The talents of lord Wellington always rose with his difficulties,

but the want of specie crippled every operation. A movement into

Spain, such as that now intended against Andalusia, could not be

effected without magazines when there was no harvest on the ground,

except by paying ready money; because it was certain that the

Spaniards, however favourably disposed, would never diminish their

own secret resources for mere promises of payment. The English

general and Mr. Stuart, therefore, endeavoured to get British bank

notes accepted as cash, by the great merchants of Lisbon and Oporto;

and lord Wellington reflecting that, from the enormous sums spent

in Portugal, many persons must needs have secret hoards which they

would be glad to invest if they could do it safely, asked for English

exchequer-bills to negotiate in the same manner; intending to pay

the interest punctually and faithfully however inconvenient it might

prove at the moment. This plan could not be adopted with Portuguese

paper, because the finances were faithlessly managed by the regency;

but some futile arguments against the proposition were advanced by

lord Liverpool, and money became so scarce, that we shall find, even

in the midst of victory, the war was more than once like to stop

altogether from absolute inability to proceed.

[Sidenote: 1812. March.]

On the 5th of March, the army being well on the way to the Alemtejo,

lord Wellington who had maintained his head-quarters on the Coa to

the last moment, that the enemy might not be awakened to his real

designs, gave up Ciudad Rodrigo to Castaños. He also in person,

and on the spot, explained to Vives, the governor, the plan and

intention of the new works; he supplied him with money to complete

them; furnished him with six weeks provision remaining from the field

stores of the British troops, and gave him the reserved stores at St.

Joa de Pesqueira on the Douro, from whence Carlos d’España undertook

to transport them to the fortress.

As Marmont was at this time in Salamanca, and still ignorant of the

allies’ march, general Victor Alten’s brigade of cavalry was posted

on the Yeltes, to screen the allies’ movement as long as possible,

and he was instructed if Marmont advanced to retire on Beira, and

cover the magazines at Castello Branco, by disputing all the rivers

and defiles with the enemy’s advanced parties. At the same time

Silveira was directed to fall back upon the Douro to cover Oporto;

the militia, under Trant and J. Wilson, were ordered to concentrate

about Guarda; and those of Beira to unite about Castello Branco under

colonel Lecor; the orders of all being the same, namely, to dispute

the passage of the rivers and defiles. Trant was to defend those

of the Estrella, and Lecor those of Castello Branco, on which town

Victor Alten’s cavalry was finally to retire if pressed. With these

forces, and the Spaniards under Sanchez and España, and with the two

fortresses, for Almeida was now capable of defence, Marmont’s efforts

were not much to be dreaded in that season, after he had lost his

battering train in Ciudad.

These things arranged, Wellington set off for Elvas which he reached

the 11th, and prepared to invest Badajos, although neither the troops

nor the stores were all arrived; but even this was ten days later

than he had designed, and threw his operations into the violent

equinoctial rains, by which the difficulties were augmented two-fold.

This was one of the evils produced by the incredibly vexatious

conduct of the Portuguese regency. There was no want of transport in

the country, but as the government would not oblige the magistrates

to do their duty, the latter either refused to procure carts for

the army, or obliged the poorer classes to supply them, from which

oppression the peasants naturally endeavoured to escape by flight.

Thus, all the arrangements for the investment of Badajos on the 6th

of March had been made, but the rich town of Evora, which had not

seen the face of an enemy for more than three years, refused to

supply any carriages at all, and the operation was necessarily put

off till the 17th.

But it was in vain that Wellington threatened and remonstrated,

in vain that he employed his time and wasted his mental powers in

devising new laws, or remedies for bad ones; it was in vain that Mr.

Stuart exerted himself, with equal vigour, to give energy to this

extraordinary government; for whether in matters of small or vital

importance, insolent anger and falsehood, disgraceful subterfuges and

stolid indifference, upon the part of all civil functionaries, from

the highest to the lowest, met them at every turn. The responsibility

even in small matters became too great for subordinate officers; and

the English general was forced to arrange the most trifling details

of the service himself; thus the iron-strength of his body and mind

was strained, until all men wondered how they held, and in truth he

did fall sick, but recovered after a few days. The critical nature

of the war may be here judged of, for no man could have taken his

place at such a moment, no man, however daring or skilful, would

have voluntarily plunged into difficulties which were like to drive

Wellington from the contest.

CHAPTER V.

[Sidenote: 1812. March.]

The 15th the pontoons were laid over the Guadiana, about four miles

from Elvas, at a place where the current was dull, two large Spanish

boats were arranged as flying bridges; and the 16th, Beresford, who

had again joined the army, crossed the river, drove in the enemy’s

posts, and invested Badajos with the third, fourth, and light

divisions, and a brigade of Hamilton’s Portuguese; in all fifteen

thousand men.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]

Soult was then before the Isla, Drouet’s division, of five thousand

men, was at Villafranca, and Darricau with a like force was at

Zalamea de Serena near Medellin; wherefore general Graham passing the

Guadiana with the first, sixth, and seventh divisions of infantry,

and two brigades of cavalry, directed his march by Valverde, and

Santa Martha, upon Llerena, while Hill moved from Albuquerque by

Merida upon Almendralejos. These covering corps were together thirty

thousand strong, nearly five thousand including the heavy Germans

who were at Estremos being cavalry; and as the fifth division

was now on the march from Beira, the whole army presented about

fifty-one thousand sabres and bayonets, of which twenty thousand were

Portuguese. Castaños had repaired to Gallicia, but the fifth Spanish

army under Morillo and Penne Villemur, being about four thousand

strong, passed down the Portuguese frontier to the Lower Guadiana,

intending to fall on Seville when Soult should advance to the succour

of Badajos.

As the allies advanced, Drouet marched by his right to Hornaches,

in the direction of La Serena and Medellin, with a view to keep

open the communication with Marmont by Truxillo. Hill then halted

at Almendralejos, and Graham took post at Zafra, placing Slade’s

cavalry at Villafranca; but Marmont had moved his sixth division from

Talavera towards Castile, through the Puerto de Pico, on the 9th,

and the four divisions and cavalry quartered at Toledo had recrossed

the Tagus and marched over the Guadarama, the whole pointing for

Valladolid. Thus it was already manifest that the army of Portugal

would not act in conjunction with that of the south.

THIRD ENGLISH SIEGE OF BADAJOS.

[Sidenote: Vol. III. Appendix, No. IX.]

This fortress has before been described. The garrison composed of

French, Hessian, and Spanish troops, was now near five thousand

strong including sick. Phillipon had since the last siege made

himself felt in all directions, for he had continually scoured the

vicinity of the place, destroyed many small bands, carried off

cattle, almost from under the guns of Elvas and Campo Mayor, and his

spies extended their researches from Ciudad Rodrigo to Lisbon, and

from Lisbon to Ayamonte.

He had also greatly improved the defences of the place. An interior

retrenchment was made in the castle, and many more guns were there

mounted; the rear of fort Cristoval was also better secured, and

a covered communication from the fort itself, to the work at the

bridge-head, was nearly completed. Two ravelins had been constructed

on the south side of the town, and a third was commenced, together

with counterguards for the bastions; but the eastern front next

the castle, which was in other respects the weakest point, was

without any outward protection save the stream of the Rivillas. A

“_cunette_” or second ditch had been dug at the bottom of the great

ditch, which was also in some parts filled with water; the gorge of

the Pardaleras was enclosed, and that outwork was connected with the

body of the place, from whence powerful batteries looked into it. The

three western fronts were mined, and on the east, the arch of the

bridge behind the San Roque, was built up to form an inundation, two

hundred yards wide, which greatly contracted the space by which the

place could be approached with troops. All the inhabitants had been

obliged, on pain of being expelled, to lay up food for three months,

and two convoys with provisions and ammunition had entered the place

on the 10th and 16th of February, but Phillipon’s stores of powder

were still inadequate to his wants, and he was very scantily supplied

with shells.

As the former system of attack against Cristoval and the castle,

was now impracticable, lord Wellington desired to assail one of the

western fronts which would have been a scientific operation; but

the engineer represented that he had neither mortars nor miners,

nor enough of guns, nor the means of bringing up sufficient stores

for such an attack. Indeed the want of transport had again obliged

the allies to draw the stores from Elvas, to the manifest hazard

of that fortress, and hence, here, as at Ciudad Rodrigo, time was

necessarily paid for, by the loss of life; or rather the crimes of

politicians were atoned for by the blood of the soldiers.

The plan finally fixed upon, was to attack the bastion of Trinidad,

because, the counter-guard there being unfinished, that bastion could

be battered from the hill on which the Picurina stood. The first

parallel was therefore to embrace the Picurina, the San Roque, and

the eastern front, in such a manner that the counter-batteries there

erected, might rake and destroy all the defences of the southern

fronts which bore against the Picurina hill. The Picurina itself was

to be battered and stormed, and from thence the Trinidad and Santa

Maria bastions, were to be breached; after this all the guns were

to be turned against the connecting curtain, which was known to be

of weak masonry, that a third breach might be made, and a storming

party employed to turn any retrenchments behind the breaches in the

bastions. In this way the inundation could be avoided, and although

a French deserter declared, and truly, that the ditch was there

eighteen feet deep, such was the general’s confidence in his troops,

and in his own resources for aiding their efforts, that he resolved

to storm the place without blowing in the counterscarp.

The battering train, directed by major Dickson, consisted of

fifty-two pieces. This included sixteen twenty-four-pound howitzers,

for throwing Shrapnel shells, but this species of missile, much

talked of in the army at the time, was little prized by lord

Wellington, who had early detected its insufficiency, save as a

common shell; and partly to avoid expense, partly from a dislike to

injure the inhabitants, neither in this, nor in any former siege,

did he use mortars. Here indeed he could not have brought them up,

for besides the neglect of the Portuguese government, the peasantry

and even the ordenança employed to move the battering train from

Alcacer do Sal, although well paid, deserted.

Of nine hundred gunners present, three hundred were British, the rest

Portuguese, and there were one hundred and fifty sappers volunteers

from the third division, who were indeed rather unskilful, but of

signal bravery. The engineer’s parc was established behind the

heights of St. Michael, and the direction of the siege was given to

general Picton. General Kempt, general Colville, and general Bowes

alternately commanded in the trenches.

In the night of the 17th, eighteen hundred men, protected by a guard

of two thousand, broke ground one hundred and sixty yards from the

Picurina. A tempest stifled the sound of their pickaxes, and though

the work was commenced late, a communication, four thousand feet in

length, was formed, and a parallel of six hundred yards three feet

deep, and three feet six inches wide, was opened. However, when

the day broke the Picurina was reinforced, and a sharp musketry

interspersed with discharges from some field-pieces, aided by heavy

guns from the body of the place, was directed on the trenches.

In the night of the 18th two batteries were traced out, the parallel

was prolonged both on the right and left, and the previous works were

improved. On the other hand the garrison raised the parapets of the

Picurina, and having lined the top of the covered way with sand-bags,

planted musketeers there, to gall the men in the trenches, who

replied in a like manner.

The 19th lord Wellington having secret intelligence that a sally was

intended, ordered the guards to be reinforced. Nevertheless, at one

o’clock some cavalry came out by the Talavera gate, and thirteen

hundred infantry under general Vielland, the second in command, filed

unobserved into the communication between the Picurina and the San

Roque; a hundred men were prepared to sally from the Picurina itself,

and all these troops jumping out at once, drove the workmen before

them, and began to demolish the parallel. Previous to this outbreak,

the French cavalry forming two parties had commenced a sham fight on

the right of the parallel, and the smaller party pretending to fly,

and answering Portuguese, to the challenge of the picquets, were

allowed to pass. Elated by the success of their stratagem, they then

galloped to the engineer’s parc, which was a thousand yards in rear

of the trenches, and there cut down some men, not many, for succour

soon came, and meanwhile the troops at the parallel having rallied

upon the relief which had just arrived, beat the enemy’s infantry

back even to the castle.

In this hot fight the besieged lost above three hundred men and

officers, the besiegers only one hundred and fifty; but colonel

Fletcher, the chief engineer, was badly wounded, and several hundred

entrenching tools were carried off, for Phillipon had promised a

high price for each; yet this turned out ill, because the soldiers,

instead of pursuing briskly, dispersed to gather the tools. After the

action a squadron of dragoons and six field-pieces were placed as a

reserve-guard behind St. Michael, and a signal post was established

on the Sierra de Venta to give notice of the enemy’s motions.

The weather continued wet and boisterous, and the labour of the works

was very harassing, but in the night of the 19th the parallel was

opened in its whole length, and the 20th it was enlarged; yet a local

obstacle and the flooding of the trenches, rendered the progress slow.

In the night of the 20th the parallel was extended to the left,

across the Seville road, and three counter-batteries were commenced;

but they were traced, in rear of the parallel, partly because the

ground was too soft in front to admit of the guns moving; partly

for safety, because the batteries were within three hundred yards

of the San Roque, and as the parallel, eighteen hundred yards long,

was only guarded by fourteen hundred men, a few bold soldiers might

by a sudden rush have succeeded in spiking the guns if they had been

placed in front of the trench. A slight sally was this day repulsed,

and a shoulder was given to the right of the parallel to cover that

flank.

The 21st the enemy placed two field-pieces on the right bank of the

Guadiana, designing to rake the trenches, but the shoulder, made

the night before, baffled the design, and the riflemen’s fire soon

sent the guns away. Indications of a similar design against the left

flank, from the Pardaleras hill, were also observed, and a guard of

three hundred men with two guns, was posted on that side in some

broken ground.

[Sidenote: La Marre’s Siege of Badajos.]

In the night another battery against the San Roque was commenced, and

the battery against the Picurina was finished; but heavy rain again

retarded the works, and the besiegers having failed in an attempt to

drain the lower parts of the parallel, by cuts, made an artificial

bottom of sand-bags. On the other hand the besieged thinking the

curtain adjoining the castle was the true object of attack, threw up

an earthen entrenchment in front, and commenced clearing away the

houses behind it. A covered communication from the Trinidad gate to

the San Roque, intended to take this supposed attack in reverse, was

also commenced; but the labour of digging being too great, it was

completed by hanging up brown cloth, which appeared to be earth, and

by this ingenious expedient, the garrison passed unseen between those

points.

Vauban’s maxim, that a perfect investment is the first requisite in a

siege, had been neglected at Badajos to spare labour, but the great

master’s art was soon vindicated by his countrymen. Phillipon finding

the right bank of the Guadiana free, made a battery in the night for

three field-pieces, which at daylight raked the trenches, and the

shots pitching into the parallel, swept it in the most destructive

manner for the whole day; there was no remedy, and the loss would

have been still greater but for the soft nature of the ground, which

prevented the touch and bound of the bullets. Orders were immediately

sent to the fifth division, then at Campo Mayor, to invest the

place on that side, but these troops were distant and misfortunes

accumulated. In the evening heavy rain filled the trenches, the

flood of the Guadiana ran the fixed bridge under water sank twelve

of the pontoons, and broke the tackle of the flying bridges; the

provisions of the army could not then be brought over, and the guns

and ammunition being still on the right bank, the siege was upon the

point of being raised. In a few days, however, the river subsided,

some Portuguese craft were brought up to form another flying-bridge,

the pontoons saved were employed as row-boats, and in this manner the

communication was secured, for the rest of the siege, without any

accident.

The 23d the besieged continued to work at the entrenchments covering

the front next the castle, and the besiegers were fixing their

platforms, when at three o’clock the rain again filled the trenches,

the earth, being completely saturated with water, fell away, the

works everywhere crumbled, and the attack was entirely suspended.

The 24th the fifth division invested the place on the right bank of

the Guadiana, the weather was fine, and the batteries were armed with

ten twenty-fours, eleven eighteens, and seven five-and-a-half-inch

howitzers. The next day, at eleven o’clock, these pieces opened, but

they were so vigorously answered, that one howitzer was dismounted

and several artillery and engineer-officers were killed. Nevertheless

the San Roque was silenced, and the garrison of the Picurina was so

galled by the marksmen in the trenches, that no man dared look over

the parapet; hence, as the external appearance of that fort did not

indicate much strength, general Kempt was charged to assault it in

the night.

The outward seeming of the Picurina was however fallacious, the

fort was very strong; the fronts were well covered by the glacis,

the flanks were deep, and the rampart, fourteen feet perpendicular

from the bottom of the ditch, was guarded with thick slanting pales

above; and from thence to the top there were sixteen feet of an

earthen slope. A few palings had, indeed, been knocked off at the

covered way, and the parapet was slightly damaged on that side, but

this injury was repaired with sand-bags, and the ditch was profound,

narrow at the bottom, and flanked by four splinter-proof casemates.

Seven guns were mounted on the works, the entrance to which by the

rear was protected with three rows of thick paling, the garrison

was above two hundred strong, and every man had two muskets. The

top of the rampart was garnished with loaded shells to push over, a

retrenched guard-house formed a second internal defence, and finally,

some small mines and a loop-holed gallery, under the counterscarp,

intended to take the assailants in rear, were begun but not finished.

Five hundred men of the third division being assembled for the

attack, general Kempt ordered two hundred, under major Rudd of the

seventy-seventh, to turn the fort on the left; an equal force, under

major Shaw of the seventy-fourth, to turn the fort by the right; and

one hundred from each of these bodies were directed to enter the

communication with San Roque and intercept any succours coming from

the town. The flanking columns were to make a joint attack on the

fort, and the hundred men remaining, were placed under captain Powis

of the eighty-third, to form a reserve. The engineers, Holloway,

Stanway, and Gips, with twenty-four sappers bearing hatchets and

ladders, guided these columns, and fifty men of the light division,

likewise provided with axes, were to move out of the trenches at the

moment of attack.

ASSAULT OF PICURINA.

The night was fine, the arrangements clearly and skilfully made,

and about nine o’clock the two flanking bodies moved forward. The

distance was short, and the troops quickly closed on the fort, which

black and silent before, now seemed one mass of fire; then the

assailants running up to the palisades in the rear, with undaunted

courage endeavoured to break through, and when the destructive

musketry of the French, and the thickness of the pales, rendered

their efforts nugatory, they turned against the faces of the work and

strove to break in there; but the depth of the ditch and the slanting

stakes at the top of the brick-work again baffled them.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2, Letter C.]

At this time, the enemy shooting fast, and dangerously, the crisis

appeared imminent, and Kempt sent the reserve headlong against

the front; thus the fight was continued strongly, the carnage

became terrible, and a battalion coming out from the town to the

succour of the fort, was encountered and beaten by the party on the

communication. The guns of Badajos, and of the castle now opened, the

guard of the trenches replied with musketry, rockets were thrown up

by the besieged, and the shrill sound of alarm bells, mixing with the

shouts of the combatants, increased the tumult. Still the Picurina

sent out streams of fire, by the light of which, dark figures were

seen furiously struggling on the ramparts; for Powis first escaladed

the place in front where the artillery had beaten down the pales,

and the other assailants had thrown their ladders on the flanks in

the manner of bridges, from the brink of the ditch to the slanting

stakes, and all were fighting hand to hand with the enemy. Meanwhile

the axe-men of the light division, compassing the fort like prowling

wolves, discovered the gate, and hewing it down, broke in by the

rear. Nevertheless the struggle continued. Powis, Holloway, Gips, and

Oates, of the eighty-eighth, fell wounded on or beyond the rampart;

Nixon of the fifty-second was shot two yards within the gate; Shaw,

Rudd, and nearly all the other officers had fallen outside; and it

was not until half the garrison were killed, that Gaspar Thiery, the

commandant, and eighty-six men, surrendered, while some, not many,

rushing out of the gate, endeavoured to cross the inundation and were

drowned.

The French governor hoped to have delayed the siege five or six

days by the resistance of Picurina, and had the assault been a day

later, this would have happened; for the loop-holed gallery in the

counterscarp, and the mines, would then have been completed, and the

body of the work was too well covered by the glacis to be quickly

ruined by fire. His calculations were baffled by this heroic assault,

which lasted an hour, and cost four officers and fifty men killed,

fifteen officers and two hundred and fifty men wounded; and so

vehement was the fight throughout, that the garrison either forgot,

or had not time to roll over the shells and combustibles arranged

on the ramparts. Phillipon did not conceal the danger accruing

to Badajos from the loss of the Picurina, but he stimulated his

soldiers’ courage, by calling to their recollection, how infinitely

worse than death it was, to be the inmate of an English hulk! an

appeal which must have been deeply felt, for the annals of civilized

nations, furnish nothing more inhuman towards captives of war, than

the prison-ships of England.

When the Picurina was taken, three battalions of reserve advanced

to secure it, and though a great turmoil and firing from the

town, continued until midnight, a lodgment in the works, and a

communication with the first parallel, were established, and the

second parallel was commenced. However at day-light the redoubt

was so overwhelmed with fire, from the town, that no troops could

remain in it, and the lodgment was entirely destroyed. In the evening

the sappers effected another lodgment on the flanks, the second

parallel was then opened in its whole length, and the next day the

counter-batteries on the right of Picurina exchanged a vigorous fire

with the town; but one of the besiegers’ guns was dismounted, and the

Portuguese gunners, from inexperience, produced less effect on the

defences than was expected.

In the night of the 27th a new communication from the first parallel

to the Picurina was made, and three breaching batteries were traced

out. The first to contain twelve twenty-four pounders, occupied the

space between the Picurina and the inundation, and was to breach the

right face of the Trinidad bastion. The second, to contain eight

eighteen pounders, was on the site of the Picurina, and was to breach

the left flank of the Santa Maria bastion. The third, constructed

on the prolonged line of the front to be attacked, contained three

Shrapnel howitzers, to scour the ditch and prevent the garrison

working in it; for Phillipon had now discovered the true line of

attack, and had set strong parties in the night, to raise the

counter-guard of the Trinidad and the imperfect ravelin covering the

menaced front.

At day-break these works being well furnished with gabions and

sand-bags, were lined with musqueteers, who severely galled the

workmen employed on the breaching batteries and the artillery

practice also was brisk on both sides. Two of the besiegers’ guns

were dismounted; the gabions placed in front of the batteries to

protect the workmen were knocked over, and the musquetry then became

so destructive that the men were withdrawn and threw up earth from

the inside.

In the night of the 27th the second parallel was extended to the

right, with the view of raising batteries, to ruin the San Roque,

to destroy the dam which held up the inundation, and to breach the

curtain behind; but the Talavera road proved so hard, and the moon

shone so brightly, that the labourers were quite exposed and the work

was relinquished.

On the 28th the screen of gabions before the batteries was restored

and the workmen resumed their labours outside; the parallel was

then improved, and the besieged withdrew their guns from San Roque;

but their marksmen still shot from thence with great exactness, and

the plunging fire from the castle dismounted two howitzers in one

of the counter-batteries which was therefore dismantled. The enemy

had also during the night observed the tracing string, which marked

the direction of the sap in front of San Roque, and a daring fellow

creeping out just before the workmen arrived, brought it in the line

of the castle fire, whereby some loss was sustained ere the false

direction was discovered.

In the night the dismantled howitzer battery was re-armed, with

twenty-four pounders, to play on the San Roque, and a new breaching

battery was traced out on the site of the Picurina, against the flank

of the Santa Maria bastion. The second parallel was also carried

by the sap across the Talavera road, and a trench was digged, for

riflemen, in front of the batteries.

The 29th a slight sally, made on the right bank of the river,

was repulsed by the Portuguese, but the sap at the San Roque was

ruined by the enemy’s fire, and the besieged continued to raise the

counter-guard and ravelin of the Trinidad and to strengthen the front

attacked. On the other hand the besiegers during the night carried

the sap over the Talavera road, and armed two breaching batteries,

with eighteen pounders, which the next day opened against the flank

of Santa Maria; but they made little impression, and the explosion of

an expense magazine killed many men and hurt others.

While the siege was thus proceeding Soult having little fear for

the town, but expecting a great battle, was carefully organizing

a powerful force to unite with Drouet and Daricau. Those generals

had endeavoured to hold the district of La Serena with the view of

keeping open the communication with Marmont by Medellin and Truxillo;

but Graham and Hill marched against their flanks and forced them into

the Morena by the Cordova roads; and on the other side of the country

Morillo and Penne Villemur, were lying close on the lower Guadiana

waiting their opportunity to fall on Seville when Soult should

advance. Nor were there wanting other combinations to embarrass and

delay the French marshal; for in February, general Montes being

detached, by Ballesteros, from San Roque, had defeated Maransin on

the Guadajore river, driving him from Cartama into Malaga. After this

the whole of the Spanish army was assembled in the Ronda hills,

with a view to fall on Seville by the left of the Guadiana while

Morillo assailed it on the right of that river. This had obliged

Soult to send troops towards Malaga, and fatally delayed his march to

Estremadura.

Meanwhile Marmont was concentrating his army in the Salamanca

country, and it was rumoured that he meant to attack Ciudad Rodrigo.

Lord Wellington was somewhat disturbed by this information; he knew

indeed that the flooding of the rivers in the north, would prevent a

blockade, and he was also assured that Marmont had not yet obtained a

battering train. But the Spanish generals and engineers had neglected

the new works and repairs of Ciudad Rodrigo; even the provisions at

St. Joa de Pesquiera had not been brought up; the fortress had only

thirty days’ supply, Almeida was in as bad a state, and the grand

project of invading Andalusia was likely to be baulked by these

embarrassments.

On the 30th Soult’s advance from Cordova being decided, the fifth

division was brought over the Guadiana as a reserve to the covering

army; but Power’s Portuguese brigade, with some cavalry, of the same

nation, still maintained the investment on the right bank, the siege

was urged forward very rapidly, forty-eight pieces of artillery were

in constant play, and the sap against St. Roque advanced. The enemy

was equally active, his fire was very destructive, and his progress

in raising the ravelin and counter-guard of the front attacked was

very visible.

[Sidenote: 1812. April.]

The 1st of April the sap was pushed close to the San Roque, the

Trinidad bastion crumbled under the stroke of the bullet, and the

flank of the Santa Maria, which was casemated and had hitherto

resisted the batteries, also began to yield. The 2d the face of the

Trinidad was very much broken, but at the Santa Maria the casemates

being laid open, the bullets were lost in their cavities, and the

garrison commenced a retrenchment to cut off the whole of the

attacked front, from the town.

In the night a new battery against the San Roque was armed, and two

officers with some sappers gliding behind that outwork, gagged the

sentinel, placed powder-barrels and a match against the dam of the

inundation, and retired undiscovered, but the explosion did not

destroy the dam, and the inundation remained. Nor did the sap make

progress, because of the French musketeers; for though the marksmen

set against them slew many they were reinforced by means of a raft

with parapets, which crossed the inundation, and men also passed by

the cloth communication from the Trinidad gate.

On the 3d some guns were turned against the curtain behind the San

Roque, but the masonry proved hard, ammunition was scarce, and as a

breach there would have been useless, while the inundation remained,

the fire was soon discontinued. The two breaches in the bastion

were now greatly enlarged and the besieged assiduously laboured at

the retrenchments behind them, and converted the nearest houses and

garden walls into a third line of defence. All the houses behind the

front next the castle were also thrown down, and a battery of five

guns, intended to flank the ditch and breach of the Trinidad, was

commenced on the castle hill, but outside the wall; the besiegers

therefore traced out a counter-battery, of fourteen Shrapnel

howitzers, to play upon that point during the assault.

The crisis of the siege was now approaching rapidly. The breaches

were nearly practicable, Soult, having effected a junction with

Drouet and Daricau, was advancing; and as the allies were not in

sufficient force to assault the place and give battle at the same

time, it was resolved to leave two divisions in the trenches, and

to fight at Albuera with the remainder. Graham therefore fell back

towards that place, and Hill having destroyed the bridge at Merida,

marched from the Upper Guadiana to Talavera Real.

Time being now, as in war it always is, a great object, the anxiety

on both sides redoubled; but Soult was still at Llerena, when on

the morning of the 5th the breaches were declared practicable, and

the assault ordered for that evening. Leith’s division was even

recalled to the camp to assist, when a careful personal examination

of the enemy’s retrenchments caused some doubt in lord Wellington’s

mind, and he delayed the storm, until a third breach, as originally

projected, should be formed in the curtain between the bastions

of Trinidad and Maria. This could not, however, be commenced

before morning, and during the night the enemy’s workmen laboured

assiduously at their retrenchments, regardless of the showers of

grape with which the besiegers’ batteries scoured the ditch and the

breach. But the 6th, the besiegers’ guns being all turned against

the curtain, the bad masonry crumbled rapidly away, in two hours a

yawning breach appeared, and Wellington, having again examined the

points of attack in person, renewed the order for the assault. Then

the soldiers eagerly made themselves ready for a combat, so fiercely

fought, so terribly won, so dreadful in all its circumstances, that

posterity can scarcely be expected to credit the tale; but many are

still alive who know that it is true.

The British general was so sensible of Phillipon’s firmness and of

the courage of his garrison, that he spared them the affront of a

summons, yet seeing the breach strongly entrenched, and the enemy’s

flank fire, still powerful, he would not in this dread crisis, trust

his fortune to a single effort. Eighteen thousand daring soldiers

burned for the signal of attack, and as he was unwilling to lose the

service of any, to each division he gave a task such as few generals

would have the hardihood even to contemplate.

On the right Picton’s division was to file out of the trenches, to

cross the Rivillas river, and to scale the castle walls, which were

from eighteen to twenty-four feet in height, furnished with all means

of destruction, and so narrow at top, that the defenders could easily

reach and as easily overturn the ladders.

On the left, Leith’s division was to make a false attack on the

Pardaleras, and a real assault on the distant bastion of San

Vincente, where the glacis was mined, the ditch deep, the scarp

thirty feet high, and the parapet garnished with bold troops well

provided; for Phillipon, following his old plan, had three loaded

muskets placed beside each man, that the first fire might be quick

and deadly.

In the centre, the fourth and light divisions under general Colville,

and colonel Andrew Barnard, were to march against the breaches.

They were furnished like the third and fifth divisions with ladders

and axes, and were preceded by storming parties of five hundred men

each with their respective forlorn hopes. The light division was to

assault the bastion of Santa Maria; the fourth division to assault

the Trinidad, and the curtain; and the columns were divided into

storming and firing parties, the former to enter the ditch, the

latter to keep the crest of the glacis.

Besides these attacks, major Wilson of the forty-eighth was to storm

the San Roque with the guards of the trenches, and on the other side

of the Guadiana, general Power was to make a feint on the bridge-head.

At first only one brigade, of the third division, was to have

attacked the castle, but just before the hour fixed upon, a sergeant

of sappers having deserted from the enemy, informed Wellington

that there was but one communication from the castle to the town,

whereupon he ordered the whole division to advance together.

This was the outline of the plan, but many nice arrangements filled

it up, and some were followed, some disregarded, for it is seldom

that all things are strictly attended to in a desperate fight. Nor

were the enemy idle, for while it was yet twilight some French

cavalry issued from the Pardaleras, escorting an officer who

endeavoured to look into the trenches, with a view to ascertain if

an assault was intended; but the picquet on that side jumped up, and

firing as it run, drove him and his escort back into the works. Then

the darkness fell and the troops only awaited the signal.

[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 9._

EXPLANATORY SKETCH

_OF THE SIEGE OF_

BADAJOS

1812.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

ASSAULT OF BADAJOS.

The night was dry but clouded, the air thick with watery exhalations

from the rivers, the ramparts, and the trenches unusually still; yet

a low murmur pervaded the latter, and in the former, lights were seen

to flit here and there, while the deep voices of the sentinels at

times proclaimed, that all was well in Badajos. The French, confiding

in Phillipon’s direful skill, watched, from their lofty station, the

approach of enemies, whom they had twice before baffled, and now

hoped to drive a third time blasted and ruined from the walls; the

British, standing in deep columns, were as eager to meet that fiery

destruction as the others were to pour it down; and both were alike

terrible for their strength, their discipline, and the passions

awakened in their resolute hearts.

Former failures there were to avenge, and on either side, such

leaders as left no excuse for weakness in the hour of trial; and the

possession of Badajos was become a point of honour, personal with the

soldiers of each nation. But the strong desire for glory was, in the

British, dashed with a hatred of the citizens on an old grudge, and

recent toil and hardship, with much spilling of blood, had made many

incredibly savage: for these things render the noble-minded indeed,

averse to cruelty, but harden the vulgar spirit. Numbers also, like

Cæsar’s centurion who could not forget the plunder of Avaricum, were

heated with the recollection of Ciudad Rodrigo, and thirsted for

spoil. Thus every spirit found a cause of excitement, the wondrous

power of discipline bound the whole together as with a band of iron,

and, in the pride of arms, none doubted their might, to bear down

every obstacle that man could oppose to their fury.

At ten o’clock, the castle, the San Roque, the breaches, the

Pardaleras, the distant bastion of San Vincente, and the bridge-head

on the other side of the Guadiana, were to have been simultaneously

assailed, and it was hoped that the strength of the enemy would

shrivel within that fiery girdle. But many are the disappointments of

war. An unforeseen accident delayed the attack of the fifth division;

and a lighted carcass, thrown from the castle, falling close to

where the men of the third division were drawn up, discovered their

array, and obliged them to anticipate the signal by half an hour.

Then, every thing being suddenly disturbed, the double columns of the

fourth and light divisions also moved silently and swiftly against

the breaches, and the guard of the trenches, rushing forward with a

shout, encompassed the San Roque with fire and broke in so violently

that scarcely any resistance was made.

But a sudden blaze of light and the rattling of musketry indicated

the commencement of a most vehement combat at the castle. There

general Kempt, for Picton hurt by a fall, in the camp, and expecting

no change in the hour, was not present, there general Kempt, I say,

led the third division; he had passed the Rivillas, in single files

by a narrow bridge, under a terrible musketry, and then reforming,

and running up the rugged hill, had reached the foot of the castle

when he fell severely wounded, and being carried back to the trenches

met Picton who hastened forward to take the command. Meanwhile his

troops spreading along the front reared their heavy ladders, some

against the lofty castle, some against the adjoining front on the

left, and with incredible courage ascended amidst showers of heavy

stones, logs of wood, and bursting shells rolled off the parapet,

while from the flanks the enemy plied his musketry with a fearful

rapidity, and in front, with pikes and bayonets, stabbed the leading

assailants or pushed the ladders from the walls; and all this

attended with deafening shouts, and the crash of breaking ladders,

and the shrieks of crushed soldiers answering to the sullen stroke of

the falling weights.

Still, swarming round the remaining ladders, these undaunted veterans

strove who should first climb, until all being overturned, the French

shouted victory, and the British, baffled, but untamed, fell back a

few paces, and took shelter under the rugged edge of the hill. Here

when the broken ranks were somewhat re-formed the heroic colonel

Ridge, springing forward, called, with a stentorian voice, on his men

to follow, and, seizing a ladder, once more raised it against the

castle, yet to the right of the former attack, where the wall was

lower, and an embrasure offered some facility. A second ladder was

soon placed alongside of the first, by the grenadier officer Canch,

and the next instant he and Ridge were on the rampart, the shouting

troops pressed after them, the garrison amazed, and in a manner

surprised, were driven fighting through the double gate into the

town, and the castle was won. A reinforcement, sent from the French

reserve, then came up, a sharp action followed, both sides fired

through the gate, and the enemy retired, but Ridge fell, and no man

died that night with more glory—yet many died, and there was much

glory.

During these events, the tumult at the breaches was such as if the

very earth had been rent asunder and its central fires were bursting

upwards uncontrolled. The two divisions had reached the glacis, just

as the firing at the castle had commenced, and the flash of a single

musket discharged from the covered way as a signal shewed them that

the French were ready; yet no stir was heard, and darkness covered

the breaches. Some hay-packs were then thrown, some ladders were

placed, and the forlorn hopes and storming parties of the light

division, about five hundred in all, had descended into the ditch

without opposition, when a bright flame shooting upwards displayed

all the terrors of the scene. The ramparts crowded with dark figures

and glittering arms, were seen on the one side, and on the other,

the red columns of the British, deep and broad, were coming on like

streams of burning lava; it was the touch of the magician’s wand,

for a crash of thunder followed, and with incredible violence the

storming parties were dashed to pieces by the explosion of hundreds

of shells and powder-barrels.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]

For an instant the light division stood on the brink of the ditch,

amazed at the terrific sight, then, with a shout that matched even

the sound of the explosion, flew down the ladders, or disdaining

their aid, leaped, reckless of the depth, into the gulf below; and

nearly at the same moment, amidst a blaze of musketry that dazzled

the eyes, the fourth division came running in and descended with a

like fury. There were however only five ladders for both columns,

which were close together, and a deep cut made in the bottom of

the ditch, as far as the counter-guard of the Trinidad, was filled

with water from the inundation; into this watery snare the head of

the fourth division fell, and it is said that above a hundred of

the fuzileers, the men of Albuera, were there smothered. Those who

followed, checked not, but as if such a disaster had been expected,

turned to the left, and thus came upon the face of the unfinished

ravelin, which, being rough and broken, was mistaken for the breach,

and instantly covered with men; yet a wide and deep chasm was still

between them and the ramparts from whence came a deadly fire wasting

their ranks. Thus baffled, they also commenced a rapid discharge of

musketry, and disorder ensued; for the men of the light division,

whose conducting engineer had been disabled early, and whose flank

was confined by an unfinished ditch intended to cut off the bastion

of Santa Maria, rushed towards the breaches of the curtain and

the Trinidad, which were indeed before them, but which the fourth

division were destined to storm.

Great was the confusion, for now the ravelin was quite crowded with

men of both divisions, and while some continued to fire, others

jumped down and ran towards the breach, many also passed between the

ravelin and the counter-guard of the Trinidad, the two divisions got

mixed, and the reserves, which should have remained at the quarries,

also came pouring in, until the ditch was quite filled, the rear

still crowding forward, and all cheering vehemently. The enemy’s

shouts also, were loud and terrible, and the bursting of shells and

of grenades, the roaring of the guns from the flanks, answered by the

iron howitzers from the battery of the parallel, the heavy roll and

horrid explosion of the powder-barrels, the whizzing flight of the

blazing splinters, the loud exhortations of the officers, and the

continual clatter of the muskets, made a maddening din.

Now a multitude bounded up the great breach as if driven by a

whirlwind, but across the top glittered a range of sword-blades,

sharp-pointed, keen-edged on both sides, and firmly fixed in

ponderous beams, which were chained together and set deep in the

ruins; and for ten feet in front, the ascent was covered with loose

planks, studded with sharp iron points, on which the feet of the

foremost being set the planks moved, and the unhappy soldiers,

falling forward on the spikes, rolled down upon the ranks behind.

Then the Frenchmen, shouting at the success of their stratagem, and

leaping forward, plied their shot with terrible rapidity, for every

man had several muskets; and each musket in addition to its ordinary

charge contained a small cylinder of wood stuck full of leaden slugs,

which scattered like hail when they were discharged.

Again the assailants rushed up the breaches, and again the

sword-blades, immoveable and impassable, stopped their charge,

and the hissing shells and thundering powder-barrels exploded

unceasingly. Hundreds of men had fallen, and hundreds more were

dropping, but still the heroic officers called aloud for new trials,

and sometimes followed by many, sometimes by a few, ascended the

ruins; and so furious were the men themselves, that in one of these

charges, the rear strove to push the foremost on to the sword-blades,

willing even to make a bridge of their writhing bodies, but the

others frustrated the attempt by dropping down; and men fell so fast

from the shot, that it was hard to know who went down voluntarily,

who were stricken, and many stooped unhurt that never rose again.

Vain also would it have been to break through the sword-blades,

for the trench and parapet behind the breach were finished, and the

assailants, crowded into even a narrower space than the ditch was,

would still have been separated from their enemies, and the slaughter

would have continued.

At the beginning of this dreadful conflict, colonel Andrew Barnard

had with prodigious efforts separated his division from the other,

and preserved some degree of military array; but now the tumult was

such, that no command could be heard distinctly, except by those

close at hand, and the mutilated carcasses heaped on each other,

and the wounded, struggling to avoid being trampled upon, broke the

formations; order was impossible! Yet officers of all stations,

followed more or less numerously by the men, were seen to start out,

as if struck by a sudden madness, and rush into the breach, which

yawning and glittering with steel, seemed like the mouth of some huge

dragon belching forth smoke and flame. In one of these attempts,

colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man, whose feeble body

would have been quite unfit for war, if it had not been sustained by

an unconquerable spirit, was killed. Wherever his voice was heard,

there his soldiers gathered, and with such a strong resolution did he

lead them up the fatal ruins, that when one behind him, in falling,

plunged a bayonet into his back, he complained not, and continuing

his course was shot dead within a yard of the sword-blades. But there

was no want of gallant leaders, or desperate followers.

Two hours spent in these vain efforts convinced the soldiers that

the breach of the Trinidad was impregnable; and as the opening in

the curtain, although less strong, was retired, and the approach to

it impeded by deep holes, and cuts made in the ditch, the troops did

not much notice it after the partial failure of one attack which

had been made early. Gathering in dark groups and leaning on their

muskets, they looked up with sullen desperation at the Trinidad,

while the enemy stepping out on the ramparts, and aiming their shots

by the light of the fire-balls which they threw over, asked, as their

victims fell, “_Why they did not come into Badajos?_”

[Sidenote: Now lieut.-col. Shaw Kennedy.]

In this dreadful situation, while the dead were lying in heaps

and others continually falling, the wounded crawling about to get

some shelter from the merciless fire above, and withal a sickening

stench from the burnt flesh of the slain, captain Nicholas, of the

engineers, was observed by Mr. Shaw, of the forty-third, making

incredible efforts to force his way with a few men into the Santa

Maria bastion. Shaw having collected about fifty soldiers of all

regiments joined him, and although there was a deep cut along the

foot of this breach also, it was instantly passed, and these two

young officers at the head of their gallant band, rushed up the slope

of the ruins; but when they had gained two-thirds of the ascent, a

concentrated fire of musketry and grape, dashed nearly the whole

dead to the earth! Nicholas was mortally wounded, and the intrepid

Shaw stood alone! After this no further effort was made at any

point, and the troops remained passive, but unflinching, beneath

the enemy’s shot, which streamed without intermission; for, of the

riflemen on the glacis, many leaping early into the ditch had joined

in the assault, and the rest, raked by a cross-fire of grape from the

distant bastions, baffled in their aim by the smoke and flames from

the explosions, and too few in number, had entirely failed to quell

the French musketry.

About midnight, when two thousand brave men had fallen, Wellington,

who was on a height close to the quarries, sent orders for the

remainder to retire and re-form for a second assault; for he had

just then heard that the castle was taken, and thinking the enemy

would still hold out in the town, was resolved to assail the breaches

again. This retreat from the ditch was, however, not effected without

further carnage and confusion, for the French fire never slackened,

and a cry arose that the enemy were making a sally from the distant

flanks, which caused a rush towards the ladders; then the groans

and lamentations of the wounded who could not move, and expected to

be slain, increased, many officers who had not heard of the order,

endeavoured to stop the soldiers from going back, and some would even

have removed the ladders but were unable to break the crowd.

All this time the third division was lying close in the castle, and

either from a fear of risking the loss of a point which ensured the

capture of the place, or that the egress was too difficult, made no

attempt to drive away the enemy from the breaches. On the other side

however the fifth division had commenced the false attack on the

Pardaleras, and on the right of the Guadiana, the Portuguese were

sharply engaged at the bridge; thus the town was girdled with fire,

for general Walker’s brigade having passed on during the feint on

the Pardaleras, was escalading the distant bastion of San Vincente.

His troops had advanced along the banks of the river, and reached

the French guard-house, at the barrier-gate, undiscovered, for the

ripple of the waters smothered the sound of their footsteps; but just

then the explosion at the breaches took place, the moon shone out,

and the French sentinels, discovering the columns, fired. The British

troops immediately springing forward under a sharp musketry began to

hew down the wooden barrier at the covered way, while the Portuguese,

being panic-stricken, threw down the scaling-ladders. Nevertheless

the others snatched them up again, and forcing the barrier, jumped

into the ditch; but the guiding engineer officer was killed, and

there was a _cunette_, which embarrassed the column, and when the

foremost men succeeded in rearing the ladders, the latter were found

too short, for the walls were generally above thirty feet high.

Meanwhile the fire of the French was deadly, a small mine was sprung

beneath the soldiers’ feet, beams of wood and live shells were rolled

over on their heads, showers of grape from the flank swept the ditch,

and man after man dropped dead from the ladders.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]

Fortunately some of the defenders having been called away to aid in

recovering the castle, the ramparts were not entirely manned, and

the assailants, having discovered a corner of the bastion where the

scarp was only twenty feet high, placed three ladders there under

an embrasure which had no gun and was only stopped with a gabion.

Some men got up, but with difficulty, for the ladders were still too

short, and the first man who gained the top was pushed up by his

comrades and then drew others after him, until many had gained the

summit; and though the French shot heavily against them, from both

flanks and from a house in front, they thickened and could not be

driven back; half the fourth regiment entered the town itself to

dislodge the enemy from the houses, while the others pushed along the

rampart towards the breach, and by dint of hard fighting successively

won three bastions.

In the last of these combats general Walker leaping forward, sword

in hand, at the moment when one of the enemy’s cannoneers was

discharging a gun, fell covered with so many wounds that it was

wonderful how he could survive, and some of the soldiers immediately

after, perceiving a lighted match on the ground, cried out a mine!

At that word, such is the power of imagination, those troops whom

neither the strong barrier, nor the deep ditch, nor the high walls,

nor the deadly fire of the enemy could stop, staggered back appalled

by a chimera of their own raising, and in this disorder a French

reserve, under general Viellande, drove on them with a firm and rapid

charge, and pitching some men over the walls, and killing others

outright, again cleansed the ramparts even to the San Vincente. There

however Leith had placed colonel Nugent with a battalion of the

thirty-eighth as a reserve, and when the French came up, shouting and

slaying all before them, this battalion, about two hundred strong,

arose, and with one close volley destroyed them.

Then the panic ceased, the soldiers rallied, and in compact order

once more charged along the walls towards the breaches, but the

French, although turned on both flanks and abandoned by fortune, did

not yet yield; and meanwhile the detachment of the fourth regiment

which had entered the town when the San Vincente was first carried,

was strangely situated, for the streets were empty and brilliantly

illuminated, and no person was seen; yet a low buzz and whisper were

heard around, lattices were now and then gently opened, and from time

to time shots were fired from underneath the doors of the houses by

the Spaniards. However, the troops with bugles sounding, advanced

towards the great square of the town, and in their progress captured

several mules going with ammunition to the breaches; but the square

itself was as empty and silent as the streets, and the houses as

bright with lamps; a terrible enchantment seemed to be in operation,

for they saw nothing but light, and heard only the low whispers close

around them, while the tumult at the breaches was like the crashing

thunder.

There, indeed, the fight was still plainly raging, and hence,

quitting the square, they attempted to take the garrison in reverse,

by attacking the ramparts from the town-side, but they were received

with a rolling musketry, driven back with loss, and resumed their

movement through the streets. At last the breaches were abandoned

by the French, other parties entered the place, desultory combats

took place in various parts, and finally general Viellande, and

Phillipon who was wounded, seeing all ruined, passed the bridge

with a few hundred soldiers, and entered San Cristoval, where they

all surrendered early the next morning upon summons to lord Fitzroy

Somerset, who had with great readiness pushed through the town to the

draw-bridge ere they had time to organize further resistance. But

even in the moment of ruin the night before, the noble governor had

sent some horsemen out from the fort to carry the news to Soult’s

army, and they reached him in time to prevent a greater misfortune.

Now commenced that wild and desperate wickedness, which tarnished

the lustre of the soldier’s heroism. All indeed were not alike, for

hundreds risked and many lost their lives in striving to stop the

violence, but the madness generally prevailed, and as the worst men

were leaders here, all the dreadful passions of human nature were

displayed. Shameless rapacity, brutal intemperance, savage lust,

cruelty, and murder, shrieks and piteous lamentations, groans,

shouts, imprecations, the hissing of fires bursting from the houses,

the crashing of doors and windows, and the reports of muskets used

in violence, resounded for two days and nights in the streets of

Badajos! on the third, when the city was sacked, when the soldiers

were exhausted by their own excesses, the tumult rather subsided than

was quelled. The wounded men were then looked to, the dead disposed

of!

Five thousand men and officers fell during this siege, and of these,

including seven hundred Portuguese, three thousand five hundred had

been stricken in the assault, sixty officers and more than seven

hundred men being slain on the spot. The five generals, Kempt,

Harvey, Bowes, Colville, and Picton were wounded, the first three

severely; about six hundred men and officers fell in the escalade

of San Vincente, as many at the castle, and more than two thousand

at the breaches, each division there losing twelve hundred! And how

deadly the strife was, at that point, may be gathered from this, the

forty-third and fifty-second regiments, of the light division, alone

lost more men than the seven regiments of the third division engaged

at the castle!

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Section 2.]

Let any man picture to himself this frightful carnage taking place in

a space of less than a hundred square yards. Let him consider that

the slain died not all suddenly, nor by one manner of death; that

some perished by steel, some by shot, some by water, that some were

crushed and mangled by heavy weights, some trampled upon, some dashed

to atoms by the fiery explosions; that for hours this destruction was

endured without shrinking, and that the town was won at last, let

any man consider this and he must admit that a British army bears

with it an awful power. And false would it be to say that the French

were feeble men, for the garrison stood and fought manfully and

with good discipline behaving worthily. Shame there was none on any

side. Yet who shall do justice to the bravery of the soldiers? the

noble emulation of the officers? Who shall measure out the glory of

Ridge, of Macleod, of Nicholas, or of O’Hare, of the ninety-fifth,

who perished on the breach, at the head of the stormers, and with

him nearly all the volunteers for that desperate service? Who shall

describe the springing valour of that Portuguese grenadier who was

killed the foremost man at the Santa Maria? or the martial fury of

that desperate soldier of the ninety-fifth, who, in his resolution

to win, thrust himself beneath the chained sword-blades, and there

suffered the enemy to dash his head to pieces with the ends of their

muskets? Who can sufficiently honour the intrepidity of Walker, of

Shaw, of Canch, or the resolution of Ferguson of the forty-third,

who having in former assaults received two deep wounds, was here,

with his hurts still open, leading the stormers of his regiment, the

third time a volunteer, and the third time wounded! Nor would I be

understood to select these as pre-eminent, many and signal were the

other examples of unbounded devotion, some known, some that will

never be known; for in such a tumult much passed unobserved, and

often the observers fell themselves ere they could bear testimony to

what they saw; but no age, no nation ever sent forth braver troops to

battle than those who stormed Badajos.

When the extent of the night’s havoc was made known to lord

Wellington, the firmness of his nature gave way for a moment, and the

pride of conquest yielded to a passionate burst of grief for the loss

of his gallant soldiers.

CHAPTER VI.

[Sidenote: 1812. April.]

The English general having now achieved the second part of his

project, was desirous to fight a great battle in Andalusia, which

would have been the crown of this extraordinary winter campaign; but

the misconduct of others would not suffer him to do this. At Ciudad

Rodrigo, the Spanish engineers had entirely ceased the repairs of the

works; Carlos d’España besides neglecting to provision that place,

had by his oppressive conduct alarmed all the people of the vicinity,

and created a dangerous spirit of discontent in the garrison; Almeida

was insecure, and Marmont’s army was already between the Agueda and

the Coa.

It was essential to place those fortresses in safety, ere the march

into Andalusia could take place; but the English general knowing

that the danger in Beira was not very imminent, lingered a few days,

hoping that Soult, in his anger at the loss of Badajos, would risk a

blow on this side of the Morena; and he was certain, that the French

general could not stop more than a few days, because of the secondary

armies whose operations were then in progress.

Soult was indeed deeply affected by the loss of Badajos, but he was

surrounded by enemies and the contest was too unequal. He had quitted

Seville the 1st of April with twelve regiments of infantry, two of

cavalry, and one battery of artillery. His march was by Lora del

Rio and Constantino upon Llerena; and, to impose upon the allies,

general Gazan moved by the road of Monasterio with the remainder

of the artillery and the baggage, escorted by Barois’ division of

infantry, and some cavalry. But this column turned into the cross

roads, at Santa de Guillena, and so reached Constantino, whence they

followed the main body, and thus the whole army was concentrated at

Llerena on the 6th. This circuitous march had been determined by the

situation of Drouet and Daricau, who having been before driven into

the mountains by the Cordova roads, could not rally upon the side of

Monasterio; now however they advanced to Fuentes de Ovejuña, and the

allies fell back to Albuera and Talavera Real.

On the 7th the French reached Villafranca and their cavalry entered

Villalba and Fuente del Maestro. The 8th they were in march to fight,

when the horsemen sent by Phillipon from Badajos, during the assault,

brought the news of its fall; at the same moment their general was

apprized, by his spies, that Marmont by whom he expected to be joined

was in the north and could not assist him. He immediately fell back

to Llerena, for the allies could then bring forty-five thousand men

into action, and the French army though strongly constituted and the

best troops in Spain did not exceed twenty-four thousand.

Soult had now little time to deliberate, for Penne Villemur and

Morillo, issuing out of Portugal with four thousand men, had crossed

the Lower Guadiana, and seized San Lucar de Mayor on the 4th. This

place was ten miles from Seville, which was only garrisoned by a

Spanish Swiss battalion in Joseph’s service, aided by “_Escopeteros_”

and by the sick and convalescent men; the commandant Rignoux had

therefore, after a skirmish, shut himself up in fortified convents.

The 6th the Spaniards had occupied the heights in front of the

Triana bridge, and the 7th attacked the French entrenchments, hoping

to raise a popular commotion. But a worse danger was gathering on

the other side, for Ballesteros, after the defeat of Maransin, at

Cartama, had advanced with eleven thousand men intending to fall on

Seville from the left of the Guadalquivir.

To distract the attention of the French, and to keep Laval from

detaching troops to Seville, the Spanish general had sent Copons

with four thousand men by Itar to Junquera, which is on the Malaga

side of the Ronda; meanwhile he himself entered Los Barios with the

rest of his army and thus threatened at once Grenada and the lines

of Chiclana. At the same time all the smaller partidas of the Ronda

were let loose in different directions, to cut the communications,

to seize the small French magazines, and to collect the Spanish

soldiers, who, at different periods, had quitted their colours and

retired to their homes.

Copons remained at Junquera, but Ballesteros with three divisions

commanded by Cruz Murgeon, the marquis de Las Cuevas, and the prince

of Anglona, marched to Utrera as soon as Soult had departed from

Seville; thus the communication of that city with Cadiz on one side,

and with Malaga and Grenada on the other, was cut off. The situation

of the French was very critical, and they wanted ammunition, because

a large convoy, coming from Madrid, with an escort of twelve hundred

men, was stopped in the Morena by the Partidas from the Ronda and

from Murcia.

On the 6th the Spanish cavalry was within a few miles of Seville,

when false information adroitly given by a Spaniard in the French

interest, led Ballesteros to believe that Soult was close at hand,

whereupon he immediately returned to the Ronda; the next day Penne

Villemur having received notice from lord Wellington that the French

would soon return, also retired to Gibraleon.

Ballesteros soon discovered the deceit, when, instead of returning

to Seville, he on the 9th assaulted the small castle of Zahara in

the hills, and being repulsed with considerable loss, made a circuit

north of Ronda, by Albodonales, Alcala de Pruna, to Casarbonela,

where he was rejoined by Copons. The division of Cuevas then marched

against Ossuna, which being only garrisoned by “_Escopeteros_,” was

expected to fall at once; but after two days combat and the loss of

two hundred killed and wounded, the three thousand patriots retired,

baffled by a hundred and fifty of their own countrymen fighting for

the invaders.

When Cuevas returned, Ballesteros marched in three columns, by roads

leading from Casarbonela and Antequera, to attack general Rey, who

was posted with eighteen hundred men near Allora, on the Guadaljore

river. The centre column was first engaged without any advantage,

but when Rey saw the flank columns coming on, he retired behind the

Guadalmedina river, close to Malaga, having lost a colonel and two

hundred men in passing the Guadaljore.

After this action Ballesteros returned to the Ronda, for Soult was

now truly at hand, and his horsemen were already in the plains.

He had sent Digeon’s cavalry on the 9th to Cordoba, to chase the

Partidas, and had ordered Drouet’s division to take post at Fuente

Obejuna; then directing Peyreymont’s cavalry upon Usagre, he had come

himself by forced marches to Seville, which he reached the 11th,

hoping to surprise the Spaniards; but the stratagem, which had saved

Seville on the 6th also saved Ballesteros, for general Conroux was

coming up on the other side from the Guadalete and the Spaniards

would have been enclosed but for their timely retreat. And scarcely

had Soult quitted Llerena when the French met with a disaster near

Usagre, which though a strong position had always proved a very

dangerous advanced post on both sides.

Sir Stapleton Cotton, while following the trail of the enemy, on the

evening of the 10th, had received intelligence that Peyreymont’s

cavalry was between Villa Garcia and Usagre, and he immediately

conceived hopes of cutting it off. To effect this Anson’s brigade,

then commanded by colonel Frederic Ponsonby, moved during the night

from Villa Franca upon Usagre, and at the same time Le Marchant’s

brigade marched from Los Santos upon Benvenida to intercept the

retreat on Llerena. Ponsonby’s advanced guard having commenced the

action too soon, the French fell back, before Le Marchant could

intercept them, but as some heights, skirting the Llerena road,

prevented them from seeing that general, they again drew up in order

of battle behind the junction of the Benvenida road.

The hostile bodies were nearly equal in numbers, about nineteen

hundred sabres on each side, but sir Stapleton soon decided the

action; for ably seizing the accidental advantage of ground he

kept the enemy’s attention engaged by skirmishing with Ponsonby’s

squadrons, while Le Marchant secretly passing at the back of the

heights, sent the fifth dragoon guards against their flank, and the

next moment Ponsonby charged their front. Thus assailed the French

gave way in disorder, and being pursued for four miles left several

officers and a hundred and twenty-eight men prisoners, and many were

killed in the field. The loss of the British was only fifty-six men

and officers, of which forty-five were of the fifth dragoon guards.

The beaten troops found refuge with Drouet’s infantry which had not

yet left Llerena; but after this action, that general fell back with

all his troops behind the Guadalquivir, for Soult was then preparing

to fight the allies at Seville.

The duke of Dalmatia was well aware of Wellington’s intention to

invade Andalusia. He knew exactly the amount and disposition of

his forces, and was resolved to meet him coming out of the Morena,

with all the French army united; neither did he doubt the final

issue, although the failure of the last harvest and the non-arrival

of convoys since February had lessened his resources. Wellington’s

plan was however deferred. He had levelled his trenches, and brought

two Portuguese regiments of infantry from Abrantes and Elvas to

form a temporary garrison of Badajos, until some Spaniards, who had

been landed at Ayamonte in March, could arrive; then giving over

the charge of the repairs to general Hill, who remained with two

divisions of infantry and three brigades of cavalry in Estremadura,

he marched himself upon Beira, which Marmont was now ravaging with

great cruelty.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 1.]

That marshal had been anxious to unite with Soult in Estremadura,

but the emperor’s orders were imperative, that he should make a

diversion for Badajos by an irruption into Portugal. On the 14th of

March he ascertained that none of Wellington’s divisions were left on

the Agueda, and on the 27th he was ready to move. Bonet, reinforced

by Carier’s brigade, was then on the Orbijo, in observation of the

Gallicians; Ferrier’s division was at Valladolid, and Foy’s in the

valley of the Tagus; but the other five divisions of infantry, and

one of cavalry, had passed the mountains and concentrated on the

Tormes, carrying with them fifteen days provisions, scaling-ladders,

and the materials for a bridge. Both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo were

therefore in manifest peril, and Almeida which contained the allies’

battering train was still very incompletely fortified. Hence on the

first rumour of Marmont’s movement, lord Wellington had thrown in two

militia regiments, with a strong detachment of British artillery-men;

the garrison was therefore three thousand six hundred strong, and the

governor, colonel Le Mesurier, laboured hard to complete the defences.

Of the northern militia, which had been called out before the allies

quitted the Coa, six thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry were

under Silveira, three thousand infantry under Trant, the same number

under John Wilson, and two thousand five hundred under Lecor. But the

law was, that persons liable to serve should be enrolled by classes

in rotation, and therefore the present men, with the exception of

Silveira’s, were raw peasants totally unskilled in the use of arms.

All these officers save Lecor, whose post was at Castello Branco, had

been for some time in movement, and Trant and Wilson were on the 22d

at Lamego, where general Bacellar, who commanded the province, fixed

his head-quarters. Silveira had the same destination, but his march

was slow, and his object rather to draw the wonder of his countrymen;

for in his unquenchable vanity he always affected to act as an

independent general.

When Trant was assured that Marmont’s direction would be on Ciudad,

and not Oporto, he advanced from Lamego followed by Wilson,

intending to take post on the Lower Coa. While in march he received

Le Mesurier’s despatches, which induced him to make a forced march

with one brigade to the Cabeça Negro mountain, behind the bridge

of Almeida. His design was to break down the restored part of that

structure, and so prevent the enemy from penetrating to Pinhel, where

there was a magazine; and his march was well-timed, for two French

divisions were then driving Carlos d’España over the plain beyond the

Coa. It appeared that Marmont having come close to Ciudad Rodrigo on

the 30th, the Spaniards and Victor Alter fell back from the Yeltes

before him; and the latter, who had six hundred excellent German

cavalry, immediately crossed the Agueda, and neither comprehending

the spirit of lord Wellington’s orders, nor the real situation of

affairs, retreated at once to Castello Branco, four long marches from

Ciudad, thus leaving all the country open to the enemy’s marauding

parties. Carlos d’España, who had eight hundred infantry, also

retreated across the plain of the Cima de Coa to Fort Conception,

but on the 3d the French, having laid their bridge at the ford of

Caridad, passed the Agueda and drove him from thence, and he reached

the Cabeça Negro in retreat with only two hundred men, at the very

moment Trant arrived.

The latter seeing no French cavalry on the plain, and, being desirous

of concerting his operations with Le Mesurier, immediately threw

some skirmishers into the vineyards on the right of the road beyond

the bridge, then escorted by some guides whom he had dressed in red

uniform, he galloped to the glacis of the fortress, communicated with

the governor, received from him a troop of English cavalry which

happened to be in the place and returned at dusk. The Cabeça Negro

was immediately covered with bivouac fires, and in the evening Le

Mesurier sallied from the fortress, and drove back the enemy’s light

troops. Two divisions of infantry had come against Almeida, with

orders to storm it, but these vigorous actions disturbed them; the

attempt was not made, and the general commanding excused himself to

Marmont, on the ground that the sudden appearance of Trant, indicated

the vicinity of British troops. In this false notion he marched the

next morning up the Coa towards Alfayates, where Marmont met him with

two other divisions, and eight squadrons of cavalry, having left one

division to blockade Ciudad.

Trant now sent back the horsemen to Le Mesurier and marched to

Guarda to cover the magazines and hospital at Celerico. Here he was

joined by Wilson, and here he ought also to have been joined by

Silveira; but that general instead of crossing the Douro on the 5th,

and marching up to Guarda, only crossed it on the 14th, and then

halted at Lamego. Thus, instead of twelve thousand infantry, and

four hundred cavalry, who had seen some service, there were scarcely

six thousand raw peasants, in a position, strong, if the occupying

force had been numerous enough to hold the ridge of Porcas and other

heights behind it, but a very dangerous post for a small force,

because it could be turned by the right and left, and the line of

retreat to the Mondego was not favourable. Neither had Trant any

horsemen to scout, for Bacellar, a weak old man, who had never seen

an enemy, was now at Celerico, and retained the only squadron of

dragoons in the vicinity for his own guard.

This post Trant and Wilson held, with six thousand militia and six

guns, from the 9th to the 14th, keeping the enemy’s marauders in

check; and they were also prepared to move by the high ridge of the

Estrella to Abrantes, if the French should menace that fortress,

which was not unlikely. For Marmont had pushed forward on Sabugal,

and Victor Alten, abandoning Castello Branco, while the French were

still at Memoa, fifty miles distant from him, had crossed the Tagus

at Vilha Velha, and it is said had even some thoughts of burning the

bridge. The French parties then traversed the Lower Beira in every

direction, plundering and murdering in such a shameful manner, that

the whole population fled before them. However, general Lecor, a good

soldier, stood fast with the militia at Castello Branco; he checked

the French cavalry detachments, removed the hospitals and some of the

stores, and when menaced by a strong force of infantry on the 12th,

destroyed the rest of the magazines, and fell back to Sarnadas, only

one short march on the road to Vilha Velha; and the next day when the

French retired, he followed and harassed their rear.

[Sidenote: Marmont’s Official Reports, MSS.]

[Sidenote: General Trant’s papers, MSS.]

Marmont’s divisions being now spread over the country in search

of supplies, Trant formed the very daring design of surprising

the French marshal himself in his quarters at Sabugal. Bacellar’s

procrastinations fortunately delayed the execution of this project,

which was undoubtedly too hazardous an enterprise to undertake

with such troops; for the distance was twenty miles, and it was a

keen observation of lord Wellington’s, when Trant adverted to the

magnitude of the object, to say that, “_In war nothing is so bad

as failure and defeat_.” This would undoubtedly have been the case

here; for in the night of the 13th, that on which Trant would have

made the attempt, Marmont having formed the design of surprising

Trant, had led two brigades of infantry and four hundred cavalry up

the mountain. He cut off the outposts, and was actually entering the

streets at day-break, with his horsemen, when the alarm was beaten

at Trant’s quarters by one drummer; this being taken up at hazard,

by all the other drummers in different parts of the town, caused the

French marshal to fall back at the moment, when a brisk charge would

have placed every thing at his mercy, for the beating of the first

drum was accidental, and no troops were under arms.

The militia immediately took post outside Guarda, but they had only

one day’s provisions, and the French cavalry could turn their flank

and gain Celerico in their rear, while the infantry attacked their

front; the guns were therefore moved off under cover of the town,

and the regiments, withdrawing in succession, retreated over three

or four miles of open ground and in good order, although the enemy’s

cavalry hovered close on the flank, and the infantry followed at a

short distance. Further on, however, there was a wooded declivity,

leading to the Mondego, and here, while the head of the troops was

passing the river below, forty dragoons, sent up by Bacellar, the

evening before, were pressed by the French, and galloped through

the rear-guard of eight hundred infantry; these last seeing the

enemy dismount to fire their carabines, and finding that the wet had

damaged their own powder, fled also, and the French followed with hue

and cry.

All the officers behaved firmly, and the Mondego was finally passed,

yet in confusion and with the loss of two hundred prisoners; and

Marmont might now have crossed the river, on the flank of the

militia, and galloped into Celerico where there was nothing to

defend the magazines; instead of which he halted and permitted

the disorderly rabble to gain that place. Such however was his

compassion, that when he found they were really nothing but poor

undisciplined peasants he would not suffer his cavalry to cut them

down and no man was killed during the whole action, although the

French horsemen were actually in the midst of the fugitives. Bacellar

having destroyed a quantity of powder at Celerico retreated with

Trant’s people the next day towards Lamego; Wilson remained at

Celerico, and when the enemy had driven in his outposts, he ordered

the magazines to be destroyed, but the order was only partly executed

when the French retired, and on the 17th the militia reoccupied

Guarda.

This short campaign of the militia I have treated at length, because

it produced an undue effect at the time, and because it shews how

trifling accidents will mar the greatest combinations; for here the

English general’s extensive arrangements for the protection of Beira

were utterly disconcerted by the slow advance of Silveira on the one

side, and the rapid retreat of general Alten on the other. Again, the

French deceived by some red uniforms and by some bivouac fires, on

the Cabeça Negro, had relinquished the attack of Almeida to run after

a few thousand undisciplined militia men, who were yet saved by the

accidental beating of a drum; and it is curious to find a marshal of

France personally acting as a partizan, and yet effecting nothing

against these miserable troops.

The disaster on the Mondego spread consternation as far as Coimbra,

and the most alarming reports reached lord Wellington, whose

operations it is now time to notice. When Soult’s retreat from

Llerena was ascertained, the allied army had marched towards the

Tagus, and on the 11th lord Wellington, hearing of Alten’s retreat,

sent him orders to recross that river without delay and return to

Castello Branco. The 16th the advanced guard of the army also reached

that town, and the same day a militia officer flying from Coimbra in

the general panic, came to head-quarters and reported that the enemy

was master of that town; but the next hour, brought general Wilson’s

report from Guarda, and the unfortunate wretch whose fears had led

him to give the false information, was tried and shot by order of

Beresford.

At this time the French army, in number about twenty-eight thousand,

was concentrated, with the exception of Brennier’s division which

remained near Ciudad Rodrigo, between Sabugal and the ridge of hills

overlooking Penamacor. Marmont was inclined to fight, for he had

heard of a convoy of provisions which lord Wellington had some days

before sent by the way of Almeida to Ciudad, and intended to cut it

off; but the convoy having reached Almeida was safe, and the French

general’s own position was very critical. Almeida and the militia

at Guarda were on his right flank, Ciudad Rodrigo was on his rear,

and immediately behind him the Coa and the Agueda rivers were both

swelled by heavy rains which fell from the 13th to the 19th, and

the flood had broken the bridge near Caridad. There remained only

the Puente de Villar on the Upper Agueda for retreat, and the roads

leading to it were bad and narrow; the march from thence to Tamames

was also circuitous and exposed to the attack of the allies, who

could move on the chord through Ciudad Rodrigo. Marmont’s retreat

must therefore have been effected through the pass of Perales upon

Coria, and the English general conceiving good hopes of falling on

him before he could cross the Coa, moved forward to Pedrogoa; but the

rear of the army was not yet across the Tagus, and a sufficient body

of troops for the attack could not be collected before the 21st. On

that day, however, the Agueda having subsided, the French restored

their bridge, the last of their divisions crossed it on the 24th, and

Marmont thus terminated his operations without loss. After this he

again spread his troops over the plains of Leon, where some of his

smaller posts had indeed been harassed by Julian Sanchez, but where

the Gallician army had done nothing.

The Portuguese militia were immediately disbanded, and the English

general made the greatest exertions to revictual Almeida and Ciudad

Rodrigo, intending when that was effected to leave Picton with a

corps upon the Agueda, and march himself against Andalusia, following

his original design. The first division, which had only reached

Castello Branco, returned to Castello de Vide, and as Foy’s division

had meanwhile reoccupied Truxillo, Hill advanced to observe him, and

the fifth Spanish army returned to Estremadura. But the difficulty of

supplying the fortresses was very great. The incursion of Marmont had

destroyed all the intermediate magazines, and dispersed the means of

transport on the lines of communication; the Portuguese government

would not remedy the inconvenience either there, or on the other

frontier, and Elvas and Badajos were suffering from the same cause as

Ciudad and Almeida.

In this dilemma lord Wellington adopted, from necessity, a very

unmilitary and dangerous remedy. For having declared to the members

of the Portuguese government, that on their heads he would throw

the responsibility of losing Badajos and Elvas, if they did not

immediately victual both, a threat which had its due effect, he

employed the whole of the carriages and mules attached to the army to

bring up stores to Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo; meanwhile he quartered

his troops near the points of water-carriage, that is to say, on the

Mondego, the Douro, and the Tagus. Thus the army was spread from the

Morena to the Tagus, from the Tagus to the Douro, from the Douro to

the Mondego, on a line little less than four hundred miles long, and

in the face of three hostile armies, the farthest of which was but

a few marches from the outposts. It was however scarcely possible

for the French to assemble again in masses, before the ripening of

the coming harvest; and on the other hand, even the above measure

was insufficient to gain time; the expedition against Andalusia was

therefore abandoned, and the fifth great epoch of the war terminated.

CHAPTER VII.

GENERAL OBSERVATIONS.

[Sidenote: 1812.]

In this campaign the French forces were too much scattered, and they

occupied the countries bordering on Portugal rather as a conquered

territory than as a field of operations. The movements of the armies

of the north, of the centre, and of Portugal, might have been so

combined as to present a hundred thousand men on a field of battle;

yet Wellington captured two great fortresses within gun-shot as it

were of them all, and was never disturbed by the approach of even

thirty thousand men. This arose partly from want of union, partly

from the orders of the Emperor, whose plans the generals either did

not or would not understand in their true spirit, and therefore

executed without vigour; and yet the French writers have generally

endeavoured to fasten the failures on Napoleon, as if he only was

mistaken about the war in Spain! It is easy to spurn the dead lion!

The expedition of Montbrun to Alicant has been fixed upon as the

chief cause of the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo. Napoleon however did not

desire that Montbrun’s march should be held in abeyance for a week,

upon the strength of some vague rumours relative to the allies’

proceedings, and yet be finally sent at precisely the wrong period;

neither did he contemplate that general’s idle display at Alicant

after the city of Valencia had fallen. But ill-executed and hurtful

as this expedition doubtless was, in various ways, the loss of Ciudad

Rodrigo cannot be directly traced to it. Montbrun was at Almanza the

9th of January and the 19th Ciudad was stormed; now, if he had not

been at Almanza he would have been at Toledo or Talavera, that is,

eight marches from Salamanca; and as the commencement of the siege

was not known until the 15th, even at Valladolid, he could not have

been on the Tormes before the 25th, which would have been five days

too late. The emperor wished to strengthen Suchet at the crisis of

the Valencian operations, and his intent was that Montbrun should

have reached that city in December, but the latter did not arrive

before the middle of January; had he been only a week earlier, that

is, had he marched at once from Toledo, Mahy could not have escaped,

Alicant would then have fallen, and if Blake had made an obstinate

defence at Valencia the value of such a reinforcement would have been

acknowledged.

At this period Valencia was the most important point in the

Peninsula, and there was no apparent reason why Ciudad should be

in any immediate danger; the emperor could not calculate upon the

errors of his own generals. It is futile therefore to affirm that

Montbrun’s detachment was made on a false principle; it was on the

contrary conceived in perfect accord with the maxim of concentrating

on the important point at the decisive moment; errors, extraneous

to the original design, alone brought it within the principle of

dissemination.

The loss of Ciudad Rodrigo may be directly traced to the duke of

Ragusa’s want of vigilance, to the scanty garrison which he kept in

the place, to the Russian war which obliged the emperor to weaken the

army of the north; finally, to the extravagance of the army of the

centre. Marmont expressly asserts that at Madrid three thousand men

devoured and wasted daily the rations of twenty-two thousand, and the

stores thus consumed would have enabled the army of Portugal to keep

concentrated, in which case Wellington could not have taken Ciudad;

and if the army of the centre had been efficient, Hill would have

incurred great danger and Soult’s power been vastly augmented.

It is not Napoleon’s skill only, that has been assailed by these

writers. Lord Wellington also is blamed for not crushing Souham’s

division at Tamames between the 23d and the 26th of January; although

Souham, a good general, never entered Tamames, except with cavalry

scouts, and kept his main body at Matilla, whence one forced march

would have placed him behind the Tormes in safety! In such a shallow

manner have the important operations of this period been treated. Nor

will the causes commonly assigned for the fall of Badajos better bear

examination.

“_Marmont instead of joining Soult in Estremadura, followed a

phantom in Beira._” “_It was his vanity and jealousy of the duke

of Dalmatia that lost Badajos._” Such are the assertions of both

French and English writers; nevertheless the duke of Ragusa never

anticipated any success from his movement into Beira, and far from

avoiding Soult, earnestly desired to co-operate with him; moreover

this invasion of Beira, which has been regarded as a folly, was the

conception of Napoleon, the greatest of all captains! and it is not

difficult to shew that the emperor’s design was, notwithstanding the

ill result, capacious and solid.

Let us suppose that Marmont had aided Soult, and that the army of

the centre had also sent men. If they had made any error in their

combinations the English general would have defeated them separately;

if they had effected their junction, he would have retreated, and

Badajos would have been succoured. But then eighty thousand French

would have been assembled by long marches in the winter rains, to

the great detriment of their affairs elsewhere, and unless they

came prepared to take Elvas, without any adequate object; for lord

Wellington could, after the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo, have repeated

this operation as often as he pleased, which, besides the opening

thus made for insurrection in Spain, would have stamped a character

of weakness on the French arms, extremely injurious, since character

is half the strength of an army.

The emperor judged better; he disliked such timid operations, he

desired that his powerful armies should throw the allies on the

defensive and he indicated the means of doing so. Wellington, he

said, expecting an effort to retake Ciudad Rodrigo, had called Hill

across the Tagus, and to prevent that movement Soult was directed to

send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. The fall of Ciudad

had thus by obliging the allies to defend it, given the French their

choice of ground for a battle, and at a distance from the sea; it

was for Marmont to avail himself of the occasion, not by marching

to aid Soult, who had eighty thousand excellent troops, and at the

worst could be only driven from Andalusia upon Valencia or Madrid;

whereas if the army of Portugal or a part of it should be defeated

on the Guadiana the blow would be felt in every part of Spain.

Marmont’s business was, he said, first to strengthen his own position

at Salamanca, as a base of operations, and then to keep the allies

constantly engaged on the Agueda until he was prepared to fight a

general battle. Meanwhile Soult should either take the fortresses of

the Alemtejo, or draw off Hill’s corps from Wellington, who would

then be very inferior to Marmont and yet Hill himself would be

unequal to fight Soult.

“Fix your quarters,” said the emperor, “at Salamanca, work day and

night to fortify that place—organize a new battering train—form

magazines—send strong advanced guards to menace Ciudad and

Almeida—harass the allies’ outposts, even daily—threaten the

frontier of Portugal in all directions, and send parties to ravage

the nearest villages—repair the ways to Almeida and Oporto, and

keep the bulk of your army at Toro Zamora, Benevente, and Avila,

which are fertile districts, and from whence, in four days, you can

concentrate the whole upon Salamanca. You will thus keep the allies

in check on the Agueda, and your troops will repose, while you

prepare for great operations. You have nothing to do with the south.

Announce the approach of your new battering train, and if Wellington

marches to invest Badajos with a few divisions, Soult will be able to

relieve it; but if Wellington goes with all his forces, unite your

army, march straight upon Almeida, push parties to Coimbra, overrun

the country in various directions, and be assured he will return.

Twenty-four hours after the receipt of this letter you should be on

your way to Salamanca, and your advanced guards should be in march

towards Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida.”

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VIII. Section 2.]

Now, if Marmont had thus conceived the war himself, he could have

commenced operations before the end of January; but this letter,

written the 15th of February, reached him in the latter end of

that month, and found him desponding and fearful even in defence.

Vacillating between his own wishes and the emperor’s orders, he did

nothing; but had he, as his despatch recommended, commenced his

operations in twenty-four hours, his advanced posts would have been

near Ciudad early in March, that is at the moment when the allies

were, as I have before shewn, disseminated all over Portugal, and

when only the fifth division was upon the Coa to oppose him. The

works of Almeida were then quite indefensible, and the movement upon

Badajos must have necessarily been suspended. Thus the winter season

would have passed away uselessly for the allies unless Wellington

turned to attack Marmont, which was a difficult operation in itself,

and would have been dangerous to the Alemtejo, while Soult held

Badajos, for that marshal, as we have seen, had received orders to

attack Hill with twenty thousand men. Here then the errors were

of execution, not of design, and the first part of the emperor’s

combinations was evidently just and solid. It remains to test the

second part which was to have been executed if lord Wellington

invested Badajos.

It must be remembered, that Marmont was so to hold his army, that

he could concentrate in four days; that he was to make an incursion

into Beira the moment Wellington crossed the Tagus; that Oporto was

to be menaced, Almeida to be attacked, Coimbra to be occupied. These

operations would undoubtedly have brought the allies back again at

the commencement of the siege, because the fall of Badajos could

not be expected under three weeks, which would have been too long

to leave Beira and the fortresses at the mercy of the invader. Now

Marmont did not reach the Agueda before the 31st March, when the

siege of Badajos was approaching its conclusion; he did not storm

Almeida, nor attack Ciudad Rodrigo, nor enter Coimbra, nor menace

Oporto; and yet his operation, feebly as it was executed, obliged

lord Wellington to relinquish his meditated attack on Andalusia,

and return to the assistance of Beira. Again therefore the error

was in the execution. And here we may observe how inferior in

hardihood the French general was to his adversary. Wellington with

eighteen thousand men had escaladed Badajos, a powerful fortress and

defended by an excellent governor with five thousand French veterans;

Marmont with twenty-eight thousand men would not attempt to storm

Ciudad, although its breaches were scarcely healed, and its garrison

disaffected. Nor did he even assail Almeida, which hardly meriting

the name of a fortress, was only occupied by three thousand militia,

scarcely able to handle their arms; and yet if he had captured

Almeida, as he could scarcely have failed to do with due vigour, he

would have found a battering train with which to take Ciudad Rodrigo,

and thus have again balanced the campaign.

The duke of Ragusa was averse to serving in the Peninsula, he wished

to be employed in the Russian expedition, and he had written to the

emperor to desire his recal, or that the whole of the northern

district, from Sebastian to Salamanca, including Madrid, should be

placed under his orders. Unless that were done, he said he could only

calculate the operations of his own troops. The other generals would

make difficulties, would move slowly, and the king’s court was in

open hostility to the French interest. The army of the north had in

retiring from Leon scrupulously carried away every thing that could

be useful to him, in the way of bridge, or battering equipages, or of

ammunition or provisions, although he was in want of all these things.

Then he painted all the jealousies and disputes in the French

armies, and affirmed that his own force, care being had for the

posts of communication, and the watching of the army of Gallicia,

would not furnish more than thirty-four thousand men for the field;

a calculation contradicted by the imperial muster-rolls, which on

the 1st of March bore sixty thousand fighting men present with the

eagles. He also rated the allies at sixty thousand, well provided

with every thing and ready to attack him, whereas the returns of

that army gave only fifty-two thousand men including Hill’s corps;

about thirty-five thousand only could have passed the Agueda, and

their penury of means had, as we have seen, prevented them from even

holding together, on the northern frontier. In like manner he assumed

that two of the allied divisions were left upon the Agueda, when

the army marched against Badajos, whereas no more than six hundred

cavalry remained there. All these things prove that Marmont, either

from dislike to the war, or natural want of vigour, was not equal to

his task, and it is obvious that a diversion, begun so late, and

followed up with so little energy, could have had little effect upon

the siege of Badajos; it would have been far better to have followed

his own first design of detaching three divisions to aid Soult, and

retained the other two to menace Ciudad Rodrigo.

It is fitting now to test the operations of the armies of the south,

and of the centre. The latter is easily disposed of. The secret of

its inactivity is to be found in Marmont’s letter. Every thing at

Madrid was confusion and intrigue, waste and want of discipline; in

fine, the union of a court and an army, had destroyed the latter. Not

so at Seville. There the hand of an able general, an indefatigable

administrator were visible, and the unravelling the intricate

combinations, which produced such an apparent want of vigour in the

operations of the duke of Dalmatia, will form at once the apology for

that general, and the just eulogium of lord Wellington.

First it must be held in mind that the army of the south, so powerful

in appearance, did not furnish a proportionate number of men for

field-service, because the reinforcements, although borne on the

rolls, were for the most part retained in the northern governments.

Soult had sixty-seven thousand French and six thousand “Escopeteros”

present under arms in September; but then followed the surprise of

Girard at Aroyo de Molinos, the vigorous demonstrations of Hill in

December, the failure of Godinot at Gibraltar, the check sustained

by Semélé at Bornos, and the siege of Tarifa, which diminished the

number of men, and occasioned fresh arrangements on the different

points of the circle. The harvest of 1811 had failed in Andalusia,

as in all other parts, and the inhabitants were reduced to feed on

herbs; the soldiers had only half rations of bread, and neither

reinforcements of men, nor convoys of money, nor ammunition, nor

clothes, had come either from France or from Madrid for a long period.

It was under these circumstances that Soult received the order to

send twenty thousand men against the Alemtejo. But the whole of

the Polish troops, and the skeletons of regiments, and the picked

men for the imperial guards, in all fifteen thousand, after being

collected at the Despeñas Peros, while Suchet was before Valencia,

had now marched to Talavera de la Reyna on the way to France; at

that moment also Ballesteros appeared, with the fourth Spanish army,

twelve thousand strong, in the Ronda, and his detachments defeated

Maransin at Cartaña, which of necessity occasioned another change

in the French dispositions. Moreover the very successes of Suchet

had at this time increased Soult’s difficulties, because all the

fugitives from Valencia gathered on the remains of the Murcian army;

and fifteen thousand men, including the garrisons of Carthagena and

Alicant, were again assembled on the frontier of Grenada, where,

during the expedition to Estremadura, the French had only three

battalions and some cavalry.

Thus the army of the south was, if the garrison of Badajos be

excluded, reduced to forty-eight thousand French sabres and bayonets

present with the eagles, and this at the very moment when its enemies

were augmented by twenty-five thousand fresh men. Soult had indeed

besides this force five thousand artillery-men and other attendant

troops, and six thousand “_Escopeteros_” were capable of taking the

field, while thirty thousand civic guards held his fortified posts.

Nevertheless he was forced to reduce all the garrisons, and even

the camp before the Isla to the lowest numbers, consistent with

safety, ere he could bring twenty-four thousand French into the field

for the succour of Badajos, and even then as we have seen, he was

upon the point of losing Seville. These things prevented him from

coming against the Alemtejo in March, when his presence with an army

would have delayed the commencement of the siege until a battle had

been fought: but he was the less fearful for the fortress because

Marmont on the 22d of February and Foy on the 28th had announced,

that if Badajos should be menaced, three divisions of the army of

Portugal, then in the valley of the Tagus, would enter Estremadura;

and these divisions uniting with Daricau’s and Drouet’s troops would

have formed an army of thirty thousand men, and consequently would

have sufficed to delay the operations of the allies. But Marmont,

having subsequently received the emperor’s orders to move into

Beira, passed the Gredos mountains instead of the Tagus river, and

thus unintentionally deceived Soult; and whether his letters were

intercepted, or carelessly delayed, it was not until the 8th of

April, that the duke of Dalmatia was assured of his departure for

Salamanca.

On the other hand Lord Wellington’s operations were so rapidly pushed

forward, that Soult cannot be censured for false calculations. No

general could suspect that such an outwork as the Picurina, would be

taken by storm without being first battered; still less that Badajos,

with its lofty walls, its brave garrison, and its celebrated

governor, would in like manner be carried before the counterscarp

was blown in, and the fire of the defences ruined. In fine, no man

accustomed to war could have divined the surpassing resolution and

surpassing fortune also, of the British general and his troops;

neither is it impertinent to observe here, that as the French never

use iron ordnance in a siege, their calculations were necessarily

formed upon the effect of brass artillery, which is comparatively

weak and slow: with brass guns the breaches would have been made

three days later.

The fall of Badajos may therefore be traced partly to the Russian

war, which drew fifteen thousand men from the army of the south,

partly to the irresolution of Marmont, who did neither execute the

emperor’s plan nor his own; finally, to the too great extent of

country occupied, whereby time and numbers were swallowed. And here

the question arises, if Soult, acting upon the principles laid down

in his letter to Joseph, just before the battle of Talavera, should

not have operated against the allies in great masses, relinquishing

possession of Grenada, Malaga, in fine of every thing, save Seville

and the camp before the Isla. If beaten, he would have lost Andalusia

and fallen back on Suchet, but then the head of the French invasion,

might have been more formidable at Valencia than at Seville, and

Marmont could have renewed the battle. And such a chequered game,

lord Wellington’s political situation both in England and Portugal

being considered, would have gone near to decide the question of the

British troops remaining in the latter country. This however is a

grave and difficult matter to resolve.

In whatever light this campaign is viewed the talent of the English

general is conspicuous. That fortune aided him is true, but it was

in the manner she favours the pilot, who watching every changing

wind, every shifting current, makes all subservient to his purpose.

Ascertaining with great pains the exact situation of each adversary,

he had sagaciously met their different modes of warfare, and with a

nice hand had adapted his measures to the successive exigences of

the moment. The army of the centre, where disorder was paramount,

he disregarded; Marmont whose temperament was hasty he deceived by

affected slowness; and Soult he forestalled by quickness. Twice

he induced the duke of Ragusa to send his divisions into distant

quarters, when they should have been concentrated, and each time he

gained a great advantage; once when he took Ciudad Rodrigo, and again

when, using a like opportunity, to obviate the difficulties presented

by the conduct of the Portuguese government, he spread his own troops

over the country, in an unmilitary manner, that he might feed and

clothe them on their march to the Alemtejo. This he could not have

done if the French had been concentrated; neither could he have so

well concealed that march from the enemy.

In Estremadura, he kept his force compact and strong to meet Soult,

from whose warfare he expected a powerful opposition, hard indeed to

resist, yet not likely to abound in sudden strokes, and therefore

furnishing more certain ground for calculation as to time; and

then he used that time so wonderfully at the siege, that even his

enemies declared it incomprehensible, and he who had hitherto been

censured for over caution was now dreaded as over daring! This

daring was, however, in no manner allied to rashness, his precautions

multiplied as his enterprises augmented. The divisions of the army of

Portugal, quartered in the valley of the Tagus, could by moving into

Estremadura in March have delayed if not prevented the siege; lord

Wellington had therefore with forecast of such an event, designed

that Hill should, when the allies entered the Alemtejo, make a forced

march to surprise the bridge and forts at Almaraz, which would have

obliged the French divisions to make a long circuit by the bridges of

Arzobispo and Talavera to reach the scene of action in Estremadura.

[Sidenote: Intercepted despatch of marshal Soult, 1812. MSS.]

This bold and skilful stroke was baulked by the never-ceasing

misconduct of the Portuguese government, with respect to means of

transport; for the battering-guns intended for Hill’s enterprise were

thus prevented passing Evora. Nevertheless the siege was commenced,

because it was ascertained that Marmont was still ignorant of the

allies’ march, and had made no change in his extended quarters,

indicating a design to aid Soult; Hill also soon drove Drouet back

towards the Morena, and by occupying Merida, intercepted the line

of communication with Almaraz, which answered the same purpose. But

the best testimony to the skill of the operation is to be found in

the enemy’s papers. “So calculated,” said Soult, “was this affair

(the siege of Badajos) that it is to be supposed lord Wellington had

intercepted some despatches which explained to him the system of

operations and the irresolution of Marmont.”

Nor when the duke of Ragusa was ravaging Beira, and both Almeida and

Ciudad appeared in the utmost danger, did lord Wellington’s delay

in Estremadura arise from any imprudence; he had good grounds for

believing, that the French would not attempt the latter place, and

that the loss of a few days would not prove injurious. For when the

first intelligence that the army of Portugal was concentrating on the

Tormes reached him, he sent captain Colquhoun Grant, a celebrated

scouting officer, to watch Marmont’s proceedings. That gentleman,

in whom the utmost daring was so mixed with subtlety of genius, and

both so tempered by discretion, that it is hard to say which quality

predominated, very rapidly executed his mission; and the interesting

nature of his adventures on this occasion will perhaps excuse a

digression concerning them.

Attended by Leon, a Spanish peasant of great fidelity and quickness

of apprehension, who had been his companion on many former occasions

of the same nature, Grant arrived in the Salamancan district, and

passing the Tormes in the night, remained, in uniform, for he never

assumed any disguise, three days in the midst of the French camp.

He thus obtained exact information of Marmont’s object, and more

especially of his preparations of provisions and scaling-ladders,

notes of which he sent to lord Wellington from day to day by Spanish

agents. However, on the third night, some peasants brought him a

general order, addressed to the French regiments, and saying, that

the notorious Grant being within the circle of their cantonments, the

soldiers were to use their utmost exertions to secure him, for which

purpose also guards were placed as it were in a circle round the army.

Nothing daunted by this news, Grant consulted with the peasants,

and the next morning, before daylight, entered the village of

Huerta, which is close to a ford on the Tormes, and about six miles

from Salamanca. Here there was a French battalion, and on the

opposite side of the river cavalry videttes were posted, two of

which constantly patrolled back and forward, for the space of three

hundred yards, meeting always at the ford. When day broke the French

battalion assembled on its alarm-post, and at that moment Grant

was secretly brought with his horse behind the gable of a house,

which hid him from the infantry, and was opposite to the ford. The

peasants standing on some loose stones and spreading their large

cloaks, covered him from the cavalry videttes, and thus he calmly

waited until the latter were separated the full extent of their beat;

then putting spurs to his horse he dashed through the ford between

them, and receiving their fire without damage, reached a wood, not

very distant, where the pursuit was baffled, and where he was soon

rejoined by Leon, who in his native dress met with no interruption.

Grant had already ascertained that the means of storming Ciudad

Rodrigo were prepared, and that the French officers openly talked of

doing so, but he desired still further to test this project, and to

discover if the march of the enemy might not finally be directed by

the pass of Perales, towards the Tagus; he wished also to ascertain

more correctly their real numbers, and therefore placed himself on a

wooded hill, near Tamames, where the road branches off to the passes,

and to Ciudad Rodrigo. Here lying perdue, until the whole French

army had passed by in march, he noted every battalion and gun, and

finding that all were directed towards Ciudad, entered Tamames after

they had passed, and discovered that they had left the greatest

part of their scaling-ladders behind, which clearly proved that the

intention of storming Ciudad Rodrigo was not real. This it was which

allayed Wellington’s fears for that fortress.

When Marmont afterwards passed the Coa, in this expedition, Grant

preceded him with intent to discover if his further march would be

by Guarda upon Coimbra, or by Sabugal upon Castello Branco; for to

reach the latter it was necessary to descend from a very high ridge,

or rather succession of ridges, by a pass, at the lower mouth of

which stands Penamacor. Upon one of the inferior ridges in the pass,

this persevering officer placed himself, thinking that the dwarf

oaks, with which the hills were covered, would effectually secure

him from discovery; but from the higher ridge above, the French

detected all his movements with their glasses, in a few moments

Leon, whose lynx-eyes were always on the watch, called out “_the

French! the French!_” and pointed to the rear, whence some dragoons

came galloping up. Grant and his follower, instantly darted into the

wood for a little space, and then suddenly wheeling, rode off in a

different direction; yet at every turn new enemies appeared, and at

last the hunted men dismounted and fled on foot through the thickest

of the low oaks; but again they were met by infantry, who had been

detached in small parties down the sides of the pass, and were

directed in their chase by the waving of the French officers’ hats on

the ridge above. At last Leon fell exhausted, and the barbarians who

first came up, killed him in despite of his companion’s entreaties.

Grant himself they carried, without injury, to Marmont, who receiving

him with apparent kindness, invited him to dinner. The conversation

turned upon the prisoner’s exploits, and the French marshal affirmed

that he had been for a long time on the watch, that he knew all

his haunts, and his disguises, and had discovered that, only the

night before, he had slept in the French head-quarters, with other

adventures, which had not happened, for this Grant never used any

disguise; but there was another Grant, a man also very remarkable in

his way, who used to remain for months in the French quarters, using

all manner of disguises; hence the similarity of names caused the

actions of both to be attributed to one, which is the only palliative

for Marmont’s subsequent conduct.

Treating his prisoner as I have said, with great apparent kindness,

the French general exacted from him an especial parole, that he would

not consent to be released by the Partidas, while on his journey

through Spain to France, which secured his captive, although lord

Wellington offered two thousand dollars to any guerilla chief who

should rescue him. The exaction of such a parole, however harsh, was

in itself a tacit compliment to the man; but Marmont, also, sent

a letter, with the escort, to the governor of Bayonne, in which,

still labouring under the error that there was only one Grant, he

designated his captive as a dangerous spy, who had done infinite

mischief to the French army, and whom he had only not executed on

the spot, out of respect to something resembling an uniform which

he wore at the time of his capture. He therefore desired, that at

Bayonne, he should be placed in irons and sent up to Paris.

This proceeding was too little in accord with the honour of the

French army to be supported, and before the Spanish frontier was

passed, Grant, it matters not how, was made acquainted with the

contents of the letter. Now the custom at Bayonne, in ordinary

cases, was for the prisoner to wait on the authorities, and receive

a passport to travel to Verdun, and all this was duly accomplished;

meanwhile the delivering of the fatal letter being, by certain means,

delayed, Grant, with a wonderful readiness and boldness, resolved not

to escape towards the Pyrenees, thinking that he would naturally be

pursued in that direction. He judged that if the governor of Bayonne

could not recapture him at once, he would for his own security

suppress the letter in hopes the matter would be no further thought

of; judging, I say, in this acute manner, he on the instant inquired

at the hotels, if any French officer was going to Paris, and finding

that general Souham, then on his return from Spain, was so bent, he

boldly introduced himself, and asked permission to join his party.

The other readily assented; and while thus travelling, the general,

unacquainted with Marmont’s intentions, often rallied his companion

about his adventures, little thinking that he was then himself an

instrument in forwarding the most dangerous and skilful of them all.