In passing through Orleans, Grant, by a species of intuition,

discovered an English agent, and from him received a recommendation

to another secret agent in Paris, whose assistance would be

necessary to his final escape; for he looked upon Marmont’s double

dealing, and the expressed design to take away his life, as

equivalent to a discharge of his parole, which was moreover only

given with respect to Spain. When he arrived at Paris he took leave

of Souham, opened an intercourse with the Parisian agent, from whom

he obtained money, and by his advice, avoided appearing before

the police, to have his passport examined. He took a lodging in a

very public street, frequented the coffee-houses, and even visited

the theatres without fear, because the secret agent, who had been

long established and was intimately connected with the police, had

ascertained that no inquiry about his escape had been set on foot.

In this manner he passed several weeks, at the end of which, the

agent informed him that a passport was ready for one Jonathan Buck,

an American, who had died suddenly, on the very day it was to have

been claimed. Seizing this occasion, Grant boldly demanded the

passport, with which he instantly departed for the mouth of the

Loire, because certain reasons, not necessary to mention, led him to

expect more assistance there than at any other port. However, new

difficulties awaited him and were overcome by fresh exertions of his

surprising talents, which fortune seemed to delight in aiding.

He first took a passage for America in a ship of that nation, but its

departure being unexpectedly delayed, he frankly explained his true

situation to the captain, who desired him to assume the character

of a discontented seaman, and giving him a sailor’s dress and forty

dollars, sent him to lodge the money in the American consul’s hands

as a pledge, that he would prosecute the captain for ill usage when

he reached the United States; this being the custom on such occasions

the consul gave him a certificate which enabled him to pass from port

to port as a discharged sailor seeking a ship.

Thus provided, after waiting some days, Grant prevailed upon a

boatman, by a promise of ten Napoleons, to row him in the night

towards a small island, where, by usage, the English vessels watered

unmolested, and in return permitted the few inhabitants to fish and

traffic without interruption. In the night the boat sailed, the masts

of the British ships were dimly seen on the other side of the island,

and the termination of his toils appeared at hand, when the boatman,

either from fear or malice, suddenly put about and returned to port.

In such a situation, some men would have striven in desperation to

force fortune, and so have perished; the spirits of others would have

sunk in despair, for the money which he had promised was all that

remained of his stock, and the boatman, notwithstanding his breach

of contract, demanded the whole; but with inexpressible coolness and

resolution, Grant gave him one Napoleon instead of ten, and a rebuke

for his misconduct. The other having threatened a reference to the

police, soon found that he was no match in subtlety for his opponent,

who told him plainly that he would then denounce him as aiding the

escape of a prisoner of war, and would adduce the great price of his

boat as a proof of his guilt!

This menace was too formidable to be resisted, and Grant in a few

days engaged an old fisherman, who faithfully performed his bargain;

but now there were no English vessels near the island; however the

fisherman cast his nets and caught some fish, with which he sailed

towards the southward, where he had heard there was an English ship

of war. In a few hours they obtained a glimpse of her, and were

steering that way, when a shot from a coast-battery brought them to,

and a boat with soldiers put off to board them; the fisherman was

steadfast and true; he called Grant his son, and the soldiers by whom

they expected to be arrested were only sent to warn them not to pass

the battery, because the English vessel they were in search of was on

the coast. The old man, who had expected this, bribed the soldiers

with his fish, assuring them he must go with his son or they would

starve, and that he was so well acquainted with the coast he could

always escape the enemy. His prayers and presents prevailed, he was

desired to wait under the battery till night, and then depart; but

under pretence of arranging his escape from the English vessel, he

made the soldiers point out her bearings so exactly, that when the

darkness came, he ran her straight on board, and the intrepid officer

stood in safety on the quarter-deck.

After this Grant reached England and obtained permission to choose

a French officer of equal rank with himself, to send to France,

that no doubt might remain about the propriety of his escape; and

great was his astonishment to find, in the first prison he visited,

the old fisherman and his real son, who had meanwhile been captured

notwithstanding a protection given to them for their services. Grant,

whose generosity and benevolence were as remarkable as the qualities

of his understanding, soon obtained their release, and having

sent them with a sum of money to France returned himself to the

Peninsula, and within four months from the date of his first capture

was again on the Tormes, watching Marmont’s army! Other strange

incidents of his life I could mention, were it not more fitting to

quit a digression, already too wide; yet I was unwilling to pass an

occasion of noticing one adventure of this generous and spirited, and

yet gentle-minded man, who having served his country nobly and ably

in every climate, died, not long since, exhausted by the continual

hardships he had endured.

Having now shewn the prudence of lord Wellington with respect

to the campaign generally, it remains to consider the siege of

Badajos, which has so often been adduced in evidence, that not skill

but fortune plumed his ambitious wing; a proceeding indeed most

consonant to the nature of man; for it is hard to avow inferiority,

by attributing an action so stupendous to superior genius alone.

A critical scientific examination would be misplaced in a general

history, but to notice some of the leading points which involve

the general conception will not be irrelevant. The choice of the

line of attack has been justified by the English engineers, as that

requiring least expenditure of means and time; but this has by the

French engineer been denied. Colonel Lamarre affirms that the front

next the castle was the one least susceptible of defence; because

it had neither ravelin nor ditch to protect it, had fewer flanks,

and offered no facility of retrenching behind it; a view which is

confirmed by Phillipon, who being the best judge of his own weak

points, did for many days imagine that this front was the true

object of the allies’ approaches. But Lamarre advances a far more

interesting question, when he affirms that the English general might

have carried Badajos by escalade and storm, on the first night of

the siege, with less difficulty than he experienced on the 7th of

April. On that night, he says, the defences were not so complete,

that the garrison was less prepared, and the surprise would have

availed somewhat; whereas at the second period the breaches were the

strongest part of the town, and as no other advantage had been gained

by the besiegers, the chances were in favour of the first period.

This reasoning appears sound, yet the fact is one which belongs, not

to the rules but the secrets of the art, and they are only in the

keeping of great captains. That the breaches were impregnable has

indeed been denied by the English engineers. Colonel Jones affirms

that the centre breach had not the slightest interior retrenchment,

and that the sword-blades in the Trinidad, might have been overturned

by the rush of a dense mass of troops. This opinion is quite at

variance with that of the officers and men engaged; it is certain

also that all the breaches were protected by the sword-blades,

and if the centre breach was not retrenched, it was rendered very

difficult of approach by the deep holes digged in front, and it was

more powerfully swept by flank fire than the others were. It is

also a mistake to suppose that no dense rush was made at the great

breach. Engineers intent upon their own art sometimes calculate on

men as they do on blocks of stone or timber, nevertheless where the

bullet strikes the man will fall. The sword-blades were fitted into

ponderous beams, and these last, chained together, were let deep into

the ground; how then was it possible for men to drag, or push them

from their places, when behind them stood resolute men, whose fire

swept the foremost ranks away? This fire could not be returned by the

soldiers engaged in removing the obstacles, nor by those in rear,

because, from the slope of the breach, they could only see their

own comrades of the front ranks; and then the dead bodies, and the

struggling wounded men, and still more the spiked planks, rendered a

simultaneous exertion impossible. The breaches were impregnable!

And why was all this striving in blood against insurmountable

difficulties? Why were men sent thus to slaughter, when the

application of a just science would have rendered the operation

comparatively easy? Because the English ministers, so ready to plunge

into war, were quite ignorant of its exigencies; because the English

people are warlike without being military, and under the pretence

of maintaining a liberty which they do not possess, oppose in peace

all useful martial establishments. Expatiating in their schools and

colleges, upon Roman discipline and Roman valour, they are heedless

of Roman institutions; they desire like that ancient republic, to be

free at home and conquerors abroad, but start at perfecting their

military system, as a thing incompatible with a constitution, which

they yet suffer to be violated by every minister who trembles at the

exposure of corruption. In the beginning of each war, England has to

seek in blood for the knowledge necessary to insure success, and like

the fiend’s progress toward Eden, her conquering course is through

chaos followed by death!

But it is not in the details of this siege we must look for

Wellington’s merits. The apportioning of the number of guns, the

quantity of ammunition, the amount of transport, the tracing of the

works, and the choice of the points of attack, are matters within

the province of the engineer; the value and importance of the place

to be attacked in reference to other objects of the campaign, the

time that can be spared to effect its reduction, the arrangements

necessary to elude or to resist the succouring army, the calculation

of the resources, from whence the means of attack are to be drawn,

these are in the province of the general. With him also rests the

choice of shortening the scientific process, and the judging of

how much or how little ought to be risked, how much trusted to the

valour and discipline of his army, how much to his own genius for

seizing accidents, whether of ground, of time, or of conjunction to

accelerate the gain of his object.

Now all armies come to the siege of a town with great advantages; for

first the besieged cannot but be less confident than the assailants;

they are a few against a many, and being on the defensive, are also

an excised portion of their own army, and without news, which damps

the fiery spirit. They are obliged to await their adversary’s time

and attack, their losses seem more numerous, in proportion to their

forces, because they are more concentrated, and then the wounded

are not safe even in the hospitals. No troops can hope to maintain

a fortress eventually, without the aid of a succouring army; their

ultimate prospect is death or captivity. The besiegers on the

contrary have a certain retreat, know the real state of affairs, feel

more assured of their object, have hope of profit, and a secure

retreat if they fail, while the besieged faintly look for succour,

and scarcely expect life. To this may be added that the inhabitants

are generally secret enemies of the garrison as the cause of their

own sufferings.

The number of guns and quantity of ammunition, in a fortress, are

daily diminished; the besiegers’ means, originally calculated to

overpower the other, may be increased. Time and materials are

therefore against the besieged, and the scientific foundation of the

defence depends on the attack which may be varied, while the other

is fixed. Finally the firmness and skill of the defence generally

depends upon the governor, who may be killed, whereas many officers

amongst the besiegers are capable of conducting the attack; and the

general, besides being personally less exposed, is likely, as the

chief of an army, to be a man of more spirit and capacity than a

simple governor. It follows then that fortresses must fall if the

besiegers sit down before them according to the rules of art; and

when no succouring army is nigh, the time, necessary to reduce any

place, may be calculated with great exactness. When these rules

cannot be attended to, when every thing is irregular and doubtful,

when the general is hurried on to the attempt, be it easy or

difficult, by the force of circumstances, we must measure him by the

greatness of the exigency, and the energy with which he acts.

This is the light in which to view the siege of Badajos. Wellington’s

object was great, his difficulties foreseen, his success complete.

A few hours’ delay, an accident, a turn of fortune, and he would

again have been foiled! aye! but this is war, always dangerous

and uncertain, an ever-rolling wheel and armed with scythes. Was

the object worth the risk—did its gain compensate the loss of

men—was it boldly, greatly acquired? These are the true questions

and they may be answered thus. Suchet had subjugated Aragon by his

mildness, Catalonia and Valencia by his vigour. In Andalusia, Soult

had tranquillized the mass of the people, and his genius, solid

and vast, was laying the deep foundation of a kingdom close to

Portugal. He was forming such great establishments, and contriving

such plans, as would, if permitted to become ripe, have enabled him

to hold the Peninsula, alone, should the French armies fail in all

other parts. In the centre of Spain the king, true to his plan of

raising a Spanish party, was likely to rally round him all those of

the patriots whom discontent, or weakness of mind, or corruption,

might induce to seek a plausible excuse, for joining the invaders;

and on the northern line the French armies, still powerful, were

strengthening their hold of the country by fortifying all the

important points of Leon and Old Castile. Meanwhile the great army,

which the emperor was carrying to Russia, might or might not be

successful, but in either case, it was the only moment when an

offensive war, against his army in Spain, could have been carried on

with success.

But how could any extensive offensive operation have been attempted

while Badajos remained in the enemy’s possession? If Wellington had

advanced in the north, Soult making Badajos his base would have

threatened Lisbon; if Wellington marched against the French centre,

the same thing would have happened, and the army of the north would

also have acted on the left flank of the allies or have retaken

Ciudad Rodrigo. If an attempt had been made against Soult, it must

have been by the Lower Guadiana, when the French army of Portugal

coming down to Badajos, could have either operated against the rear

of the allies, or against Lisbon.

Badajos was therefore the key to all offensive operations by the

allies, and to take it was an indispensable preliminary. Yet how take

it? By regular or by irreglar operations? For the first a certain

time was required, which from the experience of former sieges it

was not to be expected that the enemy would allow. What then would

have been the result, if thus, year after year, the allies showed

they were unable even to give battle to their enemies, much less to

chase them from the Peninsula? How was it to be expected that England

would bear the expense of a protracted warfare, affording no hope of

final success? How were the opposition clamours to be replied to in

Parliament? How were the secret hopes of the continental governments

to be upheld if the military power of England, Portugal, and Spain

united was unable to meet even a portion of the secondary armies of

Napoleon, while with four hundred thousand men he stalked, a gigantic

conqueror, over the wastes of Russia? To strike irregularly then

was Wellington’s only resource. To strike without regard to rules,

trusting to the courage of his men and to fortune to bear him through

the trial triumphant. Was such a crisis to be neglected by a general

who had undertaken on his own judgement to fight the battle of the

Peninsula? Was he to give force to the light declamation of the

hour, when general officers in England were heard to say that every

defeat of the French was a snare to decoy the British farther into

Spain! was he, at such a moment, to place the probable loss of a few

thousand men, more or less, in opposition to such a conjuncture, and

by declining the chance offered, shew that he despaired of success

himself? What if he failed? He would not have been, save the loss of

a few men, worse off than if he had not attacked. In either case,

he would have been a baffled general with a sinking cause. But what

if he succeeded? The horizon was bright with the coming glory of

England!

APPENDIX.

APPENDIX.

JUSTIFICATORY PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE STATE

OF SPAIN AT DIFFERENT PERIODS.

No. I.

SECTION 1.—NORTHERN PROVINCES.

_Captain Irby to Mr. Croft._

“_H. M. S. Amelia,_

“_Coruña, May 6, 1810._

“I have been cruizing for these two months past between Bayonne and

Santona.”

“In addition to the troops I have observed under arms, there has been

a great proportion of armed peasantry at Baquio, a small place to the

westward of Rachidaes; as our boats were returning from destroying

some batteries, they were attacked by armed peasantry alone, who were

dispersed by shot from the ship, and also since they have assisted

the French troops, when we captured a vessel laden with military

stores from St. Andero.”

_Mr. Stuart to general Walker._

“_Lisbon, February 20, 1811._

“I own that from the various appointments which have lately taken

place in their armies, I forbode little advantage in the course of

the ensuing campaign; it is perhaps needful to tell you that my

fears are grounded on the nomination of the duke of Albuquerque

to Gallicia, Castaños to Estremadura, Mahi to Murcia, Coupigny to

Valencia, and the brother of O’Donnel to Catalonia.”

_Sir Howard Douglas to lord Wellington._

“_Villafranca, January 4, 1812._

“Each chief is allowed three servants, a captain two, a subaltern

one; the number of soldiers employed in this way is certainly not

_under_ the regulation, and all officers resident in the interior

likewise have this excessive indulgence. The officers’ servants never

do duty, or attend any drill or review. The cooks are in general

changed weekly, and are never present at drill or review; one cook is

allowed besides to every three serjeants. These two items certainly

take 5000 choice men from the ranks of this army.”

“Some very violent recriminations have been brought on by the

imprudent reply of the military press, to some observations published

in a Coruña paper extolling the Guerillas, and at the same time

intended to convey a censure on the conduct of the army. I have had

frequent conversations with general Abadia on the spirit of disunion

which these two papers are sowing. He has at length prohibited

the military press from publishing any thing but professional

papers. I was present when he gave the order—he engaged me in the

conversation, and I could not avoid observing, that what was lost

could only be regained by the sword, not the pen. In this I alluded

to the Asturias, where certainly reputation and public confidence

were sacrificed.”

“The truth is, the army is oppressive and expensive, as well as

inefficient, from its disorganised state, particularly in the

departments of supply; and it is a very unpleasant circumstance

to hear it generally admitted, that a Spanish corps is much more

destructive to the country than an equal French army. There are

also violent dissentions between the juntas of Leon and Gallicia:

inclosure No. 6 will shew this state of feeling.”

_Sir Howard Douglas to sir H. Wellesley._

“_Coruña, March 1, 1812._

“On the 20th ultimo I had the honour to despatch to your excellency

a copy of my letter of that date to lord Wellington, in which

I acquainted his lordship that three battalions of the army of

Gallicia are preparing for embarkation for America, and that I had

positively declined making, and would not permit the delivery of any

British arms or stores for that service. I have now discovered, that

in addition to these troops it is intended to send a division of

horse-artillery, to equip which, orders have been given to transfer

appointments from the cavalry of the army, and a demand is made for

funds to prepare the ordnance, and even to adapt to colonial service

more of the field artillery which I lately delivered for the use

of the sixth Gallician army. This measure has never been openly

avowed by the government of Cadiz, it has never been communicated to

the junta of this province by the regency. It has, I imagine, been

concealed from your excellency, and it has only come to my knowledge,

by the arrangements no longer to be hidden, which general Abadia is

making to carry it into effect.”

SECTION 2.—CATALONIA.

_Extract of a Letter from Don Antonio Rocca._

(Translated.)

“_Reus, January 20, 1811._

“While we have venal men, ignorant men, and perfidious men in our

government, no good can befal us. He must be mad who can expect our

condition to ameliorate. The venal are those who, without being

called, seemingly abandon their own affairs, and introduce themselves

into the different branches of administration with no other view

than to enrich themselves at the public expense. The ignorant are

those who think themselves wise, and who either obtain by intrigue

or accept without reluctance employments the duties of which they

are not capable of discharging. The perfidious are all those who

are indifferent spectators of this bloody struggle, and who care

not for the issue, as they will equally submit to any master. Place

no confidence, my friend, in these sort of persons, nothing can be

expected from them, and yet by an inconceivable fatality which is

attached to us, to the ruin of all parties, it would appear that the

provinces employ none but these very people. Those who commend us are

either venal or ignorant, or indifferent; at least the more we search

for the remedy, the more our evil increases.”

_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._

“_April 24, 1811._

.... “With respect to the proposed plan of admitting supplies of

grain in neutral vessels from the ports of the enemy, &c., I have no

hesitation in saying I do not see sufficient reason to justify it in

the present circumstances of this part of the Peninsula, as I have

always found bread for sale at the different places on the coast, at

the rate of about _two pounds and three quarters for the quarter of

a dollar_, at which price I yesterday bought it at Escala. And as

there has been of late more corn at Taragona than money to purchase,

I presume the latter has been the greater desideratum of the two.”

.... “The difficulty of allowing a free passage of provisions from

one part of the coast to the other would be lessened by being limited

to vessels above the size of common fishing-boats, in which I have

reason to believe considerable quantities have been carried to

Barcelona; and captain Bullen, I understand, found even a mortar in a

boat of this description.”

_General C. Doyle to captain Bullen._

“_Ripol, April, 1811._

“Can you believe that in this town, _the only fabric of arms, six

months_ have passed without a firelock being made!!! They begin

to-morrow, and give me two hundred and fifty every week, &c.”

[Note. The italics and notes of admiration are in the original.]

_Admiral Freemantle to captain Codrington._

“_Mahon, May 19, 1811._

“The uncertainty of every thing connected with Spanish affairs is

such, that I am tired of writing and explaining all that arises from

their inconsistency and want of energy.

“Until eight o’clock I had understood that the intendant had procured

one thousand quintals of biscuit for the army at Taragona, which

number I find on inquiry has dwindled to fifty-seven bags. I have

therefore been under the necessity of sending five hundred bags,

which we can very ill spare, from our own stores, with a proportion

of rice. I cannot tell you how much I have been worried and annoyed

the last three days, particularly as I feel the very great importance

Taragona is to the Spaniards, and how much this island is connected

with the event of the fall of that fortress. The intendant here has

wrote that he has sent two hundred and thirty-two bags of bread. You

will have the goodness to explain that only fifty-seven were procured

by him, which I have engaged to pay for, and that all the rest comes

immediately from our own stores, and are consequently at the disposal

of the British authorities at Taragona.”

_Extract of a Letter from Sir Edward Pellew to captain

Codrington._

“_H.M. Ship Caledonia, July 22, 1811._

“The indecision, inactivity, and apparent disunion amongst the

Spanish leaders has been the great cause of failure throughout the

whole of this arduous contest, and is especially observable in the

late events in Catalonia; nor until the patriots are directed by pure

military councils and more energy and decision, can I permit myself

to think that any effectual stand can be made against the invaders.”

_Sir Edward Pellew to captain Codrington._

“_August 2, 1811._

“I have to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, &c. The

information therein conveyed affords me a very melancholy view of the

affairs of the patriots, and gives me little reason to hope better

things from their future exertions.”....“A despatch which reached me

by the same opportunity from the superior junta of Catalonia contains

a proposal for occupying a position on the coast as a naval depôt,

and the selection of Palamos is presented to my choice. It does

not appear to me that the junta possesses at present resources for

defending any such position, and from the measures being submitted to

my determination, it seems to be expected that I should provide means

of defending them while employed in securing themselves in their

new station.” “Yet whilst the noble spirit of this ill-fated people

remains unsubdued, it would not be just to expect a total failure,

although the loss of all confidence between them and the privileged

orders, and the want of leaders among themselves who possess either

skill or competency to guide them, afford but a very precarious

prospect of their doing anything effectual to stop the invaders.”

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_November 1, 1811._

“By a letter from captain Strong it seems the people of Cadagues in

the early part of October openly refused assistance to the governor

of the Medas islands, declaring that they only acknowledged the

strongest party, and therefore paid their subscriptions to the

French; and that upon the Bustard’s going with a party of Spanish

troops to enforce obedience, they rang the alarm-bell as the signal

for the approach of an enemy, and sent to Rosas for assistance.”

_Extract of a Letter from captain Codrington to

E. H. Locker, esq._

“_February 7, 1812._

“Whilst the French pay the poor, who serve their purpose, at the

expense of the rich, the Spaniards deal out severity to the lower

classes, and oblige them to serve without pay and without clothes;

and the debauched and profligate of higher life are in many instances

rewarded, for imbecility, ignorance, and indifference to the fate of

their country never yet exceeded, without one single example being

made of the many traitors which have been discovered in the persons

of priests, officers of rank, or what are termed gentlemen.”

_Captain Codrington to general Lacy._

“_February 18, 1812._

“Being an eye-witness of the discontent of the people, which has

arisen from their being partially disarmed, and knowing how fatal

have been the consequences which have followed these practices

on former occasions, I must own I cannot offer to the admiral my

conviction of all that benefit arising from his good intentions in

which I should otherwise have confided. The officers and men of

the French army are walking about this part of the coast unarmed,

because _the juntas and justices have concealed the muskets they had_

at their disposal, and refused the people permission to attack the

enemy. In the mean time the poor people, whose hearts are burning

with patriotism, are starving for want of bread, and the richer

citizens of this devoted country are supplying the enemy with corn

and other species of provisions.”

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_Villa Nueva, February 22, 1812._

“I fear things are going on very ill in this principality from the

sudden change in the system of general Lacy, and the consequent

destruction of that confidence on the part of the people which was

certainly the cause of his former successes. Nor can there be any

doubt of the sound reason which guides the conduct of the Catalans

on this occasion; for the mode in which general Lacy effected the

dishonourable breach of faith of which they complain, bespeaks a mind

practised in deception. He ordered the patriotic companies to be

sent to particular points in subdivisions, at which points general

Sarsfield was to take forcible possession of them, and attach

them to different corps of the regular army. And the discovery of

this treachery was made by the letter to general Sarsfield falling

by mistake, into the hands of the officer who commanded the whole

division of patriotic companies. In the meantime the discontent of

the people gains ground with their sufferings, and instead of the

Spanish army being increased by the late arbitrary mandate according

to its avowed object, and not less probably in consequence of the

late extraordinary conduct of general Sarsfield, many of the Catalan

soldiers have actually passed over to the enemy.”

“The letter of the baron de Eroles in the gazette No. 10, shews that

he was again deceived in the promised support of general Sarsfield

on the 24th, and I am told he says publicly it was part of a settled

plan to sacrifice him and his whole division.”

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_Villa Nueva de Sitjes, February 22, 1812._

“Nothing but a total change can produce permanent good; for the

villanies of the intendant and commissary departments are so

thoroughly organized, that not one link of the chain can be left with

safety. I have good reason to think that even the money furnished by

England is so employed in the traffic of corn, by the individuals

through whose hands it passes, as to be the direct means of supplying

the enemy.”

_Captain Codrington to Mr. H. Wellesley._

“_March 1, 1812._

“The change of the regency will I trust produce a radical change of

that diabolical system by which plunder has been openly licensed,

and despotism and injustice towards the people, and even treachery

itself, in those of a higher class, have hitherto passed with

impunity.”

SECTION 3.—VALENCIA AND MURCIA.

_The councillor of state, Mariano Orquijo, to king Joseph._

“_Madrid, Decembre 4, 1810._

“Je viens de voir le proviseur et vicaire général qui fut arrêté à

Logrogne par les insurgés. Son opinion prononcée en faveur de V. M.

lui a attiré toutes sortes de mauvais traitemens et de disgraces,

mais enfin il est parvenu à se sauver de Valence. Il m’a rapporté

que l’esprit public de cette capitale a beaucoup changé depuis que

le général Caro (frère de Romana) s’est livré aux vexations et aux

dilapidations de toute espèce, et que son opinion est qu’on n’y

éprouvera aucune résistance. L’Archevêque de Valence, qui jouit à

présent d’une grande influence, lui a souvent parlé en secret d’une

manière favorable de V. M. et de ses ministres. C’est à l’Archevêque

qu’il est redevable de son evasion. Ce prélat m’ayant connu ainsi

que à M. de Montarco dans d’autres tems le chargea de nous voir.

Le général Bassecourt n’était nullement considéré. Le proviseur

ajoute, qu’à Alicant d’où il est parti le 14 Novembre, tout était

rempli, de réfugiés de Cadiz. D’après tout ce qu’il m’a dit, je conte

qu’aussitôt la prise de Tortoze, Valence se rendra sans coup férir.

J’ai renvoyé ce proviseur à Monsieur de Santa Fé qui l’a protégé en

sa qualité de ministre des affaires ecclesiastiques et qui fut très

sensible au malheur qui lui arriva à Logrogne.”

_General Doyle to Mr. Stuart._

“_March 8, 1811._

“There is a strong French party in Valencia. It is a sad thing

that we cannot _sacar Partido_ of that kingdom, in which are more

resources than in all the other provinces of Spain. With my head

I answer for it that in one month two thousand cavalry and twenty

thousand infantry, independent of the existing army, which is one

thousand five hundred effective cavalry and eleven thousand infantry,

could be raised, and there is money enough within the city to pay

them for six months, and without looking elsewhere for assistance

to clothe them. There is abundance of cloth, and provisions in

abundance, yet Valencia is doing nothing! and this time so precious,

while Massena draining all the rest of the Peninsula gives us time

to organize. We want a Robespierre in the government, and another in

every province!!”

_Colonel Roche to Mr. Stuart._

“_Carthagena, June 20, 1811_.

“After three years leaving them to themselves, this army (the

Murcian) is everywhere in a worse state absolutely than it was in the

commencement of the revolution.”

“The fact is that the Spaniards have no confidence in their general,

nor he in them, and thus Freire apprehends if he fights his people

will disperse. Valencia, with an immense population and great

resources, is doing little. Bassecour retired to Cuença. The same

indolence, lassitude, and egotism prevails through the country, and I

see little stimulus produced by the establishment of the cortes; that

feeling of enthusiasm which existed is fast dying away. The thing in

the world most agreeable to the Spaniards at this moment would be to

be allowed to be neuter, and that England and France should fight the

battle and pay all the expenses.”

_Captain Codrington to the honourable H. Wellesley._

“_September 8, 1811._

“After ascertaining that much art was employed to disgust the army

with general Blake, and at the same time to prejudice the people

against their officers, I relied upon the purity of my motives, and

opened the subject to the general with the candour and freedom it

required. I had great satisfaction in finding him well aware of all

that was passing, and upon his guard as to the consequences. Upon my

mentioning that certain hand-bills were posted up, he produced and

gave me the enclosed copies. He told me that upon obtaining them he

went to the marquis of Palacios, who, necessarily agreeing in their

evil tendency, consented to accompany the general to the palace of

the archbishop, where I trust measures were adopted to prevent a

repetition of the misconduct of the Padre Igual and his numerous

bigoted coadjutors. I submitted to the general’s attention the fatal

effects of his quitting this part of the Peninsula, while the minds

of the people were in such a state of fermentation, and allowing the

supreme authority to revert to the marquis of Palacios. He assured

me that he clearly saw the danger which would arise from it; he had

determined on no account to do so until the marquis was removed by

the government from his present situation.”

_Mr. Tupper’s report to sir H. Wellesley._

(Extract.)

“_January 27, 1812._

“The scandalous behaviour of the members of the junta will have more

influence upon the public mind, will dishearten the people even more

than the fall of Valencia and the dispersion of the army. For seeing

their representatives return to their respective districts, it will

give an example to follow that all is lost, and having no authority

to protect them or to look to, the people have no other resource left

than to submit to the yoke of the enemy.”

_Extracts from Mr. Tupper’s report to sir Henry Wellesley

from 22 to 27 January, 1812._

“Blake with his immense resources remained altogether inactive, and

contented himself with observing the movements of the enemy, and his

progress in fortifying himself under the walls of the city.”

“With Blake’s approbation I had raised a corps of about one hundred

and eighty men to act as guerillas, and by beginning a plan of

offensive operations I expected to see the example followed. I

also demanded the direction of the chief battery, that of Santa

Catalina, from whence the French camp might be much annoyed, and for

the space of thirty successive days caused the French considerable

damage in killed and wounded. Excepting this battery, that of St.

Joseph contiguous to it, and that of the Puente del Mar, every thing

else remained in a state of complete inactivity. Blake, lulled

into a state of confidence that the enemy would not attack without

reinforcements, had taken no measures whatever.”

“The junta of Valencia was composed of members, as per list enclosed,

of which only the first remained, the others having before retired

and shamefully gone to their respective homes; but upon the fall of

the capital where they had their property, those remaining sent in

their resignation to Mahi, and without being competent to do so, gave

up the only representative authority of the province which had been

confided to them, and have thus thrown the whole country into a state

of anarchy, abandoning it altogether to the will of the enemy; yet I

am persuaded the spirit of the people is the same, great resources

are left in the province, immense riches still remain in the

churches, convents, diezmos, &c., &c.”————“I am however sorry to say

that since the fall of the capital, nay, since the battle of the 26th

ultimo, not a single step has been taken, and at this moment outside

the walls of Alicant the province does not exist.——Mahi has objected

to Padre Rico, the only man in my opinion, and in that of every body,

capable of giving activity and soul to the resources of the country.”

.... “I am sorry to inform your excellency that after repeated

interviews with Mahi and the intendant Rivas, on the subject of the

commission I had proposed, I am now clearly of the opinion from the

repeated delays and studied objections that no authority will be

established.”————“ In short nothing has been done, and nothing will

be done.”————

“I am firmly of opinion that the people now in authority are

disposed, by leaving public affairs in their present abandoned

state, to submit to the French yoke.”————“On the 16th ultimo, when

Montbrun made his appearance, the Ayuntamiento desired the Syndico

Personeso to give a petition in the name of the people to enter

into a capitulation; he refused; but I am informed there was some

arrangement between the governor and the Ayuntamiento, the members

whereof remain in office notwithstanding their traitorous conduct on

the 16th.”

SECTION 4.—ANDALUSIA.

_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._

“_9th May, 1810._

“Nothing new here; the regency and the junta are as usual more

asleep than awake, and I can augur nothing good from the government

remaining in such hands—let their intentions be ever so good.

Nothing but the assembly of the cortes, and from thence springing up

a revolutionary system, overturning abuses and interesting the people

in their own cause by solid and permanent, instead of contingent

and prospective reforms, calling forth talents if to be found for

the chief situations, and inforcing vigour and rousing enthusiasm.

Nothing but some great change (such as we might in the beginning have

assisted in bringing about) can carry on this war to any good result.

The people are obstinate in their hatred of the French, and from that

alone spring the fits of patriotism and loyalty which keep alive the

flame in some place or another. That it is so one cannot doubt from

the effects, but it is never to be met with where one is, at least I

have never yet seen enthusiasm though I have heard of it. Hence the

bulk of the people seem to be completely indifferent to what is going

on, and all seem most unwilling to submit to the deprivation of any

comfort, and to the sacrifices which a state of siege requires. They

would be very well pleased to have any thing done for them, and to

see the enemy driven away, that they might go to eat strawberries

at Chiclana, and they are much disposed to blame our inactivity,

especially that of the navy, in permitting the enemy to have advanced

so near on the point of Trocadero. The destruction of these two

forts at first was certainly a great error in admiral Purvis; had

they been kept up and well garrisoned, as they support one another,

it would have been a very tedious operation to have reduced them.

Meanwhile you will hear that the improvidence of the junta, and their

denial of any such risk to Mr. Wellesley, placed the bread provision

of the town in much too precarious a situation; in short, they

completely deceived him by their assurances of the most ample means

of subsistence, and both flour and wheat have been sent away since he

came.”

_Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._

“_Isla de Leon, February 5, 1811._

“Blake is becoming very unpopular, and I think his reign will be

short. He is supposed to be by no means partial to the English. I

know not whether you will approve of the appointments to Estremadura

and Gallicia, but I am sure you will be surprised to hear that

general Mahi is appointed to command the army of the centre. I

communicated confidentially to general Blake the copy of the letter

which you forwarded to me from general Walker, taking care to conceal

general Walker’s name, so that Blake was fully apprised of our

opinion of general Mahi previously to his appointment of him to the

command in Murcia.”

_Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._

“_Cadiz, February 27. 1811._

“It grieves me to see from day to day how little is done by the

Spaniards, and how little is likely to be done. The cortes have not

given a new impulse to the war as was expected. They look to their

regency for plans of reform for their armies, and their regency is

worse than any former government. Blake, of whom I know that you as

well as the world in general have a good opinion, does nothing. He

refuses to reform abuses that are pointed out to him, passes his days

in deliberation upon questions of no moment, and is in my opinion

decidedly adverse to the English. Whittingham’s plan, (disciplining

a separate corps,) which was approved of before his arrival, he has

endeavoured by every kind of trick to reject or render useless.”

“The cortes is full of priests, who, united with the Catalans,

are for preserving the old routine of business, and adverse to

every thing that can give energy and vigour to the operations of

government. Fanaticism and personal interest direct their opinions;

Arguelles and his party are anxious that something should be done to

remedy the disgraceful state of their armies. I have no doubt but

that they would remove the present government, though the friends of

Blake, if there was any chance of the Catalan party permitting them

to elect a better.”

“Be assured, my dear Stuart, that the cortes is, as at present

constituted, any thing but revolutionary or jacobinical. They love

their monarchy, and are anxious to maintain the inquisition in all

its forms, the only branch of government to which they seem disposed

to communicate any energy. If there is not soon some new spirit

infused into the cortes, it will become an overgrown junta, meddling

with every paltry detail of police, and neglecting the safety of

their country—and the regency will be content to reign (very badly)

over Cadiz and the Isla.”

_Mr. Vaughan to Mr. Stuart._

“_Cadiz, August 5, 1811._

“The temper of the public mind at Cadiz is very bad, the press

has lately teemed with publications filled with reproaches of the

English.”

“The regency and cortes have lost all influence every where, and

the distress for money added to the general depression here after

the campaign in Estremadura may possibly throw us into a state of

anarchy.”

“I am somewhat alarmed by the state of the Serranos de Ronda; the

Spanish generals have been quarrelling, and the peasants declare they

are tired of the abuses committed there, and that it is reported they

mean to capitulate with the French.”

_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._

“_Isla de Leon, April 24, 1811._

“The Spanish government has published an official narrative of the

expedition (Barosa) full of misrepresentations and blinking the

question of the cause of failure entirely—this has obliged me to

add something to what I wrote before to Mr. Wellesley. There are

some instances of impudence supporting falsehood beyond example. The

_proud_ Spaniard is no less _vain_ I think.”

_General Graham to Mr. Stuart._

“_Isla, May 6, 1811._

“The government here supported by the cortes seemed to be determined

to adhere with blind obstinacy and pride to a system that has nearly

brought the cause to ruin, and notwithstanding Lord Wellington’s

great efforts they are playing Buonaparte’s game so positively that I

despair of any great good.”

_Colonel Austin to Mr. Stuart._

“_Faro, March 24, 1811._

“Whether Ballesteros is authorized by his government to pursue the

steps he has taken, I know not, but I certainly cannot but consider

them as just and necessary. The junta de Seville is a mere farce

supported at an immense expense without the least utility or benefit,

and preserving in its train a number of idle characters who ought to

be employed in the defence of the nation, but who now only add to its

burthens. I have had many negotiations with the junta, and though I

have always kept up appearances through policy, yet I have found, in

the room of the honour and candour which ought to characterize it,

nothing but chicanery and dissimulation.”

_General Carrol to Mr. Stuart._

“_Olivenza, April 29, 1811._

“Would to Heaven that the Spanish armies, or, more properly speaking,

the skeletons of the Spanish armies were under his lordship’s

(Wellington’s) command; we might in that case do great things, but

alas! our pride seems to increase with our misfortunes, and is only

equalled by our ignorance!”

_Mr. Stuart to Lord Wellesley._

“_July 13, 1811._

“I have endeavoured to throw together the numbers, &c. of the

different guerillas, &c., which clearly demonstrate the false

exaggerations circulated respecting that description of force;

though their appearance in different parts has most unreasonably

encreased the alarm of the enemy and proportionable confidence of

the Spaniards, they cannot be calculated to exceed in the aggregate

twenty-five or thirty thousand men at the utmost.”

Note. Here follows a list of the Partidas with their numbers and

stations too long to insert.

_Mr. Wellesley to Mr. Stuart._

“_Cadiz, July 31, 1811._

“Nothing can be more wretched than the state of affairs here; the

regents are held in universal contempt, and such is the want of

talent, I can hardly hope that a change will make any improvement:

the treasury is empty, and no probability of the arrival of any

money from America, so that affairs are really in a worse state than

they have been at any time since the commencement of the war.”

_Extract from the manifesto of the Spanish regency._

“_January 23, 1812._

“There have reached the government the cries of the armies which

defend us, depicting their painful privations; the groans of the

inhabitants of districts, ready to fall under the yoke of the

barbarous invaders; the complaints of the provinces already occupied,

always loyal though oppressed and laid waste.”

“Cease now, and henceforward, all personal pretensions; the

ill-understood feelings of interest dictated by provincial spirit;

exemptions unjustly demanded at this period of desolation, writings

which, while they ought to create the most ardent patriotism, to

unite and enlighten the nation, appear inspired by the enemy for the

purpose of enslaving it.”

SECTION 5.

PRIVATEERS.

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_Arens de Mar, August 23, 1811._

“I have numberless complaints of the Spanish privateers that come

upon the coast, and I am sure it would be a benefit to the country

if they were all deprived of their commission. They do nothing but

plunder the inhabitants of those places which are occasionally

overrun by the French armies, and who embrace the opportunity of

their absence to carry on a little trade with other parts of the

Peninsula.”

_Ditto to sir H. Wellesley._

“_Valencia, September 8, 1811._

“I trust some decisive measures will be taken to abolish altogether

a system of privateering nothing short of piracy; and in which the

vessels from Gibraltar seem to take the lead. I have great reason to

believe that they plunder the unfortunate vessels of all countries

by hoisting whatever colours may answer their purposes of assumed

national hostility; and as we never hear of their attacking each

other, I have no doubt that the British and French flags are often

united in furtherance of this predatory warfare. The numberless

complaints which I receive from all parts of the coast, and the

difficulty of trading betwixt Catalonia and Valencia, on account

of the privateers which swarm in these seas, drive many into an

intercourse with Barcelona and other places in the occupation of the

enemy, in order to get a livelihood.”

_Ditto to admiral Penrose, Valencia._

“The depredations of the Gibraltar privateers have been carried on

to such an extent, in all parts of the Mediterranean, as to bring

serious reflections upon the British flag.”

SECTION 6.

FRENCH PRISONERS AT CABRERA.

_Captain Codrington to E. Locker, Esq._

“_September 18, 1811._

“I cannot at all events think it a wise measure to receive into

colonel Whittingham’s corps the prisoners at Cabrera, who have long

ago withstood the offers of general Roche, _when naked as they were

born, and fighting for each other’s miserable rations to prolong an

existence inconceivably wretched_, in hopes of rejoining the French.”

_Sir H. Wellesley to captain Codrington._

“_October 10, 1811._

“With regard to the French prisoners at Cabrera, I procured from

the Spanish government long since an order to the governor of the

Balearic Islands to suspend all negotiations with the French on that

subject, and not on any account to consent to exchange them.”

* * * * *

No. II.

SECTION 1.

SIEGE OF TARAGONA.

_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._

“_Taragona_, _May 15, 1811._

“During the panic which seems to have prevailed upon the unexpected

arrival of the French army, the greatest exertions and the most

extensive sacrifices appear to have been readily submitted to. But

from the present apathy and indifference in those who should set an

example of activity, and from the general deficiency of ordnance

stores, I by no means consider the place in that state of security

which the strength of its works and position would otherwise lead me

to expect.”

“A well planned sortie was made yesterday, but failed through the

backwardness of some of the officers employed in it.”——“I had the

satisfaction of being assured by an officer, who conspicuously did

his duty on this occasion, and who was outflanked by the enemy, from

the backwardness of the column directed to support him, that he

attributes the salvation of his troops entirely to the fire from the

shipping.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Blake, off Villa Nueva, June 15, 1811._

“Leaving Taragona on the 16th (May), we reached Peniscola in the

forenoon of the 17th.”——“From thence general Doyle wrote to general

O’Donnel an account of the situation of Taragona and of my detaining

captain Adam at Peniscola, in readiness to receive any reinforcement

which he might be pleased to send to that garrison. Upon our arrival

off Murviedro, we found general O’Donnel had already ordered the

embarkation of two thousand three hundred infantry and two hundred

and eleven artillery-men.”——“Delivering to general O’Donnel two

thousand stand of arms, accoutrements, and clothing to enable him to

bring into the field as many recruits already trained as would supply

the place of the regular soldiers; thus detached from his army, we

proceeded to Valencia and landed the remainder of our cargo, by which

means the troops of general Villa Campa, then dispersed as peasantry

for want of arms, were enabled again to take the field, and the corps

of Mina and the Empecinado completed in all the requisites of active

warfare.”

“At Alicant we proceeded to take in as many necessary materials for

Taragona as the ship would actually stow, besides eighty artillery

men and a considerable quantity of powder, ball-cartridge, &c. sent

in the Paloma Spanish corvette from Carthagena in company with a

Spanish transport from Cadiz deeply laden with similar supplies.”

“After returning to Valencia, where we landed the additional arms,

&c. for the Aragonese army, we moved on to Murviedro, where the conde

of Bispal proceeded from Valencia to join us in a consultation with

his brother, although, on account of his wound, he was very unfit

for such a journey. The result of this conference was a determination

on the part of general O’Donnel to commit to my protection, for

the succour of Taragona, another division of his best troops under

general Miranda, consisting of four thousand men, whilst he himself

would move forward with the remainder of his army to the banks of the

Ebro.”

“The frequent disappointments which the brave Catalonian army had

heretofore met with from Valencian promises, made the sight of so

extensive and disinterested a reinforcement the more truly welcome,

because the less expected, and the admiration which was thus created

in the besieged appeared to produce proportionate anxiety on the part

of the enemy.”

“I shall direct the whole of my attention to the neighbourhood of

Taragona, in readiness for harassing the retreat of the French, if

general Suchet should unfortunately be obliged to raise the siege,

and for re-embarking and restoring to general O’Donnel whatever may

remain of the Valencian troops, according to the solemn pledge he

exacted from me before he would consent thus to part with the flower

and strength of his army. He even went so far as to declare, in the

presence of general Miranda, the principal officer of his staff,

general Doyle, captain Adam, captain White, and myself, that he

considered me as entirely answerable for the safety of the kingdom of

Valencia, and that if I failed in redeeming my pledge he would resign

his command for that particular account.”

“It is but justice to myself, however, that I should tell you that I

did most distinctly warn general O’Donnel, that I would in no case

answer for his army if placed under the immediate command of Campo

Verde, for any distant inland operation, more particularly as I knew

that, in addition to his own deficiency in ability, he was surrounded

by people whose advice and whose conduct was in no case to be relied

on.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Blake, Taragona, June 22, 1811._

“I found upon my last return here an arrangement made, that in case

of the enemy gaining the Puerto, general Sarsfield should retire

to the Mole with part of his division, from whence I had only to

assist, but was much astonished to find, by a message, through

colonel Green, from general Contreras, that although he had heard

of such a disposition being made by general Sarsfield, and assented

to by the English squadron, it had not his official knowledge or

approbation.”——“I understand that an order had arrived in the morning

from the marquis of Campo Verde for general Velasco to take the

command of the Puerto, and for general Sarsfield to join his army,

that the latter had given up his command to some colonel at about

three o’clock, who was, by his own confession, totally unfit for it,

and that general Velasco only arrived in time to find the Spanish

troops flying in confusion from the want of being properly commanded

and the French assaulting the place.”

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_Mattaro, November 1, 1811._

“Having stated in a letter to sir Charles Cotton, on the 22d June

last, that I understand general Sarsfield had quitted the Puerto

and embarked without the knowledge of general Contreras, (which

indeed was the substance of a message sent me by general Contreras

himself,) I owe it to an officer of general Sarsfield’s high military

character to declare my conviction that the statement there made by

general Contreras is absolutely false and unfounded, and I beg leave

to enclose in justification of my present opinion; 1st, a passport

sent by general Contreras to general Sarsfield in consequence as he

alleged of an order from the marquis of Campo Verde. 2d. An extract

from the manifesto of the marquis, in which he disavows having any

knowledge of the passports. 3d. A letter from general Contreras to

general Sarsfield in answer to one written by the latter requesting

to see the order by which he was directed to quit the Puerto at such

a critical moment, in which he says ‘that he cannot send him a copy

of that letter, because it is confidential, but that his presence

is necessary at the head-quarters to assist in the operations about

to take place for the relief of the garrison, and that he has not a

moment to lose.’ 4th. The copy of another letter written on the same

day by general Contreras to the superior junta, in which he says that

general Sarsfield quitted the Puerto without his knowledge!!!”

_General Doyle to colonel Roche._

“_June 23, 1811._

“Is it possible to conceive any thing so absurd, and I could almost

say _wicked_, as the conduct of the junta or captain-general of

Cartagena in taking away the firelocks from the regiments _they sent

with such a parade of their patriotism to relieve Taragona_. Two

thousand men are already in this city without firelocks, such is the

daily destruction of arms by the enemy’s fire and the getting out of

repair from constant use.”

_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._

“_Off Taragona, June 23, 1811._

“Another regiment arrived from Carthagena yesterday under convoy of

the Cossack, but, as on a former occasion, their arms were taken from

them by colonel Roche, upon their going to embark, and therefore, as

being of no use to the garrison, I have by desire of the general sent

them to Villa Nueva, and as there are already 2000 men in the place

without arms, I have sent the Termagant to Carthagena, to endeavour

to procure those which have been thus inconsiderately taken from the

troops belonging to that place.”

_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._

(Extract.)

“_June 29, 1811._

“The Regulus with five transports including a victualler arrived

with colonel Skerrett and his detachments on the 26th. The surf

was so great on that day that we had no other communication in the

forenoon than by a man swimming on shore with a letter, and upon

colonel Skerrett putting questions to general Doyle and myself upon

the conduct he should pursue according to his orders, we agreed

in our opinion that although the arrival of the troops before the

Puerto (lower town) was taken would probably have saved the garrison,

it was now too late, and that their being landed, if practicable,

would only serve to prolong the fate of the place for a very short

time at the certain sacrifice of the whole eventually. This opinion

was grounded on a number of different circumstances, and was in

perfect coincidence with that of captains Adam and White. In the

evening the surf abated sufficiently for general Doyle, colonel

Skerrett, and some of his officers, as well as the captains of the

squadron and myself, to wait upon general Contreras, who repeated his

determination to cut his way out and join the marquis of Campo Verde

_the instant the enemy’s breaching battery should open_, and which

he expected would take place the following morning, and who agreed

the English ought not to land with any view of defending the town,

although he wished them to join in his meditated sortie.”

_Extracts from general Contreras’ report._

(Translated.)

“I saw myself reduced to my own garrison.” “I considered if my force

was capable of this effort (defending the breach), one of the most

heroic that war furnishes, and to which few men can bring themselves.

I recollected however that I _had still eight thousand of the best

and most experienced troops in Spain_.” “All conspired against this

poor garrison. Campo Verde in quitting the place promised to come

back quickly to its succour, but he did not, although he daily

renewed his promises. The kingdom of Valencia sent Miranda with a

division which disembarked, and the day following re-embarked and

went to join Campo Verde.

“An English division came on the 26th, colonel Skerrett, who

commanded them, came in the evening to confer with me and to demand

what I wished him to do. _I replied that if he would disembark and

enter the place, he should be received with joy and treated as he

merited; that he had only to choose the point that he wished to

defend and I would give it to him, but that all was at his choice,

since I would neither command nor counsel him._ The 27th the English

commandants of artillery and engineers came to examine the front

attacked, and being convinced that the place was not in a state to

resist, returned to their vessels, and then all went away from the

place they came to succour.

“_This abandonment on the part of those who came to save was the

worst of all_; it made such an impression on the soldiers, that

they began to see that they were lost, became low-spirited and only

resisted from my continual exhortations, and because they saw my

coolness and the confidence I had, that if they executed my orders

the French would fail. But this only lasted a few hours, the notion

of being abandoned again seized them and overcame all other ideas.”

_Captain Codrington to sir C. Cotton._

“_12th July, 1811._

“The vacillating conduct of general Contreras regarding the defence

of Taragona is a principal feature in the loss of that important

fortress.”

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_12th July, 1811._

“The marquis blames generals Caro and Miranda, whilst the latter

retort the accusation; and I am inclined to think that in giving full

credit to what each says of the other, neither will suffer ignominy

beyond that to which his conduct has entitled him.”

_Ditto to Mr. Wellesley._

(Extract.)

“_20th July, 1811._

“The disasters which have befallen the principality will produce

material accusations against the generals who lately commanded in it,

without, I fear, any of them meeting the punishment which is their

due. Some of the enclosed papers may help you to form a just opinion

of their conduct and that of the Spanish marine; and those respecting

the arms for which I sent to Carthagena will show how far colonel

Roche is entitled to the merit which he so largely assumes on that

occasion.”

“To enable you to form a correct opinion of general Contreras I must

refer you to general Doyle, as from his ignorance of our service,

the various requests and proposals which arose from the vacillations

in what he called his determinations, were signified to me through

him. It does not appear to me that he ever visited the works himself,

or it would not have fallen to the lot of captain Adams and myself

to remove two boats, two large stages, sixteen gun-carriages, and

a mortar from the mole, long after the French were advanced beyond

the Francoli battery, and two nights previous to their gaining the

Puerto; an accidental visit to the mole one night, just after placing

the gun-boats and launches, discovered to me this mortar with no less

than twelve guns in readiness for forming a battery; and upon general

Doyle, by my request, representing this to the general of artillery,

he talked of _inquiring into it to-morrow_.”

“It would be a waste of words to describe further the conduct of

the general of artillery, or I might find sufficient subject in

the events of every passing day from the first investment of the

place.”——“I shall be very ready to come forward personally in aid

of that justice which is due to the numberless brave men who fell a

sacrifice to the criminality of the persons alluded to who have so

grossly misconducted themselves.”

SECTION 2.

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_29th July, 1811._

“Had colonel Green, the military agent appointed to succeed general

Doyle, adopted the plan of his predecessor of continuing at the

head-quarters of the army and in personal communication with the

captain-general instead of retiring to Peniscola with the money and

arms remaining, we should not be left as we are to the precarious

source of mere accidental communications for receiving intelligence.”

_Ditto to Don F. Savartes, vocal of the Junta._

“_28th July, 1811._

“————Colonel Green, the British military agent, being at Peniscola,

I have opened the letter from the junta to him.”——“Had I not in this

instance opened the letters to the admiral and the military agent,

the junta would have received no answer to them until it would have

been too late to execute their object.”

_Captain Thomas to captain Codrington._

(Extract.)

“_H.M.S. Undaunted, off Arens, 7th Oct. 1811._

“Having observed, in the Catalonia Gazette of the 24th of September,

the copy of a letter said to be written by colonel Green to

his excellency general Lacy, relative to our operations on the

Medas Islands, from the surrender of the castle to the period of

our quitting them, I beg leave to state to you my surprise and

astonishment at seeing facts so grossly misrepresented, and request

you will be pleased to contradict in the most positive manner

the assertions there made use of. To prove how inconsistent this

letter is with real facts, it may be necessary for me only to say

that colonel Green, in the presence and hearing of all the English

officers, on my asking him a question relative to the practicability

of keeping the island, did declare that he had nothing to do with the

expedition; that my instructions pointed him out as a volunteer only.

But immediately after, in the hearing of all, did declare it to be

his opinion that the island was not tenable.

“As I understood it was intended to form an establishment on the

larger island, I judged it proper to retire from it for a short time

and destroy the remains of the castle, which might induce the enemy

to withdraw from the works he had thrown up, and thereby afford

our ally an opportunity whenever he chose to occupy them again, to

fortify himself without molestation; and this supposition it has

appeared was well grounded. But while the ruins of the castle stood,

it was an object of jealousy to the French; nor would they in my

opinion have quitted the ground they occupied, nor the Spaniards have

been enabled to settle themselves, had this measure not been adopted.

I therefore gave orders for embarking the guns and stores.

“If necessary, I could say much more on the subject of this most

extraordinary letter; the few remarks I have made will, I think, be

sufficient. As an act of courtesy to colonel Green, on landing the

marines I directed the marine officers to receive their orders from

him; but military aid was not necessary, for you may recollect before

the expedition sailed, on your informing me that general Lacy had

offered some Spanish troops, and asking how many I thought would be

necessary, my answer was ‘about forty;’ and I have no hesitation in

declaring that without the assistance of even a single soldier the

castle would have fallen into our hands as speedily as it did on this

occasion.

SECTION 3.

_Captain Codrington’s orders to captain Adam of the

Invincible._

“_July 1st, 1811._

“You are hereby directed, in consequence of a representation made

to me by general Doyle, to proceed towards Majorca in search of the

Spanish frigates Prueba, Diana, and Astrea, which the general reports

to be going to that island (contrary to orders) with the treasure,

archives of the province, and the vessels laden with stores and

ammunition destined for the inland fortresses of Catalonia, together

with the officers and soldiers which were saved from Taragona, and

which are required to join the army immediately. Upon meeting them

you are to deliver the accompanying order for them to return here,

and you are, if necessary, to enforce obedience.”

_Captain Codrington to sir Charles Cotton._

“_Villa Nueva, 3d July, 1811._

“I should feel the more hurt by being driven to adopt such a measure

had not the whole conduct both of the Prueba and Diana made their

captains a disgrace to the situation they hold. These two frigates

remained quiet spectators of the British squadron engaging the

batteries of the enemy on the 22d of last month, and never attempted

to give any assistance to the garrison, except by now and then

sending a gun-boat to join those manned by the English. They did

not assist in the embarkation of the numberless women, children,

and wounded soldiers, until goaded into it by the orders of general

Contreras, after I had already sent above two thousand to this place;

and even when I had no longer any transports for their reception, the

captain of the Prueba refused to receive some wounded officers.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_18th July, 1811._

“I cannot describe to you the difficulties which I have been put to

by the misconduct of all the Spanish ships and vessels of war which

I have had to communicate with upon the coast, with exception of

the Astrea frigate and the Paloma corvette. In the others I have

seen neither courage to oppose the enemy nor humanity to alleviate

the distresses of their countrymen.”——“I have heard also that the

Algesiras, which lately arrived at Arens, has landed the stores and

ammunition, with which she was charged, at the risk of their falling

into the hands of the enemy, and has quitted the station!”

SECTION 4.

_Captain Codrington to sir E. Pellew._

“_12th July, 1811._

“General Milans is collecting a mixture of troops, consisting of

those who have escaped the enemy.”

“He speaks loudly of his indifference to a command, while he boasts

that if he were captain-general he would raise forty thousand men and

clear the country of the enemy! But in the midst of this disgusting

rhodomontade it is not difficult to see that self-interest is the

main spring of all his actions, and that instead of raising an

army he is more likely, by the system he has adopted, to shake

the stability of that which is still left for the defence of the

principality.”

_Captain Codrington to sir H. Wellesley._

“_September 1, 1811._

“The affair of general Milans” (namely, the sending of corn to

Barcelona under his passport) “which I mentioned to you in my last

private letter, is still involved in mystery, which I hope however

to penetrate upon my return to Arens de Mar. The Mataro papers

reported that two soldiers were shot and a serjeant flogged at Arena

for suffering corn to pass their guard at Mongat on its way to

Barcelona. The _fact_ of the punishment is I believe truly stated,

but the _cause_ no less falsely, enterely as I suspect with the view

of terminating my investigation into this nefarious traffic. General

Lacy, instead of answering my letter, refers me by word of mouth to

the junta, and the deputation from the junta, who went to Mataro (as

they assured me) purposely to investigate the business, now tell me

that it is an affair purely military, and refer me to general Milans

himself.”

SECTION 5.

_Extract from a minute made by captain Codrington._

“_Mattaro, July 6, 1811._

“Colonel O’Ronan, aid-du-camp to the marquis of Campo Verde, arrived,

and informed me that he came from the marquis, who was on his march

to this town or Arens, for the purpose of embarking all the infantry

not Catalans, and the whole of the remaining cavalry, leaving the

horses on the beach. Colonel O’Ronan said this determination was the

result of a junta, composed of the marquis, general St. Juan, general

Caro, general Miranda, the general of artillery, brigadier Santa

Cruz, Velasco, and Sarsfield; that after the thing had been proposed

and discussed a long time, Sarsfield was the first to give his vote,

that he rose from his seat and said, ‘any officer who could give

such an opinion must be a traitor to his country, and that he and

his division would stand or fall with the principality.’ Every other

officer was of a contrary opinion, except the marquis (it afterwards

appeared that Santa Cruz also supported Sarsfield), who thought with

Sarsfield, and yet it seems he allowed himself to be led on by the

other generals. _In short, it appears he was resolved to abandon the

principality._

“I told him, without hesitation, that to embark the Valencians I

felt a duty to general O’Donnel, to the kingdom of Valencia, and to

the whole nation, but that I felt it equally my duty upon no account

to embark the army of Catalonia, and thus become a party concerned

in the abandonment of a province I had been sent to protect.”——“The

colonel, who could not venture on shore again lest he should be

murdered by the inhabitants of Mattaro, for having been the bearer of

a commission to arrest brigadier Milans about a month ago, sent to

the marquis my answer.”

_Extract from a minute of information given by the baron

d’Eroles._

“_July 9, 1811._

“The baron d’Eroles was appointed captain-general of Catalonia by

the junta of general officers, of which the marquis of Campo Verde

was president, and by the voice of the people. His reply was, that

so long as the army continued in the principality, and that there

was a senior general officer, he would not admit it, but that the

moment the army passed the frontier (it was then at Agramunt, in

full march to Aragon), he would accept the command, unmindful of the

dreadful situation in which he should place himself, but he would

do so in order to continue the struggle, and to prevent anarchy and

confusion. In this state things were when general Lacy arrived.

The baron instantly sought him, could not find, but met one of his

aid-du-camps, by whom he wrote to him to say what had occurred, but

that he was resolved to support general Lacy in his command, not only

with all his local influence, but by his personal exertions, and that

he would immediately join him to put this resolution in practice.”

_Extract from general Doyle’s Letter after seeing the above._

“The Valencian division, that is to say, two thousand four hundred

of the four thousand three hundred soldiers who disembarked in this

province, are now on board to return to Valencia. General Miranda

says the desertion took place in consequence of the marquis’s

determination to proceed to Aragon, which made them believe they

would not be embarked. In short, most disgraceful has been the

conduct of this division, and the marquis, as you will see by this

letter to me, attaches to it no small portion of blame.”

_Captain Codrington to the marquis of Campo Verde._

“_Blake, July 5, 1811._

“I have to remind you that by ordering the Valencian division out

of Taragona, in breach of the terms by which I bound myself when

I brought them, you yourself broke the pledge given by me, and

dissolved the contract.”

_Extracted from captain Codrington’s papers._

“Minute of a conference betwixt generals Caro and Miranda with

general Doyle and myself this day.

“_July 9, 1811._

“About eight o’clock generals Caro and Miranda came on board the

Blake. After being seated in the cabin with general Doyle and myself,

general Caro begged general Doyle would explain to me, that they were

come in consequence of my promise, to request I would embark the

division of Valencian troops which I had brought from Peniscola. I

desired to know what promise general Caro understood me to have made?

He answered, that I would take the above troops back to Valencia.

I denied positively that I had made any promise to re-embark them

if they should ever join the marquis of Campo Verde, although I had

deeply pledged myself to restore them to general O’Donnel if they

joined in a sortie from the garrison, which I was very confident

would be decisive of its success. I then referred general Miranda to

a similar explanation, which I gave to him, through general Doyle,

on the day after our quitting Peniscola, when he had said he was

ordered, both by his written instructions and by verbal explanation

from general O’Donnel, not to land within the garrison. General

Miranda instantly repeated that so he was; upon which general Doyle,

to whom he had shewn those instructions jointly with myself, after

leaving Taragona for Villa Nueva, when under a difficulty as to how

he should proceed, referred him to them again, when it appearing

that he was therein positively ordered ‘desembarear en la plaza de

Tarragona,’ general Doyle stopped.

“_General Miranda._ ‘Ah! but read on.’

“_General Doyle._ ‘No, sir, there is the positive proof of your

receiving such an order.’

“_General Miranda._ ‘Well, but read on.’

“_General Doyle_. ‘No, sir. This (_pointing to the paper_) is the

positive proof of your receiving such an order, which we wanted to

establish, because you positively denied it.’

“Upon this general Caro, shrugging up his shoulders, said, ‘he was

not aware of there being any such order.’ And general Miranda again

requested general Doyle would read on.

“_General Doyle._ ‘For what purpose?’

“_General Miranda._ ‘To prove that I was not to shut myself up with

the division in the plaza de Taragona.’

“_General Doyle._ ‘There is no occasion, sir, for any proof of that,

for it was a part of the very stipulation made by captain Codrington

when he strongly pledged himself to general O’Donnel.’

“General Doyle continued,——‘And now, general Caro, that we have

proved to you that general Miranda _had_ orders to land in Taragona,

and that captain Codrington is bound by no such promise as you had

imagined, I must inform you that he has been eight days upon the

coast with all the ships of war and transports which are wanted for

other services, for the sole purpose of embarking these troops; and

he desires me to add that in consideration of what is due to the

liberal and exemplary assistance afforded by general O’Donnel and

Valencia in aid of Taragona, but not at all on account of any pledge

he has been said to have given, that he will use the same exertion in

re-embarking and restoring the troops which he would have done if so

bound by his word of honour.’”

_Mr. Wellesley to lord Wellesley._

“_July 28._

“The morning of 30th of June, a few hours after the arrival of the

British squadron and Spanish vessels in the roadstead of Villa Nueva,

five thousand French infantry and five hundred cavalry surprised the

place by a night-march, and seized all the property of Taragona,

which had been sent there before the siege. Twenty-five thousand

dollars for each of the next three months was demanded, but no

violence or plunder allowed. Eroles narrowly escaped. Lacy, appointed

to command in Catalonia, arrived 1st July at Villa Nueva, the 6th

went to Igualada to join Campo Verde.”

“Desertion in the army at Mataro has been carried to a most

alarming extent since the fall of Taragona; the first night

fifteen hundred men disappeared, nearly three hundred cavalry had

likewise set off towards Aragon; and these desertions are to be

attributed to the gross neglect and want of activity on the part

of the officers.”————“The only division that keeps together in any

tolerable order is that of general Sarsfield, of about two thousand

men.”————“He had however disputes with Eroles, and the people called

for the latter to lead them.”

* * * * *

No. III.

SECTION 1.

POLITICAL STATE OF KING JOSEPH.

SPANISH MINISTER’S COMPLAINTS OF THE FRENCH

GENERALS.

_From the councillor of state, Mariano Luis Orquijo, to

king Joseph._

“_Madrid, 22 Juillet, 1810._

“SIRE,—Le commissaire royal de Cordoue me mande, que le duc de

Dalmatie lui a fait écrire officiellement de ne remettre aucune

somme d’argent à la capitale lors même que le ministre des finances

le demanderait, jusqu’à ce que les dépenses de l’armée des régimens

qu’on lève et des employés de la province, &c., furent pleinement

couverts, et que le duc prendrait les mesures convenables, dans le

cas que cette détermination ne fut pas suivie.”

“_Madrid, 3 Agosto de 1810._

“Le général Sebastiani a fait voir au commissaire royale à Grenade,

un ordre du duc de Dalmatie, qui lui enjoint de la manière la plus

expresse, de le mettre en état d’arrestation si pour le 1er Août lui

et le préfet de Malaga ne mettent au pouvoir de Sebastiani quatre

millions de réaux. L’exorbitance de cette somme, pour une province

qui a déjà payé son contingent, et le court terme de huit jours

designé pour le payement, donnent à croire que cette somme une fois

livrée on en demandera une plus forte. Selon toutes les apparences,

et d’après les conversations particulières, il s’agit de profiter de

l’absence du roi pour mettre les Andalousies sur le même pied que

les provinces de Biscaye, Burgos, &c. Il se peut néanmoins qu’on ait

voulu inspirer ces craintes dans des idées tout-à-fait différentes.

Quoiqu’il en soit il serait scandaleux de voir un commissaire qui

représente la personne du roi arrêté dans une de ses provinces.”

_From Mariano Luis Orquijo to king Joseph._

“_Madrid, 7 Août, 1810._

“Monsieur d’Aranza m’écrit en dâte du 22 Août dans une lettre

particulière les paroles suivantes, en les soulignant pour mieux

fixer l’attention: ‘_Le maréchal Soult est très content, mais il ne

fera usage de son autorité que pour le bien: il aime le roi et la

nation: ce pays lui plait beaucoup_.’”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Madrid, 13 Août, 1810._

“Parmi les lettres que m’a porté le courrier d’Andalousie arrivé

hier, j’en remarque une de monsieur Aranza écrite dans un stile

étudié et que je soupçonne redigée d’accord avec le duc de Dalmatie.

C’est un panégyrique à la louange de ce maréchal dans lequel monsieur

d’Aranza porte aux nues l’intelligence et la zêle du duc de Dalmatie

dans la partie administrative; la considération qu’il donne aux

autorités espagnoles; son extrême adresse à manier les esprits, et

l’habilité de ses dispositions militaires, dans un pays couvert

d’insurgés. M. d’Aranza termine en formant le vœu que le maréchal ne

soit aucunement troublé dans l’exécution de ses plans, et que le sort

de l’Andalousie soit mis entièrement a sa discretion.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Madrid, le 23 Août, 1810._

“Par ma correspondance avec l’Andalousie j’ai appris; de Cordone:

que M. Angulo à reçu les lettres qui l’appellent à Madrid, et

qu’il se dispose à suivre le grand convoi sorti de Seville le 11

du courant. De Seville: qu’un corsaire Française s’étant emparé

d’un paquebot qui allait de Cadiz à Alicante, on y avait trouvé

entr’autres depêches une lettre de Campmany, grand partisan des

Anglais, et un des Coryphées de la revolution. Il avouait à son ami,

don Anselmo Rodriguez de Ribas, intendant de l’armée du centre, qui

s’était plaint à lui des excès que commettaient certaines juntes,

que Cadiz n’offrait pas un spectacle moins digne de pitié: que les

Anglais qu’il avait appris à connaître s’arrogaient peu à peu toute

l’autorité: que le commerce libre accordé aux ports d’Amerique

excitait à Cadiz un mécontentement général, et que Venegas allait au

Méxique en qualité de viceroi: il parle en outre de l’arrestation de

plusieurs personnes connues, et de la de considération dans laquelle

est tombée la régence.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Madrid, 27 Septembre, 1810._

“Le maréchal Victor permet le passage à beaucoup de femmes qui

veulent se réunir a leurs maris, les femmes en contant les choses

telles qu’elles sont, détruisent bien des erreurs dans lesquelles

on a généralement été entrainé par le gouvernement actuel. L’ennemi

permit ces jours derniers l’entrée dans l’île à plusieurs femmes qui

voulaient passer par Chiclanes pour se réunir à leurs parents, mais

dernièrement elles furent contenus à coups de canon, et un boulet

emporta la tête de celui qui les accompagnait. Le gouvernement

Anglais preside à toutes les opérations, et crainte cette espèce des

communications.”

“_Valladolid, le 11 Août, 1810._

“SIRE,—Je suis arrivé a Valladolid, où je n’ai pas trouvé le général

Kellermann. Il parait que les Espagnols out cerné un détachement de

Français qui se trouve à la Puebla de Sanabria, et que ce général y

eu allé pour le débloquer. Les guerrilles ont été hier aux portes

de Valladolid, et il y à cinq a six jours que soixante dix Français

ont été détruits à Villalon; la terreur s’est emparée de tous les

esprits, et l’on croit que trois cent hommes ne suffisent pas pour

faire paner un courrier: malgré cela, je parterai demain, escorté par

deux cent hommes avec un convoi de prisonniers de Ciudad Rodrigo,

donc le nombre n’est pas considérable, parcequ’ici on leur accorde la

liberté moyennant une somme qu’on règle avec le général Kellermann

pour les frais de la guerre.

“Toutes les autorités du pays sont venues me visiter, et me consulter

sur la conduite qu’elles doivent tenir depuis les derniers ordres

du général Kellermann pour qu’elles n’obeinent ni ne correspondent

avec d’autre autorité que la sienne. C’est la chancellerie qui se

trouve plus embarrassée que toute autre, parce-qu’elle ne peut

concilier l’administrat de la justice au nom de votre majesté avec

l’impossibilité de correspondre avec son ministre.

“Je n’ai pas reçu le moindre égard du général Dufrene qui est à la

place du général Kellermann. Il ne m’a pas visité, ni même accorde

un factionnaire; tout le monde s’en est apperçu, et cette conduite

a confirmé l’opinion que l’on a conçue que votre majesté ne règne

point dans ce pays. J’ai tâché de detruire une idée qui décourage les

véritables sujets de votre majesté, et soutient les espérances de ses

ennemis. Les généraux ne s’apperçoivent pas du mal qu’ils produisent

en ferant croire que le service de l’empereur, et ses intérêts

peuvent être en contradiction avec ceux de votre majesté.

“Si le général Dufrene s’était borné à ne rien faire pour faciliter

mon voyage, j’aurai moins de motifs de plainte contre lui, mais il a

retenu l’escorte de cavalerie que le général Tilly m’avait donnée. De

toutes les manières, Sire, je ferai tout ce qui sera en mon pouvoir

pour accélérer mon voyage, et répondre à la confiance avec laquelle

votre majesté a daigné me distinguer.

“LE MARQUIS ALMENARA.”

_Orquijo to Joseph, relating his conference with the French

ambassador._

(Extract.)

“_Madrid, Août 22, 1810._

“Je lui dis de s’adresser sur ces deux points au ministre des

relations extérieures, il me répondit qu’un désagrément qu’on

éprouvait avec lui était l’obligation de lui donner à tout bout

de champ des notes écrites, qu’à Vittoria il l’avait compromis en

présentant à votre majesté ces notes comme officielles, que le

bon vieux duc (ce sont ses propres expressions) étourdissait dans

l’instant, qu’il n’entendait point, ou ne voulait point entendre

ce qu’on lui disait, et qu’il demandait qu’on lui donnat par écrit

ce qui n’était pas nécessaire d’écrire. Je lui répétais toujours

qu’il devait s’adresser au duc puisque c’était le seul canal par

lequel il devait diriger ses demandes, que je ne me mélais point de

ces affaires, et que je n’en entretiendrais votre majesté à moins

que votre majesté ne m’en parlat la première, mais comme simple

particulier je l’assurai de l’inviolabilité des promesses de votre

majesté et de ses idées liberales. L’ambassadeur ajouta que dans la

matinée du jour de St. Napoleon, et les jours suivants, le général

Belliard, Borelli, et leurs alentours avaient parlé fort mal des

expressions de votre majesté sur ses premiers devoirs, et qu’il ne

doutait pas qu’ils n’en eussent écrit à Paris; qu’il n’avait pas pu

se dispenser de transmettre à sa cour ces paroles; mais qu’il les

avait présentés comme une conséquence du premier discours tenu par

votre majesté et une nuance nécessaire pour adoucir le mauvais effêt

qu’avait produit ici l’article du Moniteur sur les mots de l’empereur

au duc de Berg. Je le lui avais présenté de cette manière en sortant

de l’appartement de votre majesté, et je lui montrai en même temps

un rapport venu de la Navarre dans lequel on dépeignait le facheux

étât de ce royaume en proie aux excès des bandes de brigands et

aux dilapidations des gouvernemens militaires. Si l’ambassadeur a

écrit dans ces termes comme il me l’a dit, autant par honneur que

par attachement à votre majesté, à son pays et au notre, il a bien

rempli ses devoirs. Quoiqu’il en soit, je me lui cru obligé de donner

connaissance à votre majesté de ces faits ainsi que de la surprise

que, selon l’ambassadeur, a causé à l’empereur et au ministère

Français le silence du duc de Santa Fé qui ne s’explique sur rien.

L’ambassadeur se plaint d’avoir été compromis par lui, car à sa

demande et en consequence des conversations fréquentes qu’il eut avec

lui pendant les trois jours qu’il passa à Madrid, il écrivit à sa

cour que le duc de Santa Fé était chargé de négocier sur la situation

de votre majesté et celle de notre pays, que l’ambassadeur lui-même

disait ne pouvoir pas durer. C’est à la lettre ce que c’est dit entre

l’ambassadeur et moi.” &c. &c.

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Madrid, le 13 Novembre, 1810._

“Monsieur Pereyra a reçu du maréchal Soult une réponse extrêmement

aigre. Ce commissaire royal persiste dans son opinion que les mesures

indiquées par le duc de Dalmatie pour l’approvisionnement de l’armée

ne rempliront pas le but qu’il se propose; mais le maréchal veut

être obéi. D’un autre côté le général Sebastiani l’a contraint à lui

donner onze cent mille réaux. Placé entre ces deux écueils, Monsieur

Pereyra a perdu courage et demande à votre majesté de le rappeller à

Madrid. Le général Dufour a pris le commandement de Grenade.

“MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.”

_Ditto to ditto._

“_Madrid, 19 de Decembre, 1810._

“Monsieur le comte de Montarco était le 11 courant a Manzanares,

il m’écrit que les habitans de la Manche se plaignent de ce que

les troupes qui retrouvent dans la province ne les protégent pas

autant que leur nombre le leur permet, que les brigands viennent

leur enlever leurs grains pour les transporter dans les royaumes

de Valence et de Murcie, ou dans l’Estremadoure. Ils craignent une

disette et désirent ardemmement qu’il se forme de grands dépôts

de grains dans des places à l’abri des incursions des partis

d’insurgés. Les commandants des troupes Françaises sont d’une

exigence et d’une hauteur insupportables, et les rapports faits au

comte de Montarco par toutes les autorités légales du pays confirment

complettement ceux que l’intendant de la Manche ne cesse de faire aux

divers ministères depuis plusieurs mois.”

“_Madrid, le 15 Février, 1811._

“SIRE,—Le préfet de Santander me remêt, en dâte du 16 Janvier,

copie des offices qu’il a reçus pour la réunion de cette province au

gouvernement militaire de Biscaye. J’ai l’honneur de les mettre sous

les yeux de votre majesté en lui observant que cette mesure a été

prise sur la proposition du général Caffarelli.

“On a demandé au préfet de Santander un état des employés civils

et militaires, des moines, du clergé, et des appointemens dont ils

jouissent. Il croit en conséquence que des attributions ainsi que

celles des employés seront nulles des que la province sera gouvernée

à l’instar de celle de Biscaye. Il ajoute que lui et les chefs

principaux de l’administration sont décidés à ne travailler que sous

les ordres de votre majesté et demandent avec instance que votre

majesté ne les abandonne pas.

“Le sous-préfet de Logrogne me dit en dâte du 22 Janvier que

l’opinion publique s’est améliorée depuis qu’on y a appris les

nouvelles du Portugal, et qu’on y connait le peu de moyens de defense

qu’offre Valence dans le désordre extrême qui y règne. La Riofa ne

renferme plus de bandes complettes d’insurgés, mais on y trouve

encore quelques brigands épars et des voleurs de grands chemins.

“MARIANO LUIS DE ORQUIJO.”

SECTION 2.

(Relating to Joseph’s abdication.)

_Vindication of the King._

_Le ministre secrétaire d’état à monsieur le duc de Santa Fé,

et en son absence à monsieur le marquis d’Almenara._

_Palais de Madrid, le 12 Septembre, 1810, Pars._

EXCELLENCE,—Le courrier de cabinet, Don Martin Estenoz, qui partit

de Paris le 22 Juillet, a remis les lettres écrites par V. E. le

même jour et les copies de celles que vous envoyâtes le 19 Juin par

le courrier Alvarez, qui furent interceptées. Le roi les a lues

avec la plus grande attention, et après s’être bien pénétré des

communications faites à V. E. au nom de l’empereur, par monsieur le

due de Cadore, et les observations particulières de ce ministre, S.

M. desirant détruire d’un seul trait, les craintes et la défiance

que des personnes, tout au moins mal instruites, se sont efforcées

d’inspirer, m’a ordonné d’entrer en explication sur tous les points

dont elles traitent. Mais je dois avant tout faire connaître à V. E.

que le roi s’est montré satisfait de la juste interprétation donnée

à ses idées, et à ses sentimens dans la réponse que V. E. a faite

au duc de Cadore, relativement à la protection dont S. M. I. désire

que le commerce Français jouisse dans les réglemens des douanes,

en offrant d’assurer une faveur réciproque dans ses états aux

productions d’Espagne. L’empereur ne peut ignorer les vues liberales

de son auguste frère, et si S. M. I. a été exactement informée sur ce

point, elle saura que, dès son avénement au trône, le roi a écarté

bien des obstacles opposés à l’industrie française qu’il s’agit de

favoriser encore par de nouvelles dispositions.

Il est bien douloureux pour le roi d’avoir à se justifier de

plusieurs imputations auxquelles on a dû croire puisqu’on les

a communiquées a V. E. L’une d’elles est que le roi a rendu à

leurs propriétaires, ou disposé à son gré, d’une partie des biens

confisqués par l’empereur. Cela supposerait de la part de S. M. un

oubli de la parole donnée a l’empereur de ne se mêler en aucune

manière de ces confiscations: mais c’est un infame imposture, et son

auteur mérite un chatiment exemplaire. Qu’on cite une propriété un

pouce de terrain confisqué par l’empereur, et dont on ait disposé:

on ne le pourra point si dans une pure question de fait on en

impose ainsi a l’empereur, que sera ce lorsqu’on ne parle que par

conjectures et présomption? Le roi porte à un si haut degré son

respect pour les décrets de confiscations de S. M. I. qu’ayant besoin

d’un des édifices qui y sont compris pour y placer des établissemens

publics, il n’a même pas voulu s’en servir provisoirement. S. M.

n’a-t-elle pas, en conséquence, le droit de réclamer, pour son

honneur, la punition de ses detracteurs? S. M. I. s’est expliquée sur

la direction donnée à la guerre et la manière dont elle a été faite.