THE UNITED STATES AS A WORLD POWER
_The purpose of this chapter is to answer the question: What are the
relations of the United States to the rest of the world?_
=The Old Policy of Isolation.=—For more than one hundred years it was
the settled policy of the United States to keep aloof from all
entanglements in the affairs of the rest of the world. [Sidenote: The
doctrines of Washington and Jefferson.] This tradition of aloofness was
given a definite form by Washington, who solemnly warned his countrymen
against getting mixed up in the “ordinary” conflicts of European states,
and it was subsequently endorsed by Jefferson.[296] Yet even in
Jefferson’s own administration it became apparent that if the United
States intended to carry on trade with all parts of the world, the
government must intervene for the protection of its own citizens
whenever this should become necessary. So, in 1803, the American fleet
was sent to the Mediterranean, where it bombarded a nest of pirates who
had been interfering with American commerce. Then came the War of 1812,
which grew out of foreign interference with American trade. On several
subsequent occasions during the nineteenth century the policy of
protecting and promoting foreign trade drew the United States into
negotiations with various countries of Europe and Asia. In a sense,
therefore, the United States has never pursued a policy of complete
isolation; on the other hand no permanent alliances have been made with
any country, and the principle of independence in all matters of foreign
policy has been consistently maintained. So far as diplomatic matters
did not directly concern North, Central, or South America, the statesmen
of the world could safely leave the United States out of their
reckonings during the greater part of the nineteenth century. In
diplomacy the United States belonged, so to speak, to a different world.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
[Illustration:
THE SPIRIT OF LIGHT. By Edwin A. Abbey
_Copyright by Edwin A. Abbey. From a Copley Print, copyright by Curtis
& Cameron, Boston. Reproduced by permission._
]
THE SPIRIT OF LIGHT
By Edwin A. Abbey
From a mural painting in the Pennsylvania State
Capitol at Harrisburg.
This is a very striking picture, one of the artist’s
best. In the background are the huge derricks which
lift the oil from the bowels of the earth. In front
of them golden-haired figures, robed in gauze with
torch in hand, are swirling upward in joyous energy
like a swarm of fireflies.
In making this picture the artist took infinite
pains. Each figure was first drawn from a living
model. Each was then photographed and by the use of
a lantern the figures were projected upon the
canvas where they were manœuvred into place for the
artist’s guidance. The whole picture is successful
in conveying the impression of spontaneity combined
with lightness and grace.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
=Why Isolation was Possible.=—This substantial isolation was made
possible for more than a hundred years by three features. [Sidenote: 1.
The fortunate geographical position of the United States.] The first is
the favored geographical position of the country. The United States, as
a strong nation, has stood alone in the Western Hemisphere. Her only
neighbors were European colonies and the struggling states of
Latin-America. So long, therefore, as the powerful nations of Europe
could be held at arm’s length there was no reason why the United States
should give much thought to problems of defence, alliances, and
diplomacy. Nature gave the United States an advantage in this respect
which is not possessed by any other strong nation with the exception of
Japan. Countries like England, France, and Germany could not have
pursued a policy of isolation even if their people had desired it, for
they are too close to each other.
[Sidenote: 2. The abundance of land.]
In the second place the United States was encouraged to hold aloof from
the older countries of the world by the fact that there was plenty of
room for expansion at home. For a hundred years there was no need to go
abroad seeking new territories. It took the United States a whole
century to develop and populate the solid block of country which extends
from the Atlantic to the Pacific. When other countries desired places of
overflow for their population and new fields of investment for their
capital, they engaged in a race for colonial possessions. The United
States had no such need or ambition; there was quite enough opportunity
at home.
[Sidenote: 3. The absence of European intervention.]
Finally, the traditional policy of isolation was made possible by the
good fortune which prevented European interference at critical times,
notably during the American Civil War, when there was serious danger
that Great Britain and France might combine to aid the South. If that
had actually happened, it is not unlikely that Russia would have come to
the aid of the North, and the Civil War would then have developed into a
world conflict. In that case American isolation would have ended more
than a half century ago. But good fortune, aided by competent diplomacy,
enabled the United States to settle its own troubles without foreign
interference and to continue the traditional policy of incurring no
obligations to any other country. In a word there was the will to keep
aloof and, what is quite as important, the opportunity to do it.[297]
From the War of Independence down to the year 1917 the United States
entered into no military alliance or association with any other country;
when the American armies fought, they fought alone.
=America’s Entry into the World War.=—The World War created a situation
which the United States had never faced before. [Sidenote: The old
policy of isolation comes to an end.] All Western Europe burst ablaze;
one country after another was drawn in; and hostilities soon spread
beyond the borders of the Old Continent. From the outset the United
States endeavored to maintain a strict neutrality; but American commerce
was subjected to interference by the belligerents on both sides.
Particularly offensive to the United States, however, was the German
practice of sinking without warning passenger vessels upon which
American citizens were traveling. The torpedoing of the British liner
Lusitania, and the consequent loss of many American lives, stirred
public opinion throughout the United States. This and other offences
against the law of nations moved President Wilson to demand from the
German government a pledge that the practice of sinking vessels without
warning should cease, and this pledge was conditionally given. Early in
1917, however, the German government decided to inaugurate, as a
desperate stroke, a campaign of “unrestricted submarine warfare”, and
the government of the United States was informed that even neutral
vessels, unless they observed certain strict precautions, would be
torpedoed without warning.
This action settled the matter of America’s continued neutrality.
[Sidenote: The declaration of war in 1917.] Diplomatic relations with
Germany were broken off and in April, 1917, Congress passed a
declaration of war. The events of the next eighteen months are still
fresh in everyone’s mind. America entered the struggle with a
determination to turn the scale, and on November 11, 1918, the German
military authorities were brought to terms. By signing an armistice they
acknowledged defeat and agreed to terms dictated by the Allied and
Associated Powers.
=The Fourteen Points.=—Some months before the signing of this armistice
President Wilson, in an address to Congress, set forth the principal
aims of the United States in the war. These aims were grouped under
fourteen heads and soon came to be known as the Fourteen Points. Every
one of them had to do with matters which, prior to the war, would have
been deemed of no immediate concern to the United States. Taken as a
whole, however, they outlined the principles upon which, in President
Wilson’s opinion, a durable peace could be erected and the future
security of the world maintained. The German government, in asking for
an armistice, declared its acceptance of these principles.
=The Treaty of Versailles.=—After the armistice had been signed on
behalf of the various belligerents a conference was convened at
Versailles to draw up a definite treaty of peace. This conference
included delegates from the countries which had shared in the winning of
the war. Germany and her allies, the vanquished, were not represented.
For several months the conference wrestled with the problems involved in
the making of a treaty—the rearrangement of boundaries, the recognition
of new states, the disposal of German colonies, the payment of
reparations, and, most difficult of all, the forming of a league of
nations to prevent future wars. When the work was finished the German
representatives were called in and were required to sign the treaty
substantially without any changes. The treaty was then communicated to
the various countries to be ratified and in due course it was ratified
by all the important countries except the United States.
[Sidenote: Why isolation is no longer possible:]
=The New World Order.=—The war and the changes which accompanied it
served to alter the whole world environment. America was brought into
more intimate contact with Europe than ever before. Even before the war,
however, it had become apparent that the traditional policy of isolation
could not be permanently maintained. To all intents and purposes the
world has become much smaller in these latter days. In point of miles
America is just as far away from Europe as ever, but a thousand miles
count for less nowadays than did a hundred in our great-grandfathers’
time. During the summer of 1918 the United States transported to Europe
in less than four months a million men. Fifty years ago that would have
been deemed to be an utterly impossible achievement. [Sidenote: 1. The
annihilation of distance.] The fast steamship of today can cross the
ocean in a hundred hours; in Washington’s time the fleetest
sailing-ships could not skim the Atlantic in less than three weeks on
the average. The time is soon coming, in all probability, when men can
be in London one day and in New York the next. This is not a mere dream;
it is well within the range of possibilities. So we can no longer talk
of geographical isolation. The progress of mankind has virtually
annihilated distance.
[Sidenote: 2. The acquisition of overseas possessions.]
Again, the United States is no longer, as in the old days, devoid of
tangible interests in distant parts of the earth. Beginning in 1898,
Porto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam were acquired from Spain, and
Hawaii was annexed. Later the Panama Canal was built and a zone of
territory on both sides of it acquired. More recently, the Virgin
Islands were purchased from Denmark. All this has involved a departure
from the traditional policy of acquiring local interests only. It has
given America, in the case of the Philippines, an outpost several
thousand miles away. Whatever, therefore, concerns the Malay Archipelago
or, indeed, any part of the Far East, concerns the interests of the
United States. Isolation is no longer possible because the United States
has surrendered, in this case at any rate, the geographical advantage of
isolation.
[Sidenote: 3. The acquisition of interests through the war.]
Finally, during the past few years, the relation of the United States to
the rest of the world has been changed by reason of the interests
acquired through the war. The fact that the Treaty of Versailles did not
receive the approval of the Senate does not in any way impair the rights
and interests which the United States acquired as one of the victors in
the war. Those interests, obtained at great sacrifice and acknowledged
by Germany in the separate treaty which the United States made with that
country in 1921, are spread over virtually the entire world. They are of
incalculable value, present and future. No policy of isolation is now
possible unless the country is ready to abandon these privileges
altogether, and, for reasons which will presently be stated, the
surrender of these various American interests is out of the question. In
the new world order the United States cannot hold off from the rest of
the world. The policy of a nation is determined by what it regards as
its own vital interests.
[Sidenote: Wide scope of these interests.]
=The New American Interests.=—Some important interests in various parts
of the world were acquired by the United States before the war; others
have been obtained or intensified as a result of it. The scope and
nature of these interests may best be explained, perhaps, by grouping
them under four main heads, according to their general geographical
location, namely, Europe, Central and South America, the Far East, and
the Near East. It is not possible to arrange them in the order of their
relative importance, for only the future can determine what this order
of importance may turn out to be. Certain it is, however, that in all
four world-areas the interests of the United States are of vast
consequence not only to the American people but to the cause of world
peace and prosperity. Above and beyond all, moreover, is the vital
interest of America in the maintenance of international amity. Apart
from the loss of life, America’s participation in the World War cost the
country, directly and indirectly, more than thirty thousand million
dollars. That is indeed a heavy price to pay for helping to settle a
quarrel which the United States had no part in promoting. It surely
requires no argument to prove that America has a vital interest in
avoiding another such calamity.
[Sidenote: America’s interests now extend to everything that may
threaten peace.]
=America and Europe.=—The war resulted in placing Great Britain, France,
Italy, and the other victorious countries of Europe under heavy
obligations to the United States. To a certain extent these obligations
are sentimental; in return for America’s help towards winning the war
the other victorious countries are under a natural obligation to give
the United States an adequate share in determining the permanent
conditions of peace. This they have been willing to do; but it involves
responsibilities which the United States has shown no great willingness
to accept. The old tradition of non-interference in strictly European
affairs is still strong and this has led the American government to
distinguish, wherever possible, between questions of local and of
world-wide concern. The distinction, however, is practically impossible
to make. The boundaries of some small European state may seem to be a
matter of no concern at Washington; but if a disagreement over this
question should bring once more a general European clash of arms, the
importance of the issue would speedily be recognized. So long as the
general preservation of world-peace is among the primary interests of
the United States, as it seems bound to be, no menace to peace,
anywhere, at any time, can be lightly regarded by the people of America.
=The Loans to Associated Nations.=—But the war did not result in the
creation of sentimental obligations only. Obligations of great
importance and a tangible nature on the part of Europe to America grew
out of it. During the conflict the United States loaned large sums of
money to Great Britain, France, Italy, Russia, and the other Associated
Powers.[298] These loans were made generously, in the midst of a grave
emergency; but nothing definite was arranged as to when or how they
should be repaid. [Sidenote: How the loans were made.] In view of the
disorganized conditions in Europe created by the war no request for the
payment of interest was made by the United States during the conflict or
for some years after its close. In 1922, however, Congress authorized
the President to appoint a commission of five persons to arrange with
the European countries for the funding of the debts by the issue of
bonds. These bonds will be given to the United States.
Now it must be reasonably clear to anyone who gives the matter a
moment’s thought that until these bonds are paid off by the various
European countries (which will be thirty or forty years hence) the
United States will be vitally interested in what Washington called the
“vicissitudes” of the Old World. [Sidenote: America’s mortgage on
Europe.] America, in effect, holds a mortgage on Europe, and it is the
practice of mortgage-holders to keep a sharp eye on their invested
funds. Great Britain, France, and the other debtor countries expect to
redeem these loans, in considerable part, out of reparation payments
made to them by Germany. If Germany does not pay them, it will be much
harder for them to pay America.[299] In this roundabout way, therefore,
the United States has acquired a tangible interest in the pledges made
by the German government.
=America’s Interest in the Industrial Reconstruction of Europe.=—The sum
total of America’s interest in the peace and prosperity of Europe is not
represented, however, by these ten billion dollars of loans. The
commercial relations of the two continents have become so intimate that
whatever is an injury to the one is a detriment to the other. Europe is
America’s best customer. Our exports there are greater than to all the
rest of the world put together. [Sidenote: Importance of Europe as a
market.] The farmer, the cotton grower, the manufacturer—all depend in
part upon the European market. There is not sufficient demand at home
for all the foodstuffs, materials, and manufactured goods which the
United States can now produce. The European market, however, has been
broken down as the result of the long conflict and it is greatly to the
interest of the United States that it should be built up again. This can
only be done by keeping the world at peace until the damage done by the
war has been repaired. For that commercial reason, if for no other, the
United States cannot well afford to remain entirely isolated from the
rest of the world.
=The United States and Latin-America.=—The relations of the United
States with most of the Latin-American states have been at all times
friendly. We have never been at war with any of them except Mexico. When
these various countries revolted against Spanish control about a hundred
years ago, the people of the United States, remembering their own
experience, were in sympathy with them. The announcement of the Monroe
Doctrine was regarded by Latin-America as an act of friendliness. And
for more than a century since that time the United States has served as
a protector to the sister republics of the southern continent. When the
War with Spain began in 1898 Congress announced that the United States
had no intention to annex Cuba and this pledge, at the close of the war,
was kept. Cuba was given her independence. Naturally this evidence of
good faith made a strong and favorable impression upon the Central and
South American states.
[Sidenote: Relations with Mexico.]
With Mexico, however, relations have not been cordial for several years.
Ever since the invasion of their country by an American army in 1846 the
Mexican people have been suspicious of American aggression; but the
relations between the two governments remained cordial enough so long as
President Diaz continued in power south of the Rio Grande, which was
from shortly after the close of the American Civil War until well into
the twentieth century. Diaz ruled Mexico in the fashion of a dictator;
but he kept the country peaceful as well as on good terms with the
outside world. Since the expulsion of Diaz the Mexicans have had several
changes in the presidency and for ten years the government has been
denied recognition by the United States. The successors of Diaz have
professed their desire to place the government of the country on a truly
democratic basis and to some extent they have succeeded in doing so; but
they have not managed to maintain order and justice with a firm hand.
Twice during the past decade it has been deemed necessary to send
American troops into the country. The government of Mexico is republican
in form, but elections have not, as a rule, been fairly conducted. The
leaders who have control of the government try to manipulate the
elections so as to maintain their own hold upon the country, and they
usually succeed.
[Sidenote: The situation today.]
Between Mexico and the United States there are today no questions of
great importance in dispute. The United States is ready to recognize the
existing government of Mexico but only upon condition that certain
pledges are made in writing. These include assurances that payments will
be made by Mexico as compensation for the lives and property of American
citizens destroyed during the troubles of the past ten years; that there
shall be no confiscating of property without legal reason in the future;
and that payments of interest on Mexico’s foreign obligations shall be
resumed. These do not appear to be unreasonable conditions.
There are large American investments in Mexico, particularly in the oil
and mining districts. Some of those who hold these investments would
like to see the United States intervene by force of arms, but it is
quite unlikely that there will be anything of the kind unless all other
means of securing the rights of Americans in Mexico prove unavailing.
The United States has a certain moral responsibility for the good
behavior of Mexico, even though the Mexican government may not recognize
the existence of such an obligation. [Sidenote: Mexico and the Monroe
Doctrine.] If the Monroe Doctrine gives the United States the right to
keep European countries from interfering in Mexican affairs, even when
their citizens have been wronged, it may also be said to carry the duty
of seeing that Mexico does not abuse this protectorship.
[Sidenote: Panama.]
In the region of the Isthmus the interests of the United States are
especially important because of the Canal. The Panama Canal is not only
of commercial but of military value to the United States, and no serious
disturbance of the peace in this section of Central America can well be
tolerated.
[Sidenote: The Pan-American Congress.]
Many years ago the United States government made the suggestion that
from time to time a Pan-American Congress made up of delegates from all
the republics of the New World should be held to discuss matters of
common interest. The suggestion was accepted and several Congresses have
been held during the past three decades. There has also been established
at Washington a Bureau of American Republics whose function it is to
carry out the resolutions of each Congress and to spread information
concerning the common interests of all the countries.
=The United States and the Far East.=—In ordinary usage the term “Far
East” includes the Japanese and Chinese empires, Siberia and the other
Russian territories to the north of China, and the Malay Archipelago to
the south. Until a quarter of a century ago the interests of the United
States, whether political or commercial, were relatively small in this
part of the world. [Sidenote: The Philippines.] But the acquisition of
the Philippines and the growth of American trade with the Orient have
combined to alter the situation. Another factor which has impelled the
United States to pay greater attention to the Orient today is the
progress of Japan. The rapid growth of this empire in military and naval
strength means that the United States has a rival for the mastery of the
Pacific. During the nineteenth century the eyes of America were turned
entirely towards Europe; in the twentieth they will have to be turned
towards Asia as well.
[Sidenote: China and Japan.]
Apart from affairs in the Philippines the problems of the Far East, so
far as the United States is concerned, center around two present-day
international phenomena, the weakness of China and the strength of
Japan. China is a vast country with at least three or four times the
population of the United States. Although nominally a republic its
government is weak, inefficient, unable to exercise firm control over
all parts of the country, and without effective means of national
defence. Quite naturally, therefore, China offers a temptation to any
strong country desiring exclusive trade advantages for itself. Her
nearest neighbor, Japan, would speedily be able to secure entire control
of the Chinese Republic and make China a vassal state were it not for
the deterring influence of the other great powers of the world.
In 1899, after the close of the Spanish War, the government of the
United States addressed a note to all the great powers urging that they
agree to seek no further special trade advantages in China, that the
integrity of Chinese territory be preserved, and that the principle of
“equal and impartial trade” should be adopted. [Sidenote: The “open
door.”] To this suggestion all the powers agreed. This policy thus
accepted has become known as the policy of the “open door”, and until
the outbreak of the World War it was substantially followed, except that
the various powers retained the commercial advantages that they had
already acquired.
During this war, however, Japan attacked and captured Kiao-Chao, a port
which had been leased by China to Germany for a long term of years, and
this territory the Japanese continued to hold after the war was over.
Not until the Washington conference of 1922 did Japan agree to give it
up. [Sidenote: Recent developments.] In 1918, moreover, the government
of Japan made a list of twenty-one demands upon China for special
privileges, and although some of these demands were later modified or
withdrawn entirely, several important privileges were wrung from the
Chinese. In connection with these negotiations the United States
government gave assurance in the so-called Ishii-Lansing agreement that
the United States would recognize the “special interest” of Japan in
Chinese affairs. It is avowedly the policy of Japan to acquire, if she
can, the same predominance in Asia that the United States has exercised
in North and South America.
=The Conference on Pacific Problems.= Regarding it as highly desirable
that all controversies affecting the Far East and the Pacific should be
amicably settled, thus forestalling the growth of large naval armaments
on both sides of the Western ocean, President Harding in the summer of
1921 proposed that the Washington conference should discuss these
questions and should endeavor to secure a satisfactory solution of them.
[Sidenote: The Washington conference.] The conference did so, and
embodied the results of its negotiations in certain agreements,
particularly in what is commonly known as the “Four Power” treaty. By
the terms of this treaty the United States, Great Britain, France, and
Japan mutually agree to respect the integrity of each other’s
possessions in the islands of the Pacific.[300] The nations represented
at the conference also agreed to refrain from the erection of
fortifications in certain places now unfortified.
Out of the negotiations at Washington, moreover, came the agreement on
the part of Japan to restore Kiao-Chao and the adjacent province of
Shantung to China. First and last, therefore, the Washington conference
succeeded in promoting an amicable agreement on most of the questions at
issue. It did not, however, take up the question of Japanese immigration
to the Pacific Coast of America, nor did it discuss the grievances of
the Japanese immigrants already there. These matters are left for
further negotiation through the regular diplomatic channels.
=America and the Near East.=—The expression “Near East” is commonly
regarded as including the areas which lie at the eastern end of the
Mediterranean and thereabouts; it comprises Turkey, Armenia, Syria,
Palestine, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and other territories in the same
general region. As a result of the war the Turkish Empire has been
disintegrated; most of its territories have been virtually placed under
the control of Great Britain, France, Italy, and Greece through the
instrumentality of mandates (see p. 636). The United States was offered
the mandate for Armenia, but declined to accept it.
[Sidenote: The oil question.]
Now some of these territories are rich in natural resources.
Mesopotamia, for example, is known to possess extensive oil fields. The
question arises, therefore, whether the European countries which hold
the mandates are to have the lion’s share of this natural wealth. And it
is a question of considerable importance when one bears in mind the fact
that the oil fields of the United States will probably be exhausted
before many decades have passed (see p. 330). The direct interest of the
United States is less immediate, perhaps, than in the other areas
(Europe, Central and South America, and the Far East), but it is
sufficiently vital to deserve mention.
=The Wide Scope of America’s Interests.=—From this brief and general
survey some idea of the scope of American interests can be gained. But
the preceding paragraphs have not listed them all. The people of the
United States have a sentimental interest in many foreign problems where
no economic considerations are at stake. Ireland is an example.
America’s interest in a just and peaceful settlement of the Irish
question is not inspired by economic motives. It arises in large part
from the sentimental desire to see a people, with whom there are close
ties of kinship, attain contentment and prosperity. So with Poland and
the new Slavic countries of Continental Europe. America would regret to
see them lose a status of independence which was gained at so great a
sacrifice.
There is no part of the world, in fact, to which the interest of the
United States, direct or indirect, sentimental, political, or economic,
does not now extend. The enormous strength and prestige of America, as
disclosed during the war, have made a profound impression in every part
of the globe and have given the United States a potent influence upon
the destinies of mankind. The United States has become a world power of
the first order. Whether the American people like it or not, that
inexorable fact remains.
General References
A. T. MAHAN, _The Interest of America in International Conditions_, pp.
127-185;
W. E. WEYL, _American World Policies_, passim;
A. C. COOLIDGE, _The United States as a World Power_, pp. 95-120;
C. E. JONES, _Caribbean Interests of the United States_, pp. 148-192;
J. H. LATANÉ, _America as a World Power_, pp. 255-268; _Ibid._, _From
Isolation to Leadership_, pp. 3-39;
H. H. POWERS, _America Among the Nations_, pp. 197-239;
W. A. DUNNING, _The British Empire and the United States_, pp. 357-371;
A. B. HART, _Foundations of American Foreign Policy_, pp. 1-52;
WOODROW WILSON, _State Papers and Addresses_, pp. 464-479;
P. S. REINSCH, _World Politics_, pp. 327-362.
Group Problems
=1. How the United States became a world power.= Early relations with
Europe. The Monroe Doctrine. The opening of Japan. The war with Spain
and the new acquisitions. John Hay and the “open door.” The World War
and its aftermath. Scope of American interests today. =References=: J.
H. LATANÉ, _America as a World Power_, pp. 3-28; 63-81; _Ibid._, _The
United States and Latin America_, pp. 61-291; A. C. COOLIDGE, _The
United States as a World Power_, pp. 121-147; J. W. FOSTER, _American
Diplomacy in the Orient_, pp. 399-438; W. M. FULLERTON, _Problems of
Power_, pp. 11-43; P. S. REINSCH, _World Politics_, pp. 309-336.
=2. How foreign trade affects the national welfare.= Foreign trade and
national prosperity. Foreign trade and world power. “Dollar Diplomacy.”
Trade and imperialism. =References=: C. M. PEPPER, _American Foreign
Trade_, pp. 3-32; 62-89; 110-139; J. D. WHELPLEY, _The Trade of the
World_, pp. 391-425; A. J. WOLFE, _Theory and Practice of International
Commerce_, pp. 495-522; C. L. JONES, _Caribbean Interests of the United
States_, pp. 1-16; L. C. and T. F. FORD, _The Foreign Trade of the
United States_, pp. 1-27.
=3. How the building of the Panama Canal extended American interests
abroad.= =References=: LINCOLN HUTCHINSON, _The Panama Canal and
International Trade Competition_, pp. 46-97; F. A. OGG, _National
Progress_, pp. 246-265; A. B. HART, _The Monroe Doctrine: An
Interpretation_, pp. 340-348; W. M. FULLERTON, _Problems of Power_, pp.
300-315.
=4. The open door in China.= What it means. Obstacles in its way.
=References=: K. K. KAWAKAMI, _Japan in World Politics_, pp. 117-166; J.
H. LATANÉ, _America as a World Power_, pp. 100-119; W. W. WILLOUGHBY,
_Foreign Rights and Interests in China_, pp. 245-266; A. B. HART, _The
Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation_, pp. 282-298; W. R. THAYER, _The
Life and Letters of John Hay_, Vol. II, pp. 231-249; A. C. COOLIDGE,
_The United States as a World Power_, pp. 327-374; K. K. KAWAKAMI,
_Japan and World Peace_, pp. 160-196; JOHN DEWEY, _China, Japan, and the
United States_ (_New Republic_ Pamphlets, No. 1).
Short Studies
1. =Pan-Americanism.= What it means. R. G. USHER, _Pan-Americanism_, pp.
203-231; J. V. NOEL, _The History of the Second Pan-American Congress_,
pp. 9-30; Pan-American Union, _Bulletins_, March, 1911.
2. =The United States as an international policeman.= THEODORE
ROOSEVELT, _Autobiography_, pp. 543-553; D. C. MUNRO, _The Five
Republics of Central America_, pp. 227-264; A. B. HART, _The Monroe
Doctrine: An Interpretation_, pp. 223-242.
3. =Our Mid-Pacific possessions.= E. J. CARPENTER, _America in Hawaii_,
pp. 192-251; J. M. CALLAHAN, _American Relations in the Pacific and the
Far East_, pp. 114-145.
4. =World competition for oil.= F. A. TALBOT, _The Oil Conquest of the
World_, pp. 17-34; F. R. KELLOGG, _The Mexican Oil Situation_ (in Clark
University Addresses, _Mexico and the Caribbean_, pp. 54-72).
5. =The United States in Panama.= C. L. JONES, _Caribbean Interests of
the United States_, pp. 193-228; RALPH PAGE, _Dramatic Moments in
American Diplomacy_, pp. 227-259; THEODORE ROOSEVELT, _Autobiography_,
pp. 553-571.
6. =America’s interest in China.= W. E. GRIFFIN, _America in the East_,
pp. 203-225; B. A. ROBINSON, _America’s Business Opportunity in China_
(in Clark University Addresses, _Recent Developments in China_, pp.
237-255; also Clark University Lectures, _China and the Far East_, pp.
95-119).
7. =The United States and the Latin American republics.= J. H. LATANÉ,
_America as a World Power_, pp. 269-284; C. E. JONES, _Caribbean
Interests of the United States_, pp. 106-124.
8. =Isolation as an American policy.= A. B. HART, _Foundations of
American Foreign Policy_, pp. 1-52; J. H. LATANÉ, _From Isolation to
Leadership_, pp. 3-53.
9. =America’s maritime power.= E. N. HURLEY, _The New Merchant Marine_,
pp. 122-166; A. T. MAHAN, _The Interest of America in Sea Power_, pp.
3-27.
10. =America’s interest in the reconstruction of Europe.= D. J. HILL,
_The Rebuilding of Europe_, pp. 236-282; WALTER WEYL, _The End of the
War_, pp. 50-72; R. S. BAKER, _What Wilson Did at Paris_, pp. 3-35.
Questions
1. Give reasons why a policy of isolation was possible during the first
three-quarters of the nineteenth century.
2. Was the entry of the United States into the war in 1917 in keeping
with American traditions or a departure from American traditions? Give
your reasons.
3. Look up the Fourteen Points. Indicate the ones which were
incorporated in the Treaty of Versailles. Name the ones which were not
so incorporated.
4. Explain why America is interested in the reconstruction of Europe.
How can this reconstruction be best aided by the United States?
5. It has been suggested that the loans made by the United States to
European countries ought to be canceled. Why is this proposal made and
what is your opinion of it?
6. What policy do you think the United States ought to pursue toward
Mexico? Has the United States any responsibility for the good behavior
of Mexico towards European countries? Why or why not?
7. To what extent should America insist upon the maintenance of the
“open door” in China? Has Japan a special interest in the Orient similar
to that of the United States in the Western Hemisphere?
8. What did the Washington Conference accomplish? Why did it not
accomplish more?
9. Was the United States wise or unwise in declining to accept any
mandates from the League of Nations?
10. Does the strength and prestige of America entail any
responsibilities of leadership? If so, give some idea as to how these
can be carried out.
Topics for Debate
1. The United States should maintain the Monroe Doctrine.
2. The United States should recognize a Japanese “Monroe Doctrine” in
the Far East.
3. The United States should not participate in international conferences
dealing only with European questions.
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Footnote 296:
Washington was well aware that the United States might have to take a
hand in European quarrels if they should assume an extraordinary
importance. Notice the exact wording of the passage in his Farewell
Address. “It would be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her (Europe’s)
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her
friendships or enmities.” Washington was not in the habit of wasting
words, and he did not twice insert the limitation “ordinary” without
good reason. By the way, he did not use the phrase “entangling
alliances”. That expression was first used by Jefferson in his
inaugural address (March 4, 1801).
Footnote 297:
From 1815 to 1914 all the great wars were localized. The Crimean War
(1854-1855), although five nations took part in it, was confined to
the territories around the Black Sea; the War of 1859, in which the
French and Italians on the one side fought the Austrians on the other,
was settled in Northern Italy. The other important wars were, for the
most part, individual duels between two nations or between two
sections of a single nation.
Footnote 298:
The total amount loaned to European governments by the United States
during the war was about ten billion dollars, of which nearly half was
loaned to Great Britain.
Footnote 299:
The payments made by Germany to Great Britain, France, and Italy, as
well as the payments made by these countries to the United States,
must inevitably take the form of payment in goods. There is not enough
gold in Europe to make payment in gold. All this means that so long as
the reparations and loans are being liquidated large imports of goods
from Europe are likely to come into this country.
Footnote 300:
By the terms of a supplementary treaty, this does not include the main
Japanese islands themselves.