[Sidenote: 1811. July.]
While Soult was clearing the eastern frontier of Andalusia, Marmont
retired gradually from Badajos and quartered his troops in the
valley of the Tagus, with exception of one division which he left,
at Truxillo. At the same time the fifth corps retired to Zafra, and
thus lord Wellington found himself relieved from the presence of the
French, at the very moment when he had most reason to fear their
efforts. He had by this time secured the fortresses on the frontier,
his troops were beginning to suffer from the terrible pestilence of
the Guadiana, this was sufficient to prevent him from renewing the
siege of Badajos, if Marmont’s position had not forbid that measure,
he therefore resolved to adopt a new system of operations. But to
judge of the motives which influenced his conduct we must again cast
a hasty glance over the general state of the Peninsula, which was
hourly changing.
In Catalonia Suchet had stormed Taragona, seized Montserrat, and
dispersed the Catalan army. A division of the army of the centre had
chased the Partidas from Guadalaxara and Cuença, and re-established
the communications with Aragon. Valencia and Murcia were in fear and
confusion, both from internal intrigue and from the double disasters
on each side of their frontier, at Baza and Taragona
The French emperor was pouring reinforcements into Spain by the
northern line; these troops as usual scoured the country to put down
the Guerillas on each side of their march, and nearly forty thousand
fresh men, mostly old soldiers from the army of the reserve, were
come, or coming into the north of Spain. The young guard which was at
Burgos, under general Dorsenne, was increased to seventeen thousand
men; and as no efforts, except those already noticed, were made by
the Spaniards, to shake the French hold of the country while Soult
and Marmont were on the Guadiana, the French generals were enabled to
plan extensive measures of further conquest: and the more readily,
because the king was now on his return from Paris, in apparent
harmony with his brother, and the powers and duties of all parties
were defined.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. III. Section 3.]
Suchet urged by Napoleon to hasten his preparations for the invasion
of Valencia, was resolved to be under the walls of that city in the
middle of September, and Soult was secretly planning a gigantic
enterprise, calculated to change the whole aspect of the war. In
the north when the king, who re-entered Madrid the 14th, had passed
Valladolid, the imperial guards entered Leon; thirteen thousand men
of the army of the north were concentrated at Benevente on the 17th,
and Santocildes retired into the mountains. Bessieres then sent a
large convoy to Ciudad Rodrigo, but following the treaty between
Joseph and Napoleon, returned himself to France, and general Dorsenne
taking the command of the army of the north, prepared to invade
Gallicia.
Meanwhile Marmont was directed to resign the whole of Castile and
Leon, to the protection of the army of the north, and to withdraw
all his posts and depôts with the exception of the garrison of Ciudad
Rodrigo, which was to be changed at a more convenient time. His line
of communication was to be with Madrid, and that city was to be his
chief depôt and base; he was to take positions in the valley of the
Tagus, and at Truxillo; to fortify either Alcantara or Almaraz, and
to secure the communication across the river.
Thus posted, the emperor judged that Marmont could more effectually
arrest the progress of the allies than in any other. The invasion
of Andalusia, for the purpose of raising the siege of Cadiz, was,
he said, the only object the allies had at the moment, but it could
always be frustrated by Marmont’s moving against their flank; and
with respect to the north, the allies having no object on that side,
would be unlikely to make any serious attempt, because they must in
time be overmatched, as the French fell back upon their resources.
Marmont could also act against their right flank, as he could do
against their left flank, if they marched upon Andalusia; and while
stationary he protected Madrid, and gave power and activity to the
king’s administration.
In pursuance of these instructions, Marmont, who had remained in
Estremadura, to cover Soult’s operations against Blake and the
Murcians, now proceeded to occupy Talavera, and other posts in the
valley of the Tagus; and he placed a division at Truxillo, the castle
of which place, as well as that of Medellin, was repaired. Another
division occupied Placentia, with posts in the passes of Bejar and
Baños; Girard’s division of the fifth corps, remained at Zafra, to
serve as a point of connexion between Marmont and Soult, and to
support Badajos, which, by a wise provision of Napoleon’s, was now
garrisoned with detachments from the three armies, of the centre, of
Portugal and of the south. This gave each general a direct interest
in moving to its succour, and in the same policy Ciudad Rodrigo was
to be wholly garrisoned by the army of the north, that Marmont might
have no temptation to neglect the army of the south, under pretence
of succouring Ciudad.
To restore and maintain Alcantara was beyond the means of the duke of
Ragusa; he therefore repaired the bridge of Almaraz, and constructed
two strong forts, one at each side, to protect it, and to serve as an
intermediate field depôt; a third and more considerable fort was also
built on the high ridge of Mirabete, to insure a passage over the
hills from Almaraz to Truxillo. A free intercourse with the army of
the south was thus secured on one side, and on the other, the passes
of Baños and Bejar, and the Roman road of Puerto Pico, which had been
restored in 1810, served for communication with the army of the north.
The French affairs had now assumed a very favourable aspect. There
was indeed a want of money, but the generals were obeyed with
scrupulous attention by the people of Spain, not only within the
districts occupied by them, but even in those villages where the
guerillas were posted. This obedience lord Wellington attributed
entirely to fear, and hoped as the exactions were heavy, that the
people would at last fight or fly from their habitations on the
approach of a French soldier; but this did not happen generally,
and to me it appears, that the obedience was rather a symptom of
the subjection of the nation, and that with a judicious mixture of
mildness and severity perfect submission would have followed if
England had not kept the war alive.
On the other hand the weakness and anarchy of the Spaniards were
daily increasing, and the disputes, between the British general and
the Portuguese government, had arrived to such a height, that lord
Wellington, having drawn up powerful and clear statements of his
grievous situation, sent one to the Brazils and the other to his own
government, with a positive intimation that if an entirely new system
was not immediately adopted he would no longer attempt to carry on
the contest. Lord Wellesley, taking his stand upon this ground,
made strenuous exertions in both countries to prevent the ruin of
the cause; but lord Wellington, while expecting the benefit of his
brother’s interference, had to contend with the most surprising
difficulties, and to seek in his own personal resources for the means
of even defending Portugal. He had sent marshal Beresford to Lisbon,
immediately after Albuera, to superintend the reorganization and
restoration of the Portuguese forces, and Beresford had sent Mr. De
Lemos, an officer of his own staff, to the Brazils, to represent the
inconveniences arising from the interference of the regency in the
military affairs. On the other hand the Souzas sent one Vasconcellos,
who had been about the British head-quarters as their spy, to Rio
Janeiro, and thus the political intrigues became more complicated
than ever.
But with respect to the war Wellington had penetrated Napoleon’s
object, when he saw Marmont’s position in the valley of the Tagus;
he felt the full force of the emperor’s military reasoning, yet he
did not despair, if he could overcome the political obstacles, to
gain some advantage. He had now a powerful and experienced British
force under his command, the different departments and the staff of
the army were every day becoming more skilful and ready, and he had
also seen enough of his adversaries to estimate their powers. The
king he knew to be no general, and discontented with the marshals;
Soult he had found able and vast in his plans, but too cautious in
their execution; Marmont, with considerable vigour, had already shown
some rashness in the manner he had pushed Reynier’s division forward,
after passing the Tagus, and it was, therefore, easy to conceive
that no very strict concert would be maintained in their combined
operations.
Lord Wellington had also established some good channels of
information. He had a number of spies amongst the Spaniards who
were living within the French lines; a British officer in disguise,
constantly visited the French armies in the field; a Spanish
state-counsellor, living at the head-quarters of the first corps,
gave intelligence from that side, and a guitar-player of celebrity,
named Fuentes, repeatedly making his way to Madrid, brought advice
from thence. Mr. Stuart, under cover of vessels licensed to fetch
corn for France, kept _chasse marées_ constantly plying along the
Biscay coast, by which he not only acquired direct information, but
facilitated the transmission of intelligence from the land spies,
amongst whom the most remarkable was a cobbler, living in a little
hutch at the end of the bridge of Irun. This man while plying his
trade, continued for years, without being suspected, to count every
French soldier, that passed in or out of Spain by that passage, and
transmitted their numbers by the _chasse marées_ to Lisbon.
With the exception of the state spy at Victor’s head-quarters, who
being a double traitor was infamous, all the persons thus employed
were very meritorious. The greater number, and the cleverest also,
were Spanish gentlemen, alcaldes, or poor men, who disdaining rewards
and disregarding danger, acted from a pure spirit of patriotism, and
are to be lauded alike for their boldness, their talent, and their
virtue. Many are dead. Fuentes was drowned in passing a river, on
one of his expeditions; and the alcalde of Caceres, a man, of the
clearest courage and patriotism, who expended his own property in the
cause, and spurned at remuneration, was on Ferdinand’s restoration
cast into a dungeon, where he perished; a victim to the unbounded
ingratitude and baseness of the monarch he had served so well!
With such means lord Wellington did not despair of baffling the deep
policy of the emperor in the field. He thought that the saying of
Henry the Fourth of France, that “_large armies would starve and
small ones be beaten in Spain_,” was still applicable. He felt that
a solid possession of Portugal and her resources, which, through his
brother’s aid, he hoped to have, would enable him either to strike
partial blows against the French, or oblige them to concentrate in
large masses, which, confident in his own martial genius he felt he
could hold in check, while the Spaniards ruined the small posts,
and disorganized the civil administrations in their rear. Hitherto,
indeed, the Spaniards had not made any such efforts except by the
partidas, which were insufficient; but time, his own remonstrances,
and the palpable advantages of the system, he trusted would yet
teach them what to do.
Having deeply meditated upon these matters and received his
reinforcements from England, he resolved to leave Hill with ten
thousand infantry, a division of cavalry, and four brigades of
artillery, about Portalegre, Villa Viciosa, and Estremos. From these
rich towns which were beyond the influence of the Guadiana fever, the
troops could rapidly concentrate either for an advance or retreat;
and the latter was secured upon Abrantes, or upon the communications
with Beira, by Niza, and Vilha Velha, where a permanent boat-bridge
had now been established. The front was protected by Elvas,
Jerumenha, Campo Mayor, and Ouguella; and Castaños also remained in
Estremadura with the fifth army, which by the return of the cavalry
from Ayamonte and the formation of Downie’s legion now amounted to
about a thousand infantry and nine hundred horse. This force placed
on the side of Montijo, had Albuquerque and Valencia de Alcantara
as posts of support, and a retreat either by the fords of the Tagus
near the bridge of Alcantara, or upon Portugal by Marvão and Castello
de Vide. Hill’s position was thus so well covered, that he could
not be surprised, nor even pressed except by a very strong army;
and he was always on the watch as we shall hereafter find, to make
incursions against the division of the fifth corps, which remained
in Estremadura. The rest of the army was then placed in quarters of
refreshment at Castello de Vide, Marvão and other places near the
Tagus, partly to avoid the Guadiana fever, partly to meet Marmont’s
movement to that river.
When this disposition was made, the English general arranged his
other measures of offence. The conduct of the Portuguese government
and the new positions of the French armies had, as Napoleon had
foreseen, left him no means of undertaking any sustained operation;
but, as he was ignorant of the great strength of the army of the
north, he hoped to find an opportunity of taking Ciudad Rodrigo
before Marmont could come to its assistance. For this purpose he had
caused a fine train of iron battering guns, and mortars, together
with a reinforcement of British artillery-men, which had arrived at
Lisbon from England, to be shipped in large vessels, and then with
some ostentation made them sail as it were for Cadiz; at sea they
were however shifted on board small craft, and while the original
vessels actually arrived at Cadiz and Gibraltar, the guns were
secretly brought first to Oporto and then in boats to Lamego. During
this process, several engineer, artillery, and commissariat officers,
were sent to meet and transport these guns, and the necessary stores
for a siege, to Villaponte near Celerico; and as one of the principal
magazines of the army was at Lamego, and a constant intercourse was
kept up between it and Celerico, another great depôt, the arrival,
and passage of the guns and stores to their destination was not
likely to attract the attention of the French spies.
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
Other combinations were also employed, both to deceive the enemy and
to prepare the means for a sudden attack, before the troops commenced
their march for Beira; but the hiding of such extensive preparations
from the French would have been scarcely possible, if the personal
hatred borne to the invaders by the peninsulars, combined with the
latter’s peculiar subtlety of character, had not prevented any
information spreading abroad, beyond the fact that artillery had
arrived at Oporto. The operation of bringing sixty-eight huge guns,
with proportionate stores, across nearly fifty miles of mountain, was
however one of no mean magnitude; five thousand draft bullocks were
required for the train alone, and above a thousand militia were for
several weeks employed merely to repair the road.
[Sidenote: General Harvey’s Journal.]
The allies broke up from the Caya the 21st of July, and they had
received considerable reinforcements, especially in cavalry, but
they were sickly and required a change of cantonments; hence when
an intercepted despatch gave reason to believe that Ciudad Rodrigo
was in want of provisions, Wellington suddenly crossed the Tagus
at Vilha Velha, and marched in the beginning of August by Castello
Branco and Penamacor towards Rodrigo, hoping to surprise it in a
starving state, but giving out that his movement was for the sake of
healthy quarters. His movement was unmolested save by some French
dragoons, from the side of Placentia, who captured a convoy of
seventy mules loaded with wine near Pedrogoa, and getting drunk with
their booty attacked some Portuguese infantry, who repulsed them
and recovered the mules; but there were other ostensible objects
besides the obvious one of removing from the well-known pestilence
of the Guadiana, which contributed to blind the French as to the
secret motives of the English general. We have seen that Dorsenne was
menacing Gallicia, and that Soult was in full operation against the
Murcians; it was supposed that he intended to invade Murcia itself,
and therefore the march of the allies had the double object, of
saving Gallicia, by menacing the rear of the invading army; and of
relieving Murcia by forcing Marmont to look after Ciudad Rodrigo,
and thus draw him away from the support of Soult, who would not, it
was supposed, then quit Andalusia.
[Sidenote: General Walker’s Correspondence, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Abadia’s ditto, MSS.]
[Sidenote: Appendix, No. V. Section 1.]
Gallicia was meanwhile in great danger, for the Partidas of the north
had been vigorously repressed by Caffarelli and Reille, which enabled
Dorsenne to collect about twenty thousand men on the Esla. Abadia,
who had succeeded Santocildes, was posted with about seven thousand
disciplined men behind this river, and he had a reserve of fifteen
hundred at Foncebadon; but he could make no head, for to this number
the Gallician army had again dwindled, and these were starving. The
25th the French, having passed the river in four columns, made a
concentric march upon Astorga. Abadia, whose rear-guard sustained a
sharp conflict near La Baneza, retreated, precisely by the same line
as sir John Moore had done in 1809, and with about the same relative
proportion of force; but as he only took the Foncebadon road and
did not use the same diligence and skill as that general, the enemy
forestalling him by Manzanal and Bembibre, cut him off from Villa
Franca del Bierzo and from the road to Lugo, and on the 27th drove
him into the Val des Orres. During this operation the division of the
army of the north, which Bessieres had sent with the convoy to Ciudad
Rodrigo, entered that place and returned to Salamanca.
[Sidenote: Sir H. Douglas’s Correspondence, MSS.]
The Spanish general having thus lost his line of communication with
Lugo, and the few stores he possessed at Villa Franca, took post
at Domingo Flores in the Val des Orres, where he entered a strong
country, and, under the worst circumstances, could retire upon
Portugal and save his troops if not his province. But his army which
was in the utmost distress before, for shoes and clothing, was now
ready to disband from misery, and the consternation in Gallicia was
excessive. That province torn by faction, stood helpless before the
invader, who could, and would, have taken both Coruña and Ferrol, but
for the sudden arrival of the allies on the Coa, which obliged him,
for his own safety, to return to the plains. Souham, also, who was
coming from Burgos, by forced marches, to support Dorsenne, halted at
Rio Seco, and Abadia did not fail to ascribe all this to the loss he
had inflicted, but his vanity was laughed at.
To have thus saved Gallicia was a great thing. That kingdom was
the base of all the operations against the line of communication
with France; from thence went forth, those British squadrons which
nourished the guerilla warfare in Biscay, in the Montaña, in Navarre,
in the Rioja, and the Asturias; it was the chief resource for the
supply of cattle to the allied army, it was the outwork of Portugal,
and honestly and vigorously governed, would have been more important
than Catalonia. But like the rest of Spain it was always weak from
disorders, and, if the allies had remained in Alemtejo, there was
nothing to prevent Dorsenne from conquering it; for though he should
not have taken Ferrol and Coruña, the points of St. Jago, Lugo, Villa
Franca, and Orense would have given him an entire command of the
interior, and the Spaniards holding the ports only would not have
been able to dislodge him.
[Sidenote: 1811. August.]
Lord Wellington arrived upon the Coa about the 8th of August,
intending, as I have said, first a close blockade of Ciudad Rodrigo,
and finally a siege; it was however soon known that the French had
on the 6th supplied the place for two months, and the first part
of the design was therefore relinquished. The troops were then
quartered near the sources of the Coa and Agueda, close to the line
of communication between Marmont and Dorsenne, and in a country where
there was still some corn. If the enemy advanced in superior numbers,
the army could retire through a strong country to a position of
battle near Sabugal, whence the communication with Hill was direct.
Nor was the rest of Beira left unprotected, because the French would
have exposed their left flank, by any advance in the direction of
Almeida, and the allies could, by Guarda, send detachments to the
valley of the Mondego in time to secure the magazines at Celerico.
The line of supply from Lamego along which the battering-train was
now moving, was however rather exposed.
While the army was in this position, the preparations for the siege
went on briskly, until Wellington learned, contrary to his former
belief, that the disposable force of the army of the north, was above
twenty thousand good troops; and consequently, that Ciudad Rodrigo
could not be attacked in face of that corps, and of Marmont’s army.
Then changing his plan, he resolved to blockade the place, and wait
for some opportunity to strike a sudden blow, either against the
fortress, or against the enemy’s troops; for it was the foundation
of his hopes, that as the French could not long remain in masses,
for want of provisions, and that he could check those masses on the
frontier of Portugal, so he could always force them to concentrate,
or suffer the loss of some important post. But it is worthy of
observation, that his plans were based on calculations which did not
comprise the Gallician army. He had no expectation that it would
act at all, or if it did, that it would act effectually. It had no
cavalry, and the infantry being undisciplined dared not enter the
plains in face of the enemy’s horsemen; yet this was in August 1811,
and Gallicia had not seen the face of an enemy since June 1809!
Early in September, Marmont, pushing a detachment from Placencia
through the passes, surprised a British cavalry piquet, at St. Martin
de Trebejo, and opened his communications with Dorsenne. Nevertheless
lord Wellington formed the blockade. His head-quarters were fixed at
Guinaldo, the fifth division was placed at Perales, in observation
of Marmont, and the first division, now commanded by general Graham,
occupied Penamacor. A battery of artillery, was withdrawn from
Hill, and three brigades of that general’s corps, reinforced by a
Portuguese regiment, passed the Tagus, and were placed on the Ponçul,
in advance of Castello Branco, to protect the magazines on that
line of communication. Meanwhile the battering-train was collected
at Villa de Ponte, the troops were employed to prepare gabions and
fascines, and the engineers instructed two hundred men of the line,
in the duties of sappers. The bridge over the Coa at Almeida which
had been broken by Massena, was permanently repaired, and the works
of Almeida itself, were ordered to be once more restored to form a
place of arms for the battering-train and stores; Carlos d’España
came also to Leon to form a new army under the protection of the
allies, but he was without officers, arms, money, or stores, and his
force was a mere name.