CHAPTER XXXI

THE UNITED STATES AND THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The purpose of this chapter is to describe the relations of the

United States to the most ambitious experiment in government that

the world has ever attempted.

=The Desire to End War.=—Since the dawn of human history mankind has

been divided into independent tribes and nations ready to hurl

themselves upon one another in warfare. No mind can comprehend the

immeasurable suffering which war has brought upon the human race during

the past three thousand years. From the days when the Assyrian

charioteers crushed their enemies under horse and wheel to those tragic

years of yesterday when the hospitals of Europe were filled with the

victims of high explosive shells and poison gas,—in all this long

interval there has been no cessation of warfare among men and no era of

peace on earth.

Small wonder it is, therefore, that in the anguish of the World War men

of all races should have cried out for some such settlement as would put

an end to war and all its horrors forever.[301] [Sidenote: The cry for a

permanent peace.] Soldiers in the ranks called it a “war to end war“ and

gave up their lives unflinchingly in the hope@@ that future generations

would be spared a repetition of the world-wide misery. But how might

such a blessing be obtained for future generations of mankind? That was

one of the great problems which the soldiers bequeathed to the

statesmen.

[Sidenote: How strife between individuals has been diminished.]

=Can this Desire be Realized?=—Now it is believed by many that war can

never be permanently abolished except by applying to nations a principle

which men have applied to themselves as individuals, that is to say, by

establishing an organization whereby all controversies can be settled

without resort to force. Treaties of amity and arbitration among nations

are valuable so far as they go; but so long as there is no high

authority with power to administer justice between nation and nation

each must look to its own self-preservation. This means that each feels

obliged to regard war as a possibility and to be prepared for it.

Without sufficient assurance against the possibility of war it is idle

to expect that nations will wholly disarm. And when interests clash and

the passions of men are aroused they will use the weapons which are at

hand.

[Sidenote: The motive behind the League of Nations.]

The primary motive of those who urged the formation of a League of

Nations was the desire to avoid war by substituting another method of

adjusting disputes, but they also hoped that such an organization would

enable the vast sums hitherto spent each year on warlike preparations to

be applied to the development of industry and commerce, to education, to

the protection of the public health, to the betterment of labor

conditions, and to promoting all the arts of peace. They harbored the

hope, moreover, that great constructive tasks which are beyond the power

of any one nation to accomplish might be achieved by the nations of the

world in co-operation. As an ideal it is truly great. The Italian poet,

Dante, dreamt of it six hundred years ago. Perhaps we can best

appreciate what the realization of such an ideal would mean to the world

by glancing for a moment at what tribulations the world passed through

during the course of a single century, from 1814 to 1914.

=The Great Wars of a Century Ago.=—A little more than a century ago the

various nations of Europe engaged in a long and exhausting war. First

and last all the chief countries of the world were drawn into it.

[Sidenote: How the Napoleonic Wars failed to eliminate the causes of

war.] The chief cause of this great struggle was the ambition of

Napoleon, who sought to make France dominant in the political affairs of

Europe and by his aggressions finally managed to array all the other

leading nations in an alliance against him. When France was finally

vanquished by the combined efforts of England, Prussia, Russia, Austria,

and Spain, a congress of the nations was held at Vienna to determine the

detailed arrangements by which the future peace of the continent might

be preserved, and after prolonged discussions this congress agreed upon

a general settlement. The principal motive which actuated the delegates

at the Congress of Vienna was that of strengthening the four powers to

whom the overthrow of France had been chiefly due, thus establishing a

combination which would be able to impose its will upon the rest of the

continent in the interests of peace. Great Britain, Prussia, Austria,

and Russia dominated the congress and for some years after 1815

virtually remained in a quadruple alliance to see that the terms of

peace were observed. But the Congress of Vienna took no action in the

way of establishing a league or confederation to which all the nations,

great and small, should be admitted. It left the peace of Europe in the

hands of four powerful states with the hope, a futile hope it turned out

to be, that these four states would agree among themselves.

=The Rise of the Alliances.=—The map of Europe, as rearranged by

the Congress of Vienna, paid no attention to the right of

self-determination. Territories were taken from one state and

given to another without reference to the desires of their

inhabitants. The chief aim was to strengthen the powers that had

won the war, giving each of them boundaries that could be easily

defended. The interests of military defence, not those of

nationality, prevailed.

[Sidenote: The rivalries of the nineteenth century.]

Because of this action the congress left many openings for friction and

jealousy among the various states, yet provided no regular means whereby

disputes could be adjusted. In the course of time, moreover, the

interests of the four great powers which dominated the work of the

congress drew apart. England preferred to hold aloof from the diplomatic

intrigues of the continental states, devoting her energies to the

upbuilding of an empire in other parts of the world. France, moreover,

regained her old-time strength and once more became recognized as one of

the leading European powers. Italy, which had been left by the Congress

of Vienna a mosaic of small independent states, eventually achieved its

unity, and the kingdom of Prussia expanded into the German Empire. Thus,

the four great powers of 1815 grew to six before the end of the

nineteenth century—Great Britain, Russia, Austro-Hungary, France, Italy,

and Germany.

With these six great states progressing side by side, ambitious for

power and jealous of one another, it was inevitable that alliances and

counter-alliances should be formed. These combinations took many twists

and turns during the diplomatic manoeuvres of the nineteenth century,

but in the end the six leading nations of Europe gravitated into

opposing camps. The first, known as the Triple Alliance, included

Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Italy. The second, commonly called the

Triple Entente, was made up of Great Britain, France, and Russia. These

alliances were based upon treaties or understandings of which certain

portions were made public and the rest kept secret.

[Sidenote: The “armed peace.”]

=The Balance of Power.=—For many years the preservation of European

peace rested upon the observance of a principle known as the “balance of

power”. This principle is not easy to define, but in general it meant

that no single state or combination of states should be allowed to

become strong enough to outweigh a rival state or its combination. The

balance could never be exact because some states, by virtue of their

more rapid increase in population and prosperity, were always outrunning

others, hence the situation developed into a race wherein each group of

powers sought to strengthen itself by bringing smaller states into its

circle, by welding its members more closely together, and by the

creation of great armaments. The purpose of the alliances, based upon

the principle of balance of power, was not to prevent war but rather to

prevent any state from being attacked by a combination of other states

and having to defend itself single-handed. Under the terms of the Triple

Alliance and the Triple Entente it remained quite possible for single

states to go to war and fight it out alone; but both alliances protected

their members against combined attacks. In a word, the situation became

such that any war, wherever it might start, was very likely to become a

general war.

[Sidenote: The nations in the recent war.]

=The Realignments of 1914-1918.=—On the outbreak of the World War in

1914 the Triple Entente held together, but the Triple Alliance was

weakened by the action of Italy in refusing to be drawn into a cause

which the Italian people did not approve. Italy, a little later, joined

with France, Great Britain, and Russia. Meanwhile Japan had also taken

the side of these allies and eventually the United States became

associated in the war with them. Thus the Triple Entente developed into

a powerful allied combination including not only the five powers named

but many smaller states as well. Before the close of hostilities

twenty-five states had declared war upon the German government. Germany

and Austro-Hungary, the remaining states of the Triple Alliance, had the

aid of two other states only, Turkey and Bulgaria. The course of events

showed, therefore, that not only were alliances ineffective in

preserving the peace but that they actually helped to extend the area of

conflict over a whole continent.

=The War to End War.=—When the United States, after long hesitation,

decided to throw its strength on the side of the Allies, one of the

chief actuating motives was the desire to see the struggle settled in

such a way that there would never be another great war. [Sidenote:

Idealism in this war.] As the spokesman of the American people,

President Wilson repeatedly declared that out of the war some general

agreement and league for the permanent preservation of world peace must

come. In this he undoubtedly reflected the sentiment not only of his own

country but of the great masses of the people in the other warring

states as well. Everywhere there had been going on, practically

throughout the world, a popular agitation for the establishment of some

general covenant which would make future wars impossible. It was now

felt that the balance of power was gone, that individual treaties among

nations were not sufficient protection, and that something more

effective must be found. There was no great difference of opinion as to

the ideal. It was welcomed everywhere. The problem was how to translate

the ideal into a reality. This task President Wilson believed to be the

most important and yet the most difficult among all the problems of

peace-making. To help with its solution he took the highly-unusual

course of himself attending the conference which was held at Paris to

determine the conditions of peace.

[Sidenote: How the League was brought into existence.]

=The Framing of the Covenant.=—When the members of this conference

assembled it was agreed, after some deliberation, that a commission

should be appointed to prepare a plan for a League of Nations and that

this plan, when accepted by the conference, should become an integral

part of the peace treaty. This latter point was particularly insisted

upon by President Wilson and was agreed to as the result of his

insistence. The commission was appointed; it prepared a plan; the plan

was laid before the peace conference, and before being adopted was

published to the world. In the United States it met with strong support

in some quarters and vigorous opposition in others. The Senate, by which

the whole peace treaty would have to be approved before it could be

binding upon the United States, discussed the details of the plan and

thirty-one senators signed a declaration that some of the provisions

were unacceptable. In the end, however, the original covenant, with some

modifications, was adopted by the peace conference and incorporated as a

part of the treaty of peace.[302] As such it was subsequently accepted

by all the leading powers to whom it was submitted, except the United

States. In its scope the League of Nations is designed to include,

ultimately, all the countries of the world. Provision is made in the

covenant for the immediate admission of most countries by their simple

acceptance of the covenant; others may be admitted to membership by a

two-thirds vote of the league assembly. Fifty-one states are now

members.[303]

[Sidenote: An analogy and contrast.]

=The League as a Scheme of Government.=—What are the important features

in this scheme of super-government? This question may best be answered,

perhaps, by taking as our background the federal system with which we

are most familiar in the United States, noting the outstanding points of

resemblance and contrast. At the time of its formation, indeed, the

American federal government was looked upon by the several states as a

super-government and they were very jealous of it. It was not until many

years had passed that this jealousy died down. This same designation was

given to the scheme of organization established by the League Covenant.

The government of the United States has its deliberative, executive, and

judicial departments; so has the League of Nations. But there the

resemblance ends. The methods of constituting the organs are different;

so are their powers, and so are their relations to one another.

[Sidenote: The Assembly and the Council.]

=The League’s Deliberative Organs.=—The League of Nations has two

deliberative bodies,—an Assembly to which each member-nation may send

not more than three delegates, and a Council, made up of one member from

each of the five great powers,—the United States, Great Britain, France,

Italy, and Japan (these five nations being always represented), and one

member from each of four lesser powers to be designated from time to

time by the Assembly. Since the United States has not joined the League,

the Council now consists of only eight members, the four nations

constituting the second group being at present Belgium, Brazil, Spain,

and China. Unless otherwise stated in the covenant, any decision either

of the Council or the Assembly requires a unanimous vote. The Council

must meet at least once a year; the Assembly meets at stated intervals

determined by itself. The Assembly has decided to meet annually on the

first Monday in September and the Council is now holding quarterly

sessions. Geneva has been selected as the League capital.

[Sidenote: The Secretariat.]

=The Administrative Organization.=—By the terms of the covenant certain

functions of an executive nature are given to the Council, but the

administrative work devolves upon the Secretariat of the League. This

body comprises a permanent secretary and numerous officials appointed by

him. The Secretariat performs the clerical work, registers all treaties,

carries on the correspondence with the member-nations, and prepares

business to be laid before the Council and the Assembly.

[Sidenote: The League’s judiciary.]

=The Court of International Justice.=—The covenant also makes provision

for a permanent world court, composed of judges selected by the Assembly

from among eminent jurists nominated by the different member-countries.

At the second Assembly session, held during 1921, the eleven regular

judges and four alternate or deputy judges were chosen. Controversies

come before this court whenever nations agree to submit their disputes

to it for decision.

=Outstanding Features of League Organization.=—In comparing the general

organization of League government with the American federal system some

striking contrasts appear. [Sidenote: Equality of all nations in the

League Assembly.] First of all, it is significant that in the Council

and in the Assembly each nation has one vote only. Each nation may send

to the Assembly one, two, or three representatives; but whether it sends

one or three its voting power is the same. In the American Senate all

the states have the same voting power, but in the House of

Representatives the states with larger populations have proportionate

voting strength. Equality of voting power is natural in a political

union that is just starting. The nations of the world, being accustomed

to sovereignty and legal equality were not willing to recognize

gradations of rank. The same feeling was manifested among the American

colonies when, under the Articles of Confederation, it was provided that

every state, small or large, while it might send from two to seven

delegates to the Congress, should have the same voting power as any

other. There was a long fight over this question in the Constitutional

Convention of 1787, the smaller states demanding equal power with the

larger, the larger asking that representation should be based upon

population. The matter was settled by giving the smaller states equal

representation in the Senate, and conceding to the larger states the

right to dominate the House. But the framers of the League Covenant

could not accept a compromise of this sort; for if representation

according to population were made the rule in either the Council or the

Assembly, India and China would have far more delegates than the United

States, England, and France put together. So all were given equal

representation in the Assembly, while representation in the Council was

confined to nine nations only.

Other marked contrasts should be noted. In the House of Representatives

and in the Senate of the United States measures are passed by a majority

vote; [Sidenote: The requirement of unanimity.]in the Assembly and

Council of the League, unless otherwise specified, a unanimous vote is

necessary for action. This is a mark of the distrust with which the

nations regard one another. The provision for unanimity means that

nothing can be carried through the Assembly if a single nation

disapproves, for a solitary vote can block action. The same is true of

the Council as respects each nation represented in it. This, of course,

establishes a very cumbersome and slow-working scheme of government.

Decisions of the Council or the Assembly, moreover, have no absolute

binding force, as have the enactments of Congress. There is no

centralized executive authority, with power to see that decisions are

obeyed—no executive authority in the national sense. The League has no

army to enforce its will. Even the International Court of Justice has no

jurisdiction save when the suitors, of their own accord, come to it. It

lacks the coercive power of a Supreme Court.

=Provisions for the Prevention of Wars.=—The prime purpose in

establishing the League of Nations was a desire to lessen the danger of

wars. To that end the covenant contains several provisions of high

importance which may be briefly summarized.

[Sidenote: 1. Armaments.]

First, there is a provision for the reduction of armaments. The Council

is directed to have a study made by experts and to report upon the

amount of armed strength needed by each nation. The various governments,

however, are not bound to accept the Council’s recommendations. In any

case, all members of the League agree to keep one another informed as to

the extent of their respective armament programs. This represents, of

course, a very modest step in the direction of actual international

disarmament.

[Sidenote: 2. Territorial integrity.]

Second, the members of the League agree to protect one another against

any seizure of their territories or any destruction of their

independence by outside attacks. This is the famous Article X. Whenever

such attack occurs, the Council is to advise as to how the pledge of

integrity can be fulfilled.

[Sidenote: 3. Conciliation.]

Third, if a dispute which cannot be settled by diplomatic negotiations

arises between members of the League, the members agree to refer it to

arbitration if it is suitable for such disposition; or, if not, then to

the Council of the League for inquiry. The members of the League agree

to refrain from hostilities until three months after the Council has

rendered its decision.

[Sidenote: 4. Coercion.]

Fourth, if any member-nation resorts to war in violation of the

preceding provisions, the other members of the League agree to boycott

it and to withdraw from relations with it; in extreme cases, the Council

is authorized to consider and recommend means of compulsion by armed

force.

[Sidenote: 5. Registration of treaties.]

Fifth, a very important provision is that by which all treaties

hereafter entered into by members of the League shall be registered with

the Secretariat and published. Until this has been done, no treaty is to

be considered binding. This, of itself, embodies no small step in the

direction of eliminating a prolific source of friction and strife.

Secret treaties have been the mainspring of many wars.

[Sidenote: Duties of the mandatories.]

=The System of Mandates.=—In previous wars it has been the habit of

victorious nations to divide all the conquered territory among

themselves, each taking a portion in full ownership. The Peace

Conference of 1919, however, agreed to try a new plan, namely, that of

placing the League of Nations in charge of some former German and

Turkish territories. It was provided that by means of mandates each of

these territories should be directly governed, on behalf of the League,

by one of its member-countries, with the understanding that eventually

complete self-government should be given in certain cases. The

mandatory, or country holding the mandate, is required to present an

annual report to the League and a permanent commission is provided to

examine these reports. In accordance with these arrangements, several

mandates have been granted. Great Britain, for example, has been made

the mandatory for Palestine, France for Syria, and New Zealand for

certain former German colonies in the South Pacific.

[Sidenote: A territorial trust.]

The possession of a mandate does not give the mandatory any exclusive

commercial privileges in the territory concerned, but merely creates a

trust which is to be exercised for the benefit of the people who inhabit

it. Whether this new experiment in the government of dependent

territories will work out successfully no one yet can tell. Much will

depend upon whether the League acquires prestige and power. If it should

collapse, there is little doubt that these various territories would

merely pass into the full ownership of the countries which now hold the

mandates.

=The League and Labor.=—The widely-differing policies hitherto pursued

by various countries in relation to labor have long been a cause of

international distrust and friction. When any one country endeavors to

accord greater privileges to its workers—such as the adoption of a

shorter working day or the guarantee of a minimum wage—this action

places it at a disadvantage in trade competition with other countries

not so progressive. It is, therefore, provided that a permanent

International Labor Office shall be established and that members of the

League shall send representatives to a labor conference at least once a

year. Such measures for the protection of labor as may be recommended by

this conference are to be presented to the government of each

member-country for adoption. Each government may adopt or refuse to

adopt the recommendations as it sees fit; but where a recommendation is

adopted, a country must live up to it and provisions are made for

ensuring this. [Sidenote: The first labor conference.] The first meeting

of the labor conference took place at Washington in 1919. Since that

time two further conferences have been held. Recommendations have been

made in favor of the eight-hour day, the prohibition of child labor, and

an effective system of factory inspection. In most of the discussions

concerning the League these great opportunities which it presents for

the improvement of labor conditions were entirely overlooked.

=The League and the Protection of Health.=—Great improvements in the

science of health protection have been made during the past generation

by all civilized countries, as a previous chapter has indicated. But no

matter how watchful a country may be in guarding the health of its own

people, it can never feel safe so long as epidemics are allowed to rage

unchecked in other lands. The ravages of disease stop at no national

boundaries. Trade and travel carry infection across even the

best-protected borders. In recognition of this the League covenant

pledges the member-countries to take steps for the international

prevention and control of disease. [Sidenote: The international health

office.] This is to be accomplished by the establishment of a permanent

International Health Office. The function of this office is to gather

data relating to public health questions, to promote the acceptance of

the best health regulations by the different countries, and to secure

common action in the case of dangerous epidemics.[304] The League is

also authorized to wage a war upon the use of opium and other harmful

drugs, likewise to take measures against the traffic in women and

children.

=American Objections to the Covenant.=—When the provisions of the

covenant were finally adopted by the Peace Conference, objections were

urged in various countries, but more particularly in the United States.

To what features was objection made? Some objected to the provision

which gives the British Empire six votes in the Assembly of the League

while the United States had but one.[305] Article X of the covenant, by

which the nations who enter the League must guarantee one another’s

territory and independence against outside aggression was also objected

to, for it seemed to pledge the United States to defend boundary lines

in all parts of the world. Many feared that this provision would some

day require the use of American soldiers in distant places. Objection

was also raised against certain provisions of the peace treaty, such as

that which turned over to Japan the territorial and other rights in the

Chinese province of Shantung, which had been held by Germany.[306] And

in general there was a feeling that if the United States were to enter

the League, this action would involve a continual entanglement in

European affairs and a complete abandonment of America’s traditional

policy.

[Sidenote: The proposed reservations.]

It was at first believed that by making reservations on these various

points the United States could overcome the more important objections,

ratify the treaty, and enter the League. But President Wilson declined

to accept such reservations and in the end the whole document, treaty

and covenant together, failed to receive the requisite two-thirds vote

in the Senate.

The presidential election of 1920 was fought out on this issue. The

Democratic candidate declared in favor of entering the League with

suitable reservations, while the Republican candidate made no explicit

pledge as to what course he would pursue although he seemed for a time

to favor the formation of a new association on a somewhat different

basis. [Sidenote: The ultimate decision.] After the election, which

resulted in a decisive Republican victory, President Harding announced

that the United States would not enter the League; the project of a new

association was quietly dropped; and a separate peace with the new

German republic was concluded.

=The League at Work.=—The refusal of the United States to assume

membership was a severe, and possibly a fatal, blow to the strength and

prestige of the League. It is as though the state of New York, a century

and a quarter ago, had declined to ratify the constitution, leaving the

other twelve states to form a union by themselves. [Sidenote: What the

League has done.] Nevertheless, the League of Nations seems to be a

going concern; it has established headquarters at Geneva; its

Secretariat has been organized; its Council has held many sessions; its

Assembly has been twice convoked; its court has been established; labor

conferences have been held; mandates have been allotted; commissions

have been appointed; and a good deal of important business has been

transacted. Its members are very anxious to have the United States join

with them and would doubtless go a long way in accepting whatever

reasonable reservations this country might choose to make. But there is

no immediate probability that America will become a member on any terms.

The problem which now engages the attention of the American government

is that of arranging, through treaties and conferences, for the removal

of the various dangers to peace in the future.

[Sidenote: Can the work be done by a series of conferences?]

=The League and the Washington Conference.=—The calling of the

Washington Conference was the first step in this direction. The

agreements reached at this conference represent a very substantial step

in the direction of avoiding future wars but they do not cover the whole

field of possible controversy. They leave untouched the whole question

of land armaments and deal with none of the chief European problems. It

is taken for granted that other conferences will be called from time to

time, each for the purpose of dealing with some specific set of

international questions, and there are many who believe that the primary

purposes which the League of Nations was intended to fulfill can be

served in this way. One advantage of the conference plan is that it

allows each nation to retain greater freedom of action; but this is also

a defect, for it permits any single country to block progress by merely

declining to join with the others when a conference is called. The

Washington Conference demonstrated how easy it is to reach agreements in

the common interest when nations come together for a free and frank

discussion.

[Sidenote: A lost opportunity.]

=Will the League of Nations Live?=—Will the League slowly acquire

strength despite the failure of the United States to become a member? Or

will the League gradually lose all its reason for existence, save as an

agency for carrying out the terms of the peace treaty, and when these

terms are fulfilled, pass out of existence? These are questions which no

one can answer today. The close of the war gave the world its greatest

opportunity to devise a plan which would forever put an end to the curse

of war and usher in a long era of international amity. Men labored long

and diligently to provide such a plan, but they failed to achieve a full

measure of success.

Where the blame for this partial failure belongs is not a matter that it

can profit the world much to discuss. The opportunity came and has gone.

Whether the partial failure can ever be retrieved, whether the League

devised at Paris will survive the severe setback given to it by the

action of the United States, are things which only the next generation

can determine. In spite of its handicap, however, the League must strive

to maintain its existence, for its continuance is essential to the

enforcement of the peace treaty. Those nations which are interested in

seeing the provisions of the treaty fulfilled must either use the

League, or provide other machinery in its place, or else revise the

terms of peace, and on the whole, the first alternative seems to be the

easier one. To the exhausted nations of Europe it offers some hope of

relief from the burden of great armaments, and to small countries

throughout the world the League stands as a means of obtaining a fair

hearing for their grievances. It is easy enough to pick flaws in the

covenant; but is there any likelihood that a different document would

gain the adhesion of fifty-one states? No such number ever agreed to

anything of the sort before.

The attitude of the United States was not dictated by self-interest

alone, or by party politics. There was, and still is, a strong

conviction in the minds of a large element among the American people

that the covenant of Versailles will not prove to be a safeguard against

war, but may, indeed, lead to intensified rivalries and bitterness. Many

Americans, and many Europeans also, feel that the terms of peace which

were arranged at Paris contain many unwise, unjust, and even

impracticable provisions. They believe that a League of Nations, charged

with the duty of enforcing these provisions, is bound to encounter

difficulties of a serious character.

General References

F. C. HICKS, _The New World Order_, especially pp. 3-91 (The Peace

Treaty, including the Covenant, is printed in the appendix);

W. H. TAFT, G. W. WICKERSHAM, and others, _The Covenanter: An American

Exposition of the Covenant of the League of Nations_, _passim_;

S. P. DUGGAN, _The League of Nations_, p. 1-17; 96-111;

J. A. HOBSON, _Towards International Government_, pp. 11-57;

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, _The

Place of the United States in a World Organization for the Maintenance

of Peace_ (July, 1921), pp. 1-29;

G. G. WILSON, _The First Year of the League of Nations_, pp. 1-55;

R. B. FOSDICK, GEORGE RUBLEE, J. T. SHOTWELL, LÉON BOURGEOIS, and

others, _The League of Nations Starts_, pp. 1-28;

L. OPPENHEIM, _The League of Nations_, pp. 28-48;

D. L. MORROW, _The Society of Free States_, pp. 137-154;

T. J. LAWRENCE, _The Society of Nations_, pp. 33-57;

RAY STANNARD BAKER, _America and World Peace_, _passim_.

Group Problems

=1. The idea of a league of nations in history.= Ancient Greek leagues.

Dante’s De Monarchia. The Great Design of Henry IV. William Penn’s plan.

The proposed confederation of Europe after the Napoleonic wars. Kant’s

“Everlasting Peace.” The Holy Alliance. The federation of Central

America (1824). The Hague Conferences. =References=: ELIZABETH YORK,

_Leagues of Nations, Ancient, Mediaeval, and Modern_, pp. 114-179 (see

also _Bibliography_, pp. 331-337); WILLIAM LADD, _The Peace of Europe_,

pp. 1-11; W. A. PHILLIPS, _The Confederation of Europe_, pp. 145-156; F.

C. HICKS, _The New World Order_, pp. 66-78; J. H. CHOATE, _The Two Hague

Conferences_, pp. 3-44; D. L. MORROW, _The Society of Free States_, pp.

12-32.

=2. A study of the merits and faults of the Covenant.= =References=:

Senate Debates during the period June 2 to October 6, 1919, in

_Congressional Record_ (66th Congress, 1st Session, Vol. 58), _For the

League_: SENATOR SWANSON, of Virginia (pp. 2532-2542), SENATOR

HITCHCOCK, of Nebraska (pp. 6403-6427); _Against the League_: SENATOR

JOHNSON, of California (pp. 501-509), SENATOR LODGE, of Massachusetts

(pp. 3778-3784).

Short Studies

1. =The League of Nations and American ideals.= A. H. SNOW, _The

American Philosophy of Government_, pp. 155-172.

2. =The League of Nations and American interests.= OTTO H. KAHN, _Our

Economic Problems_, pp. 354-367.

3. =The League and the Monroe Doctrine.= S. P. DUGGAN, _The League of

Nations_, pp. 273-303; Annals of American Academy of Political and

Social Science, _The Place of the United States in a World Organization

for the Maintenance of Peace_ (July, 1921), pp. 31-44.

4. =The international labor conferences.= F. C. HICKS, _The New World

Order_, pp. 270-279.

5. =The League and disarmament.= Annals of the American Academy of

Political and Social Science, _The Place of the United States in a World

Organization for the Maintenance of Peace_ (July, 1921), pp. 45-67.

6. =The League at work.= ARTHUR SWEETSER, _The League of Nations at

Work_, pp. 29-62.

7. =Some examples of international government.= L. S. WOOLF,

_International Government_, pp. 179-265; F. B. SAYRE, _Experiments in

International Administration_, pp. 18-62.

8. =The “Concert of Powers” in Europe.= T. J. LAWRENCE, _Principles of

International Law_, pp. 268-279.

9. =The system of mandates.= R. B. FOSDICK, GEORGE RUBLEE, J. T.

SHOTWELL, LÉON BOURGEOIS, and others, _The League of Nations Starts_,

pp. 110-125.

10. =International public health and sanitation.= R. B. FOSDICK, GEORGE

RUBLEE, J. T. SHOTWELL, LÉON BOURGEOIS, and others, _The League of

Nations Starts_, pp. 155-169.

11. =The League of Nations as a scheme of government.= L. OPPENHEIM,

_The League of Nations_, pp. 28-48.

12. =Small nations and the League.= S. P. DUGGAN, _The League of

Nations_, pp. 161-183; Annals of the American Academy of Political and

Social Science, _The Place of the United States in a World Organization

for the Maintenance of Peace_ (July, 1921), pp. 68-97.

Questions

1. What is meant by “applying to nations a principle which men the world

over have applied to themselves as individuals”?

2. Explain what was done at the Congress of Vienna and why there were so

many wars during the hundred years which followed that congress.

3. Explain the following expressions: _balance of power_, _Triple

Alliance_, _Entente_, _concert of powers_.

4. Make a diagram showing the organization of the League of Nations.

Explain by means of this diagram the contrasts between the League’s

organization and that of a federal government.

5. What are the weak features in the League organization?

6. Summarize the provisions which were placed in the Covenant for the

prevention of future wars and give your opinion as to the value of each.

7. Explain the relation of the League to (_a_) labor problems, (_b_)

health protection, (_c_) the suppression of the drug traffic.

8. Make a list of the chief American objections to the League and

indicate how much importance you attach to each.

9. Do you regard the refusal of the United States as a death-blow to the

success of the League? Give your reasons.

10. If the League fails, how can international peace be best secured?

Topics for Debate

1. A scheme of universal arbitration should be substituted for the

League of Nations.

2. The United States should call another conference to effect an

international agreement for the reduction of armies.

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Footnote 301:

It is said that the Thirty Years’ War reduced the population in some

sections of the warring states to one-half or one-third of what it had

been when the struggle began. The losses of all the countries engaged

in the World War have been estimated to be almost ten millions, more

than the entire population of Canada from ocean to ocean. Millions

more died from famine and under-nourishment at home. Is it not strange

that nations should work for years with might and main to increase the

size and prosperity of their populations, then turn around and undo a

large part of what they have been able to accomplish? In peace nations

labor to alleviate each others’ distress; in war they labor to cause

it. Patiently through the decades men of science wrestle with the

problem of relieving pain and suffering; then, in an instant, all

their skill is devoted to killing, maiming, and suffocating men by the

million! There is no wisdom like the wisdom of man, and no folly like

it either.

Footnote 302:

The covenant was made an integral part of the peace treaty, largely at

President Wilson’s insistence, for two reasons: First, because it was

believed that this would be a surer way of obtaining the assent of all

the great nations to the provisions of the covenant; second, because

many of the terms of the treaty (for example, those relating to

boundaries and mandates) were framed on the assumption that a League

of Nations would be in existence to carry them into effect. Taken

together, the treaty and the covenant make the longest international

document ever framed, a printed book of 87,000 words—about half the

size of this text-book. Nearly a thousand diplomats, experts, and

clerks spent more than three months in drafting it.

Footnote 303:

Invitations were not extended to Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria,

Turkey, Russia, or Mexico. Austria, however, has since been admitted

to membership.

Footnote 304:

When, for example, a typhus epidemic broke out in Poland, and the

Polish authorities found themselves unable to control it, the League

sent a commission of health experts to assist them.

Footnote 305:

This is because not only Great Britain herself but India, Canada,

Australia, South Africa, and New Zealand are members of the League. It

was assumed that the six British votes in the Assembly would always be

cast together; but, as a matter of fact, the various British dominions

insisted upon having separate votes in order that they might vote

according to their own particular interests. In most international

matters the interests of Canada, Australia, and South Africa are not

at all certain to coincide with those of England.

Footnote 306:

Since the treaty and the covenant were joined together, the objections

to one applied to the other. Concerning Shantung, see also p. 620.

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