have half the number of infantry, and the superiority

in cavalry, than to engage your enemy with an equality in both. On

the side of Hannibal there fell four thousand Celts, fifteen hundred

Iberians and Libyans, and about two hundred horse.

[Sidenote: Losses of the Romans.]

The ten thousand Romans who were captured had not, as I said, been

engaged in the actual battle; and the reason was this. Lucius Aemilius

left ten thousand infantry in his camp that, in case Hannibal should

disregard the safety of his own camp, and take his whole army on to the

field, they might seize the opportunity, while the battle was going on,

of forcing their way in and capturing the enemy’s baggage; or if, on

the other hand, Hannibal should, in view of this contingency, leave a

guard in his camp, the number of the enemy in the field might thereby

be diminished. These men were captured in the following circumstances.

Hannibal, as a matter of fact, did leave a sufficient guard in his

camp; and as soon as the battle began, the Romans, according to their

instructions, assaulted and tried to take those thus left by Hannibal.

At first they held their own: but just as they were beginning to waver,

Hannibal, who was by this time gaining a victory all along the line,

came to their relief, and routing the Romans, shut them up in their own

camp; killed two thousand of them; and took all the rest prisoners.

In like manner the Numidian horse brought in all those who had taken

refuge in the various strongholds about the district, amounting to two

thousand of the routed cavalry.

[Sidenote: The results of the battle. Defection of the allies.]

+118.+ The result of this battle, such as I have described it, had the

consequences which both sides expected. For the Carthaginians by their

victory were thenceforth masters of nearly the whole of the Italian

coast which is called _Magna Graecia_. Thus the Tarentines immediately

submitted; and the Arpani and some of the Campanian states invited

Hannibal to come to them; and the rest were with one consent turning

their eyes to the Carthaginians: who, accordingly, began now to have

high hopes of being able to carry even Rome itself by assault.

[Sidenote: Fall of Lucius Postumius in Gaul. See _supra_, ch. 106.]

On their side the Romans, after this disaster, despaired of retaining

their supremacy over the Italians, and were in the greatest alarm,

believing their own lives and the existence of their city to be in

danger, and every moment expecting that Hannibal would be upon them.

For, as though Fortune were in league with the disasters that had

already befallen them to fill up the measure of their ruin, it happened

that only a few days afterwards, while the city was still in this

panic, the Praetor who had been sent to Gaul fell unexpectedly into an

ambush and perished, and his army was utterly annihilated by the Celts.

In spite of all, however, the Senate left no means untried to save the

State. It exhorted the people to fresh exertions, strengthened the

city with guards, and deliberated on the crisis in a brave and manly

spirit. And subsequent events made this manifest. For though the Romans

were on that occasion indisputably beaten in the field, and had lost

reputation for military prowess; by the peculiar excellence of their

political constitution, and the prudence of their counsels, they not

only recovered their supremacy over Italy, by eventually conquering the

Carthaginians, but before very long became masters of the whole world.

[Sidenote: B.C. 216.]

I shall, therefore, end this book at this point, having now recounted

the events in Iberia and Italy, embraced by the 140th Olympiad. When

I have arrived at the same period in my history of Greece during this

Olympiad, I shall then fulfil my promise of devoting a book to a

formal account of the Roman constitution itself; for I think that a

description of it will not only be germane to the matter of my history,

but will also be of great help to practical statesmen, as well as

students, either in reforming or establishing other constitutions.