+40.+ While Hannibal was thus engaged in effecting a passage over the

Pyrenees, where he was greatly alarmed at the extraordinary strength

of the positions occupied by the Celts; the Romans, having heard the

result of the embassy to Carthage, and that Hannibal had crossed

the Iber earlier than they expected, at the head of an army, voted

to send Publius Cornelius Scipio with his legions into Iberia, and

Tiberius Sempronius Longus into Libya. And while the Consuls were

engaged in hastening on the enrolment of their legions and other

military preparations, the people were active in bringing to completion

the colonies which they had already voted to send into Gaul. They

accordingly caused the fortification of these towns to be energetically

pushed on, and ordered the colonists to be in residence within thirty

days: six thousand having been assigned to each colony. One of these

colonies was on the south bank of the Padus, and was called Placentia;

the other on the north bank, called Cremona. But no sooner had these

colonies been formed, than the Boian Gauls, who had long been lying in

wait to throw off their loyalty to Rome, but had up to that time lacked

an opportunity, encouraged by the news that reached them of Hannibal’s

approach, revolted; thus abandoning the hostages which they had given

at the end of the war described in my last book. The ill-feeling still

remaining towards Rome enabled them to induce the Insubres to join in

the revolt; and the united tribes swept over the territory recently

allotted by the Romans, and following close upon the track of the

flying colonists, laid siege to the Roman colony of Mutina, in which

the fugitives had taken refuge. Among them were the _triumviri_ or

three commissioners who had been sent out to allot the lands, of whom

one—Gaius Lutatius—was an ex-consul, the other two ex-praetors. These

men having demanded a parley with the enemy, the Boii consented: but

treacherously seized them upon their leaving the town, hoping by their

means to recover their own hostages. The praetor Lucius Manlius was

on guard in the district with an army, and as soon as he heard what

had happened, he advanced with all speed to the relief of Mutina.

But the Boii, having got intelligence of his approach, prepared an

ambuscade; and as soon as his army had entered a certain wood, they

rushed out upon it from every side and killed a large number of his

men. The survivors at first fled with precipitation: but having gained

some higher ground, they rallied sufficiently to enable them with much

difficulty to effect an honourable retreat. Even so, the Boii followed

close upon their heels, and besieged them in a place called the

village of Tannes.[176] When the news arrived at Rome, that the fourth

legion was surrounded and closely besieged by the Boii, the people in

all haste despatched the legions which had been voted to the Consul

Publius, to their relief, under the command of a Praetor, and ordered

the Consul to enrol two more legions for himself from the allies.

+41.+ Such was the state of Celtic affairs from the beginning to the

arrival of Hannibal; thus completing the course of events which I have

already had occasion to describe.

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius prepares to attack Carthage.]

Meanwhile the Consuls, having completed the necessary preparations for

their respective missions, set sail at the beginning of summer—Publius

to Iberia, with sixty ships, and Tiberius Sempronius to Libya, with a

hundred and sixty quinqueremes. The latter thought by means of this

great fleet to strike terror into the enemy; and made vast preparations

at Lilybaeum, collecting fresh troops wherever he could get them, as

though with the view of at once blockading Carthage itself.

[Sidenote: Publius Scipio lands near Marseilles.]

Publius Cornelius coasted along Liguria, and crossing in five days

from Pisae to Marseilles, dropped anchor at the most eastern mouth of

the Rhone, called the Mouth of Marseilles,[177] and began disembarking

his troops. For though he heard that Hannibal was already crossing the

Pyrenees, he felt sure that he was still a long way off, owing to the

difficulty of his line of country, and the number of the intervening

Celtic tribes. But long before he was expected, Hannibal had arrived

at the crossing of the Rhone, keeping the Sardinian Sea on his right

as he marched, and having made his way through the Celts partly by

bribes and partly by force. Being informed that the enemy were at hand,

Publius was at first incredulous of the fact, because of the rapidity

of the advance; but wishing to know the exact state of the case,—while

staying behind himself to refresh his troops after their voyage, and to

consult with the Tribunes as to the best ground on which to give the

enemy battle,—he sent out a reconnoitring party, consisting of three

hundred of his bravest horse; joining with them as guides and supports

some Celts, who chanced to be serving as mercenaries at the time in

Marseilles.

[Sidenote: Hannibal reaches the Rhone.]

+42.+ Meanwhile Hannibal had reached the river and was trying to get

across it where the stream was single, at a distance of four days’

march from the sea. He did all he could to make the natives living by

the river friendly to him, and purchased from them all their canoes of

hollow trunks, and wherries, of which there were a large number, owing

to the extensive sea traffic of the inhabitants of the Rhone valley.

He got from them also the timber suited to the construction of these

canoes; and so in two days had an innumerable supply of transports,

every soldier seeking to be independent of his neighbour, and to have

the means of crossing in his own hands. But now a large multitude of

barbarians collected on the other side of the stream to hinder the

passage of the Carthaginians. When Hannibal saw them, he came to the

conclusion that it would be impossible either to force a passage in

the face of so large a body of the enemy, or to remain where he was,

for fear of being attacked on all sides at once: and he accordingly,

on the third night, sent forward a detachment of his army with native

guides, under the command of Hanno, the son of the Suffete[178]

Bomilcar. [Sidenote: A detachment crosses higher up the river.] This

force marched up stream along the bank for two hundred stades, until

they arrived at a certain spot where the stream is divided by an eyot,

and there halted. They found enough wood close at hand to enable them,

by nailing or tying it together, to construct within a short time a

large number of rafts good enough for temporary use; and on these they

crossed in safety, without any one trying to stop them. Then, seizing

upon a strong position, they kept quiet for the rest of the day: partly

to refresh themselves after their fatigues, and at the same time to

complete their preparations for the service awaiting them, as they had

been ordered to do. Hannibal was preparing to proceed much in the same

way with the forces left behind with himself; but his chief difficulty

was in getting the elephants across, of which he had thirty-seven.

[Sidenote: The crossing begun.]

+43.+ When the fifth night came, however, the division which had

crossed first started before daybreak to march down the opposite bank

of the river and attack the barbarians; while Hannibal, having his men

in readiness, began to attempt the passage of the river. He had filled

the wherries with the heavy-armed cavalry, and the canoes with the most

active of his foot; and he now arranged that the wherries should cross

higher up the stream, and the canoes below them, that the violence of

the current might be broken by the former, and the canoes cross more

safely. The plan for the horses was that they should swim at the stern

of the wherries, one man on each side of the stern guiding three or

four with leading reins: so that a considerable number of horses were

brought over at once with the first detachment. When they saw what the

enemy meant to do, the barbarians, without forming their ranks, poured

out of their entrenchments in scattered groups, feeling no doubt of

being able to stop the crossing of the Carthaginians with ease. As soon

as Hannibal saw by the smoke, which was the signal agreed upon, that

the advanced detachment on the other side was approaching, he ordered

all to go on board, and the men in charge of the transports to push

out against the stream. This was promptly done: and then began a most

anxious and exciting scene. Cheer after cheer rose from the men who

were working the boats, as they struggled to outstrip each other, and

exerted themselves to the utmost to overcome the force of the current.

On the edge of either bank stood the two armies: the one sharing in the

struggles of their comrades by sympathy, and shouting encouragement

to them as they went; while the barbarians in front of them yelled

their war-cries and challenged them to battle. While this was going on

the barbarians had abandoned their tents, which the Carthaginians on

that side of the river suddenly and unexpectedly seized. Some of them

proceeded to set fire to the camp, while the greater number went to

attack the men who were standing ready to resist the passage. Surprised

by this unlooked-for event, some of the barbarians rushed off to save

their tents, while others prepared to resist the attack of the enemy,

and were now actually engaged. Seeing that everything was going as

he had intended, Hannibal at once formed the first division as it

disembarked: and after addressing some encouraging words to it, closed

with the barbarians, who, having no time to form their ranks, and being

taken by surprise, were quickly repulsed and put to flight.

[Sidenote: Completed.]

[Sidenote: Message from friendly Gauls.]

+44.+ Being thus master of the passage of the river, and victorious

over those who opposed him, the first care of the Carthaginian

leader was to bring his whole army across. This being expeditiously

accomplished, he pitched his camp for that night by the river-side, and

on the morrow, when he was told that the Roman fleet was anchored off

the mouths of the river, he detached five hundred Numidian horsemen

to reconnoitre the enemy and find out their position, their numbers,

and what they were going to do; and at the same time selected suitable

men to manage the passage of the elephants. These arrangements made,

he summoned a meeting of his army and introduced Magilus and the other

chiefs who had come to him from the valley of the Padus, and caused

them to declare to the whole army, by means of an interpreter, the

resolutions passed by their tribes. The points which were the strongest

encouragement to the army were, first, the actual appearance of envoys

inviting them to come, and promising to take part in the war with Rome;

secondly, the confidence inspired by their promise of guiding them by

a route where they would be abundantly supplied with necessaries, and

which would lead them with speed and safety into Italy; and, lastly,

the fertility and vast extent of the country to which they were going,

and the friendly feelings of the men with whose assistance they were

about to fight the armies of Rome.

Such was the substance of the speeches of the Celts. When they had

withdrawn, Hannibal himself rose, and after reminding the soldiers

of what they had already achieved, and pointing out that, though

they had under his counsel and advice engaged in many perilous and

dangerous enterprises, they had never failed in one, he bade them “not

lose courage now that the most serious part of their undertaking was

accomplished. The Rhone was crossed: they had seen with their own eyes

the display of goodwill and zeal of their allies. Let this convince

them that they should leave the rest to him with confidence; and while

obeying his orders show themselves men of courage and worthy of their

former deeds.” These words being received with shouts of approval, and

other manifestations of great enthusiasm, on the part of the soldiers,

Hannibal dismissed the assembly with words of praise to the men and

a prayer to the gods on their behalf; after giving out an order that

they should refresh themselves, and make all their preparations with

despatch, as the advance must begin on the morrow.

[Sidenote: Skirmish between reconnoitring parties.]

+45.+ When the assembly had been dismissed, the reconnoitring party

of Numidians returned in headlong flight, after losing more than half

their numbers. Not far from the camp they had fallen in with a party

of Roman horse, who had been sent out by Publius on the same errand;

and an engagement took place with such fury on either side, that the

Romans and Celts lost a hundred and forty men, and the Numidians more

than two hundred. After this skirmish, the Romans pursued them up to

the Carthaginian entrenchments: and having surveyed it, they hastened

back to announce to the Consul the presence of the enemy. As soon as

they arrived at the Roman camp with this intelligence, Publius put his

baggage on board ship, and marched his men up the bank of the river,

with the earnest desire of forcing the enemy to give him battle.

But at sunrise on the day after the assembly, Hannibal having stationed

his whole cavalry on the rear, in the direction of the sea, so as to

cover the advance, ordered his infantry to leave the entrenchment and

begin their march; while he himself waited behind for the elephants,

and the men who had not yet crossed the river.

[Sidenote: The passage of the elephants.]

+46.+ The mode of getting the elephants across was as follows. They

made a number of rafts strongly compacted, which they lashed firmly

two and two together, so as to form combined a breadth of about fifty

feet, and brought them close under the bank at the place of crossing.

To the outer edge of these they lashed some others and made them join

exactly; so that the whole raft thus constructed stretched out some way

into the channel, while the edges towards the stream were made fast to

the land with ropes tied to trees which grew along the brink, to secure

the raft keeping its place and not drifting down the river. These

combined rafts stretching about two hundred feet across the stream,

they joined two other very large ones to the outer edges, fastened very

firmly together, but connected with the others by ropes which admitted

of being easily cut. To these they fastened several towing lines,

that the wherries might prevent the rafts drifting down stream, and

might drag them forcibly against the current and so get the elephants

across on them. Then they threw a great deal of earth upon all the

rafts, until they had raised the surface to the level of the bank, and

made it look like the path on the land leading down to the passage.

The elephants were accustomed to obey their Indian riders until they

came to water, but could never be induced to step into water: they

therefore led them upon this earth, putting two females in front whom

the others obediently followed. When they had set foot on the rafts

that were farthest out in the stream, the ropes were cut which fastened

these to the other rafts, the towing lines were pulled taut by the

wherries, and the elephants, with the rafts on which they stood, were

quickly towed away from the mound of earth. When this happened, the

animals were terror-stricken; and at first turned round and round, and

rushed first to one part of the raft and then to another, but finding

themselves completely surrounded by the water, they were too frightened

to do anything, and were obliged to stay where they were. And it was by

repeating this contrivance of joining a pair of rafts to the others,

that eventually the greater part of the elephants were got across.

Some of them, however, in the middle of the crossing, threw themselves

in their terror into the river: but though their Indian riders were

drowned, the animals themselves got safe to land, saved by the strength

and great length of their probosces; for by raising these above the

water, they were enabled to breathe through them, and blow out any

water that got into them, while for the most part they got through the

river on their feet.

+47.+ The elephants having been thus got across, Hannibal formed them

and the cavalry into a rear-guard, and marched up the river bank away

from the sea in an easterly direction, as though making for the central

district of Europe.

The Rhone rises to the north-west of the Adriatic Gulf on the northern

slopes of the Alps,[179] and flowing westward, eventually discharges

itself into the Sardinian Sea. It flows for the most part through

a deep valley, to the north of which lives the Celtic tribe of the

Ardyes; while its southern side is entirely walled in by the northern

slopes of the Alps, the ridges of which, beginning at Marseilles and

extending to the head of the Adriatic, separate it from the valley of

the Padus, of which I have already had occasion to speak at length. It

was these mountains that Hannibal now crossed from the Rhone valley

into Italy.

Some historians of this passage of the Alps, in their desire to

produce a striking effect by their descriptions of the wonders of this

country, have fallen into two errors which are more alien than anything

else to the spirit of history,—perversion of fact and inconsistency.

Introducing Hannibal as a prodigy of strategic skill and boldness, they

yet represent him as acting with the most conspicuous indiscretion;

and then, finding themselves involved in an inextricable maze of

falsehood, they try to cut the knot by the introduction of gods and

heroes into what is meant to be genuine history. They begin by saying

that the Alps are so precipitous and inaccessible that, so far from

horses and troops, accompanied too by elephants, being able to cross

them, it would be very difficult for even active men on foot to do so:

and similarly they tell us that the desolation of this district is so

complete, that, had not some god or hero met Hannibal’s forces and

showed them the way, they would have been hopelessly lost and perished

to a man.

Such stories involve both the errors I have mentioned,—they are both

false and inconsistent.

+48.+ For could a more irrational proceeding on the part of a general

be imagined than that of Hannibal, if, when in command of so numerous

an army, on whom the success of his expedition entirely depended,

he allowed himself to remain in ignorance of the roads, the lie of

the country, the route to be taken, and the people to which it led,

and above all as to the practicability of what he was undertaking

to do? They, in fact, represent Hannibal, when at the height of his

expectation of success, doing what those would hardly do who have

utterly failed and have been reduced to despair,—that is, to entrust

themselves and their forces to an unknown country. And so, too, what

they say about the desolation of the district, and its precipitous and

inaccessible character, only serves to bring their untrustworthiness

into clearer light. For first, they pass over the fact that the Celts

of the Rhone valley had on several occasions before Hannibal came,

and that in very recent times, crossed the Alps with large forces,

and fought battles with the Romans in alliance with the Celts of the

valley of the Padus, as I have already stated. And secondly, they are

unaware of the fact that a very numerous tribe of people inhabit the

Alps. Accordingly in their ignorance of these facts they take refuge

in the assertion that a hero showed Hannibal the way. They are, in

fact, in the same case as tragedians, who, beginning with an improbable

and impossible plot, are obliged to bring in a _deus ex machina_ to

solve the difficulty and end the play. The absurd premises of these

historians naturally require some such supernatural agency to help them

out of the difficulty: an absurd beginning could only have an absurd

ending. For of course Hannibal did not act as these writers say he did;

but, on the contrary, conducted his plans with the utmost prudence.

He had thoroughly informed himself of the fertility of the country

into which he designed to descend, and of the hostile feelings of its

inhabitants towards Rome, and for his journey through the difficult

district which intervened he employed native guides and pioneers, whose

interests were bound up with his own. I speak with confidence on these

points, because I have questioned persons actually engaged on the

facts, and have inspected the country, and gone over the Alpine pass

myself, in order to inform myself of the truth and see with my own eyes.

[Sidenote: Scipio finds that Hannibal has escaped him.]

+49.+ Three days after Hannibal had resumed his march, the Consul

Publius arrived at the passage of the river. He was in the highest

degree astonished to find the enemy gone: for he had persuaded himself

that they would never venture to take this route into Italy, on account

of the numbers and fickleness of the barbarians who inhabited the

country. But seeing that they had done so, he hurried back to his ships

and at once embarked his forces. He then despatched his brother Gnaeus

to conduct the campaign in Iberia, while he himself turned back again

to Italy by sea, being anxious to anticipate the enemy by marching

through Etruria to the foot of the pass of the Alps.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s march to the foot of the Alps.]

Meanwhile, after four days’ march from the passage of the Rhone,

Hannibal arrived at the place called the Island, a district thickly

inhabited and exceedingly productive of corn. Its name is derived

from its natural features: for the Rhone and Isara flowing on either

side of it make the apex of a triangle where they meet, very nearly

of the same size and shape as the delta of the Nile, except that the

base of the latter is formed by the sea into which its various streams

are discharged, while in the case of the former this base is formed

by mountains difficult to approach or climb, and, so to speak, almost

inaccessible. When Hannibal arrived in this district he found two

brothers engaged in a dispute for the royal power, and confronting each

other with their armies. The elder sought his alliance and invited

his assistance in gaining the crown: and the advantage which such a

circumstance might prove to him at that juncture of his affairs being

manifest, he consented; and having joined him in his attack upon his

brother, and aided in expelling him, he obtained valuable support from

the victorious chieftain. For this prince not only liberally supplied

his army with provisions, but exchanged all their old and damaged

weapons for new ones, and thus at a very opportune time thoroughly

restored the efficiency of the troops: he also gave most of the men

new clothes and boots, which proved of great advantage during their

passage of the mountains. But his most essential service was that, the

Carthaginians being greatly alarmed at the prospect of marching through

the territory of the Allobroges, he acted with his army as their

rear-guard, and secured them a safe passage as far as the foot of the

pass.

[Sidenote: The ascent.]

+50.+ Having in ten days’ march accomplished a distance of eight

hundred stades along the river bank, Hannibal began the ascent of the

Alps,[180] and immediately found himself involved in the most serious

dangers. For as long as the Carthaginians were on the plains, the

various chiefs of the Allobroges refrained from attacking them from

fear of their cavalry, as well as of the Gauls who were escorting

them. But when these last departed back again to their own lands,

and Hannibal began to enter the mountainous region, the chiefs of

the Allobroges collected large numbers of their tribe and occupied

the points of vantage in advance, on the route by which Hannibal’s

troops were constrained to make their ascent. If they had only kept

their design secret, the Carthaginian army would have been entirely

destroyed: as it was, their plans became known, and though they did

much damage to Hannibal’s army, they suffered as much themselves. For

when that general learnt that the natives were occupying the points

of vantage, he halted and pitched his camp at the foot of the pass,

and sent forward some of his Gallic guides to reconnoitre the enemy

and discover their plan of operations. The order was obeyed: and he

ascertained that it was the enemy’s practice to keep under arms, and

guard these posts carefully, during the day, but at night to retire

to some town in the neighbourhood. Hannibal accordingly adapted his

measures to this strategy of the enemy. He marched forward in broad

daylight, and as soon as he came to the mountainous part of the road,

pitched his camp only a little way from the enemy. At nightfall he gave

orders for the watch-fires to be lit; and leaving the main body of his

troops in the camp, and selecting the most suitable of his men, he had

them armed lightly, and led them through the narrow parts of the road

during the night, and seized on the spots which had been previously

occupied by the enemy: they having, according to their regular custom,

abandoned them for the nearest town.

[Sidenote: The Gauls harass the army.]

+51.+ When day broke the natives saw what had taken place, and at

first desisted from their attempts; but presently the sight of the

immense string of beasts of burden, and of the cavalry, slowly and

painfully making the ascent, tempted them to attack the advancing

line. Accordingly they fell upon it at many points at once; and the

Carthaginians sustained severe losses, not so much at the hands of

the enemy, as from the dangerous nature of the ground, which proved

especially fatal to the horses and beasts of burden. For as the ascent

was not only narrow and rough, but flanked also with precipices, at

every movement which tended to throw the line into disorder, large

numbers of the beasts of burden were hurled down the precipices with

their loads on their backs. And what added more than anything else to

this sort of confusion were the wounded horses; for, maddened by their

wounds, they either turned round and ran into the advancing beasts of

burden, or, rushing furiously forward, dashed aside everything that

came in their way on the narrow path, and so threw the whole line into

disorder. Hannibal saw what was taking place, and knowing that, even

if they escaped this attack, they could never survive the loss of all

their baggage, he took with him the men who had seized the strongholds

during the night and went to the relief of the advancing line. Having

the advantage of charging the enemy from the higher ground he inflicted

a severe loss upon them, but suffered also as severe a one in his

own army; for the commotion in the line now grew worse, and in both

directions at once—thanks to the shouting and struggling of these

combatants: and it was not until he had killed the greater number of

the Allobroges, and forced the rest to fly to their own land, that

the remainder of the beasts of burden and the horses got slowly, and

with difficulty, over the dangerous ground. Hannibal himself rallied

as many as he could after the fight, and assaulted the town from

which the enemy had sallied; and finding it almost deserted, because

its inhabitants had been all tempted out by the hope of booty, he

got possession of it: from which he obtained many advantages for the

future as well as for the present. The immediate gain consisted of a

large number of horses and beasts of burden, and men taken with them;

and for future use he got a supply of corn and cattle sufficient for

two or three days: but the most important result of all was the terror

inspired in the next tribes, which prevented any one of those who lived

near the ascent from lightly venturing to meddle with him again.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls.]

+52.+ Here he pitched a camp and remained a day, and started again. For

the next three days he accomplished a certain amount of his journey

without accident. But on the fourth he again found himself in serious

danger. For the dwellers along his route, having concerted a plan of

treachery, met him with branches and garlands, which among nearly all

the natives are signs of friendship, as the herald’s staff is among the

Greeks. Hannibal was cautious about accepting such assurances, and took

great pains to discover what their real intention and purpose were.

The Gauls however professed to be fully aware of the capture of the

town, and the destruction of those who had attempted to do him wrong;

and explained that those events had induced them to come, because they

wished neither to inflict nor receive any damage; and finally promised

to give him hostages. For a long while Hannibal hesitated and refused

to trust their speeches. But at length coming to the conclusion that,

if he accepted what was offered, he would perhaps render the men

before him less mischievous and implacable; but that, if he rejected

them, he must expect undisguised hostility from them, he acceded to

their request, and feigned to accept their offer of friendship. The

barbarians handed over the hostages, supplied him liberally with

cattle, and in fact put themselves unreservedly into his hands; so that

for a time Hannibal’s suspicions were allayed, and he employed them as

guides for the next difficulty that had to be passed. They guided the

army for two days: and then these tribes collected their numbers, and

keeping close up with the Carthaginians, attacked them just as they

were passing through a certain difficult and precipitous gorge.

[Sidenote: Severe losses.]

+53.+ Hannibal’s army would now have certainly been utterly destroyed,

had it not been for the fact that his fears were still on the alert,

and that, having a prescience of what was to come, he had placed his

baggage and cavalry in the van and his hoplites in the rear. These

latter covered his line, and were able to stem the attack of the enemy,

and accordingly the disaster was less than it would otherwise have

been. As it was, however, a large number of beasts of burden and horses

perished; for the advantage of the higher ground being with the enemy,

the Gauls moved along the slopes parallel with the army below, and by

rolling down boulders, or throwing stones, reduced the troops to a

state of the utmost confusion and danger; so that Hannibal with half

his force was obliged to pass the night near a certain white rock,[181]

which afforded them protection, separated from his horses and baggage

which he was covering; until after a whole night’s struggle they slowly

and with difficulty emerged from the gorge.

[Sidenote: Arrives at the summit.]

Next morning the enemy had disappeared: and Hannibal, having effected

a junction with his cavalry and baggage, led his men towards the head

of the pass, without falling in again with any important muster of the

natives, though he was harassed by some of them from time to time;

who seized favourable opportunities, now on his van and now on his

rear, of carrying off some of his baggage. His best protection was his

elephants; on whatever parts of the line they were placed the enemy

never ventured to approach, being terrified at the unwonted appearance

of the animals. The ninth day’s march brought him to the head of the

pass: and there he encamped for two days, partly to rest his men and

partly to allow stragglers to come up. Whilst they were there, many of

the horses who had taken fright and run away, and many of the beasts of

burden that had got rid of their loads, unexpectedly appeared: they had

followed the tracks of the army and now joined the camp.

[Sidenote: 9th November.]

+54.+ But by this time, it being nearly the period of the setting of

the Pleiads, the snow was beginning to be thick on the heights; and

seeing his men in low spirits, owing both to the fatigue they had

gone through, and that which still lay before them, Hannibal called

them together and tried to cheer them by dwelling on the one possible

topic of consolation in his power, namely the view of Italy: which lay

stretched out in both directions below those mountains, giving the

Alps the appearance of a citadel to the whole of Italy. By pointing

therefore to the plains of the Padus, and reminding them of the

friendly welcome which awaited them from the Gauls who lived there,

and at the same time indicating the direction of Rome itself, he did

somewhat to raise the drooping spirits of his men.

[Sidenote: The descent.]

Next day he began the descent, in which he no longer met with any

enemies, except some few secret pillagers; but from the dangerous

ground and the snow he lost almost as many men as on the ascent.

For the path down was narrow and precipitous, and the snow made it

impossible for the men to see where they were treading, while to

step aside from the path, or to stumble, meant being hurled down the

precipices. The troops however bore up against the fatigue, having

now grown accustomed to such hardships; but when they came to a place

where the path was too narrow for the elephants or beasts of burden to

pass,—and which, narrowed before by landslips extending about a stade

and a half, had recently been made more so by another landslip,—then

once more despondency and consternation fell upon the troops.

Hannibal’s first idea was to avoid this _mauvais pas_ by a détour, but

this route too being made impossible by a snow-storm, he abandoned the

idea.

[Sidenote: A break in the road.]

+55.+ The effect of the storm was peculiar and extraordinary. For

the present fall of snow coming upon the top of that which was there

before, and had remained from the last winter, it was found that the

former, being fresh, was soft and offered no resistance to the foot;

but when the feet reached the lower frozen snow, they could no longer

make any impression upon it, but the men found both their feet slipping

from under them, as though they were on hard ground with a layer of mud

on the top. And a still more serious difficulty followed: for not being

able to get a foothold on the lower snow, when they fell and tried to

get themselves up by their hands and knees, the men found themselves

plunging downwards quicker and quicker, along with everything they laid

hold of, the ground being a very steep decline. The beasts, however,

when they fell did break through this lower snow as they struggled to

rise, and having done so were obliged to remain there with their loads,

as though they were frozen to it, both from the weight of these loads

and the hardness of the old snow. Giving up, therefore, all hope of

making this détour, he encamped upon the ridge after clearing away the

snow upon it. He then set large parties of his men to work, and, with

infinite toil, began constructing a road on the face of the precipice.

One day’s work sufficed to make a path practicable for beasts of burden

and horses; and he accordingly took them across at once, and having

pitched his camp at a spot below the snow line, he let them go in

search of pasture; while he told off the Numidians in detachments to

proceed with the making of the road; and after three days’ difficult

and painful labour he got his elephants across, though in a miserable

condition from hunger. For the tops of the Alps, and the parts

immediately below them, are completely treeless and bare of vegetation,

because the snow lies there summer and winter; but about half-way down

the slopes on both sides they produce trees and shrubs, and are, in

fact, fit for human habitation.

[Sidenote: He reaches the plains.]

+56.+ So Hannibal mustered his forces and continued the descent; and

on the third day after passing the precipitous path just described he

reached the plains. From the beginning of his march he had lost many

men by the hands of the enemy, and in crossing rivers, and many more

on the precipices and dangerous passes of the Alps; and not only men

in this last way, but horses and beasts of burden in still greater

numbers. The whole march from New Carthage had occupied five months,

the actual passage of the Alps fifteen days; and he now boldly entered

the valley of the Padus, and the territory of the Insubres, with such

of his army as survived, consisting of twelve thousand Libyans and

eight thousand Iberians, and not more than six thousand cavalry in all,

as he himself distinctly states on the column erected on the promontory

of Lacinium to record the numbers.

At the same time, as I have before stated, Publius having left his

legions under the command of his brother Gnaeus, with orders to

prosecute the Iberian campaign and offer an energetic resistance to

Hasdrubal, landed at Pisae with a small body of men. Thence he marched

through Etruria, and taking over the army of the Praetors which was

guarding the country against the Boii, he arrived in the valley of the

Padus; and, pitching his camp there, waited for the enemy with an eager

desire to give him battle.

[Sidenote: Digression on the limits of history.]

+57.+ Having thus brought the generals of the two nations and the war

itself into Italy, before beginning the campaign, I wish to say a few

words about what I conceive to be germane or not to my history.

I can conceive some readers complaining that, while devoting a great

deal of space to Libya and Iberia, I have said little or nothing

about the strait of the Pillars of Hercules, the Mare Externum, or

the British Isles, and the manufacture of tin in them, or even of the

silver and gold mines in Iberia itself, of which historians give long

and contradictory accounts. It was not, let me say, because I thought

these subjects out of place in history that I passed them over; but

because, in the first place, I did not wish to be diffuse, or distract

the attention of students from the main current of my narrative; and,

in the next place, because I was determined not to treat of them in

scattered notices or casual allusions, but to assign them a distinct

time and place, and at these, to the best of my ability, to give a

trustworthy account of them. On the same principle I must deprecate

any feeling of surprise if, in the succeeding portions of my history,

I pass over other similar topics, which might seem naturally in place,

for the same reasons. Those who ask for dissertations in history on

every possible subject, are somewhat like greedy guests at a banquet,

who, by tasting every dish on the table, fail to really enjoy any

one of them at the time, or to digest and feel any benefit from them

afterwards. Such omnivorous readers get no real pleasure in the

present, and no adequate instruction for the future.

+58.+ There can be no clearer proof, than is afforded by these

particular instances, that this department of historical writing stands

above all others in need of study and correction. For as all, or at

least the greater number of writers, have endeavoured to describe the

peculiar features and positions of the countries on the confines of

the known world, and in doing so have, in most cases, made egregious

mistakes, it is impossible to pass over their errors without some

attempt at refutation; and that not in scattered observations or casual

remarks, but deliberately and formally. But such confutation should

not take the form of accusation or invective. While correcting their

mistakes we should praise the writers, feeling sure that, had they

lived to the present age, they would have altered and corrected many of

their statements. The fact is that, in past ages, we know of very few

Greeks who undertook to investigate these remote regions, owing to the

insuperable difficulties of the attempt. The dangers at sea were then

more than can easily be calculated, and those on land more numerous

still. And even if one did reach these countries on the confines of the

world, whether compulsorily or voluntarily, the difficulties in the way

of a personal inspection were only begun: for some of the regions were

utterly barbarous, others uninhabited; and a still greater obstacle

in way of gaining information as to what he saw was his ignorance

of the language of the country. And even if he learnt this, a still

greater difficulty was to preserve a strict moderation in his account

of what he had seen, and despising all attempts to glorify himself by

traveller’s tales of wonder, to report for our benefit the truth and

nothing but the truth.

+59.+ All these impediments made a true account of these regions in

past times difficult, if not impossible. Nor ought we to criticise

severely the omissions or mistakes of these writers: rather they

deserve our praise and admiration for having in such an age gained

information as to these places, which distinctly advanced knowledge.

In our own age, however, the Asiatic districts have been opened up

both by sea and land owing to the empire of Alexander, and the other

places owing to the supremacy of Rome. Men too of practical experience

in affairs, being released from the cares of martial or political

ambition, have thereby had excellent opportunities for research and

inquiry into these localities; and therefore it will be but right

for us to have a better and truer knowledge of what was formerly

unknown. And this I shall endeavour to establish, when I find a fitting

opportunity in the course of my history. I shall be especially anxious

to give the curious a full knowledge on these points, because it was

with that express object that I confronted the dangers and fatigues

of my travels in Libya, Iberia, and Gaul, as well as of the sea which

washes the western coasts of these countries; that I might correct the

imperfect knowledge of former writers, and make the Greeks acquainted

with these parts of the known world.

After this digression, I must go back to the pitched battles between

the Romans and Carthaginians in Italy.

[Sidenote: Rest and recovery.]

[Sidenote: Taking of Turin.]

+60.+ After arriving in Italy with the number of troops which I have

already stated, Hannibal pitched his camp at the very foot of the Alps,

and was occupied, to begin with, in refreshing his men. For not only

had his whole army suffered terribly from the difficulties of transit

in the ascent, and still more in the descent of the Alps, but it was

also in evil case from the shortness of provisions, and the inevitable

neglect of all proper attention to physical necessities. Many had quite

abandoned all care for their health under the influence of starvation

and continuous fatigue; for it had proved impossible to carry a full

supply of food for so many thousands over such mountains, and what they

did bring was in great part lost along with the beasts that carried it.

So that whereas, when Hannibal crossed the Rhone, he had thirty-eight

thousand infantry, and more than eight thousand cavalry, he lost

nearly half in the pass, as I have shown above; while the survivors

had by these long continued sufferings become almost savage in look

and general appearance. Hannibal therefore bent his whole energies to

the restoration of the spirits and bodies of his men, and of their

horses also. When his army had thus sufficiently recovered, finding

the Taurini, who live immediately under the Alps, at war with the

Insubres and inclined to be suspicious of the Carthaginians, Hannibal

first invited them to terms of friendship and alliance; and, on their

refusal, invested their chief city and carried it after a three day’s

siege. Having put to the sword all who had opposed him, he struck such

terror into the minds of the neighbouring tribes, that they all gave in

their submission out of hand. The other Celts inhabiting these plains

were also eager to join the Carthaginians, according to their original

purpose; but the Roman legions had by this time advanced too far, and

had intercepted the greater part of them: they were therefore unable to

stir, and in some cases were even obliged to serve in the Roman ranks.

This determined Hannibal not to delay his advance any longer, but to

strike some blow which might encourage those natives who were desirous

of sharing his enterprise.

[Sidenote: Approach of Scipio.]

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius recalled.]

+61.+ When he heard, while engaged on this design, that Publius had

already crossed the Padus with his army, and was at no great distance,

he was at first inclined to disbelieve the fact, reflecting that it was

not many days since he had left him near the passage of the Rhone, and

that the voyage from Marseilles to Etruria was a long and difficult

one. He was told, moreover, that from the Tyrrhenian Sea to the Alps

through Italian soil was a long march, without good military roads.

But when messenger after messenger confirmed the intelligence with

increased positiveness, he was filled with amazement and admiration

at the Consul’s plan of campaign, and promptness in carrying it out.

The feelings of Publius were much the same: for he had not expected

that Hannibal would even attempt the passage of the Alps with forces

of different races, or, if he did attempt it, that he could escape

utter destruction. Entertaining such ideas he was immensely astonished

at his courage and adventurous daring, when he heard that he had not

only got safe across, but was actually besieging certain towns in

Italy. Similar feelings were entertained at Rome when the news arrived

there. For scarcely had the last rumour about the taking of Saguntum

by the Carthaginians ceased to attract attention, and scarcely had

the measures adopted in view of that event been taken,—namely the

despatch of one Consul to Libya to besiege Carthage, and of the other

to Iberia to meet Hannibal there,—than news came that Hannibal had

arrived in Italy with his army, and was already besieging certain towns

in it. Thrown into great alarm by this unexpected turn of affairs, the

Roman government sent at once to Tiberius at Lilybaeum, telling him

of the presence of the enemy in Italy, and ordering him to abandon

the original design of his expedition, and to make all haste home to

reinforce the defences of the country. Tiberius at once collected

the men of the fleet and sent them off, with orders to go home by

sea; while he caused the Tribunes to administer an oath to the men of

the legions that they would all appear at a fixed day at Ariminum by

bedtime. Ariminum is a town on the Adriatic, situated at the southern

boundary of the valley of the Padus. In every direction there was stir

and excitement: and the news being a complete surprise to everybody,

there was everywhere a great and irrepressible anxiety as to the future.

[Sidenote: Gallic prisoners.]

+62.+ The two armies being now within a short distance of each other,

Hannibal and Publius both thought it necessary to address their men in

terms suitable to the occasion.

The manner in which Hannibal tried to encourage his army was this. He

mustered the men, and caused some youthful prisoners whom he had caught

when they were attempting to hinder his march on the Alpine passes, to

be brought forward. They had been subjected to great severities with

this very object, loaded with heavy chains, half-starved, and their

bodies a mass of bruises from scourging. Hannibal caused these men to

be placed in the middle of the army, and some suits of Gallic armour,

such as are worn by their kings when they fight in single combat, to

be exhibited; in addition to these he placed there some horses, and

brought in some valuable military cloaks. He then asked these young

prisoners, which of them were willing to fight with each other on

condition of the conqueror taking these prizes, and the vanquished

escaping all his present miseries by death. Upon their all answering

with a loud shout that they were desirous of fighting in these single

combats, he bade them draw lots; and the pair, on whom the first lot

fell, to put on the armour and fight with each other. As soon as the

young men heard these orders, they lifted up their hands, and each

prayed the gods that he might be one of those to draw the lot. And

when the lots were drawn, those on whom they fell were overjoyed,

and the others in despair. When the fight was finished, too, the

surviving captives congratulated the one who had fallen no less than

the victor, as having been freed from many terrible sufferings, while

they themselves still remained to endure them. And in this feeling

the Carthaginian soldiers were much disposed to join, all pitying the

survivors and congratulating the fallen champion.

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s speech.]

+63.+ Having by this example made the impression he desired upon the

minds of his troops, Hannibal then came forward himself and said, “that

he had exhibited these captives in order that they might see in the

person of others a vivid representation of what they had to expect

themselves, and might so lay their plans all the better in view of the

actual state of affairs. Fortune had summoned them to a life and death

contest very like that of the two captives, and in which the prize of

victory was the same. For they must either conquer, or die, or fall

alive into the hands of their enemies; and the prize of victory would

not be mere horses and military cloaks, but the most enviable position

in the world if they became masters of the wealth of Rome: or if they

fell in battle their reward would be to end their life fighting to

their last breath for the noblest object, in the heat of the struggle,

and with no sense of pain; while if they were beaten, or from desire

of life were base enough to fly, or tried to prolong that life by

any means except victory, every sort of misery and misfortune would

be their lot: for it was impossible that any one of them could be so

irrational or senseless, when he remembered the length of the journey

he had performed from his native land, and the number of enemies that

lay between him and it, and the size of the rivers he had crossed, as

to cherish the hope of being able to reach his home by flight. They

should therefore cast away such vain hopes, and regard their position

as being exactly that of the combatants whom they had but now been

watching. For, as in their case, all congratulated the dead as much as

the victor, and commiserated the survivors; so they should think of

the alternatives before themselves, and should, one and all, come upon

the field of battle resolved, if possible, to conquer, and, if not,

to die. Life with defeat was a hope that must by no means whatever be

entertained. If they reasoned and resolved thus, victory and safety

would certainly attend them: for it never happened that men who came to

such a resolution, whether of deliberate purpose or from being driven

to bay, were disappointed in their hope of beating their opponents in

the field. And when it chanced, as was the case with the Romans, that

the enemy had in most cases a hope of quite an opposite character,

from the near neighbourhood of their native country making flight an

obvious means of safety, then it was clear that the courage which came

of despair would carry the day.”

When he saw that the example and the words he had spoken had gone home

to the minds of the rank and file, and that the spirit and enthusiasm

which he aimed at inspiring were created, he dismissed them for the

present with commendations, and gave orders for an advance at daybreak

on the next morning.

[Sidenote: Scipio crosses the Ticinus.]

+64.+ About the same day Publius Scipio, having now crossed the Padus,

and being resolved to make a farther advance across the Ticinus,

ordered those who were skilled in such works to construct a bridge

across this latter river; and then summoned a meeting of the remainder

of his army and addressed them: dwelling principally on the reputation

of their country and of the ancestors’ achievements. But he referred

particularly to their present position, saying, “that they ought to

entertain no doubt of victory, though they had never as yet had any

experience of the enemy; and should regard it as a piece of extravagant

presumption of the Carthaginians to venture to face Romans, by whom

they had been so often beaten, and to whom they had for so many years

paid tribute and been all but slaves. And when in addition to this they

at present knew thus much of their mettle,—that they dared not face

them, what was the fair inference to be drawn for the future? Their

cavalry, in a chance encounter on the Rhone with those of Rome, had,

so far from coming off well, lost a large number of men, and had fled

with disgrace to their own camp; and the general and his army, as soon

as they knew of the approach of his legions, had beat a retreat, which

was exceedingly like a flight, and, contrary to their original purpose,

had in their terror taken the road over the Alps. And it was evident

that Hannibal had destroyed the greater part of his army; and that what

he had left was feeble and unfit for service, from the hardships they

had undergone: in the same way he had lost the majority of his horses,

and made the rest useless from the length and difficult nature of the

journey. They had, therefore, only to show themselves to the enemy.”

But, above all, he pointed out that “his own presence at their head

ought to be special encouragement to them: for that he would not have

left his fleet and Spanish campaign, on which he had been sent, and

have come to them in such haste, if he had not seen on consideration

that his doing so was necessary for his country’s safety, and that a

certain victory was secured to him by it.”

The weight and influence of the speaker, as well as their belief

in his words, roused great enthusiasm among the men; which Scipio

acknowledged, and then dismissed them with the additional injunction

that they should hold themselves in readiness to obey any order sent

round to them.

[Sidenote: Skirmish of cavalry near the Ticinus, Nov. B.C. 219.]

+65.+ Next day both generals led their troops along the river Padus,

on the bank nearest the Alps, the Romans having the stream on their

left, the Carthaginians on their right; and having ascertained on the

second day, by means of scouts, that they were near each other, they

both halted and remained encamped for that day: but on the next, both

taking their cavalry, and Publius his sharp-shooters also, they hurried

across the plain to reconnoitre each other’s forces. As soon as they

came within distance, and saw the dust rising from the side of their

opponents, they drew up their lines for battle at once. Publius put his

sharp-shooters and Gallic horsemen in front, and bringing the others

into line, advanced at a slow pace. Hannibal placed his cavalry that

rode with bridles, and was most to be depended on, in his front, and

led them straight against the enemy; having put the Numidian cavalry on

either wing to take the enemy on the flanks. The two generals and the

cavalry were in such hot haste to engage, that they closed with each

other before the sharp-shooters had an opportunity of discharging their

javelines at all. Before they could do so, they left their ground, and

retreated to the rear of their own cavalry, making their way between

the squadrons, terrified at the approaching charge, and afraid of being

trampled to death by the horses which were galloping down upon them.

The cavalry charged each other front to front, and for a long time

maintained an equal contest; and a great many men dismounting on the

actual field, there was a mixed fight of horse and foot. The Numidian

horse, however, having outflanked the Romans, charged them on the rear:

and so the sharp-shooters, who had fled from the cavalry charge at

the beginning, were now trampled to death by the numbers and furious

onslaught of the Numidians; while the front ranks originally engaged

with the Carthaginians, after losing many of their men and inflicting a

still greater loss on the enemy, finding themselves charged on the rear

by the Numidians, broke into flight: most of them scattering in every

direction, while some of them kept closely massed round the Consul.

[Sidenote: Scipio retires to Placentia on the right bank of the Po.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal crosses the Po higher up and follows Scipio to

Placentia.]

+66.+ Publius then broke up his camp, and marched through the plains to

the bridge over the Padus, in haste to get his legions across before

the enemy came up. He saw that the level country where he was then was

favourable to the enemy with his superiority in cavalry. He was himself

disabled by a wound;[182] and he decided that it was necessary to shift

his quarters to a place of safety. For a time Hannibal imagined that

Scipio would give him battle with his infantry also: but when he saw

that he had abandoned his camp, he went in pursuit of him as far as

the bridge over the Ticinus; but finding that the greater part of the

timbers of this bridge had been torn away, while the men who guarded

the bridge were left still on his side of the river, he took them

prisoners to the number of about six hundred, and being informed that

the main army was far on its way, he wheeled round and again ascended

the Padus in search of a spot in it which admitted of being easily

bridged. After two days’ march he halted and constructed a bridge over

the river by means of boats. He committed the task of bringing over the

army to Hasdrubal;[183] while he himself crossed at once, and busied

himself in receiving the ambassadors who arrived from the neighbouring

districts. For no sooner had he gained the advantage in the cavalry

engagement, than all the Celts in the vicinity hastened to fulfil their

original engagement by avowing themselves his friends, supplying him

with provisions, and joining the Carthaginian forces. After giving

these men a cordial reception, and getting his own army across the

Padus, he began to march back again down stream, with an earnest

desire of giving the enemy battle. Publius, too, had crossed the river

and was now encamped under the walls of the Roman colony Placentia.

There he made no sign of any intention to move; for he was engaged in

trying to heal his own wound and those of his men, and considered that

he had a secure base of operations where he was. A two days’ march

from the place where he had crossed the Padus brought Hannibal to the

neighbourhood of the enemy; and on the third day he drew out his army

for battle in full view of his opponents: but as no one came out to

attack, he pitched his camp about fifty stades from them.

[Sidenote: Treachery of the Gauls serving in the army of Scipio.]

+67.+ But the Celtic contingent of the Roman army, seeing that

Hannibal’s prospects looked the brighter of the two, concerted their

plans for a fixed time, and waited in their several tents for the

moment of carrying them out. When the men within the rampart of the

camp had taken their supper and were gone to bed, the Celts let more

than half the night pass, and just about the time of the morning watch

armed themselves and fell upon the Romans who were quartered nearest

to them; killed a considerable number, and wounded not a few; and,

finally, cutting off the heads of the slain, departed with them to

join the Carthaginians, to the number of two thousand infantry and

nearly two hundred cavalry. They were received with great satisfaction

by Hannibal; who, after addressing them encouragingly, and promising

them all suitable rewards, sent them to their several cities, to

declare to their compatriots what they had done, and to urge them

to make alliance with him: for he knew that they would now all feel

compelled to take part with him, when they learnt the treachery of

which their fellow-countrymen had been guilty to the Romans. Just

at the same time the Boii came in, and handed over to him the three

Agrarian Commissioners, sent from Rome to divide the lands; whom, as

I have already related, they had seized by a sudden act of treachery

at the beginning of the war. Hannibal gratefully acknowledged their

good intention, and made a formal alliance with those who came: but he

handed them back their prisoners, bidding them keep them safe, in order

to get back their own hostages from Rome, as they intended at first.

[Sidenote: Scipio changes his position at Placentia to one on the

Trebia.]

Publius regarded this treachery as of most serious importance; and

feeling sure that the Celts in the neighbourhood had long been

ill-disposed, and would, after this event, all incline to the

Carthaginians, he made up his mind that some precaution for the future

was necessary. The next night, therefore, just before the morning

watch, he broke up his camp and marched for the river Trebia, and the

high ground near it, feeling confidence in the protection which the

strength of the position and the neighbourhood of his allies would give

him.

[Sidenote: Hannibal follows him.]

+68.+ When Hannibal was informed of Scipio’s change of quarters,

he sent the Numidian horse in pursuit at once, and the rest soon

afterwards, following close behind with his main army. The Numidians,

finding the Roman camp empty, stopped to set fire to it: which proved

of great service to the Romans; for if they had pushed on and caught

up the Roman baggage, a large number of the rear-guard would have

certainly been killed by the cavalry in the open plains. But as it was,

the greater part of them got across the River Trebia in time; while

those who were after all too far in the rear to escape, were either

killed or made prisoners by the Carthaginians.

[Sidenote: Scipio’s position on the slopes of Apennines, near the

source of the Trebia.]

Scipio, however, having crossed the Trebia occupied the first high

ground; and having strengthened his camp with trench and palisade,

waited the arrival of his colleague, Tiberius Sempronius, and his army;

and was taking the greatest pains to cure his wound, because he was

exceedingly anxious to take part in the coming engagement. Hannibal

pitched his camp about forty stades from him. While the numerous

Celts inhabiting the plains, excited by the good prospects of the

Carthaginians, supplied his army with provisions in great abundance,

and were eager to take their share with Hannibal in every military

operation or battle.

When news of the cavalry engagement reached Rome, the disappointment

of their confident expectations caused a feeling of consternation in

the minds of the people. Not but that plenty of pretexts were found to

prove to their own satisfaction that the affair was not a defeat. Some

laid the blame on the Consul’s rashness, and others on the treacherous

lukewarmness of the Celts, which they concluded from their recent

revolt must have been shown by them on the field. But, after all, as

the infantry was still unimpaired, they made up their minds that the

general result was still as hopeful as ever. Accordingly, when Tiberius

and his legions arrived at Rome, and marched through the city, they

believed that his mere appearance at the seat of war would settle the

matter.

[Sidenote: Tiberius Sempronius joins Scipio.]

His men met Tiberius at Ariminum, according to their oath, and he

at once led them forward in all haste to join Publius Scipio. The

junction effected, and a camp pitched by the side of his colleague,

he was naturally obliged to refresh his men after their forty days’

continuous march between Ariminum and Lilybaeum: but he went on with

all preparations for a battle; and was continually in conference with

Scipio, asking questions as to what had happened in the past, and

discussing with him the measures to be taken in the present.

[Sidenote: Fall of Clastidium. Hannibal’s policy towards the Italians.]

[Sidenote: A skirmish favourable to the Romans.]

+69.+ Meanwhile Hannibal got possession of Clastidium, by the treachery

of a certain Brundisian, to whom it had been entrusted by the Romans.

Having become master of the garrison and the stores of corn he used the

latter for his present needs; but took the men whom he had captured

with him, without doing them any harm, being desirous of showing by

an example the policy he meant to pursue; that those whose present

position towards Rome was merely the result of circumstances should

not be terrified, and give up hope of being spared by him. The man

who betrayed Clastidium to him he treated with extraordinary honour,

by way of tempting all men in similar situations of authority to

share the prospects of the Carthaginians. But afterwards, finding

that certain Celts who lived in the fork of the Padus and the Trebia,

while pretending to have made terms with him, were sending messages

to the Romans at the same time, believing that they would thus secure

themselves from being harmed by either side, he sent two thousand

infantry with some Celtic and Numidian cavalry with orders to devastate

their territory. This order being executed, and a great booty obtained,

the Celts appeared at the Roman camp beseeching their aid. Tiberius

had been all along looking out for an opportunity of striking a blow:

and once seized on this pretext for sending out a party, consisting of

the greater part of his cavalry; and a thousand sharp-shooters of his

infantry along with them; who having speedily come up with the enemy

on the other side of the Trebia, and engaged them in a sharp struggle

for the possession of the booty, forced the Celts and Numidians to beat

a retreat to their own camp. Those who were on duty in front of the

Carthaginian camp quickly perceived what was going on, and brought some

reserves to support the retreating cavalry; then the Romans in their

turn were routed, and had to retreat to their camp. At this Tiberius

sent out all his cavalry and sharp-shooters; whereupon the Celts again

gave way, and sought the protection of their own camp. The Carthaginian

general being unprepared for a general engagement, and thinking it a

sound rule not to enter upon one on every casual opportunity, or except

in accordance with a settled design, acted, it must be confessed, on

this occasion with admirable generalship. He checked their flight when

his men were near the camp, and forced them to halt and face about; but

he sent out his aides and buglers to recall the rest, and prevented

them from pursuing and engaging the enemy any more. So the Romans after

a short halt went back, having killed a large number of the enemy, and

lost very few themselves.

[Sidenote: Sempronius resolves to give battle.]

+70.+ Excited and overjoyed at this success Tiberius was all eagerness

for a general engagement. Now, it was in his power to administer the

war for the present as he chose, owing to the ill-health of Publius

Scipio; yet wishing to have his colleague’s opinion in support of his

own, he consulted him on this subject. Publius however took quite

an opposite view of the situation. He thought his legions would be

all the better for a winter under arms; and that the fidelity of the

fickle Celts would never stand the test of want of success and enforced

inactivity on the part of the Carthaginians: they would be certain, he

thought, to turn against them once more. Besides, when he had recovered

from his wound, he hoped to be able to do good service to his country

himself. With these arguments he tried to dissuade Tiberius from his

design. The latter felt that every one of these arguments were true and

sound; but, urged on by ambition and a blind confidence in his fortune,

he was eager to have the credit of the decisive action to himself,

before Scipio should be able to be present at the battle, or the next

Consuls arrive to take over the command; for the time for that to take

place was now approaching. As therefore he selected the time for the

engagement from personal considerations, rather than with a view to the

actual circumstances of the case, he was bound to make a signal failure.

Hannibal took much the same view of the case as Scipio, and was

therefore, unlike him, eager for a battle; because, in the first place,

he wished to avail himself of the enthusiasm of the Celts before it

had at all gone off: in the second place, he wished to engage the

Roman legions while the soldiers in them were raw recruits without

practice in war: and, in the third place, because he wished to fight

the battle while Scipio was still unfit for service: but most of all

because he wanted to be doing something and not to let the time slip

by fruitlessly; for when a general leads his troops into a foreign

country, and attempts what looks like a desperate undertaking, the one

chance for him is to keep the hopes of his allies alive by continually

striking some fresh blow.

Such were Hannibal’s feelings when he knew of the intended attack of

Tiberius.

[Sidenote: Hannibal prepares an ambuscade.]

+71.+ Now he had some time before remarked a certain piece of ground

which was flat and treeless, and yet well suited for an ambush, because

there was a stream in it with a high overhanging bank thickly covered

with thorns and brambles. Here he determined to entrap the enemy. The

place was admirably adapted for putting them off their guard; because

the Romans were always suspicious of woods, from the fact of the Celts

invariably choosing such places for their ambuscades, but felt no fear

at all of places that were level and without trees: not knowing that

for the concealment and safety of an ambush such places are much better

than woods; because the men can command from them a distant view of

all that is going on: while nearly all places have sufficient cover to

make concealment possible,—a stream with an overhanging bank, reeds, or

ferns, or some sort of bramble-bushes,—which are good enough to hide

not infantry only, but sometimes even cavalry, if the simple precaution

is taken of laying conspicuous arms flat upon the ground and hiding

helmets under shields. Hannibal had confided his idea to his brother

Mago and to his council, who had all approved of the plan. Accordingly,

when the army had supped, he summoned this young man to his tent, who

was full of youthful enthusiasm, and had been trained from boyhood

in the art of war, and put under his command a hundred cavalry and

the same number of infantry. These men he had himself earlier in the

day selected as the most powerful of the whole army, and had ordered

to come to his tent after supper. Having addressed and inspired them

with the spirit suitable to the occasion, he bade each of them select

ten of the bravest men of their own company, and to come with them

to a particular spot in the camp. The order having been obeyed, he

despatched the whole party, numbering a thousand cavalry and as many

infantry, with guides, to the place selected for the ambuscade; and

gave his brother directions as to the time at which he was to make the

attempt. At daybreak he himself mustered the Numidian cavalry, who were

conspicuous for their powers of endurance; and after addressing them,

and promising them rewards if they behaved with gallantry, he ordered

them to ride up to the enemy’s lines, and then quickly cross the river,

and by throwing showers of darts at them tempt them to come out: his

object being to get at the enemy before they had had their breakfast,

or made any preparations for the day. The other officers of the army

also he summoned, and gave them similar instructions for the battle,

ordering all their men to get breakfast and to see to their arms and

horses.

[Sidenote: Battle of the Trebia, December B.C. 218.]

[Sidenote: Hannibal’s forces.]

[Sidenote: The Roman forces.]

+72.+ As soon as Tiberius saw the Numidian horse approaching, he

immediately sent out his cavalry by itself with orders to engage the

enemy, and keep them in play, while he despatched after them six

thousand foot armed with javelins, and got the rest of the army in

motion, with the idea that their appearance would decide the affair:

for his superiority in numbers, and his success in the cavalry skirmish

of the day before, had filled him with confidence. But it was now

mid-winter and the day was snowy and excessively cold, and men and

horses were marching out almost entirely without having tasted food;

and accordingly, though the troops were at first in high spirits, yet

when they had crossed the Trebia, swollen by the floods which the rain

of the previous night had brought down from the high ground above the

camp, wading breast deep through the stream, they were in a wretched

state from the cold and want of food as the day wore on. While the

Carthaginians on the contrary had eaten and drunk in their tents, and

got their horses ready, and were all anointing and arming themselves

round the fires. Hannibal waited for the right moment to strike, and

as soon as he saw that the Romans had crossed the Trebia, throwing out

eight thousand spearmen and slingers to cover his advance, he led out

his whole army. When he had advanced about eight stades from the camp,

he drew up his infantry, consisting of about twenty thousand Iberians,

Celts, and Libyans, in one long line, while he divided his cavalry and

placed half on each wing, amounting in all to more than ten thousand,

counting the Celtic allies; his elephants also he divided between the

two wings, where they occupied the front rank. Meanwhile Tiberius had

recalled his cavalry because he saw that they could do nothing with the

enemy. For the Numidians when attacked retreated without difficulty,

scattering in every direction, and then faced about again and charged,

which is the peculiar feature of their mode of warfare. But he drew up

his infantry in the regular Roman order, consisting of sixteen thousand

citizens and twenty thousand allies; for that is the complete number

of a Roman army in an important campaign, when the two Consuls are

compelled by circumstances to combine forces.[184] He then placed the

cavalry on either wing, numbering four thousand, and advanced against

the enemy in gallant style, in regular order, and at a deliberate pace.

[Sidenote: The Roman cavalry retreat.]

+73.+ When the two forces came within distance, the light-armed troops

in front of the two armies closed with each other. In this part of the

battle the Romans were in many respects at a disadvantage, while the

Carthaginians had everything in their favour. For the Roman spearmen

had been on hard service ever since daybreak, and had expended most of

their weapons in the engagement with the Numidians, while those weapons

which were left had become useless from being long wet. Nor were the

cavalry, or indeed the whole army, any better off in these respects.

The case of the Carthaginians was exactly the reverse: they had come on

the field perfectly sound and fresh, and were ready and eager for every

service required of them. As soon, therefore, as their advanced guard

had retired again within their lines, and the heavy-armed soldiers

were engaged, the cavalry on the two wings of the Carthaginian army at

once charged the enemy with all the effect of superiority in numbers,

and in the condition both of men and horses secured by their freshness

when they started. The Roman cavalry on the contrary retreated: and

the flanks of the line being thus left unprotected, the Carthaginian

spearmen and the main body of the Numidians, passing their own advanced

guard, charged the Roman flanks: and, by the damage which they did

them, prevented them from keeping up the fight with the troops on their

front. The heavy-armed soldiers, however, who were in the front rank

of both armies, and in the centre of that, maintained an obstinate and

equal fight for a considerable time.

[Sidenote: Both Roman wings defeated.]

[Sidenote: The Roman centre fights its way to Placentia.]

+74.+ Just then the Numidians, who had been lying in ambush, left their

hiding-place, and by a sudden charge on the centre of the Roman rear

produced great confusion and alarm throughout the army. Finally both

the Roman wings, being hard pressed in front by the elephants, and on

both flanks by the light-armed troops of the enemy, gave way, and in

their flight were forced upon the river behind them. After this, while

the centre of the Roman rear was losing heavily, and suffering severely

from the attack of the Numidian ambuscade, their front, thus driven to

bay, defeated the Celts and a division of Africans, and, after killing

a large number of them, succeeded in cutting their way through the

Carthaginian line. Then seeing that their wings had been forced off

their ground, they gave up all hope of relieving them or getting back

to their camp, partly because of the number of the enemy’s cavalry, and

partly because they were hindered by the river and the pelting storm

of rain which was pouring down upon their heads. They therefore closed

their ranks, and made their way safely to Placentia, to the number of

ten thousand. Of the rest of the army the greater number were killed

by the elephants and cavalry on the bank of the Trebia; while those of

the infantry who escaped, and the greater part of the cavalry, managed

to rejoin the ten thousand mentioned above, and arrived with them at

Placentia. Meanwhile the Carthaginian army pursued the enemy as far

as the Trebia; but being prevented by the storm from going farther,

returned to their camp. They regarded the result of the battle with

great exultation, as a complete success; for the loss of the Iberians

and Africans had been light, the heaviest having fallen on the Celts.

But from the rain and the snow which followed it, they suffered so

severely, that all the elephants except one died, and a large number of

men and horses perished from the cold.

[Sidenote: Winter of B.C. 118-117. Great exertions at Rome to meet the

danger.]

+75.+ Fully aware of the nature of his disaster, but wishing to conceal

its extent as well as he could from the people at home, Tiberius sent

messengers to announce that a battle had taken place, but that the

storm had deprived them of the victory. For the moment this news was

believed at Rome; but when soon afterwards it became known that the

Carthaginians were in possession of the Roman camp, and that all the

Celts had joined them: while their own troops had abandoned their

camp, and, after retiring from the field of battle, were all collected

in the neighbouring cities; and were besides being supplied with

necessary provisions by sea up the Padus, the Roman people became

only too certain of what had really happened in the battle. It was a

most unexpected reverse, and it forced them at once to urge on with

energy the remaining preparations for the war. They reinforced those

positions which lay in the way of the enemy’s advance; sent legions

to Sardinia and Sicily, as well as garrisons to Tarentum, and other

places of strategical importance; and, moreover, fitted out a fleet

of sixty quinqueremes. The Consuls designate, Gnaeus Servilius and

Gaius Flaminius, were collecting the allies and enrolling the citizen

legions, and sending supplies to Ariminum and Etruria, with a view

of going to the seat of war by those two routes. They sent also to

king Hiero asking for reinforcements, who sent them five hundred

Cretan archers and a thousand peltasts. In fact they pushed on their

preparations in every direction with energy. For the Roman people are

most formidable, collectively and individually, when they have real

reason for alarm.

[Sidenote: Gnaeus Scipio in Spain.]

+76.+ While these events were happening in Italy, Gnaeus Cornelius

Scipio, who had been left by his brother Publius in command of the

fleet, setting sail from the mouth of the Rhone, came to land with his

whole squadron at a place in Iberia called Emporium. Starting from this

town, he made descents upon the coast, landing and besieging those who

refused to submit to him along the seaboard as far as the Iber; and

treating with every mark of kindness those who acceded to his demands,

and taking all the precautions he could for their safety. When he had

garrisoned those towns on the coast that submitted, he led his whole

army inland, having by this time a not inconsiderable contingent of

Iberian allies; and took possession of the towns on his line of march,

some by negotiation and some by force of arms. The Carthaginian troops

which Hannibal had left in that district under the command of Hanno,

lay entrenched to resist him under the walls of a town called Cissa.

Defeating this army in a pitched battle, Gnaeus not only got possession

of a rich booty, for the whole baggage of the army invading Italy had

been left under its charge, but secured the friendly alliance of all

the Iberian tribes north of the Iber, and took both Hanno, the general

of the Carthaginians, and Andobales, the general of the Iberians,

prisoners. The latter was despot of central Iberia, and had always been

especially inclined to the side of Carthage.

Immediately he learnt what had happened, Hasdrubal crossed the Iber to

bring aid. There he ascertained that the Roman troops left in charge

of the fleet had abandoned all precautions, and were trading on the

success of the land forces to pass their time in ease. He therefore

took with him eight thousand infantry and one thousand cavalry of his

own army, and finding the men of the fleet scattered about the country,

he killed a great many of them and forced the rest to fly for refuge

to their ships. He then retired across the Iber again, and employed

himself in fortifying and garrisoning the posts south of the river,

taking up his winter quarters at New Carthage. When Gnaeus rejoined his

fleet, he punished the authors of the disaster according to the Roman

custom; and then collected his land and sea forces together in Tarraco,

and there took up his winter quarters; and by dividing the booty

equally between his soldiers, inspired them at once with affection

towards himself and eagerness for future service. Such was the course

of the Iberian campaign.

[Sidenote: B.C. 217.]

+77.+ At the beginning of the following spring, Gaius Flaminius marched

his army through Etruria, and pitched his camp at Arretium; while his

colleague Gnaeus Servilius on the other hand went to Ariminum, to await

the advance of the enemy in that direction.

[Sidenote: Hannibal conciliates the Italians.]

Passing the winter in the Celtic territory, Hannibal kept his Roman

prisoners in close confinement, supplying them very sparingly with

food; while he treated their allies with great kindness from the first,

and finally called them together and addressed them, alleging, “that he

had not come to fight against them, but against Rome in their behalf;

and that, therefore, if they were wise, they would attach themselves

to him: because he had come to restore freedom to the Italians, and

to assist them to recover their cities and territory which they had

severally lost to Rome.” With these words he dismissed them without

ransom to their own homes: wishing by this policy to attract the

inhabitants of Italy to his cause, and to alienate their affections

from Rome, and to awaken the resentment of all those who considered

themselves to have suffered by the loss of harbours or cities under the

Roman rule.

+78.+ While he was in these winter quarters also he practised a ruse

truly Punic. Being apprehensive that from the fickleness of their

character, and the newness of the tie between himself and them, the

Celts might lay plots against his life, he caused a number of wigs

to be made for him, suited in appearance to men of various ages; and

these he constantly varied, changing at the same time his clothes also

to harmonise with the particular wig which he wore. He thus made it

hard to recognise him, not only for those who met him suddenly, but

even for his intimates. But seeing that the Celts were discontented at

the lengthened continuance of the war within their borders, and were

in a state of restless hurry to invade the enemy’s territory,—on the

pretence of hatred for Rome, but in reality from love of booty,—he

determined to break up his camp as soon as possible, and satisfy the

desires of his army. Accordingly as soon as the change of season set

in, by questioning those who were reputed to know the country best, he

ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and

well known to the enemy, but that the one which led through the marshes

was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius as a surprise.[185] This

was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take

this route. But when the report was spread in his army that the general

was going to lead them through some marshes, every soldier felt alarmed

at the idea of the quagmires and deep sloughs which they would find on

this march.

[Sidenote: Hannibal starts for Etruria. Spring of B.C. 217.]