Marshal Saxe, the terror of France’s enemies, and in whom the troops

placed an implicit confidence, was dead. Of all the officers who had

served under him, there was not any one who furnished the same hopes of

his abilities. They had courage and experience: but these were not

sufficient; for I have heard it said, that to form a hero, requires an

assortment of qualities, which are seldom found in the same man.

Amongst the generals who had served in the late wars, Marshal Belleisle

was the most desirous of commanding in chief; but besides his never

having been a good general, his capacity was greatly impaired. He

expressed himself in diffuse terms, and was very verbose. It was said of

him at court, that of all the genius that had elevated him to the

pinnacle of greatness, he retained nothing but loquacity.

The state was now threatened with three different wars, two of which

were declared. That of the Bull, as it was called, which was upon the

point of causing a revolution in the state: that of the Barbarians, who,

notwithstanding the faith of treaties, interrupted the trade of the

nation; and that of the English, who were ready to give us battle.

A man of wit, who was told that the English were going to be our foes,

said, _God be praised, the bishops quarrel is now at an end, for these

people are never at war but in time of peace_.

The Archbishop of Paris, who was still exiled, and still obstinate,

wrote a letter to the King in a stile truly original, and without

example since the foundation of the monarchy. He said to the King, in

very formal terms, that “His power was superior to that of the

Sovereign, in matters relative to the administration which God hath

entrusted him with; that his duty was that of conducting his flock; that

he acknowledged no other upon earth; finally, he would not, nor could

not, retract from the first steps he had taken; that these were his last

sentiments, which would continue always the same to the grave, &c. &c.”

This was a period distinguishable for disobedience. The clergy gloried

in rebelling against the orders of the King. This obstinate disposition

had made its way into the provinces. The deputy of Languedoc related to

the King an event that happened at Montpellier, which pointed out to

this Prince the necessity of stopping the progress of such abuses. This

man said, that the wife of a counsellor of that city, who had refused to

receive the Bull, and whose life was in danger, requested the curate of

her parish to administer the sacraments to her. Upon her first request,

the curate and four vicars fled. Application was made to the other

parishes, but it was found that all the clergy who administered had

deserted. The chief justice then ordered an independent priest, and who

was not belonging to any church, to administer to the Lady. This

ecclesiastic thought it was his duty to obey; but he had observed that

the host had accompanied the priests in their retreat. He did not find

a single wafer in the tabernacles of the different churches of the city.

The curates and the secondaries had eat them all before their departure.

He consecrated one: but this was not sufficient; it must be

administered. A general insurrection was feared. The commander of the

place was obliged to put the garrison under arms, and appoint guards for

the conducting of the host in safety to the sick Lady’s house.

Such scencs as these, in a city full of Protestants, made the Romish

religion become a subject of public derision. The King was greatly

affected at it, though he would not yet resolve to use violent remedies.

I have said that the King did not desire war; to prevent which, if it

were yet possible, he sent Bussy to Hanover, where George II. was

expected. I was not for employing this man, thinking he had not

sufficient capacity to succeed in a negociation of this importance; but

Lewis XV. had been prejudiced in his favour.

Bussy’s partizans said he spoke with resolution, and an absolute tone;

qualities that were looked upon as essential at a free court, where

moderation and suppleness are always unsuccessful. But the contrary was

the truth. Bussy negociated badly to prevent the war, and he failed some

years after to restore peace; but I laid it down as a maxim, never to

oppose the King’s sentiments.

Orders were dispatched to all the commanders in the American colonies,

to fit out as many ships as they could, to oppose the designs of the

English. I heard Marshal Noailles then say, that troops should have been

sent, and not orders.

The death of Marshal Lowendahl, the pupil and companion of Count Saxe,

that happened at this time, created sorrow, which in the present

circumstances was the more sensibly felt. His military talents had made

us conceive hopes that his death destroyed. The conquest of

Bergen-op-zoom had acquired him a reputation, from which France might

have derived advantages in the war with which she was threatened. I

testified my chagrin, upon this occasion, to the King. “You have reason

to lament the death of this officer, he replied to me; he was among the

number of those who were most deserving of any confidence. It is in vain

for me to seek amongst my subjects, I shall find no one capable of

supplying his place.”

Lewis XV. who had honoured him during his life-time, was willing to

bestow marks of distinction upon him after his death. He was at the

expence of his funeral obsequies, and granted pensions to his children

of both sexes; recompences that were due to his merit, and with which

the King gratified his heirs. All those who were eclipsed by this

general’s merit, rejoiced at his death; none but real patriots lamented

it.

Whilst France was employed about the means of supplying the expences of

the war, we learnt at Versailles that England found voluntary resources

in her subjects for her’s. Private persons offered money to such sailors

as enrolled themselves in the royal navy, and others engaged to support

their families at their own expence during the war, had it continued six

lustrums.

Certain communities offered free gifts to those who would bear arms

against France. I said to Marshal Belleisle, who related these facts to

me: “It appears to me, sir, that a people who act in this manner, has

the advantage over those who give no money but what they are compelled

to part with, for the expences of the war.” _That is true_, replied the

old Courtier; _but this same English nation, who thus voluntarily part

with their riches for a war, which they think useful to the state, often

lose all their advantages at a peace. A Lord who wants to make his way

to the administration by a system of pacification, intrigues with the

king, gains his confidence, and has his creatures. These set forth, that

sieges and battles ruin the state, that commerce is hurt by them, and

that industry perishes. The cabal acquire strength, the candidate

minister’s party increases, he gains the ascendent, and the peace is

signed, at the expence of the nation’s blood and treasure._

M. de Mirepoix still continued his negociations at London: he conferred

with Sir Thomas Robinson, who gave him hopes; but this was only to gain

time: the war was resolved upon. Count D’Argenson often said to the

King, that this Embassador should be recalled, as his residence in

London only amused the state, and made the French nation ridiculous. The

King and council were greatly perplexed; Lewis XV. was not willing that

Europe should be able to reproach him with having committed the first

hostilities.

Marshal Lowendahl, who before his death was witness to this

embarrassment, said publickly at court, that _it was better to attack as

a principal, than to be beat as a second_. This counsel was not

followed, but we repented of it.

As for me, I was neuter in this great affair. It was reported that I

wished for this war, to make myself more considerable at court. I had

no occasion for either sieges or battles, things constantly destructive

to a state, to support my credit with the King. Lewis XV. honoured me

with his confidence: all those who had endeavoured to prejudice me had

miscarried in their attempt; rank and grandeur had no longer any charms

for me: the only ambition I had remaining was the settling of my

daughter; but she was not arrived at an age to be married, and I did not

doubt that the King would honour her with his protection.

Peace was still the subject of conversation at London and Paris; but we

at length learned that the English had declared war against France in

the new world; the court of Versailles received advice, that Admiral

Boscawen had with his fleet taken the _Alcide_ man of war, upon the

banks of Newfoundland. The manner in which he took this ship aggravated

the offence. The _Alcide_ should not have been attacked, at the time it

was attacked, for she had no fighting orders. It is a custom established

amongst all civilized nations, when they declare war, to publish a

manifesto, containing the grievances which induce them to have recourse

to arms; and England had not published any such: therefore this step was

considered as a real piracy. This was observed to the King, who

immediately sent orders to the duke of Mirepoix and Bussy to return to

France, without taking leave of the court of England. Henceforward all

means of accommodation were suspended.

The King, who had been desirous of avoiding a war before it began, took

his measures as soon as he was acquainted with this first act of

hostility. His honour would let him no longer put up an affront offered

to his flag. He said, upon retiring from the council, “Madam, war is

declared; the English are my enemies.”

The operations of the war office took place; the armaments by land and

sea, the augmentation of the troops, and the means of supporting the

army, were taken into consideration.

From this time the King lived more retired, he did not hunt so often,

and he debarred himself several diversions which he took before. He

conferred regularly with his ministers. Count D’Argenson, with whom he

was often locked up, gave him a circumstantial detail of his land

forces, and the naval minister laid before him a similar account of his

navy. Lewis XV. made several objections to them concerning the principal

points of their administration, to which these chiefs in office were

obliged to answer.

The count D’Argenson, whose administration was then the most important,

as he was at the head of military affairs, told the King that his troops

were in a good state, that military discipline was well enforced, that

the French were fond of war, and that we might flatter ourselves with

successful campaigns, provided the generals seconded the ardour of the

troops, and were not themselves an obstacle to the grandeur of France.

The conferences with the minister of the finances were of a still more

intricate nature; there were many ancient debts unpaid, the revenues of

the crown were mortgaged, commerce and industry, which had just

recovered some little vigour since the peace, were upon the point of

returning to their inactive state.

The comptroller-general said to the King, “Sire, the state of things

must not be disguised to your Majesty; great springs must be put in

motion to maintain the burthen of the war. I have made a calculation

from the state of your finances, and they will procure me resources for

four years: if at the end of that time peace should not take place, the

campaigns cannot be carried on without imposing very oppressive taxes

upon your people.”

The King, who after this conference paid me a visit, said, _that he had

just been conversing with a minister, who was the honestest man in all

France; for such I must call him_, he added, _who has so much probity as

to speak freely to his King_.

The minister of the war department required an augmentation of 40000

men, which was granted him, and orders were issued accordingly for

raising recruits. M. Belleisle told me, that so many men were not

necessary for the defence of a handful of barbarians, that this would

increase the expences of the state, and only tend to weaken it. He did

not forsee that these levies were nothing in comparison of those that

were to be afterwards made.

France had been perfectly secured by the treaty of Aix la Chapelle. Her

ports were open and defenceless. Upon the commission of the first acts

of hostility in America, it was resolved to restore the works at

Dunkirk. The prince of Soubise was appointed by the King to see this

operation take place: eight thousand troops were allotted him to favour

the execution of this design.

Upon the first reports of the revolutions in Canada, two successive

squadrons were dispatched, of which no news had yet been received. The

uncertainty of the success of this small naval armament suspended the

grand operations by land.

The council of state could not resolve upon any fixed plan of

operations, the members being divided in their opinion. I was a witness

to a great part of the diversity of sentiments which then disturbed the

court, with respect to this grand affair.

A man of much good sense said, like Marshal Belleisle, “that great

armies were useless; that land campaigns were not the object, but a sea

war; that the colonies should be put in a state of security, which alone

could be conquered; that the plan of the English was not to increase

their power in Europe, but to extend their limits in America; that all

their designs tended that way, and that we should direct ours to the

same object; that France was guarantied in Europe by the general

balance; but that there was no system whereby our settlements in the new

world were guarantied; that the crown would lose its influence, when

trade would be entirely in the power of the English; that the British

navy was already superior to the navies of all Europe, but that after

the loss of Canada and the other parts of the continent of America, it

would be the only one in Europe; that this was the crisis for France,

and that if the opportunity was neglected of protecting ourselves from

this last attempt, it would never return; that all other plans of

warlike operations should be given up, to pursue that of the colonies,

as they interested the general republic; but that this personally and

solely interested France; that America being once conquered, the whole

body of Europe could not restore the equilibrium, because the power of

the first states of the continent did not extend to the sea; that the

English in the center of the christian world, were separated from

Christendom; that they could not be attacked in their own islands; that

nature had secured them from all invasions in Europe, _&c._”

The opposite party, on the contrary, said, “that great armies should be

raised to oppose the allies of England, who would not fail to form

designs in Germany; that here the capital strokes would be struck; that

the war in America was only the pretext for that which was to be carried

on in Europe; that some troops should be sent to Canada; but that

numerous legions should be raised for Germany; that we were mistaken if

we thought the English limited their enterprizes to America, as it was

visible that their designs tended to excite a revolution in the north of

Europe; that the general balance guarantied France no farther than she

herself contributed to support a just equilibrium; that with respect to

trade in general, there was no reason to apprehend that England could

engross it, as there were not sufficient materials in that country to

compass the design; that the English were compelled to have recourse to

industrious nations, and where the price of labour was not so high; that

universal trade consisted in exchanges, and that a people who should

considerably diminish that of other states, would greatly cramp their

own; that with respect to the navy, one could not be immediately formed

to balance that of England; that the expences made upon this account

would be endless, as the time was too short and the means too

circumscribed; that the loss of Canada was not certain, the events of

war being casual; that the savage nations loved the French and hated the

English; that they would prefer being exterminated, rather than submit

to the British yoke; lastly, that if Canada should be conquered in this

war, it might be retaken in another; but that if the English, united

with their allies, should avail themselves of favourable circumstances

to gain advantages in Europe, it would be then too late to repair the

damage, as the last victories would be guarantied by new treaties of

peace; whereas in America the barbarous nations in alliance with France,

who are unacquainted with the laws of nations, are always ready to

create revolutions: in a word, that it was France’s interest to set on

foot numerous armies to support her pretensions by land, and to yield

for some time the dominion of the sea, _&c._ _&c._”

A third party maintained that both these objects should be attended to:

“We should (said they) prevent the English making conquests in America,

and hinder any taking place in Europe. France is sufficiently powerful

for this; she need only manage well her forces; she will prevail every

where, when those who govern the state unite in one common interest;

that is to say, the glory of the nation, and the happiness of the

people. If the northern powers of Europe are inclinable to avail

themselves of the misunderstandings in America, we must keep our

engagements, and send 24000 men into Germany. A more numerous army can

only procure us a greater loss without any advantage. These moderate

succours will enable us to send more considerable assistance to the new

world, to protect our colonies; the revolution in Canada is not a

maritime quarrel, it is a land war. The point is to defend the

continent, and it is only necessary to land troops there; and this the

English cannot prevent. They have taken no measures yet to block up the

passages; but if we do not make haste, we shall be too late; for the

English, who keep a steady eye upon our operations, will no sooner find

that we do not make any great preparations by land, than they will begin

to make very considerable ones by sea.”

There was also a numerous party inclined for peace: the reasons which

they alledged, were founded upon our inability of carrying on the war;

but the minds of the people were too much agitated to listen to plans of

pacification; each had his schemes for pushing his fortune, and private

interest always prevails over the common weal. Subaltern officers who

wanted advancement, were desirous of sieges and battles. Those who

endeavoured to obtain the command of armies, were desperate advocates

for war; and such as would be employed in furnishing the necessaries for

carrying it on, thought it indispensable: it is plain from these

motives, how little the interest of the state was considered.

During this crisis the clergy of France were assembled; they deliberated

very seriously, whether sick people should have the sacraments

administered, or whether they should die without them. The bishops who

had been brought over by the court and the parliament, were of opinion,

that they could not be refused this assistance. Those who expected

nothing of the King, and who hated the parliament, maintained on the

contrary, that they should be refused them like heretics. At length,

after many debates, they seemed inclinable to leave this great affair to

the determination of the Pope.

I learnt this news with pleasure. Benedict XIV. then filled the papal

chair. Many persons who had been at Rome, gave me a very favourable

opinion of this pontiff. He despised his predecessors, refined policy of

turning every thing to their own advantage; the first steps he took upon

his obtaining the pontificate, made me conceive a real esteem for him.

He had abolished at Rome those wretched equivocations, which in serving

as food for superstition, dishonour the Christian religion. He knew that

God sometimes wrought miracles, but that he does not daily alter the

course of nature. This prince of the church preferred the title of an

honest man to that of a holy one, and this quality raised him above all

the Popes that ever existed upon earth. Benedict XIV. had so much

understanding and so little prejudice, that his decision could not fail

to restore tranquility to the Gallican church.

The administration of the sacraments was not the only disquisition which

engaged the clergy; the grand affair for which they were convened, and

in which the whole body were unanimous, was to deny the authority of the

parliaments, or any other body of laymen whatever. Lewis XV. who could

not begin the war without oppressing his people, was willing to set them

an example of œconomy, by diminishing his household expences. He

reduced his hunting equipages, and the number of his hunting horses in

both stables. The expences of his little journies were regulated and

diminished: it was resolved that there should be no diversions this year

at court, and the works of the Louvre were suspended, _&c._

The Count D’Argenson said, “that these savings are so small an object,

that they will scarce enrich a commissary of stores during the war.”

I was myself often inclined to have an eye to œconomy; but M. de

Belleisle had told me that it was scarce possible to benefit the state

by such frugality; he added, “if it were an evil, it was impossible to

remedy it; but that all those who served the King would enrich

themselves; that a reform would produce no advantage; that it was better

to continue employing the old officers who were already opulent, than to

replace them with new ones, who would endeavour to become so.”

Neither the council of state nor the warlike preparations deprived me of

the King’s company, who visited me regularly, and communicated to me his

designs and intentions. The resolution he had taken of being revenged of

his enemies, gave him an air of satisfaction, which he had not before

he had taken it; his only uneasiness was for his people: he was afraid

that the continuance of the war would exhaust them too much.

It was thought necessary to review the troops, and there were three

encampments. The prince of Soubise wanted the command of the camp of

Hainault: I spoke to the King, and it was granted him. M. de Chevert,

and the Marquis de Voyer, in whose favour I also interested myself,

obtained the two others.

Though hostilities were begun in America, Lewis XV. would not continue

them in Europe. A frigate of the Brest squadron having taken an English

frigate, the King immediately ordered it to be released, as he said, _he

would not make war in time of peace, and be the first to infringe the

treaty of Aix la Chapelle in Europe_.

A general officer, who was in my apartment when the King told me he had

just dispatched this order, could not refrain telling him, in my

presence, “Permit me, Sire, to represent to your Majesty, that this

moderation will noways alter the system of the court of London. The

English have resolved to fall upon us, and to seize all such ships as

they think they have the superiority over: reprisals are necessary, and

we should seize all such vessels as are inferior in strength to our’s

that meet with them.”

The Count de Argenson said, there was but one method of carrying on the

war, “which was to drub the enemy well, and take a good deal from them.”

The sea-officers paid their court regularly to me; for the navy was to

have the honour of this war. There was a promotion of officers, and I

interested myself in behalf of some, in consequence of the characters

that were given me of their capacity and courage.

I know that complaints have often been made in France of my choice of

certain persons, as well in the army as in the administration: but those

who condemned me were unacquainted with Versailles. Every courtier has a

party who cry up their talents and genius. It is impossible to descry

real merit through these extravagant elogiums. All those who are

interested in a courtier’s advancement, either in the army or in the

government, hide his faults, and display his good qualities; for every

man has a favourable side.

The death of Madame, daughter to the Dauphin, created fresh affliction

for the King. I have often heard the happiness of Kings extolled, when

they are in reality more to be pitied than other men. A citizen has

scarce any thing but domestic troubles to afflict him: a Monarch unites

family misfortunes with those of the state.

Memoirs of the Marchioness of Pompadour (vol. 2 of 2) · 第 7 / 8 段