BOOK XV.

CHAPTER I.

STATE OF THE WAR IN SPAIN.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]

_Northern Provinces._ The invasion of Gallicia, which had been

arrested by the arrival of the allies on the Coa, would have been a

most serious calamity. Abadia, a weak man, with troops, distressed

for provisions and clothing, was on bad terms with the chief of his

staff Moscosa, whom he feared, and on worse terms with the junta. The

great road to Coruña was open, and although general Walker, seeing

the danger, advised that Ferrol, which was indefensible, should be

dismantled, and the guns, amounting to fifteen hundred, with the

timber and vessels of war in the harbour, transferred to Coruña,

neither that nor any other useful measure was executed.

Before this, overtures had been made to the Spanish government,

to take Spanish troops into British pay after the manner of the

Portuguese; but the regency remembering the prodigality of Canning

demanded three millions yearly, besides arms and clothing, without

which they said the Spaniards could make no efficient exertions! To

introduce British officers into the service on any other terms was

not possible, because the Spanish military were indignant at what

they termed the degradation of such a proposal. The Perceval faction

finding it thus, and wanting greatness of mind to support Wellington,

on a scale commensurate with his talents, then turned their attention

to the encouragement of the Partidas, as being less expensive, and

affording an example to the continental nations of popular and

protracted resistance to France.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]

Sir Howard Douglas, who succeeded general Walker as military agent,

(these officers must not be confounded with the military agents

originally sent out, and whose mischievous proceedings I have had

occasion to notice,) was directed to encourage those bodies by

increased supplies, and to combine their movements better with each

other and with the British squadron in the Bay of Biscay. Lord

Wellington at the desire of government, sent to the guerilla chiefs,

military presents, with a letter acknowledging the importance of

their services, and this was not mere compliment, for he had indeed

derived great advantages from their exertions, and thought he had

derived more, because he only knew of their exploits by hearsay. When

he afterwards advanced into Spain and saw them closely, he was forced

to acknowledge that the guerillas, although active and willing, and

although their operations in general occasioned the utmost annoyance

to the enemy, were so little disciplined that they could do nothing

against the French troops unless the latter were very inferior in

numbers. If the French took post in a house or church of which they

only barricadoed the entrance, both regular troops and guerillas were

so ill equipped as military bodies, that their enemy could remain in

security until relieved. In like manner Napoleon reprimanding his

generals for suffering the Partidas to gain any head, observed, that

when cut off from communication with the English ships they were a

nullity!

[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]

Douglas arrived just as Dorsenne’s retreat enabled Abadia to resume

his position on the frontier, but the army was in a miserable

state; the wet season was setting in upon men, destitute of even

the necessaries of life, although the province abounded in cattle

and goods, which could be easily procured, because money, although

plentiful, was generally hoarded, and commodities were therefore

cheap, and could be obtained in lieu of taxes at the market-price.

An extraordinary increase of the customs, arising from the trade of

Santander and Bilbao being transferred to Coruña by the war, also

offered a valuable resource; the harbour was filled with colonial

goods, and as the appetites of men generally stifle patriotism, and

baffle power, a licensed commerce was carried on with the enemy’s

ports in Biscay; yet without judgment as related to the war, for the

return was iron, to re-export to the colonies, whereas by an internal

traffic of the same kind, clothes and grain for the troops might have

been had from Castile and Leon. But confusion and corruption every

where prevailed, the exigences of the war were always the last things

cared for, and the starving soldiers committed a thousand excesses

with impunity, for where there is no food or pay, there can be no

discipline.

The people were oppressed with imposts, legal and illegal, and yet

the defalcation in the revenue was great, and the monopoly of tobacco

the principal financial resource, was injured by the smuggling

arising from the unsettled nature of the times. The annual charge

on the province was about £1,300,000, the actual receipts were less

than £500,000, and the junta endeavoured to supply the deficiency

by an extraordinary contribution from all property, save that of

day-labourers, which they expected would produce sixty millions of

reals (£750,000). But a corrupt and vexatious collection of this tax

tormented the people without filling the treasury; the clergy, and

the richer classes, were, as in Portugal, favoured, and it yielded,

in six months, less than a seventh part.

From this state of affairs two inferences may be safely drawn:—1º.

That England and not Gallicia had hitherto supported the war here, as

in other parts of the Peninsula. 2º. That as England had in 1808-9

paid to Gallicia three millions of hard dollars, and given other

succours sufficient for double the number of troops employed, the

deficiency of the revenue had been amply compensated, and the causes

of distress must be sought for in the proceedings of the authorities,

and in the anomalous nature of the war itself. The successive

juntas, apprehensive of offending the people, were always inert in

the civil administration, and either too corrupt, or too incapable,

to apply the succours from England, justly or wisely. The junta of

this period was, like its predecessors, factious and intriguing; it

was hostile to the junta of Leon, unfriendly to that of Asturias,

jealous and contemptuous of the military leaders; in return these

last abhorred the junta, and were tormented with factions of their

own. The regular officers hated the guerillas, and endeavoured to get

the controul of the succours granted, by England, to the latter; and

as they necessarily lived by plundering their own countrymen, they

strenuously opposed the arming of the peasants, partly from fear lest

the latter should resist this license, partly because the republican,

and anti-English spirit, which was growing up in the cortes had also

reached this quarter.

The clergy clung to the peasantry, with whom they had great

influence, but the army, which had imbibed liberal words, rather than

principles, was inimical to them. A press had been established at

head-quarters, from whence issued political papers either original,

or repeated from the libels at Cadiz, in which, the Portuguese were

called slaves, for submitting to British influence; and it was openly

avowed that the French yoke was preferable to that of England; the

guerilla system, and the arming of the people were also attacked,

and these writings were met by other political papers from the civil

press at Coruña and St. Jago. The frequent changes of commanders

rendered all the evils more prominent; for the local government had

legal power to meddle with the military arrangements, and every

change of commander produced a new difficulty. Thus the junta refused

to acknowledge Abadia as their president during the absence of

Castaños, he in return complained alike of their neglect and of their

interference; and when they proposed to establish a general depôt at

Lugo he marched a part of his army there to prevent it.

But the occult source of most of these difficulties is to be found in

the inconsistent attempts of the British cabinet, to uphold, national

independence with internal slavery, against foreign aggression,

with an ameliorated government. The clergy who led the mass of the

people, clung to the English, because they supported aristocracy and

church domination; and they were also strongly for the Partidas,

because these were commanded by men who sprung directly from the

church itself, or from people who were attached to the church, while

the regular armies being officered by the friends of the cortes,

disliked the Partidas, both as interlopers and as political enemies.

The English ministers, hating Napoleon, not because he was the enemy

of England, but because he was the champion of equality, cared not

for Spain, unless her people were enslaved. They were willing enough

to use a liberal cortes to defeat Napoleon, but they also desired to

put down that cortes, by the aid of the clergy, and of the bigoted

part of the people: nevertheless as liberty will always have more

charms than slavery, they would have missed of both objects, if the

exigences of the continental system had not induced the emperor to go

to Moscow, where the snow destroyed him; and if the very advocates

of liberty in Spain had not in their madness, resolved to oppress

the Americans. The cortes, by discovering a rabid love of power in

practice, rendered their democratic doctrines suspected, and lost

partizans; but lord Wellington, in support of aristocracy, used the

greatest prudence in policy, and in his actions was considerate and

just.

[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 1.]

In the first conference held at Coruña, after sir Howard Douglas’s

arrival, the junta, as the usual preliminary, demanded more money

from England; but he advised, instead, a better management of their

own resources, and pointed out the military measures requisite to

render the army efficient. He recommended the adoption of the line

of retreat upon Orense, rather than upon Lugo and Coruña; and he

endeavoured to establish a permanent depôt in the island of Arosa,

on the Vigo coast, as a secure resource in the event of defeat; he

also furnished the soldiers with shoes and great-coats, the hospitals

with blankets, and completed the firelocks of the army to twenty-five

thousand. There were however abuses, which he could not remedy, and

which would seem rather to belong to the army of an Asiatic despot,

than to an European force fighting for independence. Innumerable

baggage animals devoured all the forage, and the personal servants

and cooks, who from custom never did duty, were above five thousand!

a sixth part of the whole force! When the sick men were deducted,

scarcely sixteen thousand infantry and three squadrons of cavalry

remained for service. Then there was so little organization or

arrangement that, although young, robust, patient, and docile to the

greatest degree, the troops could scarcely be moved, even from one

quarter to another, as a military body; and the generals, unable to

feed them on the frontier, more than once, menaced, and in December

did actually retire to Lugo, leaving the province open to invasion.

Abadia at first exerted himself with activity, and appeared to enter

loyally into the ameliorations proposed. He gave the command of the

troops to Portasgo, repaired to Coruña himself, and organized the

province in seven military governments, under as many chiefs, one for

each division of the army. Every government was to raise a reserve,

and to supply and clothe the corresponding division on the frontier.

But in a little time this activity relaxed; he entered into various

intrigues, displayed jealousy, both of the peasantry and the English,

and no real improvement took place, save in that select part of the

army, which the Cadiz regency had destined for South America, and had

ordered him to equip from the English stores. This was done at the

very moment when a French army on the frontier was again preparing

to invade Gallicia, and sir Howard Douglas vehemently opposed the

disloyal proceeding; the junta also were really averse to it, and

Abadia pretended to be so; but he had a personal interest in the

colonies and secretly forwarded the preparations. The regency, to

evade Mr. Wellesley’s reproaches, promised to suspend the embarkation

of these troops, but the expedition sailed from Vigo, and the

organization of another, three times its strength, including all

the best artillery in the province, was immediately commenced, and

also sailed a few months later. This then was the state of Gallicia

in the latter end of 1811. She was without magazines, hospitals, or

system, whether civil or military, and torn by faction, her people

were oppressed, her governors foolish, her generals bad: she had no

cavalry, and the infantry were starving, although the province easily

supplied cattle for the allies in Portugal. As a natural consequence,

those famished soldiers were too undisciplined to descend into the

plains of Leon, and were consequently of little weight in the general

contest.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Stuart’s Papers. MSS.]

Under these circumstances, sir Howard Douglas had nothing to work

upon, save the Guerilla leaders, whose activity he very considerably

increased. His policy was to augment the number of chiefs, but to

keep the force of each low, lest, growing proud of their command,

they should consider themselves generals, and become useless, as

indeed had already happened to Campillo, Longa, and Porlier, when

they were made a part of the seventh army. Nevertheless the advantage

of this policy may be doubted, for of all the numerous bands in the

north, seven only were not supported entirely by robbery. Mina,

Pastor, Salazar, Pinto, Amor, and the curate, whose united forces

did not exceed ten thousand men, were sustained by regular taxes,

customs, convent revenues, and donations; Longa supported his

from the produce of the salt-mines of Paza, but all the rest were

bandits, whose extinction was one of the advantages expected from the

formation of the seventh army.

It is now convenient to resume the narrative of military events.

In the Asturias, previous to Mendizabal’s arrival, and when Bonet had

marched to the Orbijo, Porlier surprised Santander, and plundered

some houses; but being followed by general Caucault, a very active

officer, he retired again to his strong-hold of Liebana. The British

cruizers, in concert with whom he acted, then destroyed several

coast-batteries, and the Iris frigate having arms on board, came to

the Bay of Biscay for the purpose of arranging an intercourse with

the Partidas of that province. But this was the period when Reille

and Caffarelli, were, as I have before noticed, chasing Mina and

Longa, whom they drove from the coast, into the mountains of Leon,

and thus marred the object of the Iris. Nevertheless, when Mina was

reinforced by the Valencians and other fugitives from Catalonia, he

returned to Navarre, and there performed very considerable exploits,

which, as belonging to other combinations of the war, will be

hereafter noticed.

While Caffarelli and Reille thus scoured the line of communication,

Dorsenne having the invasion of Gallicia in view, relieved Bonet

on the Esla, and sent him early in November, with eight thousand

men to re-occupy the Asturias as a preliminary measure. The

Gallicians foreseeing this, had detached Moscoso with three thousand

five hundred men to reinforce San Pol, who was at Pagares, below

the passes leading from Leon; and on the other hand Mendizabal

uniting the bands of Porlier and other chiefs, concentrated five

thousand men to the eastward on the Xalon. Eleven thousand men were

therefore ready to oppose the entrance of Bonet, but with the usual

improvidence of the Spaniards, the passes of Cubillas and Ventana, to

the westward of Pagares, were left unguarded. By these roads, Bonet,

an excellent officer, turned Moscoso, and drove him down the Lena

with loss and disgrace; then turning upon Mendizabal, he chased him

also in disorder from Lanes into the Liebana.

[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]

All the civil authorities immediately fled to Castropol, the Spanish

magazines fell into the hands of the French, and Bonet having

resumed his old positions at Oviedo, Gihon, and Grado, fortified

several posts in the passes leading to Leon, raised contributions,

and effectually ruined all the military resources of the Asturias.

The organization of the seventh army was thus for the time crushed,

and in Gallicia great mischief ensued. For the return of Moscoso’s

division and the want of provisions in the Bierzo, which had obliged

Abadia to retire to Lugo, while Dorsenne was menacing the frontier,

had thrown that kingdom into a ferment, which was increased by the

imposition of the new contributions. The people became exceedingly

exasperated and so unfavourably disposed, that it was common to hear

them say, “the exactions of a French army were a relief in comparison

to the depredations of the Spanish troops.”

During these transactions in the north, Drouet had joined Girard at

Merida, and menaced the allies in the Alemtejo, hoping thus to draw

Wellington from the Coa; but the demonstration was too feeble, and

the English general thought it sufficient to reinforce Hill with his

own brigade from Castello Branco. These movements were undoubtedly

part of a grand plan for invading Portugal, if the emperor could have

arranged his affairs peaceably with Russia. For to move once more

against Lisbon, by Massena’s route, was not promising, unless the

northern provinces of Portugal were likewise invaded, which required

the preliminary occupation of Gallicia, at least of the interior. In

the south also, it was advisable to invade Alemtejo, simultaneously

with Beira; and the occupation of Valencia and Murcia was necessary

to protect Andalusia during the operation. The plan was vast,

dangerous, and ready for execution; for though the wet season had set

in, an attack on the northern parts of Portugal, and the invasion

of Gallicia, were openly talked of in Dorsenne’s army, Caffarelli

was to join in the expedition, and Monthion’s reserve, which was to

replace Caffarelli’s on the line of communication, was already six

thousand strong. Ney or Oudinot were spoken of to command the whole,

and a strong division was already in march to reinforce the army of

the south, arrangements which could have reference only to Napoleon’s

arrival; but the Russian war soon baulked the project, and

Wellington’s operations, to be hereafter noticed, obliged Dorsenne to

relinquish the invasion of Gallicia, and caused Bonet once more to

abandon the Asturias.

Thus, with various turns of fortune, the war was managed in the

northern provinces, and no great success attended the French arms,

because the English general was always at hand to remedy the faults

of the Spaniards. It was not so on the eastern line of invasion.

There Suchet, meeting with no opponent capable of resisting him,

had continued his career of victory, and the insufficiency of the

Spaniards to save their own country was made manifest; but these

things shall be clearly shewn in the next chapter, which will treat

of the conquest of Valencia.

CHAPTER II.

CONQUEST OF VALENCIA.

[Sidenote: 1811. August.]

In August, and the beginning of September, Suchet, while preparing

for this great enterprise, had dispersed the bands of Villa Campa

and the other chiefs, who during the siege of Taragona vexed Aragon.

He had sent his feeble soldiers to France, receiving conscripts in

their places, and although the harvest was very bad, formed large

magazines in Morella and Tortoza. Eight thousand men had been left

in Catalonia under general Frere, another eight thousand were placed

under general Musnier, to protect Aragon, and twenty-four thousand

of all arms remained for the invasion of Valencia, but this force

Suchet thought inadequate, and demanded a reinforcement from the army

of reserve, then in Navarre. Napoleon, whose system of war, whatever

has been said to the contrary, was eminently methodical, refused.

He loved better to try a bold push, at a distant point, with a few

men, than to make an overwhelming attack, if he thereby weakened his

communications; he judged courage and enterprise fittest for the

attack, prudence and force for the support. And yet he designed to

aid Suchet’s operations vigorously when the decisive blow could be

struck. Then not only the divisions of the reserve were to march,

but combined movements, of detachments from nearly all the armies in

the Peninsula, were arranged; and we shall find, that if Wellington,

by menacing Ciudad Rodrigo, saved Gallicia, the French army of the

north, in return, by menacing Gallicia, fixed the allies on the

Agueda, and so protected Suchet’s invasion of Valencia.

[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]

Three roads led to the Guadalaviar, one from Tortoza by the

sea-coast, one by Teruel and Segorbe, and one by Morella and San

Mateo. That from Tortoza, and that by Teruel, were carriage-roads,

but the first only was fit for heavy artillery, and it was blocked,

partially by the fortress of Peniscola, and completed by the fort

of Oropesa. Wherefore, though the infantry and cavalry could move

on a bye-road to the right, the convoys and the guns, which were at

Tortoza, could not pass until Oropesa was reduced. Nevertheless the

French general, well knowing the value of boldness in war, resolved

to mask Peniscola, to avoid Oropesa, to send his field artillery by

Teruel, and uniting his troops near Saguntum, to offer battle to

Blake; and if the latter declined it, to reduce Oropesa and Saguntum,

trusting for subsistence to the “_huerta_” or garden of Valencia,

until the arrival of his convoys.

He had, however, organized his system of supply with care. From

Morella and Tortoza, brigades of mules, after the manner adopted in

the British army, were to carry provisions to the troops, and sheep

and cattle were delivered to each regiment for its subsistence in

advance. This last plan, which sir John Moore had also projected in

his campaign, Suchet found advantageous; and I am persuaded that

the principle should be extended, so that all things requisite

for the subsistence, and fighting of troops should be organized

regimentally, and the persons employed wear the uniform of their

different corps. Jealousies between the functionaries, of different

branches of the service, would then be unknown; and the character

of all subordinate persons, being under the guardianship of the

battalions to which they belonged, would be equally praiseworthy,

which cannot now be said.

[Sidenote: Capt. Codrington’s papers, MSS.]

While Suchet was thus gathering his strength, Valencia was a prey

to disorder. About the period of the siege of Taragona, Palacios,

notwithstanding his high monarchical principles, which caused him to

be dismissed from the regency, had been appointed captain-general

of Valencia, Murcia, and Aragon; and he immediately raised a strong

party amongst the friars and other opponents of the cortes. When

after the dispersion of the Murcian army at Baza, Blake had rallied

the fugitives, and in virtue of his power as regent, assumed the

chief command at Valencia, Palacios’ faction opposed him, and

endeavoured to draw the soldiers and the populace to their side,

by proposing to inundate the plain of Murviedro, and to defend the

strong country in advance. Blake, however, resolved to act on the

flanks of the French army by detachments, and, in this view, sent C.

O’Donnel, with the divisions of Obispo and Villa Campa, to Albaracin,

supporting them with four thousand men at Segorbe and Liria. He

charged Mahy, who commanded five thousand infantry, and seven hundred

cavalry of the Murcian army, to surprise the French detachment of the

army of the centre, posted at Cuença. He detached Bassecour with two

thousand men to Requeña, and the same time, directed Duran and the

Empecinado, to unite, and invade Aragon; and it was to aid in this

expedition that Mina quitted the mountains of Leon.

[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Mr. Wellesley, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Doyle, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.]

Blake had, exclusive of Mahy’s and Bassecour’s divisions, about

twenty thousand infantry, and two thousand cavalry. Three thousand

five hundred men were placed in Saguntum, which was provisioned for

three months; two hundred were in Oropesa, and fifteen hundred in

Peniscola; and there were so many Partidas, that the whole country

seemed to be in arms, but the assembling of these people being very

uncertain, Blake could not depend upon having a permanent partizan

force, of more than eight thousand. The Valencian army contained the

Albuera divisions, St. Juan’s, Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s veterans;

it was therefore, not only numerous, but the best Spain had yet

produced; and Valencia itself was exceedingly rich in all things

necessary for its supply: but there was no real power, the building,

though fair enough outside, had the dry rot within. The French had

many secret friends, faction was as usual at work, the populace were

not favourable to Blake, and that general had rather collected than

organized his forces, and was quite incapable of leading them. He was

unpopular, both at Cadiz and Valencia, and the regency of which he

formed a part was tottering. The Cortes had quashed Mahy’s command

of the Murcian army, and even recalled Blake himself; but the order,

which did not reach him until he was engaged with Suchet, was not

obeyed. Meanwhile that part of the Murcian army, which should have

formed a reserve, after Mahy’s division had marched for Cuença, fell

into the greatest disorder: above eight thousand men deserted in a

few weeks, and those who remained were exceedingly dispirited. Thus

all interest became concentrated in the city of Valencia; which was

in fact the key of all the eastern coast because Carthagena required

an army to defend it, and could only be fed from Valencia, and

Alicant was then quite defenceless.

[Sidenote: Suchet.]

[Sidenote: Vacani.]

It was in this state of affairs, that Suchet commenced the invasion.

His army was divided into three columns, and, on the 15th of

September one moved by the coast-road, one by Morella and San Mateo,

and one by Teruel, where an intermediate magazine was established;

but this latter column instead of proceeding directly to Segorbe,

turned off to its left, and passed over the Sierra de Gudar to

Castellon de la Plana, where the whole three were united on the 20th.

The main column, commanded by Suchet in person, had masked Peniscola

on the 15th, and invested Oropesa by a detachment on the 19th; but as

the road run directly under the fire of the last place, the main body

moved by the rugged route of Cabanes to Villa Franca, leaving the

battering-train still at Tortoza.

[Sidenote: Roche, MSS.]

[Sidenote: Tupper, MSS.]

During these operations Blake appeared inclined to fight, for he

brought Zayas up in front of Murviedro, and called in Obispo; Mahy,

who had done nothing on the side of Cuença, was also in march to join

him; but all these divisions marched slowly, and with confusion; and

a slight skirmish at Almansora, on the Mingares, where a few French

dragoons put a great body of Spanish infantry to flight, made Blake

doubt the firmness of his troops. He therefore left O’Donnel with

four thousand men on the side of Segorbe, and then retired himself

with fifteen thousand behind the Guadalaviar. Valencia was thus

thrown into great confusion, but Bassecour’s division was at hand,

and Suchet fearing to attack so large an army in an entrenched camp

(which had cost two years to construct), while his own communication

with Tortoza was intercepted, merely dispersed the armed peasants

which had assembled on his flank, and then turned against Murviedro.

SIEGE OF SAGUNTUM.

This celebrated place, situated about four leagues from Valencia, was

a rocky mountain, covered with the ruins of the ancient city, and

the remains of Moorish towers and walls, which being connected by

modern works, formed four distinct posts covering the whole summit

of the rock: but in consequence of the usual Spanish procrastination

the heavy guns prepared to arm it were not yet mounted, and only

seventeen pieces of inferior size were available for defence. The

modern town of Murviedro, situated at the foot of the rock, was

covered by the river Palancia, and by a canal, and occupied by some

Spanish picquets; but the 23d Habert, having passed the water,

invested the rock on the east, while Harispe invested it on the

west and south, and a third division drove the Spanish posts from

Murviedro and entrenched itself in the houses. The rest of the

army was disposed in villages, on the hills to the north-west, and

patroles were pushed towards Valencia. Thus the rock of Saguntum

was invested, but it was inaccessible to the engineer, save on the

west, where the ascent, although practicable, was very rough and

difficult. It would have been impregnable, if the Spaniards had

mounted their large guns; for the French were obliged to bring earth

from a distance, to form the batteries and parallels, and to set the

miner to level the approaches, and their parapets were too thin to

withstand heavy shot.

The first point of resistance was an ancient tower called San Pedro,

and immediately above it was the fort of San Fernando, which could

not be attacked until San Pedro fell, and, from its height, then

only by the miner. But near the eastern extremity of the rock, there

were two ancient breaches which the Spaniards were still engaged

repairing, and had only stopped with timber; a large tank offered

cover for the assembling of troops close to these breaches, and

Suchet resolved to try an escalade. To effect this, three columns

were assembled before daybreak on the 28th in the tank, a strong

reserve was held in support, and a false attack was directed against

the San Pedro to distract the attention of the besieged: but in

the previous part of the night, the Spaniards having sallied were

repulsed, and the action having excited both sides, a French soldier

fired from the tank before the appointed time, whereupon the columns

rushing forward, in disorder, planted their ladders, and the garrison

would have carried the place by noise, but the garrison thrust the

ladders from the walls, and drove the stormers back, with the loss

of three hundred men. After this check, as the artillery was still

at Tortoza, Suchet ordered a part of his army to attack Oropesa,

employed another part in making a road, for the guns, to reach the

battery raised against the tower of San Pedro, and then turned his

own attention to the movements of Blake.

That general following his first plan of action against the French

flanks, had during the investment of Saguntum, sent C. O’Donnel

with Villa Campa’s division and St. Juan’s cavalry, to Betera, and

Beneguazil, and Obispo’s division to Segorbe; thus forming a half

circle round the French army, and cutting its communication with

Teruel, near which place Mahy had by this time arrived. Suchet

however caused Palombini to attack Obispo, whose whole division

dispersed after a skirmish with the advanced guard, and the Italians

then returned to the siege. The next night Harispe marched against

O’Donnel, who was well posted at Beneguazil behind a canal, having

his centre protected by a chapel and some houses; nevertheless the

Spaniards were beaten with loss at the first shock, and fled in

disorder over the Guadalaviar. During these events Blake remained an

idle spectator of the defeat of his division, although he had a large

body of troops in hand, and was within a few miles of the field of

battle.

[Sidenote: 1811. October.]

The French train now advanced from Tortoza, and four pieces were

placed in battery against Oropesa. On the 10th Suchet took the

direction of the attack in person, and the fort situated upon an

isolated rock, was breached in a few hours; but the garrison of the

King’s Tower (a separate work placed on a small promontory, and

commanding the harbour) refused to surrender, and was carried off,

on the 11th, under the French fire, by the Magnificent. The French

general having thus with a loss of only thirty men opened the road

for his artillery, returned to Saguntum and pushed the siege of

that place; but the difficulties were very great, the formation of

the road to the batteries was itself a work of pain, and although

his indefatigable troops had formed a breaching battery on the

12th, while seven small mortars and howitzers, placed on the right

and left, had nearly silenced the Spanish fire, the muskets of the

besiegers alone brought down from fifteen to twenty men.

On the 17th the breaching battery being armed, opened its fire

against the tower, and the new masonry crumbled away at once; yet

the ancient work resisted the guns like a rock. On the 18th the fire

recommenced, when the wall gave way to the stroke of the guns, and

the assault was ordered; but from the height of the tower, which

overlooked the works at a short distance, the preparations were

early discovered, the Spaniards collecting on the breach repaired

it with sand-bags, and regardless of the French fire, with loud

cries provoked the attack. At five o’clock, four hundred men rushed

forward as swiftly as the steepness of the ascent would permit. Soon,

however, the head of the column was checked, the rear began to fire,

the whole got into confusion, and when one-half had fallen without

making the slightest impression on the defenders, the attempt was

abandoned. After this signal failure the French erected a second

battery of six pieces, one hundred and forty yards from the tower,

and endeavoured to push the approach close to the foot of the breach,

yet the plunging fire of the besieged baffled them; meanwhile

Andriani the governor, having communication by signal with the ships

in the Grao, was encouraged to continue his gallant defence, and was

informed that he was already promoted for what he had done. But to

understand Suchet’s embarrassments, from the protracted resistance of

Saguntum, we must take a view of Lacy’s contemporary operations in

Catalonia, and the proceedings of the Partidas against the French

communications and posts in Aragon.

CATALONIA.

[Sidenote: August.]

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. II. Section 2.]

It will be recollected that the blockade of Figueiras produced

sickness in M‘Donald’s army, and that the return of Suchet to

Aragon, and the parcelling of his troops on the lines, from Lerida

to Montserrat, Tortoza, and Taragona, had completely extinguished

the French power in the field; because the divisions of the army of

Aragon which still remained in Lower Catalonia, being destined for

the enterprize against Valencia, could not be employed in harassing

expeditions. Lacy was therefore enabled, notwithstanding the troubles

which followed the fall of Taragona, to reorganize about eight

thousand men in two divisions, the one under Eroles, the other under

Sarsfield; the junta also called out the tercios of reserve, and arms

and ammunition being supplied by the English navy, Lacy was soon in a

condition to act offensively. Thus the taking of Montserrat was very

injurious to the French, for it is generally supposed that Friere’s

division, if held together in the field, would have prevented this

reaction in the principality. Lacy at first suggested to the British

navy the recapture of the Medas Islands, and it was effected in the

latter end of August, by the Undaunted, Lavinia, and Blossom, aided

by a small party of Spaniards, the whole under the command of captain

Thomas. The enterprise itself was one of more labour than danger,

and the Spanish allies were of little use, but the naval officers

to whose exertions the success was entirely due, were indignant at

finding that colonel Green, who served as a volunteer, endeavoured to

raise his own reputation with the Catalans by injuring the character

of those under whom he served.

[Sidenote: Memoir upon Busa, by Capt. Zeupfinning, MSS.]

Immediately after the fall of Montserrat, Lacy and the junta had

proposed the fortifying of Palamos or Blanes, to be held as a marine

depôt and strong-hold, in common with the British navy, but with a

strange folly expected that sir E. Pellew, who had no troops, would

defend them from the enemy while establishing this post. Finding this

scheme received coldly by the admiral, they turned their attention

inland, and blowing up the works of Berga, fixed upon the position

of Busa, as a place of strength and refuge. This remarkable rock

which is situated between the Cardener and Bindasaes rivers and about

twenty miles from Cardona could be reached by one road only, and that

a very rugged one. The rock itself fourteen miles in circumference,

healthy and full of springs, is fertile, and produces abundance

of forage, and fuel. It is cut off from the rest of the world by

frightful precipices, and could neither be forced, nor starved into

a surrender. Busa, Cardona, Solsona, and Seu d’Urgel were therefore

guarded by the tercios of reserve and Lacy soon commenced offensive

excursions with the regular army, against the long lines of the

French communication.

[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]

In September while the Somatenes interrupted the passage of the

convoys to Montserrat, Eroles made an unsuccessful attack on the fort

of Moncada near Barcelona; Lacy who had returned from an incursion

in the French Cerdaña where he had gathered some booty, then united

Eroles and Sarsfield’s troops, and surprised the town of Igualada,

where he killed two hundred French, but not daring to attack the

castle retired to Calaf, and from thence again detached Eroles to

Jorbas, to attack a French convoy coming to Igualada. Eroles beat

the escort, and captured the convoy, and then the French quitted the

fortified convent of Igualada, and joined the garrison of Montserrat,

when the whole, fearful of being invested and so starved, abandoned

that important point, and marched through Barcelona to Taragona; the

Spaniards immediately occupied Montserrat, and recovered a large

store of clothing and cavalry equipments, which had been hidden

in a vault and were undiscovered by the enemy. Eroles, pursuing

his success, forced the garrisons of Belpuig, and Cervera, about

five hundred in all, to surrender, and thus the whole line of

communication, between Lerida and Barcelona, fell into the power of

the Catalonians. The confidence of the people then revived; Sarsfield

occupied Granollers, and the passes leading into the valley of Vich;

Manso and Rovira menaced the Ampurdan; and Eroles suddenly passing by

Seu d’Urgel into the Cerdaña, defeated, at Puigcerda, some national

guards commanded by general Gareau, who had been sent there after

Lacy’s invasion. He afterwards raised large contributions on the

frontier, burnt a French town, and returning with his spoil by the

way of Ribas, and Ripol, took post in the pass of Garriga, while

Milans occupied Mataro, and both watched to intercept a convoy which

M‘Donald was preparing for Barcelona.

Sarsfield at the same time embarked his division and sailed to the

coast of the Ampurdan, but the weather would not permit him to land.

Nevertheless the attention of the French general was distracted, and

the convoy did not move. Lacy then recalled Sarsfield, and projected

the surprise of Barcelona itself, but after putting his troops in

march, feared the execution and relinquished the attempt. Meanwhile

one swarm of the smaller Partidas menaced the French communication

between Mequinenza and Tortoza, and another swarm settled on the

plains about Lerida.

The state of Aragon was equally alarming. Duran and the Empecinado

had received Blake’s orders to unite near Cuença, for the purpose of

invading Aragon; but the secret junta of the district were averse to

the plan, and the troops of the latter chief refused to move, and

even came to blows with the junta’s people. In this confusion general

d’Armanac, who had retired from Cuença, returned, and dispersed

the whole. The Empecinado however collected them again, and having

joined Duran, their united powers being about six thousand infantry

and two thousand five hundred horse, moved against Calatayud; Mina

also acting in concert with them, quitted the mountains of Leon

and entered Navarre with about five thousand men, and some minor

partisans were already acting against different parts of Aragon.

The whole were in want of clothing and ammunition, but Mr. Tupper,

the consul at Valencia, having safe means of communication with the

interior supplied them.

General Musnier’s force was so scattered that he could not fight

either of the large Partidas, without exposing some important

point to the other, and the 29th of September the Empecinado took

possession of the pass of Frasno, while Duran invested the fortified

convent of Calatayud. This place was garrisoned by some French and

Italian troops, who differed upon the defence, and when the explosion

of two mines had killed a number of them they surrendered. Musnier

collected some men to succour the place, but unable to force the

pass of Frasno, retired; yet being reinforced on the 5th, he again

advanced, and a column sent from Navarre by general Reille also came

up; whereupon the Spaniards disappeared until the French retired, and

then reoccupied Calatayud. They were now in full communication with

Mina and a general plan of invasion was discussed, but as Duran and

Mina could not accord each acted separately.

[Sidenote: 1811. October.]

Severoli’s division eight thousand strong and just arrived from

Italy, then reinforced Musnier, and on the 9th driving the Spaniards

from Calatayud pursued them on the roads to Molino, Daroca, and

Medinaceli. On the other side of the Ebro however Mina fell on the

post of Exca in the Cinco Villas; the garrison broke through his

investment in the night, but he pursued them almost to the gates of

Zaragosa, and then turning off towards Ayerbe, attacked that post and

menaced the communication by Jaca. The commandant of Zaragosa had

sent an Italian battalion to look after the flying garrison of Exca,

which was found at Zuera, and the united forces amounting to eleven

hundred infantry and sixty cavalry followed Mina and came up with

him at Ayerbe; the guerilla chief instantly turned with a part of

his troops, and the Italians retreated towards Huesca, but having to

cross a plain were all killed or taken.

Reille and Musnier hearing of this misfortune spread their columns

in all directions to intercept Mina, but he evaded their toils, and

although sharply chased and several times engaged, reached Motrico

on the Biscay coast with his prisoners. The Iris frigate which was

then harassing the enemy’s coast line took some of them off his

hands, and the remainder, three hundred in number, were sent to

Corunna by the Asturian mountains, but only thirty-six arrived, the

rest were shot by the escort, under pretence that they made a noise

near a French post!

While these events were passing on the left of the Ebro,

Mazzuchelli’s brigade followed the Empecinado, and having defeated

him in a sharp action, at Cubiliejos de la Sierra, brought off the

garrison of Molino and dismantled that fort; but the smaller Partidas

infested the road between Tortoza and Oropesa, and in this disturbed

state of affairs reports were rife that an English force was to

disembark at Peniscola. Blake also sent Obispo’s division against

Teruel, which was thus menaced on all sides, for Mahy was still in

those parts. Thus the partizan warfare seemed interminable, and

Suchet’s situation would really have been very dangerous, if he had

been opposed by a man of ability. He had an inferior force and was

cooped up between the enemy’s fortresses; his communications were all

interrupted; he had just met with two signal failures at Saguntum,

and he was menaced by a formidable army which was entirely master of

its operations. Blake however soon relieved him of his difficulties.

Palacios with the junta had retired to Alcira, and in concert with

the friars of his faction had issued a manifesto, intended to raise

a popular commotion to favour his own restoration to the command,

but Blake was now become popular; the Valencians elated by the

successful resistance of Saguntum, called for a battle, and the

Spanish general urged partly by his courage, the only military

qualification he possessed, partly that he found his operations on

the French rear had not disturbed the siege, acceded to their desire.

Mahy and Bassecour’s divisions had arrived at Valencia, Obispo was

called in to Betera, eight thousand irregulars were thrown upon

the French communications, and the whole Spanish army amounting to

about twenty-two thousand infantry, two thousand good cavalry, and

thirty-six guns made ready for battle.

Previous to this, Suchet, although expecting such an event, had

detached several parties to scour the road of Tortoza, and had

directed Palombini’s division to attack Obispo and relieve Teruel.

Obispo skirmished at Xerica on the 21st, and then rapidly marched

upon Liria with a view to assist in the approaching battle; but

Blake, who might have attacked while Palombini was absent, took

little heed of the opportunity, and Suchet, now aware of his

adversary’s object, instantly recalled the Italians who arrived the

very morning of the action.

The ground between Murviedro and Valencia was a low flat,

interspersed here and there with rugged isolated hills; it was

also intersected by ravines, torrents, and water-cuts, and thickly

studded with olive-trees; but near Saguntum it became straitened by

the mountain and the sea, so as to leave an opening of not more than

three miles, behind which it again spread out. In this narrow part

Suchet resolved to receive the attack, without relinquishing the

siege of Saguntum; and he left a strong detachment in the trenches

with orders to open the fire of a new battery, the moment the

Spanish army appeared.

His left, consisting of Habert’s division, and some squadrons of

dragoons, was refused, to avoid the fire of some vessels of war and

gun-boats which flanked Blake’s march. The centre under Harispe, was

extended to the foot of the mountains, so that he offered an oblique

front, crossing the main road from Valencia to Murviedro. Palombini’s

division and the dragoons, were placed in second line behind the

centre, and behind them the cuirassiers were held in reserve.

This narrow front was favourable for an action in the plain, but the

right flank of the French, and the troops left to carry on the siege,

were liable to be turned by the pass of Espiritus, through which, the

roads from Betera led to Gilet, directly upon the line of retreat.

To prevent such an attempt Suchet posted Chlopiski with a strong

detachment of infantry and the Italian dragoons in the pass, and

placed the Neapolitan brigade of reserve at Gilet: in this situation,

although his fighting troops did not exceed seventeen thousand men,

and those cooped up between two fortresses, hemmed in by the mountain

on one side, the sea on the other, and with only one narrow line

of retreat, the French general did not hesitate to engage a very

numerous army. He trusted to his superiority in moral resources, and

what would have been madness in other circumstances, was here a proof

of skilful daring.

[Illustration: _Vol. 4 Plate 4._

_Explanatory Sketch_

OF THE SIEGE & BATTLE OF

_SAGUNTUM_,

1811.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

Blake having issued a fine address to his soldiers on the 25th of

October advanced to fight. His right wing under Zayas, composed

of the Albuera divisions, marched by a road leading upon the

village of Puzzol; and Blake followed in person, with a weak reserve,

commanded by general Velasco.

The centre under Lardizabal supported by the cavalry of Loy and Caro,

moved by the main road.

The left consisting of Miranda’s, and Villa Campa’s infantry, and of

St. Juan’s cavalry, and supported by Mahy’s division which came from

the side of Betera moved against the defile of Espiritus. Obispo,

also coming from Betera, acted as a flanking corps, and entering the

mountains by Naquera, menaced the right of Chlopiski, but he was met

by a brigade under general Robert.

The Spaniards moved on rapidly and in good order, driving the French

outposts over a ravine called the Piccador, which covered Suchet’s

front. Zayas and Lardizabal immediately passed this obstacle as did

also Caro and Loy, and the first took possession of Puzzol while

the flotilla ranged along the coast and protected his right flank.

Blake with Velasco’s reserve halted at El Puig, an isolated hill on

the sea-coast behind the Piccador, but Lardizabal and the cavalry

forming an oblique line, in order to face the French front, occupied

the ground between Puzzol and the Piccador. Thus the Spanish order

of battle was cut in two by the ravine, for on the hither side of

it St. Juan, Miranda, and Villa Campa were drawn up, and Mahy took

possession of a height called the Germanels, which was opposite the

mouth of St. Espiritus.

By this disposition the Spanish line, extending from Puzzol to the

Germanels, was not less than six miles, and the division of Obispo

was separated from the left by about the same distance. Blake’s order

of battle was therefore feeble, and he was without any efficient

reserve, for Velasco was distant and weak and Mahy’s was actually in

the line. The French order of battle covering less than three miles

was compressed and strong, the reserves were well placed and close

at hand; and Chlopiski’s division, although a league distant from

the main body, was firmly posted, and able to take a direct part in

the battle, while the interval between him and Suchet was closed by

impassable heights.

BATTLE OF SAGUNTUM.

The fight was commenced by Villa Campa, who was advancing against the

pass of Espiritus, when the Italian dragoons galloping out overthrew

his advanced guard, and put his division into confusion. Chlopiski

seeing this, moved down with the infantry, drove Mahy from the

Germanels, and then detached a regiment to the succour of the centre,

where a brisk battle was going on, to the disadvantage of Suchet.

That general had not judged his ground well at first, and when the

Spaniards had crossed the Piccador, he too late perceived that an

isolated height in advance of Harispe’s division, could command

all that part of the field. Prompt however to remedy his error, he

ordered the infantry to advance, and galloped forward himself with

an escort of hussars to seize the hill; the enemy was already in

possession, and their guns opened from the summit, but the head of

Harispe’s infantry then attacked, and after a sharp fight, in which

general Paris and several superior officers were wounded, gained the

height.

At this time Obispo’s guns were heard on the hills far to the right,

and Zayas passing through Puzzol endeavoured to turn the French left,

and as the day was fine, and the field of battle distinctly seen by

the soldiers in Saguntum, they crowded on the ramparts, regardless of

the besiegers’ fire, and uttering loud cries of Victory! Victory! by

their gestures seemed to encourage their countrymen to press forward.

The critical moment of the battle was evidently approaching. Suchet

ordered Palombini’s Italians, and the dragoons, to support Harispe,

and although wounded himself galloped to the cuirassiers and brought

them into action. Meanwhile the French hussars had pursued the

Spaniards from the height to the Piccador, where however the latter

rallied upon their second line and again advanced; and it was in

vain that the French artillery poured grape-shot into their ranks,

their march was not checked. Loy and Caro’s horsemen overthrew the

French hussars in a moment, and in the same charge sabred the French

gunners and captured their battery. The crisis would have been fatal,

if Harispe’s infantry had not stood firm while Palombini’s division

marching on the left under cover of a small rise of ground, suddenly

opened a fire upon the flank of the Spanish cavalry, which was still

in pursuit of the hussars. These last immediately turned, and the

Spaniards thus placed between two fires, and thinking the flight

of the hussars had been feigned, to draw them into an ambuscade,

hesitated; the next moment a tremendous charge of the cuirassiers put

every thing into confusion. Caro was wounded and taken, Loy fled with

the remainder of the cavalry over the Piccador, the French guns were

recovered, the Spanish artillery was taken, and Lardizabal’s infantry

being quite broken, laid down their arms, or throwing them away,

saved themselves as they could. Harispe’s division immediately joined

Chlopiski’s, and both together pursued the beaten troops.

This great, and nearly simultaneous success in the centre, and on the

right, having cut the Spanish line in two, Zaya’s position became

exceedingly dangerous. Suchet was on his flank, Habert advancing

against his front, and Blake had no reserve in hand to restore the

battle, for the few troops and guns under Velasco, remained inactive

at El Puig. However such had been the vigour of the action in the

centre, and so inferior were Suchet’s numbers, that it required two

hours to secure his prisoners and to rally Palombini’s division for

another effort. Meanwhile Zayas, whose left flank was covered in some

measure by the water-cuts, fought stoutly, maintained the village

of Puzzol for a long time, and when finally driven out, although he

was charged several times, by some squadrons attached to Habert’s

division, effected his retreat across the Piccador, and gained El

Puig. Suchet had however re-formed his troops, and Zayas now attacked

in front and flank, fled along the sea-coast to the Grao of Valencia,

leaving his artillery and eight hundred prisoners.

During this time, Chlopiski and Harispe, had pursued Mahy, Miranda,

Villa Campa, and Lardizabal, as far as the torrent of Caraixet,

where many prisoners were made; but the rest being joined by Obispo,

rallied behind the torrent, and the French cavalry having outstripped

their infantry, were unable to prevent the Spaniards from reaching

the line of the Guadalaviar. The victors had about a thousand killed

and wounded, and the Spaniards had not more, but two generals, five

thousand prisoners, and twelve guns were taken; and Blake’s inability

to oppose Suchet in the field, being made manifest by this battle,

the troops engaged were totally dispirited, and the effect reached

even to Saguntum, for the garrison surrendered that night.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. In this campaign the main object on both sides was Valencia.

That city could not be invested until Saguntum was taken, and the

Spanish army defeated; hence to protect Saguntum without endangering

his army, was the problem for Blake to solve, and it was not very

difficult. He had at least twenty-five thousand troops, besides

the garrisons of Peniscola, Oropesa, and Segorbe, and he could

either command or influence the movements of nearly twenty thousand

irregulars; his line of operations was direct, and secure, and he

had a fleet to assist him, and several secure harbours. On the other

hand the French general could not bring twenty thousand men into

action, and his line of operation, which was long, and difficult, was

intercepted by the Spanish fortresses. It was for Blake therefore

to choose the nature of his defence: he could fight, or he could

protract the war.

2º. If he had resolved to fight, he should have taken post at

Castellon de la Plana, keeping a corps of observation at Segorbe, and

strong detachments towards Villa Franca, and Cabanes, holding his

army in readiness to fall on the heads of Suchet’s columns, as they

came out of the mountains. But experience had, or should have, taught

Blake, that a battle in the open field between the French and Spanish

troops, whatever might be the apparent advantage, was uncertain; and

this last and best army of the country ought not to have been risked.

He should therefore have resolved upon protracting the war, and have

merely held that position to check the heads of the French columns,

without engaging in a pitched battle.

3º. From Castellon de la Plana and Segorbe, the army might have

been withdrawn, and concentrated at Murviedro, in one march, and

Blake should have prepared an intrenched camp in the hills close to

Saguntum, placing a corps of observation in the plain behind that

fortress. These hills were rugged, very difficult of access, and

the numerous water-cuts and the power of forming inundations in the

place, were so favourable for defence, that it would have been nearly

impossible for the French to have dislodged him; nor could they have

invested Saguntum while he remained in this camp.

4º. In such a strong position, with his retreat secure upon the

Guadalaviar, the Spanish general would have covered the fertile

plains from the French foragers, and would have held their army at

bay while the irregulars operated upon their communication. He might

then have safely detached a division to his left, to assist the

Partidas, or to his right, by sea, to land at Peniscola. His forces

would soon have been increased and the invasion would have been

frustrated.

5º. Instead of following this simple principle of defensive warfare

consecrated since the days of Fabius, Blake abandoned Saguntum, and

from behind the Guadalaviar, sent unconnected detachments on a half

circle round the French army, which being concentrated, and nearer

to each detachment than the latter was to its own base at Valencia,

could and did, as we have seen, defeat them all in detail.

6º. Blake, like all the Spanish generals, indulged vast military

conceptions far beyond his means, and, from want of knowledge,

generally in violation of strategic principles. Thus his project

of cutting the communication with Madrid, invading Aragon, and

connecting Mina’s operations between Zaragoza and the Pyrenees, with

Lacy’s in Catalonia, was gigantic in design, but without any chance

of success. The division of Severoli being added to Musnier’s, had

secured Aragon; and if it had not been so, the reinforcements then

marching through Navarre, to different parts of Spain, rendered the

time chosen for these attempts peculiarly unfavourable. But the

chief objection was, that Blake had lost the favourable occasion

of protracting the war about Saguntum; and the operations against

Valencia, were sure to be brought to a crisis, before the affair

of Aragon could have been sufficiently embarrassing, to recal the

French general. The true way of using the large guerilla forces, was

to bring them down close upon the rear of Suchet’s army, especially

on the side of Teruel, where he had magazines; which could have

been done safely, because these Partidas had an open retreat, and

if followed would have effected their object, of weakening and

distressing the army before Valencia. This would have been quite a

different operation from that which Blake adopted, when he posted

Obispo and O’Donnel at Benaguazil and Segorbe; because those

generals’ lines of operations, springing from the Guadalaviar, were

within the power of the French; and this error alone proves that

Blake was entirely ignorant of the principles of strategy.

7º. Urged by the cries of the Valencian population, the Spanish

general delivered the battle of the 25th, which was another great

error, and an error exaggerated by the mode of execution. He who had

so much experience, who had now commanded in four or five pitched

battles, was still so ignorant of his art, that with twice as many

men as his adversary, and with the choice of time and place, he

made three simultaneous attacks, on an extended front, without any

connection or support; and he had no reserves to restore the fight or

to cover his retreat. A wide sweep of the net without regard to the

strength or fierceness of his prey, was Blake’s only notion, and the

result was his own destruction.

8º. Suchet’s operations, especially his advance against Saguntum,

leaving Oropesa behind him, were able and rapid. He saw the errors

of his adversary, and made them fatal. To fight in front of Saguntum

was no fault; the French general acted with a just confidence in his

own genius, and the valour of his troops. He gained that fortress by

the battle, but he acknowledged that such were the difficulties of

the siege, the place could only have been taken by a blockade, which

would have required two months.

CHAPTER III.

[Sidenote: 1811. Nov.]

Saguntum having fallen, Suchet conceived the plan of enclosing and

capturing the whole of Blake’s force, together with the city of

Valencia, round which it was encamped; and he was not deterred from

this project by the desultory operations of the Partidas in Aragon,

nor by the state of Catalonia. Blake however, reverting to his

former system, called up to Valencia, all the garrisons and depôts

of Murcia, and directed the conde de Montijo, who had been expelled

by Soult from Grenada, to join Duran. He likewise ordered Freire to

move upon Cuença, with the Murcian army, to support Montijo, Duran,

and the Partida chiefs, who remained near Aragon after the defeat

of the Empecinado. But the innumerable small bands, or rather armed

peasants, immediately about Valencia, he made no use of, neither

harassing the French nor in any manner accustoming these people to

action.

In Aragon his affairs turned out ill. Mazuchelli entirely defeated

Duran in a hard fight, near Almunia, on the 7th of November; on the

23d Campillo was defeated at Añadon, and a Partida having appeared at

Peñarova, near Morella, the people rose against it. Finally Napoleon,

seeing that the contest in Valencia was coming to a crisis, ordered

general Reille to reinforce Suchet not only with Severoli’s Italians,

but with his own French division, in all fifteen thousand good

troops.

Meanwhile in Catalonia Lacy’s activity had greatly diminished. He

had, including the Tercios, above sixteen thousand troops, of which

about twelve thousand were armed, and in conjunction with the junta

he had classed the whole population in reserves; but he was jealous

of the people, who were generally of the church party, and, as he had

before done in the Ronda, deprived them of their arms, although they

had purchased them, in obedience to his own proclamation. He also

discountenanced as much as possible the popular insurrection, and he

was not without plausible reasons for this, although he could not

justify the faithless and oppressive mode of execution.

He complained that the Somatenes always lost their arms and

ammunition, that they were turbulent, expensive, and bad soldiers,

and that his object was to incorporate them by just degrees with the

regular army, where they could be of service; but then he made no

good use of the latter himself, and hence he impeded the irregulars

without helping the regular warfare. His conduct disgusted the

Catalonians. That people had always possessed a certain freedom and

loved it; but they had been treated despotically and unjustly, by all

the different commanders who had been placed at their head, since the

commencement of the war; and now finding, that Lacy was even worse

than his predecessors, their ardour sensibly diminished; many went

over to the French, and this feeling of discouragement was increased

by some unfortunate events.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. I. Section 3.]

Henriod governor of Lerida had on the 25th of October surprised and

destroyed, in Balaguer, a swarm of Partidas which had settled on

the plain of Urgel, and the Partizans on the left bank of the Ebro

had been defeated by the escort of one of the convoys. The French

also entrenched a post before the Medas Islands, in November, which

prevented all communication by land, and in the same month Maurice

Mathieu surprised Mattaro. The war had also now fatigued so many

persons, that several towns were ready to receive the enemy as

friends. Villa Nueva de Sitjes and other places were in constant

communication with Barcelona; and the people of Cadaques openly

refused to pay their contributions to Lacy, declaring that they had

already paid the French and meant to side with the strongest. One

Guinart, a member of the junta, was detected corresponding with the

enemy; counter guerillas, or rather free-booting bands, made their

appearance near Berga; privateers of all nations infested the coast,

and these pirates of the ocean, the disgrace of civilized warfare,

generally agreed not to molest each other, but robbed all defenceless

flags without distinction. Then the continued bickerings between

Sarsfield, Eroles, and Milans, and of all three with Lacy, who was,

besides, on bad terms with captain Codrington, greatly affected the

patriotic ardour of the people, and relieved the French armies from

the alarm which the first operations had created.

In Catalonia the generals in chief were never natives, nor identified

in feeling with the natives. Lacy was unfitted for open warfare, and

had recourse to the infamous methods of assassination. Campo Verde

had given some countenance to this horrible system, but Lacy and his

coadjutors have been accused of instigating the murder of French

officers in their quarters, the poisoning of wells, the drugging of

wines and flour, and the firing of powder-magazines, regardless of

the safety even of the Spaniards who might be within reach of the

explosion; and if any man shall doubt the truth of this allegation,

let him read “_The History of the Conspiracies against the French

Armies in Catalonia_.” That work, printed in 1813 at Barcelona,

contains the official reports of the military police, upon the

different attempts, many successful, to destroy the French troops;

and when due allowance for an enemy’s tale and for the habitual

falsifications of police agents is made, ample proof will remain that

Lacy’s warfare was one of assassination.

The facility which the great size of Barcelona afforded for these

attempts, together with its continual cravings and large garrison,

induced Napoleon to think of dismantling the walls of the city,

preserving only the forts. This simple military precaution has been

noted by some writers as an indication that he even then secretly

despaired of final success in the Peninsula; but the weakness of

this remark will appear evident, if we consider, that he had just

augmented his immense army, that his generals were invading Valencia,

and menacing Gallicia, after having relieved Badajos and Ciudad

Rodrigo; and that he was himself preparing to lead four hundred

thousand men to the most distant extremity of Europe. However the

place was not dismantled, and Maurice Mathieu contrived both to

maintain the city in obedience and to take an important part in the

field operations.

It was under these circumstances that Suchet advanced to the

Guadalaviar, although his losses and the escorts for his numerous

prisoners had diminished his force to eighteen thousand men while

Blake’s army including Freire’s division was above twenty-five

thousand, of which near three thousand were cavalry. He first

summoned the city, to ascertain the public spirit; he was answered

in lofty terms, yet he knew by his secret communications, that the

enthusiasm of the people was not very strong; and on the 3d of

November he seized the Grao, and the suburb of Serranos on the left

of the Guadalaviar. Blake had broken two, out of five, stone bridges

on the river, had occupied some houses and convents which covered

them on the left bank, and protected those bridges, which remained

whole, with regular works. Suchet immediately carried the convents

which covered the broken bridges in the Serranos, and fortified his

position there and at the Grao, and thus blocked the Spaniards on

that side with a small force, while he prepared to pass the river

higher up with the remainder of his army.

The Spanish defences on the right bank consisted of three posts.

1º. The city itself which was surrounded by a circular wall thirty

feet in height, and ten in thickness with a road along the summit,

the platforms of the bastions being supported from within by timber

scaffolding. There was also a wet ditch and a covered way with

earthen works in front of the gates.

2º. An intrenched camp of an irregular form five miles in extent. It

enclosed the city and the three suburbs of Quarte, San Vincente, and

Ruzafa. The slope of this work was so steep as to require scaling

ladders, and there was a ditch in front twelve feet deep.

3º. The lines, which extended along the banks of the river to the sea

at one side, and to the villages of Quarte and Manisses on the other.

The whole line, including the city and camp, was about eight miles;

the ground was broken with deep and wide canals of irrigation, which

branched off from the river just above the village of Quarte, and the

Spanish cavalry was posted at Aldaya behind the left wing to observe

the open country. Suchet could not venture to force the passage

of the river until Reille had joined him, and therefore contented

himself with sending parties over to skirmish, while he increased his

secret communications in the city, and employed detachments to scour

the country in his rear. In this manner, nearly two months passed;

the French waited for reinforcements, and Blake hoped that while he

thus occupied his enemy a general insurrection would save Valencia.

But in December, Reille, having given over the charge of Navarre and

Aragon to general Caffarelli, marched to Teruel where Severoli with

his Italians had already arrived.

The vicinity of Freire, and Montijo, who now appeared near Cuença,

obliged Reille to halt at Teruel until general D’Armanac with a

detachment of the army of the centre, had driven those Spanish

generals away, but then he advanced to Segorbe, and as Freire did not

rejoin Blake, and as the latter was ignorant of Reille’s arrival,

Suchet resolved to force the passage of the Guadalaviar instantly.

[Illustration: _Vol 4. Plate 5._

_Explanatory Sketch_

OF

The Siege & Battle of

VALENCIA,

1812.

_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]

On the 25th, the Neapolitan division being placed in the camp at the

Serranos, to hold the Spaniards in check, Habert took post at the

Grao, and Palombini’s division was placed opposite the village of

Mislata, which was about half-way between Valencia and the village

of Quarte. Reille at the same time made a forced march by Liria

and Benaguazil, and three bridges being thrown in the night, above

the sources of the canals, opposite Ribaroya, the rest of the army

crossed the Guadalaviar with all diligence on the 26th and formed

in order of battle on the other side. It was then eight o’clock and

Reille had not arrived, but Suchet, whose plan was to drive all

Blake’s army within the entrenched camp, fearing that the Spanish

general, would evade the danger, if he saw the French divisions in

march, resolved to push at once with Harispe’s infantry and the

cavalry to the Albufera or salt-lake, beyond Valencia, and so cut off

Blake’s retreat to the Xucar river. Robert’s brigade therefore halted

to secure the bridges, until Reille should come up, and while the

troops, left on the other bank of the Guadalaviar, attacked all the

Spanish river line of entrenchments, Suchet marched towards the lake

as rapidly as the thick woods would permit.

[Sidenote: 1811. Dec.]

The French hussars soon fell in with the Spanish cavalry at Aldaya

and were defeated, but this charge was stopped by the fire of

the infantry, and the remainder of the French horsemen coming up

overthrew the Spaniards. During this time Blake instead of falling on

Suchet with his reserve, was occupied with the defence of the river,

especially at the village of Mislata, where a false attack, to cover

the passage at Ribaroya, had first given him the alarm. Palombini,

who was at this point, had passed over some skirmishers and then

throwing two bridges, attacked the entrenchments; but his troops were

repulsed by Zayas, and driven back on the river in disorder; they

rallied and had effected the passage of the canals, when a Spanish

reserve coming up restored the fight, and the French were finally

driven quite over the river. At that moment Reille’s division, save

one brigade which could not arrive in time, crossed at Ribaroya, and

in concert with Robert, attacked Mahy in the villages of Manisses and

Quarte, which had been fortified carefully in front, but were quite

neglected on the rear, and on the side of Aldaya. Suchet who had

been somewhat delayed at Aldaya by the aspect of affairs at Mislata,

then continued his march to the lake, while Reille meeting with a

feeble resistance at Manisses and Quarte, carried both at one sweep,

and turned Mislata where he united with Palombini. Blake and Zayas

retired towards the city but Mahy driven from Quarte took the road to

Alcira, on the Xucar, and thus passing behind Suchet’s division, was

entirely cut off from Valencia.

All the Spanish army, on the upper Guadalaviar, was now entirely

beaten with the loss of its artillery and baggage, and below the

city, Habert was likewise victorious. He had first opened a cannonade

against the Spanish gun-boats near the Grao, and this flotilla

although in sight of an English seventy-four and a frigate, and

closely supported by the Papillon sloop, fled without returning a

shot; the French then passed the water, and carried the entrenchment,

which consisted of a feeble breast-work, defended by the irregulars

who had only two guns. When the passage was effected Habert fixed

his right, as a pivot, on the river, and sweeping round with his

left, drove the Spaniards towards the camp; but before he could

connect his flank with Harispe’s troops, who were on the lake,

Obispo’s division, flying from Suchet’s cavalry, passed over the rice

grounds between the lake and the sea, and so escaped to Cullera.

The remainder of Blake’s army about eighteen thousand of all kinds

retired to the camp and were closely invested during the night.

Three detachments of French dragoons, each man having an infantry

soldier behind him, were then sent by different roads of Alcira,

Cullera, and Cuença, the two first in pursuit of Mahy and Obispo, the

latter to observe Freire. Mahy was found in a position at Alcira,

and Blake had already sent him orders to maintain the line of the

Xucar; but he had lost his artillery, his troops were disheartened,

and at the first shot he fled although the ground was strong and he

had three thousand men while the French were not above a thousand.

Obispo likewise abandoned Cullera and endeavoured to rejoin Mahy,

when a very heavy and unusual fall of snow not only prevented their

junction, but offered a fine advantage to the French. For the British

consul thinking the Xucar would be defended, had landed large stores

of provisions and ammunition at Denia and was endeavouring to

re-embark them, when the storm drove the ships of war off the coast,

and for three days fifty cavalry could have captured Denia and all

the stores.

In this battle which cost the French less than five hundred men,

Zayas alone displayed his usual vigour and spirit, and while retiring

upon the city, he repeatedly proposed to Blake to retreat by the road

Mahy had followed, which would have saved the army; yet the other

was silent, for he was in every way incapable as an officer. With

twenty-three thousand infantry, a powerful cavalry, and a wide river

in his front—with the command of several bridges by which he could

have operated on either side; with strong entrenchments, a secure

camp—with a fortified city in the centre, whence his reserves could

have reached the most distant point of the scene of operation, in

less than two hours—with all these advantages he had permitted

Suchet whose force, seeing that one of Reille’s brigades had not

arrived, scarcely exceeded his own, to force the passage of the

river, to beat him at all points, and to enclose him, by a march,

which spread the French troops on a circuit of more than fifteen

miles or five hours march; and he now rejected the only means of

saving his army. But Suchet’s operations which indeed were of the

nature of a surprise, proves that he must have had a supreme contempt

for his adversary’s talents, and the country people partook of the

sentiment; the French parties which spread over the country for

provisions, as far as Xativa, were every where well received, and

Blake complained that Valencia contained a bad people.

The 2d of December, the Spanish general, finding his error, attempted

at the head of ten thousand men to break out by the left bank of

the Guadalaviar; but his arrangements were unskilful, and when his

advanced guard of five thousand men had made way, it was abandoned,

and the main column returned to the city. The next day many deserters

went over to the French, and Reille’s absent brigade, now arrived and

reinforced the posts on the left bank of the river. Suchet fortified

his camp on the right bank, and having in the night of the 30th

repulsed two thousand Spaniards who made a sally, commenced regular

approaches against the camp and city.

SIEGE OF VALENCIA.

[Sidenote: 1812. January.]

It was impossible for Blake to remain long in the camp; the city

contained one hundred and fifty thousand souls besides the troops,

and there was no means of provisioning them, because Suchet’s

investment was complete. Sixty heavy guns with their parcs of

ammunition which had reached Saguntum, were transported across

the river Guadalaviar to batter the works; and as the suburb of

San Vincente, and the Olivet offered two projecting points of the

entrenched camp, which possessed but feeble means of defence, the

trenches were opened against them in the night of the 1st of January.

The fire killed colonel Henri, the chief engineer, but in the night

of the 5th the Spaniards abandoned the camp and took refuge in the

city; the French, perceiving the movement, escaladed the works, and

seized two of the suburbs so suddenly, that they captured eighty

pieces of artillery and established themselves within twenty yards

of the town wall, when their mortar-batteries opened upon the place.

In the evening, Suchet sent a summons to Blake, who replied, that

he would have accepted certain terms the day before, but that the

bombardment had convinced him, that he might now depend upon both the

citizens and the troops.

This answer satisfied Suchet. He was convinced the place would

not make any defence, and he continued to throw shells until the

8th; after which he made an attack upon the suburb of Quarte,

but the Spaniards still held out and he was defeated. However,

the bombardment killed many persons, and set fire to the houses

in several quarters; and as there were no cellars or caves, as at

Zaragoza, the chief citizens begged Blake to capitulate. While he

was debating with them, a friar bearing a flag, which he called the

Standard of the Faith, came up with a mob, and insisted upon fighting

to the last, and when a picquet of soldiers was sent against him,

he routed it and shot the officer; nevertheless his party was soon

dispersed. Finally, when a convent of Dominicans close to the walls

was taken, and five batteries ready to open, Blake demanded leave to

retire to Alicant with arms, baggage, and four guns.

These terms were refused, but a capitulation guaranteeing property

and oblivion of the past, and providing that the unfortunate

prisoners in the island of Cabrera should be exchanged against an

equal number of Blake’s army, was negotiated and ratified on the

9th. Then Blake complaining bitterly of the people, gave up the

city. Above eighteen thousand regular troops, with eighty stand of

colours, two thousand horses, three hundred and ninety guns, forty

thousand muskets, and enormous stores of powder were taken; and it is

not one of the least remarkable features of this extraordinary war,

that intelligence of the fall of so great a city took a week to reach

Madrid, and it was not known in Cadiz until one month after!

On the 14th of January Suchet made his triumphal entry into Valencia,

having completed a series of campaigns in which the feebleness of

his adversaries somewhat diminished his glory, but in which his own

activity and skill were not the less conspicuous. Napoleon created

him duke of Albufera, and his civil administration was strictly in

unison with his conduct in the field, that is to say vigorous and

prudent. He arrested all dangerous persons, especially the friars,

and sent them to France, and he rigorously deprived the people of

their military resources; but he proportioned his demands to their

real ability, kept his troops in perfect discipline, was careful not

to offend the citizens by violating their customs, or shocking their

religious prejudices, and endeavoured, as much as possible, to govern

through the native authorities. The archbishop and many of the clergy

aided him, and the submission of the people was secured.

The errors of the Spaniards contributed as much to this object, as

the prudent vigilance of Suchet; for although the city was lost, the

kingdom of Valencia might have recovered from the blow, under the

guidance of able men. The convents and churches were full of riches,

the towns and villages abounded in resources, the line of the Xucar

was very strong, and several fortified places and good harbours

remained unsubdued; the Partidas in the hills were still numerous,

the people were willing to fight, and the British agents and the

British fleets were ready to aid, and to supply arms and stores.

The junta however dissolved itself, the magistrates fled from their

posts, the populace were left without chiefs; and when the consul,

Tupper, proposed to establish a commission of government, having

at its head the padre Rico, the author of Valencia’s first defence

against Moncey, and the most able and energetic man in those parts,

Mahy evaded the proposition; he would not give Rico power, and

shewed every disposition to impede useful exertion. Then the leading

people either openly submitted or secretly entered into connection

with the French, who were thus enabled tranquilly to secure the

resources of the country; and as the regency at Cadiz refused the

stipulated exchange of prisoners, the Spanish army was sent to

France, and the horrors of the Cabrera were prolonged.

During the siege of Valencia, Freire, with his Murcians, including a

body of cavalry, had abandoned the passes of the Contreras district

and retired across the Xucar to Almanza; Mahy occupied Alcoy, and

Villa Campa had marched to Carthagena. Suchet wished to leave them

undisturbed until he was ready to attack Alicant itself. But to

ensure the fall of Valencia, Napoleon had directed Soult to hold

ten thousand men in the Despeñas Peros, ready to march if necessary

to Suchet’s assistance; and at the same time Marmont was ordered to

detach Montbrun with two divisions of infantry and one of cavalry,

from the valley of the Tagus, to co-operate with the army of Aragon.

These last-named troops should have interposed between Valencia and

Alicant before the battle of the 26th, but they were delayed, and

only reached Almanza on the 9th, the very day Valencia surrendered.

Freire retreated before them, and Mahy, who was preparing to advance

again to Alcira, took shelter in Alicant. Montbrun knew that Valencia

had fallen, and was advised by Suchet to return immediately, but

ambitious to share in the glory of the hour he marched against

Alicant, and throwing a few shells summoned it to surrender. The

municipal authorities, the governor and many of the leading people,

were disposed to yield, yet Montbrun did not press them, and when

he retired the place was, as Suchet had foreseen, put into a state

of defence. The consul, Tupper, and Roche, the military agent, by

distributing clothes and food to the naked famishing soldiers,

restored their courage, drew many more to Alicant, and stopped the

desertion, which was so great that in one month Freire’s division

alone had lost two thousand men. Montbrun’s attempt therefore, hurt

the French interests, and his troops on their return to Toledo wasted

and pillaged the country through which they passed in a shameful

manner.

Villa Campa now abandoned Carthagena and returned to the mountains

of Albarazin; and Suchet, embarrassed by the failure at Alicant,

and dreading the fever at Carthagena, posted Harispe’s division on

the Xucar, to guard against the pestilence rather than to watch the

enemy. Yet he seized Gandia and Denia, which last was strangely

neglected both by the Spaniards and by the British squadron after

the stores were removed; for the castle had sixty guns mounted, and

many vessels were in the port; and as a post it was important, and

might easily have been secured until a Spanish garrison could be

thrown in. When these points were secured Suchet detached a brigade

on the side of Cabrillas to preserve the communication with Cuença,

and then directed Musnier’s division to form the siege of Peniscola;

but at the moment of investing that place, intelligence arrived that

Taragona, the garrison of which, contrary to orders, had consumed

the reserve-provisions, was menaced by Lacy; wherefore Severoli’s

division moved from Valencia to replace Musnier, and the latter

marched to Tortoza in aid of Taragona. Previous to Musnier’s arrival,

Lafosse, governor of Tortoza, had advanced with some cavalry and

a battalion of infantry to the fort of Balaguer, to observe Lacy,

and being falsely told that the Spaniards were in retreat, entered

Cambril the 19th, and from thence pushed on with his cavalry to

Taragona. Lacy was nearer than he imagined.

It will be remembered that the Catalan army was posted in the valley

of the Congosta and at Mattaro, to intercept the French convoy to

Barcelona. In December Maurice Mathieu seized Mattaro, while Dacaen,

who had received some reinforcements, brought down the long expected

convoy, and the Spaniards being thus placed between two fires, after

a slight action, opened the road. When Dacaen returned to Gerona

they resumed their position, but Lacy after proposing several new

projects, which he generally relinquished at the moment of execution,

at last decided to fall on Taragona, and afterwards to invade Aragon.

With this view, he drew off Eroles’ division and some cavalry, in

all about six thousand men, from the Congosta, and took post about

the 18th of January, at Reus. Stores from Cadiz were landed from the

English vessels at Cape Salou; captain Codrington repaired to the

Spanish quarters on the 19th to concert a combined operation with the

fleet, and it was at this moment the scouts brought word that Lafosse

had entered Taragona with the cavalry, and that the French infantry,

about eight hundred in number, were at Villa Seca, ignorant of the

vicinity of the Spanish army.

Lacy immediately put his troops in motion, and captain Codrington

would have returned to his ship, but a patrol of French dragoons

chased him back, and another patrol pushing to Salou made two

captains and a lieutenant of the squadron prisoners, and brought them

to Villa Seca. By this time, however, Lacy had fallen upon the French

infantry in front, and Eroles turning both their flanks, and closing

upon their rear, killed or wounded two hundred when the remainder

surrendered.

The naval officers, thus freed, immediately regained their ships,

and the squadron was that night before Taragona; but a gale of wind

off shore impeded its fire, the Spaniards did not appear on the

land-side, and the next day the increasing gale obliged the ships

to anchor to the eastward. Lacy had meanwhile abandoned the project

against Taragona, and after sending his prisoners to Busa, went off

himself towards Montserrat, leaving Eroles’ division, reinforced by

a considerable body of armed peasantry, in a position at Altafulla,

behind the Gaya. Here the bridge in front being broken, and the

position strong, Eroles, who had been also promised the aid of

Sarsfield’s division, awaited the attack of three thousand men who

were coming from Barcelona. He was however ignorant that Dacaen,

finding the ways from Gerona open, because Sarsfield had moved to the

side of Vich, had sent general Lamarque with five thousand men to

Barcelona, and that Maurice Mathieu was thus in march not with three

but eight thousand good troops.

BATTLE OF ALTAFULLA.

The French generals, anxious to surprise Eroles, took pains to

conceal their numbers, and while Maurice Mathieu appeared in front,

Lamarque was turning the left flank. They marched all night, and at

day-break on the 24th, having forded the river, made a well combined

and vigorous attack, by which the Spaniards were defeated with a loss

of more than one thousand killed and wounded. The total dispersion

of the beaten troops baffled pursuit, and the French in returning to

Barcelona suffered from the fire of the British squadron, but Eroles

complained that Sarsfield had kept away with a settled design to

sacrifice him.

While this was passing in Lower Catalonia, Dacaen scoured the higher

country about Olot, and then descending into the valley of Vich

defeated Sarsfield at Centellas, and that general himself was taken,

but rescued by one of his soldiers. From Centellas, Dacaen marched

by Caldas and Sabadel upon Barcelona, where he arrived the 27th

January, meanwhile Musnier re-victualled Taragona. Thus the Catalans

were again reduced to great straits, for the French knowing that they

were soon to be reinforced, occupied all the sea-coast, made new

roads out of reach of fire from the ships, established fresh posts

at Moncado, Mattaro, Palamos, and Cadaques, placed detachments in

the higher valleys, and obliged their enemies to resort once more

to an irregular warfare; which was however but a feeble resource,

because from Lacy’s policy the people were now generally disarmed and

discontented.

Milans, Manso, Eroles, Sarsfield, and Rovira, indeed, although

continually quarrelling, kept the field; and being still supplied

with arms and stores which the British navy contrived to land, and

send into the interior, sustained the war as partizans until new

combinations were produced by the efforts of England; but Lacy’s

intrigues and unpopularity increased, a general gloom prevailed, and

the foundations of strength in the principality were shaken. The

patriots indeed still possessed the mountains, but the French held

all the towns, all the ports, and most of the lines of communication;

and their moveable columns without difficulty gathered the harvests

of the valleys, and chased the most daring of the partizans.

Meanwhile Suchet, seeing that Taragona was secure, renewed his

operations.

SIEGE OF PENISCOLA.

This fortress, crowning the summit of a lofty rock in the sea, was

nearly impregnable; and the only communication with the shore, was by

a neck of land sixty yards wide and two hundred and fifty long. In

the middle of the town there was a strong castle, well furnished with

guns and provisions, and some British ships of war were at hand to

aid the defence; the rock yielded copious springs of water, and deep

marshes covered the approach to the neck of land, which being covered

by the waves in heavy gales, had also an artificial cut defended by

batteries and flanked by gun-boats. Garcia Navarro, who had been

taken during the siege of Tortoza, but had escaped from France, was

now governor of Peniscola, and his garrison was sufficiently numerous.

On the 20th ground was broken, and mortar-batteries being established

twelve hundred yards from the fort, opened their fire on the 28th.

In the night of the 31st a parallel five hundred yards long was

built of fascines and gabions, and batteries were commenced on either

flank.

[Sidenote: 1812. February.]

In the night of the 2d of February the approaches were pushed beyond

the first parallel, and the breaching batteries being finished and

armed were going to open when a privateer captured a despatch from

the governor, who complained in it that the English wished to take

the command of the place, and declared his resolution rather to

surrender than suffer them to do so. On this hint Suchet opened

negotiations which terminated in the capitulation of the fortress,

the troops being allowed to go where they pleased. The French found

sixty guns mounted, and the easy reduction of such a strong place,

which secured their line of communication, produced a general

disposition in the Valencians to submit to fortune. Such is Suchet’s

account of this affair, but the colour which he thought it necessary

to give to a transaction, full of shame and dishonour, to Navarro,

can only be considered as part of the price paid for Peniscola. The

true causes of its fall were treachery and cowardice. The garrison

were from the first desponding and divided in opinion, and the

British naval officers did but stimulate the troops and general to do

their duty to their country.

After this capture, six thousand Poles quitted Suchet, for Napoleon

required all the troops of that nation for his Russian expedition.

These veterans marched by Jaca, taking with them the prisoners of

Blake’s army, at the same time Reille’s two French divisions were

ordered to form a separate corps of observation on the Lower Ebro,

and Palombini’s Italian division was sent towards Soria and Calatayud

to oppose Montijo, Villa Campa, and Bassecour, who were still

in joint operation on that side. But Reille soon marched towards

Aragon, and Severoli’s division took his place on the Lower Ebro;

for the Partidas of Duran, Empecinado, and those numerous bands from

the Asturias and La Montaña composing the seventh army, harassed

Navarre and Aragon and were too powerful for Caffarelli. Mina’s also

re-entered Aragon in January, surprised Huesca, and being attacked

during his retreat at Lumbiar repulsed the enemy and carried off his

prisoners.

Suchet’s field force in Valencia was thus reduced by twenty thousand

men, he had only fifteen thousand left, and consequently could not

push the invasion on the side of Murcia. The approaching departure

of Napoleon from Paris also altered the situation of the French

armies in the Peninsula. The king was again appointed the emperor’s

lieutenant, and he extended the right wing of Suchet’s army to

Cuença, and concentrated the army of the centre at Madrid; thus

Valencia was made, as it were, a mere head of cantonments, in front

of which fresh Spanish armies soon assembled, and Alicant then

became an object of interest to the English government. Suchet, who

had neglected the wound he received at the battle of Saguntum, now

fell into a dangerous disorder, and that fierce flame of war which

seemed destined to lick up all the remains of the Spanish power, was

suddenly extinguished.

OBSERVATIONS.

1º. The events which led to the capitulation of Valencia, were but

a continuation of those faults which had before ruined the Spanish

cause in every part of the Peninsula, namely, the neglect of all good

military usages, and the mania for fighting great battles with bad

troops.

2º. Blake needed not to have fought a serious action during any part

of the campaign. He might have succoured Saguntum without a dangerous

battle, and might have retreated in safety behind the Guadalaviar;

he might have defended that river without risking his whole army,

and then have retreated behind the Xucar. He should never have shut

up his army in Valencia, but having done so he should never have

capitulated. Eighteen thousand men, well conducted, could always

have broken through the thin circle of investment, drawn by Suchet,

especially as the Spaniards had the power of operating on both banks

of the river. But the campaign was one huge error throughout, and was

pithily summed up in one sentence by the duke of Wellington. Being

accused by the regency at Cadiz of having caused the catastrophe,

by permitting the army of the north and that of Portugal to send

reinforcements to Suchet, he replied thus—“The misfortunes of

Valencia are to be attributed to Blake’s ignorance of his profession,

and to Mahi’s cowardice and treachery!”

CHAPTER IV.

OPERATIONS IN ANDALUSIA AND ESTREMADURA.

[Sidenote: 1811.]

The affairs of these provinces were so intimately connected, that

they cannot be treated separately, wherefore, taking Soult’s position

at Seville as the centre of a vast system, I will show how, from

thence, he dealt his powerful blows around, and struggled, even as a

consuming fire, which none could smother though many tried.

Seville the base of his movements, and the storehouse of his army,

was fortified with temporary citadels, which, the people being

generally submissive, were tenable against desultory attacks. From

this point he maintained his line of communication, with the army of

Portugal, through Estremadura, and with Madrid through La Mancha;

and from this point he sustained the most diversified operations on

all parts of a circle, which embraced the Condado de Niebla, Cadiz,

Grenada, Cordoba, and Estremadura.

The Niebla, which furnished large supplies, was the most vulnerable

point, because from thence the allies might intercept the navigation

of the river Guadalquivir, and so raise the blockade of Cadiz; and

the frontier of Portugal would cover the assembly of the troops until

the moment of attack. Moreover, expeditions from Cadiz to the mouth

of the Guadiana were as we have seen frequent. Nevertheless, when

Blake and Ballesteros had been driven from Ayamonte, in July and

August, the French were masters of the Condado with the exception

of the castle of Paymago, wherefore Soult, dreading the autumnal

pestilence, did not keep more than twelve hundred men on that side.

The blockade of the Isla was always maintained by Victor, whose

position formed an irregular crescent, extending from San Lucar de

Barameda on the right, to Conil on the left, and running through

Xeres, Arcos, Medina, Sidonia, and Chiclana. But that marshal

while thus posted was in a manner blockaded himself. In the Isla,

including the Anglo-Portuguese division, there were never less

than sixteen thousand troops, who, having the command of the sea,

could at any moment land on the flanks of the French. The Partidas,

although neither numerous nor powerful, often impeded the intercourse

with Seville; the Serranos of the Ronda and the regular forces at

Algeziras issuing, as it were, from the fortress of Gibraltar,

cut the communication with Grenada; and as Tarifa was still held

by the allies, for general Campbell would never relinquish that

important point, the fresh supplies of cattle, drawn from the great

plain called the Campiña de Tarifa, were straitened. Meanwhile the

expeditions to Estremadura and Murcia, the battles of Barosa and

Albuera, and the rout of Baza, had employed all the disposable part

of the army of the south; hence Victor’s corps, scarcely strong

enough to preserve its own fortified position, could make no progress

in the attack of the Isla. This weakness of the French army being

well known in Cadiz, the safety of that city was no longer doubtful,

a part of the British garrison therefore joined lord Wellington’s

army, and Blake as we have seen carried his Albuera soldiers to

Valencia.

In Grenada the fourth corps, which, after the departure of

Sebastiani, was commanded by general Laval, had two distinct tasks to

fulfil. The one to defend the eastern frontier from the Murcian army;

the other to maintain the coast line, beyond the Alpuxaras, against

the efforts of the Partidas of those mountains, against the Serranos

of the Ronda, and against the expeditionary armies from Cadiz and

from Algeziras. However, the defeat at Baza, and the calling off of

Mahi, Freire, and Montijo to aid the Valencian operations, secured

the Grenadan frontier; and Martin Carera, who was left there with a

small force, having pushed his partizan excursions rashly, was killed

in a skirmish at Lorca about the period when Valencia surrendered.

Cordoba was generally occupied by a division of five or six thousand

men, who were ready to operate on the side of Estremadura, or on that

of Murcia, and meanwhile chased the Partidas, who were more numerous

there than in other parts, and were also connected with those of La

Mancha.

Estremadura was the most difficult field of operation. There Badajos,

an advanced point, was to be supplied and defended from the most

formidable army in the Peninsula; there the communications with

Madrid, and with the army of Portugal, were to be maintained by the

way of Truxillo; and there the fifth French corps, commanded by

Drouet, had to collect its subsistence from a ravaged country; to

preserve its communications over the Sierra Morena with Seville; to

protect the march of monthly convoys to Badajos; to observe the corps

of general Hill, and to oppose the enterprises of Morillo’s Spanish

army, which was becoming numerous and bold.

Neither the Spanish nor British divisions could prevent Drouet from

sending convoys to Badajos, because of the want of bridges on the

Guadiana, below the fortress, but Morillo incommoded his foraging

parties; for being posted at Valencia de Alcantara, and having his

retreat upon Portugal always secure, he vexed the country about

Caceres, and even pushed his incursions to Truxillo. The French

general, therefore, kept a strong detachment beyond the Guadiana,

but this exposed his troops to Hill’s enterprises; and that bold and

vigilant commander having ten thousand excellent troops, and being

well instructed by Wellington, was a very dangerous neighbour.

Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus; the construction of

the forts and bridge at Almaraz, which enabled him to keep a division

at Truxillo, and connected him with the army of the south, tended

indeed to hold Hill in check, and strengthened the French position

in Estremadura; nevertheless, Drouet generally remained near Zafra

with his main body, because from thence he could more easily make

his retreat good to the Morena, or advance to Merida and Badajos as

occasion required.

[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 3.]

Such was the state of military affairs on the different parts of the

circle round Seville, at the period when Suchet invaded Valencia, and

Wellington blockaded Ciudad Rodrigo; and to support his extensive

operations, the duke of Dalmatia, if his share of the reinforcements

which entered Spain in July and August had joined him, would have

had about a hundred thousand troops, of which ninety thousand men

and fourteen thousand horses were French. But the reinforcements

were detained in the different governments, and the actual number of

French present with the eagles was not more than sixty-seven thousand.

The first corps contained twenty thousand; the fourth and fifth about

eleven thousand each; the garrison of Badajos was five thousand;

twenty thousand formed a disposable reserve, and the rest of the

force consisted of “_Escopeteros_” and civic guards, who were chiefly

employed in the garrisons and police. Upon pressing occasions, Soult

could therefore take the field, at any point, with twenty-four or

twenty-five thousand men, and in Estremadura, on very pressing

occasions, with even a greater number of excellent troops well

and powerfully organized. The manner in which this great army was

paralysed in the latter part of 1811, shall now be shown.

[Sidenote: 1811. October.]

In October, Drouet was in the Morena, and Girard at Merida, watching

Morillo, who was in Caceres, when Soult, who had just returned to

Seville after his Murcian expedition, sent three thousand men to

Fregenal, seemingly to menace the Alemtejo. General Hill therefore

recalled his brigades from the right bank of the Tagus, and

concentrated his whole corps behind the Campo Maior on the 9th.

The 11th Girard and Drouet advanced, the Spanish cavalry retired

from Caceres, the French drove Morillo to Caza de Cantellaña, and

every thing indicated a serious attack; but at this moment Soult’s

attention was attracted by the appearance of Ballesteros in the

Ronda, and he recalled the force from Fregenal. Drouet, who had

reached Merida, then retired to Zafra, leaving Girard with a

division and some cavalry near Caceres.

Ballesteros had disembarked at Algeziras on the 11th of September,

and immediately marched with his own and Beguine’s troops, in all

four thousand men, to Ximena, raising fresh levies and collecting the

Serranos of the Ronda as he advanced. On the 18th he had endeavoured

to succour the castle of Alcala de Gazules, where Beguines had a

garrison, but a French detachment from Chiclana had already reduced

that post, and after some skirmishing both sides fell back, the one

to Chiclana, the other to Ximena.

At this time six thousand French were collected at Ubrique, intending

to occupy the sea-coast, from Algeziras to Conil, in furtherance of

a great project which Soult was then meditating, and by which he

hoped to effect, not only the entire subjection of Andalusia, but the

destruction of the British power in the Peninsula. But this design,

which shall be hereafter explained more fully, required several

preliminary operations, amongst the most important of which was the

capture of Tarifa; for that place, situated in the narrowest part

of the straits, furnished either a protection, or a dangerous point

of offence, to the Mediterranean trade, following the relations

of its possessor with England. It affected, as we have seen, the

supplies of the French before the Isla; it was from its nearness,

and from the run of the current, the most convenient and customary

point for trading with Morocco; it menaced the security of Ceuta,

and it possessed, from ancient recollections, a species of feudal

superiority over the smaller towns, and ports along the coast, which

would have given the French, if they had taken it, a moral influence

of some consequence.

Soult had in August despatched a confidential officer from Conil to

the African coast to negotiate with the Barbaric emperor, and the

latter had agreed to a convention, by which he engaged to exclude

British agents from his court; and to permit vessels of all nations

to use the Moorish flag to cover their cargoes, while carrying to

the French those supplies hitherto sent to the allies, provided

Soult would occupy Tarifa as a depôt. This important convention was

on the point of being ratified, when the opportune arrival of some

unusually magnificent presents from England, turned the scale against

the French: their agent was then dismissed, the English supplies were

increased, and Mr. Stuart entered into a treaty for the purchase of

horses to remount the allied cavalry.

Although foiled in this attempt, Soult, calculating on the capricious

nature of barbarians, resolved to fulfil his part by the capture

of Tarifa; hence it was, that when Ballesteros appeared at Ximena,

he arrested the movement of Drouet against the Alemtejo, and sent

troops from Seville by Ubrique against the Spanish general, whose

position besides being extremely inconvenient to the first and fourth

corps, was likely to affect the taking of Tarifa. Ballesteros, if

reinforced, might also have become very dangerous to the blockade of

Cadiz, by intercepting the supplies from the Campiña de Tarifa, and

still more by menacing Victor’s communications with Seville, along

the Guadalquivir. A demonstration by the allies in the Isla de Leon

arrested the march of these French troops for a moment, but on the

14th eight thousand men under generals Godinot and Semélé advanced

upon St. Roque and Algeziras. The inhabitants of those places

immediately fled to the green island, and Ballesteros took refuge

under Gibraltar, where his flanks were covered by the gun-boats of

the place. The garrison was too weak to assist him with men, and

thus cooped up, he lived upon the resources of the place, while

efforts were therefore made to draw off the French by harassing their

flanks. The naval means were not sufficient to remove his whole army

to another quarter, but seven hundred were transported to Manilba,

where the Serranos and some Partidas had assembled on the left of

the French, and at the same time twelve hundred British troops with

four guns, under colonel Skerrett, and two thousand Spaniards, under

Copons, sailed from Cadiz to Tarifa to act upon the French right.

Copons was driven back by a gale of wind, but Skerrett arrived the

17th. The next day Godinot sent a detachment against him, but the

sea-road by which it marched was so swept with the guns of the Tuscan

frigate, aided by the boats of the Stately, that the French after

losing some men returned. Then Godinot and Semélé being in dispute,

and without provisions, retreated; they were followed by Ballesteros’

cavalry as far as Ximena, where the two generals separated in great

anger, and Godinot having reached Seville shot himself. This failure

in the south unsettled Soult’s plans, and was followed by a heavier

disaster in Estremadura.

SURPRISE OF AROYO MOLINO.

When Drouet had retired to Zafra, Hill received orders from

Wellington to drive Girard away from Caceres, that Morillo might

forage that country. For this purpose he assembled his corps at

Albuquerque on the 23d, and Morillo brought the fifth Spanish army

to Aliseda on the Salor. Girard was then at Caceres with an advanced

guard at Aroyo de Puerco, but on the 24th Hill occupied Aliseda and

Casa de Cantillana, and the Spanish cavalry drove the French from

Aroyo de Puerco. The 26th at day-break Hill entered Malpartida de

Caceres, and his cavalry pushed back that of the enemy. Girard then

abandoned Caceres, but the weather was wet and stormy, and Hill,

having no certain knowledge of the enemy’s movements, halted for the

night at Malpartida.

On the morning of the 27th the Spaniards entered Caceres; the enemy

was tracked to Torre Mocha on the road to Merida; and the British

general, hoping to intercept their line of march, pursued by a cross

road, through Aldea de Cano and Casa de Don Antonio. During this

movement intelligence was received that the French general had halted

at Aroyo Molino, leaving a rear-guard at Albala, on the main road

to Caceres, which proved that he was ignorant of the new direction

taken by the allies, and only looked to a pursuit from Caceres. Hill

immediately seized the advantage, and by a forced march reached

Alcuesca in the night, being then within a league of Aroyo de Molinos.

This village was situated in a plain, and behind it a sierra or

ridge of rocks, rose in the form of a crescent, about two miles wide

on the chord. One road led directly from Alcuesca upon Aroyo, another

entered it from the left, and three led from it to the right. The

most distant of the last was the Truxillo road, which rounded the

extremity of the sierra; the nearest was the Merida road, and between

them was that of Medellin.

During the night, though the weather was dreadful, no fires were

permitted in the allied camp; and at two o’clock in the morning of

the 28th, the troops moved to a low ridge, half-a-mile from Aroyo,

under cover of which they formed three bodies; the infantry on the

wings and the cavalry in the centre. The left column then marched

straight upon the village, the right marched towards the extreme

point of the sierra, where the road to Truxillo turned the horn of

the crescent; the cavalry kept its due place between both.

One brigade of Girard’s division, having marched at four o’clock by

the road of Medellin, was already safe, but Dombrouski’s brigade

and the cavalry of Briche were still in the place; the horses of

the rear-guard, unbridled, were tied to the olive-trees, and the

infantry were only gathering to form on the Medellin road outside

the village. Girard himself was in his quarters, waiting for his

horse, when two British officers galloped down the street, and in an

instant all was confusion; the cavalry bridled their horses, and the

infantry run to their alarming posts. But a thick mist rolled down

the craggy mountain, a terrifying shout, drowning even the clatter of

the elements arose on the blast, and with the driving storm came the

seventy-first and ninety-second regiments, charging down the street.

Then the French rear-guard of cavalry, fighting and struggling hard,

were driven to the end of the village, and the infantry, hastily

forming their squares, covered the main body of the horsemen which

gathered on their left.

The seventy-first immediately lined the garden walls, and opened a

galling fire on the nearest square, while the ninety-second filing

out of the streets formed upon the French right; the fiftieth

regiment closely following, secured the prisoners in the village,

and the rest of the column, headed by the Spanish cavalry, skirted

the outside of the houses, and endeavoured to intercept the line of

retreat. The guns soon opened on the French squares, the thirteenth

dragoons captured their artillery, the ninth dragoons and German

hussars, charged their cavalry and entirely dispersed it with

great loss; but Girard, an intrepid officer, although wounded,

still kept his infantry together, and continued his retreat by the

Truxillo road. The right column of the allies was however already

in possession of that line, the cavalry and artillery were close

upon the French flank, and the left column, having re-formed,

was again coming up fast; Girard’s men were falling by fifties,

and his situation was desperate, yet he would not surrender, but

giving the word to disperse, endeavoured to escape by scaling the

almost inaccessible rocks of the sierra. His pursuers, not less

obstinate, immediately divided. The Spaniards ascended the hills

at an easier part beyond his left, the thirty-ninth regiment and

Ashworth’s Portuguese turned the mountain by the Truxillo road; the

twenty-eighth and thirty-fourth, led by general Howard, followed him

step by step up the rocks, and prisoners were taken every moment,

until the pursuers, heavily loaded, were unable to continue the trial

of speed with men who had thrown away their arms and packs. Girard,

Dombrouski, and Briche, escaped at first to San Hernando, and Zorita,

in the Guadalupe mountains, after which, crossing the Guadiana at

Orellano on the 9th of November, they rejoined Drouet with about six

hundred men, the remains of three thousand. They were said to be

the finest troops then in Spain, and indeed their resolution not to

surrender in such an appalling situation was no mean proof of their

excellence.