[Sidenote: 1811. Sept.]
During the first arrangements, for the blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo,
the garrison made some excursions, to beat up the quarters of the
British cavalry, and to forage the villages; and some lancers
from Salamanca drove Julian Sanchez from Ledesma. Meanwhile in
Estremadura, Morillo chased the enemy from Caceres, and advancing
to Montanches, menaced Truxillo, but being beaten there by general
Foy, he returned to Montijo, where some French cavalry, arriving
from Zafra, again defeated him and drove him to Albuquerque. Other
military operations, worth relating, there were none, but the civil
transactions in Portugal were very important.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. IX. Section 1.]
Mr. Stuart’s exertions had produced some improvement in the
Portuguese revenue; the ranks of the infantry were again filling
by the return of deserters, and by fresh recruits, which, with the
reinforcements from England had raised the actual number of the
allied army to upwards of eighty thousand men, fifty-six thousand
of which were British; the number under arms did not however exceed
twenty-four thousand Portuguese and thirty-three thousand British,
of whom five thousand were cavalry, with about ninety pieces of
artillery. The previous operations in Alemtejo had produced sickness,
which was increasing, and twenty-two thousand men were in hospital;
and hence, Hill’s corps being deducted, lord Wellington could not
bring to the blockade of Ciudad above forty-four thousand of all
arms, including Sanchez’s Partida. But Marmont, alone, could in
a few days bring as many to its succour, and Dorsenne always had
from twenty to twenty-five thousand men in hand; because the French
reinforcements had relieved the old garrisons in the north and the
latter had joined the army in the field.
At this time the British military chest was quite bankrupt, even the
muleteers, upon whose fidelity and efficiency the war absolutely
depended, were six months in arrears for wages; and the disputes
with the Portuguese government were more acrimonious than ever. The
regency had proposed a new system of military regulations, calculated
to throw the burthen of feeding the native troops entirely upon
the British commissariat, without any reform of abuses, and lord
Wellington had rejected it, hence renewed violence; and as Beresford
had fallen sick at Cintra, Mr. Stuart deprived of his support on
military questions, and himself no longer a member of the regency,
was unable to restrain the triumphant faction of the Souzas. The
prince regent’s return to Portugal was prevented by troubles in
the Brazils, and the regency expecting a long hold of power, and
foolishly imagining that the war was no longer doubtful, were, after
the custom of all people who employ powerful auxiliaries, devising
how to get rid of the British army. With this view they objected to
or neglected every necessary measure, and made many absurd demands,
such as that the British general should pay the expenses of the
Portuguese post office; and at the same time they preferred various
vexatious, and unfounded charges against British officers, while
gross corruption, and oppression of the poorer people, marked the
conduct of their own magistrates.
But the fate of Portugal, which to these people appeared fixed,
was in the eyes of the English general more doubtful than ever.
Intercepted letters gave reasons to believe that the emperor was
coming to Spain. And this notion was confirmed by the assembling
of an army of reserve in France, and by the formation of great
magazines at Burgos, and other places, to supply which, and to obtain
money, the French generals were exacting the fourth of the harvest,
and selling the overplus of corn again even by retail. Minute
reports of the state of these magazines were demanded by Napoleon;
reinforcements, especially of the imperial guards, were pouring into
Spain, and Wellington judging that the emperor must either drive the
British from the Peninsula, or lower his tone with the world, thought
that he would invade Portugal from the side of Rodrigo, the valley of
the Tagus, and Alemtejo at the same time; and that he would risk his
fleet in a combined attack upon Lisbon by sea and land.
Whether Napoleon really meant this; or whether he only spread the
report, with a view to restrain the allies from any offensive
operations during the summer, and to mislead the English cabinet
as to the real state of his negotiations with Russia, intending if
the latter proved favourable to turn his whole force against the
Peninsula, does not very clearly appear; yet it is certain that every
thing in Spain at this time indicated his approach. Lord Wellington’s
opinion that the emperor was bound to drive the British army away or
lose his influence in the world does not however seem quite just;
because the mighty expedition to Moscow, proved, that Napoleon did
not want force to conquer Spain; and success in Russia would have
enabled him to prolong the war in the Peninsula as a drain on the
English resources for many years; which was so obvious a policy,
that the rest of Europe could not from thence draw conclusions
unfavourable to his influence.
[Sidenote: Colonel Jones’s History of the Peninsular War.]
Under the notion that Napoleon’s coming was probable, the English
general, with characteristic prudence, turned his own attention to
the security of his ancient refuge within the lines, and therefore
urgently desired the government to put the fortresses in order,
repair the roads, and restore the bridges broken during Massena’s
invasion. An increased number of workmen were also put to the lines,
for the engineers had never ceased to improve those on the northern
bank of the Tagus, and on the southern bank the double lines of
Almada had been continued on a gigantic scale. The defensive canal
there was planned to float ships of three hundred tons, and to serve
as a passage from the Tagus to Setuval by joining the navigation of
the Sadao and Marateca rivers; thus conducing to objects of general
utility as well as the military defence; as it will be found that
lord Wellington did at all times sustain, not only the political,
and financial, and military affairs, but also the agricultural, the
commercial, and charitable interests of Portugal. The batteries at
the mouth of the Tagus were likewise put into complete order, they
were provided with furnaces for heating shot, and captain Holloway
of the engineers, at a trifling expense, constructed four jetties at
St. Julian’s, in such an ingenious manner, that they withstood the
most tempestuous gales and secured the embarkation of the army in
any season. Finally the militia were again called out, a measure of
greater import, in the actual state of affairs, than would at first
appear; for the expense was a very heavy drain upon the finances, and
the number of hands thus taken away from agriculture was a serious
evil.
[Sidenote: Wellington’s correspondence with Lord Liverpool, MSS.]
Had all these preparations been duly executed, lord Wellington
would not have feared even Napoleon; but all that depended upon
the Portuguese government, if that can be called government which
was but a faction, was, as usual, entirely neglected. The regency
refused to publish any proclamation to display the danger, or to
call upon the people to prepare for future efforts; and although the
ancient laws of Portugal provided the most ample means for meeting
such emergencies, the bridges over the Ceira, the Alva and other
rivers, on the line of retreat, were left unrepaired. The roads were
therefore impassable, and as the rainy season was coming on, the
safety of the army would have been seriously endangered if it had
been obliged to retire before the emperor. The regency pleaded want
of money, but this also could be traced to their own negligence in
the collection of the taxes, for which there was no solid reason;
because, with the exception of the devastated districts, the
people were actually richer than they had ever been, not indeed in
goods, but in hard cash, derived from the enormous sums expended
by the British army. To add to these embarrassments the secret
correspondents of the army on the side of Salamanca suddenly ceased
their communications, and it was at first feared they had paid
with their lives for the culpable indiscretion of the Portuguese
government; for the latter had published, in the Lisbon Gazette, all
the secret information sent to Silveira, which being copied into
the English newspapers, drew the enemy’s attention. Fortunately this
alarm proved false, but a sense of the other difficulties was greatly
aggravated to the English general, by comparison of his situation
with that of the enemy; neither necessity nor remuneration, could
procure for him due assistance from the Portuguese people, while the
French generals had merely to issue their orders to the Spaniards
through the prefects of the provinces, and all means of transport or
other succour, possible to be obtained, were sure to be provided on
the day and at the place indicated.
In the midst of these cares lord Wellington was suddenly called
into military action by the approach of the enemy. Ciudad Rodrigo
having been blockaded for six weeks wanted food, and Marmont, who had
received a reinforcement of eleven thousand men from France, and had
now fifty thousand, present under arms, in the valley of the Tagus,
being in pain for the garrison, had concerted with Dorsenne a great
combined operation for its succour. In this view Truxillo had been
occupied by a part of the fifth corps, and Girard with the remainder
had advanced to Merida, while Foy, reinforced by a strong division of
the army of the centre, occupied Placentia. Marmont himself quitting
Talavera, had passed the mountains and collected a large convoy at
Bejar; at the same time Dorsenne reinforced by eight thousand men
under Souham, had collected another convoy at Salamanca, and leaving
Bonnet’s division, which now included Mayer’s troops, at Astorga, to
watch the Gallicians, came down to Tamames. They met on the 21st,
their united armies presenting a mass of sixty thousand men, of
which six thousand were cavalry; and they had above a hundred pieces
of artillery.
The English general, who had expected this movement, immediately
concentrated his scattered troops. He could not fight beyond the
Agueda, but he did not think fit to retreat until he had seen their
whole army, lest a detachment should relieve the place to his
dishonour. Hence to make the enemy display his force, he established
himself in the following positions near the fortress.
The third division, reinforced by three squadrons of German and
British cavalry, formed his centre. It was posted on the heights of
Elbodon and Pastores, on the left of the Agueda, and within three
miles of Ciudad, commanding a complete prospect of the plains round
that place.
The right wing, composed of the light division, some squadrons of
cavalry, and six guns, was posted beyond the Agueda, and behind the
Vadillo, a river rising in the Peña de Francia, and flowing in a
rugged channel to the Agueda, which it joins about three miles above
Rodrigo; from this line an enemy coming from the eastern passes of
the hills could be discerned.
The left wing, composed of the sixth division and Anson’s brigade of
cavalry, the whole under general Graham, was placed at Espeja, on
the lower Azava, with advanced posts at Carpio and Marialva. From
thence to Ciudad Rodrigo was about eight miles over a plain, and
on Graham’s left, Julian Sanchez’s Partida, nominally commanded by
Carlos d’España, was spread along the lower Agueda in observation.
The heads of the columns were therefore presented on three points to
the fortress; namely, at the ford of the Vadillo; and the heights of
Pastores and Espeja. The communication between the left and centre
was kept up by two brigades of heavy cavalry, posted on the Upper
Azava, and supported at Campillo by Pack’s Portuguese brigade. But
the left of the army was very distant from Guinaldo, which was the
pivot of operations, and to obviate the danger of making a flank
march in retreat, should the enemy advance, the seventh division
was placed in reserve at Alamedillo, and the first division at Nava
d’Aver. Thus the allied army was spread out on the different roads
which led, like the sticks of a fan, to one point on the Coa.
The fifth division remained at St. Payo, watching the passes from
Estremadura, lest Foy should from that direction fall on the rear
of the right wing; and as Marmont’s movement affected the line of
communication along the eastern frontier, general Hill first sent
Hamilton’s Portuguese towards Alburquerque, to support the Spanish
cavalry, which was menaced by the fifth corps, and then brought the
remainder of his troops nearer to the Tagus, in readiness to take
the place of his third brigade, which now marched from the Ponçul to
Penamacor.
Wellington’s position before Rodrigo was very extensive, and
therefore very weak. The Agueda, although fordable in many places
during fine weather, was liable to sudden freshes, and was on both
sides lined with high ridges. The heights, occupied by the troops, on
the left bank, were about three miles wide, ending rather abruptly
above Pastores and Elbodon, and they were flanked by the great
plains and woods, which extend from Ciudad to the bed of the Coa.
The position of Elbodon itself, which was held by the centre of
the army, was, therefore, not tenable against an enemy commanding
these plains; and as the wings were distant their lines of retreat
were liable to be cut, if the centre should be briskly pushed back
beyond Guinaldo. But, at the latter place, three field redoubts had
been constructed, on the high land, with a view to impose upon the
enemy, and so gain time to assemble and feel Marmont’s disposition
for a battle, because a retreat behind the Coa was to be avoided if
possible.
On the 23d the French advanced from Tamames, and encamped behind the
hills to the north-east of Ciudad Rodrigo. Then a strong detachment
entered the plain, and having communicated with the garrison, and
examined the position of the light division on the Vadillo returned.
The 24th, six thousand cavalry, with four divisions of infantry,
crossed the hills in two columns, and placing some troops in
observation on the Vadillo, introduced the convoy. On this day the
fourth division of the allies, was brought up to the position of
Guinaldo, and the redoubts were completed, yet no other change was
made, for it was thought the French would not advance further. But
the 25th, soon after daybreak, fourteen squadrons of the imperial
guards drove the outposts of the left wing from Carpio across the
Azava, and the lancers of Berg crossed that river in pursuit, they
were however flanked by some infantry in a wood, and then charged and
beaten by two squadrons of the fourteenth, and sixteenth, dragoons,
who reoccupied the post at Carpio.
During this skirmish, fourteen battalions of infantry, thirty
squadrons of cavalry, and twelve guns, the whole under Montbrun,
passed the Agueda by the bridge of Rodrigo and the fords above it,
and marched towards Guinaldo. The road soon divided, one branch
turning the Elbodon heights on the right hand, the other leading
nearer to the Agueda, and passing through the villages of Pastores,
La Encina, and Elbodon; and as the point of divarication was covered
by a gentle ridge, it was for some time doubtful which branch
the French would follow. In a short time this doubt was decided.
Their cavalry poured along the right-hand road leading directly to
Guinaldo, the small advanced posts which the allied squadrons had on
the plain were rapidly driven in, and the enemy’s horsemen without
waiting for their infantry commenced the
COMBAT OF ELBODON.
The position of the third division was completely turned by this
movement, and the action began very disadvantageously, for the
seventy-fourth and sixtieth regiments, being at Pastores, on the
right, were too distant to be called in, and Picton being with three
other regiments, at Elbodon, could not take any immediate part in
the fight. Hence, as the French force was considerable, Wellington
sent to Guinaldo for a brigade of the fourth division, and meanwhile
directed general Colville to draw up the seventy-seventh and fifth
British regiments, the twenty-first Portuguese, and two brigades
of artillery of the same nation, on the hill over which the road
to Guinaldo passed, supporting their flanks with Alten’s three
squadrons. The height, thus occupied by the allies, was convex
towards the enemy, and covered in front and on both flanks, by deep
ravines, but it was too extensive for their numbers; and before
Picton could bring in the troops from the village of Elbodon, the
crisis of the combat passed. The Portuguese guns had sent their shot
amongst the thickest of Montbrun’s horsemen in the plain, but the
latter passed the front ravine in half squadrons, and with amazing
vigour riding up the rough height, on three sides, fell vehemently
upon the allies. Neither the loose fire of the infantry, nor of
the artillery, could stop them, but they were checked by the fine
fighting of the cavalry, who charged the heads of the ascending
masses, not once but twenty times, and always with a good will, thus
maintaining the upper ground for above an hour.
It was astonishing to see so few troopers bearing up against that
surging multitude, even favoured as the former were by the steep
rocky nature of the ground; but Montbrun obstinate to win soon
brought up his artillery, and his horsemen gaining ground in the
centre, cut down some of the gunners and captured the guns; and
one of the British squadrons by charging too far got entangled
in the intricacy of the ravines. The danger was then imminent,
when suddenly the fifth regiment, led by major Ridge, a daring
spirit, darted into the midst of the French cavalry, and retook
the artillery, which again opened its fire; and nearly at the same
time the seventy-seventh, supported by the twenty-first Portuguese,
repulsed the enemy on the left. However, this charging of a weak line
of infantry against a powerful cavalry, could only check the foe at
that particular point. Montbrun still pressed onwards with fresh
masses, against the left flank of the allies, while other squadrons
penetrated between the right flank and the village of Elbodon. From
the enclosures and vineyards of that village, Picton was at this time
with difficulty and some confusion extricating his regiments; the
expected brigade of the fourth division was not yet in sight, and the
French infantry was rapidly approaching: the position was no longer
tenable, and lord Wellington directed both Picton and Colville to
fall back and unite in the plain behind.
Colville forming his battalions in two squares immediately descended
from the hill, but Picton had a considerable distance to move, and
at this moment, the allied squadrons, fearing to be surrounded by
the French, who had completely turned their right, galloped away,
and took refuge with the Portuguese regiment, which was farthest in
retreat. Then the fifth and seventy-seventh, two weak battalions
formed in one square, were quite exposed, and in an instant the
whole of the French cavalry came thundering down upon them. But how
vain, how fruitless to match the sword with the musket! To send the
charging horseman against the steadfast veteran! The multitudinous
squadrons, rending the skies with their shouts, and closing upon the
glowing squares, like the falling edges of a burning crater, were as
instantly rejected, scorched, and scattered abroad; and the rolling
peal of musketry had scarcely ceased to echo in the hills, when
bayonets glittered at the edge of the smoke, and with firm and even
step, the British regiments came forth like the holy men from the
Assyrian’s furnace.
[Illustration: _Vol. 4. Plate 3._
EXPLANATORY SKETCH
of the
_OPERATIONS AND COMBAT_
of
EL BODON.
_London. Published by T. & W. BOONE._]
Picton now effected his junction and the whole retired over
the plain to the position at Guinaldo, which was about six miles
distant. The French, although fearing to renew the close attack,
followed, and plied the troops with shot and shell, until about four
o’clock in the evening, when the entrenched camp was gained. Here
the fourth division presented a fresh front, Pack’s brigade came up
from Campillo, and the heavy cavalry from the Upper Azava, being also
brought into line, the action ceased. By this retrograde movement of
the left and centre of the third division, the seventy-fourth and the
sixtieth regiments, posted at Pastores, were cut off; they however
crossed the Agueda by a ford, and moving up the right bank happily
reached Guinaldo in the night, after a march of fifteen hours, in the
course of which they captured a French cavalry patrol.
During the retreat from Elbodon, the left wing of the army was
ordered to fall back on the first division, at Nava d’Aver, but to
keep posts in observation on the Azava. Carlos d’España retired with
Sanchez’s infantry behind the Coa, and the guerilla chief himself
passed with his cavalry into the French rear. The seventh division
was withdrawn from Allemadilla to Albergaria, and the head-quarters
baggage moved to Casilla de Flores. The light division should have
marched to Guinaldo; general Craufurd received the order at two
o’clock, he plainly heard the cannonade, and might easily have
reached Guinaldo before midnight, but he only marched to Cespedosa,
one league from the Vadillo, which river was immediately passed
by fifteen hundred French. The position at Guinaldo was therefore
occupied by only fourteen thousand men, of which about two thousand
six hundred were cavalry. The left of the army, concentrated at Nava
d’Aver, under Graham, was ten miles distant; the light division being
at Cespedosa and debarred the direct route by the ford of Carros, was
sixteen miles distant, and the fifth division, posted at Payo in the
mountains, was twelve miles distant. Meanwhile Marmont brought up
a second division of infantry, and in the course of the night, and
the following day, united sixty thousand men in front of Guinaldo.
The situation of the English general was become most critical, yet
he would not abandon the light division, which did not arrive until
after three o’clock in the evening. Marmont’s fortune was fixed in
that hour! He knew nothing of the allies’ true situation, and having
detached a strong column by the valley of the Azava to menace their
left, contented himself with making an ostentatious display of the
imperial guards in the plain, instead of attacking an adversary who
was too weak to fight, and laughing to see him so employed, soon
changed the state of affairs.
In the night, Wellington by a skilful concentric movement from
Guinaldo, Nava d’Aver, Perales, and Payo, united the whole army on
new ground, between the Coa and the sources of the Agueda, twelve
miles behind Guinaldo; and it is a curious fact that Marmont had so
little knowledge of his own advantages, that instead of harassing the
allies in this difficult movement, he also retired during the night,
and was actually in march to the rear, when the scouts of the column,
which had marched by the valley of Azava, brought word that the
allies were in retreat, and their divisions still widely separated.
Dorsenne then insisted that Marmont should wheel round and pursue,
but lord Wellington was already in a strong position behind the
stream of the Villa Maior.
The fifth division, coming up from Payo, was now on the right at
Aldea Velha, the fourth and light divisions, with Victor Alten’s
cavalry, and the heavy dragoons, under sir Stapleton Cotton, were
in the centre in front of Alfayates; the convent of Sacaparte was
on their left, and the line was prolonged to Rebulon by Pack’s and
M‘Mahon’s Portuguese brigades; the sixth division with Anson’s
cavalry closed the line at Bismula. The cavalry picquets were pushed
beyond the Villa Maior in front of Aldea de Ponte, in the centre, and
towards Furcalhos on the right; and the third and seventh divisions
were in reserve behind Alfayates. This position was extensive, but
the days were short, serious dispositions were required for a general
attack, and the allies could not be turned, because they covered all
the practicable roads leading to the bridges and fords of the Coa.
COMBAT OF ALDEA DE PONTE.
The French, moving by the roads of Furcalhos and of Aldea de Ponte,
were checked by the picquets of the light division on the former; but
on the latter their horsemen drove the cavalry posts from the hills,
and across the stream of the Villa Maior, and about ten o’clock took
possession of Aldea de Ponte.
At twelve o’clock the head of the infantry came up and immediately
attacked general Pakenham, then commanding a brigade of the fourth
division, which was posted on the opposite heights. Lord Wellington
arrived at the same moment, and directed the seventh fuzileers to
charge in line, and he supported them on each flank with a Portuguese
regiment in column. The French, who had advanced well up the hill,
were driven back, and though they afterwards attempted to turn the
brigade by a wood, which was distant about musket-shot from the
right, while their cavalry advanced to the foot of the hills, the
artillery sufficed to baffle the effort. Then the English general
taking the offensive, directed the twenty-third fuzileers and
Portuguese caçadores to turn the French left, and seize the opposite
hills, which finished the action, and Aldea de Ponte was again
occupied by the allies. Wellington, who had been much exposed to
the fire, rode to another part of the position, but scarcely had he
departed when the French from the Forcalhos road joined those near
Aldea de Ponte, and at five o’clock renewing the attack retook the
village. Pakenham, with his fuzileers, immediately recovered it, but
the French were very numerous, the country rugged, and so wooded,
that he could not tell what was passing on the flanks, wherefore,
knowing that the chosen ground of battle was behind the Coa, he
abandoned Aldea de Ponte and regained his original post.
In the night the allies retreated, and on the morning of the 28th
occupied a new and very strong position in front of the Coa, the
right resting on the Sierra de Mesas, the centre covered by the
village of Soita, the left at Rendo upon the Coa. The whole army thus
enclosed, as it were in a deep loop of the Coa river could only be
attacked on a narrow front, and Marmont, who had brought up but a
few days’ provisions and could gather none in that country, retired
the same day. This terminated the operations. The French placed a
fresh garrison in Ciudad Rodrigo; Dorsenne marched to Salamanca; a
strong division was posted at Alba de Tormes to communicate with
Marmont, and the latter resumed his old position in the valley of the
Tagus. At the same time Foy, who had advanced with his two divisions
as far as Zarza Mayor, in the direction of Castello Branco, returned
to Placentia; Girard also, being threatened by Hamilton’s Portuguese
division, which Hill had sent to check his advance, left two thousand
men of the fifth corps at Merida, and retired to Zafra; and when
these movements were known, the light division reinforced by some
cavalry resumed the nominal blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo, in concert
with Julian Sanchez. The rest of the army was cantoned on both sides
of the Coa, and head-quarters were fixed at Frenada.
[Sidenote: Victoires et Conquêtes des François.]
Nearly a month had been employed by the French in the preparation
and execution of this great operation, which terminated so feebly
and so abruptly, because the generals were as usual at variance.
They had victualled Ciudad Rodrigo, but they had lost the favourable
opportunity of invading Gallicia. Nothing had been gained in the
field, time was lost, and the English general’s plans were forwarded.
OBSERVATIONS.
[Sidenote: Londonderry’s Narrative.]
[Sidenote: Annals of the Peninsular Campaigns]
1º. Lord Wellington’s position behind Soita has been noticed by two
recent authors. The one condemns the imprudence of offering battle
on ground whence there was no retreat; the other intimates that it
was assumed in contempt of the adversary’s prowess. This last appears
a mere shift to evade what was not understood, for if lord Wellington
had despised Marmont, he would have fought him beyond the Agueda. But
sixty thousand French soldiers were never to be despised, neither
was Wellington a man to put an army in jeopardy from any overweening
confidence; and it is not difficult to show that his position was
chosen well, without imprudence, and without presumption.
The space between the Sierra de Mesas and the Coa was less than six
miles, and the part open to attack was very much reduced by the
rugged bed of a torrent which covered the left. Forty thousand men
were quite able to defend this line, which was scarcely more than
one-third of their full front; and as the roads were bad, the country
hilly and much broken with woods and ravines, the superiority of the
enemy’s horse and guns would have availed him little. Lord Wellington
had a right to be bold against an adversary who had not molested him
at Guinaldo, and it is always of importance to show a menacing front.
It was also certain that great combinations must have been made by
Marmont, before he could fight a general battle on such ground; it
was equally certain that he could only have a few days’ provisions
with his army, and that the neighbourhood could not supply him. It
was, therefore, reasonable to expect that he would retire rather than
fight, and he did so.
Let us however, take the other side, and suppose that Marmont was
prepared and resolute to bring on a great battle. The position behind
Soita would still have been good. The French were indeed too strong
to be fought with on a plain, yet not strong enough to warrant a
retreat indicating fear; hence the allies had retired slowly for
three days, each day engaged, and the enemy’s powerful horse and
artillery was always close upon their rear. Now the bed of the Coa,
which was extremely rugged, furnished only a few points for crossing,
of which the principal were, the ford of Serraleira behind the right
of the allies; the ford of Rapoulha de Coa behind their left; and the
bridge of Sabugal behind their centre. The ways to those points were
narrow, and the passage of the river, with all the baggage, could not
have been easily effected in face of an enemy without some loss and
perhaps dishonour: and had lord Wellington been unable to hold his
position in a battle, the difficulty of passing the river would not
have been very much increased, because his incumbrances would all
have been at the other side, and there was a second range of heights
half-a-mile in front of Sabugal favourable for a rear-guard. The
position of Soita appears therefore to have been chosen with good
judgment in regard to the immediate object of opposing the enemy; but
it is certain that the battering train, then between Pinhel and Villa
Ponte, was completely exposed to the enemy. Marmont, however, had not
sufficiently considered his enterprize, and knew not where or how to
strike.
2º. The position of Aldea Ponte, was equally well chosen. Had the
allies retreated at once from Guinaldo, to Soita, baggage and
stores would have been lost, and the retrograde movement have had
the appearance of a flight; the road from Payo would have been
uncovered, and the junction of the fifth division endangered. But
in the position taken up, the points of junction of all the roads
were occupied, and as each point was strong in itself, it was not
difficult for a quick-sighted general, perfectly acquainted with
the country, and having excellent troops, to check the heads of the
enemy’s columns, until the baggage had gained a sufficient offing,
and the fifth division had taken its place in line.
3º. The position at Guinaldo was very different from the others. The
previous entrenching of it proved lord Wellington’s foresight, and
he remained there thirty-six hours, that is, from mid-day of the
25th until midnight of the 26th, which proved his firmness. It is
said that sir George Murray advised him to abandon it in the night
of the 25th, and that arrangements were actually made in that view,
yet anxious for the safety of the light division he would not stir.
The object was certainly one of an importance sufficient to justify
the resolution, but the resolution itself was one of those daring
strokes of genius which the ordinary rules of art were never made to
controul. The position was contracted, of no great natural strength
in front, and easily to be turned; the entrenchments constructed were
only a few breast-works and two weak field redoubts, open in rear,
and without palisades; not more than fourteen thousand British and
Portuguese troops were in line, and sixty thousand French veterans
with a hundred pieces of artillery were before them! When Marmont
heard of the escape of the light division, and discovered the deceit,
he prophetically exclaimed, alluding to Napoleon’s fortune, “_And
Wellington’s star, it also is bright!_”
4º. The positions of Aldea Ponte and Soita are to be commended, that
at Guinaldo to be admired rather than imitated, but the preceding
operations are censurable. The country immediately beyond Ciudad
Rodrigo offered no covering position for a siege or blockade; and
the sudden floods, to which the Agueda is subject, rendered the
communications with the left bank precarious. Nor though bridges had
been secured, could Wellington have ventured to encamp round the
place with lines of contravallation and circumvallation, on both
sides of the river; because Marmont’s army would then have advanced
from Placencia to Castello Branco, have seized the passage over the
Tagus at Vilha Velha, and in concert with the fifth corps endangered
the safety of Hill. This would have obliged the allies to quit their
entrenched camp, and Dorsenne could then have re-victualled the
place. It was therefore necessary to hold a strong central position
with respect to Marmont and Dorsenne, to keep both in check while
separate, and to oppose them when united. This position was on the
Coa, and as Salamanca or Bejar, the nearest points where convoys
could be collected for Ciudad Rodrigo, were from fifty to sixty miles
distant, lord Wellington’s object, namely the forcing the French to
assemble in large bodies without any adequate result, could be, and
was obtained by a distant as well as by a close investment.
So far all was well calculated, but when Marmont and Dorsenne arrived
with sixty thousand men at Ciudad Rodrigo, the aspect of affairs
entirely changed, and as the English general could not dispute the
entrance of the convoy, he should have concentrated his army at
once behind Guinaldo. Instead of doing this he kept it extended on
a line of many miles and the right wing separated from the centre
by a difficult river. In his despatch, he says, that, from some
uncertainty in his estimate of the enemy’s numbers, it was necessary
to ascertain their exact strength by actual observation; but this is
rather an excuse than a valid reason, because, for this object, which
could be obtained by other means, he risked the loss of his whole
army, and violated two vital rules of war which forbid—
1º. The parcelling of an army before a concentrated enemy.
2º. The fixing of your own point of concentration within the enemy’s
reach.
Now lord Wellington’s position on the 24th and 25th extended from
the ford of the Vadillo on the right of the Agueda, to Marialva
on the Azava; the distance either from the Vadillo, or Marialva,
to Guinaldo, was as great as that from Ciudad to Guinaldo, and by
worse roads; and the distance from Ciudad to Elbodon was as nothing,
compared to the distance of the wings from the same place. Wherefore
when Montbrun attacked, at Elbodon, the allies’ wings were cut off,
and the escape of the third and light divisions, and of the troops
at Pastores, was a matter of fortune and gallantry, rather than of
generalship; that is, in the enlarged sense of the last word, for
it cannot be denied that the actual movements of the troops were
conducted with consummate skill.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
But what if Marmont, instead of being drawn by circumstances into
a series of ill-combined, and partial attacks, had previously made
dispositions for a great battle? He certainly knew, through the
garrison, the real situation of the allies, and he also knew of
the camp at Guinaldo, which being on their line of retreat was the
important point. If he had issued from the fortress before daybreak
on the 25th with the whole or even half of his forces, he could
have reached Campillo in two hours with one column, while another
fell on the position at Pastores and Elbodon; the third division,
thus attacked, would have been enveloped and captured, or broken
and driven over the Agueda, by the ford of Zamara, and would have
been irretrievably separated from Guinaldo. And if this division
had even reached Guinaldo, the French army would have arrived with
it in such overwhelming numbers, that the fourth division could
not have restored the battle; meanwhile a few thousand men thrown
across the ford of Caros near Robleda would have sufficed to keep the
light division at bay, because the channel of the Robleda torrent,
over which their retreat lay, was a very deep and rugged ravine.
The centre being broken the French could, at choice, have either
surrounded the light division, or directed the mass of their forces
against the reserves, and then the left wing under Graham would have
had to retreat from the Azava over the plains towards Almeida.
It may be said that all the French were not up on the 25th, but
they might have been so, and as lord Wellington was resolved to see
their number he would have been in the same position the 26th. It is
however sufficient to remark that the allies exclusive of the fifth
division, which was at Payo, did not exceed thirty-five thousand men
of all arms; that they were on an irregular line of at least twenty
miles, and mostly in an open country; that at no point were the
troops more than eight, and at the principal point, namely Pastores,
only three, miles, from a fortress from whence sixty thousand
infantry and six thousand cavalry, with one hundred and twenty guns
were ready to issue. Finally the point of concentration at Guinaldo
was only twelve miles from that fortress. The allies escaped because
their adversary was blind! Lord Wellington’s conduct at Guinaldo was
above rules, but at Elbodon it was against rules, which is just the
difference between genius and error.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
4º. In these operations Marmont gave proof that as a general he was
rather shining than great. He was in error throughout. Before he
commenced his march he had desired Girard to advance on the side of
the Alemtejo, assuring him that the whole of the allied army, and
even the Spanish troops under Castaños, had crossed the Tagus to
operate against Rodrigo; but in fact only one brigade of Hill’s corps
had moved, and Girard would have been destroyed, if, fortunately for
him, the allies had not intercepted the original and duplicate of the
letter containing this false information.
5º. When Marmont brought his convoy into Ciudad, it would appear he
had no intention of fighting, but tempted by the false position of
the allies, and angry at the repulse of his cavalry on the Lower
Azava, he turned his scouting troops into columns of attack. And yet
he permitted his adversary to throw dust in his eyes for thirty-six
hours at Guinaldo; and at Aldea Ponte his attack was a useless waste
of men, because there was no local advantage offered, and he did not
intend a great battle.
6º. The loss incurred in the different combats was not great. About
three hundred men and officers fell on the part of the allies, and on
that of the French rather more, because of the fire of the squares
and artillery at Elbodon. But the movements during the three days
were full of interest, and instruction, and diversified also by
brilliant examples of heroism. Ridge’s daring charge has been already
noticed, and it was in one of the cavalry encounters, that a French
officer in the act of striking at the gallant Felton Harvey of the
fourteenth dragoons, perceived that he had only one arm, and with a
rapid movement brought down his sword into a salute and passed on!
Such was the state of the war on the frontier of Portugal; in the
next book will be found the contemporary events in Spain.