determination and boldness of the enemy, for the obstinacy of the
battles fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those
who were engaged, is second to none recorded in history, but which,
regarded as a specimen of scientific strategy, is utterly contemptible.
The Gauls showed no power of planning or carrying out a campaign, and
in everything they did were swayed by impulse rather than by sober
calculation. As I have seen these tribes, after a short struggle,
entirely ejected from the valley of the Padus, with the exception of
some few localities lying close to the Alps, I thought I ought not
to let their original attack upon Italy pass unrecorded, any more
than their subsequent attempts, or their final ejectment: for it is
the function of the historian to record and transmit to posterity
such episodes in the drama of Fortune; that our posterity may not
from ignorance of the past be unreasonably dismayed at the sudden
and unexpected invasions of these barbarians, but may reflect how
short-lived and easily damped the spirit of this race is; and so may
stand to their defence, and try every possible means before yielding an
inch to them. I think, for instance, that those who have recorded for
our information the invasion of Greece by the Persians, and of Delphi
by the Gauls, have contributed materially to the struggles made for
the common freedom of Greece. For a superiority in supplies, arms, or
numbers, would scarcely deter any one from putting the last possible
hope to the test, in a struggle for the integrity and the safety of
his city and its territory, if he had before his eyes the surprising
result of those expeditions; and remembered how many myriads of men,
what daring confidence, and what immense armaments were baffled by the
skill and ability of opponents, who conducted their measures under the
dictates of reason and sober calculation. And as an invasion of Gauls
has been a source of alarm to Greece in our day, as well as in ancient
times, I thought it worth while to give a summary sketch of their
doings from the earliest times.
[Sidenote: Death of Hasdrubal in Spain, B.C. 221. See chap. 13.]
[Sidenote: Succession of Hannibal to the command in Spain. His
hostility to Rome.]
+36.+ Our narrative now returns to Hasdrubal, whom we left in command
of the Carthaginian forces in Iberia. After eight years command in
that country, he was assassinated in his own house at night by a
certain Celt in revenge for some private wrong. Before his death he
had done much to strengthen the Carthaginian power in Iberia, not so
much by military achievements, as by the friendly relations which
he maintained with the native princes. Now that he was dead, the
Carthaginians invested Hannibal with the command in Iberia, in spite
of his youth, because of the ability in the conduct of affairs, and
the daring spirit which he had displayed. He had no sooner assumed the
command, than he nourished a fixed resolve to make war on Rome; nor was
it long before he carried out this resolution. From that time forth
there were constant suspicions and causes of offence arising between
the Carthaginians and Romans. And no wonder: for the Carthaginians
were meditating revenge for their defeats in Sicily; and the Romans
were made distrustful from a knowledge of their designs. These things
made it clear to every one of correct judgment that before long a war
between these two nations was inevitable.
[Sidenote: Social war, B.C. 220-217.]
+37.+ At the same period the Achaean league and King Philip, with their
allies, were entering upon the war with the Aetolian league, which is
called the Social war. Now this was the point at which I proposed to
begin my general history; and as I have brought the account of the
affairs of Sicily and Libya, and those which immediately followed, in
a continuous narrative, up to the date of the beginning of the Social
and Second Punic, generally called the Hannibalic, wars, it will be
proper to leave this branch of my subject for a while, and to take up
the history of events in Greece, that I may start upon my full and
detailed narrative, after bringing the prefatory sketch of the history
of the several countries to the same point of time. For since I have
not undertaken, as previous writers have done, to write the history of
particular peoples, such as the Greeks or Persians, but the history
of all known parts of the world at once, because there was something
in the state of our own times which made such a plan peculiarly
feasible,—of which I shall speak more at length hereafter,—it will be
proper, before entering on my main subject, to touch briefly on the
state of the most important of the recognised nations of the world.
[Sidenote: The progress of the Achaean league.]
Of Asia and Egypt I need not speak before the time at which my history
commences. The previous history of these countries has been written
by a number of historians already, and is known to all the world;
nor in our days has any change specially remarkable or unprecedented
occurred to them demanding a reference to their past. But in regard to
the Achaean league, and the royal family of Macedonia, it will be in
harmony with my design to go somewhat farther back: for the latter has
become entirely extinct; while the Achaeans, as I have stated before,
have in our time made extraordinary progress in material prosperity and
internal unity. For though many statesmen had tried in past times to
induce the Peloponnesians to join in a league for the common interests
of all, and had always failed, because every one was working to secure
his own power rather than the freedom of the whole; yet in our day
this policy has made such progress, and been carried out with such
completeness, that not only is there in the Peloponnese a community of
interests such as exists between allies or friends, but an absolute
identity of laws, weights, measures, and currency.[155] All the States
have the same magistrates, senate, and judges. Nor is there any
difference between the entire Peloponnese and a single city, except in
the fact that its inhabitants are not included within the same wall; in
other respects, both as a whole and in their individual cities, there
is a nearly absolute assimilation of institutions.
[Sidenote: The origin of the name as embracing all the Peloponnese.]
+38.+ It will be useful to ascertain, to begin with, how it came to
pass that the name of the Achaeans became the universal one for all
the inhabitants of the Peloponnese. For the original bearers of this
ancestral name have no superiority over others, either in the size of
their territory and cities, or in wealth, or in the prowess of their
men. For they are a long way off being superior to the Arcadians and
Lacedaemonians in number of inhabitants and extent of territory; nor
can these latter nations be said to yield the first place in warlike
courage to any Greek people whatever. Whence then comes it that these
nations, with the rest of the inhabitants of the Peloponnese, have
been content to adopt the constitution and the name of the Achaeans?
To speak of chance in such a matter would not be to offer any adequate
solution of the question, and would be a mere idle evasion. A cause
must be sought; for without a cause nothing, expected or unexpected,
can be accomplished. The cause then, in my opinion, was this. Nowhere
could be found a more unalloyed and deliberately established system of
equality and absolute freedom, and, in a word, of democracy, than among
the Achaeans. This constitution found many of the Peloponnesians ready
enough to adopt it of their own accord: many were brought to share in
it by persuasion and argument: some, though acting under compulsion
at first, were quickly brought to acquiesce in its benefits; for none
of the original members had any special privilege reserved for them,
but equal rights were given to all comers: the object aimed at was
therefore quickly attained by the two most unfailing expedients of
equality and fraternity. This then must be looked upon as the source
and original cause of Peloponnesian unity and consequent prosperity.
That this was the original principle on which the Achaeans acted in
forming their constitution might be demonstrated by many proofs; but
for the present purpose it will be sufficient to allege one or two in
confirmation of my assertion.
[Sidenote: B.C. 371.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 405-367.]
[Sidenote: Ζεὺς ὁμάριος or ἀμάριος]
+39.+ And first: When the burning of the Pythagorean clubs in Magna
Grecia was followed by great constitutional disturbances, as was
natural on the sudden disappearance of the leading men in each state;
and the Greek cities in that part of Italy became the scene of murder,
revolutionary warfare, and every kind of confusion; deputations
were sent from most parts of Greece to endeavour to bring about
some settlement of these disorders.[156] But the disturbed states
preferred the intervention of the Achaeans above all others, and
showed the greatest confidence in them, in regard to the measures
to be adopted for removing the evils that oppressed them. Nor was
this the only occasion on which they displayed this preference. For
shortly afterwards there was a general movement among them to adopt
the model of the Achaean constitution. The first states to move in
the matter were Croton, Sybaris, and Caulonia, who began by erecting
a common temple to Zeus Homorios,[157] and a place in which to hold
their meetings and common councils. They then adopted the laws and
customs of the Achaeans, and determined to conduct their constitution
according to their principles; but finding themselves hampered by the
tyranny of Dionysius of Syracuse, and also by the encroachment of the
neighbouring barbarians, they were forced much against their will
to abandon them. Again, later on, when the Lacedaemonians met with
their unexpected reverse at Leuctra, and the Thebans as unexpectedly
claimed the hegemony in Greece, a feeling of uncertainty prevailed
throughout the country, and especially among the Lacedaemonians and
Thebans themselves, because the former refused to allow that they were
beaten, the latter felt hardly certain that they had conquered. On
this occasion, once more, the Achaeans were the people selected by the
two parties, out of all Greece, to act as arbitrators on the points
in dispute. And this could not have been from any special view of
their power, for at that time they were perhaps the weakest state in
Greece; it was rather from a conviction of their good faith and high
principles, in regard to which there was but one opinion universally
entertained. At that period of their history, however, they possessed
only the elements of success; success itself, and material increase,
were barred by the fact that they had not yet been able to produce a
leader worthy of the occasion. Whenever any man had given indications
of such ability, he was systematically thrust into the background and
hampered, at one time by the Lacedaemonian government, and at another,
still more effectually, by that of Macedonia.
+40.+ When at length, however, the country did obtain leaders of
sufficient ability, it quickly manifested its intrinsic excellence by
the accomplishment of that most glorious achievement,—the union of the
Peloponnese. The originator of this policy in the first instance was
Aratus of Sicyon; its active promotion and consummation was due to
Philopoemen of Megalopolis; while Lycortas and his party must be looked
upon as the authors of the permanence which it enjoyed. The actual
achievements of these several statesmen I shall narrate in their proper
places: but while deferring a more detailed account of the other two, I
think it will be right to briefly record here, as well as in a future
portion of my work, the political measures of Aratus, because he has
left a record of them himself in an admirably honest and lucid book of
commentaries.
I think the easiest method for myself, and most intelligible to my
readers, will be to start from the period of the restoration of the
Achaean league and federation, after its disintegration into separate
states by the Macedonian kings: from which time it has enjoyed an
unbroken progress towards the state of completion which now exists, and
of which I have already spoken at some length.
[Sidenote: 124th Olympiad, B.C. 284-280.]
[Sidenote: First Achaean league.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 371.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 323-284.]
+41.+ The period I mean is the 124th Olympiad. In this occurred the
first league of Patrae and Dyme, and the deaths of Ptolemy son of
Lagus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Ptolemy Ceraunus. In the period before
this the state of Achaia was as follows. It was ruled by kings from
the time of Tisamenus, son of Orestes, who, being expelled from
Sparta on the return of the Heraclidae, formed a kingdom in Achaia.
The last of this royal line to maintain his power was Ogyges,
whose sons so alienated the people by their unconstitutional and
tyrannical government, that a revolution took place and a democracy
was established. In the period subsequent to this, up to the time of
the establishment of the supreme authority of Alexander and Philip,
their fortunes were subject to various fluctuations, but they always
endeavoured to maintain intact in their league a democratical form of
government, as I have already stated. This league consisted of twelve
cities, all of them still surviving, with the exception of Olenus, and
Helice which was engulfed by the sea before the battle of Leuctra.
The other ten were Patrae, Dyme, Pharae, Tritaea, Leontium, Aegium,
Aegeira, Pellene, Bura, Caryneia. In the period immediately succeeding
Alexander, and before the above-named 124th Olympiad, these cities,
chiefly through the instrumentality of the Macedonian kings, became so
estranged and ill-disposed to each other, and so divided and opposed
in their interests, that some of them had to submit to the presence
of foreign garrisons, sent first by Demetrius and Cassander, and
afterwards by Antigonus Gonatas, while others even fell under the power
of Tyrants; for no one set up more of such absolute rulers in the Greek
states than this last-named king.
[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280, Second Achaean league.]
But about the 124th Olympiad, as I have said, a change of sentiment
prevailed among the Achaean cities, and they began again to form a
league. This was just at the time of Pyrrhus’s invasion of Italy. The
first to take this step were the peoples of Dyme, Patrae, Tritaea, and
Pharae. And as they thus formed the nucleus of the league, we find no
column extant recording the compact between these cities. But about
five years afterwards the people of Aegium expelled their foreign
garrison and joined the league; next, the people of Bura put their
tyrant to death and did the same; simultaneously, the state of Caryneia
was restored to the league. For Iseas, the then tyrant of Caryneia,
when he saw the expulsion of the garrison from Aegium, and the death of
the despot in Bura at the hands of Margos and the Achaeans, and when he
saw that he was himself on the point of being attacked on all sides,
voluntarily laid down his office; and having obtained a guarantee for
his personal safety from the Achaeans, formally gave in the adhesion of
his city to the league.
+42.+ My object in thus going back in point of time was, first, to show
clearly at what epoch the Achaeans entered into the second league,
which exists at this day, and which were the first members of the
original league to do so; and, secondly, that the continuity of the
policy pursued by the Achaeans might rest, not on my word only, but on
the evidence of the actual facts. It was in virtue of this policy,—by
holding out the bait of equality and freedom, and by invariably making
war upon and crushing those who on their own account, or with the
support of the kings, enslaved any of the states within their borders,
that they finally accomplished the design which they had deliberately
adopted, in some cases by their own unaided efforts, and in others
by the help of their allies. For in fact whatever was effected in
this direction, by the help of these allies in after times, must be
put down to the credit of the deliberately adopted policy of the
Achaeans themselves. They acted indeed jointly with others in many
honourable undertakings, and in none more so than with the Romans:
yet in no instance can they be said to have aimed at obtaining from
their success any advantage for a particular state. In return for the
zealous assistance rendered by them to their allies, they bargained for
nothing but the freedom of each state and the union of the Peloponnese.
But this will be more clearly seen from the record of their actual
proceedings.
[Sidenote: Victory of Lutatius off the insulae Aegates, B.C. 241.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 243-242.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 255-254. Margos.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 251-250. Aratus.]
+43.+ For the first twenty-five years of the league between the cities
I have mentioned, a secretary and two strategi for the whole union were
elected by each city in turn. But after this period they determined
to appoint one strategus only,[158] and put the entire management of
the affairs of the union in his hands. The first to obtain this honour
was Margos of Caryneia. In the fourth year after this man’s tenure
of the office, Aratus of Sicyon caused his city to join the league,
which, by his energy and courage, he had, when only twenty years of
age, delivered from the yoke of its tyrant. In the eighth year again
after this, Aratus, being elected strategus for the second time, laid
a plot to seize the Acrocorinthus, then held by Antigonus; and by his
success freed the inhabitants of the Peloponnese from a source of
serious alarm: and having thus liberated Corinth he caused it to join
the league. In his same term of office he got Megara into his hands,
and caused it to join also. These events occurred in the year before
the decisive defeat of the Carthaginians, in consequence of which they
evacuated Sicily and consented for the first time to pay tribute to
Rome.
[Sidenote: Antigonus Gonatas, B.C. 283-239.]
Having made this remarkable progress in his design in so short a time,
Aratus continued thenceforth in the position of leader of the Achaean
league, and in the consistent direction of his whole policy to one
single end; which was to expel Macedonians from the Peloponnese, to
depose the despots, and to establish in each state the common freedom
which their ancestors had enjoyed before them. So long, therefore,
as Antigonus Gonatas was alive, he maintained a continual opposition
to his interference, as well as to the encroaching spirit of the
Aetolians, and in both cases with signal skill and success; although
their presumption and contempt for justice had risen to such a pitch,
that they had actually made a formal compact with each other for the
disruption of the Achaeans.
[Sidenote: Demetrius, B.C. 239-229.]
+44.+ After the death of Antigonus, however, the Achaeans made terms
with the Aetolians, and joined them energetically in the war against
Demetrius; and, in place of the feelings of estrangement and hostility,
there gradually grew up a sentiment of brotherhood and affection
between the two peoples. Upon the death of Demetrius, after a reign of
only ten years, just about the time of the first invasion of Illyricum
by the Romans, the Achaeans had a most excellent opportunity of
establishing the policy which they had all along maintained. For the
despots in the Peloponnese were in despair at the death of Demetrius.
It was the loss to them of their chief supporter and paymaster. And now
Aratus was for ever impressing upon them that they ought to abdicate,
holding out rewards and honours for those of them who consented,
and threatening those who refused with still greater vengeance from
the Achaeans. There was therefore a general movement among them to
voluntarily restore their several states to freedom and to join the
league. I ought however to say that Ludiades of Megalopolis, in the
lifetime of Demetrius, of his own deliberate choice, and foreseeing
with great shrewdness and good sense what was going to happen, had
abdicated his sovereignty and become a citizen of the national league.
His example was followed by Aristomachus, tyrant of Argos, Xeno of
Hermione, and Cleonymus of Phlius, who all likewise abdicated and
joined the democratic league.
[Sidenote: The Aetolians and Antigonus Doson, B.C. 229-220.]
+45.+ But the increased power and national advancement which these
events brought to the Achaeans excited the envy of the Aetolians; who,
besides their natural inclination to unjust and selfish aggrandisement,
were inspired with the hope of breaking up the union of Achaean states,
as they had before succeeded in partitioning those of Acarnania with
Alexander,[159] and had planned to do those of Achaia with Antigonus
Gonatas. Instigated once more by similar expectations, they had now
the assurance to enter into communication and close alliance at once
with Antigonus (at that time ruling Macedonia as guardian of the
young King Philip), and with Cleomenes, King of Sparta. They saw that
Antigonus had undisputed possession of the throne of Macedonia, while
he was an open and avowed enemy of the Achaeans owing to the surprise
of the Acrocorinthus; and they supposed that if they could get the
Lacedaemonians to join them in their hostility to the league, they
would easily subdue it, by selecting a favourable opportunity for
their attack, and securing that it should be assaulted on all sides at
once. And they would in all probability have succeeded, but that they
had left out the most important element in the calculation, namely,
that in Aratus they had to reckon with an opponent to their plans of
ability equal to almost any emergency. Accordingly, when they attempted
this violent and unjust interference in Achaia, so far from succeeding
in any of their devices, they, on the contrary, strengthened Aratus,
the then president of the league, as well as the league itself. So
consummate was the ability with which he foiled their plan and reduced
them to impotence. The manner in which this was done will be made clear
in what I am about to relate.
[Sidenote: The Aetolians intrigue with Cleomenes, King of Sparta, B.C.
229-227.]
+46.+ There could be no doubt of the policy of the Aetolians. They
were ashamed indeed to attack the Achaeans openly, because they could
not ignore their recent obligations to them in the war with Demetrius:
but they were plotting with the Lacedaemonians; and showed their
jealousy of the Achaeans by not only conniving at the treacherous
attack of Cleomenes upon Tegea, Mantinea, and Orchomenus (cities not
only in alliance with them, but actually members of their league), but
by confirming his occupation of those places. In old times they had
thought almost any excuse good enough to justify an appeal to arms
against those who, after all, had done them no wrong: yet they now
allowed themselves to be treated with such treachery, and submitted
without remonstrance to the loss of the most important towns, solely
with the view of creating in Cleomenes a formidable antagonist to
the Achaeans. These facts were not lost upon Aratus and the other
officers of the league: and they resolved that, without taking the
initiative in going to war with any one, they would resist the attempts
of the Lacedaemonians. Such was their determination, and for a time
they persisted in it: but immediately afterwards Cleomenes began to
build the hostile fort in the territory of Megalopolis, called the
Athenaeum,[160] and showed an undisguised and bitter hostility. Aratus
and his colleagues accordingly summoned a meeting of the league, and it
was decided to proclaim war openly against Sparta.
[Sidenote: Cleomenes, B.C. 227-221.]
[Sidenote: Aratus applies to Antigonus Doson.]
+47.+ This was the origin of what is called the Cleomenic war. At
first the Achaeans were for depending on their own resources for
facing the Lacedaemonians. They looked upon it as more honourable not
to look to others for preservation, but to guard their own territory
and cities themselves; and at the same time the remembrances of his
former services made them desirous of keeping up their friendship with
Ptolemy,[161] and averse from the appearance of seeking aid elsewhere.
But when the war had lasted some time; and Cleomenes had revolutionised
the constitution of his country, and had turned its constitutional
monarchy into a despotism; and, moreover, was conducting the war with
extraordinary skill and boldness: seeing clearly what would happen, and
fearing the reckless audacity of the Aetolians, Aratus determined that
his first duty was to be well beforehand in frustrating their plans. He
satisfied himself that Antigonus was a man of activity and practical
ability, with some pretensions to the character of a man of honour;
he however knew perfectly well that kings look on no man as a friend
or foe from personal considerations, but ever measure friendships and
enmities solely by the standard of expediency. He, therefore, conceived
the idea of addressing himself to this monarch, and entering into
friendly relations with him, taking occasion to point out to him the
certain result of his present policy. But to act openly in this matter
he thought inexpedient for several reasons. By doing so he would not
only incur the opposition of Cleomenes and the Aetolians, but would
cause consternation among the Achaeans themselves, because his appeal
to their enemies would give the impression that he had abandoned all
the hopes he once had in them. This was the very last idea he desired
should go abroad; and he therefore determined to conduct this intrigue
in secrecy.
The result of this was that he was often compelled to speak and act
towards the public in a sense contrary to his true sentiments, that he
might conceal his real design by suggesting one of an exactly opposite
nature. For which reason there are some particulars which he did not
even commit to his own commentaries.
[Sidenote: Philip II. in the Peloponnese, B.C. 338.]
+48.+ It did not escape the observation of Aratus that the people of
Megalopolis would be more ready than others to seek the protection of
Antigonus, and the hopes of safety offered by Macedonia; for their
neighbourhood to Sparta exposed them to attack before the other
states; while they were unable to get the help which they ought to
have, because the Achaeans were themselves hard pressed and in great
difficulties. Besides they had special reasons for entertaining
feelings of affection towards the royal family of Macedonia, founded
on the favours received in the time of Philip, son of Amyntas. He
therefore imparted his general design under pledge of secrecy to
Nicophanes and Cercidas of Megalopolis, who were family friends of
his own and of a character suited to the undertaking; and by their
means experienced no difficulty in inducing the people of Megalopolis
to send envoys to the league, to advise that an application for help
should be made to Antigonus. Nicophanes and Cercidas were themselves
selected to go on this mission to the league, and thence, if their view
was accepted, to Antigonus. The league consented to allow the people
of Megalopolis to send the mission; and accordingly Nicophanes lost no
time in obtaining an interview with the king. About the interests of
his own country he spoke briefly and summarily, confining himself to
the most necessary statements; the greater part of his speech was, in
accordance with the directions of Aratus, concerned with the national
question.
[Sidenote: The message to Antigonus Doson.]
+49.+ The points suggested by Aratus for the envoy to dwell on were
“the scope and object of the understanding between the Aetolians and
Cleomenes, and the necessity of caution on the part primarily of the
Achaeans, but still more even on that of Antigonus himself: first,
because the Achaeans plainly could not resist the attack of both; and,
secondly, because if the Aetolians and Cleomenes conquered them, any
man of sense could easily see that they would not be satisfied or stop
there. For the encroaching spirit of the Aetolians, far from being
content to be confined by the boundaries of the Peloponnese, would
find even those of Greece too narrow for them. Again, the ambition of
Cleomenes was at present directed to the supremacy in the Peloponnese:
but this obtained, he would promptly aim at that of all Greece, in
which it would be impossible for him to succeed without first crushing
the government of Macedonia. They were, therefore, to urge him to
consider, with a view to the future, which of the two courses would
be the more to his own interests,—to fight for supremacy in Greece in
conjunction with the Achaeans and Boeotians against Cleomenes in the
Peloponnese; or to abandon the most powerful race, and to stake the
Macedonian empire on a battle in Thessaly, against a combined force
of Aetolians and Boeotians, with the Achaeans and Lacedaemonians to
boot. If the Aetolians, from regard to the goodwill shown them by
the Achaeans in the time of Demetrius, were to pretend to be anxious
to keep the peace as they were at present doing, they were to assert
that the Achaeans were ready to engage Cleomenes by themselves; and if
fortune declared in their favour they would want no assistance from
any one: but if fortune went against them, and the Aetolians joined
in the attack, they begged him to watch the course of events, that he
might not let things go too far, but might aid the Peloponnesians while
they were still capable of being saved. He had no need to be anxious
about the good faith or gratitude of the Achaeans: when the time for
action came, Aratus pledged himself to find guarantees which would be
satisfactory to both parties; and similarly would himself indicate the
moment at which the aid should be given.”
[Sidenote: Aratus wishes to do without the king if possible.]
+50.+ These arguments seemed to Antigonus to have been put by Aratus
with equal sincerity and ability: and after listening to them, he
eagerly took the first necessary step by writing a letter to the people
of Megalopolis with an offer of assistance, on condition that such a
measure should receive the consent of the Achaeans. When Nicophanes
and Cercidas returned home and delivered this despatch from the king,
reporting at the same time his other expressions of goodwill and zeal
in the cause, the spirits of the people of Megalopolis were greatly
elated; and they were all eagerness to attend the meeting of the
league, and urge that measures should be taken to secure the alliance
of Antigonus, and to put the management of the war in his hands with
all despatch. Aratus learnt privately from Nicophanes the king’s
feelings towards the league and towards himself; and was delighted
that his plan had not failed, and that he had not found the king
completely alienated from himself, as the Aetolians hoped he would
be. He regarded it also as eminently favourable to his policy, that
the people of Megalopolis were so eager to use the Achaean league as
the channel of communication with Antigonus. For his first object was
if possible to do without this assistance; but if he were compelled
to have recourse to it, he wished that the invitation should not be
sent through himself personally, but that it should rather come from
the Achaeans as a nation. For he feared that, if the king came, and
conquered Cleomenes and the Lacedaemonians in the war, and should then
adopt any policy hostile to the interests of the national constitution,
he would have himself by general consent to bear the blame of the
result: while Antigonus would be justified, by the injury which had
been inflicted on the royal house of Macedonia in the matter of the
Acrocorinthus. Accordingly when Megalopolitan envoys appeared in the
national council, and showed the royal despatch, and further declared
the general friendly disposition of the king, and added an appeal to
the congress to secure the king’s alliance without delay; and when also
the sense of the meeting was clearly shown to be in favour of taking
this course, Aratus rose, and, after setting forth the king’s zeal, and
complimenting the meeting upon their readiness to act in the matter,
he proceeded to urge upon them in a long speech that “They should
try if possible to preserve their cities and territory by their own
efforts, for that nothing could be more honourable or more expedient
than that: but that, if it turned out that fortune declared against
them in this effort, they might then have recourse to the assistance of
their friends; but not until they had tried all their own resources to
the uttermost.” This speech was received with general applause: and it
was decided to take no fresh departure at present, and to endeavour to
bring the existing war to a conclusion unaided.
[Sidenote: Euergetes jealous of the Macedonian policy of Aratus, helps
Cleomenes.]
+51.+ But when Ptolemy, despairing of retaining the league’s
friendship, began to furnish Cleomenes with supplies,—which he did
with a view of setting him up as a foil to Antigonus, thinking the
Lacedaemonians offered him better hopes than the Achaeans of being able
to thwart the policy of the Macedonian kings; and when the Achaeans
themselves had suffered three defeats,—one at Lycaeum in an engagement
with Cleomenes whom they had met on a march; and again in a pitched
battle at Ladocaea in the territory of Megalopolis, in which Lydiades
fell; and a third time decisively at a place called Hecatomboeum in
the territory of Dyme where their whole forces had been engaged,—after
these misfortunes, no further delay was possible, and they were
compelled by the force of circumstances to appeal unanimously to
Antigonus. Thereupon Aratus sent his son to Antigonus, and ratified
the terms of the subvention. The great difficulty was this: it was
believed to be certain that the king would send no assistance, except
on the condition of the restoration of the Acrocorinthus, and of having
the city of Corinth put into his hands as a base of operations in this
war; and on the other hand it seemed impossible that the Achaeans
should venture to put the Corinthians in the king’s power against their
own consent. The final determination of the matter was accordingly
postponed, that they might investigate the question of the securities
to be given to the king.
[Sidenote: The Achaeans offer to surrender the Acrocorinthus to
Antigonus.]
+52.+ Meanwhile, on the strength of the dismay caused by his successes,
Cleomenes was making an unopposed progress through the cities,
winning some by persuasion and others by threats. In this way, he
got possession of Caphyae, Pellene, Pheneus, Argos, Phlius, Cleonae,
Epidaurus, Hermione, Troezen, and last of all Corinth, while he
personally commanded a siege of Sicyon. But this in reality relieved
the Achaeans from a very grave difficulty. For the Corinthians by
ordering Aratus, as Strategus of the league, and the Achaeans to
evacuate the town, and by sending messages to Cleomenes inviting his
presence, gave the Achaeans a ground of action and a reasonable pretext
for moving. Aratus was quick to take advantage of this; and, as the
Achaeans were in actual possession of the Acrocorinthus, he made his
peace with the royal family of Macedonia by offering it to Antigonus;
and at the same time gave thus a sufficient guarantee for friendship in
the future, and further secured Antigonus a base of operations for the
war with Sparta.
[Sidenote: Cleomenes prepares to resist.]
[Sidenote: Antigonus comes to the Isthmus, B.C. 224.]
Upon learning of this compact between the league and Antigonus,
Cleomenes raised the siege of Sicyon and pitched his camp near the
Isthmus; and, having thrown up a line of fortification uniting the
Acrocorinthus with the mountain called the “Ass’s Back,” began from
this time to expect with confidence the empire of the Peloponnese. But
Antigonus had made his preparations long in advance, in accordance with
the suggestion of Aratus, and was only waiting for the right moment to
act. And now the news which he received convinced him that the entrance
of Cleomenes into Thessaly, at the head of an army, was only a question
of a very few days: he accordingly despatched envoys to Aratus and the
league to conclude the terms of the treaty[162] and marched to the
Isthmus with his army by way of Euboea. He took this route because
the Aetolians, after trying other expedients for preventing Antigonus
bringing this aid, now forbade his marching south of Thermopylae with
an army, threatening that, if he did, they would offer armed opposition
to his passage.
+53.+ Thus Antigonus and Cleomenes were encamped face to face: the
former desirous of effecting an entrance into the Peloponnese,
Cleomenes determined to prevent him.
[Sidenote: The Achaeans seize Argos.]
Meanwhile the Achaeans, in spite of their severe disasters, did
not abandon their purpose or give up all hopes of retrieving their
fortunes. They gave Aristotle of Argos assistance when he headed
a rising against the Cleomenic faction; and, under the command of
Timoxenus the Strategus, surprised and seized Argos. And this must be
regarded as the chief cause of the improvement which took place in
their fortunes; for this reverse checked the ardour of Cleomenes and
damped the courage of his soldiers in advance, as was clearly shown by
what took place afterwards. For though Cleomenes had already possession
of more advantageous posts, and was in the enjoyment of more abundant
supplies than Antigonus, and was at the same time inspired with
superior courage and ambition: yet, as soon as he was informed that
Argos was in the hands of the Achaeans, he at once drew back, abandoned
all these advantages, and retreated from the Isthmus with every
appearance of precipitation, in terror of being completely surrounded
by his enemies. At first he retired upon Argos, and for a time made
some attempt to regain the town. But the Achaeans offered a gallant
resistance; and the Argives themselves were stirred up to do the same
by remorse for having admitted him before: and so, having failed in
this attempt also, he marched back to Sparta by way of Mantinea.
[Sidenote: Antigonus receives the Acrocorinthus.]
+54.+ On his part, Antigonus advanced without any casualty into the
Peloponnese, and took over the Acrocorinthus; and, without wasting
time there, pushed on in his enterprise and entered Argos. He only
stayed there long enough to compliment the Argives on their conduct,
and to provide for the security of the city; and then immediately
starting again directed his march towards Arcadia; and after ejecting
the garrisons from the posts which had been fortified by Cleomenes in
the territories of Aegys and Belmina, and, putting those strongholds
in the hands of the people of Megalopolis, he went to Aegium to attend
the meeting of the Achaean league. There he made a statement of his own
proceedings, and consulted with the meeting as to the measures to be
taken in the future. He was appointed commander-in-chief of the allied
army, and went into winter quarters at Sicyon and Corinth.
[Sidenote: B.C. 223. Recovery of Tegea.]
[Sidenote: Skirmish with Cleomenes.]
[Sidenote: Capture of Orchomenus]
[Sidenote: and Mantinea]
[Sidenote: and Heraea and Telphusa.]
At the approach of spring he broke up his camp and got on the march.
On the third day he arrived at Tegea, and being joined there by the
Achaean forces, he proceeded to regularly invest the city. But the
vigour displayed by the Macedonians in conducting the siege, and
especially in the digging of mines, soon reduced the Tegeans to
despair, and they accordingly surrendered. After taking the proper
measures for securing the town, Antigonus proceeded to extend his
expedition. He now marched with all speed into Laconia; and having
found Cleomenes in position on the frontier, he was trying to bring him
to an engagement, and was harassing him with skirmishing attacks, when
news was brought to him by his scouts that the garrison of Orchomenus
had started to join Cleomenes. He at once broke up his camp, hurried
thither, and carried the town by assault. Having done that, he next
invested Mantinea and began to besiege it. This town also being soon
terrified into surrender by the Macedonians, he started again along the
road to Heraea and Telphusa. These towns, too, being secured by the
voluntary surrender of their inhabitants, as the winter was by this
time approaching, he went again to Aegium to attend the meeting of the
league. His Macedonian soldiers he sent away to winter at home, while
he himself remained to confer with the Achaeans on the existing state
of affairs.
+55.+ But Cleomenes was on the alert. He saw that the Macedonians in
the army of Antigonus had been sent home; and that the king and his
mercenaries in Aegium were three days’ march from Megalopolis; and
this latter town he well knew to be difficult to guard, owing to its
great extent, and the sparseness of its inhabitants; and, moreover,
that it was just then being kept with even greater carelessness than
usual, owing to Antigonus being in the country; and what was more
important than anything else, he knew that the larger number of its
men of military age had fallen at the battles of Lycaeum and Ladoceia.
There happened to be residing in Megalopolis some Messenian exiles; by
whose help he managed, under cover of night, to get within the walls
without being detected. When day broke he had a narrow escape from
being ejected, if not from absolute destruction, through the valour
of the citizens. This had been his fortune three months before, when
he had made his way into the city by the region which is called the
Cōlaeum: but on this occasion, by the superiority of his force, and the
seizure in advance of the strongest positions in the town, he succeeded
in effecting his purpose. He eventually ejected the inhabitants,
and took entire possession of the city; which, once in his power,
he dismantled in so savage and ruthless a manner as to preclude the
least hope that it might ever be restored. The reason of his acting in
this manner was, I believe, that Megalopolis and Stymphalus were the
only towns in which, during the vicissitudes of that period, he never
succeeded in obtaining a single partisan, or inducing a single citizen
to turn traitor. For the passion for liberty and the loyalty of the
Clitorians had been stained by the baseness of one man, Thearces; whom
the Clitorians, with some reason, denied to be a native of their city,
asserting that he had been foisted in from Orchomenus, and was the
offspring of one of the foreign garrison there.
[Sidenote: Digression (to ch. 63) on the misstatements of Phylarchus.]
[Sidenote: Mantinea.]
+56.+ For the history of the same period, with which we are now
engaged, there are two authorities, Aratus and Phylarchus,[163] whose
opinions are opposed in many points and their statements contradictory.
I think, therefore, it will be advantageous, or rather necessary, since
I follow Aratus in my account of the Cleomenic war, to go into the
question; and not by any neglect on my part to suffer misstatements in
historical writings to enjoy an authority equal to that of truth. The
fact is that the latter of these two writers has, throughout the whole
of his history, made statements at random and without discrimination.
It is not, however, necessary for me to criticise him on other points
on the present occasion, or to call him to strict account concerning
them; but such of his statements as relate to the period which I have
now in hand, that is the Cleomenic war, these I must thoroughly sift.
They will be quite sufficient to enable us to form a judgment on the
general spirit and ability with which he approaches historical writing.
It was his object to bring into prominence the cruelty of Antigonus
and the Macedonians, as well as that of Aratus and the Achaeans; and
he accordingly asserts that, when Mantinea fell into their hands, it
was cruelly treated; and that the most ancient and important of all
the Arcadian towns was involved in calamities so terrible as to move
all Greece to horror and tears. And being eager to stir the hearts
of his readers to pity, and to enlist their sympathies by his story,
he talks of women embracing, tearing their hair, and exposing their
breasts; and again of the tears and lamentations of men and women, led
off into captivity along with their children and aged parents. And
this he does again and again throughout his whole history, by way of
bringing the terrible scene vividly before his readers. I say nothing
of the unworthiness and unmanliness of the course he has adopted: let
us only inquire what is essential and to the purpose in history. Surely
an historian’s object should not be to amaze his readers by a series
of thrilling anecdotes; nor should he aim at producing speeches which
_might_ have been delivered, nor study dramatic propriety in details
like a writer of tragedy: but his function is above all to record
with fidelity what was actually said or done, however commonplace
it may be. For the purposes of history and of the drama are not the
same, but widely opposed to each other. In the former the object is
to strike and delight by words as true to nature as possible; in the
latter to instruct and convince by genuine words and deeds; in the
former the effect is meant to be temporary, in the latter permanent.
In the former, again, the power of carrying an audience is the chief
excellence, because the object is to create illusion; but in the latter
the thing of primary importance is truth, because the object is to
benefit the learner. And apart from these considerations, Phylarchus,
in most of the catastrophes which he relates, omits to suggest the
causes which gave rise to them, or the course of events which led up
to them: and without knowing these, it is impossible to feel the due
indignation or pity at anything which occurs. For instance, everybody
looks upon it as an outrage that the free should be struck: still,
if a man provokes it by an act of violence, he is considered to have
got no more than he deserved; and, where it is done for correction
and discipline, those who strike free men are deemed worthy of honour
and gratitude. Again, the killing of a fellow-citizen is regarded
as a heinous crime, deserving the severest penalties: and yet it is
notorious that the man who kills a thief, or his wife’s paramour, is
held guiltless; while he who kills a traitor or tyrant in every country
receives honours and pre-eminence. And so in everything our final
judgment does not depend upon the mere things done, but upon their
causes and the views of the actors, according as these differ.
[Sidenote: B.C. 227.]
+57.+ Now the people of Mantinea had in the first instance abandoned
the league, and voluntarily submitted, first to the Aetolians,
and afterwards to Cleomenes. Being therefore, in accordance with
this policy, members of the Lacedaemonian community, in the fourth
year before the coming of Antigonus, their city was forcibly taken
possession of by the Achaeans owing to the skilful plotting of Aratus.
But on that occasion, so far from being subjected to any severity
for their act of treason, it became a matter of general remark how
promptly the feelings of the conquerors and the conquered underwent a
revolution. As soon as he had got possession of the town, Aratus issued
orders to his own men that no one was to lay a finger on anything
that did not belong to him; and then, having summoned the Mantineans
to a meeting, he bade them be of good cheer, and stay in their own
houses; for that, as long as they remained members of the league,
their safety was secured. On their part, the Mantineans, surprised
at this unlooked-for prospect of safety, immediately experienced a
universal revulsion of feeling. The very men against whom they had
a little while before been engaged in a war, in which they had seen
many of their kinsfolk killed, and no small number grievously wounded,
they now received into their houses, and entertained as their guests,
interchanging every imaginable kindness with them. And naturally so.
For I believe that there never were men who met with more kindly foes,
or came out of a struggle with what seemed the most dreadful disasters
more scatheless, than did the Mantineans, owing to the humanity of
Aratus and the Achaeans towards them.
+58.+ But they still saw certain dangers ahead from intestine
disorders, and the hostile designs of the Aetolians and Lacedaemonians;
they subsequently, therefore, sent envoys to the league asking for a
guard for their town. The request was granted: and three hundred of
the league army were selected by lot to form it. These men on whom the
lot fell started for Mantinea; and, abandoning their native cities
and their callings in life, remained there to protect the lives and
liberties of the citizens. Besides them, the league despatched two
hundred mercenaries, who joined the Achaean guard in protecting the
established constitution. But this state of things did not last long:
an insurrection broke out in the town, and the Mantineans called in the
aid of the Lacedaemonians; delivered the city into their hands; and
put to death the garrison sent by the league. It would not be easy to
mention a grosser or blacker act of treachery. Even if they resolved to
utterly set at nought the gratitude they owed to, and the friendship
they had formed with, the league; they ought at least to have spared
these men, and to have let every one of them depart under some terms
or another: for this much it is the custom by the law of nations to
grant even to foreign enemies. But in order to satisfy Cleomenes and
the Lacedaemonians of their fidelity in the policy of the hour, they
deliberately, and in violation of international law, consummated a
crime of the most impious description. To slaughter and wreak vengeance
on the men who had just before taken their city, and refrained from
doing them the least harm, and who were at that very moment engaged in
protecting their lives and liberties,—can anything be imagined more
detestable? What punishment can be conceived to correspond with its
enormity? If one suggests that they would be rightly served by being
sold into slavery, with their wives and children, as soon as they were
beaten in war; it may be answered that this much is only what, by the
laws of warfare, awaits even those who have been guilty of no special
act of impiety. They deserved therefore to meet with a punishment even
more complete and heavy than they did; so that, even if what Phylarchus
mentions did happen to them, there was no reason for the pity of Greece
being bestowed on them: praise and approval rather were due to those
who exacted vengeance for their impious crime. But since, as a matter
of fact, nothing worse befel the Mantineans than the plunder of their
property and the selling of their free citizens into slavery, this
historian, for the mere sake of a sensational story, has not only told
a pure lie, but an improbable lie. His wilful ignorance also was so
supreme, that he was unable to compare with this alleged cruelty of the
Achaeans the conduct of the same people in the case of Tegea, which
they took by force at the same period, and yet did no injury to its
inhabitants. And yet, if the natural cruelty of the perpetrators was
the sole cause of the severity to Mantinea, it is to be presumed that
Tegea would have been treated in the same way. But if their treatment
of Mantinea was an exception to that of every other town, the necessary
inference is that the cause for their anger was exceptional also.
[Sidenote: Aristomachus.]
+59.+ Again Phylarchus says that Aristomachus the Argive, a man of
a most distinguished family, who had been despot of Argos, as his
fathers had been before him, upon falling into the hands of Antigonus
and the league “was hurried off to Cenchreae and there racked to
death,—an unparalleled instance of injustice and cruelty.” But in this
matter also our author preserves his peculiar method. He makes up a
story about certain cries of this man, when he was on the rack, being
heard through the night by the neighbours: “some of whom,” he says,
“rushed to the house in their horror, or incredulity, or indignation
at the outrage.” As for the sensational story, let it pass; I have
said enough on that point. But I must express my opinion that, even
if Aristomachus had committed no crime against the Achaeans besides,
yet his whole life and his treason to his own country deserved the
heaviest possible punishment. And in order, forsooth, to enhance this
man’s reputation, and move his reader’s sympathies for his sufferings,
our historian remarks that he had not only been a tyrant himself,
but that his fathers had been so before him. It would not be easy to
bring a graver or more bitter charge against a man than this: for the
mere word “tyrant” involves the idea of everything that is wickedest,
and includes every injustice and crime possible to mankind. And if
Aristomachus endured the most terrible tortures, as Phylarchus says,
he yet would not have been sufficiently punished for the crime of one
day, in which, when Aratus had effected an entrance into Argos with the
Achaean soldiers,—and after supporting the most severe struggles and
dangers for the freedom of its citizens, had eventually been driven
out, because the party within who were in league with him had not
ventured to stir, for fear of the tyrant,—Aristomachus availed himself
of the pretext of their complicity with the irruption of the Achaeans
to put to the rack and execute eighty of the leading citizens, who were
perfectly innocent, in the presence of their relations. I pass by the
history of his whole life and the crimes of his ancestors; for that
would be too long a story.
+60.+ But this shows that we ought not to be indignant if a man reaps
as he has sown; but rather if he is allowed to end his days in peace,
without experiencing such retribution at all. Nor ought we to accuse
Antigonus or Aratus of crime, for having racked and put to death a
tyrant whom they had captured in war: to have killed and wreaked
vengeance on whom, even in time of peace, would have brought praise and
honour to the doers from all right-minded persons.
But when, in addition to these crimes, he was guilty also of treachery
to the league, what shall we say that he deserved? The facts of the
case are these. He abdicted his sovereignty of Argos shortly before,
finding himself in difficulties, owing to the state of affairs brought
on by the death of Demetrius. He was, however, protected by the
clemency and generosity of the league; and, much to his own surprise,
was left unmolested. For the Achaean government not only secured him an
indemnity for all crimes committed by him while despot, but admitted
him as a member of the league, and invested him with the highest office
in it,—that, namely, of Commander-in-Chief and Strategus.[164] All
these favours he immediately forgot, as soon as his hopes were a little
raised by the Cleomenic war; and at a crisis of the utmost importance
he withdrew his native city, as well as his own personal adhesion,
from the league, and attached them to its enemies. For such an act of
treason what he deserved was not to be racked under cover of night at
Cenchreae, and then put to death, as Phylarchus says: he ought to have
been taken from city to city in the Peloponnese, and to have ended his
life only after exemplary torture in each of them. And yet the only
severity that this guilty wretch had to endure was to be drowned in the
sea by order of the officers at Cenchreae.
[Sidenote: Megalopolis.]
+61.+ There is another illustration of this writer’s manner to be
found in his treatment of the cases of Mantinea and Megalopolis. The
misfortunes of the former he has depicted with his usual exaggeration
and picturesqueness: apparently from the notion, that it is the
peculiar function of an historian to select for special mention only
such actions as are conspicuously bad. But about the noble conduct
of the Megalopolitans at that same period he has not said a word: as
though it were the province of history to deal with crimes rather than
with instances of just and noble conduct; or as though his readers
would be less improved by the record of what is great and worthy of
imitation, than by that of such deeds as are base and fit only to be
avoided. For instance, he has told us clearly enough how Cleomenes
took the town, preserved it from damage, and forthwith sent couriers
to the Megalopolitans in Messene with a despatch, offering them the
safe enjoyment of their country if they would throw in their lot with
him;—and his object in telling all this is to enhance the magnanimity
and moderation of Cleomenes towards his enemies. Nay, he has gone
farther, and told us how the people of Megalopolis would not allow
the letter to be read to the end, and were not far from stoning the
bearers of it. Thus much he does tell us. But the sequel to this, so
appropriate to an historian,—the commendation, I mean, and honourable
mention of their noble conduct,—this he has altogether left out. And
yet he had an opportunity ready to his hand. For if we view with
approval the conduct of a people who merely by their declarations and
votes support a war in behalf of friends and allies; while to those
who go so far as to endure the devastation of their territory, and a
siege of their town, we give not only praise but active gratitude:
what must be our estimate of the people of Megalopolis? Must it not
be of the most exalted character? First of all, they allowed their
territory to be at the mercy of Cleomenes, and then consented to be
entirely deprived of their city, rather than be false to the league:
and, finally, in spite of an unexpected chance of recovering it, they
deliberately preferred the loss of their territory, the tombs of their
ancestors, their temples, their homes and property, of everything in
fact which men value most, to forfeiting their faith to their allies.
No nobler action has ever been, or ever will be performed; none to
which an historian could better draw his reader’s attention. For what
could be a higher incentive to good faith, or the maintenance of frank
and permanent relations between states? But of all this Phylarchus says
not a word, being, as it seems to me, entirely blind as to all that is
noblest and best suited to be the theme of an historian.
[Sidenote: and its wealth.]
[Sidenote: B.C. 378.]
+62.+ He does, however, state in the course of his narrative that,
from the spoils of Megalopolis, six thousand talents fell to the
Lacedaemonians, of which two thousand, according to custom, were given
to Cleomenes. This shows, to begin with, an astounding ignorance of the
ordinary facts as to the resources of Greece: a knowledge which above
all others should be possessed by historians. I am not of course now
speaking of the period in which the Peloponnese had been ruined by the
Macedonian kings, and still more completely by a long continuance of
intestine struggles; but of our own times, in which it is believed, by
the establishment of its unity, to be enjoying the highest prosperity
of which it is capable. Still even at this period, if you could
collect all the movable property of the whole Peloponnese (leaving
out the value of slaves), it would be impossible to get so large a
sum of money together. That I speak on good grounds and not at random
will appear from the following fact. Every one has read that when the
Athenians, in conjunction with the Thebans, entered upon the war with
the Lacedaemonians, and despatched an army of twenty thousand men,
and manned a hundred triremes, they resolved to supply the expenses
of the war by the assessment of a property tax; and accordingly had a
valuation taken, not only of the whole land of Attica and the houses in
it, but of all other property: but yet the value returned fell short
of six thousand talents by two hundred and fifty; which will show that
what I have just said about the Peloponnese is not far wide of the
mark. But at this period the most exaggerated estimate could scarcely
give more than three hundred talents, as coming from Megalopolis
itself; for it is acknowledged that most of the inhabitants, free and
slaves, escaped to Messene. But the strongest confirmation of my words
is the case of Mantinea, which, as he himself observes, was second to
no Arcadian city in wealth and numbers. Though it was surrendered after
a siege, so that no one could escape, and no property could without
great difficulty be concealed; yet the value of the whole spoil of the
town, including the price of the captives sold, amounted at this same
period to only three hundred talents.
[Sidenote: Ptolemy Euergetes and Cleomenes.]
+63.+ But a more astonishing misstatement remains to be remarked. In
the course of his history of this war, Phylarchus asserts “that about
ten days before the battle an ambassador came from Ptolemy announcing
to Cleomenes, that the king declined to continue to support him with
supplies, and advised him to make terms with Antigonus. And that when
this message had been delivered to Cleomenes, he made up his mind that
he had better put his fortune to the supreme test as soon as possible,
before his forces learnt about this message, because he could not hope
to provide the soldiers’ pay from his own resources.” But if he had
at that very time become the master of six thousand talents, he would
have been better supplied than Ptolemy himself. And as for war with
Antigonus, if he had become master of only three hundred talents, he
would have been able to continue it without any difficulty. But the
writer states two inconsistent propositions—that Cleomenes depended
wholly on Ptolemy for money: and that he at the same time had become
master of that enormous sum. Is this not irrational, and grossly
careless besides? I might mention many instances of a similar kind, not
only in his account of this period, but throughout his whole work; but
I think for my present purpose enough has been said.
[Sidenote: B.C. 222. Cleomenes invades Argos.]
+64.+ Megalopolis having fallen, then, Antigonus spent the winter at
Argos. But at the approach of spring Cleomenes collected his army,
addressed a suitable exhortation to them, and led them into the Argive
territory. Most people thought this a hazardous and foolhardy step,
because the places at which the frontier was crossed were strongly
fortified; but those who were capable of judging regarded the measure
as at once safe and prudent. For seeing that Antigonus had dismissed
his forces, he reckoned on two things,—there would be no one to resist
him, and therefore he would run no risk; and when the Argives found
that their territory was being laid waste up to their walls, they would
be certain to be roused to anger and to lay the blame upon Antigonus:
therefore, if on the one hand Antigonus, unable to bear the complaints
of the populace, were to sally forth and give him battle with his
present forces, Cleomenes felt sure of an easy victory; but if on the
other hand Antigonus refused to alter his plans, and kept persistently
aloof, he believed that he would be able to effect a safe retreat home,
after succeeding by this expedition in terrifying his enemies and
inspiring his own forces with courage. And this was the actual result.
For as the devastation of the country went on, crowds began to collect
and abuse Antigonus: but like a wise general and king, he refused
to allow any consideration to outweigh that of sound strategy, and
persisted in remaining inactive. Accordingly Cleomenes, in pursuance of
his plan, having terrified his enemies and inspired courage in his own
army for the coming struggle, returned home unmolested.
[Sidenote: The summer campaign. The army of Antigonus.]
+65.+ Summer having now come, and the Macedonian and Achaean soldiers
having assembled from their winter quarters, Antigonus moved his army,
along with his allies, into Laconia. The main force consisted of ten
thousand Macedonians for the phalanx, three thousand light armed, and
three hundred cavalry. With these were a thousand Agraei; the same
number of Gauls; three thousand mercenary infantry, and three hundred
cavalry; picked troops of the Achaeans, three thousand infantry and
three hundred cavalry; and a thousand Megalopolitans armed in the
Macedonian manner, under the command of Cercidas of Megalopolis. Of
the allies there were two thousand infantry, and two hundred cavalry,
from Boeotia; a thousand infantry and fifty cavalry from Epirus; the
same number from Acarnania; and sixteen hundred from Illyria, under
the command of Demetrius of Pharos. The whole amounted to twenty-eight
thousand infantry and twelve hundred cavalry.
[Sidenote: The position of Cleomenes at Sellasia.]
Cleomenes had expected the attack, and had secured the passes into the
country by posting garrisons, digging trenches, and felling trees;
while he took up position at a place called Sellasia, with an army
amounting to twenty thousand, having calculated that the invading
forces would take that direction: which turned out to be the case. This
pass lies between two hills, called respectively Evas and Olympus, and
the road to Sparta follows the course of the river Oenus. Cleomenes
strengthened both these hills by lines of fortification, consisting of
trench and palisade. On Evas he posted the perioeci and allies, under
the command of his brother Eucleidas; while he himself held Olympus
with the Lacedaemonians and mercenaries. On the level ground along the
river he stationed his cavalry, with a division of his mercenaries,
on both sides of the road. When Antigonus arrived, he saw at once
the strength of the position, and the skill with which Cleomenes had
selected the different branches of his army to occupy the points of
vantage, so that the whole aspect of the position was like that of
skilled soldiers drawn up ready for a charge. For no preparation for
attack or defence had been omitted; but everything was in order, either
for offering battle with effect, or for holding an almost unassailable
position.
+66.+ The sight of these preparations decided Antigonus not to make an
immediate attack upon the position, or rashly hazard an engagement. He
pitched his camp a short distance from it, covering his front by the
stream called Gorgylus, and there remained for some days; informing
himself by reconnaissances of the peculiarities of the ground and the
character of the troops, and at the same time endeavouring by feigned
movements to elicit the intentions of the enemy. But he could never
find an unguarded point, or one where the troops were not entirely
on the alert, for Cleomenes was always ready at a moment’s notice to
be at any point that was attacked. He therefore gave up all thoughts
of attacking the position; and finally an understanding was come to
between him and Cleomenes to bring the matter to the decision of
battle. And, indeed, Fortune had there brought into competition two
commanders equally endowed by nature with military skill. To face
the division of the enemy on Evas Antigonus stationed his Macedonian
hoplites with brazen shields, and the Illyrians, drawn up in alternate
lines, under the command of Alexander, son of Acmetus, and Demetrius
of Pharos, respectively. Behind them he placed the Acarnanians and
Cretans, and behind them again were two thousand Achaeans to act
as a reserve. His cavalry, on the banks of the river Oenous, were
posted opposite the enemy’s cavalry, under the command of Alexander,
and flanked by a thousand Achaean infantry and the same number of
Megalopolitans. Antigonus himself determined to lead his mercenaries
and Macedonian troops in person against the division on Olympus
commanded by Cleomenes. Owing to the narrowness of the ground, the
Macedonians were arranged in a double phalanx, one close behind the
other, while the mercenaries were placed in front of them. It was
arranged that the Illyrians, who had bivouacked in full order during
the previous night along the river Gorgylus, close to the foot of Evas,
were to begin their assault on the hill when they saw a flag of linen
raised from the direction of Olympus; and that the Megalopolitans and
cavalry should do the same when the king raised a scarlet flag.
[Sidenote: Battle of Sellasia.]
[Sidenote: Philopoemen’s presence of mind.]
+67.+ The moment for beginning the battle had come: the signal was
given to the Illyrians, and the word passed by the officers to their
men to do their duty, and in a moment they started into view of the
enemy and began assaulting the hill. But the light-armed troops who
were stationed with Cleomenes’s cavalry, observing that the Achaean
lines were not covered by any other troops behind them, charged them
on the rear; and thus reduced the division while endeavouring to carry
the hill of Evas to a state of great peril,—being met as they were on
their front by Eucleidas from the top of the hill, and being charged
and vigorously attacked by the light-armed mercenaries on their rear.
It was at this point that Philopoemen of Megalopolis, with a clear
understanding of the situation and a foresight of what would happen,
vainly endeavoured to point out the certain result to his superior
officers. They disregarded him for his want of experience in command
and his extreme youth; and, accordingly he acted for himself, and
cheering on the men of his own city, made a vigorous charge on the
enemy. This effected a diversion; for the light-armed mercenaries,
who were engaged in harassing the rear of the party ascending Evas,
hearing the shouting and seeing the cavalry engaged, abandoned their
attack upon this party and hurried back to their original position to
render assistance to the cavalry. The result was that the division of
Illyrians, Macedonians, and the rest who were advancing with them, no
longer had their attention diverted by an attack upon their rear, and
so continued their advance upon the enemy with high spirits and renewed
confidence. And this afterwards caused it to be acknowledged that to
Philopoemen was due the honour of the success against Eucleidas.
+68.+ It is clear that Antigonus at any rate entertained that opinion,
for after the battle he asked Alexander, the commander of the cavalry,
with the view of convicting him of his shortcoming, “Why he had engaged
before the signal was given?” And upon Alexander answering that “He had
not done so, but that a young officer from Megalopolis had presumed to
anticipate the signal, contrary to his wish:” Antigonus replied, “That
young man acted like a good general in grasping the situation; you,
general, were the youngster.”
[Sidenote: Defeat of Eucleidas.]
What Eucleidas ought to have done, when he saw the enemy’s lines
advancing, was to have rushed down at once upon them; thrown their
ranks into disorder; and then retired himself, step by step, to
continually higher ground into a safe position: for by thus breaking
them up and depriving them, to begin with, of the advantages of their
peculiar armour and disposition, he would have secured the victory by
the superiority of his position. But he did the very opposite of all
this, and thereby forfeited the advantages of the ground. As though
victory were assured, he kept his original position on the summit of
the hill, with the view of catching the enemy at as great an elevation
as possible, that their flight might be all the longer over steep and
precipitous ground. The result, as might have been anticipated, was
exactly the reverse. For he left himself no place of retreat, and by
allowing the enemy to reach his position, unharmed and in unbroken
order, he was placed at the disadvantage of having to give them battle
on the very summit of the hill; and so, as soon as he was forced by the
weight of their heavy armour and their close order to give any ground,
it was immediately occupied by the Illyrians; while his own men were
obliged to take lower ground, because they had no space for manœuvring
on the top. The result was not long in arriving: they suffered a
repulse, which the difficult and precipitous nature of the ground over
which they had to retire turned into a disastrous flight.
[Sidenote: Defeat of Cleomenes.]
+69.+ Simultaneously with these events the cavalry engagement was also
being brought to a decision; in which all the Achaean cavalry, and
especially Philopoemen, fought with conspicuous gallantry, for to them
it was a contest for freedom. Philopoemen himself had his horse killed
under him, and while fighting accordingly on foot received a severe
wound through both his thighs. Meanwhile the two kings on the other
hill Olympus began by bringing their light-armed troops and mercenaries
into action, of which each of them had five thousand. Both the kings
and their entire armies had a full view of this action, which was
fought with great gallantry on both sides: the charges taking place
sometimes in detachments, and at other times along the whole line, and
an eager emulation being displayed between the several ranks, and even
between individuals. But when Cleomenes saw that his brother’s division
was retreating, and that the cavalry in the low ground were on the
point of doing the same, alarmed at the prospect of an attack at all
points at once, he was compelled to demolish the palisade in his front,
and to lead out his whole force in line by one side of his position.
A recall was sounded on the bugle for the light-armed troops of both
sides, who were on the ground between the two armies: and the phalanxes
shouting their war cries, and with spears couched, charged each other.
Then a fierce struggle arose: the Macedonians sometimes slowly giving
ground and yielding to the superior courage of the soldiers of Sparta,
and at another time the Lacedaemonians being forced to give way before
the overpowering weight of the Macedonian phalanx. At length Antigonus
ordered a charge in close order and in double phalanx; the enormous
weight of this peculiar formation proved sufficient to finally dislodge
the Lacedaemonians from their strongholds, and they fled in disorder
and suffering severely as they went. Cleomenes himself, with a guard
of cavalry, effected his retreat to Sparta: but the same night he went
down to Gythium, where all preparations for crossing the sea had been
made long before in case of mishap, and with his friends sailed to
Alexandria.
+70.+ Having surprised and taken Sparta, Antigonus treated the citizens
with magnanimity and humanity; and after re-establishing their ancient
constitution, he left the town in a few days, on receiving intelligence
that the Illyrians had invaded Macedonia and were laying waste the
country. This was an instance of the fantastic way in which Fortune
decides the most important matters. For if Cleomenes had only put off
the battle for a few days, or if when he returned to Sparta he had only
held out for a brief space of time, he would have saved his crown.
[Sidenote: Death of Antigonus Doson, B.C. 220.]
As it was, Antigonus after going to Tegea and restoring its
constitution, arrived on the second day at Argos, at the very time
of the Nemean games. Having at this assembly received every mark of
immortal honour and glory at the hands of the Achaean community, as
well as of the several states, he made all haste to reach Macedonia.
He found the Illyrians still in the country, and forced them to give
him battle, in which, though he proved entirely successful, he exerted
himself to such a pitch in shouting encouragement to his men, that
he ruptured a bloodvessel, and fell into an illness which terminated
shortly in his death. He was a great loss to the Greeks, whom he had
inspired with good hopes, not only by his support in the field, but
still more by his character and good principles. He left the kingdom of
Macedonia to Philip, son of Demetrius.
+71.+ My reason for writing about this war at such length, was the
advisability, or rather necessity, in view of the general purpose of my
history, of making clear the relations existing between Macedonia and
Greece at a time which coincides with the period of which I am about to
treat.
[Sidenote: B.C. 284-280. B.C. 224-220.]
Just about the same time, by the death of Euergetes, Ptolemy Philopator
succeeded to the throne of Egypt. At the same period died Seleucus,
son of that Seleucus who had the double surnames of Callinicus
and Pogon: he was succeeded on the throne of Syria by his brother
Antiochus. The deaths of these three sovereigns—Antigonus, Ptolemy,
and Seleucus—fell in the same Olympiad, as was the case with the three
immediate successors to Alexander the Great,—Seleucus, Ptolemy, and
Lysimachus,—for the latter all died in the 124th Olympiad, and the
former in the 139th.
I may now fitly close this book. I have completed the introduction and
laid the foundation on which my history must rest. I have shown when,
how, and why the Romans, after becoming supreme in Italy, began to
aim at dominion outside of it, and to dispute with the Carthaginians
the dominion of the sea. I have at the same time explained the state
of Greece, Macedonia, and Carthage at this epoch. I have now arrived
at the period which I originally marked out,—that namely in which
the Greeks were on the point of beginning the Social, the Romans the
Hannibalic war, and the kings in Asia the war for the possession of
Coele-Syria. The termination therefore of the wars just described, and
the death of the princes engaged in them, forms a natural period to
this book.