+1.+ I stated in my first book that my work was to start from the
Social war, the Hannibalian war, and the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria. In the same book I stated my reasons for devoting my first
two books to a sketch of the period preceding those events. I will now,
after a few prefatory remarks as to the scope of my own work, address
myself to giving a complete account of these wars, the causes which led
to them, and which account for the proportions to which they attained.
[Sidenote: A summary of the work from B.C. 220 to B.C. 168.]
The one aim and object, then, of all that I have undertaken to write is
to show how, when, and why all the known parts of the world fell under
the dominion of Rome. Now as this great event admits of being exactly
dated as to its beginning, duration, and final accomplishment, I think
it will be advantageous to give, by way of preface, a summary statement
of the most important phases in it between the beginning and the end.
For I think I shall thus best secure to the student an adequate idea
of my whole plan, for as the comprehension of the whole is a help to
the understanding of details, and the knowledge of details of great
service to the clear conception of the whole; believing that the best
and clearest knowledge is that which is obtained from a combination
of these, I will preface my whole history by a brief summary of its
contents.
[Sidenote: B.C. 220-216.]
I have already described its scope and limits. As to its several parts,
the first consists of the above mentioned wars, while the conclusion or
closing scene is the fall of the Macedonian monarchy. The time included
between these limits is fifty-three years, and never has an equal space
embraced events of such magnitude and importance. In describing them I
shall start from the 140th Olympiad and shall arrange my exposition in
the following order:
[Sidenote: 1. The cause and course of the Hannibalian war.]
+2.+ First I shall indicate the causes of the Punic or Hannibalian war:
and shall have to describe how the Carthaginians entered Italy; broke
up the Roman power there; made the Romans tremble for their safety
and the very soil of their country; and contrary to all calculation
acquired a good prospect of surprising Rome itself.
[Sidenote: 2. Macedonian treaty with Carthage, B.C. 216.]
I shall next try to make it clear how in the same period Philip of
Macedon, after finishing his war with the Aetolians, and subsequently
settling the affairs of Greece, entered upon a design of forming an
offensive and defensive alliance with Carthage.
[Sidenote: 3. Syrian war, B.C. 218.]
Then I shall tell how Antiochus and Ptolemy Philopator first quarrelled
and finally went to war with each other for the possession of
Coele-Syria.
[Sidenote: 4. Byzantine war, B.C. 220.]
Next how the Rhodians and Prusias went to war with the Byzantines, and
compelled them to desist from exacting dues from ships sailing into the
Pontus.
[Sidenote: First digression on the Roman Constitution.]
At this point I shall pause in my narrative to introduce a disquisition
upon the Roman Constitution, in which I shall show that its peculiar
character contributed largely to their success, not only in reducing
all Italy to their authority, and in acquiring a supremacy over the
Iberians and Gauls besides, but also at last, after their conquest of
Carthage, to their conceiving the idea of universal dominion.
[Sidenote: Second on Hiero of Syracuse.]
Along with this I shall introduce another digression on the fall of
Hiero of Syracuse.
[Sidenote: 5. The attempted partition of the dominions of Ptolemy
Epiphanes, B.C. 204.]
After these digressions will come the disturbances in Egypt; how, after
the death of King Ptolemy, Antiochus and Philip entered into a compact
for the partition of the dominions of that monarch’s infant son. I
shall describe their treacherous dealings, Philip laying hands upon the
islands of the Aegean, and Caria and Samos, Antiochus upon Coele-Syria
and Phoenicia.
[Sidenote: 6. War with Philip, B.C. 201-197.]
+3.+ Next, after a summary recapitulation of the proceedings of the
Carthaginians and Romans in Iberia, Libya, and Sicily, I shall,
following the changes of events, shift the scene of my story entirely
to Greece. Here I shall first describe the naval battles of Attalus and
the Rhodians against Philip; and the war between Philip and Rome, the
persons engaged, its circumstances, and result.
[Sidenote: 7. Asiatic war, B.C. 192-191.]
Next to this I shall have to record the wrath of the Aetolians, in
consequence of which they invited the aid of Antiochus, and thereby
gave rise to what is called the Asiatic war against Rome and the
Achaean league. Having stated the causes of this war, and described
the crossing of Antiochus into Europe, I shall have to show first in
what manner he was driven from Greece; secondly, how, being defeated in
the war, he was forced to cede all his territory west of Taurus; and
thirdly, how the Romans, after crushing the insolence of the Gauls,
secured undisputed possession of Asia, and freed all the nations on
the west of Taurus from the fear of barbarian inroads and the lawless
violence of the Gauls.
[Sidenote: 8. Gallic wars of Eumenes and Prusias.]
Next, after reviewing the disasters of the Aetolians and Cephallenians,
I shall pass to the wars waged by Eumenes against Prusias and the
Gauls; as well as that carried on in alliance with Ariarathes against
Pharnaces.
[Sidenote: 9. Union of the Peloponnese. Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt.
Fall of the Macedonian monarchy, B.C. 188-168.]
Finally, after speaking of the unity and settlement of the Peloponnese,
and of the growth of the commonwealth of Rhodes, I shall add a summary
of my whole work, concluding by an account of the expedition of
Antiochus Epiphanes against Egypt; of the war against Perseus; and the
destruction of the Macedonian monarchy. Throughout the whole narrative
it will be shown how the policy adopted by the Romans in one after
another of these cases, as they arose, led to their eventual conquest
of the whole world.
[Sidenote: The plan extended to embrace the period from B.C. 168-146.]
+4.+ And if our judgment of individuals and constitutions, for praise
or blame, could be adequately formed from a simple consideration of
their successes or defeats, I must necessarily have stopped at this
point, and have concluded my history as soon as I reached these last
events in accordance with my original plan. For at this point the
fifty-three years were coming to an end, and the progress of the Roman
power had arrived at its consummation. And, besides, by this time the
acknowledgment had been extorted from all that the supremacy of Rome
must be accepted, and her commands obeyed. But in truth, judgments of
either side founded on the bare facts of success or failure in the
field are by no means final. It has often happened that what seemed
the most signal successes have, from ill management, brought the
most crushing disasters in their train; while not unfrequently the
most terrible calamities, sustained with spirit, have been turned to
actual advantage. I am bound, therefore, to add to my statement of
facts a discussion on the subsequent policy of the conquerors, and
their administration of their universal dominion: and again on the
various feelings and opinions entertained by other nations towards
their rulers. And I must also describe the tastes and aims of the
several nations, whether in their private lives or public policy. The
present generation will learn from this whether they should shun or
seek the rule of Rome; and future generations will be taught whether
to praise and imitate, or to decry it. The usefulness of my history,
whether for the present or the future, will mainly lie in this. For
the end of a policy should not be, in the eyes either of the actors
or their historians, simply to conquer others and bring all into
subjection. Nor does any man of sense go to war with his neighbours
for the mere purpose of mastering his opponents; nor go to sea for
the mere sake of the voyage; nor engage in professions and trades for
the sole purpose of learning them. In all these cases the objects are
invariably the pleasure, honour, or profit which are the results of
the several employments. Accordingly the object of this work shall
be to ascertain exactly what the position of the several states was,
after the universal conquest by which they fell under the power of
Rome, until the commotions and disturbances which broke out at a later
period. These I designed to make the starting-point of what may almost
be called a new work, partly because of the greatness and surprising
nature of the events themselves, but chiefly because, in the case of
most of them, I was not only an eye-witness, but in some cases one of
the actors, and in others the chief director.
[Sidenote: A new departure; the breaking-up of the arrangement made
after the fall of Macedonia. Wars of Carthage against Massinissa; and
of Rome against the Celtiberians, B.C. 155-150; and against Carthage
(3d Punic war, B.C. 149-146).]
+5.+ The events I refer to are the wars of Rome against the
Celtiberians and Vaccaei; those of Carthage against Massinissa, king of
Libya; and those of Attalus and Prusias in Asia. Then also Ariarathes,
King of Cappadocia, having been ejected from his throne by Orophernes
through the agency of King Demetrius, recovered his ancestral power by
the help of Attalus; while Demetrius, son of Seleucus, after twelve
years' possession of the throne of Syria, was deprived of it, and of
his life at the same time, by a combination of the other kings against
him. Then it was, too, that the Romans restored to their country those
Greeks who had been charged with guilt in the matter of the war with
Perseus, after formally acquitting them of the crimes alleged against
them. Not long afterwards the same people turned their hands against
Carthage: at first with the intention of forcing its removal to some
other spot, but finally, for reasons to be afterwards stated, with the
resolution of utterly destroying it. Contemporaneous with this came the
renunciation by the Macedonians of their friendship to Rome, and by the
Lacedaemonians of their membership of the Achaean league, to which the
disaster that befell all Greece alike owed its beginning and end.
This is my purpose: but its fulfilment must depend upon whether Fortune
protracts my life to the necessary length. I am persuaded, however,
that, even if the common human destiny does overtake me, this theme
will not be allowed to lie idle for want of competent men to handle
it; for there are many besides myself who will readily undertake its
completion. But having given the heads of the most remarkable events,
with the object of enabling the reader to grasp the general scope of my
history as well as the arrangement of its several parts, I must now,
remembering my original plan, go back to the point at which my history
starts.
[Sidenote: The origin of the 2d Punic war;]
[Sidenote: B.C. 334,]
[Sidenote: B.C. 192,]
[Sidenote: B.C. 401-400,]
[Sidenote: B.C. 396-394,]
+6.+ Some historians of the Hannibalian war, when they wish to point
out to us the causes of this contest between Rome and Carthage, allege
first the siege of Saguntum by the Carthaginians, and, secondly,
their breach of treaty by crossing the river called by the natives
the Iber. But though I should call these the first actions in the
war, I cannot admit them to be its causes. One might just as well say
that the crossing of Alexander the Great into Asia was the _cause_
of the Persian war, and the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias the
_cause_ of his war with Rome. In neither would it be a probable or true
statement. In the first case, this action of Alexander’s could not be
called the cause of a war, for which both he and his father Philip in
his lifetime had made elaborate preparations: and in the second case,
we know that the Aetolian league had done the same, with a view to a
war with Rome, before Antiochus came upon the scene. Such definitions
are only worthy of men who cannot distinguish between a first overt
act and a cause or pretext; and who do not perceive that a _cause_
is the first in a series of events of which such an overt act is the
last. I shall therefore regard the first attempt to put into execution
what had already been determined as a “beginning,” but I shall look
for “causes” in the motives which suggested such action and the policy
which dictated it; for it is by these, and the calculations to which
they give rise, that men are led to decide upon a particular line of
conduct. The soundness of this method will be proved by the following
considerations. The true causes and origin of the invasion of Persia
by Alexander are patent to everybody. They were, first, the return
march of the Greeks under Xenophon through the country from the upper
Satrapies; in the course of which, though throughout Asia all the
populations were hostile, not a single barbarian ventured to face them:
secondly, the invasion of Asia by the Spartan king Agesilaus, in which,
though he was obliged by troubles in Greece to return in the middle of
his expedition without effecting his object, he yet found no resistance
of any importance or adequacy. It was these circumstances which
convinced Philip of the cowardice and inefficiency of the Persians; and
comparing them with his own high state of efficiency for war, and that
of his Macedonian subjects, and placing before his eyes the splendour
of the rewards to be gained by such a war, and the popularity which it
would bring him in Greece, he seized on the pretext of avenging the
injuries done by Persia to Greece, and determined with great eagerness
to undertake this war; and was in fact at the time of his death engaged
in making every kind of preparation for it.
Here we have the _cause_ and the _pretext_ of the Persian war.
Alexander’s expedition into Asia was the _first action_ in it.
[Sidenote: and of the war with Antiochus.]
+7.+ So too of the war of Antiochus with Rome. The _cause_ was
evidently the exasperation of the Aetolians, who, thinking that they
had been slighted in a number of instances at the end of the war with
Philip, not only called in the aid of Antiochus, but resolved to go to
every extremity in satisfying the anger which the events of that time
had aroused in them. This was the _cause_. As for the _pretext_, it
was the liberation of Greece, which they went from city to city with
Antiochus proclaiming, without regard to reason or truth; while the
_first act_ in the war was the descent of Antiochus upon Demetrias.
My object in enlarging upon this distinction is not to attack the
historians in question, but to rectify the ideas of the studious. A
physician can do no good to the sick who does not know the causes
of their ailments; nor can a statesman do any good who is unable to
conceive the manner, cause, and source of the events with which he has
from time to time to deal. Surely the former could not be expected to
institute a suitable system of treatment for the body; nor the latter
to grapple with the exigencies of the situation, without possessing
this knowledge of its elements. There is nothing, therefore, which we
ought to be more alive to, and to seek for, than the causes of every
event which occurs. For the most important results are often produced
by trifles; and it is invariably easier to apply remedial measures at
the beginning, before things have got beyond the stage of conception
and intention.
[Sidenote: The credibility of Fabius Pictor.]
+8.+ Now the Roman annalist Fabius asserts that the cause of the
Hannibalian war, besides the injury inflicted upon Saguntum, was the
encroaching and ambitious spirit of Hasdrubal. “Having secured great
power in Iberia, he returned to Libya with the design of destroying
the constitution and reducing Carthage to a despotism. But the leading
statesmen, getting timely warning of his intention, banded themselves
together and successfully opposed him. Suspecting this Hasdrubal
retired from Libya, and thenceforth governed Iberia entirely at his own
will without taking any account whatever of the Carthaginian Senate.
This policy had had in Hannibal from his earliest youth a zealous
supporter and imitator; and when he succeeded to the command in Iberia
he continued it: and accordingly, even in the case of this war with
Rome, was acting on his own authority and contrary to the wish of the
Carthaginians; for none of the men of note in Carthage approved of
his attack upon Saguntum.” This is the statement of Fabius, who goes
on to say, that “after the capture of that city an embassy arrived in
Carthage from Rome demanding that Hannibal should be given up on pain
of a declaration of war.”
Now what answer could Fabius have given if we had put the following
question to him? “What better chance or opportunity could the
Carthaginians have had of combining justice and interest? According to
your own account they disliked the proceeding of Hannibal: why did they
not submit to the demands of Rome by surrendering the author of the
injury; and thus get rid of the common enemy of the state without the
odium of doing it themselves, and secure the safety of their territory
by ridding themselves of the threatened war—all of which they could
have effected by merely passing a decree?” If this question were put,
I say, it would admit of no answer. The fact is that, so far from
doing anything of the sort, they maintained the war in accordance with
Hannibal’s policy for seventeen years; and refused to make terms until,
at the end of a most determined struggle, they found their own city and
persons in imminent danger of destruction.
+9.+ I do not allude to Fabius and his annals from any fear of their
wearing such an air of probability in themselves as to gain any
credit,—for the fact is that his assertions are so contrary to reason,
that it does not need any argument of mine to help his readers to
perceive it,—but I wished to warn those who take up his books not to
be misled by the authority of his name, but to be guided by facts.
For there is a certain class of readers in whose eyes the personality
of the writer is of more account than what he says. They look to the
fact that Fabius was a contemporary and a member of the Senate, and
assume without more ado that everything he says may be trusted. My
view, however, is that we ought not to hold the authority of this
writer lightly: yet at the same time that we should not regard it as
all-sufficient; but in reading his writings should test them by a
reference to the facts themselves.
[Sidenote: The Hannibalian or 2nd Punic war. First cause.]
This is a digression from my immediate subject, which is the war
between Carthage and Rome. The cause of this war we must reckon to be
the exasperation of Hamilcar, surnamed Barcas, the father of Hannibal.
The result of the war in Sicily had not broken the spirit of that
commander. He regarded himself as unconquered; for the troops at
Eryx which he commanded were still sound and undismayed: and though
he yielded so far as to make a treaty, it was a concession to the
exigencies of the times brought on by the defeat of the Carthaginians
at sea. But he never relaxed in his determined purpose of revenge; and,
had it not been for the mutiny of the mercenaries at Carthage, he would
at once have sought and made another occasion for bringing about a war,
as far as he was able to do so: as it was, he was preoccupied by the
domestic war, and had to give his attention entirely to that.
[Sidenote: B.C. 238. Bk. i. ch. 88. Second cause.]
[Sidenote: Third cause.]
+10.+ When the Romans, at the conclusion of this mercenary war,
proclaimed war with Carthage, the latter at first was inclined to
resist at all hazards, because the goodness of her cause gave her
hopes of victory,—as I have shown in my former book, without which
it would be impossible to understand adequately either this or what
is to follow. The Romans, however, would not listen to anything: and
the Carthaginians therefore yielded to the force of circumstances;
and though feeling bitterly aggrieved, yet being quite unable to do
anything, evacuated Sardinia, and consented to pay a sum of twelve
hundred talents, in addition to the former indemnity paid them, on
condition of avoiding the war at that time. This is the second and
the most important cause of the subsequent war. For Hamilcar, having
this public grievance in addition to his private feelings of anger, as
soon as he had secured his country’s safety by reducing the rebellious
mercenaries, set at once about securing the Carthaginian power in
Iberia with the intention of using it as a base of operations against
Rome. So that I record as a third cause of the war the Carthaginian
success in Iberia: for it was the confidence inspired by their forces
there which encouraged them to embark upon it. It would be easy to
adduce other facts to show that Hamilcar, though he had been dead ten
years at its commencement, largely contributed to bring about the
second Punic war, but what I am about to say will be sufficient to
establish the fact.
[Sidenote: Hannibal’s oath.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 195.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 238.]
+11.+ When, after his final defeat by the Romans, Hannibal had at last
quitted his country and was staying at the court of Antiochus, the
warlike attitude of the Aetolian league induced the Romans to send
ambassadors to Antiochus, that they might be informed of the king’s
intentions. These ambassadors found that Antiochus was inclined to the
Aetolian alliance, and was eager for war with Rome; they accordingly
paid great court to Hannibal with a view of bringing him into suspicion
with the king. And in this they entirely succeeded. As time went on the
king became ever more and more suspicious of Hannibal, until at length
an opportunity occurred for an explanation of the alienation that had
been thus secretly growing up between them. Hannibal then defended
himself at great length, but without success, until at last he made the
following statement: “When my father was about to go on his Iberian
expedition I was nine years old: and as he was offering the sacrifice
to Zeus I stood near the altar. The sacrifice successfully performed,
my father poured the libation and went through the usual ritual. He
then bade all the other worshippers stand a little back, and calling
me to him asked me affectionately whether I wished to go with him on
his expedition. Upon my eagerly assenting, and begging with boyish
enthusiasm to be allowed to go, he took me by the right hand and led me
up to the altar, and bade me lay my hand upon the victim and swear that
I would never be friends with Rome. So long, then, Antiochus, as your
policy is one of hostility to Rome, you may feel quite secure of having
in me a most thorough-going supporter. But if ever you make terms or
friendship with her, then you need not wait for any slander to make you
distrust me and be on your guard against me; for there is nothing in my
power that I would not do against her.”
+12.+ Antiochus listened to this story, and being convinced that
it was told with genuine feeling and sincerity, gave up all his
suspicions. And we, too, must regard this as an unquestionable proof
of the animosity of Hamilcar and of the aim of his general policy;
which, indeed, is also proved by facts. For he inspired his son-in-law
Hasdrubal and his son Hannibal with a bitterness of resentment against
Rome which nothing could surpass. Hasdrubal, indeed, was prevented
by death from showing the full extent of his purpose; but time gave
Hannibal abundant opportunity to manifest the hatred of Rome which he
had inherited from his father.
The most important thing, then, for statesmen to observe is the
motives of those who lay aside old enmities or form new friendships;
and to ascertain when their consent to treaties is a mere concession
to the necessities of the hour, and when it is the indication of a
real consciousness of defeat. In the former case they must be on their
guard against such people lying in wait for an opportunity; while
in the latter they may unhesitatingly impose whatever injunctions
are necessary, in full reliance on the genuineness of their feelings
whether as subjects or friends. So much for the causes of the war. I
will now relate the first actions in it.
[Sidenote: Death of Hamilcar, B.C. 229.]
[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal, B.C. 221.]
+13.+ The Carthaginians were highly incensed by their loss of Sicily,
but their resentment was heightened still more, as I have said, by
the transaction as to Sardinia, and by the addition recently made to
their tribute. Accordingly, when the greater part of Iberia had fallen
into their power, they were on the alert to seize any opportunity that
presented itself of retaliating upon Rome. At the death of Hasdrubal,
to whom they had committed the command in Iberia after the death of
Hamilcar, they waited at first to ascertain the feelings of the army;
but when news came from thence that the troops had elected Hannibal as
commander-in-chief, a popular assembly was at once held, and the choice
of the army confirmed by a unanimous vote. As soon as he had taken over
the command, Hannibal set out to subdue the tribe of the Olcades; and,
having arrived before their most formidable city Althaea, he pitched
his camp under its walls; and by a series of energetic and formidable
assaults succeeded before long in taking it: by which the rest of
the tribe were overawed into submission to Carthage. Having imposed
a contribution upon the towns, and thus become possessed of a large
sum of money, he went to the New Town to winter. There, by a liberal
treatment of the forces under his command, giving them an instalment of
their pay at once and promising the rest, he established an excellent
feeling towards himself in the army, as well as great hopes for the
future.
[Sidenote: B.C. 220. Hannibal attacks the Vaccaei.]
+14.+ Next summer he set out on another expedition against the Vaccaei,
in which he took Salmantica by assault, but only succeeded in storming
Arbucala, owing to the size of the town and the number and valour of
its inhabitants, after a laborious siege. After this he suddenly found
himself in a position of very great danger on his return march: being
set upon by the Carpesii, the strongest tribe in those parts, who were
joined also by neighbouring tribes, incited principally by refugees
of the Olcades, but roused also to great wrath by those who escaped
from Salmantica. If the Carthaginians had been compelled to give these
people regular battle, there can be no doubt that they would have been
defeated: but as it was, Hannibal, with admirable skill and caution,
slowly retreated until he had put the Tagus between himself and the
enemy; and thus giving battle at the crossing of the stream, supported
by it and the elephants, of which he had about forty, he gained, to
every one’s surprise, a complete success. For when the barbarians
attempted to force a crossing at several points of the river at once,
the greater number of them were killed as they left the water by the
elephants, who marched up and down along the brink of the river and
caught them as they were coming out. Many of them also were killed
in the river itself by the cavalry, because the horses were better
able than the men to stand against the stream, and also because the
cavalry were fighting on higher ground than the infantry which they
were attacking. At length Hannibal turned the tables on the enemy, and,
recrossing the river, attacked and put to flight their whole army, to
the number of more than a hundred thousand men. After the defeat of
this host, no one south of the Iber rashly ventured to face him except
the people of Saguntum. From that town Hannibal tried his best to keep
aloof; because, acting on the suggestions and advice of his father
Hamilcar, he did not wish to give the Romans an avowed pretext for war
until he had thoroughly secured the rest of the country.
[Sidenote: Saguntum appeals to Rome. Winter of B.C. 220-219.]
[Sidenote: Hannibal’s defiance.]
+15.+ But the people of Saguntum kept sending ambassadors to Rome,
partly because they foresaw what was coming, and trembled for their
own existence, and partly that the Romans might be kept fully aware
of the growing power of the Carthaginians in Iberia. For a long
time the Romans disregarded their words: but now they sent out some
commissioners to see what was going on. Just at that time Hannibal had
finished the conquests which he intended for that season, and was going
into winter quarters at the New Town again, which was in a way the
chief glory and capital town of the Carthaginians in Iberia. He found
there the embassy from Rome, granted them an interview, and listened to
the message with which they were charged. It was a strong injunction
to him to leave Saguntum alone, as being under the protection of Rome;
and not to cross the Iber, in accordance with the agreement come to
in the time of Hasdrubal. To this Hannibal answered with all the
heat of youth, inflamed by martial ardour, recent success, and his
long-standing hatred of Rome. He charged the Romans with having a short
time before, when on some political disturbances arising in the town
they had been chosen to act as arbitrators, seized the opportunity to
put some of the leading citizens to death; and he declared that the
Carthaginians would not allow the Saguntines to be thus treacherously
dealt with, for it was the traditional policy of Carthage to protect
all persons so wronged. At the same time he sent home for instructions
as to what he was to do “in view of the fact that the Saguntines were
injuring certain of their subject allies.” And altogether he was in a
state of unreasoning anger and violent exasperation, which prevented
him from availing himself of the real causes for war, and made him
take refuge in pretexts which would not admit of justification, after
the manner of men whose passions master all considerations of equity.
How much better it would have been to demand of Rome the restoration
of Sardinia, and the remission of the tribute, which she had taken an
unfair opportunity to impose on pain of a declaration of war. As it
was, he said not a word of the real cause, but alleged the fictitious
one of the matter of Saguntum; and so got the credit of beginning the
war, not only in defiance of reason, but still more in defiance of
justice. The Roman ambassadors, finding that there must undoubtedly be
a war, sailed to Carthage to enter the same protest before the people
there. They expected, however, that they would have to fight not in
Italy, but in Iberia, and that they would have Saguntum as a base of
operations.
[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 219. Coss. M. Livius Salinator L. Aemilius Paullus.]
+16.+ Wherefore the Senate, by way of preparing to undertake this
business, and foreseeing that the war would be severe and protracted,
and at a long distance from the mother country, determined to make
Illyria safe. For it happened that, just at this time, Demetrius
of Pharos was sacking and subduing to his authority the cities of
Illyria which were subject to Rome, and had sailed beyond Lissus, in
violation of the treaty, with fifty galleys, and had ravaged many of
the Cyclades. For he had quite forgotten the former kindnesses done
him by Rome, and had conceived a contempt for its power, when he saw
it threatened first by the Gauls and then by Carthage; and he now
rested all his hopes on the royal family of Macedonia, because he had
fought on the side of Antigonus, and shared with him the dangers of the
war against Cleomenes. These transactions attracted the observation
of the Romans; who, seeing that the royal house of Macedonia was in
a flourishing condition, were very anxious to secure the country
east of Italy, feeling convinced that they would have ample time to
correct the rash folly of the Illyrians, and rebuke and chastise the
ingratitude and temerity of Demetrius. But they were deceived in their
calculations. For Hannibal anticipated their measures by the capture
of Saguntum: the result of which was that the war took place not in
Iberia, but close to Rome itself, and in various parts throughout all
Italy. However, with these ideas fixed in their minds, the Romans
despatched Lucius Aemilius just before summer to conduct the Illyrian
campaign in the first year of the 140th Olympiad.
[Sidenote: Hannibal besieges Saguntum.]
+17.+ But Hannibal had started from New Carthage and was leading
his army straight against Saguntum. This city is situated on the
seaward foot of the mountain chain on which the frontiers of Iberia
and Celtiberia converge, and is about seven stades from the sea. The
district cultivated by its inhabitants is exceedingly productive, and
has a soil superior to any in all Iberia. Under the walls of this
town Hannibal pitched his camp and set energetically to work on the
siege, foreseeing many advantages that would accrue if he could take
it. Of these the first was that he would thereby disappoint the Romans
in their expectation of making Iberia the seat of war: a second was
that he would thereby strike a general terror, which would render the
already obedient tribes more submissive, and the still independent
ones more cautious of offending him: but the greatest advantage of
all was that thereby he would be able to push on his advance, without
leaving an enemy on his rear. Besides these advantages, he calculated
that the possession of this city would secure him abundant supplies
for his expedition, and create an enthusiasm in the troops excited
by individual acquisitions of booty; while he would conciliate the
goodwill of those who remained at Carthage by the spoils which would
be sent home. With these ideas he pressed on the siege with energy:
sometimes setting an example to his soldiers by personally sharing in
the fatigues of throwing up the siege works; and sometimes cheering on
his men and recklessly exposing himself to danger.
[Sidenote: Fall of Saguntum.]
After a siege extending to the eighth month, in the course of which
he endured every kind of suffering and anxiety, he finally succeeded
in taking the town. An immense booty in money, slaves, and property
fell into his hands, which he disposed of in accordance with his
original design. The money he reserved for the needs of his projected
expedition; the slaves were distributed according to merit among his
men; while the property was at once sent entire to Carthage. The result
answered his expectations: the army was rendered more eager for action;
the home populace more ready to grant whatever he asked; and he himself
was enabled, by the possession of such abundant means, to carry out
many measures that were of service to his expedition.
[Sidenote: Illyrian war, B.C. 219.]
+18.+ While this was taking place, Demetrius, discovering the
intentions of Rome, threw a sufficient garrison into Dimale and
victualled it in proportion. In the other towns he put those who were
opposed to him to death, and placed the chief power in the hands of
his own partisans; and selecting six thousand of the bravest of his
subjects, quartered them in Pharos. When the Consul arrived in Illyria
with his army, he found the enemies of Rome confident in the strength
of Dimale and the elaborate preparations in it, and encouraged to
resistance by their belief in its impregnability; he determined,
therefore, to attack that town first, in order to strike terror into
the enemy. Accordingly, after addressing an exhortation to the several
officers of the legions, and throwing up siege works at several points,
he began the siege in form. In seven days he took the town by assault,
which so dismayed the enemy, that envoys immediately appeared from all
the towns, surrendering themselves unconditionally to the protection
of Rome. The Consul accepted their submission: and after imposing
such conditions as appeared suitable to the several cases, he sailed
to Pharos to attack Demetrius himself. Being informed that the city
there was strongly fortified, thronged with excellent soldiers, and
well-furnished with provisions and all other munitions of war, he began
to entertain misgivings that the siege would be long and difficult; and
therefore, with a view to these difficulties, he adopted on the spur of
the moment the following strategem. He crossed to the island by night
with his whole army. The greater part of it he disembarked at a spot
where the ground was well-wooded and low; while with only twenty ships
he sailed at daybreak to the harbour nearest the town. The smallness
of the number of the ships moved only the contempt of Demetrius when
he saw them, and he immediately marched out of the town down to the
harbour to oppose the landing of the enemy.
[Sidenote: Capture of Pharos.]
+19.+ A violent struggle at once began: and, as it went on, division
after division of the troops in the city came down to support him,
until at length the whole force had poured out to take part in the
engagement. The Romans who had landed in the night arrived at the
critical moment, after a march by an obscure route; and seizing a
strong position on some rising ground between the city and the harbour,
efficiently cut off from the city the troops that had sallied out.
When Demetrius became aware of what had taken place, he desisted from
opposing the disembarkation; and having rallied his men and addressed
the ranks, he put them in motion, with the resolution of fighting a
pitched battle with the troops on the hill. When the Romans saw the
Illyrian advance being made in good order and with great spirit, they
formed their ranks and charged furiously. At the same moment the Roman
troops which had just effected their landing, seeing what was going on,
charged the enemy on the rear, who being thus attacked on both sides,
were thrown into great disorder and confusion. The result was that,
finding both his van and his rear in difficulties, Demetrius fled.
Some of his men retreated towards the city; but most of them escaped
by bye-paths into various parts of the island. Demetrius himself made
his way to some galleys which he kept at anchor at a solitary point
on the coast, with a view to every contingency; and going on board,
he sailed away at nightfall, and arrived unexpectedly at the court of
King Philip, where he passed the remainder of his life:—a man whose
undoubted boldness and courage were unsupported by either prudence or
judgment. His end was of a piece with the whole tenor of his life; for
while endeavouring at the instigation of Philip to seize Messene, he
exposed himself during the battle with a careless rashness which cost
him his life; of which I shall speak in detail when I come to that
period.
The Consul Aemilius having thus taken Pharos at a blow, levelled the
city to the ground; and then having become master of all Illyria, and
having ordered all its affairs as he thought right, returned towards
the end of the summer to Rome, where he celebrated a triumph amid
expressions of unmixed approval; for people considered that he had
managed this business with great prudence and even greater courage.
[Sidenote: Indignation at Rome at the fall of Saguntum.]
+20.+ But when news came to Rome of the fall of Saguntum, there was
indeed no debate on the question of war, as some historians assert; who
even add the speeches delivered on either side. But nothing could be
more ridiculous. For is it conceivable that the Romans should have a
year before proclaimed war with the Carthaginians in the event of their
entering the territory of Saguntum, and yet, when the city itself had
been taken, should have debated whether they should go to war or no?
Just as absurd are the wonderful statements that the senators put on
mourning, and that the fathers introduced their sons above twelve years
old into the Senate House, who, being admitted to the debate, refrained
from divulging any of its secrets even to their nearest relations. All
this is as improbable as it is untrue; unless we are to believe that
Fortune, among its other bounties, granted the Romans the privilege of
being men of the world from their cradles. I need not waste any more
words upon such compositions as those of Chaereas and Sosilus;[165]
which, in my judgment, are more like the gossip of the barber’s shop
and the pavement than history.
[Sidenote: Envoys sent to Carthage to demand surrender of Hannibal.]
The truth is that, when the Romans heard of the disaster at Saguntum,
they at once elected envoys, whom they despatched in all haste to
Carthage with the offer of two alternatives, one of which appeared
to the Carthaginians to involve disgrace as well as injury if they
accepted it, while the other was the beginning of a great struggle
and of great dangers. For one of these alternatives was the surrender
of Hannibal and his staff to Rome, the other was war. When the Roman
envoys arrived and declared their message to the Senate, the choice
proposed to them between these alternatives was listened to by the
Carthaginians with indignation. Still they selected the most capable of
their number to state their case, which was grounded on the following
pleas.
+21.+ Passing over the treaty made with Hasdrubal, as not having ever
been made, and, if it had, as not being binding on them because made
without their consent (and on this point they quoted the precedent of
the Romans themselves, who in the Sicilian war repudiated the terms
agreed upon and accepted by Lutatius, as having been made without
their consent)—passing over this, they pressed with all the vehemence
they could, throughout the discussion, the last treaty made in the
Sicilian war; in which they affirmed that there was no clause relating
to Iberia, but one expressly providing security for the allies of both
parties to the treaty. Now, they pointed out that the Saguntines at
that time were not allies of Rome, and therefore were not protected
by the clause. To prove their point, they read the treaty more than
once aloud. On this occasion the Roman envoys contented themselves
with the reply that, while Saguntum was intact, the matter in
dispute admitted of pleadings and of a discussion on its merits; but
that, that city having been treacherously seized, they had only two
alternatives,—either to deliver the persons guilty of the act, and
thereby make it clear that they had no share in their crime, and that
it was done without their consent; or, if they were not willing to do
that, and avowed their complicity in it, to take the consequences.
The question of treaties between Rome and Carthage was referred
to in general terms in the course of this debate: but I think a
more particular examination of it will be useful both to practical
statesmen, who require to know the exact truth of the matter, in order
to avoid mistakes in any critical deliberation; and to historical
students, that they may not be led astray by the ignorance or partisan
bias of historians; but may have before them a conspectus, acknowledged
to be accurate, of the various compacts which have been made between
Rome and Carthage from the earliest times to our own day.
[Sidenote: Treaties between Rome and Carthage.]
[Sidenote: The first treaty, B.C. 509-508.]
+22.+ The first treaty between Rome and Carthage was made in the
year of Lucius Junius Brutus and Marcus Horatius, the first Consuls
appointed after the expulsion of the kings, by which men also the
temple of Jupiter Capitolinus was consecrated. This was twenty-eight
years before the invasion of Greece by Xerxes. Of this treaty I append
a translation, as accurate as I could make it,—for the fact is that
the ancient language differs so much from that at present in use, that
the best scholars among the Romans themselves have great difficulty in
interpreting some points in it, even after much study. The treaty is as
follows:—
“There shall be friendship between the Romans and their allies, and the
Carthaginians and their allies, on these conditions:
“Neither the Romans nor their allies are to sail beyond the Fair
Promontory, unless driven by stress of weather or the fear of enemies.
If any one of them be driven ashore he shall not buy or take aught for
himself save what is needful for the repair of his ship and the service
of the gods, and he shall depart within five days.
“Men landing for traffic shall strike no bargain save in the presence
of a herald or town-clerk. Whatever is sold in the presence of these,
let the price be secured to the seller on the credit of the state—that
is to say, if such sale be in Libya or Sardinia.
“If any Roman comes to the Carthaginian province in Sicily he shall
enjoy all rights enjoyed by others. The Carthaginians shall do no
injury to the people of Ardea, Antium, Laurentium, Circeii, Tarracina,
nor any other people of the Latins that are subject to Rome.
“From those townships even which are not subject to Rome[166] they
shall hold their hands; and if they take one shall deliver it unharmed
to the Romans. They shall build no fort in Latium; and if they enter
the district in arms, they shall not stay a night therein.”
+23.+ The “Fair Promontory” here referred to is that which lies
immediately to the north of Carthage; south of which the Carthaginians
stipulated that the Romans should not sail with ships of war, because,
as I imagine, they did not wish them to be acquainted with the coast
near Byzacium, or the lesser Syrtis, which places they call Emporia,
owing to the productiveness of the district. The treaty then goes on
to say that, if any one of them is driven thither by stress of weather
or fear of an enemy, and stands in need of anything for the worship of
the gods and the repair of his vessel, this and no more he may take;
and all those who have come to anchor there must necessarily depart
within five days. To Carthage, and all the country on the Carthaginian
side of the Fair Promontory in Libya, to Sardinia, and the Carthaginian
province of Sicily, the treaty allows the Romans to sail for mercantile
purposes; and the Carthaginians engage their public credit that such
persons shall enjoy absolute security.
It is clear from this treaty that the Carthaginians speak of Sardinia
and Libya as belonging to them entirely; but, on the other hand, make
a distinction in the case of Sicily, and only stipulate for that part
of it which is subject to Carthage. Similarly, the Romans also only
stipulate concerning Latium; the rest of Italy they do not mention, as
not being under their authority.
[Sidenote: Second treaty, B.C. 306 (?).]
+24.+ After this treaty there was a second, in which we find that the
Carthaginians have included the Tyrians and the township of Utica
in addition to their former territory; and to the Fair Promontory
Mastia and Tarseium are added, as the points east of which the
Romans are not to make marauding expeditions or found a city. The
treaty is as follows: “There shall be friendship between the Romans
and their allies, and the Carthaginians, Tyrians, and township of
Utica, on these terms: The Romans shall not maraud, nor traffic, nor
found a city east of the Fair Promontory, Mastia, Tarseium. If the
Carthaginians take any city in Latium which is not subject to Rome,
they may keep the prisoners and the goods, but shall deliver up the
town. If the Carthaginians take any folk, between whom and Rome a peace
has been made in writing, though they be not subject to them, they
shall not bring them into any harbours of the Romans; if such an one
be so brought ashore, and any Roman lay claim to him,[167] he shall
be released. In like manner shall the Romans be bound towards the
Carthaginians.
“If a Roman take water or provisions from any district within the
jurisdiction of Carthage, he shall not injure, while so doing, any
between whom and Carthage there is peace and friendship. Neither shall
a Carthaginian in like case. If any one shall do so, he shall not
be punished by private vengeance, but such action shall be a public
misdemeanour.
“In Sardinia and Libya no Roman shall traffic nor found a city; he
shall do no more than take in provisions and refit his ship. If a storm
drive him upon those coasts, he shall depart within five days.
“In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and in Carthage he may transact
business and sell whatsoever it is lawful for a citizen to do. In like
manner also may a Carthaginian at Rome.”
Once more in this treaty we may notice that the Carthaginians emphasise
the fact of their entire possession of Libya and Sardinia, and prohibit
any attempt of the Romans to land in them at all; and on the other
hand, in the case of Sicily, they clearly distinguish their own
province in it. So, too, the Romans, in regard to Latium, stipulate
that the Carthaginians shall do no wrong to Ardea, Antium, Circeii,
Tarracina, all of which are on the seaboard of Latium, to which alone
the treaty refers.
[Sidenote: Third treaty, B.C. 279.]
+25.+ A third treaty again was made by Rome at the time of the invasion
of Pyrrhus into Sicily, before the Carthaginians undertook the war for
the possession of Sicily. This treaty contains the same provisions as
the two earlier treaties with these additional clauses:—
“If they make a treaty of alliance with Pyrrhus, the Romans or
Carthaginians shall make it on such terms as not to preclude the one
giving aid to the other, if that one’s territory is attacked.
“If one or the other stand in need of help, the Carthaginians shall
supply the ships, whether for transport or war; but each people shall
supply the pay for its own men employed on them.
“The Carthaginians shall also give aid by sea to the Romans if need be;
but no one shall compel the crews to disembark against their will.”
Provision was also made for swearing to these treaties. In the case
of the first, the Carthaginians were to swear by the gods of their
ancestors, the Romans by Jupiter Lapis, in accordance with an ancient
custom; in the case of the last treaty, by Mars and Quirinus.
The form of swearing by Jupiter Lapis was this. The commissioner for
swearing to the treaty took a stone in his hand, and, having taken the
oath in the name of his country, added these words, “If I abide by this
oath may he bless me; but if I do otherwise in thought or act, may all
others be kept safe each in his own country, under his own laws, in
enjoyment of his own goods, household gods, and tombs,—may I alone be
cast out, even as this stone is now.” And having uttered these words he
throws the stone from his hand.
[Sidenote: Misstatement of Philinus.]
+26.+ Seeing that such treaties exist and are preserved to this day,
engraved on brass in the treasury of the Aediles in the temple of
Jupiter Capitolinus, the historian Philinus certainly does give us some
reason to be surprised at him. Not at his ignorance of their existence:
for even in our own day those Romans and Carthaginians, whose age
placed them nearest to the times, and who had the reputation of taking
the greatest interest in public affairs, were unaware of it. But what
is surprising is, that he should have ventured on a statement exactly
opposite: “That there was a treaty between Rome and Carthage, in virtue
of which the Romans were bound to keep away from the whole of Sicily,
the Carthaginians from the whole of Italy; and that the Romans broke
the treaty and their oath when they first crossed over to Sicily.”
Whereas there does not exist, nor ever has existed, any such written
compact at all. Yet this assertion he makes in so many words in his
second book. I referred to this in the preface of my work, but reserved
a more detailed discussion of it to this place; which was necessary,
because the assertion of Philinus has misled a considerable number of
people on this point. I have nothing to say if a man chooses to attack
the Romans for crossing into Sicily, on the grounds of their having
taken the Mamertines into alliance at all; or in having thus acted in
answer to their request, after these men’s treachery to Rhegium as well
as Messene: but if any one supposes that in so crossing they broke
oaths or treaties, he is manifestly ignorant of the truth.
[Sidenote: Fourth treaty, B.C. 241.]
+27.+ At the end of the first Punic war another treaty was made,
of which the chief provisions were these: “The Carthaginians shall
evacuate Sicily and all islands lying between Italy and Sicily.
“The allies of neither of the parties to the treaty shall be attacked
by the other.
“Neither party shall impose any contribution, nor erect any public
building, nor enlist soldiers in the dominions of the other, nor make
any compact of friendship with the allies of the other.
“The Carthaginians shall within ten years pay to the Romans
two-thousand two-hundred talents, and a thousand on the spot; and shall
restore all prisoners, without ransom, to the Romans.”
[Sidenote: Fifth treaty, B.C. 238.]
Afterwards, at the end of the Mercenary war in Africa, the Romans went
so far as to pass a decree for war with Carthage, but eventually made
a treaty to the following effect: “The Carthaginians shall evacuate
Sardinia, and pay an additional twelve hundred talents.”
[Sidenote: Sixth treaty, B.C. 228.]
Finally, in addition to these treaties, came that negotiated with
Hasdrubal in Iberia, in which it was stipulated that “the Carthaginians
should not cross the Iber with arms.”
Such were the mutual obligations established between Rome and Carthage
from the earliest times to that of Hannibal.
[Sidenote: No excuse for the Roman claim on Sardinia.]
+28.+ As we find then that the Roman invasion of Sicily was not in
contravention of their oaths, so we must acknowledge in the case of
the second proclamation of war, in consequence of which the treaty for
the evacuation of Sardinia was made, that it is impossible to find any
reasonable pretext or ground for the Roman action. The Carthaginians
were beyond question compelled by the necessities of their position,
contrary to all justice, to evacuate Sardinia, and to pay this enormous
sum of money. For as to the allegation of the Romans, that they had
during the Mercenary war been guilty of acts of hostility to ships
sailing from Rome,—that was barred by their own act in restoring,
without ransom, the Carthaginian prisoners, in gratitude for similar
conduct on the part of Carthage to Romans who had landed on their
shores; a transaction which I have spoken of at length in my previous
book.[168]
These facts established, it remains to decide by a thorough
investigation to which of the two nations the origin of the Hannibalian
war is to be imputed.
[Sidenote: The Roman Case.]
+29.+ I have explained the pleas advanced by the Carthaginians; I must
now state what is alleged on the contrary by the Romans. For though
it is true that in this particular interview, owing to their anger at
the fall of Saguntum, they did not use these arguments, yet they were
appealed to on many occasions, and by many of their citizens. First,
they argued that the treaty of Hasdrubal could not be ignored, as the
Carthaginians had the assurance to do: for it did not contain the
clause, which that of Lutatius did, making its validity conditional
on its ratification by the people of Rome; but Hasdrubal made the
agreement absolutely and authoritatively that “the Carthaginians should
not cross the Iber in arms.”
Next they alleged that the clause in the treaty respecting Sicily,
which by their own admission stipulated that “the allies of neither
party should be attacked by the other,” did not refer to then existing
allies only, as the Carthaginians interpreted it; for in that case
a clause would have been added, disabling either from making new
alliances in addition to those already existing, or excluding allies,
taken subsequently to the making of the treaty, from its benefits.
But since neither of these provisions was made, it was plain that
both the then existing allies, and all those taken subsequently on
either side, were entitled to reciprocal security. And this was only
reasonable. For it was not likely that they would have made a treaty
depriving them of the power, when opportunity offered, of taking on
such friends or allies as seemed to their interest; nor, again, if they
had taken any such under their protection, was it to be supposed that
they would allow them to be injured by any persons whatever. But, in
fact, the main thing present in the minds of both parties to the treaty
was, that they should mutually agree to abstain from attacking each
other’s allies, and on no account admit into alliance with themselves
the allies of the other: and it was to subsequent allies that this
particular clause applied, “Neither shall enlist soldiers, or impose
contributions on the provinces or allies of the other; and all shall be
alike secure of attack from the other side.”
+30.+ These things being so, they argued that it was beyond controversy
that Saguntum had accepted the protection of Rome, several years before
the time of Hannibal. The strongest proof of this, and one which would
not be contested by the Carthaginians themselves, was that, when
political disturbances broke out at Saguntum, the people chose the
Romans, and not the Carthaginians, as arbitrators to settle the dispute
and restore their constitution, although the latter were close at hand
and were already established in Iberia.
[Sidenote: Mutual provocation.]
I conclude, then, that if the destruction of Saguntum is to be regarded
as the cause of this war, the Carthaginians must be acknowledged to be
in the wrong, both in view of the treaty of Lutatius, which secured
immunity from attack for the allies of both parties, and in view of
the treaty of Hasdrubal, which disabled the Carthaginians from passing
the Iber with arms.[169] If on the other hand the taking Sardinia from
them, and imposing the heavy money fine which accompanied it, are to
be regarded as the causes, we must certainly acknowledge that the
Carthaginians had good reason for undertaking the Hannibalian war: for
as they had only yielded to the pressure of circumstances, so they
seized a favourable turn in those circumstances to revenge themselves
on their injurers.
+31.+ Some uncritical readers may perhaps say that such minute
discussion on points of this kind is unnecessary. And if any man were
entirely self-sufficing in every event, I might allow that the accurate
knowledge of the past, though a graceful accomplishment, was perhaps
not essential: but as long as it is not in mere mortals to say this,
either in public or private affairs,—seeing that no man of sense, even
if he is prosperous for the moment, will ever reckon with certainty
on the future,—then I say that such knowledge is essential, and not
merely graceful. For take the three commonest cases. Suppose, first,
a statesman to be attacked either in his own person or in that of his
country: or, secondly, suppose him to be anxious for a forward policy
and to anticipate the attack of an enemy: or, lastly, suppose him to
desire to maintain the _status quo_. In all these cases it is history
alone that can supply him with precedents, and teach him how, in the
first case, to find supporters and allies; in the second, to incite
co-operation; and in the third, to give vigour to the conservative
forces which tend to maintain, as he desires, the existing state of
things. In the case of contemporaries, it is difficult to obtain an
insight into their purposes; because, as their words and actions are
dictated by a desire of accommodating themselves to the necessity
of the hour, and of keeping up appearances, the truth is too often
obscured. Whereas the transactions of the past admit of being tested by
naked fact; and accordingly display without disguise the motives and
purposes of the several persons engaged; and teach us from what sort
of people to expect favour, active kindness, and assistance, or the
reverse. They give us also many opportunities of distinguishing who
would be likely to pity us, feel indignation at our wrongs, and defend
our cause,—a power that contributes very greatly to national as well
as individual security. Neither the writer nor the reader of history,
therefore, should confine his attention to a bare statement of facts:
he must take into account all that preceded, accompanied, or followed
them. For if you take from history all explanation of cause, principle,
and motive, and of the adaptation of the means to the end, what is left
is a mere panorama without being instructive; and, though it may please
for the moment, has no abiding value.
+32.+ Another mistake is to look upon my history as difficult to
obtain or master, because of the number and size of the books. Compare
it in these particulars with the various writings of the episodical
historians. Is it not much easier to purchase and read my forty
books, which are as it were all in one piece, and so to follow with a
comprehensive glance the events in Italy, Sicily, and Libya from the
time of Pyrrhus to the fall of Carthage, and those in the rest of the
world from the flight of Cleomenes of Sparta, continuously, to the
battle between the Achaeans and Romans at the Isthmus? To say nothing
of the fact that the compositions of these historians are many times
as numerous as mine, it is impossible for their readers to get any
certain information from them: first, because most of them differ in
their account of the same transactions; and secondly, because they
omit contemporary history,—the comparative review of which would put
a very different complexion upon events to that derived from isolated
treatment,—and are unable to touch upon the most decisive events at
all. For, indeed, the most important parts of history are those which
treat the events which follow or accompany a certain course of conduct,
and pre-eminently so those which treat of causes. For instance, we
see that the war with Antiochus took its rise from that with Philip;
that with Philip from the Hannibalian; and the Hannibalian from the
Sicilian war: and though between these wars there were numerous events
of various character, they all converged upon the same consummation.
Such a comprehensive view may be obtained from universal history, but
not from the histories of particular wars, such as those with Perseus
or Philip; unless we fondly imagine that, by reading the accounts
contained in them of the pitched battles, we gain a knowledge of the
conduct and plan of the whole war. This of course is not the case; and
in the present instance I hope that there will be as wide a difference
between my history and such episodical compositions, as between real
learning and mere listening.
+33.+ To resume the story of the Carthaginians and the Roman
deputies.[170] To the arguments of the former the [Sidenote: Answer
of Fabius. See Livy, 21, 18.] ambassadors made no answer, except that
the senior among them, in the presence of the assembly, pointed to the
folds of his toga and said that in them he carried peace and war, and
that he would bring out and leave with them whichever they bade him.
The Carthaginian Suffete[171] bade him bring out whichever of the two
he chose: and upon the Roman saying that it should be war, a majority
of the senators cried out in answer that they accepted it. It was on
these terms that the Senate and the Roman ambassadors parted.
[Sidenote: Winter of 219-218 B.C. Hannibal’s arrangements for the
coming campaign.]
Meanwhile Hannibal, upon going into winter quarters at New Carthage,
first of all dismissed the Iberians to their various cities, with
the view of their being prepared and vigorous for the next campaign.
Secondly, he instructed his brother Hasdrubal in the management of
his government in Iberia, and of the preparations to be made against
Rome, in case he himself should be separated from him. Thirdly, he
took precautions for the security of Libya, by selecting with prudent
skill certain soldiers from the home army to come over to Iberia, and
certain from the Iberian army to go to Libya; by which interchange
he secured cordial feeling of confidence between the two armies. The
Iberians sent to Libya were the Thersitae, the Mastiani, as well as
the Oretes and Olcades, mustering together twelve hundred cavalry and
thirteen thousand eight hundred and fifty foot. Besides these there
were eight hundred and seventy slingers from the Balearic Isles,
whose name, as that of the islands they inhabit, is derived from the
word _ballein_, “to throw,” because of their peculiar skill with the
sling. Most of these troops he ordered to be stationed at Metagonia
in Libya, and the rest in Carthage itself. And from the cities in the
district of Metagonia he sent four thousand foot also into Carthage,
to serve at once as hostages for the fidelity of their country, and
as an additional guard for the city. With his brother Hasdrubal in
Iberia he left fifty quinqueremes, two quadriremes, and five triremes,
thirty-two of the quinqueremes being furnished with crews, and all five
of the triremes; also cavalry consisting of four hundred and fifty
Libyophenicians and Libyans, three hundred Lergetae, eighteen hundred
Numidians of the Massolian, Massaesylian, Maccoeian, and Maurian
tribes, who dwell by the ocean; with eleven thousand eight hundred and
fifty Libyans, three hundred Ligures, five hundred of the Balearic
Islanders, and twenty-one elephants.
[Sidenote: The inscription recording these facts.]
The accuracy of this enumeration of Hannibal’s Iberian establishment
need excite no surprise, though it is such as a commander himself would
have some difficulty in displaying; nor ought I to be condemned at once
of imitating the specious falsehoods of historians: for the fact is
that I myself found on Lacinium[172] a bronze tablet, which Hannibal
had caused to be inscribed with these particulars when he was in Italy;
and holding it to be an entirely trustworthy authority for such facts,
I did not hesitate to follow it.
+34.+ Though Hannibal had taken every precaution for the security of
Libya and Iberia, he yet waited for the messengers whom he expected to
arrive from the Celts. He had thoroughly acquainted himself with the
fertility and populousness of the districts at the foot of the Alps
and in the valley of the Padus, as well as with the warlike courage
of the men; but most important of all, with their hostile feelings
to Rome derived from the previous war, which I described in my last
book, with the express purpose of enabling my readers to follow my
narrative. He therefore reckoned very much on the chance of their
co-operation; and was careful to send messages to the chiefs of the
Celts, whether dwelling actually on the Alps or on the Italian side of
them, with unlimited promises; because he believed that he would be
able to confine the war against Rome to Italy, if he could make his way
through the intervening difficulties to these parts, and avail himself
of the active alliance of the Celts. When his messengers returned with
a report that the Celts were ready to help him and all eagerness for
his approach; and that the passage of the Alps, though laborious and
difficult, was not, however, impossible, he collected his forces from
their winter quarters at the approach of spring. Just before receiving
this report he had learnt the circumstances attending the Roman embassy
at Carthage. Encouraged by the assurance thus given him, that he would
be supported by the popular sentiment at home, he no longer disguised
from his army that the object of the forthcoming campaign was Rome; and
tried to inspire them with courage for the undertaking. He explained to
them how the Romans had demanded the surrender of himself and all the
officers of the army: and pointed out the fertility of the country to
which they were going, and the goodwill and active alliance which the
Celts were prepared to offer them. When the crowd of soldiers showed
an enthusiastic readiness to accompany him, he dismissed the assembly,
after thanking them, and naming the day on which he intended to march.
[Sidenote: B.C. 218. Hannibal breaks up his winter quarters and starts
for Italy.]
+35.+ These measures satisfactorily accomplished while he was in winter
quarters, and the security of Libya and Iberia being sufficiently
provided for; when the appointed day arrived, Hannibal got his army in
motion, which consisted of ninety thousand infantry and about twelve
thousand cavalry. After crossing the Iber, he set about subduing the
tribes of the Ilurgetes and Bargusii, as well as the Aerenosii and
Andosini, as far as the Pyrenees. When he had reduced all this country
under his power, and taken certain towns by storm, which he did with
unexpected rapidity, though not without severe fighting and serious
loss; he left Hanno in chief command of all the district north of the
Iber, and with absolute authority over the Burgusii, who were the
people that gave him most uneasiness on account of their friendly
feeling towards Rome. He then detached from his army ten thousand
foot and a thousand horse for the service of Hanno,—to whom also he
entrusted the heavy baggage of the troops that were to accompany
himself,—and the same number to go to their own land. The object of
this last measure was twofold: he thereby left a certain number of
well-affected persons behind him; and also held out to the others a
hope of returning home, both to those Iberians who were to accompany
him on his march, and to those also who for the present were to remain
at home, so that there might be a general alacrity to join him if he
were ever in want of a reinforcement. He then set his remaining troops
in motion unencumbered by heavy baggage, fifty thousand infantry and
nine thousand cavalry, and led them through the Pyrenees to the passage
of the river Rhone. The army was not so much numerous, as highly
efficient, and in an extraordinary state of physical training from
their continuous battles with the Iberians.
[Sidenote: Geography of Hannibal’s march.]
+36.+ But as a knowledge of topography is necessary for the right
understanding of my narrative, I must state the places from which
Hannibal started, through which he marched, and into which he descended
when he arrived in Italy. Nor must I, like some historians, content
myself with mentioning the mere names of places and rivers, under
the idea that that is quite sufficient to give a clear knowledge. My
opinion is that, in the case of well-known places, the mention of names
is of great assistance, but that, in the case of unknown countries,
names are no better than unintelligible and unmeaning sounds: for the
understanding having nothing to go upon, and being unable by referring
to something known to translate the words into thought, the narrative
becomes confused and vague, and conveys no clear idea. A plan therefore
must be discovered, whereby it shall be possible, while speaking of
unknown countries, to convey real and intelligible notions.
The first, most important, and most general conception is that of the
division of the heaven into four quarters, which all of us that are
capable of a general idea at all know as east, west, south, and north.
The next is to arrange the several parts of the globe according to
these points, and always to refer in thought any place mentioned to
one or other of them. We shall thus get an intelligible and familiar
conception of places which we do not know or have never seen.
[Sidenote: General view of the geography of the world.]
+37.+ This principle established as universally applicable to the
world, the next point will be to make the geography of our own part of
it intelligible by a corresponding division.
It falls, then, into three divisions, each distinguished by a
particular name,—Asia, Libya, Europe.[173] The boundaries are
respectively the Don, the Nile, and the Straits of the Pillars of
Hercules. Asia lies between the Don and the Nile, and lies under that
portion of the heaven which is between the north-east and the south.
Libya lies between the Nile and the Pillars of Hercules, and falls
beneath the south portion of the heaven, extending to the south-west
without a break, till it reaches the point of the equinoctial sunset,
which corresponds with the Pillars of Hercules. These two divisions
of the earth, therefore, regarded in a general point of view, occupy
all that part which is south of the Mediterranean from east to west.
Europe with respect to both of these lies to the north facing them,
and extending continuously from east to west. Its most important and
extensive part lies under the northern sky between the river Don and
the Narbo, which is only a short distance west of Marseilles and
the mouths by which the Rhone discharges itself into the Sardinian
Sea. From Narbo is the district occupied by the Celts as far as the
Pyrenees, stretching continuously from the Mediterranean to the Mare
Externum. The rest of Europe south of the Pyrenees, to the point where
it approaches the Pillars of Hercules, is bounded on one side by the
Mediterranean, on the other by the Mare Externum; and that part of it
which is washed by the Mediterranean as far as the Pillars of Hercules
is called Iberia, while the part which lies along the Outer or Great
Sea has no general name, because it has but recently been discovered,
and is inhabited entirely by barbarous tribes, who are very numerous,
and of whom I will speak in more detail hereafter.
[Sidenote: The extreme north and south unknown.]
+38.+ But as no one up to our time has been able to settle in regard
to those parts of Asia and Libya, where they approach each other in
the neighbourhood of Ethiopia, whether the continent is continuous to
the south, or is surrounded by the sea, so it is in regard to the part
between Narbo and the Don: none of us as yet knows anything of the
northern extent of this district, and anything we can ever know must be
the result of future exploration; and those who rashly venture by word
of mouth or written statements to describe this district must be looked
upon as ignorant or romancing.
My object in these observations was to prevent my narrative being
entirely vague to those who were unacquainted with the localities. I
hoped that, by keeping these broad distinctions in mind, they would
have some definite standard to which to refer every mention of a place,
starting from the primary one of the division of the sky into four
quarters. For, as in the case of physical sight, we instinctively turn
our faces to any object pointed at; so in the case of the mind, our
thoughts ought to turn naturally to localities as they are mentioned
from time to time.
It is time now to return to the story we have in hand.
[Sidenote: The length of the march from Carthagena to the Po, 1125
Roman miles.]
+39.+ At this period the Carthaginians were masters of the whole
Mediterranean coast of Libya from the Altars of Philaenus,[174]
opposite the Great Syrtis, to the Pillars of Hercules, a seaboard of
over sixteen thousand stades. They had also crossed the strait of the
Pillars of Hercules, and got possession of the whole seaboard of Iberia
on the Mediterranean as far as the Pyrenees, which separate the Iberes
from the Celts—that is, for a distance of about eight thousand stades:
for it is three thousand from the Pillars to New Carthage, from which
Hannibal started for Italy; two thousand six hundred from thence to
the Iber; and from that river to Emporium again sixteen hundred; from
which town, I may add, to the passage of the Rhone is a distance of
about sixteen hundred stades; for all these distances have now been
carefully measured by the Romans and marked with milestones at every
eighth stade.[175] After crossing the river there was a march up stream
along its bank of fourteen hundred stades, before reaching the foot of
the pass over the Alps into Italy. The pass itself was about twelve
hundred stades, which being crossed would bring him into the plains
of the Padus in Italy. So that the whole length of his march from New
Carthage was about nine thousand stades, or 1125 Roman miles. Of the
country he had thus to traverse he had already passed almost half in
mere distance, but in the difficulties the greater part of his task was
still before him.
[Sidenote: Coss. P. Cornelius Scipio and Tib. Sempronius Longus. B.C.
218. The Consuls are sent, one to Spain, and the other to Africa.]
[Sidenote: Placentia and Cremona.]
[Sidenote: Outrage by Boii and Insubres.]