The trophies of this action were the capture of twelve or thirteen

hundred prisoners, including general Bron, and the prince of

Aremberg; all the French artillery, baggage, and commissariat,

together with a contribution just raised; and during the fight, a

Portuguese brigade, being united to Penne Villamur’s cavalry was sent

to Merida, where some stores were found. The loss of the allies was

not more than seventy killed and wounded, but one officer, lieutenant

Strenowitz, was taken. He was distinguished by his courage and

successful enterprises, but he was an Austrian, who having abandoned

the French army in Spain to join Julian Sanchez’ Partida, was liable

to death by the laws of war; having been however originally forced

into the French service he was, in reality, no deserter. General

Hill, anxious to save him, applied frankly to general Drouet, and

such was the latter’s good temper, that while smarting under this

disaster he released his prisoner.

[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 6._

_Explanatory Sketch of_

GEN^L. HILL’S OPERATIONS,

1811.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

Girard was only deprived of his division, which was given to

general Barois, yet in a military point of view his offence was

unpardonable. He knew two or three days before, that general Hill

was near him; he knew that there was a good road from Malpartida

to Alcuesca, because he had himself passed it coming from Caceres;

and yet he halted at Aroyo de Molino without necessity, and without

sending out even a patrole upon his flank, thus sacrificing two

thousand brave men. Napoleon’s clemency was therefore great, and yet

not misplaced, for Girard, afterwards, repaid it by his devotion at

the battle of Lutzen when the emperor’s star was on the wane. On the

other hand general Hill neglected no precaution, let no advantage

escape; and to good arrangements added celerity of movement, with the

utmost firmness and vigour of execution. His troops seconded him as

he merited; and here was made manifest the advantage of possessing

the friendship of a people so strongly influenced by the instincts of

revenge as the Peninsulars; for, during the night of the 27th, every

Spaniard in Aroyo, as well as in Alcuesca, knew that the allies were

at hand, and not one was found so base or so indiscreet as to betray

the fact.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s papers, MSS.]

This blow being struck, Hill returned to his old quarters, and the

Spanish troops fell back behind the Salor, but the report of Girard’s

disaster set all the French corps in motion. Drouet reoccupied

Caceres with a thousand men; Foy passed the Tagus at Almaraz on the

15th of November, and moved to Truxillo; a convoy entered Badajos

from Zafra on the 12th, a second on the 20th, and Soult, while

collecting troops in Seville, directed Phillipon to plant all the

ground under the guns at Badajos with potatoes and corn. Every thing

seemed to indicate a powerful attack upon Hill, when a serious

disturbance amongst the Polish troops, at Ronquillo, obliged Soult

to detach men from Seville to quell it. When that was effected, a

division of four thousand entered Estremadura, and Drouet, whose

corps was thus raised to fourteen thousand infantry and three

thousand cavalry, on the 5th of December advanced to Almendralejos,

and the 18th his advanced guard occupied Merida. At the same time

Marmont concentrated part of his army at Toledo, from whence

Montbrun, as we have seen, was directed to aid Suchet at Valencia,

and Soult with the same view sent ten thousand men to the Despeños

Peros.

[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]

Drouet’s movements were, however, again stopped by some

insubordination in the fifth corps. And as it was now known that

Soult’s principal object was to destroy Ballesteros, and take Tarifa,

Hill again advanced, partly to protect Morillo from Drouet, partly

to save the resources of Estremadura, partly to make a diversion in

favour of Ballesteros and Tarifa, and in some sort also for Valencia.

With this view he entered Estremadura by Albuquerque on the 27th of

December, and having received information that the French, untaught

by their former misfortunes were not vigilant, he made a forced march

in hopes to surprise them. On the 28th he passed Villar del Rey and

San Vincente and reached Nava de Membrillos, where he fell in with

three hundred French infantry, and a few hussars, part of a foraging

party, the remainder of which was at a village two leagues distant.

A patrole gave an alarm, the French retreated towards Merida, and

were closely followed by four hundred of the allied cavalry, who

had orders to make every effort to stop their march; but to use the

words of general Hill, “the intrepid and admirable manner in which

the enemy retreated, the infantry formed in square, and favoured as

he was by the nature of the country of which he knew how to take the

fullest advantage, prevented the cavalry alone from effecting any

thing against him.” Captain Neveux, the able officer who commanded

on this occasion, reached Merida with a loss of only forty men, all

killed or wounded by the fire of the artillery; but the French at

Merida immediately abandoned their unfinished works, and evacuated

that town in the night, leaving behind some bread and a quantity of

wheat.

[Sidenote: 1812. January]

From Merida, Hill, intending to fight Drouet, marched on the 1st of

January to Almendralejos, where he captured another field store; but

the French general, whose troops were scattered, fell back towards

Zafra; the weather was so bad, and the roads so deep, that general

Hill with the main body halted while colonel Abercrombie with a

detachment of Portuguese and German cavalry followed the enemy’s

rear-guard. Meanwhile Phillipon, who never lost an advantage, sent,

either the detachment which had escorted the convoy to Badajos, or

some Polish troops with whom he was discontented, down the Portuguese

frontier on the right of the Guadiana, by Moura, Mourao, and Serpe,

with orders to drive the herds of cattle from those places into the

sierra Morena.

Abercrombie reached Fuente del Maestro, on the evening of the 3d,

where, meeting with a stout squadron of the enemy, a stiff charge

took place, and the French out-numbered and flanked on both sides

were overthrown with a loss of thirty men. But Drouet was now in full

retreat for Monasterio, and Morillo moving upon Medellin, took post

at San Benito. Thus the allies remained masters of Estremadura until

the 13th of January, when Marmont’s divisions moved by the valley

of the Tagus towards the eastern frontier of Portugal; Hill then

returned to Portalegre and sent a division over the Tagus to Castello

Branco. Drouet immediately returned to Llerena and his cavalry

supported by a detachment of infantry marched against Morillo, but

that general, instead of falling back when Hill did, had made a

sudden incursion to La Mancha, and was then attacking the castle of

Almagro. There, however, he was so completely defeated by general

Treillard that, flying to Horcajo in the Guadaloupe mountains,

although he reached it on the 18th, his fugitives were still coming

in on the 21st, and his army remained for a long time in the greatest

disorder.

CHAPTER V.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

While the events, recorded in the foregoing chapter, were passing in

Estremadura, the south of Andalusia was the scene of more important

operations. Soult, persisting in his design against Tarifa, had given

orders to assemble a battering train, and directed general Laval

with a strong division of the 4th corps to move from Antequera upon

San Roque. Skerrett was then menacing the communications of general

Semélé on the side of Vejer de Frontera, and Ballesteros had obtained

some success against that general at Bornos on the 5th of November;

but Skerrett finding that Copons instead of four thousand had only

brought seven hundred men, returned to Tarifa on the approach of some

French from Conil.

Semélé, being thus reinforced, obliged Ballesteros, on the 27th,

again to take refuge under the walls of Gibraltar, which he reached

just in time, to avoid a collision with Laval’s column from

Antequera. Semélé’s troops did not follow very close, and a combined

attack upon Laval by the divisions of Ballesteros, Skerrett, and

Copons, was projected. The two latter with a part of the troops under

Ballesteros, were actually embarked on the 29th of November for the

purpose of landing at Manilba, in pursuance of this scheme, when

Semélé’s column came in sight, and Skerrett and Copons instantly

returned to Tarifa.

[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]

Ballesteros remained at Gibraltar, a heavy burthen upon that

fortress, and his own troops without shelter from the winter rain,

wherefore general Campbell proposed to send them, in British vessels,

to renew the attempt against Malaga, which had formerly failed

under Lord Blayney. On the 12th of January, at the very moment of

embarking, the French retired from before Gibraltar, by the Puerto de

Ojen, a grand pass connecting the plains of Gibraltar and the vallies

of the Guadaranque, with the great and rich plain called the Campiña

de Tarifa; and with the gorge of Los Pedragosos, which is the eastern

entrance to the pastures called the Vega de Tarifa. This movement

was preparatory to the siege of Tarifa; and as the battering train

was already within five leagues of that place, Skerrett proposed to

seize it by a combined operation from Cadiz, Tarifa, Gibraltar, and

Los Barios, where Ballesteros had now taken post. This combination

was however on too wide a scale to be adopted in all its parts;

Ballesteros indeed fell on the enemy by surprise at the pass of Ojen,

and Skerrett and Copons received orders from general Campbell to take

advantage of this diversion; but the former, seeing that his own plan

was not adopted to its full extent, would not stir, and the Spaniards

after a skirmish of six hours retired. Laval then left fifteen

hundred men to observe Ballesteros, and placing a detachment at

Vejes to cover his right flank, threaded Los Pedragosos and advanced

against Tarifa.

[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 7._

_Explanatory Sketch_

OF THE

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

This town was scarcely expected by the French to make any resistance.

It was encircled with towers, which were connected by an ancient

archery wall, irregular in form without a ditch, and so thin as to

offer no resistance even to field artillery. To the north and east,

some high ridges flanked, and seemed entirely to command the weak

rampart; but the English engineer had observed that the nearest

ridges formed, at half pistol-shot, a natural glacis, the plane of

which, one point excepted, intersected the crest of the parapet with

great nicety; and to this advantage was added a greater number of

towers, better flanks, and more powerful resources for an interior

defence. He judged therefore that the seemingly favourable nature of

the ridges combined with other circumstances, would scarcely fail to

tempt the enemy to commence their trenches on that side. With a view

to render the delusion unavoidable, he strengthened the western front

of the place, rendered the access to it uneasy, by demolishing the

main walls and removing the flooring of an isolated suburb on the

north-west; and an outwork, of a convent which was situated about a

hundred yards from the place, and to the east of the suburb. This

done, he prepared an internal defence, which rendered the storming

of the breach the smallest difficulty to be encountered; but to

appreciate his design the local peculiarities must be described.

Tarifa was cloven in two by the bed of a periodical torrent which

entering at the east, passed out at the opposite point. This stream

was barred, at its entrance, by a tower with a portcullis, in front

of which pallisades were planted across the bed of the water. The

houses within the walls were strongly built and occupied inclined

planes rising from each side of the torrent, and at the exit of the

latter there were two massive structures, forming part of the walls

called the tower and castle of the Gusmans, both of which looked

up the hollow formed by the meeting of the inclined planes at the

stream. From these structures, first a sandy neck of land, and then

a causeway, the whole being about six hundred yards long, joined the

town to an island, or rather promontory, about two thousand yards in

circumference, with perpendicular sides, which forbade any entrance

save by the causeway; and at the island end of the latter there was

an unfinished entrenchment and battery.

On the connecting neck of land were some sand hills, the highest of

which, called the Catalina, was scarped and crowned with a slight

field work, containing a twelve-pounder. This hill covered the

causeway, and in conjunction with the tower of the Gusmans, which

was armed with a ship eighteen-pounder, flanked the western front,

and commanded all the ground between the walls and the island. The

gun in the tower of the Gusmans also shot clear over the town on to

the slope where the French batteries were expected to be raised; and

in addition to these posts, the stately ship of the line, the Druid

frigate, and several gun and mortar-boats were anchored in the most

favourable situation for flanking the enemy’s approaches.

Reverting then to the head of the defence, it will be seen, that

while the ridges on the eastern fronts, and the hollow bed of the

torrent, which offered cover for troops moving to the assault,

deceitfully tempted the enemy to that side; the flanking fire of the

convent, the ruins of the suburb, the hill of the Catalina, and the

appearance of the shipping deterred them even from examining the

western side, and as it were, forcibly urged them towards the eastern

ridge where the English engineer wished to find them. There he had

even marked their ground, and indicated the situation of the breach;

that is to say, close to the entrance of the torrent, where the

hollow meeting of the inclined planes rendered the inner depth of the

walls far greater than the outer depth; where he had loop-holed the

houses, opened communications to the rear, barricaded the streets,

and accumulated obstacles. The enemy after forcing the breach would

thus have been confined between the houses on the inclined planes,

exposed on each side to the musketry from the loop-holes and windows,

and in front to the fire of the tower of the Gusmans, which looked

up the bed of the torrent. Thus disputing every inch of ground, the

garrison could at worst have reached the castle and tower of the

Gusmans, which being high and massive were fitted for rear-guards to

cover the evacuation of the place, and were provided with ladders for

the troops to descend and retreat to the island under cover of the

Catalina.

The artillery available for the defence appeared very powerful,

for besides that of the shipping, and the guns in the Catalina,

there were in the island twelve pieces, comprising four

twenty-four-pounders, and two ten-inch mortars; and in the town

there were six field-pieces and four coehorns on the east front. An

eighteen-pounder was on the Gusmans, a howitzer on the portcullis

tower, and two field-pieces were kept behind the town in reserve for

sallies; but most of the artillery in the island was mounted after

the investment, so that two twenty-four-pounders and two mortars

only, could take part in the defence of the town; and as the walls

and towers of the latter were too weak and narrow to sustain heavy

guns, only three field-pieces and the coehorns did in fact reply to

the enemy’s fire.

SIEGE OF TARIFA.

The garrison, including six hundred Spanish infantry and one hundred

horse of that nation, amounted to two thousand five hundred men, and

was posted in the following manner. Seven hundred were in the island,

one hundred in the Catalina, two hundred in the convent, and fifteen

hundred in the town.

On the 19th of December the enemy having driven in the advanced

posts, were encountered with a sharp skirmish, and designedly led

towards the eastern front.

The 20th the place was invested, but on the 21st a picquet of French

troops having incautiously advanced towards the western front,

captain Wren of the eleventh suddenly descended from the Catalina

and carried them off. In the night the enemy approached close to the

walls, but the next morning captain Wren again came down from the

Catalina, and, at the same time, the troops sallied from the convent,

with a view to discover the position of the French advanced posts. So

daring was this sally that Mr. Welstead of the eighty-second actually

pushed into one of their camps and captured a field-piece there;

and although he was unable to bring it off, in face of the French

reserves, the latter were drawn by the skirmish under the fire of the

ships, of the island, and of the town, whereby they suffered severely

and could with difficulty recover the captured piece of artillery

from under the guns of the north-east tower.

In the night of the 22d the anticipations of the British engineer

were realized. The enemy broke ground in two places, five hundred

yards from the eastern front, and assiduously pushed forward their

approaches until the 26th; but always under a destructive fire, to

which they replied with musketry, and with their wall-pieces, which

killed several men, and would have been very dangerous, but for the

sand-bags which captain Nicholas, the chief engineer at Cadiz, had

copiously supplied. This advantage was however counterbalanced by the

absence of the ships which were all driven away in a gale on the 23rd.

On the 27th the French battering-train arrived, and on the 29th

the sixteen-pounders opened against the town, and the howitzers

against the island. These last did little damage beyond dismounting

the gun in the tower of the Gusmans, which was however quickly

re-established; but the sixteen-pounders brought the old wall down in

such flakes, that in a few hours a wide breach was effected, a little

to the left of the portcullis tower, looking from the camp.

The place was now exposed both to assault and escalade, but behind

the breach the depth to the street was above fourteen feet, the space

below was covered with iron window-gratings, having every second

bar turned up, the houses there, and behind all points liable to

escalade, were completely prepared and garrisoned, and the troops

were dispersed all round the ramparts, each regiment having its own

quarter assigned. The Spanish and forty-seventh British regiment

guarded the breach, and on their right some riflemen prolonged the

line. The eighty-seventh regiment occupied the portcullis tower and

extended along the rampart to the left.

In the night of the 29th the enemy fired salvos of grape on the

breach, but the besieged cleared the foot of it between the

discharges.

The 30th the breaching fire was renewed, the wall was broken for

sixty feet, and the whole breach offered an easy ascent, yet the

besieged again cleared away the rubbish, and in the night were fast

augmenting the defences behind, when a heavy rain filled the bed

of the river, and the torrent bringing down, from the French camp,

planks, fascines, gabions, and dead bodies, broke the palisades with

a shock, bent the portcullis backward, and with the surge of the

waters even injured the defences behind the breach: a new passage was

thus opened in the wall, yet such was the vigour of the besieged,

that the damage was repaired before the morning, and the troops

calmly and confidently awaited

THE ASSAULT.

The waters subsided in the night as quickly as they had risen, but

at daylight a living stream of French grenadiers glided swiftly down

the bed of the river, and as if assured of victory, arrived, without

shout or tumult, within a few yards of the walls, when, instead of

quitting the hollow, to reach the breach, they, like the torrent

of the night, continued their rapid course and dashed against the

portcullis. The British soldiers, who had hitherto been silent and

observant, as if at a spectacle which they were expected to applaud,

now arose, and with a crashing volley smote the head of the French

column! The leading officer, covered with wounds, fell against the

portcullis and gave up his sword through the bars to colonel Gough;

the French drummer, a gallant boy, who was beating the charge,

dropped lifeless by his officer’s side, and the dead and wounded

filled the hollow. The remainder of the assailants then breaking

out to the right and left, spread along the slopes of ground under

the ramparts and opened a quick irregular musketry. At the same

time, a number of men coming out of the trenches, leaped into pits

digged in front, and shot fast at the garrison, but no escalade or

diversion at the other points was made, and the storming column was

dreadfully shattered. For the ramparts streamed forth fire, and from

the north-eastern tower a field-piece, held in reserve expressly

for the occasion, sent, at pistol-shot distance, a tempest of grape

whistling through the French masses, which were swept away in such a

dreadful manner, that they could no longer endure the destruction,

but plunging once more into the hollow returned to their camp, while

a shout of victory, mingled with the sound of musical instruments,

passed round the wall of the town.

[Sidenote: 1812. January.]

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s Correspondence, MSS.]

In this combat the allies lost five officers and thirty-one men,

but the French dead covered all the slopes in front of the rampart,

and choked the bed of the river, and ten wounded officers, of

whom only one survived, were brought in by the breach. Skerrett,

compassionating their sufferings and admiring their bravery,

permitted Laval to fetch off the remainder; and the operations of

the siege were then suspended, for both sides suffered severely

from the weather. The rain partially ruined the French batteries,

interrupted their communications, and stopped their supplies; on

the other hand the torrent, again swelling, broke the stockades

of the allies and injured their retrenchments, and some vessels,

coming from Gibraltar with ammunition, were wrecked on the coast.

Nevertheless a fresh assault was hourly expected until the night of

the 4th, when, several cannon-shots being heard in the French camp,

without any bullets reaching the town, it was judged that the enemy

were destroying the guns previous to retreating. Soon afterwards

large fires were observed, and at daylight the troops issuing out

of the convent, drove the enemy from the batteries, and commenced a

skirmish with the rear-guard; but a heavy storm impeded the action;

the French conducted their retreat skilfully, and the British, after

making a few prisoners, relinquished the pursuit. Nevertheless

Laval’s misfortunes did not end here. The privations his troops had

endured in the trenches produced sickness; many men deserted, and it

was computed, at the time, that the expedition cost the French not

less than a thousand men, while the whole loss of the allies did not

exceed one hundred and fifty.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.]

Such is the simple tale of Tarifa, but the true history of its

defence cannot there be found. To hide the errors of the dead is

not always a virtue, and when it involves injustice to the living

it becomes a crime; colonel Skerrett has obtained the credit, but

he was not the author of the success at Tarifa. He, and lord Proby,

the second in command, were from the first impressed with a notion,

that the place could not be defended and ought to be abandoned;

all their proceedings tended to that end, and they would even have

abandoned the island. At colonel Skerrett’s express desire general

Cooke had recalled him on the 18th, that is to say, the day before

the siege commenced; and during its progress he neither evinced

hopes of final success, nor made exertions to obtain it; in some

instances he even took measures tending directly towards failure. To

whom then was England indebted for this splendid achievement? The

merit of the conception is undoubtedly due to general Campbell, the

lieutenant-governor of Gibraltar. He first occupied Tarifa, and he

also engaged the Spaniards to admit an English garrison into Ceuta,

that the navigation of the straits and the coasting trade might be

secured; for he was the only authority in the south of the Peninsula

who appeared to understand the true value of those points. Finally,

it was his imperious and even menacing orders, which prevented

colonel Skerrett from abandoning Tarifa before the siege commenced.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 5.]

General Campbell’s resolution is the more to be admired, because

Tarifa was, strictly speaking, not within his command, which did

not extend beyond the walls of his own fortress; and he had also

to contend against general Cooke, who claimed the controul of a

garrison which was chiefly composed of troops from Cadiz. He acted

also contrary to the opinion of lord Wellington, who, always averse

to any serious co-operation with the Spaniards, as well knowing

the latter would inevitably fail, and throw the burthen on the

British in the hour of need, was in this instance more strongly

influenced, because the reports of general Cooke, founded on colonel

Skerrett’s and lord Proby’s representations, reprobated the defence

of Tarifa. Thus misinformed of the real resources, and having no

local knowledge of the place, lord Wellington judged, that the

island only could be held—that Skerrett’s detachment was not wanting

for that purpose—and that without the island the enemy could not

keep possession of Tarifa. Were they even to take both, he thought

they could not retain them, while Ballesteros was in strength and

succoured from Gibraltar, unless they also kept a strong force in

those parts; finally, that the defence of the island was the least

costly and the most certain. However, with that prudence, which

always marked his proceedings, although he gave his opinion, he

would not interfere from a distance, in a matter which could only be

accurately judged of on the spot.

But the island had not a single house, and was defenceless; the

rain alone, without reckoning the effects of the enemy’s shells,

would have gone near to force the troops away; and as the shipping

could not always remain in the roadstead, the building of casemates

and barracks, and storehouses for provisions and ammunition, would

have been more expensive than the defence of the town. Tarifa was

therefore an outwork to the island, and one so capable of a good

defence that a much more powerful attack had been expected, and a

more powerful resistance prepared by the English engineer; a defence

not resting on the valour of the troops alone, but upon a skilful

calculation of all the real resources, and all the chances.

[Sidenote: Intercepted despatches, 17th April, 1812.]

[Sidenote: General Campbell’s papers, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI.]

That the value of the object was worth the risk may be gathered

from this, that Soult, three months after the siege, thus expressed

himself, “The taking of Tarifa will be more hurtful to the English

and to the defenders of Cadiz, than the taking of Alicant or even

Badajos, where I cannot go without first securing my left and taking

Tarifa.” And, besides the advantages already noticed as belonging

to the possession of this place, it was close to Ceuta where there

were a few British soldiers, but many French prisoners, and above

two thousand discontented Spanish troops and galley-slaves; Ceuta,

which was so neglected by the Spanish regency that a French general,

a prisoner, did not hesitate to propose to the governor to give it

up to Soult as his only means of avoiding starvation. Neither would

Soult have failed to strengthen himself at Tarifa in despite of

Ballesteros, were it only to command the supplies of the Campiña,

and those from Barbary which could but be brought to that port or to

Conil: the latter was however seldom frequented by the Moors, because

the run was long and precarious, whereas a favourable current always

brought their craft well to Tarifa. Swarms of French gun-boats would

therefore soon have given Soult the command of the coasting trade, if

not of the entire straits.

Tarifa then was worth the efforts made for its defence; and setting

aside the courage and devotion of the troops, without which nothing

could have been effected, the merit chiefly appertains to sir Charles

Smith, the captain of engineers. That officer’s vigour and capacity

overmatched the enemy’s strength without, and the weakness and

cajolement of those who did not wish to defend it within. Skerrett

could not measure a talent above his own mark, and though he yielded

to Smith’s energy, he did so with avowed reluctance, and dashed it

with some wild actions, for which it is difficult to assign a motive;

because he was not a dull man, and he was a brave man, as his death

at Bergen-op-Zoom proved. But his military capacity was naught, and

his mind did not easily catch another’s enthusiasm. Tarifa was the

commentary upon Taragona.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VI. Section 3.]

During the siege, the engineer’s works in front were constantly

impeded by colonel Skerrett; he would call off the labourers to

prepare posts of retreat, and Smith’s desire to open the north-gate,

(which had been built up,) that the troops might have egress in

case of escalade, was opposed by him, although there was no other

point for the garrison to sally, save by the sea-gate which was

near the castle. On the 29th of December a shell, fired from the

eighteen-pounder in the tower of the Gusmans, having bursted too

soon, killed or wounded one of the inhabitants, and a deputation of

the citizens came to complain of the accident; Colonel Skerrett,

although the breach was then open, immediately ordered that gun, and

a thirty-two-pound caronade, which at four hundred yards looked into

the French batteries, to be dismounted and spiked! and it was done!

To crown this absurd conduct, he assigned the charge of the breach

entirely to the Spanish troops, and if Smith had not insisted upon

posting the forty-seventh British regiment alongside of them, this

alone would have ruined the defence; because hunger, nakedness, and

neglect, had broken the spirit of those poor men, and during the

combat general Copons alone displayed the qualities of a gallant

soldier.

To the British engineer, therefore, the praise of this splendid

action is chiefly due; because he saw from the first all the

resources of the place, and with equal firmness and talent developed

them, notwithstanding the opposition of his superiors; because at the

same time he, by skilful impositions, induced the enemy (whose attack

should have embraced the suburbs and the north-west salient angle

of the place) to open his trenches on the east, where the besieged,

under the appearance of weakness, had concentrated all their

strength; finally, because he repressed despondency where he failed

to infuse confidence. The second in merit was captain Mitchell, of

the artillery; because in the management of that arm for the defence

of the town, his talent and enterprise were conspicuous, especially

during the assault; nor can the result of this last event be taken

as the just measure of either officer’s merits, seeing that a

prolonged siege and a more skilful and powerful attack was expected.

In the enemy’s camp was found the French engineer’s sketch for a

renewed operation by a cautious and extensive system of mines and

breaches; but nothing was there laid down that had not been already

anticipated, and provided against by his British opponents. If then

the defence of Tarifa was a great and splendid exploit, and none can

doubt that it was, those who conceived, planned, and executed it

should have all the glory. Amongst those persons colonel Skerrett has

no right to be placed; yet, such are the errors of power, that he was

highly applauded for what he did not do, and general Campbell was

severely rebuked by lord Liverpool for having risked his Majesty’s

troops!

The French displayed courage but no skill. For two days, their heavy

howitzers had been directed vaguely against the interior of the

town, and the distant island, whither the unfortunate people fled

from their shattered and burning houses. A portion of the shells

thus thrown away in cruelty would have levelled the north-east tower

with the ground, and the French were aware of its importance; but

throughout the siege their operations were mastered by the superior

ability of the engineer and artillery officers opposed to them.

In the expectation that a more powerful attack would be made in the

spring, general Campbell directed casemates and splinter proofs to

be made in the island, but Skerrett’s troops were recalled to Cadiz,

which now contained nearly eight thousand British, exclusive of

fifteen hundred of these destined for Carthagena and Alicant. This

arrangement was however soon changed, because the events of the

war put Carthagena out of the French line of operations, and the

pestilence there caused the removal of the British troops. Neither

was Tarifa again attacked; lord Wellington had predicted that it

would not, and on sure grounds, for he was then contemplating a

series of operations, which were calculated to change the state of

the war, and which shall be set forth in the next book.

BOOK XVI.

CHAPTER I.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

Up to this period, the invasion, although diversified by occasional

disasters on the part of the invaders, had been progressive. The

tide, sometimes flowing, sometimes ebbing, had still gained upon the

land, and wherever the Spaniards had arrested its progress, it was

England that urged their labour and renovated their tired strength;

no firm barrier, no solid dike, had been opposed to its ravages, save

by the British general in Portugal, and even there the foundation of

his work, sapped by the trickling waters of folly and intrigue, was

sliding away. By what a surprising effort of courage and judgment

he secured it shall now be shown; and as the field operations, in

this war, were always influenced more by political considerations,

than by military principles, it will be necessary first to place the

general’s situation with respect to the former in its true light.

_Political situation of king Joseph._ France, abounding in riches

and power, was absolute mistress of Europe from the Pyrenees to the

Vistula; but Napoleon, resolute to perfect his continental system for

the exclusion of British goods, now found himself, in the pursuit

of that object, hastening rapidly to a new war, and one so vast,

that even his force was strained to meet it. The Peninsula already

felt relief from this cause. The dread of his arrival ceased to

influence the operations of the allied army in Portugal, many able

French officers were recalled, and as it was known that the imperial

guards, and the Polish troops, were to withdraw from Spain, the scale

of offensive projects was necessarily contracted. Conscripts and

young soldiers instead of veterans, and in diminished numbers, were

now to be expected; and in the French army there was a general, and

oppressive sense, of the enormous exertion which would be required to

bring two such mighty wars to a happy conclusion. On the other hand,

the Peninsulars were cheered by seeing so powerful a monarch, as the

czar, rise in opposition to Napoleon, and the English general found

the principal basis of his calculations realized by this diversion.

He had never yet been strong enough to meet eighty thousand French

troops in battle, even under a common general; but his hopes rose

when he saw the great warrior of the age, not only turning himself

from the contest, but withdrawing from it a reserve of four hundred

thousand veterans, whose might the whole world seemed hardly able to

withstand.

The most immediate effect, however, which the approaching contest

with Russia produced in the Peninsula, was the necessity of restoring

Joseph to his former power over the French armies. While the emperor

was absent from Paris, the supreme controul of the operations could

only be placed in the hands of the monarch of Spain; yet this was

only to reproduce there, and with greater virulence, the former

jealousies and disputes. Joseph’s Spanish policy remained unchanged;

the pride of the French generals was at least equal to his, pretexts

for disputes were never wanting on either side, and the mischievous

nature of those disputes may be gathered from one example. In

November the king being pressed for money, sold the magazines of corn

collected near Toledo, for the army of Portugal, and without which

the latter could not exist; Marmont, regardless of the political

scandal, immediately sent troops to recover the magazines by force,

and desired the purchasers to reclaim their money from the monarch.

_Political state of Spain._ All the intrigues and corruptions and

conflicting interests before described had increased in violence. The

negotiations for the mediation of England with the colonies, were not

ended; Carlotta still pressed her claims; and the division between

the liberals and serviles, as they were called, became daily wider.

Cadiz was in 1811 the very focus of all disorder. The government

was alike weak and dishonest, and used many pitiful arts to extract

money from England. No subterfuge was too mean. When Blake was going

with the fourth army to Estremadura, previous to the battle of

Albuera, the minister Bardaxi entreated the British envoy to grant a

loan, or a gift, without which, he asserted, Blake could not move;

Mr. Wellesley refused, because a large debt was already due to the

legation, and the next morning a Spanish ship of war from America

landed a million and a half of dollars!

In July, notwithstanding the victory of Albuera, the regency was

held in universal contempt, both it and the cortes were without

influence, and their conduct merited it. For although vast sums

were continually received, and every service was famished, the

treasury was declared empty, and there was no probability of any

further remittances from America. The temper of the public was soured

towards England, the press openly assailed the British character, and

all things so evidently tended towards anarchy, that Mr. Wellesley

declared “Spanish affairs to be then worse than they had been at any

previous period of the war.”

The cortes, at first swayed by priests and lawyers, who cherished

the inquisition and were opposed to all free institutions, was now

chiefly led by a liberal or rather democratic party, averse to the

British influence; hence, in August a new constitution, quite opposed

to the aristocratic principle, was promulgated. With the excellencies

and defects of that instrument the present History has indeed little

concern, but the results were not in accord with the spirit of the

contrivance, and the evils affecting the war were rather increased

by it; the democratic basis of the new constitution excited many

and bitter enemies, and the time and attention, which should have

been bestowed upon the amelioration of the soldiers’ condition, was

occupied in factions, disputes, and corrupt intrigues.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I.]

That many sound abstract principles of government were clearly and

vigorously laid down in the scheme of this constitution, cannot be

denied, the complicated oppressions of the feudal system were swept

away with a bold and just hand; but of what avail, as regarded the

war, was the enunciation of principles which were never attempted to

be reduced to practice? What encouragement was it to the soldier, to

be told he was a free man, fighting for a constitution as well as for

national independence, when he saw the authors of that constitution,

corruptly revelling in the wealth which should have clothed, and

armed, and fed him? What was nominal equality to him, when he saw

incapacity rewarded, crimes and treachery unpunished in the rich, the

poor and patriotic oppressed? He laughed to scorn those who could

find time to form the constitution of a great empire, but could not

find time or honesty to feed, or clothe, or arm the men who were to

defend it!

The enemies of democracy soon spread many grievous reports of

misfortunes and treachery, some true, some false; and at the most

critical period of the war in Valencia, they endeavoured to raise a

popular commotion to sweep away the cortes. The monks and friars,

furious at the suppression of the inquisition, were the chief

plotters every where; and the proceedings of Palacios, in concert

with them, were only part of a church project, commenced all over

Spain to resist the cortes. In October, Lardizabal, the other deposed

regent, published at Alicant, a manifesto, in which he accused the

cortes and the Cadiz writers of jacobinism, maintained the doctrine

of passive obedience, and asserted, that the regents only took the

oath to the cortes, because they could not count on the army or the

people at Cadiz; otherwise they would cause the king’s authority to

be respected in their persons as his only legitimate representatives.

This manifesto was declared treasonable, and a vessel was despatched

to bring the offender to Cadiz; but the following day it was

discovered, that the old council of Castile had also drawn up a

manifesto similar in principle, and the persons sent by the cortes

to seize the paper were told that it was destroyed. The protest of

three members against it was however found, and five lawyers were

selected from the cortes to try the guilty councillors and Lardizabal.

In November the public cry for a new regency became general, and it

was backed by the English plenipotentiary. Nevertheless the matter

was deferred upon divers pretexts, and meanwhile the democratic party

gained strength in the cortes, and the anti-British feeling appeared

more widely diffused than it really was; because some time elapsed

before the church and aristocratic party discovered that the secret

policy of England was the same as their own. It was so, however,

even to the upholding of the inquisition, which it was ridiculously

asserted had become objectionable only in name; as if, while the

frame-work of tyranny existed, there could ever be wanting the will

to fill it up. Necessity alone induced the British cabinet to put on

a smooth countenance towards the cortes. In this state of affairs,

the negotiation for the colonial mediation, was used by the Spaniards

merely as a ground for demanding loans, subsidies, and succours in

kind, which they used in fitting out new expeditions against the

revolted colonists; the complaints of the British legation on this

point were quite disregarded. At this time also Lapeña was acquitted

of misconduct at Barosa, and would have been immediately re-employed,

if the English minister had not threatened to quit Cadiz, and advised

general Cooke to do the same.

Mr. Wellesley seeing that the most fatal consequences to the war must

ensue, if a stop was not put to the misconduct of the regency, had

sent Mr. Vaughan, the secretary of legation, to acquaint the British

cabinet with the facts, and to solicit a more firm and decided course

of policy. Above all things he desired to have the subsidies settled

by treaty, that the people of Spain might really know what England

had done and was still doing for them; for on every occasion, arms,

clothing, ammunition, loans, provisions, guns, stores, and even

workmen and funds, to form founderies, were demanded and obtained

by the Spanish government, and then wasted or embezzled, without

the people benefiting, or even knowing of the generosity, or rather

extravagance, with which they were supplied; while the receivers and

wasters were heaping calumnies on the donors.

[Sidenote: 1811. June.]

[Sidenote: Joseph’s papers captured at Vittoria.]

The regency question was at last seriously discussed in the cortes,

and the deputy, Capmany, who if we may believe the partizans of

Joseph, was anti-English in his heart, argued the necessity of this

change on the ground of pleasing the British. This excited great

discontent, as he probably intended, and many deputies declared

at first that they would not be dictated to by any foreign power;

but the departure of Mr. Vaughan alarmed them, and a commission,

formed to improve the mode of governing, was hastening the decision

of the question, when Blake’s disaster at Valencia completed the

work. Carlotta’s agent was active in her behalf, but the eloquent

and honest Arguelles was opposed to him; and the cortes although

they recognized her claim to the succession, denied her the regency,

because of a previous decree which excluded all royal personages from

that office.

[Sidenote: 1812.]

On the 21st of January 1812, after a secret discussion of twenty-four

hours, a new regency, to consist of five members, of which two

were Americans, was proclaimed. The men chosen, were the duke of

Infantado, then in England, Henry O’Donnel, admiral Villarvicencio,

Joachim de Mosquera, and Ignacios de Ribas; and each was to have the

presidency by rotation for six months.

They commenced beneficially. O’Donnel was friendly to the British

alliance, and proposed a military feast, to restore harmony between

the English and Spanish officers; he made many changes in the

department of war, and finances; consulted the British generals, and

disbanding several bad regiments, incorporated the men with other

battalions; he also reduced many inefficient and malignant colonels,

and striking off from the pay lists all unemployed and absent

officers, it was found, that they were five thousand in number!

Ballesteros was appointed captain-general of Andalusia and received

the command of the fourth army, whose head-quarters were prudently

removed to Algeziras; the troops there were encreased, by drafts

from Cadiz to ten or twelve thousand men, and a new army was set on

foot in Murcia. Finally, to check trading with the French a general

blockade of all the coast in their possession, from Rosas to St.

Sebastian, was declared.

But it was soon discovered that the secret object was to obtain a

loan from England, and as this did not succeed, and nothing good was

ever permanent in Spanish affairs, the old disputes again broke out.

The democratic spirit gained strength in the cortes; the anti-English

party augmented; the press abounded in libels, impugning the good

faith of the British nation, especially with respect to Ceuta; for

which however there was some plausible ground of suspicion, because

the acquisition of that fortress had actually been proposed to lord

Liverpool. The new regency, also as violent as their predecessors

with respect to America, disregarded the mediation, and having

secretly organized in Gallicia an expedition against the colonies,

supplied it with artillery furnished from England for the French

war, and then, under another pretence, demanded money of the British

minister to forward this iniquitous folly.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

_Political state of Portugal._—In October all the evils before

described still existed, and were aggravated. The old disputes

remained unsettled, the return of the royal family was put off, and

the reforms in the military system, which Beresford had repaired to

Lisbon to effect, were either thwarted or retarded by the regency.

Mr. Stuart indeed forced the government to repair the bridges and

roads in Beira, to throw some provisions into the fortresses;

and, in despite of Redondo, the minister of finance, who, for the

first time, now opposed the British influence, he made the regency

substitute a military chest and commissariat, instead of the “Junta

de Viveres.” But Forjas and Redondo then disputed for the custody of

the new chest; and when Mr. Stuart explained to the one, that, as

the intent was to separate the money of the army from that of the

civil departments, his claims were incompatible with such an object;

and to the other that the conduct of his own department was already

more than he could manage, both were offended; and this new source of

disorder was only partially closed by withholding the subsidy until

they yielded.

Great malversations in the revenue were also discovered; and a plan,

to enforce an impartial exaction of the “decima,” which was drawn

up by Nogueira, at the desire of Wellington, was so ill received

by those whose illegal exemptions it attacked, that the Souzas

immediately placed themselves at the head of the objectors out of

doors. Nogueira then modified it, but the Souzas still opposed, and

as Wellington, judging the modification to be an evasion of the

principle, would not recede from the first plan, a permanent dispute

and a permanent evil, were thus established by that pernicious

faction. In fine, not the Souzas only, but the whole regency in

their folly now imagined that the war was virtually decided in their

favour, and were intent upon driving the British away by disgusting

the general.

A new quarrel also arose in the Brazils. Lord Wellington had been

created conde de Vimiero, Beresford conde de Trancoso, Silveira

conde d’Amurante; and other minor rewards, of a like nature, had

been conferred on subordinate officers. These honours had however

been delayed in a marked manner, and lord Strangford, who appears

to have been ruled entirely by the Souza faction, and was therefore

opposed to Forjas, charged, or as he termed it, reported a charge,

made against the latter, at the Brazils, for having culpably delayed

the official return of the officers who were thus to be rewarded.

Against this accusation, which had no foundation in fact, seeing that

the report had been made, and that Forjas was not the person to whose

department it belonged, lord Wellington and Mr. Stuart protested,

because of the injustice; and because it was made in pursuance of a

design to remove Forjas from the government. The English general was

however thus placed in a strange position, for while his letters to

Forjas were menacing rebukes to him, and his coadjutors, for their

neglect of public affairs; and while his formal complaints of the

conduct of the regency were transmitted to the Brazils, he was also

obliged to send other letters in support of the very persons whom he

was justly rebuking for misconduct.

In the midst of these embarrassments, an accidental event was like

to have brought the question of the British remaining in Portugal

to a very sudden decision. While Massena was before the lines,

one d’Amblemont had appeared in North America, and given to Onis,

the Spanish minister, a plan for burning the British fleet in the

Tagus, which he pretended to have received orders from the French

government to execute. This plan being transmitted to the Brazils,

many persons named by d’Amblemont as implicated were, in consequence

arrested at Lisbon and sent to Rio Janeiro, although Mr. Stuart had

ascertained the whole affair to be a forgery. The attention paid to

this man by Onis and by the court of Rio Janeiro, induced him to

make farther trial of their credulity, and he then brought forward

a correspondence between the principal authorities of Mexico and

the French government; he even produced letters from the French

ministers, directing intrigues to be commenced at Lisbon, and the

French interest there to be placed in the hands of the Portuguese

intendant of police.

Mr. Stuart, lamenting the ruin of many innocent persons, whom

this forging villain was thus dooming, prayed lord Wellesley to

interfere; but meanwhile the court of Rio Janeiro, falling headlong

into the snare, sent orders to arrest more victims; and amongst

others, without assigning any cause, and without any communication

with the English general, the regency seized one Borel, a clerk in

the department of the British paymaster-general. This act being at

once contrary to treaty, hostile to the alliance, and insulting in

manner, raised lord Wellington’s indignation to such a pitch, that he

formally notified to the Portuguese government his resolution, unless

good reasons were assigned and satisfaction made for the outrage,

to order all persons attached to the British to place themselves

in security under the protection of the army, as if in a hostile

country, until the further pleasure of the British prince regent

should be made known.

The political storm which had been so long gathering then seemed

ready to break, but suddenly the horizon cleared. Lord Wellington’s

letter to the prince, backed up by lord Wellesley’s vigorous

diplomacy, had at last alarmed the court of Rio Janeiro, and in

the very crisis of Borel’s case came letters, in which the prince

regent admitted, and approved of all the ameliorations and changes

proposed by the English general; and the contradiction given by

Mr. Stuart to the calumnies of the Souza faction, was taken as the

ground for a complete and formal retraction, by Linhares, of his

former insinuations, and insulting note relative to that gentleman’s

conduct. Principal Souza was however not dismissed, nor was Forjas’

resignation noticed, but the prince declared that he would overlook

that minister’s disobedience, and retain him in office; thus proving

that fear, not conviction, or justice, for Forjas had not been

disobedient, was the true cause of this seeming return to friendly

relations with the British.

Mr. Stuart considering the submission of the prince to be a mere

nominal concession of power which was yet to be ripened into real

authority, looked for further difficulties, and he was not mistaken:

meanwhile he made it a point of honour to defend Forjas, and

Nogueira, from the secret vengeance of the opposite faction. The

present submission of the court however gave the British an imposing

influence, which rendered the Souzas’ opposition nugatory for the

moment. Borel was released and excuses were made for his arrest;

the formation of a military chest was pushed with vigour; the paper

money was raised in value; the revenue was somewhat increased, and

Beresford was enabled to make progress in the restoration of the

army. The prince had however directed the regency to revive his

claim to Olivenza immediately; and it was with difficulty that

lord Wellington could stifle this absurd proceeding; neither did

the forced harmony last, for the old abuses affecting the civil

administration of the army rather increased, as will be shewn in the

narration of military operations which are now to be treated of.

[Sidenote: 1811. October.]

It will be remembered that after the action of El Bodon, the allied

army was extensively cantoned on both sides of the Coa. Ciudad

Rodrigo was distantly observed by the British, and so closely by

Julian Sanchez, that on the 15th he carried off more than two hundred

oxen from under the guns of the place, and at the same time captured

general Renaud the governor, who had imprudently ventured out with

a weak escort. At this time Marmont had one division in Placentia,

and the rest of his infantry between that place and Madrid; but his

cavalry was at Peneranda on the Salamanca side of the mountains, and

his line of communication was organized on the old Roman road of the

Puerto de Pico, which had been repaired after the battle of Talavera.

The army of the north stretched from the Tormes to Astorga, the walls

of which place, as well as those of Zamora, and other towns in Leon,

were being restored, that the flat country might be held with a few

troops against the Gallician army. It was this scattering of the

enemy which had enabled lord Wellington to send Hill against Girard

at Aroyo de Molino; but when the reinforcements from France reached

the army of Portugal, the army of the north was again concentrated,

and would have invaded Gallicia while Bonet attacked the Asturias,

if Julian Sanchez’s exploit had not rendered it necessary first to

revictual Ciudad Rodrigo.

With this view a large convoy was collected at Salamanca, in

October, by general Thiebault, who spread a report that a force

was to assemble towards Tamames, and that the convoy was for its

support. This report did not deceive lord Wellington; but he believed

that the whole army of the north and one division of the army of

Portugal would be employed in the operation, and therefore made

arrangements to pass the Agueda and attack them on the march. The

heavy rains however rendered the fords of that river impracticable;

Thiebault seized the occasion, introduced the convoy, and leaving a

new governor returned on the 2nd of November before the waters had

subsided. One brigade of the light division was at this time on the

Vadillo, but it was too weak to meddle with the French, and it was

impossible to reinforce it while the Agueda was overflowed; for such

is the nature of that river that all military operations on its banks

are uncertain. It is very difficult for an army to pass it, at any

time in winter, because of the narrow roads, the depth of the fords

and the ruggedness of the banks; it will suddenly rise from rains

falling on the hills, without any previous indication in the plains,

and then the violence and depth of its stream will sweep away any

temporary bridge, and render it impossible to pass except by the

stone bridge of Ciudad Rodrigo, which was at this time in the enemy’s

possession.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

Early in November, Bonet, having reoccupied the Asturias, Dorsenne

marched a body of troops towards the hills above Ciudad, as if to

conduct another convoy; but the allied troops being immediately

concentrated, passed the Agueda at the ford of Zamara, whereupon the

French retired, and their rear was harassed by Carlos d’España and

Julian Sanchez, who captured some provisions and money contributions

they had raised. But now the provisions in the country between the

Coa and the Agueda were all consumed, and the continued negligence of

the Portuguese government, with respect to the means of transport,

rendered it impossible to bring up the field magazines from the

points of water carriage to the army. Lord Wellington was therefore,

contrary to all military rules, obliged to separate his divisions in

face of the enemy, and to spread the troops, especially the cavalry,

even to the Mondego and the valley of the Douro, or see them starved.

To cover this dangerous proceeding he kept a considerable body of

men beyond the Coa, and the state of all the rivers and roads, at

that season, together with the distance of the enemy in some measure

protected him; general Hill’s second expedition into Estremadura was

then also drawing the attention of the French towards that quarter;

finally Marmont, being about to detach Montbrun towards Valencia,

had withdrawn Foy’s division from Placentia, and concentrated

the greatest part of his army at Toledo; all which rendered the

scattering of the allies less dangerous, and in fact no evil

consequences ensued. This war of positions had therefore turned

entirely to the advantage of the allies, lord Wellington by taking

post near Ciudad Rodrigo while Hill moved round Badajos, had in a

manner paralysed three powerful armies. For Soult harassed by Hill

in Estremadura, and by Ballesteros and Skerrett in Andalusia, failed

in both quarters; and although Marmont in conjunction with Dorsenne,

had succoured Ciudad Rodrigo, the latter general’s invasion of

Gallicia had been stopped short, and his enterprises confined to the

reoccupation of the Asturias.

Meanwhile the works of Almeida were so far restored as to secure it

from a sudden attack, and in November when the army by crossing the

Agueda had occupied the attention of the French, the battering train

and siege stores were brought to that fortress, without exciting the

enemy’s attention, because they appeared to be only the armament

for the new works; a trestle bridge to throw over the Agueda was

also secretly prepared in the arsenal of Almeida by major Sturgeon

of the staff corps, an officer whose brilliant talents, scientific

resources, and unmitigated activity continually attracted the

attention of the whole army. Thus the preparation for the attack of

Ciudad advanced while the English general seemed to be only intent

upon defending his own positions.

CHAPTER II.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

Having now brought the story of the war to that period, when, after

many changes of fortune, the chances had become more equal, and the

fate of the Peninsula, thrown as it were between the contending

powers, became a prize for the readiest and boldest warrior, I would,

ere it is shown how Wellington seized it, recal to the reader’s

recollection the previous vicissitudes of the contest. I would have

him remember how, when the first, or insurrectional epoch of the war,

had terminated successfully for the Spaniards, Napoleon vehemently

broke and dispersed their armies, and drove the British auxiliaries

to embark at Coruña. How the war with Austria, and the inactivity of

Joseph, rendered the emperor’s victories unavailing, and revived the

confidence of the Spaniards. How sir Arthur Wellesley, victorious on

the Douro, then marched into Spain, and, although the concentrated

force of the enemy, and the ill conduct of the Spanish government,

forced him to retreat again to Portugal as sir John Moore, from the

same causes, had been obliged to retreat to the ocean, he by his

advance relieved Gallicia, as Moore had by a like operation before

saved Andalusia, which concluded the third epoch.

How the peninsulars, owing to the exertions of their allies, still

possessed a country, extending from the Asturias, through Gallicia,

Portugal, Andalusia, Murcia, Valencia, and Catalonia, and including

every important harbour and fortress except Santander, Santona,

Barcelona, and St. Sebastian. How Wellington appreciating the

advantages which an invaded people possess in their numerous lines of

operation, then, counselled the Spaniards, and forced the Portuguese,

to adopt a defensive war; and with the more reason that England,

abounding beyond all nations in military resources, and invincible

as a naval power, could form with her ships a secure exterior

floating base or line of depôts round the Peninsula, and was ready to

employ her armies as well as her squadrons in the struggle. How the

Spaniards, unheeding these admonitions, sought great battles, and in

a few months lost the Asturias, Andalusia, Estremadura, Aragon, and

the best fortresses of Catalonia, and were again laid prostrate and

helpless before the enemy.

How the victorious French armies then moved onwards, in swelling

pride, until dashed against the rocks of Lisbon they receded, broken

and refluent, and the English general once more stood a conqueror on

the frontier of Spain; and had he then retaken Badajos and Rodrigo

he would have gloriously finished the fourth or defensive epoch of

the war. But being baffled, partly by skill, partly by fortune;

factiously opposed by the Portuguese regency, thwarted by the Spanish

government, only half supported by his own cabinet, and pestered by

the follies of all three, he was reduced to a seeming inactivity; and

meanwhile the French added Taragona and the rich kingdom of Valencia

to their conquests.

These things I would have the reader reflect upon, because they

are the proofs of what it is the main object of this history to

inculcate, namely that English steel, English gold, English genius,

English influence, fought and won the battle of Spanish independence;

and this not as a matter of boast, although it was very glorious!

but as a useful lesson of experience. On the other hand also we must

wonder at the prodigious strength of France under Napoleon, that

strength which could at once fight England and Austria, aim at the

conquest of the Peninsula, and the reduction of Russia at the same

moment of time, and all with good hope of success.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 2.]

Let it not be said that the emperor’s efforts in the war of Spain

were feeble, for if the insurrectional epoch, which was unexpected

and accidental, be set aside, the grandeur of his efforts will be

found answerable to his gigantic reputation. In 1809 the French army

was indeed gradually decreased by losses and drafts for the Austrian

war, from three hundred and thirty-five thousand, which Napoleon

had led into the country, to two hundred and twenty-six thousand.

But in 1810 it was again raised to three hundred and sixty-nine

thousand, and fluctuated between that number and three hundred and

thirty thousand until August 1811, when it was again raised to three

hundred and seventy-two thousand men with fifty-two thousand horses!

And yet there are writers who assert that Napoleon neglected the war

in Spain! But so great is the natural strength of that country, that

had the firmness of the nation in battle and its wisdom in council,

been commensurate with its constancy in resistance, even this power,

backed by the four hundred thousand men who marched to Russia, would

scarcely have been sufficient to subdue it; whereas, weak in fight

and steeped in folly, the Spaniards must have been trampled in the

dust, but for the man whose great combinations I am now about to

relate.

The nicety, the quickness, the prudence, and the audacity of

Wellington’s operations, cannot however be justly estimated without

an exact knowledge of his political, local, and moral position. His

political difficulties have been already described, and his moral

situation was simply, that of a man, who felt, that all depended upon

himself; that he must by some rapid and unexpected stroke effect in

the field what his brother could not effect in the cabinet, while

the power of the Perceval faction was prevalent in England. But to

understand his local or military position, the conformation of the

country and the lines of communication must be carefully considered.

The principal French magazines were at Valladolid, and their advanced

troops were on the Tormes, from whence to the Agueda, where they held

the important point of Ciudad Rodrigo, was four long marches through

a wild forest country.

The allies’ line of communication from the Agueda to Lisbon, was

supplied by water to Raiva on the Mondego, after which the land

carriage was at least a hundred miles, through wild mountains, or

devastated valleys; it required fifteen days to bring up a convoy

from Lisbon to the army.

The line of communication with Oporto on the left flank, run through

eighty miles of very rugged country, before it reached the first

point of water carriage on the Douro.

The line of communication with Hill’s army on the right flank,

running also through a country full of strong passes and natural

obstacles, offered no resources for an army, save what were furnished

by the allies’ field magazines, which were supplied from Abrantes,

the first navigable point on the Tagus. On this line the boat-bridge

of Villa Velha was a remarkable feature, as furnishing the only

military passage over the Tagus between Abrantes and Almaraz.

The country between the Coa and the Agueda could not supply the

troops who occupied it; and the nature of the last river, and the

want of a covering position beyond, rendered it a matter of the

utmost danger and difficulty to besiege or even invest Ciudad

Rodrigo. The disadvantage which the French suffered in being so

distant from that fortress was thus balanced.

These considerations had prevented the English general from attacking

Ciudad Rodrigo in May; he had then no battering train, and Almeida

and her guns, were rendered a heap of ruins by the exploit of

Brenier. Badajos was at that period his object, because Beresford was

actually besieging it, and the recent battle of Fuentes Onoro, the

disputes of the French generals, the disorganization of Massena’s

army, and as proved by that battle, the inefficiency of the army of

the north, rendered it improbable that a serious invasion of Portugal

would be resumed on that side. And as the lines of communication with

the Mondego and the Douro, were not then completely re-established,

and the intermediate magazines small, no incursion of the enemy could

have done much mischief; and Spencer’s corps was sufficiently strong

to cover the line to Vilha Velha.

Affairs however soon changed. The skill of Phillipon, the diligence

of Marmont, and the generalship of Soult, in remaining at Llerena

after his repulse at Albuera, had rescued Badajos. Lord Wellington’s

boldness in remaining on the Caya prevented further mischief, but

the conduct of the Portuguese government, combined with the position

which Napoleon had caused Marmont to take in the valley of the

Tagus, effectually precluded a renewal of that siege; and then the

fallacious hope of finding Ciudad unprovided, brought lord Wellington

back to the Coa. This baffled the enemy’s projects, yet the position

of the army of the north, and that of Portugal, the one in front, the

other on the flank, prevented the English general from undertaking

any important operations in the field. For if he had advanced on

Salamanca, besides the natural difficulties of the country, his

communications with Hill, and even with Abrantes and Lisbon, would

have been cut by Marmont; and if he turned against Marmont on the

Tagus, Soult and Dorsenne would have closed upon his flanks.

This state of affairs not being well considered, had induced some

able officers, at the time of the Elbodon operation, to censure

the line of retreat to Sabugal, because it uncovered the line of

Celerico, and exposed to capture the battering train then at Villa

Ponte; but war is always a choice of difficulties, and it was better

to risk guns, of whose vicinity the enemy was not aware, than to give

up the communication with Hill which was threatened by the advance of

Foy’s two divisions on Zarza Maior.

As the French armies were reinforced after the allies came to

Beira, Dorsenne and Marmont became each equal to Wellington in the

field, and together infinitely too strong. Soult was then master of

Andalusia, and had a moveable reserve of twenty thousand men; the

army of Suchet daily gained ground in Valencia, the Asturias were

reoccupied by Bonet, and the army of the centre was reorganized.

Hence, to commence the siege of either Ciudad or Badajos, in form,

was hopeless, and when the rumour of Napoleon’s arrival became rife,

the English general, whose embarrassments were hourly increasing,

looked once more to the lines of Torres Vedras as a refuge. But

when the certainty of the Russian war removed this fear, the aspect

of affairs again changed, and the capture of Ciudad Rodrigo became

possible. For, first, there was a good battering train in Almeida,

and the works of that place were restored; secondly, the line of

communication with Oporto was completely organized, and shortened

by improving the navigation of the Douro; thirdly, Ciudad itself

was very weakly garrisoned and the ignorance of the French as to

the state of the allies’ preparations gave hope of a surprise. It

was, however, only by a surprise that success could be expected,

and it was not the least of lord Wellington’s merits that he so

well concealed his preparations, and for so long a period. No other

operation, promising any success, was open; and yet the general

could no longer remain inactive, because around him the whole fabric

of the war was falling to pieces from the folly of the governments

he was serving. If he could not effect a blow against the French

while Napoleon was engaged in the Russian war, it was clear that the

Peninsula would be lost.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

Now the surprise of a fortress, with a garrison of only seventeen

hundred men, seems a small matter in such grave circumstances, but

in reality it was of the very greatest importance, because it was

the first step in a plan which saved the Peninsula when nothing else

could have saved it. Lord Wellington knew that the valley of the

Tagus, could not long support both the army of Portugal, and the

army of the centre; he knew by intercepted letters that Marmont and

the king were already at open war upon the subject, and he judged,

that if he could surprise Ciudad Rodrigo, the army of Portugal would

be obliged, for the sake of provisions, and to protect Leon, then

weakened by the departure of the imperial guards, to concentrate in

that province. This was the first step.

The French kept magazines in reserve for sudden expeditions, feeding

meanwhile as they could upon the country, and therefore their

distress for provisions never obstructed their moving upon important

occasions. Nevertheless lord Wellington thought the tempestuous

season would render it very difficult for Marmont, when thus forced

into Leon, to move with great masses; wherefore he proposed when

Rodrigo fell, to march by Vilha Velha to Estremadura, and suddenly

besiege Badajos also, the preparations to be previously made in

Elvas, under the protection of Hill’s corps, and unknown to the

enemy. This was the second step, and in this surprise also he

hoped to be successful, because of the jealousies of the marshals,

the wet season, and his own combinations, which would impede

the concentration of the French armies, and prevent them from

keeping together if they did unite. He had hopes likewise that as

Ballesteros’ corps was now augmented, it would vex Soult’s posts on

the coast, while Hill and Morillo harassed him on the Guadiana; and

if Badajos fell, the English general was resolved to leave a force

to cover the captured place against the army of the centre, and then

fight Soult in Andalusia. For he judged that Marmont could not for

want of provisions, pass beyond the Guadiana, nor follow him before

the harvest was ripe; neither did he fear him in Beira, because the

torrents would be full, the country a desert, and the militia, aided

by a small regular corps, and covered by Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo,

would, he thought, be sufficient to prevent any serious impression

being made on Portugal during the invasion of Andalusia.

This was lord Wellington’s plan, and his firmness and resolution

in conceiving it were the more signal because his own troops were

not in good plight. The army had indeed received reinforcements,

but the infantry had served at Walcheren, and exposure to night

air, or even slight hardship, threw them by hundreds into the

hospital, while the new regiments of cavalry, inexperienced, and

not acclimated, were found, men and horses, quite unfit for duty,

and were sent to the rear. The pay of the army was three months in

arrear, and the supplies, brought up with difficulty, were very

scanty; half and quarter rations were often served, and sometimes

the troops were without any bread for three days consecutively, and

their clothing was so patched, that scarcely a regiment could be

known by its uniform. Chopped straw, the only forage, was so scarce

that the regimental animals were dying of hunger; corn was rarely

distributed save to the generals and staff, and even the horses of

the artillery and of the old cavalry suffered; nay, the very mules

of the commissariat were pinched by the scarcity, and the muleteers

were eight months in arrears of pay. The cantonments on the Coa

and Agueda were unhealthy from the continued rains, above twenty

thousand men were in hospital; and deduction made for other drains,

only fifty-four thousand of both nations, including garrisons and

posts of communication, were under arms. To finish the picture,

the sulky apathy produced in the Portuguese regency by the prince

regents letter, was now becoming more hurtful than the former active

opposition.

[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]

But even these distresses so threatening to the general cause,

Wellington turned to the advantage of his present designs; for the

enemy were aware of the misery in the army, and in their imagination

magnified it; and as the allied troops were scattered, for relief,

from the Gata mountains to the Douro, and from the Agueda to the

Mondego, at the very moment when the battering train entered Almeida,

both armies concluded, that these guns were only to arm that

fortress, as a cover to the extended country quarters which necessity

had forced the British general to adopt. No person, not even the

engineers employed in the preparations, knew more than that a siege

or the simulation of a siege was in contemplation; but when it was to

be attempted, or that it would be attempted at all, none knew; even

the quarter-master general Murray, was permitted to go home on leave,

with the full persuasion that no operation would take place before

spring.

In the new cantonments, however, abundance of provisions, and dry

weather (for in Beira the first rains generally subside during

December,) stopped the sickness, and restored about three thousand

men to the ranks; and it would be a great error to suppose, that

the privations had in any manner weakened the moral courage of the

troops. The old regiments had become incredibly hardy and experienced

in all things necessary to sustain their strength and efficacy; the

staff of the army was well practised, and lord Fitzroy Somerset, the

military secretary, had established such an intercourse between the

head-quarters and the commanders of battalions, that the latter had,

so to speak, direct communication with the general-in-chief upon

all the business of their regiments; a privilege which increased

the enthusiasm and zeal of all in a very surprising manner. For the

battalions being generally under very young men, the distinctions of

rank were not very rigidly enforced, and the merits of each officer

were consequently better known, and more earnestly supported when

promotion and honours were to be obtained. By this method lord

Fitzroy acquired an exact knowledge of the true moral state of each

regiment, rendered his own office at once powerful and gracious to

the army, and yet, such was his discretion and judgment, did in

no manner weaken the military hierarchy; thus also all the daring

young men were excited, and being unacquainted with the political

difficulties of their general, anticipated noble triumphs which were

happily realized.

The favourable moment for action so long watched for by Wellington

came at last. An imperial decree had remodelled the French armies.

That of Aragon was directed to give up four divisions to form a

new corps, under Reille, called the “_army of the Ebro_,” whose

head-quarters were at Lerida. The army of the south was recomposed in

six divisions of infantry and three of cavalry, besides the garrison

of Badajos, and marshal Victor returned to France, discontented, for

he was one of those whose reputation had been abated by this war.

His divisions were given to generals Conroux, Barrois, Villatte,

Laval, Drouet, Daricau, Peyremont, Digeon, and the younger Soult,

Phillipon continuing governor of Badajos. The reserve of Monthion

was broken up, and the army of the north, destined to maintain the

great communications with France and to reduce the Partidas, on that

line, was ordered to occupy the districts round Santander, Sebastian,

Burgos, and Pampeluna, and to communicate by the left with the new

army of the Ebro: it was also exceedingly reduced in numbers; for

the imperial guards, seventeen thousand strong, were required for

the Russian war, and marched in December to France. And besides

these troops, the Polish battalions, the skeletons of the cavalry

regiments, and several thousand choice men destined to fill the ranks

of the old guard were drafted; so that not less than forty thousand,

of the very best soldiers, were withdrawn, and the maimed and

worn-out men being sent back to France at the same time, the force in

the Peninsula was diminished by sixty thousand.

[Sidenote: 1812. January.]

The head-quarters of the army of the north arrived at Burgos in

January, and a division was immediately sent to drive Mendizabel from

the Montaña de Santander; but as this arrangement weakened the grand

line of communication with France, Marmont was ordered to abandon

the valley of the Tagus and fix his head-quarters at Valladolid or

Salamanca. Ciudad Rodrigo, the sixth and seventh governments, and

the Asturias, were also placed under his authority, by which Souham

and Bonet’s division, forming together about eighteen thousand men,

were added to his army; but the former general returned to France.

These divisions however, being pressed by want, were extended from

the Asturias to Toledo, while Montbrun was near Valencia, and

meanwhile Soult’s attention was distracted by Tarifa, and by Hill’s

pursuit of Drouet. Thus the French armies, every where occupied, were

spread over an immense tract of country; Marmont deceived by the

seemingly careless winter attitude of the allies, left Ciudad Rodrigo

unprotected within their reach, and Wellington jumped with both feet

upon the devoted fortress.

CHAPTER III.

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

[Sidenote: 1812. January.]

The troops disposable for the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo were about

thirty-five thousand, including cavalry; the materials for the siege

were established at Gallegos, Villa del Ciervo, and Espeja, on the

left of the Agueda, and the ammunition was at Almeida. From those

places, the hired carts and mules, were to bring up the stores to

the parc, and seventy pieces of ordnance had been collected at Villa

de Ponte. But from the scarcity of transports only thirty-eight guns

could be brought to the trenches, and these would have wanted their

due supply of ammunition, if eight thousand shot had not been found

amidst the ruins of Almeida.

On the 1st of January the bridge was commenced at Marialva, near

the confluence of the Azava with the Agueda, about six miles below

Ciudad, and piles were driven into the bed of the river, above and

below, to which the trestles were tied to render the whole firm.

The fortress was to have been invested on the 6th, but the native

carters were two days moving over ten miles of flat and excellent

road, with empty carts; the operation was thus delayed, and it was

dangerous to find fault with these people, because they deserted on

the slightest offence. Meanwhile the place being closely examined,

it was found that the French, in addition to the old works, had

fortified two convents, which flanked and strengthened the bad

Spanish entrenchments round the suburbs. They had also constructed

an enclosed and palisadoed redoubt upon the greater Teson; and this

redoubt, called Francisco, was supported by two guns and a howitzer

placed on the flat roof of the convent of that name.

The soil around was exceedingly rocky, except on the Teson itself,

and though the body of the place was there better covered by the

outworks, and could bring most fire to bear on the trenches, it was

more assailable according to the English general’s views; because

elsewhere the slope of the ground was such, that batteries must

have been erected on the very edge of the counterscarp before they

could see low enough to breach. This would have been a tedious

process, whereas the smaller Teson furnished the means of striking

over the crest of the glacis at once, and a deep gully near the

latter offered cover for the miners. It was therefore resolved to

storm fort Francisco, form a lodgement there, and opening the first

parallel along the greater Teson, to place thirty-three pieces in

counter-batteries with which to ruin the defences, and drive the

besieged from the convent of Francisco; then working forward by the

sap to construct breaching batteries on the lesser Teson, and blow in

the counterscarp, while seven guns, by battering a weak turret on the

left, opened a second breach, with a view to turn any retrenchment

behind the principal breach.

The first, third, fourth, and light divisions, and Pack’s Portuguese,

were destined for the siege, but as the country on the right bank of

the Agueda was destitute of fuel and cover, these troops were still

to keep their quarters on the left bank; and although there was a

very severe frost and fall of snow, yet one division carrying a day’s

provisions ready cooked, was to ford the river, every twenty-four

hours, either above or below the town, and thus alternately carry on

the works. Meanwhile to cover the siege, Julian Sanchez and Carlos

d’España were posted on the Tormes in observation of the enemy.

To obviate the difficulty of obtaining country transport, the English

general had previously constructed eight hundred carts drawn by

horses, and these were now his surest dependence for bringing up

ammunition; yet so many delays were anticipated from the irregularity

of the native carters and muleteers, and the chances of weather, that

he calculated upon an operation of twenty-four days, and yet hoped

to steal it from his adversaries; sure, even if he failed, that the

clash of his arms would again draw their scattered troops to that

quarter, as tinkling bells draw swarming bees to an empty hive.

The 8th of January the light division and Pack’s Portuguese forded

the Agueda near Caridad, three miles above the fortress, and making

a circuit, took post beyond the great Teson, where they remained

quiet during the day, and as there was no regular investment, the

enemy believed not that the siege was commenced. But in the evening

the troops stood to their arms, and colonel Colborne commanding; the

fifty-second, having assembled two companies from each of the British

regiments of the light division, stormed the redoubt of Francisco.

This he did with so much fury, that the assailants appeared to be at

one and the same time, in the ditch, mounting the parapets, fighting

on the top of the rampart, and forcing the gorge of the redoubt,

where the explosion of one of the French shells had burst the gate

open.

Of the defenders a few were killed, not many, and the remainder,

about forty in number, were made prisoners. The post being thus taken

with the loss of only twenty-four men and officers, working parties

were set to labour on the right of it, because the fort itself was

instantly covered with shot and shells from the town. This tempest

continued through the night, but at day-break the parallel, six

hundred yards in length, was sunk three feet deep, and four wide,

the communication over the Teson to the rear was completed, and

the progress of the siege was thus hastened several days by this

well-managed assault.

The 9th the first division took the trenches in hand. The place was

encircled by posts to prevent any external communication, and at

night twelve hundred workmen commenced three counter-batteries, for

eleven guns each, under a heavy fire of shells and grape. Before

day-light the labourers were under cover, and a ditch was also sunk

in the front to provide earth; for the batteries were made eighteen

feet thick at top, to resist the very powerful artillery of the place.

On the 10th the fourth division relieved the trenches, and a

thousand men laboured, but in great peril, for the besieged had a

superabundance of ammunition, and did not spare it. In the night the

communication from the parallel to the batteries was opened, and on

the 11th the third division undertook the siege.

This day the magazines in the batteries were excavated, and the

approaches widened, but the enemy’s fire was destructive, and the

shells came so fast into the ditch in front of the batteries,

that the troops were withdrawn, and the earth was raised from the

inside. Great damage was also sustained from salvos of shells, with

long fuzes, whose simultaneous explosion cut away the parapets in a

strange manner, and in the night the French brought a howitzer to the

garden of the convent of Francisco, with which they killed many men

and wounded others.

On the 12th the light division resumed the work, and the riflemen

taking advantage of a thick fog, covered themselves in pits, which

they digged in front of the trenches, and from thence picked off the

enemy’s gunners; but in the night the weather was so cold, and the

besieged shot so briskly, that little progress was made.

The 13th, the first division being on duty, the same causes impeded

the labourers, and now also the scarcity of transport baulked the

general’s operations. One third only, of the native carts, expected,

had arrived, and the drivers of those present were very indolent;

much of the twenty-four pound ammunition was still at Villa de Ponte,

and intelligence arrived that Marmont was collecting his forces to

succour the place. Wellington therefore changing his first plan,

resolved to open a breach with his counter-batteries, which were not

quite six hundred yards from the curtain, and then to storm the place

without blowing in the counterscarp; in other words, to overstep the

rules of science, and sacrifice life rather than time, for such was

the capricious nature of the Agueda that in one night a flood might

enable a small French force to relieve the place.

[Sidenote: Vide page 328.]

The whole army was immediately brought up from the distant quarters,

and posted in the villages on the Coa, ready to cross the Agueda and

give battle; and it was at this time, that Hill, who was then at

Merida, returned to Portalegre, and sent a division across the Tagus,

lest Marmont in despair of uniting his force in the north, in time to

save Ciudad, should act against the line of communication by Castello

Branco and Vilha Velha.

In the night of the 13th the batteries were armed with twenty-eight

guns, the second parallel and the approaches were continued by the

flying sap, and the Santa Cruz convent was surprised by the Germans

of the first division, which secured the right flank of the trenches.

The 14th the enemy, who had observed that the men in the trenches

always went off in a disorderly manner on the approach of the relief,

made a sally and overturned the gabions of the sap; they even

penetrated to the parallel, and were upon the point of entering the

batteries, when a few of the workmen getting together, checked them

until a support arrived, and thus the guns were saved. This affair,

together with the death of the engineer on duty, and the heavy fire

from the town, delayed the opening of the breaching batteries, but at

half-past four in the evening, twenty-five heavy guns battered the

“_fausse braye_” and rampart, and two pieces were directed against

the convent of Francisco. Then was beheld a spectacle at once fearful

and sublime. The enemy replied to the assailants’ fire with more than

fifty pieces, the bellowing of eighty large guns shook the ground

far and wide, the smoke rested in heavy volumes upon the battlements

of the place, or curled in light wreaths about the numerous spires,

the shells, hissing through the air, seemed fiery serpents leaping

from the darkness, the walls crashed to the stroke of the bullet, and

the distant mountains, faintly returning the sound, appeared to moan

over the falling city. And when night put an end to this turmoil, the

quick clatter of musketry was heard like the pattering of hail after

a peal of thunder, for the fortieth regiment assaulted and carried

the convent of Francisco, and established itself in the suburb on the

left of the attack.

The next day the ramparts were again battered, and fell so fast that

it was judged expedient to commence the small breach at the turret,

and in the night of the 15th five more guns were mounted. The 16th

at day-light the besiegers’ batteries recommenced, but at eight

o’clock a thick fog obliged them to desist, nevertheless the small

breach had been opened, and the place was now summoned, but without

effect. At night the parallel on the lower Teson was extended, and a

sharp musketry was directed from thence against the great breach. The

breaching battery as originally projected was also commenced, and the

riflemen of the light division, hidden in the pits, continued to pick

off the enemy’s gunners.

The 17th the fire on both sides was very heavy and the wall of the

place was beaten down in large cantles; but several of the besiegers’

guns were dismounted, their batteries injured, and many of their men

killed; general Borthwick the commandant of artillery was wounded

and the sap was entirely ruined. Even the riflemen in the pits were

at first overpowered with grape, yet towards evening they recovered

the upper hand, and the French could only fire from the more distant

embrasures. In the night the battery, intended for the lesser

breach, was armed, and that on the lower Teson raised so as to afford

cover in the day-time.

On the 18th the besiegers’ fire was resumed with great violence.

The turret was shaken at the small breach, the large breach became

practicable in the middle, and the enemy commenced retrenching it.

The sap however could make no progress, the superintending engineer

was badly wounded, and a twenty-four pounder having bursted in the

batteries, killed several men. In the night the battery on the lower

Teson was improved, and a field-piece and howitzer being placed

there, kept up a constant fire on the great breach to destroy the

French retrenchments.

On the 19th both breaches became practicable, major Sturgeon closely

examined the place, and a plan of attack was formed on his report;

the assault was then ordered, and the battering-guns were turned

against the artillery of the ramparts.

ASSAULT OF CIUDAD RODRIGO.

This operation which was confided to the third and light divisions,

and Pack’s Portuguese, was organized in four parts.

1º. _The right attack._ The light company of the eighty-third and the

second caçadores which were posted in the houses beyond the bridge

on the Agueda, were directed to cross that river and escalade an

outwork in front of the castle, where there was no ditch, but where

two guns commanded the junction of the counterscarp with the body of

the place. The fifth and ninety-fourth regiments posted behind the

convent of Santa Cruz and having the seventy-seventh in reserve, were

to enter the ditch at the extremity of the counterscarp; then to

escalade the “_fausse braye_,” and scour it on their left as far as

the great breach.

2º. _The centre attack or assault of the great breach._ One hundred

and eighty men protected by the fire of the eighty-third regiment,

and carrying hay-bags to throw into the ditch, were to move out of

the second parallel and to be followed by a storming party, which was

again to be supported by general Mackinnon’s brigade of the third

division.

3º. _Left attack._ The light division, posted behind the convent of

Francisco, was to send three companies of the ninety-fifth to scour

the “_fausse braye_” to the right, and so connect the left and centre

attacks. At the same time a storming party preceded by the third

caçadores carrying hay-sacks, and followed by Vandeleur’s and Andrew

Barnard’s brigades, was to make for the small breach, and when the

“_fausse braye_” was carried to detach to their right, to assist the

main assault, and to the left to force a passage at the Salamanca

gate.

4º. _The false attack._ This was an escalade to be made by Pack’s

Portuguese on the St. Jago gate at the opposite side of the town.

The right attack was commanded by colonel O’Toole of the caçadores.

Five hundred volunteers commanded by major Manners of the

seventy-fourth with a forlorn hope under Mr. Mackie of the

eighty-eighth, composed the storming party of the third division.

Three hundred volunteers led by major George Napier of the

fifty-second with a forlorn hope of twenty-five men under Mr.

Gurwood, of the same regiment, composed the storming party of the

light division.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. VII. Sect. 1.]

All the troops reached their different posts without seeming to

attract the attention of the enemy, but before the signal was given,

and while lord Wellington, who in person had been pointing out the

lesser breach to major Napier, was still at the convent of Francisco,

the attack on the right commenced, and was instantly taken up along

the whole line. Then the space between the army and the ditch was

covered with soldiers and ravaged by a tempest of grape from the

ramparts. The storming parties of the third division jumped out of

the parallel when the first shout arose, but so rapid had been the

movements on their right, that before they could reach the ditch,

Ridge, Dunkin, and Campbell with the fifth, seventy-seventh, and

ninety-fourth regiments, had already scoured the “_fausse braye_,”

and were pushing up the great breach, amidst the bursting of shells,

the whistling of grape and muskets, and the shrill cries of the

French who were driven fighting behind the retrenchments. There

however they rallied, and aided by the musketry from the houses, made

hard battle for their post; none would go back on either side, and

yet the British could not get forward, and men and officers, falling

in heaps, choked up the passage, which from minute to minute was

raked with grape, from two guns, flanking the top of the breach at

the distance of a few yards; thus striving and trampling alike upon

the dead and the wounded these brave men maintained the combat.

Meanwhile the stormers of the light division, who had three hundred

yards of ground to clear, would not wait for the hay-bags, but with

extraordinary swiftness running to the crest of the glacis, jumped

down the scarp, a depth of eleven feet, and rushed up the “_fausse

braye_” under a smashing discharge of grape and musketry. The bottom

of the ditch was dark and intricate, and the forlorn hope took

too much to their left; but the storming party went straight to

the breach, which was so contracted that a gun placed lengthwise

across the top nearly blocked up the opening. Here the forlorn hope

rejoined the stormers, but when two-thirds of the ascent were gained,

the leading men, crushed together by the narrowness of the place,

staggered under the weight of the enemy’s fire; and such is the

instinct of self-defence, that although no man had been allowed to

load, every musket in the crowd was snapped. The commander, major

Napier, was at this moment stricken to the earth by a grape-shot

which shattered his arm, but he called on his men to trust to their

bayonets, and all the officers simultaneously sprang to the front,

when the charge was renewed with a furious shout, and the entrance

was gained. The supporting regiments coming up in sections, abreast,

then reached the rampart, the fifty-second wheeled to the left, the

forty-third to the right, and the place was won. During this contest

which lasted only a few minutes, after the “_fausse braye_” was

passed, the fighting had continued at the great breach with unabated

violence, but when the forty-third, and the stormers of the light

division, came pouring down upon the right flank of the French, the

latter bent before the storm; at the same moment, the explosion of

three wall magazines destroyed many persons, and the third division

with a mighty effort broke through the retrenchments. The garrison

indeed still fought for a moment in the streets, but finally fled to

the castle, where Mr. Gurwood who though wounded, had been amongst

the foremost at the lesser breach, received the governor’s sword.

The allies now plunged into the streets from all quarters, for

O’Toole’s attack was also successful, and at the other side of

the town Pack’s Portuguese, meeting no resistance, had entered

the place, and the reserves also came in. Then throwing off the

restraints of discipline the troops committed frightful excesses. The

town was fired in three or four places, the soldiers menaced their

officers, and shot each other; many were killed in the market-place,

intoxication soon increased the tumult, disorder every where

prevailed, and at last, the fury rising to an absolute madness, a

fire was wilfully lighted in the middle of the great magazine, when

the town and all in it would have been blown to atoms, but for the

energetic courage of some officers and a few soldiers who still

preserved their senses.

[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i.]

Three hundred French had fallen, fifteen hundred were made prisoners,

and besides the immense stores of ammunition, above one hundred and

fifty pieces of artillery including the battering-train of Marmont’s

army, were captured in the place. The whole loss of the allies was

about twelve hundred soldiers and ninety officers, and of these

above six hundred and fifty men and sixty officers had been slain or

hurt at the breaches. General Crawfurd and general Mackinnon, the

former a man of great ability, were killed, and with them died many

gallant men, amongst others, a captain of the forty-fifth, of whom it

has been felicitously said, that “three generals and seventy other

officers bad fallen, but the soldiers fresh from the strife only

talked of Hardyman.” General Vandaleur, colonel Colborne, and a crowd

of inferior rank were wounded, and unhappily the slaughter did

not end with the battle, for the next day as the prisoners and their

escort were marching out by the breach, an accidental explosion took

place and numbers of both were blown into the air.

[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 8._

_Explanatory Sketch_

OF THE

SIEGE OF CIUDAD RODRIGO,

1812.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

To recompense an exploit so boldly undertaken and so gloriously

finished, lord Wellington was created duke of Ciudad Rodrigo by the

Spaniards, earl of Wellington by the English, and marquis of Torres

Vedras by the Portuguese; but it is to be remarked, that the prince

regent of Portugal had previous to that period displayed great

ingratitude in the conferring of honours upon the British officers.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The duration of this siege was twelve days, or half the time

originally calculated upon by the English general, and yet the

inexperience both of the engineer and soldier, and the very heavy

fire of the place, had caused the works to be more slowly executed

than might have been expected; the cold also had impeded the

labourers, and yet with a less severe frost the trenches would have

been overflowed, because in open weather the water rises every where

to within six inches of the surface. But the worst obstacle was

caused by the disgraceful badness of the cutting-tools furnished

from the storekeeper-general’s office in England, the profits of

the contractor seemed to be the only thing respected; the engineers

eagerly sought for French implements, because those provided by

England were useless.

2º. The audacious manner in which Wellington stormed the redoubt of

Francisco, and broke ground on the first night of the investment;

the more audacious manner in which he assaulted the place before the

fire of the defence had been in any manner lessened, and before the

counterscarp had been blown in; were the true causes of the sudden

fall of the place. Both the military and political state of affairs

warranted this neglect of rules. The final success depended more upon

the courage of the troops than the skill of the engineer; and when

the general terminated his order for the assault, with this sentence,

“Ciudad Rodrigo _must_ be stormed this evening,” he knew well that

it would be nobly understood. Yet the French fought bravely on the

breach, and by their side many British deserters, desperate men, were

bayonetted.

3º. The great breach was cut off from the town by a perpendicular

descent of sixteen feet, and the bottom was planted with sharp

spikes, and strewn with live shells; the houses behind were all

loop-holed, and garnished with musketeers, and on the flanks there

were cuts, not indeed very deep or wide and the French had left the

temporary bridges over them, but behind were parapets so powerfully

defended that it was said the third division could never have carried

them, had not the light division taken the enemy in flank: an

assertion perhaps easier made than proved.

4º. The rapid progress of the allies on this occasion, has been

contrasted with the slow proceedings of Massena in 1810, and the

defence of Herrasti has been compared with that of Barrié. But

Massena was not pressed for time, and he would have been blameable

to have spared labour at the expense of blood; Herrasti also had

a garrison of six thousand men, whereas Barrié had less than two

thousand, of which only seventeen hundred were able to bear arms,

and he had additional works to guard. Nevertheless his neglect of

the lesser breach was a great error; it was so narrow and high,

that a very slight addition to its defences would have rendered it

quite impracticable; and as the deserters told him in the morning

of the 19th that the light division was come up, out of its turn,

he must have expected the assault and had time to prepare for it.

Moreover the small breach was flanked at a very short distance, by

a demi-bastion with a parapet, which, though little injured, was

abandoned when the head of the storming party had forced their way on

to the rampart. But the true way of defending Ciudad was by external

operations, and it was not until it fell, that the error of Marmont

at Elbodon could be judged in its full extent. Neither can that

marshal be in any manner justified for having left so few men in

Ciudad Rodrigo; it is certain that with a garrison of five thousand

the place would not have been taken, for when there are enough of men

the engineer’s art cannot be overcome by mere courage.

[Sidenote: Captain Cooke’s Memoirs, vol. i. p. 122.]

5º. The excesses committed by the allied troops were very

disgraceful. The Spanish people were allies and friends, unarmed and

helpless, and all these claims were disregarded. “The soldiers were

not to be controuled.” That excuse will however scarcely suffice

here, because colonel Macleod of the forty-third, a young man of a

most energetic spirit, placed guards at the breach and did constrain

his regiment to keep its ranks for a long time after the disorders

commenced; but as no previous general measures had been taken, and no

organized efforts made by higher authorities, the men were finally

carried away in the increasing tumult.

CHAPTER IV.

[Sidenote: 1812. January.]

In Ciudad Rodrigo, papers were found by which it appeared, that many

of the inhabitants were emissaries of the enemy: all these people

Carlos d’España slew without mercy, but of the English deserters, who

were taken, some were executed, some pardoned, and the rigour of the

Spanish generals was thought to be overstrained.

When order had been restored workmen were set to repair the breaches

and to level the trenches, and arrangements were made to provision

the place quickly, for Marmont’s army was gathering at Valladolid;

that general was however still ignorant that Ciudad had fallen. In

the latter end of December, rumour, anticipating the fact had indeed

spoken of an English bridge on the Agueda, and the expedition to

Alicant was countermanded; yet the report died away, and Montbrun

recommenced his march. But though the bridge was cast on the 1st and

the siege commenced on the 8th, on the 12th nothing was known at

Salamanca.

On the 11th Marmont arrived at Valladolid; on the 15th he for the

first time heard of the siege. His army was immediately ordered to

concentrate at Salamanca, Bonnet quitted the Asturias, Montbrun

hastened back from Valencia, Dorsenne sent a detachment to aid, and

on the 25th six divisions of infantry and one of cavalry, being about

forty-five thousand in all, were assembled at Salamanca, from whence

to Ciudad, was four marches.

On the 23d Souham had advanced to Matilla to ascertain the fate

of the fortress, but meanwhile five thousand of Hill’s troops had

reached Castello Branco, and the allies were therefore strong enough

to fight beyond the Agueda. Hence if the siege had even lasted

twenty-four days, the place might still have been taken.

The 26th Marmont knew that the fortress was lost, and unable to

comprehend his adversary’s success, retired to Valladolid. His

divisions were thus harassed by ruinous marches in winter; for

Montbrun had already reached Arevalo on his return from Valencia, and

Bonnet in repassing the Asturian mountains, had suffered much from

cold and fatigue, and more from the attacks of Porlier who harassed

him without cessation. Sir Howard Douglas immediately sent money

and arms to the Asturians, on one flank, and on the other flank,

Morillo who had remained at Horcajo in great peril after his flight

from Almagro, took the opportunity to escape by Truxillo; meanwhile

Saornil’s band cut off a French detachment at Medina del Campo,

other losses were sustained from the Partidas on the Tietar, and

the operations of those in the Rioja, Navarre, and New Castile were

renewed. The regular Spanish troops were likewise put in movement.

Abadia and Cabrera, advancing from Gallicia, menaced Astorga and La

Baneza, but the arrival of Bonnet at Benevente, soon obliged them to

retire again to Puebla de Senabria and Villa Franca; and Silveira who

had marched across the frontier of Tras os Montes to aid them, also

fell back to Portugal.

Marmont’s operations were here again ill judged. He should have taken

post at Tamames, or St. Martin de Rio, and placed strong advanced

guards at Tenebron and St. Espiritus, in the hills immediately above

Ciudad. His troops could have been concentrated at those places the

28th and on that day such a heavy rain set in, that the trestle

bridge at Marialva could not stand, and the river rose two feet over

the stone bridge at the town. The allies were then on the left bank,

the communication with the town was entirely cut off, the repair of

the breaches was scarcely complete, and Ciudad being entirely exposed

for several days might have been retaken. But the greatest warriors

are the very slaves of fortune!

[Sidenote: 1812. February.]

The English general’s eyes were now turned towards Badajos, which he

was desirous to invest in the second week of March; because then the

flooding of the rivers in Beira, would enable him to carry nearly all

his forces to the Alemtejo, without risk, and the same rains would

impede the junction of the enemy’s force in Estremadura. Green forage

was to be had in the last province considerably earlier than on the

Agueda, and the success of the contemplated campaign in Andalusia

depended upon the operations taking place before the harvest upon the

ground should ripen, which was the enemy’s resource, and would happen

much earlier there than in Leon.

Preliminary measures were already in progress. In December a pontoon

bridge escorted by military artificers and some Portuguese seamen,

had been ordered from Lisbon to Abrantes, where draft bullocks were

collected to draw it to Elvas. After the fall of Ciudad stores and

tools were sent from Lisbon to Setuval, and thence in boats to

Alcacer do Sal; and a company of the military artificers, then at

Cadiz, were disembarked at Ayamonte to proceed to Elvas, where an

engineer officer secretly superintended the preparations for the

siege. Meanwhile the repairs of Ciudad went on, two new redoubts were

traced out upon the Tesons, the old one was enlarged, and the suburbs

were strengthened, but the heavy storms before mentioned, impeded

these works, and having entirely stopped all communication by sea

and land, delayed for many days the preparations for the ulterior

operations. When the weather cleared they were renewed, yet other

obstacles were not wanting.

The draft bullocks, sinking from want, were unable to drag the

whole battering train by the way of Vilha Velha, and only sixteen

twenty-four pounders, and twenty spare carriages could be moved on

that line. To supply the deficiency sixteen twenty-four pounders,

then in vessels in the Tagus, were ordered up to Abrantes, and

admiral Berkeley was applied to for twenty ship-guns. He had none

of that calibre and offered eighteen pounders, which were accepted;

but when major Dickson, who superintended the arrangements for the

artillery service, arrived at Lisbon, he found that these were

Russian pieces whose bore was too large for English shot, and the

admiral refused to give guns from his own ship the Barfleur, in their

place. This apparently capricious proceeding produced both difficulty

and delay, because the artillery-men were in consequence obliged

to cull the Portuguese shot in the arsenal to obtain a sufficient

supply. However the energy of major Dickson overcame every obstacle,

and in the beginning of March the battering guns fifty-two in number,

the pontoons from Abrantes, and most of the stores from Alcarçer do

Sal, were parked at Elvas, where also gabions and fascines were piled

in great numbers.

Marmont having lost his emissaries at Ciudad Rodrigo, and being

unable to measure his adversary’s talent and energy, had during

these transactions again spread his troops that he might the more

easily feed them. Three divisions of infantry and part of the cavalry

returned to Talavera and Toledo. Souham occupied the country from

Zamora and Toro, to the banks of the Tormes; and Bonnet after driving

the Gallicians back to Senabria and Villa Franca remained about

Benevente and Astorga. The army of Portugal appeared to dread no

further operations on the part of the allies, yet from some secret

misgiving, Marmont caused general Foy to march through the Guadalupe,

by the pass of St. Vincente to ascertain whether an army could march

by that line from the Tagus to the Guadiana.

This scattering of the French relieved lord Wellington from a serious

embarrassment. The constant difficulty of land transport, had

prevented him from bringing up the clothing of the army, and he was

now obliged to send the regiments to those points on the Mondego, the

Douro, and the Tagus, where the clothing had arrived by boats; hence

the march to the Alemtejo was necessarily long and unmilitary, and

would have been too dangerous to attempt, if Marmont had kept his

troops together on the Tormes, with advanced posts pushed towards

Ciudad Rodrigo. The weather was now however extremely favourable

to the allies, and the new Portuguese commissariat supplied the

troops on this march well, and without any of those exactions and

oppressions which had always before marked the movements of the

native troops; nevertheless the scarcity was so great, that rations

of cassava root were served to the Portuguese instead of bread.